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SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR URBAN WARFARE

John C. Scharfen, et al

Stanford Research InstituteMenlo Park, California

December 1975

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Technical Note Ducembe 1975SSC-TN-2M2-16 Final

SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE

FOR URBAN WARFARELCC

By: JOHN C. SCHARFEN

MICHAEL J. DEANE

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SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINEFOR URBAN WARFARE

STANFORD By: JOHN C. SCHARFEN MICHAEL J. DEANE

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I. SUPPt.EOU5TARY NOTES

IS. MEV 0onos (C.,emb an ..... ,. .* -,if n..ee mu, Ivmi.6 bl, .ck einb)

TACTICAL WARFARE MILITARY STRATEGYWARFARE USSRURBAN ENVIRONMENTSMILITARY FORCES (FOREIGN)

2 AGSIWACT (Cmw.Euwso u..win eld If neeegoodp o fdS.IIIt by Woek 0006w

This is a study which analyzes the Soviet tactical doctrine for urban warfare.The study was conducted in two parts. The first part was devoted to anextensive research into extant, open source Soviet literature. The secondpart was devoted to continuing research, an analysis and report of findings.This report is based or. the second part of the study.

DO ,o'j, IM7 amnow r now, sor.is oesotg-AN, * 1 UNCLASSIFIED

ABSTRACT

This is a study which awlyzes the Soviet tactical doctrine for urban

warfare. The study was conducted in tvo parts. The first part was devoted

to an extensive research into extant, open source Soviet literature. The

second part was devoted to continuing research, an analysis and report of

findings. This report is based on the second part of the study.

DISCLAIMR

The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of

the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing

the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency or the U.S. Government.

CONTRACTUAL TASK

This Techvical Note ie in partial fulfillment of research under

Contract DAftC15-73-C-0380, ARPA Orler No. 2520, SR1 Project 2625-600.

FORMOLRD

This ix a Strategic Studies Center, Stanford Research Institute Report

of study results on Soviet Tactical Doctrine for Urban Warfare.

Tit overall study, which was conducted in two parts, was made under

the general supervision of Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic

Studies Center, and N. Hark Earle, Jr., Senior Economist and Assistant

Director. This report covers the second, analytical portion of the ef-

fort. Initially the project was undertaken by Mr. Jams T. Reitz, Senior

Soviet Area Specialist. Subsequently the project leadership was assumed

by Mr. John C. Scharfen, Senior Operations Analyst, and was researched/

authored by the interdisciplinary team of Mr. Scharfen and Dr. Michael

J. Dean*, a Soviet Area Specialist. Valuable assistance was provided by

Mr. Gerald Sullivan and LTC Ray N. Franklin, USMC, of the Advanced Research

Projects Agency, Lt. Gen. Julian J. Evell, USA (Ret.), (Consultant), Mr.

George Schecter (author of "Advanced Firepower Concepts for Military Oper-

ations in Built-Up Areas," a reference source document), and Gail Patelcuis,

Research Assistant.

Richu,-' B. FosterDirector

Strategic Studies Center

preceding Page Blanyl

V

PREFACE

in 1700, Charles XII of Sweden, with a highly disciplined army of

8,500, thoroughly routed a numerically superiot but tactically primitive

Russian army of 45,000, guining down the fleeing Russians like "wild

gees*."' Nine years later, the erratic Charles, allied with the Cosack

hetma, Mezeppa, led an army of about 24,000 against the fortified town

of Poltava. 2

Tsar Peter marched to relieve the garrison with a refurbished, well-

trained army of 50,000 to 60,000 men equipped with 120 artillery pieces..

Both leaders foresaw the significance of the battle: that it would be de-

cisive, and that it would determine not only the outcome of Charles' cam-

:aivn but the long-term future of their states as vail."

The battle, lasting several days, was fought courageously on both

sides. The Russia generals had innovated a new tactic of employing well-

trained, highly selective outposts in front of a main line of reoistance.

The 9weden exhausted themselves against the Russian defenses. 5 In an at-

tempt to outflank the defenders the left wing of the Swedish maneuver ale-

ments were encircled by the Russians. Peter's infantry and cavalry, supported

Richard Pipes (quoting Charles XII), Russia Lnder the Old Regime, p. 120

(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1974).

4 Charles had originally left Saxony with 43,000 well-disciplined, well-equipped troops, The campaign into the Ukraine seriously depleted hisforces as Peter laid waste the area and as Mezeppa failed to producethe Cossack support which Charles hoped to secure.Lynn Montross, War fhrousth the Ages, p. 372 (Harper and Brothers, NewYork, 3rd Edition 1963).

""Sir Edward S. Creasy, The Fifteen Decisive Battles of tha World, p. 298(J. M, Dent and Sons Ltd., New York, A851).

Moncross, p. 372.

vii

Preceding Page Blank

by their vastly superior artillery, routed the Swedes and their allies driv-

ing them back into a confluence of rivers where the wounded, litter-borne

Charles, with only a few hundred remmiinin troops, escaped into Turkey.

Peter wrote of the significance of hie victory& "Now by God's help, are

the foundations of Petersburg securely laid for all ties."l

This battle for a fortified town proved to be a turning point in Rus-

sian history. Poltava marked the ergence of Russia as the dominant power

of Northern Europe:

Few battles have had such far-reaching results, foron that June day in 1709 a new European war powercame into being as an old one declined.2

It seem prophetic that this watershed in Russian history should oc-

cur in the battle for a fortified city, for the history which follows is

punctuated with epic events of equally historic defenses at Sebastopol,

Stalingrad and Leningrad and the capture of Berlin. Because of these

historical precedents and faced with the growing urbanization of Central

Europe, the Soviet soldier has been conditioned to take urban warfare

merioualy. This work is dedicated to the conviction that NATu allies,

to successfully defend in Europe, must understand the Soviet tactics for

fighting for and within cities.

I.

J.F.C. Fuller, Decisive Battles: Their In'€luence Upon History and

Civilization, p. 425 (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940).2 Montrops, p. 372.

viii

MIN

This DocumentReproduced From

Best Available CopyCONTENTS

ABST1CACr . . . . . . ................. . . ... . ..

PREFACE . . . .. ... .... .. .. ... . . . . . . . vii

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............ x.

SUIMMARY . ............ . ............ . . . . . 1

A. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . .. 1B. Approach . . . .......... . . . . . . . . . . 1C. The Significance of Cities. ........ ............... 2

D. Conclusions . . . . . . . . ............... 4

E. Major Items to iote ...................... 7

1 INTRODUCTION ... ................. . . . . . . . 11

A. Urban Grovth ...... ...................... 11

B. Soviet Viers . . . . . ................. 14

C. Strategic Views . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 19

D. The Nature or Urban Warfare .. .......... . 22

I1 SOVIET MILITARY TACTICS: AN OVERVIEW . . ... ......... .... 27

A. Soviet Strategy, Operational Art, and Tactics ..... .. 27

B. Soviet Approach to Tactics ....... . ........... . 28

C. Principles &-i Form of Tactical Warfare ........ . 34

1. The Meeting Engagement ...... .............. ... 342. The Offensive ................ ......... 383. Defense .... . . . . . . ....... 424. The Wichdrawal ............... .................. 45

III SOVIET COMBAT TRAINING FOR URBAN WARFARE ....... .......... 47

A. Soviet Emphasis on Importance of Combat Training . . . 47

B. Soviet Urban Warfare Training .... ............ .... 51

I. Training Fiald No. I ....... .............. ... 512. Training Field No. 2 ... ............... 513. Training Field No. 3. .. ........................... 534. Training Field No. 4 . .............. 545. Training Field No. 5 ...... ............... ... 56

ix

III SOVIET COMBAT TRAINING FOR UR.U WARFARE (Continued)

6. Traiinng Feld No. 6 .... ........*.. 587. Traininp Field No. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608. Training Field No. 8 ............... 62

G. Sunmrt7. . . . .. . . . . . . 63'

IV SOVIET TACTICAL DOC17RJEE FOR URBAN WARFARE . . . . . . . . . 65

1. Soviet Guidelines of General Application in UrbanWarfare . . . . . . * . . . . . . .* o e e . o 66

a. Conduct of the Attack and Defense .. .. . . 67b. Task Organization . . . . . . . . . .. .. . 76c. Water Obstacles ................... 79d. Night Operations . . . . . .. ... . . .. 81

2. Soviet Guidelines for the Infant rymn in UrbanWarfare . . . . . . . . . . . . .. * .. . . .. 82

a. Missions, Objectives and Sectors . . .@. . . 83b. Formations and Positions . . . . . *. .. 86c. Maneuver * . . . . . . . * .. * * . * 93d. Arm and Lquipment . . . . . . . . . . . .. 97e. louse and Street Fighting .......... 102f. Pursuit ........ ............. ... .. 108g. Consolidation.... . . . . . . . *. . 108

3. Soviet Guidelines for the Engineer in Urban Warfare 109

4. Soviet Guidelines for Chemical and RadiationSpecialists . . . 0 a ..a. . . . ..&. . . . .&. 120

5. Soviet Guidelines for the Logistician . . . . . . 122

6. Soviet Guidelines for the ArtIlleryman . . . . .. 125

7. Soviet Guidelines for the Employment of Aviationand Anti-Aircraft Forces ................. e 132

8. Soviet Guidelines for Armor and Antitank Forces . 135

9. Soviet Guidelines for Signal Comunications . . . 142

10. Soviet Guidelines for Reconnaissance Forces . . . 143

Footnotes .. .. .. .. .. *.. .. .. .. .. .... 1.51

This DocumentReproduc From

BeSt Available Copy

x

This DocumentReproduced From

Best Available Copy

LIST OF TABLEs

1 Dynamics of City Population by Main Regions of the WorldFrom 1920-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . # . a 12

2 Big City Growth in the USSR .... ................ . 13

3 Big City Growth in Selected NATU Countries ..... ......... 15

4 Urban Agglomrate Growth in Selected MATO Countries . . .. 17

5 East European Population Density Estimates ..... .......... 18

xi

SUMMARY

A. Background

The overall objective of this study was to conduct an extensive re-

view of the Soviet open literature and, consequentially, to report on Soviet

tactical doctrine and training for urban warfare.

Urban varfare is defined, for this purpose, as combat operations by

and against regular military forces in cities. The definition includes

both nuclear and nonnuclear combat. It includes the types of combat re-

ferred to in U.S. military publications as "combat in built-up areas,"

"city fighting," "street fighting" and "house-to-house fighting."' The

definition focuses upon the city rather than the town or village which

i'-iies mult..storied structures, paved thorougnfares, modern comunications

facilities, underground passages, factories, etc. The definition does not

include terrorist and gueirilla operations as principal considerations.

B. Approach

The study is concentrated upon Soviet tactical doctrine and training

although there are references to strategic considerations for background

and to U.S. doctrine largely for the purposes of comparison. Because the

study is oriented toward the Soviet approach to urban warfare it also

focuses upon potential combat in Central Europe, a principal area of con-

cern for both the NATO and Pact nations.

1 For example, see Department of the Arm Field Manual, "Combat in Forti-

fied and Built-Up Areas," FM 31-50 (March 1964).

C. The Significance of Cities

The Central Region of Europe has long been the focus of concern for

U.S. planners for it constitutes the frontier of the NATO-Warsaw Pact con-

frontation and has been considered the most critical area for defense

against potential Pact aggression. It is here in the Central Region of

Europe that there is the greatest potential for major combat action for

and in cities.

Most popular scenarios 2 of a Warsaw Pact-NATO war portray a blitzkrieg

attack by the Soviets across the Northern European plains, the classic

East-West invasion route. Until recently, Northern Germany was principally

rural with a relatively low population density. In 1972 the Yederal Republic

of Germany (FRG) had a population of 59.6 million in an area of 95,727 square

miles for a density-per-square-vile figure of 620.8. The FRG population den-

sity is 10 times that of th~e United States and ranks second only to Japan

in this respect among the 26 most populous countries in the world. Tue an-

nual increase in population in the FRG over the 1963-70 period was 1.0 per-

cent, a relatively small growth rate but still larger than that of France,

Italy or the United Kingdom. Given a straight line population increase of

one percent to 1995, and all other variables remaining constant, the popula-

tion density of West Germany vouid be 483.5 persons per square mile, which

For a uetailed terrain analysis of Central Europe which gives special

attention to build-up areas and their impact on mobility see TerrainAnalysis Center, U.S. Army Engineer Topographic Laboratories, Phase I

Study, Built-Up Areas and Structured Landscapes, FRG. The StrategicView (June 1975).

2 For example, the Martin-Marietta Corporation has developed the "Bar-

barossa" scenario to demonstrate a Soviet blitzkrieg assault againstCentral Europe.

2

exceeds the contemporary populatiun density of Japan. The bulk of the FRG

population is urban and is becoiing more so. About 20 percent of the popu-

lace currently live in the 11 largest cities of the state, end three of tho

cities have populations of more than 1 million. '

Major General Stanier, Commanding General of the British lt Division

of the British Army of the Rhine (which will have a lion's share of the re-

sponsibility for defending the North German plains against a Warsav Pact

blitzkrieg attack), has provided an excellent aralysis of the problem cities

can pcse to the military tactician and strategist.

It is an easy misconception to think of the North GermanPlain as a vast billiard table of agricti. •ural land, in-tersected here and there by great rivers and a certainamount of forest land. That was indeed how it looked atthe end of the last war. Today, however, things arechanagln fast. There can be very few countries in theworld where industry and housing is developing so quickly.The great cities of Hamburg, Hanover, Bremen, Braunschveig,Kassel and G;ttingen, to name but a few, are growingenormously all the time. It has been estimated thatduring the 1980s many of these great urbanisations arein fact going to link up with each other, giving thestrategist a totally different problem to face, letalone the tactician.

2

The foregoing passage derived from John C. Scharfen, "Defense Planning

Guidelines," Appendix A to Ronald C. Wakeford and William C. Perry,"Defense RDT&E Planning and Strategy Parameters: Methodological Con-sideration," SSC-TN-2358-1, SRI/Strategic Studies Center, p. 134(December 1974).

2 Major General J. W. Stavier, M.B.E., remarks during the conduct of a

seminar held at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studieson 26 March 1975, "A Conventional Strategy for the Central Front inNATO" as reported in USAF Current News Special Edition, No. 32, p. 13(26 August 1975).

3

Stanier points out the problems of modern cities In war without elec-

tricity required for hospitals, refrigeration, transportation, commanica-

tions, "ewage, water and other essential services, He describes refugees

Jamming thoroughfares not with carts and wagons but with Opals, Mercecds

and Porsches. He asks, but does not atteept to answer the question:

What will the attacker do about the cities? Will hetry to by-pass then in order to speed up his arrivalat his final objectives, whatever they way be, or willhe use their streets as a safe concentration area forhis reserve forces where he can be sure that no Alliednuclear weapons will be directed? This is a very dif-ficult problem, rapidly coming home to roost.'

D. Conclusions

Based on, this research and analysis of Soviet literature, the follow-

ing conclusions are offered concerning Soviet tactical doctrine for urban

warfare.

1. General considerations.

" Fighting in cities is neither a preferred tactic nor strategyfor the Soviet armed forces. Soviet tactical doctrine, in thebroadest sense, provides that if possible, the attack or de-fense of cities is to be avoided in warfare.

" The Soviets recognize that the growth of the urban populationin the cities of Europe and the consequent expansion of built-upareas my make urban warfare an unavoidable contingency in aNATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and they therefore afford it highpriority.

" The capture and defense of cities have been particularly signi-ficant in Russian history from the battles of Poltava toStalingrad, Berlin, and Prague.

" The Soviet soldier has proven to be effective, resourceful,tenacious and innovative in urban operations from the battlesof World War II to Budapest, Berlin and Prague in the post-war era.

1 Major General J. W. Stanier, p. 13.

4

9 If a city cannot be bypassed, the preferred method of attackis either directly "from the march" or following an encircle-ment of the city.

s In the attack "from the march" great emphasis is given tospeed and to traing the city by storm, rapidly bypassing andisoating pockets of enemy resistance rather than a block-by-block, section-by-section, methodical advance.

"* If an attack "from the march" should fail to seize a cityquickly, the most important objectives are seized and thecity is blockaded and taken under siege.

"e Urban warfare may be conducted with or without the employmentof nuclear or chemical weapons although the Soviets emphasizethe integrity, flexibility and duality of tactical conceptsand that future wars will entail nuclear, chemical and con-ventional operations.

" From the materials reviewed in this study, Soviet treatment ofeMloyment of nuclear weapons in urban warfare is judged to besuperficial and in a one-dimensional view of a single Sovietattack rather than a maltiple exchange of weapons betweenadversaries.

2. Soviet urban tactics emphasize:

"e Small unit tactics

"* Task organization for combat

"e Uniqueness of each urban ccobat situation

"e Tank-infantry team cooperation

"e Antitank operations to include the destruction of supportinginfantry

"e Direct-lay fire of artillery

"* Wall breaching by direct fire weapons and engineer personnel

"e The role of the sapper

"* The top-down assault of a building where feasible

* Isolation of objectives (buildings/strongpoints) in the attack

Employment of automatic individual arms and grenades

5

* The use of smoke and darkess to conceal movement

0 Continuity of operations through the ful 24-bour daily cycle

* Realistic training in urban area mockups with as much realisma possible

* Thorough mativation and psychological preparation for cityfighting

* The rapid crossing of water obstacles

3. Relatively little emphasis was found in this research on Sovietconcern for or interest in:

"e The difficulties of operating in an urban nuclear environment(asse casualty evacuations, pestilence, extensive contamina-tion, blast-effects of rubble, etc.)

" Employment of fixed wing air support to include precisionguided weaponry

"e Remotely piloted vehicles

"e Use of the helicopter for attack, communication or logisticsupport

"e Shoulder fired antiaircraft missiles

"a Employment of unattended ground sensors

"s Bloymsnt of off route mines.

4. There appear to be more similarities than differences betweenthe U.S. and USSR approaches to and experience In urban warfare.The more explicit differences are:

"e The Sovieta appear to place greater emphasis upon the use ofnuclear weapons in the city

"• The Soviets appear to have lass concern for the implicationsof exposing a flank to a bypassed city

"e The Soviets appear to give less attention to the employmentof snipers than is found in U.S. tactical wmnuals

"e The Soviets appear to give more attention to the use ofarmor and artillery in the reduction of urban defenses

6

"* The city has &reater historical significance relative to theSoviet military with a strong identification with epicbattles such as Poltava, Stalingrad, Lanisgrad and Berlin

" While past Soviet experiences In urban warfare have been quit.!dramatic, recnt experience is limited to the Berlin, Budapestand Prague operations while the United States forces have en-gaged in active operations in Seoul, Hue, Santo Domingo andKonttm

" The Soviets appear to give more emphasis to the use of chemicalaanitions.

1

Z. ,Maor Items to Note

It is unusual when one finds an article in a Western military jour-

nal on the subject of urban warfare. One of the objectives in initiating

this study effort was to determine if the Soviet literature reflected equal,

greater or less interest in this facet of combat. Without embarking upon

a detailed not assessment between Western and Soviet literature, it soon

became obvious from this review that the Soviets devoted far more space

in their publications to urban warfare than did Western writers. Our

literature survey focused upon the period 1967-74 although the review un-

covered relevant materials published as far back as the World War II era.

There were 365 Russian and English language documents which were found to

have particular value for this effort. Of the 365 items used in the survey,

60 or more provided sufficient detail on Soviet tactics to formulate a

fairly comprehensive view of their approach to urban combat. Of the 365

sources, 220 were in the origir.4l Russian while 145 had already been trans-

lated into English. About 275 of the sources were oriented to offensive

urban war while 190 focused upon defensive actions. About 245 concerned

This statement does accurately reflect the research of this study. However,

the number of references in Soviet literature to chemical warfare in anurban environment is much less than what one finds in more general litera-ture on strategy and tactics.

7

y!

historical events while 95 dealt with mors contemporary ;roblem. Sam

of the material dealt with both. 1 The Soviet Uteratu-e collected for

this search covered a broad spectrum of detail from strategic to tactical

concepts at the army level to the tactics of the individual Soviet rifle-

man, eginear, artilleryman, at. al.

If there appears to be small concern for the ranifications of urban

warfare in Western writings it can hardly be laid to a lack of attention

in popular Soviet military journals. There are sufficient research mate-rials available in open and classified sources to develop detailed eati-

mates and reports on how the Soviets would employ their units in combat

in cities today and in the near future.' In Chapter IV of this study is

a preliminary effort on an approach to generate such reports. It will be

noted that Chapter IV provides brief analyses and pertinent citations ofSoviet writings on urban warfare categorized by separate arms of the ser-

vice. This material assembled in the study archives are sufficiently rich

in substantive detail to warrant further study. It would be particularly

valuable if this =ncyclopaedic resource was further developed to generate

separate tactical handbooks on how Soviet infantrymen, artillerymen, en-

gineers, etc., plan to fight in cities. Such a method of presentation

should be instructive for U.S. personnel, not only from the standpoint

of acquiring knowledge of a potential adversary but for comparing and

assessing U.S. doctrine and technicues as well.

One measure of Soviet concern for urban warfare can be found in the

rather extensive training facilities which are devoted to preparing Soviet

forces for fighting in cities. Chapter III is devoted to a description

of these facilities. Eight training fields are described, each field

A more detailed report on this literature search may be found in the

publication: James T. Reitz, "A Review of Soviet Tactical Literature,"SSC-TN-2625-4, Part I, p. 14, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (October1974) CONFIDENTIAL.

2 Ibid.

/

meticulously prepared to replicate some condition or conditions which may

be found in city warfare. One of the fields is two kilometers deep, has

maltistoried structures and underground shelters. One sourcel describes

in some detail the roquisites of an ideal structure within an urban com-

bat training area which would ropresent in great detail the varied condi-

tions an assault force would meet in a built-up area. According to the

author, the structure should include, in its several stories, one floor

with several rooms emptying into a corridor, the building should have a

basement, Lhere should be a stone fence surrounding the structure and

there shottld be a second building in the near proximity.

Another training area, in a military engineer school, is divided into

three special sectors. One is devoted to reconnaissance and obstacle

breaching, another to contaminated areas and mined obstacles, and the

third to populated areas.

The single best indicator as to whether or not a national military

force takes urban warfare seriously is the degree to which they appear

willing to expend assets of time and material on training and training

facilities. This survey would indicate that the Soviet military forces

do indeed devote considerable resources to such endeavors. There is sub-

stantial evidence to be found in Soviet writings that the Soviets are con-

cerned with urban warfare. The evidence is confirmed and reinforced by

the attention they devote to training in urban tactics.

Colonel A. Romanenko, "Combat of a Motorized-Rifle Platoon in a City,"Voyenny Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 40-44 (December 1969).

9

I .INTRODUCTION

A. Urban Growth

The increase in urbanization in the USSR itself, and more gradual

increases in already heavily urbanized Western Europe since World War 11,

are impottant factors which keep urban conflict very much In the minds

of Soviet military writers (and probably military planners). According

to the 1972 edition of the Nstion&. EcVoM (Narodnoye Khozyalstvo), Sta-

tistika Press. Moscow, 1972, the Soviet urban population in 1940 was Just

over 63 million, forming about a third of the population. By 1972, this

figure had climbed to nearly 144 %illion or nearly 60 percent of the popu-

lation.

Soviet writers are equally aware of urbanization trends in other

areas of the world as indicated by Table I translated below from a re-

cent Russian-language publication.

Pravda reports, "In the Russian Federation alone. thr number of cities

with populations of more than 200,000 doubled within 25 years."' Table 2

demonstrates the Soviet growth from 1959 to 1974. Soviet literature indi-

cates that during this 15-year pariod the Soviet Union's urban population

throughout the country increased by 50 percent. The increase was not pri-

marily due to favorable birth and death ratios but, rather, to migration

from rural areas. The trends, of course, are not irreversible. The USSR

is making a concentrated effort to limit the growth of cities. Neverthe-

less, the increased concentration of populatlin in cities, which is visi-

ble in 1975, will probably continue even though the rate may be slowed. 2

1 A. Libkind, Pravda p. 3 (5 August 1975).2 Victor Perevedentsev in Literaturnaya Gazeta (30 April 1975).

11

Prceding page blank

Table 1

DYNMICS 01 CjrY POPU.IATION BY MAIN IN IONSor To wom nm 192o-2000'

1920 1940 1960 1980 2000

*a P• C

USSR 60 32 105 49 190 18 300 85

Europe (-USSR) 200 53 245 SR 310 65 375 71East Asia 85 13 180 21 325 31 520 40

Africa 20 11 50 18 350 25 750 35

Worth Ame~rica (USA & Canadn) 85 59 140 70 215 81 310 87Latti America 40 31 105 49 245 60 540 80

Australia & OCeani. 5 53 10 64 20 75 25 80

Eatlrt World 570 25 990 33 1780 46 3090 51

Euro: (U) From 1920-1960 estimated; from 1980-2000 projected. These

figures were determined by the Commission on Population of theEconomic and Social Councl of the UN.

nT. Tr . Urlands, ed., Population of the Countries of the World (Refer-

ence Book), p. 419 (Statistic Publishing House, Moscow, 1974).

12

Table 2

BIG CITY GROWTH IN THE USSR

Population Increae Over the(in T,,usand,, 15-Year Period

J1957 (In Tho..-nd-) Percent

MscoV 6,044 7,528 1,48,4 25

Lanin-rad 3,321 4,243 922 28

Kiev 1,110 1,887 777 70

Tashkent 927 1,552 625 67

Bku 968 1,359 391 40

Mar'kov 953 1,330 377 40

Gor'kiy 941 1,260 319 34

Novosibirsk 885 1,243 358 41

Kuybyshev 806 1,140 334 41

Sverdlovsk 779 1,122 343

N.unak 509 1,095 586 115

Total 17,243 23,759 6,516 38

Source: Perevedentsev In Litersturnaya Gazetj (30 April 1975).

13

Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate the pattern of big city growth In those

areas of Northern and Central Europe of principal concern. Generally,

the growth in built-up areas is most sa.riking in the eztemsion of suburbs

which is demonstrated in Table 4.

The population densities of the Soviet Union's Warsaw Pact allies are

displayed in Table 5. Note that the population density of East Germany at

408 persons per square mile is by far the largest of the Pact partners but

falls short of that for West Germany at the 621 mark.

B. Soviet Views

The importance of cities in the overall scheme of warfare has been

recognized and frequently commented upon by Soviet military writers. It

is pointed out in Soviet literature that in Central Europe ( a most

likely objective of a Soviet advance) there are numerous large cities.

For every 200 to 300 square kilometers of territory, will be found at

least one or two cities of 25.000 to 30,000 people, as well as numerous

other populated points. In soma highly developed economic regions, more-

over, these cities will have an area of several thousand square kilometers.

Consequently, one Soviet source has asserted that "under contemporary

conditions, combat aitivities in a city will be a frequent phenomanon"

and has estimated that "engaging in battle for the seizing of cities will

be held every 40 to 60 kilometers." 2

Guards General Major L. Kuznetsov, "The Offensive in a City," Voyennyy

Vestnik, No. 8, p. 36 (August 1969). See also €'coonel A. Sidorchuk,

"Combat Actions of Troops in the Seizure of Large Cities," Voyenno-

istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 10, p. 20 (October 1971).

2 General Hajor A. K. Shovkolovich, Colonel F. I. Konasov, and Colonel

S. I. Tkach, Boyevyye deystvi-a motostrelkovoio batal'ona v gorode

(Combat Activity of a Motorized-Rifle Battalion in a City), p. 5

(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1971).

14

Table 3

BIG CITY GROWlTH IN SELECTID NATO COUWTrIZS

Populationi Change Over The(Un ThousalEd) 15-Year Period

Country and CiLi 1959 1973 Percent

Brussels 170.4 103.72 -66.7 -39"Antwrp 260.7 217.3 -43.4 -174Liese 156.5 142.8 -13.7 - 9

Scbsarbeek 118.2 119.0' .8 1

Denmurks

Copewauge 942.1' 1299.0' 356.9 38Aarhus 118UA 245.6 127.2 107OdeWms 110.2 167.8 57.6 52

Wesa Geatvny

Aachen 165.0 239.6 74.6 45Augsburg 204.3 257.0 52.7 26loan 144.3 281.1 136.8 95Breon 546.1 589.8 43.7 8Bremerhaven 137.5 144.5 7.0 5Darmstadt 133.1 140.9 7.8 6Duisburg 500.4 441.5 -58.9 -12Dusseldorf 689.1 637.1 -52.0 - 8Essen 728.2 682.3 -45.9 - 6Frankfurt 651.7 667.5 15.8 2Freiburg 137.6 171.5 33.9 25Gelsenkirchen 391.1 339.8 -51.3 -13Hagen 190.0 197.9 7.9 4

Information for this table was calculated from data in the UN Demographic

Yearbook for 1962 and 1973 and from the Europa Yearbook for 1961 and 1975(Europa Publications Ltd., London).

2 1971 estimate for Brussels.

3 1970 figure for Schaarbeek.

""Increased in overall urban agglomerate (see Table 2).

s 1974 estimate for Denmark cities (Europa Yearbook 1975).

Includes Frederiksberg and Gentofte (from Europa Yearbook statistics).

15

Population Change Over The J(in ,Thousands) 15-Year Period

Country and City 1959 1973 (in Thousands) Percent

West Germany

Hamburg 1815.4 1766.2 -49.2 - 3lHannover 568.0 511.3 -56.7 -10Karlsruhe 232.8 263.5 30.7 13Kamsel 200.4 213.0 12.6 6Kiel 268.3 268.8 .5 0Koln 770.7 840.3 69.6 9Lubeck 231.5 237.7 6.2 3Ludvigshafen 158.2 174.3 16.1 10Mainz 128.2 181.1 52.9 41Mannheim 302.7 328.4 25.7 8?ulheim 180.A 191.8 11.4 6Hunich 1047.7 1338.9 291.2 28Munster 172.7 200.5 27.8 16Nuremburg 444.0 515.0 71.0 16Oldenburg 120.8 133.3 12.5 10Osnabruck 133.6 164.0 30.4 23Regensburg 123.0 133.5 10.5 9Remacheid 123.0 135.5 12.5 10Salzgitter 105.9 117.6 11.7 11Solingen 167.2 176.7 9.5 6Stuttgart 626.1 630.4 4.3 1Wilhelmshaven 99.6 104.3 4.7 5Wuppertal 418.5 413.2 -5.3 - 1Luxembourg 72.6 78.0 5.4 - 7

Netherlandsl

Amsterdam 871.0 799.8 -71.2 - 82

Apeldoorn 102.0 128.3 26.3 26Arnheime 123.7 130.5 6.8 5Breda 106.4 121.8 15.4 14Eindhoven 164.6 191.5 26.9 16Enschede 122.9 143.2 20.3 17Groningen 143.9 170.9 27.0 19Haarlem 169.1 171.4 2.3 1mijmegen 128.3 149.7 21.4 17Rotterdam 731.8 662.0 -69.8 _102

The Hague 606.3 517.9 -88.4 -15Tilberg 135.8 154.3 18.5 14Utrecht 252.9 272.2 19.3 8

Netherland cities are 1972 estimates from UN Demo&raphic Yearbook 1973.2 Increased in overall urban agglomerate (see Table 2).

16

Table 4

URBAN AGGLOMERATE GROWTH IN SILECTED NATO COUNTRIES 1

2 Change Over the 10-

Population2 to'-Cnf;• PeriodCountry and City (In Thousands) (In Thous•sds) Percent

1961 1971Belgium Estimate Estimate

Antverp 643.5 672.7 29.2 5Brussels 1019.5 1074.7 55.2 5Liege 448.2 440.4 -7.8 - 2

1960 1972Denmark Estimate Estimate

Copenhagen 1262.2 1362.2 100.0 8Aarhus 177.2 187.34 10.1 6Odense 129.8 133.04 3.2 2

1959 1972Netherlands Estimate Estimate

Amsterdam 917.5 1023.7 106.2 12Groningen 157.0 206.0 49.0 31HBarlem 215.0 238.6 23.6 11The Hague 728.1 697.9 -30.2 - 4Rotterdam 811.1 1059.6 248.5 31

I Source does not provide agglomerate data for the FRG.

2 Information calculated from data in United Nations Demographic Yearbook

of 1962 and 1973 (published in 1962 and 1974 respectively, New York).

3 5-year period." 1965 figure for Aarhus and Odense.

17

Table 5

EAST EJROPEAN POPULATION DENSITY ESTIMATES

1973 Area1973 Population (Thousands of 1973 Density

(1illions of People) Sq, Mile) (Perions Per Sq. Mile)

East Germany 17.0 41.6 408

Czechoslovakia 14.6 49.4 295

Hungary 10.4 35.9 290

Poland 33.4 120.6 277

Romania 20.9 91.7 228

Bulgaria 8.6 42.8 201

Average 17.5 63.6 283

Sources: Population estimates from Central Intelligence Agency; areasfrom Associated Press Almanac (1974).

18

Moreover, from the enormous nuaber of articles vritten by the Sovieta

since 1945 on the battles vaed In and around msjor cities, It is obvious

that they place considerable ephasis on the peychological value in winning

or losing the battle for a large city. It is stressed thet the successful

defende of a city can have significant consequences. As me source has

succinctly recalled frou the experience of World War ID

Skillful defense of the garrisons of Brest, LiyepsayMogilev, Sevastopol$ Odessa and other important popu-lated points restrained and paralysed considerebletorces of the eneay. Injplitical respects, the suc-cessful defense of the cities inspired confidence invictory, strengthened the moral spirit of the Sovietpeople at the front and in the rear. In military re-spects, it diverted the enormous forces of the anewand delayed his general offensAk".

C. Strateuic Vieas

Modern strategists, Russian or Western, must view cities from two

distinct perspectives--one offensive, one defensive. For the commander

of forces on the offense operating in seane territory, the city can be

viewed, inter alia, as:

P A hostage to an attacker's threat of destruction or wide-spread damage

a An obstacle to advance, attack and maneuver

* A fortress for the defender

e A base for sorties against the attacker's exposed flanks

e A vital center of conmunications either essential to orwhich would facilitate the attack

"1 "Combat Activities in a City," Starshina Serzhant, No. 6, p. 1 (June

1972). A further analysis of the importance of cities is provided inChapter II, paragraph D.

19

"* A source of resources which are either coveted by theattacker or which should be denied to the defender

"* A symbol of national will the retention of which i.critical to continuing resistance

"* The locus of political power

"* A problem for defending and governing if occupied.

For the commander of defensive forces operating against a hostile

force which has crossed national borders, the city can be viewed, inter

alia, as:

" Of such cultural, historic value that it must be spareddestruction and consequently declared "open" as was Parisin World War II.

" A trap in which to delay, impede or U • lt the attackingarmy and air forces

" An essential communications center without which continuedresistance is infeasible

" The stadt-geist of the country which requires defense atall costs

" A potential locus of disease, pestilence, mass casualtiesand hysteria on a large scale

"e Essential for economic survival

"e A source of political stability or instability

"* A strongpoint more easily defended than a position inopen terrain.

This brief and incomplete citation of opposing perceptions of cities

demonstrates the complexity of categorizing the significance of urban cen-

ters in modern war. Recognizing that there are many variables which influ-

ence the role cities play in war, there are, nevertheless, some overall

generalizations which can be drawn about their significance for the Soviet

Union and the United States:

20

0 Given circumstances of var In Central Burope Involvinga Warsaw Pact attack against the NATO allies;

Warsaw Pact forces are most likely to manilze speed,maneuver and depth of penetration to the Rhine andWeser Rivers' line and beyond, bypassing urban centerswherever and whenever possible.

- As a strategic policy, the Warsav Pact would not likelydestroy the cities of Western Nurope for to do so woulddenigrate the advantages of conquest, reinforce anti-pathies and Invite retaliation by stand-off air andmissile forces.

- Notwithstanding the Warsav Pact preference to avoidcombat in cities in a blitzkrieg-style attack, thedeeper the penetration, the loager the period of at-tack and the later the event occurs in this century,the more likely It will be that they will be forcedto fight in cities.

- If Warsaw Pact forces are persistent In bypassingcities in a march to the Phines, their lines of con-munication could be vulnerable to those NATO forcesleft within or shielded by cities.

- Once Warsaw Pact forces are committed to city fight-ing, the effectiveneas of messed armor 1s reduced andthe overall advantage accrues to the defender. Assum-Ing the defender has the will to persevere, the tempoof var goes from the blitzkrieg measured in advencesof hundreds of mUies per phase to street fightingmeasured in blocks per phase.

e Given circumstances of var in areas other than CentralEurope where the Soviet Union is likely to commit forces,the potential for urban operations is dependent upon thevariables of where, when, objectivas, etc.

- iowever, the major Soviet commitmnts to military oper-ations post-1945 are heavily weighted to urban areas toinclude Berlin (1953), Budapest (1956), and Prague (1968).

- All such operations have the common characteristic thatoverpowering force was used to control and influence thecentral apparatus of state power or the populace in capi-tal cities.

- As the Soviets extend their Influence out from theirimediate borders and increase their capabilities toproject force into forward areas, they may increasinglyfind that such operations as Beirut (1958), SantoDomingo (1965), Belfast (1972 and later) and perhaps,even Hue (1968) are characteristic of great poweroperations in areas distant from its national base.

21

Do The Nature of Urban Warfare

Throughout the areas which have reasonable potential for Soviet co.-

bat operat ions there is a great diversity emong cities. They range from

ancient walled cities dating back to the Middle Ages to completely modern

citiee reconstructed from the ruins of World War 11. In size, they range

from the relatively mamll cities which are scattered across the North

of Europe to the half million plus of Braman, to the 3.2 million of the

Est-West Berlin complex. Sam of the smaller citiee are still surrounded

by rural areas with open approaches, while the larger cities tend to sup-

port suburban ag•loseretes with the approaches restricted by built-up

areas. The nature of urban warfare will obviously vary with conditionsof population density, the size, haeiht and density of buildings, sub-

terranesan commications system, architectural style, whether or notthere ws tint or disposition to evacuate the city, the plans of attack

and defense, the size and organisation of combat forces, climate and a

host of other variables which make it difficult to meke categorical state-

ments on the nature of urban warfare. Nevertheless, there are omen fairly

consistent lessons to be learned from recent history as there are insights

into the future which can be drawn upon to develop a list of Soms rela-

tively universal characteristics of city fighting.

Generally, combat in cities becomes a series of small-unit actions at

the squad, platoon, company and battalion level. Maneuver of these small

units become complex and detailed while larger unit movement at the bri-

gade and division level is limited and slow and there are few opportunities

for decisive maneuver. There may be excaptions to these generalizations

of focusing on smaller units in limited maneuver when the attacker elects

to storm a city by pushing armored columns through the streets or deliver-

ing troops by air, thus bypassing defensive positions. Extensive destruc-

tion of city structures by nuclear or conventional firepower may, on the

one hand, significantly reduce the capability of the defenders but the

resultant destruction and rubble of such fires may, on the other hand,

so impede movement that they prove to be a major obstacle to the attackers.

22

Armor is vry effective in cities but mast be employed with care In

a menor which capitalizes ea its firepower and armor protection while

mimnisming its vulnerability due to lack of vision# restricted nobility

and the very close proximity of undetected eneW forces. Both In offense

and defense, direct fire support by tanks has been used to good advantage.

Both in offemse and defene", there mut be close tank-infantry coordination

to overcome the close-in vulnerability of the tank. Tank and armored

infantry columns are singularly effective in the attack when resistance

is light and the streets are relatively clear of obstacles.

Artillery employed within a city Is obviously restricted in its flexi-

bility and much greater emphasis must be given to direct lay, short-range

fire techniques. Mortars have an increased effectivenese as do flamathrowers

which have effective short-range capabilities. Chemical smoke, haze,

dust and darkness all may be used to mask movemt. Subterranean systems

(subways* severs, etc.), my become major avenues of movement although

they ar easily blocked or interdicted.

Conventional fixed and rotary wing aircraft close support is generally

limited due to the indiscriminate destruction and obstacles they may gene-

rate and due to vulnerability to hostile fire. from crew-served and new

handheld weapons such as the SA-7/Redeye. Ramotely piloted air vehicles

may reduce the significance of this vulnerability within the next two

decades.

Movement from one objective to another or assault upon a position

may be limited to well defined approaches unless effective barrier-reduciug

or wall-breaching systems are used.

The capabilities of the adividual soldier and small units may, with

effective training and employment, be maximized at the expense of opposing

forces to the extent that relatively small units may defeat, deter or im-

pede a substantially larger force.

23

Where cities still contain noncombatants, distinct advantage may

accrue to the side which is less concerned with the safety of the populace.

The details of task oranisation become much more Important at the

lwmer levels of organization than in more open form of warfare. Infan-

try squads may be reinforced with flamethrowers, engineers or commnica-

tars. Tanks and artillery may be placed in direct support of platoons.

Observation is limited because of buildings, dust and smoks. Cover

and concealment are plentiful and there is less nsed for artificial canou-

flage. The aberrations of sound bouncing off structures and the lack of

long-range visibility and distinctive landmarks have a tendency to dis-

orient and confuse maneuvering forces.

There is a greater requirement for effective communications at the

small-unit level. Radio communications may be less reliable due to the

interference of buildings. Basic arm and hand signals, flares and wire

communications may become the principal means of communication for forces

in cont- it.

Precision guided munitions, comand detonated mines, unattended ground

sensors, remotely piloted vehicles both air and ground and other current

state-of-the-art technological advances may substantially change the nature

of urban warfare as it is currently envisioned.

The effects of selective use of small nuclear weapons to include those

of enhanced radiation are speculative as are the potential capabilities of

chemical munitions. It seems certain however that their use could also

change contemporary tacticians? views on fighting in cities.

In sumary, the tactics of urban warfare are unique whether viewed

from the perspective of the Soviet Union or the United States. There are,

however, many principles of control, coordination, techniques of fire,

24

maneuver, recomnaisance and air operations that are quite similar to more

open form of warfare along with the many divergencies. It Is thee diver-

pmcies end differences which make the study of Soviet tactical doctrine

for urban warfare a worthwhile pursuit.

25

II SOVIRT MILITARY TACTICS: AN OVERVIEW

A. Soviet Stratesy. Operational Art. and Tactics

As background to this study of Soviet concepts of urban wcfare, it

seem important to understand that the place of tactics in the field of

Soviet military science is someuhat different from that of the U.S. prac-

titioner of the military arts.

In the volume on tactics published in the aid-1960@ as part of the

authoritative Officer's Library series, it is stated that, as a scienti-

fie theory, Soviet military art is divided into three parts: strategy,

operational art, and tactics. In the military dictionary, which also is

part of the Officer's Library series, strategy is described as "the high-

est are of military art, representing a system of scientific knowledge

on the occurrence and rules of armed struggle."' Strategy is concerned

with the investigation and e"aboration of questions related to the condi-

tions and nature of a future war, the prepaeraton and strategic utiliza-

tion of the armed forces, the forme and methods of conducting and leading

armed struggle, and the comprehensive strategic aafeguard of the troops'

combat activity. 2

Operational art is "a comonent part of military art" vhich is en-

gaged in working out the theory and practice of preparing and conducting

the joint or independent operations of strategic formations of the armed

forces. It is "the combining link between strategy and tactics." Guided

Slovar' oenovnykh voyennykh teruinov (Dictionary of Basic Military Term.),

p. 220 (Moscow: Voyanizdat, 1965).

2 Ibid., General Major V. G. Reznichenko, ed., Taktika (Tactics), p. 6

(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1966); and Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D.Sokolovskiy, ed., Voyennaya strategiya (Military Strategy), pp. 16-17(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1968).

S.~...... J_ .• Monk 27 j

by the requirements of strategy, operational art investitats the nature

of contemporary operations, defines the methods of preparing and conduct-

ing operations for the achievement of strategic goals, and determines the

matters of operational support, troop control, and rear support. Opera-

tional art also embodies the initial data for tactics by organizing the

preparation and conduct of battle in coordination with the purposes and

tasks of operations.'

Tactics, the principal concern of this study on Soviet urban doctrine,

is "the particular area of theory and practice of military art, which stud-

is* the objective rules of fighting and works out methods of preparing for

and conducting it on land, in the air, and on the sea." 2 Consequently, as

compared to strategy and operational art, tactics "occupies a subordinate

position and is designed to work in the interests of operational art and

strategy as well as to obtain the aims proposed by operational art."13

Given this role, it is recognized that "the principles of tactics are not

eternal and immutable,"* and therefore the dynamic impact of postwar mili-

tary developments must be fully taken into consideration.

B. Soviet Approach to Tactics

Much attention in Soviet literature is directed to the influence of

the postwar "scientific-technological revolution" on military affairs.

This influence is particularly felt in such areas as military organiza-

tion, troop control, and weapons development. Writing on the 57th anni-

versary of Soviet Armed Forces Day, for example, first deputy Minister

of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union I. I. Yakubovskiy remarked thet:

I Slovar' osnovnykh voyennykh terminov, p. 150; and Reznichenko, op. cit.,

p. 6.2 Slovar' osnovnykh vovennykh terminov, p. 224.

3 Gavrilov, op. cit., p. 22.

SColonel V. Zamorovskiy, "Laws of Battle," Soviet Military Review, do. 3,

p. 19 (March 1975).

28

Three decades have passed since the end of the war.In this time our army and navy have substantiallychanged. Their mobility, striking strength, and fire-power have Increased Imeaasursbly. They have advancedto a new stage of development. It is determined by thefact that the combat power of the armed fares In theconditions of a developed socialist society and on thebasis of a gigantic growth of the economy, rapidscientific-technical progress, and the further consoli-dation of the moral-political unity sand friendship ofthe peoples of the USSR is steadfastly continuing tostrengthen. The nature of the army and navy has un-recognizably transformed the modern types of arm andcombat equipment, which Soviet troops are skillfullywielding.'

While the strategic missile forces may have been the primary bensfi-

ciary of rapid scientific-technical progress attained since World War II,

Soviet spokesmen strongly assert that this progress has been responsible

for a significant Increase In the combat capabilities of the other service

branches.' It follows that nuclear strikes will have a tremendous Impact

in a general war, especially in the Initial phase, but will not in them-selves be decisive. Tactical armed conflicts will have an important role

in any war. As the tactical volume fro, the Officer's Library stated in

the aid-1960s:

Doubtlessly, with the presence of nuclear weapons atthe direct disposal of the strategic and operationalleadership, their capabilities have evidenced. At the

sam tine, it should be consldsred that armed strugglehas niw acquired a different character than before. Ithas become mrs complex and covers not only the line ofdirect contact of troops, but also the entire depth ofthe theater of troop activity and even the entire ter-ritory of the warring sides. Under these conditions,

1 rasnaya Zvezda (23 February 1975).

2 Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, "V. I. Lenin and the ArmedForces of the Soviet State," Komist, No. 3, p. 22 (Februar- 1974).Cf. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grschko, Vooruzhenniyo silysovetskozo aosudarstva (The Armed Forces of the Soviet State), pp. 95-99 (Moscow: Veyenizdat, 1974); and Marshal of the Soviet Union K. S.Moskalenko, Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1503 QGM (14 May 1975).

29

while nuclear strikes inflicted directly by the stra-tegic and operational leadership may decide the mantimportant taska, they are still but a part of thegeneral tasks of the armed struggle. For total vic-tory, it is necessary to consolidate the results ofthe nuclear strikes inflicted by the high command, tocomplete the destruction of the enemy, to seize histerritory, and to deprive the enemy of the capabilityto carry out resistance in any form. The attainmentof this objective is inevitably connected with theconduct of intense combat activity.'

The continuity of Soviet thought on this line was demonstrated several

years later in a work on offensive warfare which states:

The uatual employment of nuclear weapons by the sideswill give modern combat an absolutely different charac-ter in comparison with its former characters. Just ascombat became a combat of fire with the broad introduc-tion of fast-firing weapons among the troops, moderncombat can be characterized as nuclear combat. Ofcourse, this does not repudiate its combined armscharacter but only stresses the decisive role ofnuclear weapons in battle and the special features ofthe battle itself which follow therefrom. The actionsof the troops on the battlefield are coordinated firstof all with the nuclear strikes and are directed towardthe exploitation of their results. 1

Similarly, stressing the combined-arms nature of a general war, a training

manual written in 1972 explained that:

Contemporary war is a combined arm war. Characteris-tic of it are the use of nuclf ar weapons and the partic-ipation of great numbers of ground troops with thisdiverse combat equipment, rocket troops, eviation andairborne troops, as well as the increased role of tanks...

1 Reznichenko, Taktika, p. 11.

2 Colonel A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (A Soviet View), translated by

the United States Air Force, pp. 41-42 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1970).

30

Combined-arms fighting is conducted by the combinedeffort of all types of troops and special troops.I

The Soviets take chemical and bacteriological warfare seriously and

cite precedents of "American imperialists" employing such weapons. "The

Americans used this Ibacteriological] weapon in the war against the Korean

people (1950-53) and also on the territory of the Chinese Peoples' Republic." 2

According to the Soviet writers, these precedents should serve as object

lessons for Soviet military forcest

All this permits us to consider that troops will beforced to conduct combat actions nct only during mas-sive enemy use of nuclear weapons but also ýaringwide use of toxic substances and bacteriological agents.We must -. ,:'-ipate that in this war the aggressor willuse chmical "d bacteriological weapons in combinationwith nuclear weapons.4

In particular in a futute war one may expect the employ-ment of cheatca! aad bacteriological weapons the devel-opment of which is being given great attention in theWestern countries especially the United States.$

It is also pointed out by Soviet writers that the characteristics of

tactical fighting have undergone fundamental changes since World War II.

These changes, say the Soviets, preclude the possibility that a future

battle will be fought between two armies drawn up in continuous battle

lines stretching over long distances. As one source noted, protracted

battles are "definitely a thing of the past." whose place has been taken

General Lieutenant A. I. Odintsov, ad., Uchebnoye posobiye po nachalnoyvoyennoy podgotovke (Training Manual for Initial Combat Training), p.127 (Moscow: DOSAAF Publishing House, 1972).

2 Reznichenko, Taktika, p. 30.

3 Ibid, p. 31.

""I. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, 3rd Edition, StanfordResearch Institute, edited by Harriet Fast Scott, p. 201 (New York,Crane RPussak & Co., Inc., 1975).

s Ibid., p. 243.

31

J

by ht~ly flexible combat actions.' Indeed, the Soviets envision that a

future conventional war will be a short camaign marked principally by the

following features:

* Mobility and high speeds of combat operations

e Concentration of superior forces only in the decisiveplace and at the decisive time

e Rapid breakthrough

e Penutration and dispersal into the depth of the opponent'sdefense

e Bepass and encirclement of enemy ntrongpoints and popu-lated areas

* Destruction of bypassed points.

One of the most emphatic points made by Soviet tacticians is that

priority must be given to quick movement on the battlefield. "Quickness,

swiftness, and the decisiveness of the actions of subunits," noted one

such writer, '"have always been indispensable conditions of the successful

outcome of any sort of battle." 2 Similarly, another high ranking military

figure noted that:

Contemporary battle, characterized by high maneuvera-bility and dynamic actions, is as a rule developed ina short time and conducted at a high tempo. So, inorder to execute a bold and swift maneuver and delivera powerful blow into the flank and rear of the enemy ahigh speed of movement is needed. 3

Colonel V. Savkin, "Traits of Modern Combat," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3,

p. 25 (March 1974).2 General Major of Tank Troops I. Skorodumov, "'he Guarantee of Success

in Battle is in the Swiftness of Actions," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 5,p. 11 (May 1973).

3 General Lieutenant M. Ryb'yakov, "Long-Distance March," Voyennyy Vestnik,No. 2 (February 1973).

32

Well evwre that tactical nuclear weapons could annihilate-and thereby

cause the early defeat of-an opponent which mosses its forces too soon,

Soviet writers suggest that troops marching to the attack should be diu-

parsed (1) widely enough to prevent their destruction, but (2) closely

enough to permit their swift concentration along the main line of attack

at the proper time. Scenarios developed by SoSet writers suggest the

following subsequent actions: '

From a dispersed formation, troops are massed along themain line of attack. The concentrated forces, eitheralone or in conjunction with tactical nuclear strikes,make a break in the defensive line of the enemy. Swiftly,the troops break through the gap and move into the depthof the enemy. The breakthrough is followed by a rapidredispersal in order to prevent the enemy from fullutilization of his n'tclear weapons. Bypassing strong-points and centers of resistance, the troops move quicklyinto the depth of the enemy.

This theorizing on the nature of future wars can be invalidated to a

large degree should the Soviets choose or be forced to fight in cities.

As has been previously cited, city fighting is characterized by "limited

and slow" maneuvers which are hardly consistent with these prescriptions

for "high maneuverability,': "quickness" and "swiftness." While Soviet

writers view nuclear warfare as causing "dispersion," swift "breakthroughs"

and "rapid redisparsal," the use of nuclear weapons in cities could promote

such rubble and local contamination that there would be serious impediments

to any movement.

See, for example, Colonel V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Opera-

tional Art and Tactics (A Soviet View), translated by the United StatesAir Force, pp. 167-239 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972); Colonel I.Nikolayev, "Breakthrough of Enemy Defenses," Soviet Hilitsry Review,No. 7, pp. 10-13 (July 1974); General Mlajor V. Matsulenko, "Breakthroughof Enemy Defenses," Soviet Military Review, No. 1, pp. 54-56 (January1974); Reznichenko, op. cit., pp. 74-89. Cf. P. H. Vigor and C. N.Connelly, "The Soviet Threat to Europe," RUSI, Vol. 120, No. 1, pp.69-73 (March 1975).

33

C. Principles and 1.)rm of Tactical Warfare

Soviet tactical doctrine Identifies four distinct form of combined

arm combat: the meting engagemnt, the offensive, the defensive, and

the withdrawal. There are characteristics of each of these four categor-

ins of tactical combat operations which will influence the Soviet approach

to combat in and for cities. These characteristics are discussed in more

detail in the following passages.

1. The Meeting Engene•et

Soviet writers point out that the probability of mating engage-

ments "has significantly increased" under contemporary conditions. Not

only will these engagements be more complicated than previously, but they

will also involve exposed flanks and sizable intervals between the various

elements of the combat formation.'

It is stressed that meting engagements my arise under numerous

different conditions. Warning against stereotyped tactical training, one

Soviet source explains that:

In addition to a march, a battalion my indepen-dently conduct a meeting engagement under verydifferent combat conditions: after comittingitself into action fox Ahe development of an of-fensive, in the course of an offensive in thedepth of the enemy's defense, when overcoming asecurity zone, when pursuing the enemy along aparallel march, when operating on an exposed flankand in disconnected sectors, and especially whenterrain conditions coupel it; in the course ofthe advance of airborne troops from the landingplace to the object fixed for seizure; in thesecond eahelon (in the reserve) in the defense;as well as in all cases where there are large in-tervals with adjacent elements along the front and

Lieutenant Colonel V. Kokhanov, "Meeting Engagement of a Motorized-RifleBattalion," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3, p. 51 (March 1975).

34

In the depth, when the actions of adjacent elementsare halted by active enemy resistance or they havesustained great losses. I

Another Soviet vriter similarly points out that meeting engage-

ments vwil most likely develop (1) during an offen•ive, when the enemy is

counterattacking. (2) during a Soviet counterattack, and (3) during 4 meach.

In the first instance, fighting viii occur along the flanks with those enemy

reserve units and second echelons which may have been bypassed. In the

second, It is noted that a defensive counterattack an the Soviet pert will

"almost always" occur as a meeting engagement. 2

Special emphasis is given to the increased potential for meting

engagements at the outset of war where forces advance over long distances

before making initial contact. As the tactical manual of the Officer's

Library noted:

In a future war, if the imperialist aggressor. un-leash it, the initial period acquires especiallyimportant significance.

After massive nuclear strikae with strategic weap-ons, using their results and acting with them, theground forces will immediately begin active and de-cisive combat actions. Their actions will be char-acterized by a large spatial sweep, dynamic andswift development in separate directions, wide ap-plication of different form of maneuver, and theabsence of solid fronts. Conflict will acquire anextremely intensive character. The sides will striveto fulfill their fundamental missions by a decisiveoffensive, in consequence of which maeting battlesand engagements will frequently occur. 3

I Colonel V. Vinnikov, "On Meeting Engagement," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 1,

p. 22 (January 1973).2 Colonel P. Kunitskiy, "On Meeting Engagement," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 8,

pp. 59-62 (August 1974).3 Reznichenko, Taktika, p. 198.

35

AmMg the traits whIch Soviet spokesman consider important for

conducting meting sangemagts two of the mat significant are the time

factor and dispersal. The very essence of this type of fighting, says

one author, "consists of each side's use of speed, mineuverability, andspeed of introducing troops and building up cowbat efforts.," With re-

gard to troop dispersal, it hba been stated that "strivia to reduce theffective•sesei of 0 en nuclear strikes CoWael comauders to advance units

and subunits into regions of a meeti enSgagment in formations dispersed

along the front and in the depth."'

Urban warfare presents may opportunities for meting engagements,

particularly at the suall unit level. Soviet military writers ephasizethe advantages the defender has in meeting engagements under circumtances

*here he hbm msde good use of obstacles, has preregistered his artillery

support, has laid hi fields of fire and has organized his defensive posi-

tions. Such conditions are all characteristic of a well planned defea

In city fighting. The following are the features identified in Soviet

doctrine as being characteristic of meting ensgagments in the contemporary

period:s

"o There is continuous and intense combat to captureand retain the initiative

"o Deployment for combat is chiefly made from a columnformation

"o There is great confusion at the initiation and duringmeeting engagements

"o The situation changes rapidly and drastically duringmeetin angeagaments

Colonel I. Vorob'yev, a professor and doctor of military science, in

Krasnaya Zvezda (5 March 1975).2 Colonel A. Serov, "The Meeting Engagement of a Battalion," Voyeany

Vestnik, No. 3. p. 20 (March 1972).

Reznichenko, Taktika, pp. 204-211.

36

"* There is normally high speed in maneuvering elements

" Combat formations change rapidly

"* There are vide fronts, open flanks and a high degreeof freedom of maneuver.

The requisite combat initiatives for success in a contemporary

meeting engagement are identified by the Soviets as: 1

"* The acquisition of continuous and thorough knowledgeof the enemy

"* Rapid decisionmaking and communicating such decisionsto the troops

"* Preemption in nuclear attacks and gaining fire super-iority

"a Early occupation of favorable terrain

"* Flank security

"a Initiative and independence of unit commanders.

There are Cew discernible differences in detail between the

Soviet and U.S. tactical doctrines for meeting engagements. Both U.S. and

Soviet tacticians emphasize (1) the need to seize the initiative, (2) the

need to protect one's flanks while searching for the enemy's, (3) the high

incidence of confusion and (4) the lack of intelligence. In U.S. doctrine

there seem to be more emphasis on communication with higher and adjacent

headquarters while the Soviets tend to empha3aie the necessity of conuni-

cations down to the troops. 2 The Soviets also tend to give more emphasis

to the "attack from the march" or meeting engagement.

Ibid., pp. 211-218.2 See, for example, Headquarters, Department of the Army Field Manuil,

FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalions, pp. 4-24 (hereafter cited as FM 7-20)and Reznichenko, Taktika, pp. 138-139.

37

2. Th , Of fesive

According to a leading Soviet military fi1pre, In general var,

of fessive operations "will be the basic mans of solving the task* of armd

conflict in land theaters of military operations."' Due to imroved weap-

onry in the postwar years, say the Soviets, the offensive will be excep-

tionally dynamic and highly maneuverable. Combat action will develop

extremly irregularly; that is, without a continuous front line. This

will result in many gape in the combat formation, as well as the presence

of open flanks. Consequently, rapid maneuvers will be characteristic of the

offensive. 2

Writing in mid-1972, one leading Soviet tactician defined maneu-

vers as consisting of five basic formt:

"* Envelopment

" .Encirclement

9 Frontal assault

"• Maneuver by air

"o Withdrawal

Envelopment was described as a mnneuver whose objective is to

strike a blow at the enemy's flank. Encirclement was a deeper maneuver,

whose objective is to strike at the enemy's rear. Envelopment and en-.

ci.rclement are preferred types of maneuvers. However, it is sometimes

necessary to resort to a frontal attack when terrain is unfavorable for

flanking, when time for flanking is unavailable, and when enveloping enemy

1 Sokolovskiy, Voyennaya Strategiya, pp. 352-353.

2 Sidorenko, pp. 57-61.

3 Colonel V. Savkin, "Maneuver in Battle," Voyannyy Vestnik, No. 4, pp.26-27 (April 1972).

38

units are unexpectedly encountered. Maneuver by air permits rapid move-

ment over great distances. Withdrawal is a "forced" maneuver, in which

troops are removed from the olove of a superior enemy force and trans-

ferred to a more favorable line. 1

In the Soviet view, the following advantages accrue to forces

which adopt the offensive:

9 They gain the initiative

* They achieve time in which to better

- plan- mass forces at critical points- prepare for future operations

s They are imbued with higher morale while the moraleof their adversary is degraded

o They are able to focus forces for maneuver in criti-cal directions

e It takes them to the enemy

- positions- resources

9 By closing with the enemy it deprives him of theuse ot his weapons of mass destruction againstforward forces. 2

Savkin's classifications were not without criticism. In 1972, several

other writers rose to challenge this description. See, Colonel F.Sverdlov, Lieutenant Colonel R. Portugal'skiy, a.id Colonel N. Mal'ginov,"On the Question of Maneuver in Battle," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 8, pp.30-33 (August 1972); and General Lieutenant V. Reznichenko, "On Maneuverin Bal'tle," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 39-49 (December 1972). Cf.also, Y. Novikov and F. Sverdlov, Maneuver in Modern Land Warfare, pp.28-36 (Moscow: Progress, 1972).

2 Reznichenko, Taktika, pp. 70-71; and Sidorenko, pp. 1-2.

39

The "essence" of the Soviet offensive idicates a fairly stan-

dard concept of how tactical attacks will be planned and conducted In con-

tosporary war. Soviet tacticians describe the opening phases of combat,

cominsctag with a nuclear strike followed by aerial strikes, artillory

barrages and the rapid advance of forces into the depth of the enemy poei-

tice to seize and destroy personnel, materiel. equipment and critical ter-

rain.' It is, in effect, a modern, large-scale version of the German blitz-

krieg. The Soviets credit the introduction of nuclear weapons for employment

on the tactical battlefield with revolutionizing concepts of warfare. Nu-

clear weapons are recognized as providing the capability to completely

destroy enemy massed forces in very brief periods of tim. The "ratio of

forces" to which Soviet stratejists and tacticians refer is seen to be a

singularly unstable index in nuclear war. The first priority target in

such war is the enemy nuclear delivery capabilities.

The following are viewed as the chief characteristics of contem-

porary nuclear warfare for offensive operations: 2

"* There will be an increase in the "intensity", vio-lence and destruction of combat

"e The "spatial sweep" of the offensive will be broad-ened

"e The "struggle for firepower superiority" will beintensified

"e The importance of the capability to maneuver willbe increased

"e There will be a fractionalization of the battlefieldwith many separate actions taking place across abroad area

"e Radioactive areas will provide effective barriersto the maneuver of forces.

1 ieznichenko, Taktika, pp. 70-71.

2 Ibid., pp. 245-247.

40

In urban varfare, Soviet emphasis upon initiative and aggressive-

ness on the part of offensive forces becomes particularly important. 11he

nature of urban combat with the profusion of obstacles, barricades, cover

and concealment encourages inertia. Should commanders not be aggressive,

lengthy iesges., stalemate, and slow attrition begin to take their toll on

the attackers.

The priucipal difference between the Soviet aud U.S. tactical

doctrines for offensive operations found in standard manuals is on the

employment of nuclear weapons. In Soviet doctrine, use of nuclear weap-

ons ie Lited as being "the most important and decisive act of offensive

combat." 1 The employment of nuclear weapons is institutionalized in that

they are consistently identified as being the initial weapons to be used

in an offensive action. Compared to Soviet publications, U.S. field manuals

such as FH 7-30 (The Infantry Brigades) and FM 7-20 (The Infantry Battalions)

give very light treatment to nuclear fires in offensive operations, and

those references which are made seem incidental and breed on contingencies:

" When nuclear or chemical munitions are employed,the battalion exploits these fire%

" The commander's concept may include ... use of nu-clear and other fire support...

" Conventional, nuclear and chemical fires may be em-ployed to accomplish tasks appropriate to a support-ing attack

o When nuclear or chemical weapons are employed priorto an attack, their delivezy is closely coordinatedwith the time of attack.2

It is not the purpose of the above citation of differences be-

tween Soviet and U.S. tactical doctrine on the offense to make a judgment

on either approach. An interpretation of the significance of the differ-

ence between the two approaches would require much more analysis than is

SSokolovskiy, Voyennaya Strategiya, pp. 347-348.2 FM 7-20, op. cit., pp. 4-1 to 4-8.

41

merited here. It is sufficient to note that there is a very real and all-

nificant qualitative and quantitative difference in the epproech to the

employment of nuclear weapons in Soviet and U.S. tactical writings, with

Soviet literature institutionalizing the employment of such weapons and

U.S. literature seeming to doemphasi•e such employment.

3. Defense

Among Soviet tacticians, defense is not a preferred course of

action. Indeed, defens is described as a "forced type of combat," which

is to be used only when an attack is imposible or inadvisable or when it

is necessarl to economize on forces in one area in order to support an at-

tack in another area. 1 Under these conditions, it is explained that the

objectives of defending troops are "to repulse an offensive by a superior

force of the enemy, inflict heavy casualties on him, hold the secured posi-

tion, and create conditions for transformation to a decisive offensive."2

Soviet literature is emphatic on the point that defense must not

ba passive. As one Soviet general officer has stated:

... the Soviet Army never acknowledged passivedefense. Even the very structure of the defenseis used as the starting point for passing overto the offensive. Any form of defense presup-poses active combat operations, employment offire weapons and resolute counterattacks, S

Another general officer, similarly emphasizing activity as "one of the most

important requirements related to defense," notes that this activity "con-

sists in the continuous hitting of the eneay by fire and in carrying out

1Odintsov, p. 128.

2 Colonel A. Serov, "The Motorized-Rifle Battalion in Defense," Voyennyy

Vestnik, No. 7, p. 28 (July 1972).

3 General Lieutenant V. Reznichenko, "Combat Activity," Soviet Military

Reviv.E, No. 4, p. 24 (April 1974).

42

wide maneuvers by subuniti and fire weapons and with artificial obstacles,

as well as in conducting decisive counterattacks.'"

In Soviet tactical doctrine the defense, even while having the

advantage of selecting and preparing the terrain for combat, is categorized

as leading to inconclusive results, giving the defender the advantage of

selecting and preparing the terrain for combat, being subordinated to the

overall interests of the offensive, and being employed in areas of se.ondary

concern. The purpose of defensive combat is to:

"e Repel the attack of superior enew forces

"e Inflict losses on the enemy

e Hold critical terrain

a Create conditions which will permit transition tothe offensive.

2

In addition to the heavy Soviet emphasis on the offensive directed

toward gaining enemy territory and destroying enemy forces and equipment,

another apparent reason for avoiding passivo defensive deployments whe.ever

possible is traceable to the Soviet desire to avoid the destructive poLen-

tial of nuclear weapons. Consequently, as in the offensive, troop disper-

sal in the defensive is given considerable attention. It has, for example,

been declared in one Soviet work on tactics that:

An important trait of modern defense is the fur-thest dispersal of troops both along the front andin the depth. Application of dispersal was oneof the first methods of solving the problem ofthe prcservation of manpower and raising thestability of defense under conditions of the at-tacker using nuclear weapons. The opinion is ex-pressad that, as nuclear ammunition of less

General Lieutenant P. Varushin, "Activity of the Defense," VoyennyyVestnik, No. 3, p. 26 (March 1971).

2 Reznichenko, Taktika, p. 319.

43

caliber appear, the depee of dispersal of troopson the field of battle will increase. 1

The new methods developed for defense on the nuclear battlefield

are designed to provide eophasis on an "active" force which is "stable" and

which demonstrates a high degree of capability in antinuclear and antitank

operations. Maneuver become more important to the defense as do counter-attacks to repel tank attacks and breakthroughs in depth into defensive

positions. The Soviets demonstrate concern for thQ effectiveness of re-

motely piloted vehicles and give priority to antiaircraft, antimissile and

antiairborne defens.

Defense, according to Soviet tacticians, will no longer be linear

but will have a character of all around 360* security with the front arbi-trarily identified as the direction from which the enem launches his at-

tack. There will be dispersion of force in depth as well as laterally.

Fortifications should be designed to shield troops from nuclear blast and

radiation and must be developed over very brief periods of time. Defense

against nuclear attack alao will be achieved through camouflage and decep-

tion and intelligent use of the cover of darkness.

In studying Soviet defensive doctrine there appears to be equally

as much to learn of how the Soviets anticipate they will conduct offensive

operations in a nuclear environment. There is the great eaphasis, for ex-

ample, on defending against blitskrieg-style attack with deep penetrations

by armor and airborne forces. There may be some distinction between the

U.S. concepts of airborne operations and those of the Soviets. U.S. forces

1 Ibid., p. 326.

44

are light on airborne (i.e., paradrop) divisions vis-a-vis the Soviets

(at a 1 to 7 ratio). On the other hand, the United States lays more stress

on airmobile operations by heliborne forces. 1

Nevertheless, even though Soviet defensive tactics seem to re-

flect their predilection for offensive combat, they do recognize the dis-

tinctive characteristics of U.S. force structure. Very specifically the

Soviets single out 'aerial maneuver of troops" with helicoptere organic

to the U.S. army as being significant.

4. The Withdrawal

The Soviets postulate that greater reliance may be placed upon

withdrawal operations in contemporary war not as a consequence of a forced

retreat but as a deliberate tactic to draw an enemy into a position where

he is vulnerable to a nuclear strike or to buy time to bring up reinforce-

ments.

In U.S. tactical doctrine, withdrawal operations are grouped un-

der an overall category of retrograde operations which also includes delay-

ing, retiring and relief operations. The Soviets, while recognizing that

these categories reflect doctrine in other national armies, do not make

the same categorical distinctions. While withdrawal operations may be

initiated for any number of purposes, there seems to be a reluctance to

dignify the tactic by analyzing components of movements to the rear in

gr-at detail. There is emphasis, however, as in U.S. doctrine, that with-

drawals are accomplished only upon receipt of an order from the senior

It is always hazardous to make relative comparisons for forces without

a complete analysis of all the factors which contribute to combat effi-ciency, such as strength, firepower, mobility, etc. In this instanceit is of interest that U.S. airborne divisions are at a 13,000-manstrength while Soviet airborne divisiops are manned at 7,000. NATOfields 5(-) airborne divisions while Warsaw Pact countries have 9(-)such divisions. Source: The Military Balance 1974-1975 (The Inter-national Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1974).

45

//

commander. Tim initial stage of vithdravwl is always disengagemeat which

is judged to be near impossible in daylight operations. When disengagement

must be executed during daylight hours, Soviet force are trained to make

maexima use of smoke, cover, demonstrationso concealment and deception. The

withdrawal in built-up areas is facilitated by natural conditions of cover

and concoalment and the characteristic lack of intelligence on the disposi-

tion of opposing forces.

46

p

Ill SOVIET COMBAT TRAINING FOR URBAN WAkFARE

This chapter is divided into three major sections providing:

" A discussion of the importance the Soviets attach to fieldcombat training.

" Illustrations of specific Soviet exercises and description ofexercise courses the Soviets have contructed for urban opera-tions.

"* A brief sumation.

A. Soviet Emphasis on Importance of Combat Training

Offensive fighting in a large city is one of the mostcomplex types of troop combat activity and demandsthorough training.'

According to the first deputy counander-in-chief of the Soviet Ground

Forces, the attainment of success in a modern _:!mbined-arms battle "will

to a considerable extent depend on tactically knowledgeable, bold, and

* vigorous operations by small units-companies, platoons, sections, crews,

and teama." 2 Such a battle is described as not only a confrontation of

material forces, but also a contest of brains and wills. With regard to

the mental factor, one candidate of pedagogical science has noted thatl "the dependence of military skill on mental processes--thinking, imagina-

tion, attention, memory, etc.-increases as armies are supplied with more

technical equipment and the weapons and fighting itself becomes more com-

plicated."'3

1 Colonel A. Sidorchuk, "Combat Actions of Troops in the Seizure of LargeCities," Voyenno-lstoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 10, p. 27 (October 1971).

2 General Colonel V. Yakushin, "To a New Stage of Combat Skill," Znamenosets,

No. 12, p. 2 (December 1974).3 Lieutenant Colonel I. Vydrin, "Developing Tactiril Thinking," Soviet

Military Review, No. 6, p. 25 (January 1971).

47

Just as important for success is the will of the soldier, representedby his moral-political and psychological qualities. As defined in a Journal

of the Main Political Administration, moral-political qualities are those"qualities of Soviet soldiers which express their conscientious attitudetowards the policies of the State and Party and their ability to proceed

and perform in the interest of reliably defending the socialist homeland." 1

It is these moral-political qualities, notes one training guide for political

workers, which form "the foundation of all other qualities essential to a

guardian of the Fatherland." 2 Psychological qualities include functional

reliability and a steadfast state of mind, which covers the ability to

concentrate attention for a prolonged period of time, the ability to accur-

ately recall something, speed of reaction, and maintaining self-control in

a dangerous situation, etc. Soviet writers constantly stress that these

psychological qualities are vitally important and must be increased through

training. As one source stated:

A soldier, deeply loyal to his homeland, but not possessingthese special psychological qualities, can lose his headin battle, yield to panic, and not fulfill the combat mission.Based on their own combat experience, participants of the warknow how it was difficult originally to adapt to a combatsituation and to overcome the psychological barrier of asense of danger. An "experienced" soldier acts confidentlyin battle not because he is indifferent to danger, but ratherbecause he was taught "to subordinate passionate reason."This circumstance evoked a special trend in the education oftroops-psychological training. 3

In Soviet military literature, moral-political aud psychological

training is quite closely tied with combat training in the field. Onemilitary writer has described the field as "that laboratory, where military

skill is polished" and has observed that "here the unification of the

1 Colonel N. Tabunov, "V.I. Lenin-the Founder of the Theory of CommunistEducation," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 2, p. 16 (January 1974).

"2 "Methodological Recommendations," Komnist Vooruzhennykb Sil, No. 7,p. 24 (April 1974).

3 Tabunov, p. 16.

48

theoretical knowledge and practical skills acquired at the various objects

of training takes place and the high moral-combat and psychological quali-

ties of soldiers are formed."' Another has noted that field combat training

has "an appreciable effect" on the soldiers' stability becau" "it is

particularly in conditions of the utmost moral and physical strain that

the men's character becomes hardened, their will-power, self-possession,

fearlessness and staunchness grow, and they acquire the ability to act

boldly and resolutely in tense and dangerous situation of modern battle." 2

In even greater detail, the command of the Central Asian Military District

has explained that:

Moral-political and psychological preparation of troopsoccupies an important place in field training under contem-porary conditions. This is a complicated and lengthy processof education. It continues the full length of militaryservice, but field exercises and tactical trainings offer themost favorable conditions for it. Simulation of a nuclearstrike, driving tanks under complex mountain conditions,rolling over personnel with tanks, throwing live handgrenades, attacking after mine, shell, and bomb explosions,while simultaneously firing all kinds of weapons during theday and night, repulsing air raids, and dropping airbornetroops by parachute or landing by helicopter in the rear ofthe "enezy"-this is far from a complete list of conditions,which help form the high moral-combat qualities in trooppersonnel."

3

No less emphasis is attached in Soviet literature to the importance

of field combat training for the acquisition of combat skills. Field

training is viewed as the foundation of troop combat preparations. For

this reason, it has been suggested that "students should be put in condi-

tions approximating combat as much as possible.""4 Within this field

I Major A. Raspopov, "When They Forgot About Tactics," Voyennyy Vestnik,No. 10, p. 18 (October 1973).

2 "As in Real Battle," Soviet Military Revipw, No. 1, p. 21 (January 1975).

3 General of the Army N. Lyashchenko, "Field Training of Troops ls the Focus ofAttention," Komminist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 19. vp. 41-42 (October 1974).

""Colonel I. Sevryukov, "To Successfully Create a Target Layout,"Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 10, p. 38 (October 1971).

49

training, note Soviet authors, the basic principle to be applied is:

"Teach troops that which is necessary in var."' Sumnin8 up the point,

the deputy chief of the admnnistration of combat training of the Far

Eastern Military District has claimed that field training must play an

important role.

As is known, fleld training is the foundation of highcombat readiness of troops. Only in the field can theentire arsenal of weapons of fighting a powerful, well-armed enemy be mastered. And thus one of the principlesof training says: teach troops that which is necessaryin war; then it is natural that field exercises andtraining lessons occupy an Important place in the combattraining of units and subunits of our district. 2

Furthermore, a March 1975 article in a military newspaper states that

greater attention and increased time is being devoted to the tactical

training of officers, especially by means of field exercises. According

to the article:

In past years in the training programs of militaryschools, the proportion of tactical training has notice-ably increased. This is a gratifying fact. Trainingsections have begun to plan field exercises more pre-cisely and to use the facilities of training centersbetter and more fully. Tactical training departmentsare also displaying more thought and creativity inorganizing lessons. Great attention is given to per-fecting the methodological skills of the instructors.The content and quality of lectures on tactics haveimproved. 3

1 "To Utilize the Training-Material Base Skillfully," Vo-ennyy Vestnik,

No. 12, p. 2 (December 1971). See also Colonel V. Yegorov, "In theInterests of Tactics," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 10, p. 11 (October 1974).

2 General Major A. Kozlov, "As Contemporary Battle Demands," Znamenosets,

No. 10, p. 2 (October 1974).

3 Krasnaya Zvezda (25 March 1975).

50

B. Soviet Urban Warfare Training

In order to approximate urban combat conditions as closely as possible,

the Soviet Armed Forces have developed training mock-ups which simulate

situations encountered in fighting in a built-up area. Based upon Soviet

descriptions in open source literature, these training fields range from

the simple to the very complex. On the less complicated fields, short

exercises are conducted which familiarize the troops with many diverse

and basic tactical techniques. On the more elaborate fields, protracted

exercises are conducted which acquaint troops with more difficult proce-

dures and missions requiring the coordination of several service arms.

Utilizing recent Soviet open-literature military journals, this section will

sunmarize several Soviet descriptions of training facilities.

1. Training Field No. 1

Describing various sectors of a training field in the Transcarpa-

thian Military District, an article in a Soviet military journal states:

A model of a populated point of a city type witha center of resistance in its dimensions 500 meterslong and 300 meters deep, in which exercises withplatoons, companies, and batteries can be conducted,has been created. 1

The same article goes on to describe other sectors of the training field

which are used for tank, low-flying target, nuclear weapon, and chemical

weapon training.

2. Training Field No. 2

One unit in Lhe Moscow Miilitary District is credited with having

constructed a training field, 2 which is aimed basically at working out

"To Utilize the Training-Material Base Skillfully," Voyennyy Vestnik,No. 12, p. 4 (December 1971).

2 Colonel I. Afansov, "In Order to Attack in a City ,More Successfully,"Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 101-103 (June 1970).

51

piobleme related to protection against incendiary devices. The field Is

40 meters by 200 meters. According to the Soviet description, the field

contains, inter alia, seven obstacles of the type "which are most fre-

quently encountered during fighting on streets of cities."

* DIAGRAM OF THE ASSAULT FIRE STRIP

0 V 2

714J 2OA% 0')A 2OA -1 A 2x

* C A.tl a pm.| (' 1• | IJl 0 I OJI 14'l..

Point 1 is a full trench profile, which serves as the starting

point for an infantry squad. Point 2 is a brick corridor, which is 6

meters long, 2 meters high, and 70 centimeters wide and has a 1350 angle

in its center. The corridor is designed to simulate an underground corri-

dor or a narrow passage between buildings. Point 3 is a shell crater, 2

meters wide at the top and 90 centimeters deep. Point 4 is a partially

burned bridge, 6 meters long and 4 meters wide. Point 5 is a damaged

building. According to the Soviet description of the building:

The frame of it is welded out of rod iron or pipe,the front and back walls are made of brick, theroof is iron or tin-plated. On the right and leftwalls are fastened four U-shaped metal corners,which are evenly distributed along the entire lengthof the house, with two on the inside and two on theoutside. The dimensions of the house are: width,3 meters; height, 2.5 meters; and length, 6 meters.1

1 Ibid., p. 102.

52

Point 6 is a brick fence, 70 centimeters high and 5 miters vide.

This is followed by a ditch, 40 centimeters lonS end 30 centimeters deep.

Point 7 is a simulated mine field, 20 meters by 25 meters. Point

8 is a finiai trench. Point 9 is a tar-Let setup for hand grenade

throving.

Electric cables have been laid in the field so that explosions

and firing can be simulated and targets can be lifted.

One hour is allotted for training on the field.

3. Training Field No. 3

At the Kalingra4 Higher Command Military-Engineering School imeniA.A. Zhdanov, a special field for sapper-reconnaissance training, "which

has the most characteristic objectives of engineer reconnaissance," hasbeen established. The field is divided into three sectors. The first

sector is for reconnaissance of obstacles and their breaching in the courseof an offensive. The secund sector has zones of heavy destruction, blockages,

Sector L - 14r 1" 1 ri C',. H .4a

Sector 2 2-i' twrOr X- O~hE KTb1D •3aC 1K W J !,j•W •.11, 0A. n C ~K*4 , 50 . 1,0 'I7 ,'0 0 in ,-.7 .,,7 trzi i 1 711

2" ) -\ . - . , ", 7 '

,m ---. ' , "F• ¾,.- . _, - • " , ,- " •• • ••_

Sector 3 3 v •4.ACTO.K.O=,'.E,-0 PA,3r,,E_-,,K YH. 0 F 1 nll 7n - 1•v [ Z:,"•..ltWt; (?n RT CTn A 6;r • . rg,•A..

S/----'-r"E LE~4-. s H'•c,,nEH'4w ý r".SH,,(TAA(

-IL

---- kin--- ---------

Lieutenant Colonel V. Makurov, "Strip for Training of Sapper-Engineers," I

Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 83-85 (December 1972).

j3

contaminated areas, and mined obstacles. Tse third sector contains the

most frequent engineer reconnaissance objectives in populated points and

objectives for destruction in the enemy's rear area.

Sector 3 is described as having the following:

20. Wall of a demolished building

21. A telephone pole

22. A mined entrance to a building

23. A destroyed house

24. A drain pipe

25. A flue

26. A railway point

27. A wooden (stone) fence

28. A rope suspension

According to the author of the article, primary attention is

focused in the third sector on "methods of breaching various obstacles

and reconnoitering and disarming booby traps."' Squads rotate on the

three sectors during a three-hour exercise.

4. Training Field No. 4

At the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command School, 2 a tactical

training field for the training of future officers has been built. The

field, pictured below, is described as being two kilometers in depth.

1 Ibid., p. 85.

2 Colonel L. Tsarikov, "The Psychological Preparation of Future Officers,"Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 55-59 (December 1972).

54

/!

IVI

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I

5

- -i-- ji ,. -, ,,AI

• ,;. . .;/ : / /' j

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pp.3 r5

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According to the article, the ileld has the following facilities (as

numbered in the original drwing):

1. Craters

2. Short picket wire obstacle

3. Collapsed brick vall

4. Pillbox

5. Collapsed building fortified for defense

6. Mockup of a single-story brick building

7. Underground shelter with entrance hatch

8. Obstacles

9. A maze of underground structures terminating in two manholes,with a fire simulator, and full-length targets in each corner.

10. A tank in an entrenchment and a sector of controlled landmines

11. A command post set up in a demolished building

12. A firing position for a mortar subunit

13. Mockup of a two-story building with a collapsed first-floorwall; interior contains a loudspeaker and fire simulator

14. Mockup of a two-story building fortified for defense

In addition to illustrating the layout of the training field, a

specific exercise on the field is described. Among other tasks, the troops

are required to assault the buildings, pass through a maze of underground

structures, cross between upper stories of the buildings, and endure simu-

lated shellbursts, shouts, and comnmands in foreign languages.

5. Training Field No. 5

A recent article in a Soviet military journal points out that

similar tactical training fields have been erected in several units of

the Transcarpathian, Leningrad, and Moscow Military Districts and at the

56

Military imeni the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. ' The fields are described as

2 kilometers wide and 4 kilometers deep. The author notes that the fields

are constructed to permit activities at any time of the year, day or night,

with or without the use of weapons of mass destruction, and coordinating

several subunits.

a 7. Sector of buildings of n populated.- point of a city type with an aajacent

ing the organization and conduct of

/-, offensive and defensive fighting int ) a city.

VI:"- . • 5. Complex of elements for psychologicaltraining intended for teaching activi-

7 ties at high altitudes and under condi-

/ of the enemy's use of incendiary

INI

* ' 1

l Colonel V. Kalikhovich, "The Tactical Training Field," Voyennly Vestnik,No. 11, pp. 48-51 (November 1974).

57

With regard to urban combat, Points 5 and 7 are most important. As

depicted in the Soviet drawing, Point 5 inclides severer mockups of buildings,

wberein incendiary devices can be simulated. Point 7 is more complicated;

it coatains building found in rural and urban settings, as well as open

areas between buildings and diverse types of intersecting streets.

6. Training Field No. 6

In 1971, a Soviet general officer published in a military journal

an outline for a training field and a plan for "the advance by a reinforced

motorized-rifle company in a town." While the wording of the article leads

this writer to have doubts on the existence of the training field, the

article is sumarized here for its hypothetical importance. 1 According to

the Soviet author, the training field should include a mockup of a town,

500 meters wide and 300 meters deep. He also elaborated in detail a

field exercise for a motorized-rifle company, a tank platoon (three tanks),

and a sapper squad. The two-hour exercise is broken down according to the

following training issues and time allotments.

Issue Time

Organization of fighting in the city 15 mintles

Conducting fighting on the approachesto the buildings 20 minutes

Storming and capture of buildings 30 minutes

Conducting fighting for capturing an openspace and the buildings behind it 25 minutes

Critique of the lesson 10 minutes

G General Major N. Sergeyev, "The Tactical Training Field," VoyennyyVestnik, No. 7, pp. 41-48 (July 1971).

58

r 4

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i I

59

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fl?

59

7. Trainins Field No. 7

In 1970, an article by a Soviet general officer presented a de-

tailed description of a protracted exercise on the topic "Offensive of a

motorized-rifle battalion in a populated point and the capture and rein-

forcement of advantageo,;s zone." 1 Lasting a total of six hours, the exercise

was to be held at a training center, the exact location of which was not

given. The plan specified for the battalion to be reinforced by tank

companies, artillery battalions, and sappers. The enemy was simulated by

a motorized-rifle platoon on armored personnel carriers with three tanks

and one rotor trench digger.

The exercise plan delineates four separate operations, with the

specific time allotted for each operation: 2

" Attack of the enemy and taking buildings on the outskirtsof the populated point (one-story buildings), 8:30-10:00

- Moving to the buildings under the cover fire ofartillery and tanks,

- Exit from captured buildings and continuation ofattacks.

"• Conducting street fighting, 10:00-11:30

- Techniques for attacking along main streets andthrough parks, gardens, and yards,

- Overcoming barriers, obstacles, and ruins, and

- Circling and blockading individual buildings.

" Attack on buildings in the center of a populated point andfighting inside of them, 11:30-13:00

- Moving to buildings from the front and flanks underthe cover fire of artillery and tanks,

- Waging battle by the assault group, and

- Fighting on the first, second, and third floors.

General Major of Tank Troops A. Zyryanov, "Offensive of a Battalionin a Populated Point," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 18-24 (June 1970).

Ibid., p. 21.

60

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s Reinforcing captured buildings and repulsing a counterattackof the enemy, 13:00-14:00

- Selecting and occupying posltions for fire weapons inbuildings and around them,

- Setting mined fields, and

- Repulsing a counterattack by the tanks and infantryof the enemy.

Moreover, it should be noted that the author gives a detailed

account of the activities and techniques implemented during each phase of

the exercise by the infantry singly and in coordination with the other

service arm.

8. Training Field No. 8

A similar, though somwhat less elaborate, plan for an exercise

on the theme "Combat of a motortzed-rifle platoon in a city" was published

in a Soviet military journal in 1969.1 Unlike the previous plan which con-

cerned a multi-block area, this plan concentrates more closely on the

approaches to and inside of individual buildings. Devised for three

hours, the exercise is divided into three phases:

0704 of iehi OpwtQFo

T 7" 771 e Combat on approaches to building, 60f \.. is minutes

S- Line of departure lesson,

V ' •A '- Suppression of enemy fire weapons

\in the building and on the flanks, and

h~, Attack and fight for securing theI Vi first floor.

'\x' 1 /; e •• Destruction of the enemy in the huildinK,\,!'j \ i1 hour and 50 minutes

S- Clearing the first floor,III li J-_lit - Intensification of efforts to clear

the building, and"- Consolidation of captured objective.

L . . . ._.J

. ... "Seeps . 0 - Critique of the exercise, 10 minutes.4 ': ; ' " ... ,, - ..., ,

Colonel A. Romaneno "Combat of a Motorized-Rifle Platoon in a City,"Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 12, pp. 40-44 (December 1969).

b2

In addition to an enumeration of specific equipment required for

such an exercise, the author describes in depth the tactical methods employed

in scaling buildings, moving along rooftops, assaulting a three-story

building, and seizing individual rooms within the building. An especially

'..teresting passage gives a recomendation for the type of structure to be

constructed in order to carry out exercises on approaching and fighting

within a building.

The approach to a building and the destruction of anenemy in staircases, in garrets, and in basements isvery difficult. These methods must, therefore, beworked out and first of all with the platoon (squad)in tactical lessons. This can be done cn an especiallyequipped tactical field, where there are mockups ofmultistoried buildings. One of the floors should beequipped with a corridor arrangement of rooms, and theremaining floors, with individual entrances and stair-cases. It should also be provided with a basement.It is advisable to build a stone fence in front of thehouse. A neighboring building should be designated bya wooden mockup (of one wall). For an entrance into thebuilding, instead of windows and doors, breaches inthe walls of the ground floor are used; and forpassage from one floor to another, breaches in theceilings are used. It is recommended to destroy aseparate section of the staircase and to barricadea part. In some windows and door openings are to bebuilt loop-holes and embrasures for machineguns,automatic weapons, and other kinds of light weapons;in separate open windows are to be mounted anti-grenade nets. Between buildings should be builttrenches and communication trenches. For designationas enemy activity, targets, part of which are con-trollable and wit., firing simulators, are used.)

C. Summary

The Soviets emphasize the importance of preparing the soldier morally,

politically and psychologically as well as in tactical technical proficiency

irrespective of the nature of combat. Field training is considered to be

Ibid., p. 40.

0 3

the foundation of troop combat preparations. The Soviets describe a number

of training facilities devoted to techniques of urban combat a few of which

are described here. In general, the facilities and training routines appear

to be similar to thoso developed within the U.S. forces. Training field

number 4, described in these pages, is a particularly el~aborate course over

two kilometers in depth including a number of single and multistory

buildings, underground passages and extensive rubble.

The research conducted for this study has uncovered a significant

amount of information on Soviet urban warfare training. The findings con-

firm other indications that this form of tactical operations has a high

Soviet priority not only in doctrine but in training as well. There is

insufficient information available in open literature to make a detailed

comparison of emphasis and frequency between urban and other forms of

tactics; however, there is little doubt of the Soviet serious concern for

urban warfare.

b4

/

-I

IV SOVIET TACTICAL DOCTRINE FOR URBAN WARFARE

This chapter provides a description of the rolee of several arms

of the Soviet services in urban warfare. The list does not correspond

to the categories of combat arms in either the USSR or U.S. armed forces

but rather to the general groupings of guidelines found in Soviet

literature. Therefore, the following list does not replicate the

division of Soviet forces but it is representative of the categories

Soviet authors cite as being significant to urban tactical operations.

There are also general guidelines which apply to all services and cannot

be identified exclusively with merely one or several service categories

and are therefore listed under the title "General Application." We

will consider guidelines for:

General Application

The Infantryman

The Engineer

The Chemical/Radiological Specialist

The Logistician

The Artilleryman

The Employment of Aviation and Antiaircraft Forces

The Armor and Antitank Forces

Signal Communications

Reconnaissance Forces

Includes airborne and helicopterborne forces.

65

In the following paragraphs guidelines are developed from a

number of diverse Soviet sources. In many cases the guidelines apply

equally to the tank commander, the battery commander or infantryman.

In such cases, to facilitate each section standing on its own, the

guideline is identified with a separate arm wherever possible. Tn

some few cases the guidelines cited were not provided in the context

of urban warfare in the original Russian text but are listed here

because they are universal in application and are particularly relevant.

Footnotes refer to references found in the last pages of this chapter.

1. Soviet Guidelines of General Application in Urban Warfare

These guidelines of general application to the Soviet soldier

Arc divided into four categories:

Conduct of the Attack and Defense

Task Organization

Water Obstacles

Night Operations

The guidelives stress that in the attack, when Soviet forces are

confronted with a tow-n or city which cannot be bypassed, it is preferable

that the city be taken under siege and that direct assault should be

avoided. When assault of the city is required it is preferable to

attack it from the march or move to capitalize on the speed and momentum

of assault forces to carry them through the built up area as rapidly

a• possible. The guidelines acknowledge that the conduct of attack

and defense of cities will change with many variable conditions and

that the difference between nuclear and conventional combat is substantial.

However, there is little elaboration found on this theme of disparity

in various operations and little evidence of detailed planning or

*raining for the conduct of operations in an urban nuclear environment.

66

There is emphasis -non the singular nature of urban warfare and

the varying conditions which requires task organizing of units for the

mission and conditions of combat. Water obstacles and night combat in

cities were subjects which were found to be sufficiently important to

warrant separate treatment. The emphasis on night operations is

consistent with Soviet writings on other forma of combat and reinforces

the impression that Soviet tacticians are convincud of the necessity

for opt-rating during all conditions of visibility and on twenty-four

hour cycles in both attack and defense.

a. Conduct of the Attack and Defense

Of course, it is most advantageous to envelop, surround,and blo-kade the enemy. However this is not alwayspossible and podrazdeleniya** will have to resort toassaulting cities from the move. In this instance,according to the decision by the senior commnander,assault detachments may be created which •repare forcarrying out the mission ahead of time. ( )

If the enemy offers weak resistance the tank-bornemotorized infantrymen approach the most importantobjectives at high speed and capture them on themove. (0)

The attackers capture a town by a surprise attack onthe move or by the method of planned preparation. Anattack on the move can be successful if the attackersiaflict a decisive defeat on the enemy, destroying

his manpower and materiel, and thus prevent him fromorganizing defences. (1)

In present-day combined arms combat seizing a city ora part of it is accomplished, as a rule, by attack fro-ithe march or following envelopmer.l of it. In thosecases when this is impossible due to the situation,troops will revert to the attack from a position ofdirect contact with thc enemy and conduct the attacksimultaneously along different avenues of approach(or the city may be taken by storm). (3 p. 13)

See, for example, Major L. Chyzankov, "Thevez Vcdn,•iu Peregrady Noch'iu"(Across Water Obstacles at Night), Voennvi Vestnik, June 1971.

**

A submit.

-7

Am a rule, an attack for the purpose of seizing a cityfrom a position of direct contact with the enemy is usedif an attack from the march has failed. In this caseadvance chast'* or yodrazdeleniYe, on approaching thecity, blockade it from several different directionsand by swift and decisive action seize the most importantobjectives on the edge of the city, thereby supportingthe approach and formation of the main forces for theattack. (3 p. 14)

If an attack on the move has not been a success, thetovn is captured from a position of close contact withthe enemy. The advanced subunits block the town fromseveral directions. By vigorous and resolute actionsthey seize the most important objectives on the outskirtsand ensure the approach and creation of the necessarygroupings of manpower and equipment for an advance. (1)

By vigorous and resolute actions throug•i gaps in theenemy defences, advanced detachments, usually comprisinga reinforced motorized infantry battalion, (in theattack) capture important objectives and main thoroughfareson the move and hold them till the arrival of the mainforces. The latter, avoiding protracted fighting onthe approaches to the town, exploit the success of theadvanced subunits, envelop any stubbornly resistingstrongpoints and defence centres, isolating them onefrom another. Then, depriving the enemy of the possibilityto manoeuvre and withdraw to the heart of the town oroutside its bounds, they destrby him and capture theassigued area of the town. (1)

In those cases when a city is strongly fortified andattempts to seize it from the march fail, seizing thecity is done by night or daytime assault with a simul-taneous attack on the flanks and rear from a positionof direct contact with the enemy. Under these conditionsfor the purpose of attack or assault attacking troopssurround the city, seize salients along the edge, andoccupy an initial position for attacking immediatelyin front of the forward edge of the defensive positionin the city. (3 pp. 42-43)

An attack in a town is carried out without interruptionuntil the opposite outskirts are reached or a link-upwith own troops advancing in the opposite direction iseffected. (1)

A unit.

68

As a rule, a combat mission in a city was organizedless deeply than under ordinary conditions. (" p. 123)

The main method of attack under conditions where nuclearwapons are emloyed is attack from the march. (1 p. 8)

The conditions under which an attack is organized andconducted for the purpose of seizing a city or part ofit differ significantly from ordinary field conditions.In both cases the nature of the action depends uponwhether nuclear weapons or only cnnventional weaponsare used. (1 p. 8)

In organizing for combat, podrazdelenive commanderscarefully study the city on large-scale maps (or citymaps), number blocks and individual objectives, analyzeinformation on the character of enemy defenses andhis fire system, and plot this on working maps. (5)

The following are necessary conditions for achievingsuccess in an attack: thorough and concealed preparationof podrazdeleniye or assault groups to seize strongpointslocated on the edge of the city; sudden and decisiveaction of podrazdeleniye in seizing them and swiftdevelopment of the attack deep within the city; andrapid exploitation of the results of strikes deliveredon decision of senior commanders and capable employmentof weapons remaining at the disposal of podrqzdt-leniyecommanders. (3 p. 43)

The advance must be uninterrupted. Having capturedone objective subunits attack the next applying variousmethods of action: storm, turning movement, blocking. ()

For the purpose of seizing a city by attack from amarch or encircling it podrazdeleniye may move out froman assembly area. In this case organization for combatis completed while podrazdeleniye are in the area. (3 p. 14)

Preparatory fires for the attack are delivered at thedesignated time. During this period sapper podrazdelenlye,under the cover of fire from artillery, mortars, tanks,and guns designated for firing by direct lay and alsofire of motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, lay passages inenemy obstacles. However, in the interests of achievingsuddenness of attack there may be no preparatory firesand this is characteristic of a night attack. In thiscase artillery will deliver fire for effect at thestart of the attack. (3 p. 43)

69

An attack of the FM is carried out simultaneoualyby reinforced subunits of the first echelons at theexactly appointed tm. (1)

Having captured the strong points on the outskirtsof the town, subunits advance along the streets fromone objective to another using gardens, yards, breschesin wall& and underground structures, systematicallydestroy the enmy, giving each other fire support, andpenetrate into the depth. (I)

To approach the flanks and the rear of the next objectiveuse is made of gaps in the enemy defence and deadground: gaps in the walls of buildings, yards, gardens,roofs and underground passages. (1)

At the signal for the attack or assault motorized riflepodrazdeleniye, under cover of fire and smoke, willcross obstacles using the passages which have been laid,reach the buildings occupied by the enemy which areuider attack, ard enter then and destroy the enemy. At,his time the fire from artillery, tanks, and guns"vsignated for fire by direct lay, which is deliveredover the heads and from the flanks of attachingpodrazdeloniye, is intensified.

When the at tacking podrazdelcniye approach the buildingsartillery pieces and machinrýguns shift fire to the upperstories and attics, to adjaceut buildings, and to thegaps between them. (3 p. 43)

In one case a strongpoint might be seized by assaultand in another it might be advantageous to bypass itafter blockading the defending enemy. Sometimes itwill be advisable to wipe out the garrison of astronfpoinL by demolio'ing it or setting fire toit. ( p. 41)

When preparing to assault a block, the commander ofthe battalion pointed out the house, which were to be!-'eized first of all and were to be used then as aK' 'geh.. d for taking the entire block. Usually, this4, ;t'ui ;lding, the approaches to which were leastsil--'ted to the flank fire of the enemy. p. 27)

70 This Document

R e po d u c e F r o rneSt AVailable Copy

/

Motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, on approaching astructure, block armored turrets and cover embrasureswith bags filled with dirt. They occupy positions infroat and to the sides of a structure in order to destroythe enemy in case he leaves a building, prevent theapproach of enemy reserves from the rear, aad repulsehis counterattacks. (3 p. 44)

With successful development of the attack of our troops

advance podrazdaleniye relentlessly pursue the tetreeating

enemy, prevent an organiztd exit from the city, Aind,

delivering simultaneous blows from different directionsand using the gaps between hib combat formations, break

into the city, seize important objectives in it, anddevelop the attack in depth, supporting rapid captureof the city by the man forces. (3 p. 13)

Shortly thereafter, the combat order was received. From

it I understood that our assault group, including amotorized-rifle platoon, a tank, a detachment of sappersand chesical scouts attack along the highway. Its task:in coordination with the neighboring assault group toseize an adjacent block of homes and factories. Subse-quently, to advance to the opposite side of the populatedpoint. An artillery battery supports the assault gruup.

The commander of the assault group to seize an adjacentblock of homes and factories. Subsequently, to advanceto the opposite side of the populated point. An artillerybattery supports the assault group.

The commander of the assault group ordered mte in theperiod of fire preparation, together with the rRgh',5ritngcrew, to destroy the enemy tank in the trench at thu

corner of building No. 2 and to crush the gun at thecorner of building No. 1. Then, to attack along thestreet.

At the appointed time, blew up green rockets. Rolls ofartillery cannonade shook the air. The outskirts of thv

populated point was covered with the smoke of explosions.

The sappers pushed ahead and under the cover of artilleryfire gaps in the mine fields.

We also pushed our tank into position for firing bydirect lay. I ordered Private V. Gomel. to open fire,when had lifted the smoke of the explosions at build!ngNo. 2. Catching the right moment, he pushed the electronictrigger. The hit was accurate. The tank in the trench

71

I •' 'U

"began to emit smoke."Under the cover of the fire veapcna, the motorizedInfantryman moved into the created gaps. Combiningmovement with firing on the u.1ve, he advanced to theassault position.

Artillery at this time transferred into the defensedepth of "the enemy". F:%r some timn our crew tookintensive machinegun fire icou the window of the upperstories of the building, securing the approaches of theassault groups.

As only the motorized infantrymen started "fighting"inside the building, we changed fire positions. Ad-vancing, intensive Sun and machinegun fire was taken.Covered by the corner of building No. 2, our tank openedfire on the window and doorway openings of house No. 3.Quickly, it was occupied by motorized infantrymen.The neighboring assault group attacked in series.

Buildings No. 5 and 6, as was presupposed, "the enemy"strongly fortified, and the approaches to them wereexposed to artillery-machinegun fire. It was impossibleto attack these strongpoints without the hope ofsuppressing "enemy" weapon emplacements. Artilleristsopened fire. At the very same time from the undergroundstructures of the sewage system, the commander sent anassault group into the rear of the "enemy" motorizedinfantrymen and sappers in order to destroy his weaponemplacement, hindering the advancement.

Combining fire and a strike from the rear, our assaultgroup withdrew to arouse the confusion of the enemy.Taking advantage of it, he attacked the strongpointat the front and took the first story of the building.The fire and dense smoke hampered observation and firingfrom the tank. I decided to change the firing position.But when we began to advance to building No. 6, then frombehind the right corner of house No. 7, the "enemy"wheeled out a recoilless gun. The danger was firstnoticed by the motorized infantrymen of the neighboringassault group. They opened fire on the crew of therecoilless gun.

Aý this moment, we all in only a second relaxed thecircuiar observation and because of this we almost paid(with our lives). The neighboring crew, which destroyedthe target with the first shot, rescued (us).

72

Silzing the strongpoint, the motorized infautrymenbegan "fighting" on the approaches to the factory.Otar crew supported them by fire. "Fighting" for tiefactory-building No. 10--was protracted; howeverweapons withdrew to crush "enemy" resistance by assaultfire of all kinds. Under cover of a smoke-screen andthe firing of artillery and tanks, the motorized-ihfan-trymen infiltrated into the basement of the building.

With the loss of the factory the resistance of thedefenders began to weaken. After some time, the ,iss•.•-lgroups knocked out the enemy of the remaining housea

in the northeastern region of the city.

The "fighting" in the populated point was difficult.It demanded from each member of the crew skill, forti-tude, resourcefulness, and psychological hardiness.(11p. 8)

The lay-out of a town, the character of its struLcttIi',s,the time of the day and climatic conditions considerablyinfluence the organization and conduct of defensiveoperations. The commander takes account of all thesepeculiarities. (6)

The main distinguishing aspect of organizing coordinationin defense of a city is that particular attention is

devoted to coordinating the actions of smallpodrazdelcniye and sometimes even separate groups olsoldiers when they maneuver by changing position nd

whvn they maneuver by fire. Battle in n city break:

down into a series of local and separatf, bat tles.rhl.r,.fore. ,very podrazdeleni, e or gnrri.or, fiu I t t le,ooir.q, of vombat enjoys great tactical Indepe.,ie,-e a'hdth,.tr efforts must be directed toward carrying Otit. if

overal l battalion mission in accordance witll thc ,'Cn-",.itfor battle of the commander. (3 p. 65)

Defe~nsive operations on the approaches to , rown ir,carried out as in field conditions. First thfi-nenmyis attacked from the air. by artillery fire andcounterattacks. At this time it is very 1mp',rtaat t,

determine the character of the enemy action., thedirection in which his principal efforts are cn'ncentratoi(and the rime at which he will pass over to the uffvn';iv,.The comnandr employs all means of reconnaissance forthis purpose. (6)

7 3 This Document

Reproduced FromBest Available Copy

I I

Wich the approach of the enemy to the outskirts of thetown, the main aim of the fighting is to hold tacticallyadvantageous stone buildings (structures), turned intostronspoints. (1)

With the beginning of the enemy artillery barrage andair attacks all the personnel of the stronspoints arein basements and other shelters. The crews of dutyweapons and observers stay at their stations. Sometimesthe subunits holding the defences take up their actionstations on the order of the commander and prepare torepulse the enemy attack before the enemy opens fire,begins his attack or lifts fire. (6)

The success of a defensive battle depends to a greatextent on the independent and courageous actions ofsmall subunits reinforced with artillery, tanks andcombat engineers. A town offers favourable conditionsfor the operations of small units: the enemy attacksin different directions separated from one anotherby fires, buildings and blocks. As a result thereare usually open flanks and Saps in the enemy battleorders. This allows the defenders to deliver blowsat the enemy and his flanks, to encircle and destroyhis. (')

The advancing enemy is destroyed at the approaches toa strongpoint by the use of all weapons in coordinationwith the neighbors and with artillery and mortar firefrom covered positions, by air strikes and demolitionof mined obstacles. If in separate areas the enemymanages to penetrate the defences and to captureseveral buildings or a str.agpoint, the commanders ofsubunits stop him by well-organized fire. Artilleryand mortar fire prevents the enemy reserves from beingbrought up and isolates the subunits which have pene-trated the defences. (6)

Extensive use is made of ambushes along routes ofprob 3le enemy forward movement to deliver fire at histanks and armored personnel carriers. Even individualsoldiers armed with antitank hand grenades and antitankgrenade launchers can inflict significant losses onenemy tanks and armored personnel carriers moving alongcity streets which hamper maneuver. (3 p. 54)

74

1N1 rvpuLi..ing thr enemy attack the Infanti y ,'miLa h.. ,itoff frorw the tan"a and destroyed &irst since seratr.tt o,,or grt'upi of tanks which break Lnto the (iLy wltho,,.tiloatitry can be rapidly destroyed by antitanpk weaI-iNi it.,hort range. In this event the strength of tile batt'lii,.defensive position will not be iMpUited. C p. 11)

Mhe defenders achieve the complete rout of ti• en:v hdaring and surprise counterattacks at his flank and r, .Irhe msbunits advance unnoticed to the deployment I aii,.,i.mainlv% by imndsirground p.issages ,ind comrmuni. ;ition t t,.,r..Iecause if the llmit.d field of sight In a town ind iia.compikication of the situation in th-, area of the e.r'v\.i-entatration, a reconnaisKance and Ri-cur[. eltvm:'enit.r

sent out in front of the subqin itna� LI&ncInv, :,it !, . )ia,ittac,. The rolnterjtttieki ng Subunti .' i+iahtitn• f. r ,r

bh ildings frequeiitly Assuries the nature o, :aa ass•i;:.lh-ri.)rv. thiit ,4c c,ind et-che]Ilon subuni~ts must b! ab1,1 ,i, t -is '..,,t grouph.. (b')

, :,t L,1] L,..r ompary conr•ander can .431•gn pait t I tI

l.)res ., .'over tite flanks and repulst' an en,..m, tiutitiLnt -.Ittlick ind alI .i blockade individual buildings and utse iiimiiin lores to develop the attack in the Intiu tt .ei ....

:lht..ri,!<', rifle pt>dr.-zdeleniye s•t up smuke, scrten, t.,,sap~ort rapid Lrossing of certain -ýt-otor!.

Spi c i1 ll'. assigned l1.,4'r,'zdel*-nlv., Iains r, 5, ts.reserve chc.-k ,•eizt-d j1ildid tnts cit14 ;.L , I 'i.i j 7 . ,from rienain ng .;rutp.; -r lnd(Ividuai :.,, i r: I liv t[ Iett.nmy, clear mines, and Lii case o.f i.e.. :, it r•t' 'olti

CIisil !.ite the nbjecti ves seIz.,. . +y

" Siv sl 15 l , Ct,%tiktcaratt .ca • "i ; tt" .' a .- ,.* 7. . I tiot

,itt tic .. ournieous ;ind ro,.o Iiu tt j. t I a 'i II , * ,

and sepa r,-te t+rcsups of soidiers, ,)n tiLI i- 'I" i I I

-nan,)euvre, tL, use point-blank fire. t. I ; .ii ,an(d courageilisly enA,agi, the enemy in l:i:h,- ' i *, ,':

3uildings and structurvý, cleared )I tI !.' , . -... :--, vteIy checked for mines and conso. Iid r., i u O-. .. i,, I i isdetailed for this purpose. (6)

W4hit'l strong tenemy forces penetrate o, kLt i . , ai'

position a counter-itLack may not be au,.is •,t,,tiditlons a battalion commander idopt; .:.ll I .",.I r.ineas•lres to hold the enemy and striva;,.; Lo .tai Ili- priily ilong that avenue where further ftrwar. i...,' Ii.the enemy can lead ti division of the battil in , ,tformation or to isolation from adj..cent Iodr, setth. l v.

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(encirclement). To hold the enemy be uses his reserve ursecond echelon which occupies previously prepared huildingsand other structures or he adapts them for the defenseduring the course of combat and repuses further attemptsby the enemy to move deep within the city.

When the counterattacks are launched by the next highercommader the battalion takes all possible measures tosupport the deployment of the advanced podrazdeleniyeand the counterattack which they launch. The battalionattacks together with them using the second echelon orthe reserve.

When threatened with encirclement the battalion commanderregroups his podrazdeleniye as necessary. He uses hisreserve or second echelon to create a perimeter defenseand direct his main efforts toward destroying an enemywho threatens encirclement or isolation of the battalionfrom the rest of the chast'.

Combat in a city has an especially stubborn and fiercenature. Buildings or separate regions in a city may changehands several tines. But in every case every defendedbuilding must be a fortress inaccessible to the enemy.The one who possesses the stronger moral qualities suchas boldness, fortitude, endurance, and resourcefulnessand knows procedures and methods for fighting in a citywill be the victor. (S p. 75)

b. Task OrmaniIzation

Podrazdeleniye attacking in a city are separated by thebuildings and other structures between them. A needarises to organize the control of small podrazdeleniye,from squad to company. (3 p. 37)

Under these condittons, the combat formation of an assaultgroup may consist of the following elements: threeattacking subgroups (according to the number of platoonsin a company), reinforced with heavy machine guns and AThM;fire support subgroup (howitzer artillery, mortars, tanks);support subgroup (sappers, chemical specialists); a reserverifle squad), or in its place a subgroup for consolidatingsuccess. The commander may assign one or two squads togive help to gun crews and drivers of APCs in preparing(clearing) routes of movement to the objective, as wellas for covering tanks against tank destroyers, (s)

76

In the composition of the assault group was detailed fro,a platoon to a rifle company. They war& reinforced by ,.kto two detachments of medium machineguns, one to twodetachments of f1.unethrowers, one to two platoons 4 art .lery, a platoon of tanks or a self-propelled artillery tiiii•The assault groups were divided into subgroups: ol hviiar(assault), support (fire weapons), consolidatinn andreserve. In some groups, for example in the asiiaulL ofBerlin and Budapest, were created subgroups for obstacleclearing, deaolition (arson), and smoke screening.(Is p. 123)

For conducting battle in a city were created assaultdetachments, which, as a rule, were divided into assatiltgroupn, and the latter into subgroups (of seizure, supporr.and consolidation).

In the c:omposition of the assault det:ichment was t ,,ill,included a rifle battalion, reinforced regiment.il anddivision artillery units, morrars, tanks or self-pr, 1,-clitiinstal lat mns, large caliber machineguns, sapper sutbunit.,and portable flamethrowers...

To the assault detachment was assigned the task of selzitý'a strt.t or an individual block. It was, as a rule,divided into I to 6 assault groups, a support group, and:i reserve. The assault group was the foundation of th,detachment. its Composition and armament in each split-., [tcase was determined bv the situation, the combat riji.,andI the character of the enemy's deleuse.

I n the assgalt I roup wa-4 I ti~bert.,l I rom .i I) I t(• o ,, f ,1,,,mpany of Infantry, I to '. I a,lwt, i.ent.; .)f medfiums ,iiiiiltt-

gin., I to 2 ia ShK machrneasins, a tay.Ich'in ment (if ir'itank.wea;ponls, 3 to' 4 guns f•H t vatrious. ,il Dim, r, I r,, 2 t nk,' -. !

qel t-prcipel led Instkilaht iont, I to 2 detacitnit-tts ýiff 15 to A port.thle fl.tmethrowcr5, and 2' to 3 ch,'mlw sts withsmoke-screen and incendiairv 'lUi'up-nt. It w-v; ,apable ,,destroying or setting fire rn k huil,linn, d,:•nol!shing t;l.enemy Inside of it, and capturing and liolding the :att.1,,objective.

A support group Included an :irtilher% unit., rtoti.tr ;, t;,

heavy infantry gun. It was inteudi,:, for hi~nviing ;n tOleobjective of the attack by fir-, preventing tne i i rin•;the attack from neighboring b,,ildiai's. repellinng thu ,'nc.counterattacks, and securing; the continuity (if tile t•ft,•,-sive.

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7,

The reserve datacbment (a platoon to a company with supportmeans) was used for daveloping successes, repelling counter-attack&, supplementing or replacing active assault groups,blockading and destroying a ot-rounded enmy., as wall asreinforcing captured buLldings, and other objectives.

A seizure subgroup is used for the direct attack of abuilding and the destruction, in close connection withneighboring subgroups, of the manpower and fire weapons ofthe enemy.

It consists of I to 2 detachments.

A support subgroup during the attack prevents firing onthe flanks of the attackers from neighboring homes and,by firing at windows, entrances, doors, and garrets,destroyed the fire weapons of the defenders. After this,.it protects artillerymen, tankiste, sappers, and flame-throwers from the attack of the enemy's automatic gunners.,and eliminates enemy observers.

As soon as the seizure subgroup seizes an objective, thesupport subgroup immediately prepared for supporting anattack on the next building.

The consolidation subgroup, following after the seizuresubgroup, cleared the captured objective of the remainingsoldiers and officers of the enemy, secured it, and preparedit for defense, guarded the flanks, and coordirated itsfire for the development of the attack. (14 p. 27)

In our opinion, it is advisable to reinforce a companywhich attacks usually along one street with two or threetanks, a hovitzer battery, mortar platoon, two or threePTURS (protivotankovyy upravlyayemyy reaktivinyy snaryad;antitank guided missile], one or two sapper squads, andtwo or three chemical specialists, and provide supportwith the fire of a battery or rocket artillery. Such anassault group rill be able to create fire superiorityover an enemy reinforced platoon usually defending a largebuilding, which will allow it to ac,.omplish the assignedmission after fire preparation and air strikes and developthe attack without stopping. (5)

Assault detachments and groups are created for the captureof strongly fortified buildings, strongpoLnts, and centersof resistance. To the detachme.-t is ordinarily detaileda motorLzed-rifle battalion, reinforced by tanks, guns ofvarious calibers, and subunits of engineer and chemicaltroops. In it, assault groups are formed consisting of areinforced motorized-rifle company or a platoon each.Personnel are provided with an increased number of hand

78

grenadr.r, cartridges, and smoka weapons, as wall as ii,,,necessary devices for assaulting buildings-ladders, rol,'aboat hooks, grapnels, etc. Tanks, guns, and subunit.. a,,

special troops operate directly in the combat format ion.

of the motorized-rifle subunits. (7 p. 37)

A motorized rifle battalion assigned as an assault detach-sent is reinforced with artillery, tanks, and sapperg.

It is committed to combat on the outskirts or right withlivthe city for assaulting heavily fortified buildings.

Depending on the number of objectives being attacked in.'

the degree of enemy resistance, assault groups (up to areinforced motorized rifle company in strength) are formed

within the assault detachment. A portion of the podraz-

delenlya is assigned to the reserve. (5)

A bAtt:alion acting in the first echelon on a maJn avv'iu-of approach may receive tor reinforcement an artillervbattalion, . tank company or a battery ot SAU (.el f-p•r.-pelled artillery pieces), and a company of sappers and ,.:

be supported by the tire of an artillery battalion.

A battalion acting as an assault dttachment can receivemore sapper podrazdelenlye than inoicated above and thiaartillery in support of its attack will be stronger.

A motorized rifle company can receive for reinforcementai Lank platoon, an artillery battery, and a sapper piaou,',.(a 1. 17)

lhe subunits detailed to defend strong points and ,..,t..-sof resistance are trained to fight independently :al, i,iencirclenent. Therefore they are reinforced withr ii . :.,

tanks, self-propelled guns ard subunits of combat a 'ia...-.(I)

c. Water o}bstacles

During an attack In a town subunits otrvn hr.t. , ., 'a ,

water obstacles. The assault crossin,-. of riv'rs ,iu. ,

has its peculiarities. The availability a't huildings ',nbank already captured by the att.ickiiug suh,,iits Ill).W' th.

assault positions to be located 1i4)-150 m neairer th,- C.,;-

off line and ensures cover trim entv:,v fire. A lar•e

quantity of improvised materials and :ieans, utilizatioa -t

bridges, barges, river trams and steambuat- lilow tle.: .'.b-

units to speed up the assault crushing of "..ter a:rri. -.

At the same time high and steep hanks, f,,L&,-. With ';? 'lit 'r

concrete, with a Imiited number of '.pproachv. and a'.it'.

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as well as the utilization by the enemy of high buildingsfor delivering a multitier fir4e hamper tha assaultcrossing. hoxzsty of the eno y FUA (56-M a from thebank) excludes any possibility of concentrating subunitsfor the attack after landing on rhe opposite bank.More often than not an attack is carried out by smallgroups immediately after negotiating the water barrier.

Fighting for a bridgehead in a town means, first of all,storming the enemy in buildings (structures) adjoining theenbanmkmnt. After capturing these buildings and con-solidating the troops set about launching bridges for thecrossing of the main forces.

Wide canals and rivers floving through a city may proveto be serious obstacles for attacking troops. To forcethen successfully from the march podrazdeleniye reinforcedwith sappers and diver-scouts are sent out ahead of timeto support successful forcing of them from the march.These podrazdeleniye have the mission of determiningwhether the enemy occupies the far bank, whether theobstacle is mined on the banks and in the water, thenature of the banks and the bottom, and the existence ofcrossings and fords. Furthermore, provisions are made forsending out podrazdeleniye (depending on the importanceof the water obstacles) to seize existing bridges andcrossings and secure them until the approach of the attack-ing podrazdeleniye. These podrazdeleniye, without joiningwith the enemy in combat and using underground structures,reach the indicated objectives, hold them, and supportcrossing of the water obstacles by the attackin& 2draz-deleniye.

If bridges, dams, and other structures on water obstaclesare not seized or prove to be destroyed by the enemy andif bridge-carrying tanks cannot be used, attackingpodrazdelenuye are obliged to force the water obstacles.This entails a great amount of engineer work to makeentries and exits at the water's edge for equipment since,as a rule, the banks of canals or rivers in a city aresteep and made of concrete. To support this work advancemotorized rifle podrazdeleniye, in forcing a water obstacleby using means found at hand, will have to seize objec-tives on the far bank. (3 p. 41)

The banks of rivers and canals in cities are, as a rule,lined with stone and concrete. With the help of hydro-technical facilities, the enemy can quickly change the levelof the water, increase the speed of the flow, and thuscreate additional difficulties for managing crossings.Therefore, advancing in a city, it is necessary to try tocapture existing bridges very rapidly. As experience

80

/

.4howh, it Is advisbiLe to create also special detachzb-in-t.;or groups, having included in it tank, motrrized-ritle,and engineering-sapper subunits for this purpoat. (I p.

It the couirse of an offensive In a city, it is ofti-nnecegmary to cross water obstacles. Best of all this Ito be done with a rush-by the surprise capture of bridgca,crossings, fords, And various hydrotechnical stractures.

T'he forcing of a water obstacle in a city, on the one htii,Is fa-ilitated since it is possible to approach the- hankunder cover and there are Improvised ineans and .onSLru,-tiun material. On the other hand, it Is hlindered by shevrbanks, which are usually faced with stone or con,-rete,as well :is by a limited number of approaches (exlts) and-Ioseness to the enemy. (7 p. 39)

d,�. jiht Operazions

.omb.•t in a city dUes tiot CU.a14 e at iaig;ot. lie or.i ni,,I.Ltl.ill corwianders clarify the missions assigned theirjodrazdele.ive; appoint guides, .iz& Ointh men, in.1 h ise:;oldiers and podrazdcteniye; provid,, ti.em wit illriu, .devices, prepare illumination and also blinding of enemy",ibjectives; and prescribo exactly methods to be ased torwarning and target designation. (1 n. 42)

;iftn tlii coming of darkness, some of the observation poi•t.transfer from the upper atore's of the building tLo thelower stirey and the basement, since the destroyed stru:-tuires, public gardens, and city streets are better mevnagainst the background of the sky. (11 p. 24)

1 ht s,%sttan of fire must be apable of carryingaP o.,t 01 al .1i:;i,iiozs cven it the event the ent:eý attacks ait ni,,'iit

,o1li, r -tiher condition-, of limited vi,ibi!iLt- and tit,,rt' ,rweapons must be prepared for deliverin,, fire under tlbie"0,'aditions. (C pp. 51-52)

lite oattalion occupies the initiai position ',or tsta-ia accordance wit'. the decision of -he regir ,,o taldurins the nignt or under other ctiitlti,,ns if llmltt Ivi.iihility and wrhile observitim camouflage mrcjP,irv,. C

Irep-iratox , fires for the attacik i,-. dejiv.tt-d :,t -'etl(siý.;'.!te-l Lime. During tnis period a.:pj~vr ,'r,;:', ,

,dtar the cover cf -ire from irtille:, aorLars, 'anks,-11d guccns deslgnart i for flrinr by dir-ct I-; ind al.,,. rvof notorized rifle podrazdelen e, l.iv naqsag•s In 1)OStjtLlt's. ftowever, in the interests of :-IkivvIn, :;,dness 1:" attack thert, nay be no preparator'. iires anro tr,Is Lhi.r iteristic of a nilht .itt.,ck. In thi, t'.ase • rAill .,iv-r fire for effect at the start of the itt

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2. Soviet Guidelines for the Infantuyman in Urban Varfare

a one would anticipate, the infantryman is the basic element

1n Soviet tactical doctrine for city fighting. In some cases the guide-

lines refer to mitorized or mechanized infantry, in othars to the infantry-

man on foot. The distinction i&, in all cases, obvious within the text.

The guldelines which follov are directed to the infantry comander as

vell as the Individual soldiar and, again, the distinction Is apparent

ln the text. For convenience this infantry section is broken down into

the following categories:

Missions, Objectives and Sectors Fire TechniquesFormations and Positions House and Street FightingManeuver PursuitArm and Equipment Consolidation

Soviet writers on tactics consistently maintain that sectors of

operations assigned to tactical units In urban warfare in both offense

and defense are considerably less than under other conditions where

visibility and the unobstructed range of direct fire weapons are greater.

In the assault a preferred formation for taking a city "by storm" is

the tank platoon wedge with a 3quad of motorized infantry following behind

each tank. The defense is organized by the infantryman around strongpointe

in selected buildings which are extensively fortified. Tactical airborne,

to include helicopter, assaults are favored for operations deep in the

enemy rear. Underground passages are recommended for the covered

maneuver of both offensive and defensive forces. The Soviets list

individual automatic weapons and grenades as having special significance

for urban warfare and indicate that the infantryman's combat load for

such a.u'nition will be increased for city fighting. There are consistent

references to control and coordination of small arms, artillery and direct

fire weapons and interlocking bands of multilevel, concentrated fire are

sought from defensive positions to mainimze the density of fire.

Barricades and obstacles are covered by fire and special attention is

devoted to antitank firing techniques and tank ambushes.

82

The Infaatryana Is iastructed that fighting in buildings and

.tre..ts t-.q,,ir.s special techniques which are characterized by vioh4-nt

,ttion .it dLust. Iund to hand quiirters where small units have the

initiativ.. Wall bre.,chings are made using the nervices of the sappers

with th.ir explosive charges and employing direct fire weapons. There

ask- references to the preference for attacking buildings from the

up;per .ltortes first and concentrating on staircases, entrances and exits.

a. .4issions, Objectives and Sectors

One distinguishing aspect of an attack in a city Istmat podrazdelenlye are assigned missions to seizeobjectives in the city and not line.. 0 p. 17)

In illustrating a tactical example of an attack (ina city) the authors recommend designating in thebattalion special "groups for creating panic," sendingthem for this purpose to the enemy rear. It is hirdlypossible to agree with this. Indeed, creating panic isnot a special but a concomitant mission and it may, andeven must, be carried out by all podrazdeleniye whichreach the enemy rear in order to destroy or seize oneobjective or another. (4)

The rotorized rifle battalion and company, the ccohatcapabliltics of which have strongly increased, artc:apalile of using one combat formatito to handle n,-. i,,,,-,

to .a greater depth than during the past war. 0

The frontage of the offersive in a town s; connidr..hiv

less than under usual conditions and reache.s ".i) .

for a battalion and 300 m for a company. 0)

A motrized-rifle platoon can attack alon6 vno *tre't

on both sides or assault an individual obh(,,tti,.t(a building, a structure). A .'om.inv ,rditar i•v

attacks along one or two street. or receivt the t..-to seize a large industrial strzcture (a,.nin i.t tr, O,'-

building), and a battalion--on eev.0.l p lrallelstreets, including 2 to 4 city blo~k-.. (7 p. 17)

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The enemy objectives, depending on the size of buildingsend the degree of contact of the defenders, are attackedby a reinforced platoon, company or battalion. Provisionis made beforehand for special groups to destroy andblock fortified structures. (1)

The Immediate task of a battalion ts to destroy theenemy manpower and fire weapons located within thebounds of ons or two blocks, or to capture one bigstructure. Subsequently a battalion captures importantobjectives in the depth of ene" defences. (1)

The Immediate mission of a battalion may be to destroyenemy personnel and weapons located in one or twoblocks or to seize a single large structure. Then thebattalion may develop the attack for the putpose ofseizing important objectives deep within the enemy'sdefensive position.

If a nuclear weapon is used on a battalion's routeof action, the battalion's Iisediate mission may begreater. It may amount to destroying enemy personneland weapons and seizing several blocks and thendeveloping the attack for the purpose of reachingmin arteries or the center of the city. (3 p. 17)

The front of a battalion attack in a city and thedepth of a combat mission depend on conditions ofattack, the nature of the city and the way it isbuilt, the existence of obstacles, the nature offortifications prepared on the edge of the city andwithin it, the degree to which the opposing enemyis suppressed by fire, and the coqposition of thebattalion.

The width of the front of an attack in a city willbe such less than in the case of an attack underordinary field conditions. In view of the fact thatthe width of a city block is about 200--400 u anda battalion usually attacks along several parallelstreets, the front of an attack may be 400-600 aor more. For a motorized rifle company attacking,as a rule, along one street the width of front ofattack will be 200-300 a. (3 p. 16)

84

.• ,'. , , ••4 _

No/" .I .-

The role a battalion plays in an attack is determinedby the combat mission it is carrying out and itsplace in the combat formation of the regiment.

'rie most difficult mission is carried out by a battal,.'n

operating in the first echelon or on a main avnueWof approach. In an attack launched for the pu 1pose

of seizing a city by attack from the march its mi.,.sIvn

is, by exploiting the results of the actions of the

advance detachment, advance guard, tactical air assa,!tforce, or enveloping detachment and air bitrikisJ autl

artillery fire and in conjunction with adjacent

podrazdeieniye, to destroy the podrazdeleniye covering

the approacheb to the city, enter the city, inflict

lovses on the opposing enemy, and thereby createfavorable conditions for seizing the city or partof it. (3 p. 15)

An iTaaortant role Is allwttod to t.atic.,l -IrNbrri

troops, which are employed for the purpose of denyingthe enemy the opportunity to close gaps ano intervals!n combat formations, to seize and hold importantobjectives (squa*res. boulevards, public gardens,

major crossroads, statlonb, bases, warehouses, etc.).and means of nuclear attack, and to disrupt Ltie couitrolof troops. Their composition in each specific caseIs different, but most often it in a motorized-rifleCOmpdny or platoon. (7 p. 37)

Thus the assault group of the battalion first echaeloncan capture a fortified block. To seize one or twomore objectives (blocks) In the depth of a city.

live battalion commander ComMitS the aecond echelon. 1")

Me frontage and depth of defence areas in a Lownare determined by the combat mission, Lite availabilit.of friendly man; ow, r and eq •ipment and the ,,ppoins"enemv forces. as well as by :he iav-otit o ti h town

and Lte str4-nvth of its buildings and !tructureq. 1!1

d town tOe f IVl ol sictat .ind botjbardmivnt at. i ;.,H ,i.

'ianoeuvring is rkvr, di,.Eicu!t anr~d cuoperat.,or, !, -•nt.nsubunits ind troor .nt.:,,l artr ,,n.;1 m• ' . 'l)ts

is WhI the front awe and depth uf !, enm -,, w 1ýi

naturally, !e less than in 'ield -,,nditi,' .I

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S' / #

/ A t""

In addition to carrying out Its smin mission whichis to Intensify the force of the blow struck by thefirst echelon, a battalion in the second echelon mustbe reedy to repulse enemy counterattacks, replacevodrazdeleni2e which have lost their comat capability,or act in capacity of enveloping detachment.

A battalion in reserve must be ready to carry outmissions arising suddenly during the course of battleand also several of the missions assigned to a battalionin the second echelon. (0 p. 15)

Usually a motorized rifle battalion defends severalblocks in a city. (3 p. 51)

A motorized rifle battalion assigned as an assaultdetachment is reinforced with artillery, tanks, andsappers. It is comitted to combat on the outskirtsor right within the city for assaulting heavilyfortified buildings. Depending on the ntmber ofofjectives being attacked and the degree of enemyresistance, assault groups (up to a reinforced motorizedrifle company in strength) are formed within theassault detachment. A portion of the podrazdeleniyais assigned to the reserve.

A company may defend several buildings prepared forperimeter defense and tied in by fire. A platoondefends one or two buildings within a company strong-point. In some cases one large building may bedefended by a company and In this case a rFatoonmay defend part of the building or one floor. (1 pp. 51-52)

Today a motorized infantry company usually defendsa strongpoint. It includes one or several buildings.one or two blocks and is a component part of abattalion centre of resistance. The battalion centreof resistance consists of two or three strongpoints.Fire coordination is established between them, crmamica-tion trenches are organized and ambushes are laid inthe gaps and on the flanks. (')

b. Formations and Positions

Motorized rifle podrazdelenlye reinforced by tanks,sappers, and artillery, using the results of nuclear

86

.- . _ • < ," . • ... - ., •¾ , . , ..-. '

S'- -y,::\ . -_ ------A.. .. .. -

strikes, air strikes, and artillery fire, deploystep-by-step into the approach march and then intocombat formation in order to go into the attack.C1 p. 40)

A battalion's battle formation consists of companybattle formation- with reinforcing means and the tireweapons at the direct disposal of the battalion CO.It is drawn up in single echelon formation. Duringan offensive In a big town a battalion can asium,two-echelon battle formation. In order that eachsubunit may possess complete tactical independenceguns, tanks and combat engineers are attached to it. C)

An advance detachment can also be formed by a rein-torced motorized rifle battalion. By swift, daring,and decisive action and using air strikes it is ableto, seize two or three blocks and hold them securelyuntil the approach of the main forces. (' p. 13)

For an •ltenmivo in a city, it is recommended to havedeper ,',mbat formations, since the defense is strongurher(- thaIn under field conditions. Moreover, unoccupiedor poorly defended sectors may be detected which shouldbe utilized for the development of success by thecomimntment to action ot fresh forceq from the depth.The deep echeloning of combat lormations is alsoprovoked by the continuity of the condutr of combatactivity day and night, and by the necessity to destrovseparate groups of the enemy left in the rear of theattackers, to sec,,re captured buildings, and to replacesubunits which have suttered great losses. (' p. 37)

When advancing in a town command and observationposts are located nearer the subunits attacking themost Important objectives. (1)

Th,. KN' (kor,mndirs•Kiv nablyudatcl'nvy punkt; o•n hndvr' SohservaLion post) of the assault group coraander tissituated In the Imnmediate vicinit" of the noterl-edrifle, podrazdeleniva and so that It is easy to se.from there all the terraii. ahead, the attLack ,hj., iand buildings adjacent to it. Trenches. bhunkert:, u..!semihasements are good for these purposes. The (,oill 1 1i'nst of the artilleory battery -rom-Lder is h,,tplaced with the 0P of the rmutoriz,.d rifle lvripany

ontmander. which increases efficiency of control ofpodrazdeleniya. ()

ram attached taeks usually operate "n motorizedInfantry battle formations and, firing on the mave, Xdestroy the smasy fire weapons. (')

Task podrazdelenive, as a rule, are attached to motorizedrifle companies and platoons and operate in theircmbat formations. They fire by direct lay to clearthe path for motorized rifle Podrazdelenive. Theycan be included in assault groups and groups fordestroying nuclear chargse. Usually the ilatoon isthe least subdivision of teak podrazdelenlye. However,the posasibility of separate teaks acting with motorizedrifle platoons and squads cannot be precluded. Ixperi-once gained in battle show, during the course of anattack in a city a sound tactic is to employ a tankplatoon wedge formation wherein one tank or SAU moavsdonm the center of a street and other tanks or SAUmove behind it at soew distance on the right or leftside of the street, providing nutual fire support.A squad of a motorized rifle platoon moves behindeach tank, protected by the armor. In this case tanks,covering one another by fire, can successfully hitweapons in strong Implacements, remove barricades andrubble, and destroy enemy tanks and armor personnelcarriers. Motorized rifleman can effectively combatenemy close-combat weapons and thereby support thetanks in successfully carrying out a aisuion. (3 pp. 19-20)

A battalion acting in the first echelon on a mainavenue of approach may receive for reinforcemnt anartillery battalion, a tank company or a battery ofSAU (self-propelled artillery pieces), and a companyof sappers and may be supported by the fire of anartillery battalion.

A battalion acting as an assault detachment can receivemore sapper podrazdeleniye than indicated above andthe artillery in support of its attack will be stronger.

A motorized rifle coupany can receive for reinforcementa tank platoon, an artillery battery, and a sapperplatoon. (3 p. 17)

Depending on the nature of the enemy defense and theassigned mission, and also if the comamnder has notsucceeded in sufficiently exposing the dispositionof enemy strongpoints, particularly in the depth ofthe city, the combat formation of a reinforced motorizedrifle battalion can be formed into two and sometimes

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three echelons. The second echelon completes thedestruction of the enmy, consolidates the successof V' trt echelon, and repulses possible counter-attacks from the flank and rear. (S)

A battalion defensive position includes the combatformations of podrazdelenlye and the battalion defensiveposition, the system of fire, and fortifications ofthe defensive area.

A battalion defensive area consists of the followingelements: company strongpoints prepared for perimeterdefense constituting the basis of the battaliondefensive positions; strongpoint of the reserve;locations for preparing ambushes; firing posttlons ofmortars, artillery, and antitank weapons left in thehands of the battalion comander; and places preparedas control points for the battalion and its rear servicepodrazdelenlye. Furthermore, in a defensive areadumy strongpoints and podrazdelenive positions forsecuring and defending entrances and exits of under-ground structures and routes of commnication may beprepared. Sometimes combat security positions areprepared in front of the defensive position of abattalion In the first echelon. (3 p. 51)

Wdhen selecting a building for a strongpoint one takesinto consideration, first of all, Its fitness forcarrying out all-round observation and fire. Multitlerfire is organized. The bulk of fire weapons are isitedin the lower stories and basements. Wooden buildingswhich hamper fire are torn down. It is ad-risable touse as strongpoints buildings lov•ated at crossroadsand in squares. The nunber of personnel for a strong-point is determined by the significance of the defendedobjective and the availability of manpower and equipment.The experience of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45)shows that a reinforced infantry company was detailedfor the defence of a four- or five-story building orseveral two- or three-story buildings located alongthe 200-600 a frontage and 200-400 a in depth. (6)

From the very first day the "Home of Pavlov" wasprepared for perimeter defense. All approaches to thebuilding were gradually mined and antitank and anti-personnel minefields were prepared around tne building.In some sectors land mines were put out. A communica-tion trench was dug to the rear for the pturpoHe of

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delivering ammition, food, end wter to the garrison.A treach we dug In the rear of the building to giveperson•el proteotiea against enW artillery fire.Furthermore, a drain pipe passing to the rear of thebuiLM' was adapted for the same purpose and twocommication trenches were dug to it. Soldiersoccupying a defensive position on the first and uuper /stories of the building, during strong artillery lire,used these routes to take cover In the drain pipe.Soldiers defending sealbasement areas, during artilleryfirs, remained In place at their weapona. Goodfortification helped our courageoua fighting ma holdthe building for 58 days, until the day our troopsreverted to the attack for the purpose of destroyingthe enemy forces at Stalingrad. (I a. 70)

Strongpoints, organized in the first place in rein-forced concrete end stone buildings, form the basisof defence In a town. Prepared for all-round defence,the strongpoints are connected with each other byconmunication trenches. (6)

In dr fense of a city combat security is set out bya battalion in the first echelon when reverting to thedefense and when not In contact with the enemy and whenIn direct conta-t with his combat security may be setout only on those avenues of approach where the distancebet"ee the forward edge of the defenlve position endthe enemy Is greater than 1000 a. (I p. 68)

Buildings and other structures In the Saps betweenstronspoints are prepared for blasting, mined obstaclesare prepared, log obstacles and barricades are setup, and provisions are made for flanking and Interlockingfire of all types to cover the flanks and the Sapsbetween strongpoints. (3 p. 55)

Podrazdelenive control points can best be locatei instrong basements and on the lover floors of buildingsand they should be equipped to provide antinuclearand antichenical protection. Observation posts areestablished on the upper floors and on roofs.Podrasdelenive 'comanders are given orienting. andlarge-scale maps or plans of the city. (I p. 55)

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The battalion command-observation post is located closeto company combat formations. Based an experiencegained in the war it is often 200-300 a from thecompanies of the first echelon. (' p. 38)

The stability of a defensive position in a city isgreatly enhanced by fortifications. All kinds ofbuildings and underground structures and basmannsare prepared and fortified as shelters which provideprotection against nuclear and other weapons. Buildingsare adapted for the defense, windows and doors arefilled In with bricks and sandbags, firing embrasuresare made, holes are made and routes prepared in atticsand between floors for maneuver and Interaction amongpodruadelenie. (1 P. 54)

Not all ijuildings are used for the defensive positionsof a company or platoon but only the more solid oneswhich are located at intersections of min arteriesand at the entrances to squares, parks, bridges, andother important sites. Buildings are selected forstrongpoints in light of the possibility of conductingobservation and fire from them and the possibilityof protecting personnel against weapons of massdeqtruction. Wooden structures and also buildingswhich hinder fields of fire are removed wherepossible. (3 pp. 51-52)

Masonry and reinforced concrete buildings designatedfor defenso are prepared for all-around defense. Doorand window openings in the buildings which are notdesignated for use are filled in solid with brick orsandbags. Embrasures for firing submachineguns,machineguns, grenade launchers, and other weapons andviewing slits for observation are prepared withperimeter defense of the building in mind. Stairwellsare barricaded, mined, or destroyed. Hatches aremade through ceiling,, and ladderm are made. Corridorswithin buildings are barricaded and prepared for smallarms fire. To decrease losses from shell fragmentswhich get irside buildings, partitions made from brickssandbags, or other material must be made betweenembrasures and viewing slits.

Communication routes are prepared between strongpolntsand defended buildings for which purpose use is firstmade of underground structures (tunnels, subways,water mains, etc.), and when these do not existtrenches are dug, the most important sectors of which

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are covered to protect ther wben buildings around thanare destroyed.

In those cases when there are no strong undergroundstructures or basn-mnt areas which might be used toprotect personnel against nuclear weapons, sheltersare dug In the ground away from defended buildings inorder to kMa then from becoming covered with rubble.

In preparing basement areas which are used for sheltersfor protection against fire and to dilinish the doseof penetrating rediation, the floor of the first storyis sprinkled with dirt to a thickness of 20--0 cm.Shelters are built so that they will be under theruins of the upper stories following a nuclear blast.The mein entrance is usually mede near a stairwelland existing underground routes of comiuncationbetween basemnt areas are used as alternate entrances.

The gaps between strongpoints, streets, squares, andparks are filled with mined mnd other obstacles andcovered by fire. In a city all types of obstaclescan be used In conjunction with explosives or withoutthem: antitank ad antipersonnel mines, delayed actionamnes, fragm•ntation-barrier mines, barricades, anti-tank steel hedgehogs and turnstiles, reinforced concreteposts, tetrahedra, and also barbed wire obstacles.

Bridges over rivers and canals and also undergroundstructures running from the direction of the enemy(tunnels, subways, drainage ditches) are prepared fordemolition. As a rule, they are blasted when theenemy threatens to seize them. Som buildings shouldbe prepared for reduction to rubble for the purposeof blocking streets In case of need. (3 pp. 69-70)

It Is most advantageous to select positions for weaponsas close as possible to the attack objective, and toplace machineguas, grenade launchers, and ATQI in semi-basements and lower stories, and in windows or embrasuresof buildings adjacent to the attack objective. As arule, snipers and observers are situated in upperstories, In attics, and on roofs of buildings. Firingpositions for mortars are assigned in courtyards,gardens, building attics, and behind fences, and forattached and supporting artillery-in gardens, parks,and behind snelter on squares and in streets. In thiscase the crews can fire not only from Indirect layingpositions, but by direct laying as well. Before theattack begins, APCa are placed under cover, with theirmechinegunners ready to support the attack of thepodradelmeiya. (5)

A2

Camoufl~age in a city is greatly facilitated by the cls•eu1nature of the terrain and does not require greet expendt-ture of caouflage means. It is achieved by the locationof personnel and weapons in buildings, and window and dolropenings, by the creation of dumy defensive locations Inblocks and in buildings not defended by podrazdelentye,by observing sound and light discipline, by extensive uneof smoke agents, and by excluding the local populace fromLte defensive area. A battalion comnander provides forall these measures in organizing a defensive position andfortifying it. (3 p. 70)

To facilitate fire fighting all inflammable objects areremoved from buildings, wooden floors are sprinkled with"sand, and water supplies are established in case themunicipal water supply system is put out of operation.Windows and other openings in buildings are covered vithgrills or fire-resistant plates so that the enemy will beunable to throw incendiaries through them. The entrancesinto dugouts and base=ent and smalbasoment areas arecovered with brick thresholds 15-20cm thick for the purposeof preventing spread into these areas of napalm, pyrogel,and other incendiary mixtures. Fire lanes not less than50-70 m wide are prepared on the streets for the purposeof preventing the spread of fires over the city. (3 p. 55)

Ambushes are prepared in addition to combat security onsome avenues of ap:roach for immediate security and forpreventing sudden enemy attack. Within a city patrolsare organized for streets, squares, and parks. An exten-sive network of observers to established and at nightlistening posts are used. (S p. 68)

Maneuver

In those cases when the enemy offers vea'- resistance alonga street, tanks with infantry mounted on them or inian-yin armored personnel carriers and trucks move along thestree. at a great speed, delivering fire on the move.They reach important objectives In this way and seize themfrom tV.- march.

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An attack in a town is carried out without interruptionuntil the opposite outskirts are reached or a link-upwith ow troops advauncing In the opposite directionIs effected. (I p. 12)

If the enaey offers weak resistance the tank-bornemotorized infsatrymim approach the most importantobjectivew at high speed and capture them on the move. (1)

An attack from the merch directly sainst a city beginsafter seizing the nearest outer trace of the city.

With successful development of the attack battalionsin the first echelon, pursuing a retreating enemy alongparallel routes, strive to prevent bin from leavingthe city and they attack indicated objectives from themarch as they approach the enemy. (2 p. 38)

Tanks usually advance togsther with motorized rifleodrazdelenive in Liair formation. and, delivering fire

on the move, destroy enemy weapons hindering forwardmovement of the infantry. (3 p. 40)

For the purpose of assisting advance chast' in rapidselzure of a city and important otjectives along theroutes leading from the city to the rear, extensive usewill be made of tactical airborne assaults up to areinforced motorized rifle battalion In strength droppedin the enear rear by helicopter. (I p. 13)

Having captured one objective, the subumits ceaselesslydevelop the offensive into the depth and those specifi-cally chosen check captured buildings and defensivestructures, clear them of the remaining small groupsand individual soldiers, carry out minse field clearanceand where necessary put out fires.

Objectives in the depth of the city are attacked asa measure of the approach of the attackers. Theirdisposition and the nature of the defense exclude thepossibility for simultaneous attack. Therefore,commanders of the subunits must constantly and contin-uously conduct reconnaissance, quickly assign additionaltasks to subordinates, coordinate their activitiesamong themselves, and with attacked and supportingsubunits, and employ mneuvers for the purpose ofintensifying the efforts in the directions of markedsuccess. First of all, It is necessary to try toseize the main strongpoints and focal points on the

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main roads of the city, centers of comunication,bridges, overbridges, railway stations, subway stations.For this, It is recommended to use tactical airbornetroops In helicopters. The landing of the subunitsshould be accomplished under the cover of darknessand smoke, and supported by the fire of artillery andair support. They my be landed in squares, brotdstreets, public gardens, parks, flat roofs of houses,and using suspension ladders. (7 p. 38)

In L•irge squares where several streets converp, theattack is carried out by the forces of several sub-units. Commanders try to ensure that they simultane-ously appr,,ach the centre of the square ftom differentstreets. The corner buildings are the first to bestormed. (1)

For the nubunits' manoeuvre in a town passages andthoroughfares are organized inside the blocks. Under-ground passages are aloo adapted for this purpose. (6)

Smoke agents are used to conceal the maneuver of manand weapons between strongpoints, defensive areas,and separate buildings not having concealed or under-ground routes between them and also to prevent theenemy from observing and conducting aimed fire. (3 p. 57)

After seizing strongpoints on the edge of the city anddeveloping the attack, podrazdeleiye move forwardalong streets from one objective to another, usinggarden.s, yards, gaps in walls, and underground structureR.They destroy step-by-step the defending enemy whilesupporting one another by fire as tney penetrate hisposition. (3 p. 40)

Between strongpoints fire is coordinated, commuicationtrenches are prepared, and ambushes are set up in thegaps between strongpoints and on the flanks. Tunnels,subways, drain pipes, and other underground structuresand routes of communication are used for maneuver bymen and weapons in a battalion defensive area and onits flanks and foot and vehicle passages are preparedwithin blocks. (3 p. 52)

During the course of an attack motorized riflepo-irazdeleniye, moving on both sides of streets andkeeping close to buildings, deliver fire from smallarms at the windows of buildings located on theopposite side. Weapons assigned to fire by direct lay

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move behind the motorized rifle Podrandel•an• andthe tanks, from covered position to covered position.Delvering fire along the streets, they hit targetshindering the forward ovement of the Infantry andtanks. p. 40)

For advancing from one objective to another, the sub-units use gardýus, kitchen gardens, parks, holes inwalls, underground structures, s well as uarrov streets.In the latter case, advicing along both of its sidesthey fire at the windows and loopholes on the oppoe 4reside. Nachineguns and Sums advance from ona shelterto another. Using the gaps between strongpoints andumderground structures, the troops employ close anddeep envlopment for coming out In the flank and rear.Amy penetration Into the depth mest be utIlixed forthe rapfd developsent of the success by the comitmutInto battle of the second echelons or reserves. (7 p. 38)

Tanks equipped with anttine drags Act together withsappers and lay passages in enemy mined obstacles.Motorized rifle and sapper podrazdelaniye designatedfor In--diate assault uove behind then. The tanks,delivering fire at mbrasures or windows of a structureunder attack, approach it and cover the attackingmotorized riflemen aid sappers with their fire andarmor. (3 pp. 43-4)

The motorized infantry and tanks, moving from cover tocover, are followed by Suns detailed for direct fire.Firing along the streets, they destroy any targetswhich hinder the advance of the infantry and tanks. (1)

As the attacking podragdelenite reach the artillerysafety line, fire is shifted to the rear of the enemyposttion. After approaching to within band grenaderange, motorized rifle podrazdelent•e, throwing handgrenades at the enemy, attack objectives on the forwardedge. At this time artillery and aviation destroythe enemy located deep within the city and some of theartillery delivers covering fire against enemy artilleryand mortar batteries and control points. (1 p. 40)

To handle missions which unexpectedly artse, thebattalion comender and even the company comander canasasign up to a rifle platoon or squad respectivelyas a reserve. (5)

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To develop the attack deep within a city battalioncommanders vial comit their second echelons or reserv,,;.As a rule, they will be committed wiLh the permisaionof the next higher coimnider after the battalion hascarried out its imediate mission. However, the situationmy force a battalion commander to cooat his secondechelon earlier. Most frequently this will be whenthc enemy offers stubborn resistance. Undergroundstructures and gaps through buildings will be used asa covered approach for the second echelon to reach theline of departure. One distinguishing aspect ofreaching the line of departure tinder the conditionsprevailing in the city is that second echelons orreserves will wost frequently move in small podrazdeleniyeand even by separate groups. The line for entry intocombat is usually selected so that a second echelondill be commi.'ted around a battalion flank or in thegaps between companies or assault groups. However, thepossibility cannot be precluded that entry into combatwill be by leap-frogging through the combat formationsof attacking units. This is advantageous in thosecases when companies in the first echelon have sufferedgreat losses or If buildings do not peramt deployingthe podrazdeleniye of the second echelon. (3 p. 42)

In our opinion, it is advisable to reinforce a companywhich attacks usually along one street with two orthree tanks, a howitzer battery, mortar platoon, twoor three PTURS (protivotanko upravlyayemyy reaktivnyysnaryad; antitank guided missile), one or two sapper.qtiads, and two or three chemical specialists, andprovide support with the fire of a battery or rocket-artillery. Such an assault group will be able to createfire superiority over an enemy reinforced platoonusia•illy defending a large building, wnich will vllowit to accomplish the assigned mission after fire pre-paration and air strikes and develop the attack wihoutstopping. (s)

d. Arms and Equipment

In distinction from an attack under ordinary conditionqpodrazdeleniye In combat in a city are given additionalhand and antitank grenades, cartridges, shells, smoke

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clirges, signalling equipment, and Bear for assaultingbuildings. Furthermore, sapper podrazdelaniye areprovided with Additional explosives, elongated charges,and antitank and aatipersonnal alms. (I p. 17)

Combat action in a city, as a rule, is conducted atclose range and therefore the weapons of motorizedrifle podrasdeleniye, such as machineguns, submschineguns,grenade launchers, and hand grenades will play anImportant role in inflicting damage on the enemy. Ina city where ssauver and fire of tanks are limited,a large role will be played by manually operated anti-tank grenade launchers, hand grenades, and recoillessguns in the fight against eanmy tanks. (I p. 56)

In our opinion, two or three obstacle-clearing groupsincluded In the sapper squad on the armored personnelcarrier, one or two tanks with MTT and D4T-5s equippedwith ropes with grapnels are necessary. It is necessaryfor sappers to have with them 400 to 500 kg of explosives,20 to 30 components of distributed charges and severalcumulative charges, mine searchers, probes, detonatingmeans, and wooden mallets for tapping walls in orderto discover chambers with explosive charges. If thereare many narrow canals in the city, it would be advisableto include in these groups a bridge layer.

The obstacle-clearing groups should follow directlybehind the companies of the first echelon, and, whenobstacles are met, they are moved forward under cnverof fire to make gaps. (10 p. 95)

Assault detachments and groups are created for thecapture of strongly fortified buildings, strongpoints,and centers of resistance. To the detachment isordinarily detailed a motorized-rifle battalion, rein-forced by tanks, guns of various calibers, and subunitsof engineer and chemical t.-oops. In it, assault groupsare formed consisting of a reinforced motorized-riflecompany or a platoou each. Pers_•mel are providedwith an increased number of hand grenades, cartridges,and smoke weapons, as well as the necessary devicesfor assaulting buildings-ladders, ropes, boat hooks,grapnels, etc. Tanks, guns, and subunits of specialtroops operate directly in the combat formations ofthe motorized-rifle subunits. (7 p. 37)

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General Major Babushkin stresses that flame throwers:

i. can kill many soldiers held up in strongly fortifiedbuildings

2. are especially useful at night

3. can have great psychological value by strikingfear into soldiers when used unexpectedly

4. are to be used in conjunction with other arms. (12)

When podrazdelenlye approach objectives under attackguns and tanks on signal of the battalion or companycomander shift fire to the upper floors and toadjacent buildings and prevent the approach of enemyreserves. (3 p. 40)

At the signal for the attack or assault motorized riflepodrazdeleniye, under cover of fire and smoke, willcross obstacles using the passages which have been laid,reach the buildings occupied by the enemy which areunder attack, and enter them and destroy the enemy.At this time the fire from artillery, tanks, and bunsdesignated for fire by direct lay, which is deliveredover the heads and from the flanks of attackingpodrazdeleniye, is intensified.

When the attacking podrazdeleniye approach the buildingsartillery pieces and machineguns shift fire to the upperstories and attics, to adjacent buildings, and to thegaps between them. (3 p. 43)

After entering a building motorized rifle podrazdeleniye,acting boldly, daringly, and decisively, destroy theenemy by fire point-blank and with g.enades, clearingone room or corridor after another, floor-by-floor.Sappers attached to the rifle companies or assaultgroups lay passages through walls and between floorsand in case of need they clear mines from the buildingsseized. After seizing a strongpoint or building orother structure and carrying out an isnrediate mission,every podrazdeleniyc receives a new mission and attackssubsequent objectives without stopping. (3 pp. 40-41)

The system of fire in a defensive position in a cityis based on a combination of flanking and interlockingfire of all types and is arranged in several layersfor the purpose of creating multfiayer fire on theapproaches to a defensive area and its strongpointsas well as on the flanks and in the rear of podrazdeleniye.

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The system of fire is tied in with artificial andnatural obstacles. It nmst provide for: destructionof the enemy and mainly his tactical nuclear weaponsand artillery and tanks on the distant approaches tothe battalion defensive position; repulse of wase tankand infantry attacks in front of the forward edge;cover by fire of flanks and gaps when occupied bypodrazdeleniye and also artificial and naturalobstacles; and infliction of dmsaga on an enemy whohas penetrated the defensive position and rapidconcentration of fire at any threatened point orsector. (3 p. 53)

To support a perimeter defense of a site, strongpoint,or the defensive area as a whole the system of fire isso organized that all streets, interiections, gapsbetween buildings, entrances to squares and also parksand public gardens, the approaches to bridges andoverpasses, and the approaches to water obstacles arekept under flank:int and interlocking multilayer fireand also concentrated fire of mortars and artillerylocated in covered firing positions. Particularattention is devoted to the organization of antitankfire since ir will be possible to deliver fire acenemy tanks in the city itself only for a very limitedtime. (' p. 54)

Weapons are concealed and distributed in the strongest,buildings and structures, behind strong walls, and alsoin positions prepared on squares, in parks, and in otherareas which are not built up. To increase the densityof fire it is advantageous to place weapons on allfloors, in several tiers. in so doing it must beremembered that the upper floors will be destroyedby enemy fire to a greater extent than the lower floorsand therefore most of the firing positions should beplaced on the lower fGoors and in the sealbacementsof buildings. For the weapons on upper floors sheltersas well as firing posit~ons are prepared. (S p. 54)

The reconnaissance and attack by lead enemypodrazdeleniye are repulsed by the fire of designatedweapons and also by podrazdeleniye defending on theavenues of approach involved. For the purpose ofdeceiving the enemy with respect to the friendlysystem of fire it is advisable to locate some of the

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'9

weapons intended for the purpose of repulsingreconnaissance and the attack of the enemy leadpodrazdeleniye outside the defended buildings andstrongpoints, for example, in dummy strongpointsor in adjacent buildings. After an attack Is repulsedthe weapons whose positions have been revealed aremoved to new firing positions. Passages laid by theenemy in our obstacles are inmediately covered bymined obstacles or covered by strong fire of alltypes. (3 p. 73)

The system of fire is closely tied in with the systemof obstacles. The battalion comander determinesexactly the location of minefields in front of theforward edge of the defensive position, in the gapsbetween company strongpoints, and on the flanks of thebattalion defensive positions and within it. Hedetermines the locations of barricades and log obstarlenand the degree to which natural obstacles most bereinforced.

Preparation of a system of fire at obstacles is not aseparate step in the work of a comander in organizinga defensive position. It is part of the complex ofsteps taken by a battalion cotusander in assigningmissions and organizing coordination amongpodrazdeleniye. (3 p. 65)

Streets and gaps between strongpoints are barricadedand approaches to them are swept with fire. Toprevent the enemy from enveloping these obstacles,they are installed close to strongly built constructionsand fences. Loopholes and machin_,gun emplacementsfor firing at the streets and squares are made inthe barricades. Passages for the manoeuvre offriendly subunits and for mechanical transport are alsoleft in them. The passages are thoroughly guarded"". nd covered with fire and movable obstacles. (6)

The existence of numerous dead spaces not kept tuderfire and sectors not kept tuder observation on theapproaches to defended buildings and other structuresand generally to all sites under conditions prevailingin a city make it necessary to organize fire in severallayers. Firing positions are prepared on all floorsof buildings and in attic areas. To avoid large lossesin personnel and weapons firing positions on the upperfloors should be occupied only in case of need and

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only when In direct contact with the onemy when thereis little probability of employment of nuclear weaponsby the enemy. (I p. 63)

Buildings and other structures In the Saps betweenstromgpoints are prepared for blasting, mined obstaclesare prepared, log obstacles and barricades are set up,and provisions are made for flanking and Interlockingfire of all types to cover the flanks and the gapsbetween strongpoints. (3 p. 55)

Antitank podrazdeleniye remaining under the directcontrol of the motorized rifle battalion commanderprepare firing positions In places from which they candeliver fire along wide and long streets, main arteries,squares, and expected routes of attack of the enemymain forces. (I p. 57)

In repulsing the enemy attack the infantry should becut off from the tanks and destroyed first sinceseparate tanks or groups of tanks which break Into thecity without infantry can be rapidly destroyed byantitank weapons at short range. In this event thestrength of the battalion defensive position will notbe mpaired. (3 p. 73)

Men in tank and motorized rifle ambushes do not openfire at the enemy before he approaches the ambushes.When the enemy gets close to them they destroy tanksand infantry by opening fire suddenly, preventing theenemy from making further progress within the defensiveposition. After they have completed their missionthe tanks and motorized riflemen designated for ambushoccupy other positions and receive a new mission.(3 p. 74)

e. House and Street Fightins

If battle is fought in a building having a large numberof rooms the commanders try not to disperse their forces.In order to break down the enemy resistance quicker,the troops capture, first of all, the upper storiesof the building, staircases, entrances and exits. The

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//

defenders on the lower floors and in basements are* destroyed with grenades, submachine- and machinegrun

fire through holes in the cuilin&,.a. The main wallsare breached with hand grenaise or blown down. Insidea building hand-to-hand fight~ng, employment of grenadesand point-blank fire acquire special importance. Thepersonnel of the advancing submits are provided withan increased supply of hand grinadeas and cartridges. (1)

On the scrupulousness of preparing the subunits toattack a building is indicated by the fact thatImmediately before the attack each soldier is shownnot only the direction of movement, but also intowhich window, door, or opening he must break and wherehe is to go subsequently. The commander of thebattalion personally checked the readiness of thegroup for the attack, their understanding of theirtasks, knowledge of signals, readiness to fight withfire weapons, and supply of ammunition. (i4 p. 27)

The advancing enemy is destroyed at the approachesto a mtrongpoint by the use of all weapons in coordi-nation with the neighbors and with artillery and mortarfire from covered positions, by air strikes and demolitionof mined obstacles. If in separate areas the enemymanages to penetrate the defences and to capture severalbuildings or a strongpoint, the comnanders of subunitsstop him by vell-organized fire. Artillery and mortarfire prevents the enemy reserves from being broughtup and isolates the subunits which have penetratedthe defences. (6)

If the building is set in a closely built-up streetbarring a roundabout way, it is necessary to attackthe front. Sometimes it is advantageous to seize atfirst an adjacent, less strong or an unoccupiedopposite building in order to then inflict a strikesimultaneously on the front and flank. For approachingthe rear of the enemy, to use underground structures.

In the building first of all to seize the stairsbetween stories, entrances, and exits, in order to morequickly cut the enemy garrison into parts and destroy It.

In the rooms can be employed different modes of activity.For example, one of the soldiers, reaching the doorfrom one side, by a sharp movement opens it and hurlsa grenade. (16)

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I.After entering a building motorized rifle Bodrazdeleniyeacting boldly, daringly, and decisively, destroy theenemy by fire point-blank and with grenades, clearingone room or corridor after another, floor-by-floor.Sappero attached to the rifle eopanies or assaultgroups lay passage. through walls and between floorsand in case of need taey clear mines from the buildingsseized. After seizing a strongpoint or building orother structure and carrying out an inmediate mission,every 9odrazdeleniYe receives a new mission and attackssubsequent objectives without stopping. (I pp. 40-41)

They boldly burst into the houses and block all entrancesand exits, especially from basements. Making wide usaof hand grenades and point-blank fire, they destroythe enemy. Machinegunners fire at windows, embrasures,garrets and roofs to cover the attacking subunits.Success of fighting inside a building depends on thespeed, resolve, initiative and daring of each soldier. (1)

Motorized-rifle subunits should try to seize attackedobjectives from two or three sides. The success ofthe fighting within a building depends on the quickness,initiative, and bold actions of each soldier. Passagefrom one story to another is performed along stairsand through holes in ceilings. In order to paralyzethe resistance of the enemy and to deprive his separatedgroups of mutual assistance and support, it is recomnendedfirst of all to seize the stairs between the floors,entrances, and exits from premises, and then to annihi-late isolated groups in detail. (7 p. 38)

Approaching a building, the soldiers on the run threwgrenades at windows, doors, and openings in the walls,and after the explosion burst into the room.

Entering the house, the attackers first of all triedto cover the staircases leading to the upper floors,to locate the passage to the basement, and on the firstfloor several room with windows to the yard. Thiswas done in order to isolate individual groups of theenemy and to prevent then from conducting a maneuveror rendering assistance to each other. (" p. 28)

Ascending the staircase to the upper floors, troopsthrew smoke grenades ahead of themselves and sweptthe area with automatic fire and the stairwell is

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I ....

gotten over in one stroke. leaching the next floor,the attackers burst into the rooma after throwinggrenades into them. If doors were closed, they wereblown up. It was not recommended to break down a door,since the enemy attacked the attackers by automaticweapon fire at this time.

For passage from .me room to another, walls were blownup by grenades or TNT. (14 p. 28)

Thus, attacking along the streets, it is necessary tomove close to the sidewalk in order to corduct moreeffective fire on buildings situated on the oppositeside. One motorized-rifle subdivision moves on the leftand right of the tanks firing at lover stories ofbuildings, others-directly behind them firing higher.(16)

A battalion or company cosmander can assign part ofhis forces to cover the flanks and repulse an enemycounterattack and also blockade individual buildingsand use his vain forces to develop the attack in theindicated direction.

Motorized rifle podrazdeleniye set up smoke screensto support rapid crossing of certain sectors.

Specially assigned podrazdeleniye or teama from thereserve check seized buildings and structures, seizethem from remaining groups or individual soldiersleft by the enemy, clear mines, and in case of needpuc out fires and consolidate thi objectives seized.(3 p. 41)

When the enemy penetrates the edge of the city defensivecombat breaks down into several local battles. Defendingpodrazdeleni-e destroy an enemy who has penetratedbuildings by point-blank fire, hand grenades, and hand-to-hand combat. An enemy who has seized a buildingprepared for destruction is destroyed when the buildingis blown up. (3 p. 74)

The existence of numerous dead spaces not kept underfire and sectors not kept under observation on theapproaches to defended buildings and other structuresand generally to all sites under conditions prevailingin a city make it necessary to organize fire in several

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layers. Firing positions are prepared on all floorsof buildings and in attic areas. To avoid large lossesin personnel and weapons firing positions on the upperfloor- should be occupied only in case of need dadonly woen In direct contact with the enemy when thereis little probability of employment of nuclear weaponsby the enemy. 0 p. 63)

It is advisable to locate separate subanchinegunnersor snipers on the upper floors or In the attics. Whenwvll canouflaged and sheltered, they can maintainobservation over the eanmy and with precise fire inflictcasualties on enemy personnel and prevent unhinderedmovement by personnel over the territory occupied bythe enemy.

An example of capable distribution if weapons in acity is provided by '"ome of Pavlov" which during battlesin the city of Stalingrad was defended by a garrisonconsisting of 20 men. In addition to submachinegunsand rifles the garrison had as weapons: one hand andone heavy machinegun, three antitank guns in thesesibasement of the first doorway and the antitankguns in the semibasement of the second doorway.Alternate positions on the second fleet were preparedfor them. The hand machinegun was on the second floorand the submachinegunners in rooms on the flrst floor.The mortarmen occupied firing positions within thebuildIng and during the course of combat they oftenchanged position, moving from one floor to another.Later two snipers were sent to the garrison from theregiment and they occupiud positions in the upperfloors of the buiLding. Embrasures and viewingslits were prepared on all floors to the front as wellas to the rear. The gatrison ms able to cover theentire perimeter of the building.

The locations of weapons as indicated above wasdictated by the situation. (3 p. 64)

In defending a city fighting fires acquires very greatimportance. The conditions prevailing in a city usuallyabet fires and fires break up combat action ofpodrazdeleniyva, hinder the delivery of counterattacks,and make the defense of separate locations or buildingsimpossible. As a result of fires, passages andcrossings appear where they formerly did not exist

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amid, on the other hand, ezisting passages may becom,covered and LApaosable.

In view of this cosmanders take several special measures:they create special detachments for fighting fires;prepare subordinate podrazdelnniye and all personnelto make capable use of fire-fighting equipment andprovide protection against enemy incendiaries; andin places where fires are mout apt to break out theyestablish stores of uacer in barrels, sand, ponchos,etc. (S p.70)

If the enemy breaks through into a building he i,destroyed by point-blank fire, hand grenades and hand-to-hand fighting. During the fighting inside a building,the fire of guns, machineguns and mortars is used toprevent the approach of fresh enemy forces and thedelivery of ammnition.

The success of a counterattack depends to a great extenton the courageous and resolute actions of small subunitsand separate groups of soldiers, on their skill tomanoeuvre, to use point-blank fire, to use hand grenadesand courageously engage the enemy in hand-to-handfighting. Buildings and structures cleared of theenemy are immediately checked for mines and consolidatedby the subunits detailed for this purpose. (')

For the purpose of regaining buildings and strong-points seized by the enemy the battalion comanderorganizes a counterattack with his reserve or secondechelon. This counterattack must be launched immediatelysinte an enemy will be able to adapt seized buildingsor locations rpaidly for perimeter defense.

A counterattack in a city is executed rapidly to theflanks and rear of an enemy who has penetrated.

* Podrazdeleniye prepare concealed routes to lines ofdeployment, making primary use of underground routesof communication and communication trenches. Becauseof limitations on observation in a city and thecomplexity and lack of clarity in the situation in asector where an enemy has penetrated, podrazdelenlye

* moving to the front in a counterattack must havereconnaissance and security. Fighting by counter-attacking podrazdelenive for strong and large buildingsmay have the nature of an assault. Thereiore, comaniesin the second echelon or the reserve must be ready to

p

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//

act as assault groups. All buildings and otherstructures freed of the eam during the course of acounterattack are checked Immdiately for mines and areoccupied by "odrasdtlenive designated for this purpose.The success of a counterattack will depend In largemeasure on bold and decisive action by smallpodrazdeleaie and separate groups of soldiers andon their ability to execute maneuver, fire theirwapons point-blank, use hand grenades, and fighthand-to-hand. (I p. 73)

f. Pursuit

Pursuit is begun Imediately upon the initiative ofthe subunit commanders who discover the retreat. Bytheir decisive actions they eliminhate subunits of enemy

cover and, making use of breaks and intervals in hiscombat formation, move swiftly to the flanks and tothe rear, attempting to prevent the enemy from capturingImportant road Junctions, commanding heights, andcrossings. What is most Important is not to give theenemy any respite, to block all his attempts to with-draw his troops from under attack, and to prevent himfrom systematicall retreating or occupying defensesat useful sites. ( )

g. Consolidation

After carrying out assigned miesions the battalionor company commander imediately reports this to hisnext higher commander. Depending on instructions apodrazdeleniye may continue to develop the attack orconsolidate on a line which has been reached. (' p. 44)

Having fulfilled the assigned mission, the attackersImmediately consolidate in the captured area. (1)

To keep order in a captured tow or in a part of it

a commandant and a duty subunit are appointed andpatrols are organized. A thorough check of allcaptured buildings and their clearing of the enemypersonnel and demining is carried out. (1)

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Important objectives or structures seized areconsolidated by specially designated podrszde1erniy!and are prepared for perimeter defense. Un this casepi.rticular attnL ton to devoted to consolidatingstreet intersections, open sreas, squares, and exitsfrom underground structures and to preparing to repulse

emny Louwterattacks. (3 p. 42)

The objectives (buildings) captured are consolidatedby specially detailed subunits and prepared for pert-water defence. Special attention is paid to streetcrossings, squares, public gardens, exits from under-ground structures, and to readiness for repulsingenemy counterattacks. All-round support of combatactions, especially active and continuous recownalssence,acquires great Importance during fighting In a town. (1)

To assure the successful development of the attackin the depth and the repelling of possible couate'-attackers, captured objectives (positions) are contkll-dated by forces of the reserve. Tactically importantobjectives are improved as strongoints and streetsare prepared for mining. Special attention is devotedto consolidating crossroads, main streets, squares,bridges, and other important sectors. (7 p. 39)

Having destroyed the enemy who have penetrated andre-established the situation the troops take measuresfor the immediate organization of the disorganizedfire system, repair damaged obstacles and replenishtheir stocks of ammunition. Buildings destroyed butnot occupied by friendly trnops are mined. In thedeath of the defences the roads are cJleared andbypasses for the manoeuvre of tanks, self-propelledartillery and artillery are organized. (6)

3. Soviet Guidelines for the Engineer in Urban Warfare

The bulk of Soviet tactical writings on urban warfare indicate

that the Soviets normally attach angineer support unitsipersonnel to

the very small, units ita their task organizing for combat. In this

research a rather singular exception is uncovered which indicates

109

that wasa rule sapper wodrazdeleanie attached to a battalion are kept

centralized under the battalion comender." The quote Is Is the

contzt of defense however and the Implication is clear that in the

defense centralized control at the battalion leel Is preferred while

in the attack attacbment down to the mall unit level is considered

to be required. Engineer tasks include engineer reconnai/sence,

piomner work such *s general demolitions, route preparation,

constructing and clearing obstacles, barricades and fortifications, -*

the clearing of buildings and lines of c municatlons as weU as

the normal sapper functions of wall breaching and laying, detecting,

tuMrOVIN, detonating and disarming aies. Enginser support at the

mail =it level can be su'-itantial to include reinforcement of a

rifle coepany by as large a unit as an engineer platoon. Engineers

are assigned special tasks for "emrgency rescue work' following

nuclear detonations and as special fire fighters in cities.

Sapper godrazdeleniye in an attack in a city viiioften be attached to motorized rifle companies andplatoons designated for action as part of assault groupsand also groups for seizure and destruction of nuclearcharges.

Their main missions will be: preparing paths forapproach to the city; laying passages through rubbleand barricades; destroying individual buildings;clearing mines from the most Important sites designatedby the attackers for setting up control points, aidstations, storage areas, etc.; and preparing minedobstacles for fortifying regions and sites which areseized.

Acting as part of assault groups, sapper podrazdeleniyeconduct eng8neer reconnaissance, lay passages inmined obstacles and barricades and rubble; support theforward movement of tanks, armored personnel carriers,and artillery; do demolition work in buildings andother structures defended by the enemy; and participate

Shovkolavich, et &l., op. cit., p. 57.

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in the eliaination of the cousequemces of employmentby the enemy of nuclear veapons. (1 p.21)

Engineering support for an offensive in a city iacludeRengineering reconnaissance of the fortifications andobstructions of the enemy; making gaps in the obstructionsand ruins; making breaches in walls, fences, and ceilingsof buildings; supporting assaults of strongly fortifiedbuildings and strongpoints; arranging for river andcanal crossings within a city (usually with coveredbanks); clearing streets and mining buildings;localizing and extinguishing fires; and setting upobstructions (including electrified obstructionsusing energy from the city power stations) for rein-forcing the captured targets and blocks. Furthermore,it may be possible to adapt underground structuresfor reinforced points and shelters and to rettore waterlines for supplying troops with water, etc. ( p. 93)

On the average, in our opinion, in the direction ofthe offensive of each motorized-rifle battalion (ortank bastalion),* it is necessary to send out one ortwo lID (or IRC), supplying then with photographicequipment, radio stations, and large scale plans ofthe city. (00 p. 93)

Enjgneer support amounts to performing engineer recon-naissance; preparation of routes for advance to thecity by attacking podrazdaleniye; laying passages Incbstacles and obstructions in the streets, barricades,and fences; destruction of buildings or other structuresprepared by the enemy for defense; setting up obstaclesand consolidating lines or objectives seized; clearinglines from buildings or other structures to be adaptedas control points, aid stations, and food, clothing,and equipment supply points.

Particular attention is devoted to checking for thepresence of nines in underground routes of communication.Underground routes can be used for maneuveringpodrazdeleniye during the course of combat withinthe city and for penetrating the city.Sapper podrazdeleniye acting as part of motorizedrifle podrazdeleniye or assault groups support execution

Engineering reconnaissance patrol (eng. recon. group)

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of the comhat mission by these iodrazdelaniye orgroups. They perform engineer reconnaissance ofapproaches to objectives which might be mined; luypanssang in barnicad.. and obstacles thereby providingfor forwerd movement of tanks, BTR (armored personnelcarriers), and artillery; destroy the enemy defendingin buildings and other structures by blowing thenup; and give help to attacking Podrazdelanie infighting fires and conducting rescue work. ( pp. 34-35)

It Is apparent that the methods and mens of conductinge'gineering reconnaissance vwill be the same as underordinary conditions. However, direct inspection andsearch should be considered the most effective. Thisis emplaIned by the fact that, on the one hand, thedistance of observation and photographing is limitedin a city, and on the other hand, more favorableconditions for the secret approach and activity ofscouts are created.

Therefore, in preparing an offensive in a city, itsakes sense to reduce the number of engineeringobservation posts and with these smn to create moreengineering reconnaissance patrols (groups) for reconnais-sance by search. (10 p. 93)

A battalion acting in the first echelon on a mainavenue of approach may receive for reinforcement anartillery battalion, a tank company or a battery ofSAU (self-propelled artillery pieces), and a companyof sappers and may be supported by the fire of anartillery battalion.

A battalion acting as an assault detachment canreceive more sapper podrazdeleniye than indicatedabove and the artillery in support of its attack willbe stronger.

A motorized rifle company can receive for reinforcementa tank platoon, an artillery battery, and a sapperplatoon. (I p. 17)

Success of the actions of an assault group dependslargely on a rapid approach of podrazdeleniya to cheobjective under attack, which in turn is connected withcrossing mine fields. In our opinion, one attachedsquad of sappers can make 1-2 passages. This willallow a company to occupy favorable positions for theassault. A second sapper squad together with heavy

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artIllery can be advantageously used for makingbreaches in the walls of the objective beingdefended. (ý)

A motorized rifle battalion assigned as an assaultdetachment is reinforced with artillery, tanks, andsappers. It is committed to combat on the outskirtsor right within the city for assaulting heavilyfortified buildings. (5)

In our opinion, it is adv.sable to reinforce, a com|panywhich attacks usually along one street with two ortnee tanks, a howitzer battery, miortar platoon, twoor three PTURS (protivotankovyv upravlyayemyreaktivnyy snaryad; antitank guided missile), one ortwo sapper squads, and two or three chemical specialists,and provide support with the fire of a battery or

rocket artillery. (5)

With the beginning of the artillery barrage, underthe cover of fire and smoke screers, subunits ofcombat engineers make gaps in obstacles. For theirprotection and to let the infantry and tanks paqsthrough them, the combat engineers detail commandant'sposts. (1)

Preparatory fires for the attack are delive-ed at thedesignated time. During this period sapperpodrazdeleniye, under the cover of fire from artillcry,mortars, tanks, and guns designated for firing bydirect lay and also fire of motorized riflepodrazde eniye, lay passages in enemy obstacles. (3 p. 41)

Sappers acting with attacking podrazdeleniyc layexplosive charges and on signal of the podrazdelenlyloconmander blast permanent structures or buildings.

(3 p. 44)

Sappers designated to lay passages move under coverof fire to the objective under attack, reconnoiterthe obstacles around it, and lay passages to them.(3 p. 43)

Sapper podrazdeleniye blast with elongated chargesand lay passages in enemy mined obstacles. (3 p. 40)

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Tanks equipped with antimine draos act together withsappers and lay passages in enemy mined obstacles.Motorized rifle and sapper podrazdelenie designatedfor Immediate assault move behind then. The tanks,deliverinS fire at embrasures or windows of a structureunder attack, approach it and cover the attackinguotorisgd rifleman and sappers with their fire andarmor. (I pp. 43-4)

After entering a building motorized rifle podrazdeleniye,acting boldly, daringly, and dacisively# destroy theenemy by fire point-blank and with grenades, clearingone room or corridor after another, floot-by-floor.Sappero attached to the rifle companies or assaultgroups lay passages through walls and between floorsand in case of need they clear mines from the buildingsseized. (I pp. 40-41)

In our opinion, two or three obstacle-clearing groupsincluded in the sapper squad on the armored personnelcarrier, one or two tanks with BTY and OfT-5s equip;edwith ropes with grapnels are necessary. It is necessaryfor sappers to have with then 400 to 500 kg of explosives,20 to 30 components of distributed charges and severalcumulative charges, mine searchers, probes, detonatingmeans, and wooden mallets for tapping walls in orderto discover chambers with explosive charges. If thereare many narrow canals in the city, it would be advisableto include in these groups a bridge layer.

The obstacle-clearing groups should follow directlybehind the companies of the first echelon, and, whenobstacles are met, they are moved forward under coverof fire to make gaps. (10 p. 95)

Wide canals and rivers flowing through a city may proveto be serious obstacles for attacking troops. To forcethen successfully from the march podrazdeleniye rein-forced with sappers and diver-scouts are sent out aheadof time to support successful forcing of them from themarch. These podrazduleniye have the mission of deter-mining whether the enemy occupies the far bank, whetherthe obstacle is mined on the banks and in the water,the nature of the banks and the bottom, and the existenceof crossings and fords. Furthermore, provisions aremade for sending out podrazdeleniye (depending on theimportance of the water obstacles) to seaze existing

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a

bridges and crossings and secure themn until the approachof the attacking podrazdelenlye. These podrszdelenlye,without joining with the enemy in combat and usingitsdergrouad structures, reach the indicated objectives,hold them, and support crossing of the water obstaclesby the attacking podrazdeleniye.

If bridges, dams, and other structures on water obstscle, sare not seized or prove to be destroyed by the enemyand if bridge-carrying tanks cannot be used, attacking

podrazdoleniye are obliged to force the water obstacles.This entails a great amount of engineer work to makeentries and exits at the water's edge for equipment since,as a rule, the banks of canals or rivers in a city aresteep and made of concrete. To support this workadvance motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, in forcing awater obstacle by using means found at hand, will haveto seize objectives on the tar bank. (3 p. 41)

In organis.ng fortifications of a defensive area abattalion comander determines the extent of engineerwork needed, establishes sequences and terinz forcompletion, indicates what machinery is available andwhere it is to be used; he indicates locations forsetting out mined and other obstacles, what buildingsand other structures are to be prepared for blastingand procedures for blasting them, and the locationsfor log obstacles and barricades on streets; and hedetermines procedures for using podrazdeleniye to rerformengineer work and he also indicates necessary camouflagemeasures. (3 pp. 68-69)

Sapper podrazdeleniye in defense of a city set outmised obstacles; prepare log obstacles, barricades,and other obstacles; destroy buildings or lay passagesthrough their walls and in fences and other structures;and they lay routes for movement of podrazdeleniyefor executing counterattacks and maneuvering from oneposition to another. Sapper podrazdeleniye are alsoused for emergency rescue work in case the enemy usesweapons of mass destruction and to put out fires inthe city.

As a rule sapper podrazdeleniye attached to a battalionare kept centralized muder the battalion commander.(3 p. 57)

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I

Wasonry and reinforced concrete buildings designatedfor defense are prepared for all-aroumd defense. Doorand window opensngs in the buildins which are notdesignated for use are filled in solid with brick orsandbap. habrasures for firing submachineguns,mmchineuns, grenade launcher, and other weapons andviewing slits for observation are prepared vith pear-meter defense of the building in mind. Stairwells arbarricaded, mined, or destroyed. Hatches are madethrough ceillng@ and ladders are made. Corridors withinbuildings a'e barricaded and prepared for small armsfire. To decrease losses from shell fraents whichget inside buildings, partitions made from bricks,sandbags, or other material must be made betweenembrasures and viewing slits.

Conoaunication routes are prepared between strongpointsand defended buildings for which purpose use is first-ide of underground structures (tunnels, subways, watermainsa, etc.), and when these do not exist trenches aredug, the most Important sectors of which are coveredto protect them when buildings around then are destroyed.

In those cases when there are no strong undergroundstructures or basement areas which sight be used toprotect personnel against nuclear weapons, sheltersare dug in the ground away from defended buildings inorder to keep then from becoming covered with rubble.

In preparing basement areas which are used for sheltersfor protection against fire and to diminish the doseof penetrating radiation, the floor of the first storyis sprinkled with dirt to a thickness of 20-40 ca.Shelters are built so that they will be under the ruinsof the upper stories following a nuclear blast. Themain entrance is usually made near a stairwell andcitisting underground routes of commnication betweenbasement areas are used as alternate entrances.

The gaps between strongpoints, streets, squares, andparks are filled with mined and other obstacles andcovered by fire. In a city all types of obstacles canbe used in conjunction with explosives or without them:antitank and antipersonnel mines, delayed action mines,fragmentation-barrier mines, barricades, antitank steelhedgehogs and turnstiles, reinforced concrete posts,tetrahedra, and also barbed wire obstacles.

Brldses over rivers and canals and also undergroundstructures running from the direction of the enemy

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4-

(tunnels, subways, drainage ditches) are prepared fordemolition. As a rule, they are blasted when the enemythreatens to seize them. Some buildings should beprepared for reduction to rubble for the purpose ofblocking streets in case of need. (' pp. 69-70)

Streets and gaps between strongpoints are barricadedand approaches to them are swept with fire. To preventthe enesy from enveloping these obstacles, they areinstalled close to strongly built constructions andfences. Loopholes and machinegun emplacements for firingat the streets and squares are made in the barricades.Passages for the manoeuvre of friendly subunits andfor mechanical transport are also left in then. Thepaa4sages are thoroughly 1 uarded and covered with fireand movable obstacles. ( )

Accessible underground routes of communication arcprepared to serve as routes of supply and evacuation.Furthermore, stores of materials and repair equipmentas well as aid stations are located in them.

In connection with the difficulty involved in bringingup supplies and evacuation, stores of ammunition,food, medicine, and drinking water are set up in strong-points in the defensive area. (3 p. 55)

Not all buildings are used for the defensive positionsof # company or platoon but only the more solid oneswhich are located at intersections of main arterles andat the entrances to squares, parks, bridges, and otherImportant sites. Buildings are selected for strong-points in light of the possibility of conductingobservation and fire from them and the possibility ofprotecting personnel against weapons of mass destruc-tion. Wooden structures and also buildings which hinderfields of fire are removed where possible. (3 pp. 51-52)

The stability of a defensive position in a city isgreatly enhanced by fortifications. All kinds ofbuildings and underground 4tructures and basements areprepared and fortified as shelters which provideprotection against nuclear and other weapons. Buildingsare adapted for the defense, windows and doors are filledin with bricks and sandbags, firing embrasures are made,holes are made and routes prepared in attics and betweenfloors for maneuver and interaction among podrazdelenlye.(3 p. 54)

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Buildings and other structures in the gaps betweenstrongpoints are prepared for blasting, mined obstaclesare prepared, log obstacles and barricades are setup, and provisions are made for flakin8 and interlockingfire of all types to cover the flanks and the gapsbetween strongpoints. (I p. 55)

Land and other wines are laid on the main arteries onthe approaches to the defensive position and to defendedsites; barricades and other obstacles are erected onstreets and squares; and bridges, overpasses, subwaystations, separate buildings and sectors of undergroundstructures are prepared for blasting. (l p. 55)

To facilitate fire fighting all inflammable objectsare removed from buildings, wooden floors are sprinkledwith send, and water supplies ate established in casethe municipal water supply system is put out of operation.Windows and other openings in buildings are coveredwith grills or fire-resistant plates so that tho enemywill be unable to throw incendiaries through them.The entrances into dugouts and basement and semibasementareas are covered with brick thresholds U5-20 cm thickfor the purpose of preventing spread into these areasof napalm, pyrogel, and other inSendiary mixtures. Firelanes not lese than 50-70 a wide are prepared on thestreets for the purpose of preventing the spread offires over the city. ($ p. 55)

Camouflage in a city is greatly facilitated by theclosed nature of the terrain and does not require greatexpenditure of camouflage man. It Is achieved bythe location of personnel and weapons in buildings,arranging and carefully covering embrasures In thecorners of buildings, and window and door openings,by the creation of dumy defensive locations in blocksand In buildings not defended by podrazdeleniye, byobserving sound and light discipline, by extensive useof smoke agents, and by excluding the local populacefrom the defensive area. A battalion commander providesfor all these measures in organizing a defensive positionand fortifying it. (3 p. 70)

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From the very first day the "Roam of Pavlov" was preparedfor perimeter defense. All approaches to the buildingwere gradually mined and ant'.tank and antipersonnelmineftelds wore prepared around the building. In douesectors land mines were put out. A commnication trenchwas dug to the rear for the purpose of deliveringammunition, food, and water to the garrison. A trenchwas dug in the rear of the building to give personnelprotection against enemy artillery fire. Furthermore,a drain pipe passing to the rear of the buildingwas adapted for the same purpose and two communiciationtrenches were dug to it. Soldiers occupying a defensiveposition on the first and upper stories of the building,during strong artillery fire, used these routes to takecover in the drain pipe. Soldiers defending semihasomentareas, during artillery fire, remained in place at theirweapons. Good fortification helped our courageousfighting men hold the building for 58 days, until theday our troops reverted to the attack for the purposeof destroying the enemy for.es at Stalingrad. (3 p. 70)

In organizing rear service support a battalion commanderdetermines: in which of the strongest undergroundstructures and basements to locate rear servicepodrazdeleniye and what stores of materials and waterto establish in the strongpoints of companies in theevent of combat in encirclement; what fortificationsto prepare for the purpose of getting protection forrear service units against nuclear weapons; and howto provide continuous material, technical, andmedical support for podrazdeleniye during the courseof battle. (3 pp. 70-71)

The advancing enemy is destroyed at the approaches toa strongpoint by the use of all weapons in coordinationwith the neirhbors and with artillery and mortar firefrom covered positions, by air strikes and demolitionof mined obstacles. (6)

The success of a counterattack depends to a great extenton the courageous and resolute actions ot small subunitmand separate groups of soldiers, on their skill tomanoeuvre, to use point-blank fire, to use hand grenadesand courageously engage the enemy in hand-to-handfighting. Buildings and structures cleared of the enemyare imediately checked for mines and consolidated bythe subunits detailed for this purpose. (4)

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Naving destroyed the enem who have penetrated andre-established the situation the troops take measuresfor the lmediate organization of the disorganized firesystem, repair damaged obstacles and replenish theirstocks of asnmnition. Buildings destroyed but notoccupied by friendly troops are mined. In the depthof the defences the roads are cleared and bypasses forthe manoeuvre of tanks, self-propelled artillery andartillery are organized. (4)

After an attack Is repulsed the weapons whose positionshave been revealed are moved to nem firing positions.Passages laid by the enemy In our obstacles are immediatelycovered by mined obstacles or covered by strong fireof all types. (3 p. 73)

4. Soviet Guidelines for Chemical and Radiation Speeialists

Chemical and radiological reconnaissance Is conducted contin-

uously within the city according to Soviet tactical doctrine. There

are references to creation of dependable systems for warning of chemical,

bacteriological and radiation hazards. These specialists are also

charged with monitoring the quality of food and water before being

consomd by Soviet troops. Chemical smoke agents are cited as beingparticularly effective In concealing troop maneuver within the city.

In toking his estimate of the radiation and chemicalsituation the battalion cosmander decides: how toorganize radiation, chemical, and biological reconnaissanceand warning of danger of nuclear or chemical attack ort-ploymant of biological weapons by the enemy; whatweasures must be taken to provide security and protectionfor sources of water against contamination by radio-active, chemLcal ard, especially, biological agents;and where and in what quantity to establish stores of.nrotective supplies and equipment. (S p. 62)

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In our opinion, it Is advisable to reinforce a companywhich attacks usually along one street with two or threetanks, a holitzer battery, mrtar platoon, two or threePTURS (protivotankovyy upravlyayemy" reaktivnyy snaryad:antitank guided misile), one or two sapper squads, andtow or three chemical specialists, and provide supportwith the fire of a battery or rocket artillery. ( )

As regards the attached chemical specialists, they willsupport the sappers' work in preparing building' forthe assault, resorting when necessary to the placementof smoke screens. For successful operations in a city,personnel are issued an increased amount of ammunition,hand grenades, and antitank grenades. The men areprovided with devices for assaulting reinforced buildings,means of signalling, and smoke devices, while sagpersare given a sufficient quantity of explosives. ( )

* Many measures are taken to organize protection againstweapons of mass destruction. A dependable system forwarning the garrisons in strongpoints employing all

ames of commnication is established, and continuousradiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissanceis conducted within the city. Provisions are made formore complete use for protection of personnel of strongunderground structures and basements and in case of needthey are reinforced. Particular attention is devoted !to protection for sources of water and safeguardingthem against bacteriological contamination as wellas strict observance in strongpoints and in a battaliondefensive area as a whole of rules governing sanitationand hygiene. Measures are taken to eliminate the conse-quences of employment by the enemy of weapons of uassdestruction and measures are prescribed for puttingout fires and carrying out emergency resc'ae work.Personnel are categorically forbidden from using food,alcoholic beverages, and other things seized from theenemy or left by him and also water from any sourcewithout a preliminary test by medical workers. Partic-ular attention is devoted to checking the quality offood and water before consuming them. (S p. 68)

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ldMardelenmve for orotection asainst weapons of massda I if they are attaached to the battalion, areused firstly for performing radation and chemicalrecomnsiasgane and also for eliminating the consequencesof esumm employisent of weapons of mess destrurtion.(I p. 57)

Radiation and chemical reconnaisesnce in a battalion isconducted by observation organized, as a rule, at thecinsnder-observation post of the battalion, combatreconnaissance patrols which include attached chemicaltroops, and chemical reconnaissance patrols. (I p. 68)

Smoke aments are used to conceal the imnuver of ame andweapons between strongpoints, defensive areas, andseparate buildings not having concealed or undesrgromdroutes between them and also to prevent the enemy fromobserving and conducting &led fire. (2 p. 57)

Smoke is used, as a rule, when meteorological conditionsare favorable at the decision of the battalion commender.(l p. 57)

Motorized rifle podrazdeleniye set up smoke screens tosupport rapid crossing of certain sectors. (* p. 41)

Camouflage in a city is greatly facilitated by the closednature of the terrain and does not require great expend-iture of camouflage meams. It is Achieved by the locationof personnel and weapons in buildings, arranging andcarefully covering embrasures in the corners of buildingsand window and door openings, by the creation of dummydefensive locations in blocks and in Luildings notdefended by podrazdeleniye, by observing sound and lightdiscipline, by extensive use of smoke agents, and byexcluding the local populace from the defensive area.(3 p. 70)

5. Soviet Guidelines for the Lozistician

The logistician is Instructed to anticipate such higher levels

of ordnance expenditures in city fighting. In defense the stocks are

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positioned vell forward to facilitate distribution down to the small

unit level at separate strongpoints (unit distribution system). In

defense, protection of rear area service support against nuclear attack

Is cited as a special concern for the commander. In the attack, rear

area service support is located outside or on the edge of a city prior

to attack. Helicopters are cited as having special utility for deliver-

ing supplies in city fighting. Cuidellnes for medical personnel

emphasizing the positioning of aid stations well forward (up to platoon

strongpoints) and special techniques to be employed for recovering and

evacuating the wounded.

Aminition expenditure is such greater during an attackin a city. To conduct combat continuously it is neces--sary to increase supplies of ammunition in possessionof personnel. For example, in the battles to seize thecity and fortress of Konigsberg riflemen and tankmanhad as such as two units of fire. Usually bearers frompodrazdeleniye vii bring up additional amunition.Vehicles carrying ammunition must be kevt imnmdiatelybehind the second echelon or reserve. ( p. 42)

In doing this work the battalion coimander governshimself primarily by the fact that under the conditionsprevailing in a city stores of supplies must be based oncalculations for extended combat by individualpodrazdeleniye isolated from battalion main forces. Thenecessary stores of all supplies, including medical, areestablished in every company strongpoint and in somecases every 3latoon strongpoint. An aid station isorganized. ( p. 71)

Accessible underground routes of commication areprepared to serve as routes of supply and evacuation.Furthermore, stores of materials and repair equipmentas well as aid stations are located in them.

In connection with the difficulty involved In bringingup supplies and evacuation, stores of asumition, food,medicine, and drinking water are set up in strongpointsin the defensive area. (' p. 55)

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In orsanistng rear service support a battalion commiderdetermines: in which of the strongest undergroundstructures and basements to locate rear service9odresal and what stores of materials and waterto establish In the stronpoints of companies in theevent of combat In encirclemnat; what fortificationsto prepare for the purpose of getting protection for rearservice units against nuclear waponm; and how to providecontinuous material, technical, and medical support forDodraedelenive during the course of battle. The coemandersof support oodrasdelenive are told procedures forreplenishing ammnition and other supplies and preparinghot food and delivering It to personnel. They are toldwhat roates to use for carrying out wounded and routesof evacuation to aid stati.ons, procedures for performingmaintenance on combat equipment, refueling, lubricating,and repair. (' pp. 70-71)

Rear service smport is organized In light of the natureof the coming battle. Additional reserves of suppliesare established, especially amunition and food, andprocedures are prescribed for issuing then to personnel.A rear service odrazdelen*vye Is located outside a cityor on the edge of it prior to the beginning of the attack.In the case of attack deep within a city the battalionaid station, amnition vehicles. and a water tank truckare located close to combat formations. Different coveredplaces, Including basements and semibasements In buildingsand underground structures, are used to locate them afterthese places have been checked for contamination andmines. Amimtion and food are delivered directly by'bearers designated In each platoon. Search and collectianof the wounded in baemets, buildings, rubble, parks,and gardens are organized. is p. 35)

St.ccessful use can be msade of helicopters in defenseof a city for delivering needed cargo to garrisons whichare defending the city or sites In It and which arecaught in enemy encirclement or are isolated fromfriendly forces. (3 pp. 57-58).

Personnel designated for searching for the wounded areprovided with ropes, straps, and other gear for extractingthe wounded from places difficult to reach. Companyaid stations are set up in shelters in motorized riflecompanies or assault groups. (I p. 35)

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6. Soviet Guidelines for the Artillery•.n

As indicated in the following guidelines, the moat significant

characteristic of the employment of artilery in urban warfare is decen-

tralization and the attachment of artillery units down to the single gun

as far as the platoon level. The citation of the statistic that in a

World War I1 precedent, 40 percent of all gun artillery was employed in a

direct-lay mode seems significant. There is little Soviet emphasis

in the following guidelines or in materI 1 researched in this investi-

gation on the varied characteristics of urban warfare which may warrant

varied approaches to attachment of artillery. While it would appear that

at one extreme (a slow, building-to-building operation in a very large

city) that decentralization of artillery assets was deirable while at

another extreme- (attack "from the march" against a sasLl town where

the assault is carried through the objective) that there would be a

greater centralization of assets. The guidelines uncovered here are lets

flexible and tend to emphasize attachment of artillery in the attack

as wei.1 as defense, in rapidly moving assaults aH wall as deliberate

defense. Tnere Is ample reference to the importance of artillery

preparation fires although there dre several citations of the possibility

of dispensing with such fires to capitalize on the principle of surprise.

Artillery. There are many important distinguishingaspects about employing artillery podrazdeleniye in acity. Btcau3e of the lack of wide fields of observationand fire, since there are large buildings and otherstructures, it is not possible to centralize the employ-sent of artillery. Most frequently artillerypodrazdeleniye accompany infantry and tanks by separateplatoon or even separate gun during street fighting.Part of the artillery will deliver fire from coveredfiring positions while directly subordinate to thebattalion commander.

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In the Great Patriotic War during combat action to@eise the city of Budapest 40 percent of all Sun artillerywas used to fire by direct lay, Including 152-m guns.In the battle for the city of Potnan' 203-m guns wvetused to fire by direct lay.

In an assault detachment or group It is best to useartillery nodracdelenive directly in combat formationsof motorized rifle podragdeleniye as accompanying gunsfor destroying buildings and other structures with fireby direct lay.

In this way artillery podrazdeleniye up to and includingthe firing platoon will be attached to motorized riflecompanies and even to platoons.

In street fighting artillery firing positions areselected in gaps in walls and in fences, ruins, publicani other gardens, parks, and in the spaces betweenbuildings and structures. The coinnd-observation postsof artillery comnanders should be located together withthose of the commnders of the motorized rifleoodrazdelenive to which they are attached or which theysupport. There muet be artillery scouts reconnoiteringfor targets in the combat formations of the advancepodrazdeleniye. During combat a battery changes positionby platoon and a platoon acting separately by gun, leap-frogging forward under the cover of fire from adjacentguns and smake.

Preparatory fives may consist of one or several onslaughtsof fire depending on the nature of structures in thecity, the strength of the defending enemy, and the densityof fire needed to suppress him. The duration of thisfire can be very brief. For ezamle, in the battle forBerlin the duration of preparatory fires in the zone ofattack of the 94th Guards Rifle Division and the FifthShock Army fluctuated from 5 to 20 afn.

In comparison with preparatory fires conducted duringan attack under ordinary field conditions, in a city fordestroying various structures and the weapons locatedin then more artillery or mortar systems mout be used,especially guns designated for firing by direct lay attargets located on the forward edge and i nediately behindit. Separate batteries and even platoons deliveringfire from covered firfrg positions and high-power gunsfor firing by direct lay are used to destroy enemytargets. To carry out their firing missions they willbe given most of the tims allotted for delivering

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preparatory fires.

Supporting fire is conducted by separate fire onslaughtsduring the course of which separate en*W defensivestructures are destroyed ac attacking troops approachthem. The signal to shift fire is given by aotorizedrifle podrazdeleniye commanders.

Mortar and in many cases howitzer podrazdeleniye areable with their high-angle fire to hit concentrationsof infantry, suppress artillery and mortars, anddeliver strikes at targets in the resr and enemy commandpost located in buildings and other structures.

As a rule, organic and attached mortar podrazdeleniyeof the motorized rifle battalion are attached tomotorized rifle companies and platoons and act in directproximity to their combat formations. Some of themortars, especially the large-caliber mortars, will mostfrequently be kept under the direct control of thebattalion commander.

To Increase the effectlveress of mortar fire whenfiring at targets located behind high, close-in cover,the firing positions for them can be located on roofs,in attics, on balconies, in wide places, in trenches,and even in basements. This is a distinguishing aspectof combat employment of mortars in a city. (S pp. 20-21)

The suppression of the strongpoints in the forward area,the fire weapons in buildings located to a depth of500 to 800 m, command and command-observation pointson roofs and in garrets, and firing rasitions of mortarsubunits, and the destruction of individual structuresadapted for conducting flank fire are planred by theartillery subunits attached to or supporting thebattalion (company) in the period of preparatory fire.Suppression of artillery batteries and %ajor controlpoints is charged to the commander of a highercommander. :0 pp. 28-29)

Attached to a motorized-rifle battalion attacking in acity along several parallel streets for reinforcementmay be ma artillery division and sometimes, in addition,a battery of antitank artillery. The attached artillerybattalion is used for firing not only from the covered,but also from the open firing positicne. Batteries areusually distributed for support of the companies in the

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first echelon, and one of them Is left at the disposalof the battalion commander. Battalion artf.llery and atank-destroyer battery also operate with coupanies ofthe first echelon.

It can not be excluded that a motorized-rifle battalionwill be reinforced by only a oubunit of antitankartillery. In this case, Its actions, a a rule, willbe supported by an artillery battalion. ( p. 28)

Due to the angle of mortar fire it Is possible to hitan enemy located behind shelters.

However, It nust be kept In mind that stooe structures,having basements, jerve as a reliable shelter frommortar fire. Under these conditions, the most typicalmsdsions for ,% mortar battery will be: hitting manpowerand firepower deployed on city squares, streets,boulevards, vacant lots, in public gardwns and parks,as well as command-observation points, manpower and fire-power on the roofs and In the garrote of homes, behindbarricades, and In ruins; suppressing the maneuver andcounterattack of the enemy; covering the flanks of theirsubunits; and suppressing mortar subunits. Purthermore,mortars can also create centers of fires, and illminateand screen objects in smoks. (11 p. 108)

Howitzer artillery and mortarr, which by their firedestroy enemy personnel and weapons, destroy buildingsand other structures or make breaches in them, destroycontrol points, and prevent the enemy frou maneuveringhis son and weapons, are used primarily to con4uctpreparatory fires or a fire onslaught. When nuclearattack weapons are discovered all maasures are used todestroy then immediately. The conduct of fire by directlay at Individual targets for which even large-caliberguns are used acquires particular impoatance. (3 p. 39)

With the initiation of the attack, artillery subunitsby mans of concentrated fLre and firing on Individualobject'v'.s continuously support the attacking subunits.Batter.es Implementing tasks from closed firing positionstransfer firing into the depth In order to disrupt thefire coordination among them. Installations of PTURSsand guns chosen for firing point blank transfer their fireto objectives in neighboring buildings hindering theforvard movement of attacking subunits. With thedevelopment of the offensive, an artillery battalioncan be enlisted for firing point blank. (0 p. 29)

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In our opinion, it is advisable to reinforce a companywhich attacks usually aloag one street with two or threetanks, a howitzer battery, mortar platoon, two or threePTURS (grotivotankov upravlyayyy reaktivnyy snaryn,1;antitank guided missile), one or two sapper squads, andtwo or three chemical specialists, and provide supportwith the fire of a battery or rocket artillery. Such anassault group will be able to create fire superiorityover an enemy reinforced platoon usually defending alarge building, which will allow it to accomplish theassigned mission after fire preparation and air strikesand develop the attack without stopping. (5)

An attack against objectives located on the edge of acity is preceded by preparatory fires delivered byunits under control of the next higher commander or byfire onslaught. An onslaught will usually be brief butwill involve maximum use of all firepower of theartillery involved. (3 pp. 38-39)

A battalion acting in the first echelon on a mainavenue of approach may receive for reinforcement anartillery battalion, a tank company or a battery ofSAU (self-propelled artillery pieces), and a company ofsappers ard may be supported by the fire of an artillcrybattalion.

A battalion acting as an assault detachment can receivemore sapper podrazdeleniye than indicated above and theartillery in support of its attack will be stronger.

A motorized rifle company crn receive for reinforcementa tank platoon, an artillery battery, and a sapperplatoon. (3 p. 17)

With this method of attack a strongly fortified citycan be seized by a day or night assault by simultaneousattacks on flanks and in the rear, as a rule, only afterlong preparatory fires. However, the possibility cannotbe excluded that in the interests of gaining surprisepreparatory fires will not be used. Assault detachmentsand groups are formed in troop combat formations forthe purpose of storming the city. (3 p. 14)

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As the attacking uodrazdelansye reach the artillerysafety lUne, fire is shifted to the rear of the enemyposition. After approadhig to within hand grenada range,motorized rifle godrasdelenive- throwing hand grenadesat the ems, attack objectivois on the forward edge.At this tims artillery and aviation destroy the enomlocated deep within the city and some of the artillerydelivers covering fire against enemy artillery andmortar batteries and control points. (I p. 40)

The launching of an attack by the subunit Is precededby a short but pcverful fire onslaught, during which theartillery and mortars neutralize and destroy the liveforces and firing means In buildings and strongpoints,coumnd and observation points, radio and radar stations,and prevent the maneuver of the enemy by forces and mens.Por demolishing strong defensive structures and forcrushing the mans of mass destruction, reserves,artillery, and control points may be used heavy artillery,rocket artillery, and missiles. A part of the guns andtanks, which have been moved up as close as possibleto the objective of the attack, by point-blank shootingneutralizer the firing mane, demolishes defensivestructures, and knocks breaches into the walls ofbuildings. (' p. 37)

Preparatory fires for the attack are delivered at thedesignated time. During this period sapper podrazdelenive,under the cover of fire from artillery, mortars, tanks,and guns designated for firing by direct lay and alsofire of motorized rifle podrazdeleniye, lay passages inenemy obstacles. However, in the interests of achievingsuddenness of attack there may be no preparatory firesand this is characteristic of a night attack. In thiscase artillery will deliver fire for effect at the startof the attack. (3 p. 43)

Guns designated for firing by direct lay supportmotorized rifle and cank podrazdeleniWe, preventing theenemy from entering the building or leaving it. (3 p. 44)

The motorized infantry and tanks, moving from cover tocover, are followed by guns detailed for direct fire.Firing along the streets, they destroy any targets whichhinder the advance of the infantry and tanks. (l)

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When podrazdelenlye approach objectives under attack gutsand tanks on signal of the battalion or company commandershift fire to the upper floors and to adjacent buildings/and prevent the approach of enemy reserves. p. 40)

At the signal for the attack or assault motorized riflepodrazdeleniye, under cover of fire and smoke, will crossobstacles using the passages which have been laid, reachthe buildings occupied by Lhe enemy which are under attack,and enter them and destroy the enemy. At this time thefire from artillery, tanks, and guns desbigated for fireby direct lay, which is delivered over the heads and fromthe flanks of attecking podrazdele4iye, is intensified.

When the attacking podrazdelaniye approach the buildingsartillery pieces and machineguns shift fire to the upperstories and attics, to adjacent buildings, and to thegaps between them. (I p. 43)

Success of the actions of an assault group depends largelyon a rapid approach of podrazdeleoiya to the objectiveunder attack, which in turn is connected with crossingmine fields. In our opinion, one attached squad ofsappers can mke 1-2 passages. This will allow a companyto occupy favorable positions foi the assault. A secondsaFper squad together with heavy artillery can be advan-tageously used for making breaches in the walls of theobjective being defended. ()

Artillery in a city carries out most of its mission.i byfiring by direct lay. Therefore, more artillery thanunder ordinary conditions, including heavy artillerysystem, is attached to companies and platoons and is u;,ý.dby platoon and by gun directly in strongpoints fordelivery of fire by direct lay. Every gun in a strong-point, as is the case for a tank, has two or threepositions and routes of movement to them.

Artillery and mortars which remain under the directcontrol or the battalion commander deliver fire fromcovered firing positions. Mortars of al1 calibers findhighly effective employment in a city. They are ableto deliver fire at an enemy located behind cover,buildings, fences, and walls. (3 pp. 56-57)

The firing positions of tanks, guns, and armoredpersonnel carriers are selected in corner buildings,in structures standing alone, and behind masonry fences.Door and window openings are used for firing andembrasures are made in walls. (3 p. 54)

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Artillery and mnortars dalivering fIre froa coveredfUrin8 positions are located in yards, vegetable andother gardens, on squares, and In stadius. (I p. 54)

It is advisable to locate fire positioms as close aspossible to the notoriaed-tifle subunit in wide yards,parks, on squares and between buildings. With this theyshould rake it possible to conduct fire with significantvariances from the assanpd basic direction, and havegood approach routes. p. 108)

The fire of artillery and mortars frou covered positionsis arranged in light of possibilities for destroying theeuimy on the distant approaches to the city, on the nearapproaches to it, in front of the forward edge of thedefensive area, and also deep within the city. Sectorsfor Lire concentrations are designated so as to destroythe naem on all routes and lines, including enemypositions behind shelters, buildings, fences, and walls.The fire of mortars is eztensively used for this purpose.Positions for firing by direct lay in case of enemybreakthrough Into the city are prepared for an artillerybattery in addition to Its covered positions. (1 p. 65)

The advancing enem is destroyed at the approachesto a stronupoint by the use of all weapons In coordinationwith the neighbors and with artillery and mortar firefrom covered positions, by air strikes and demolitionof mined obstacles. If In separate areas the enemy

nages to penetrate the defences and to capture severalbuildings or a strougpoint, the commnders of subunitsstop him by well-organized fire. Artillery and mortarfire prevents the enemy reserves from being brought upand Isolates the subunits which have penetrated thedefences. (6)

As a rule, counterattacks are supported by artilleryand mortar fire as well as by the tanks operatingdirectly in the subunits' battle formations. (6)

7. Soviet Guidelines for the Employment of Aviation and Anti-aircraft Forces

As in U.S. Field Manuals there is little written in Soviet

open literature on the employment of flied wing, c'ose support aviation

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* in urban warfare. There are obvdously limitationa on the employment

of high performance aircraft against posltions where FEBAs * re

obscure and irregular and where a singi. building may be occupied by

opposing forces for an extended period. Precision guided intuitions

will provide a greater capability to fixed wing aircraft in city

warfare but many of the limitations and operational restrictions will

remain. The Soviets do emphasize the use of aviation in counter air,

interdiction, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting role* and there

are citations of the flexibility and effectivenas3 of heliborne and

helicopter supply operations. The guidelines imply that antiaircraft

units are retained under centralized control. The principal missions

assigned in defense are to protect defensive forces from low-flylng

aircraft and helicopters although they are also used in a direct

fire role in support of infantry units. In the attack, antiaircraft

weapons are employed principally to prevent air resupply of besieged

forces within a city.

Aviation in fighting for a city I.; also used in accord-ance with the plans of senior commanders. Depending onits intended purpose it will be used to carry out varyingmissions. Reconnaissance aviation takes aerial photosof sites which are designated for destruction. Tt is alsoused to adjust the fire of artillery and mortars firingfrom c-overed firing positions and to keep track ofapproach by the enemy from the rear and the actions anddispiositions of his troop units. Fighter-bomber aviationduring preparatory fires suppresses the enemy occupyingdefenses in especially strong buildings; delivers strikesat his reserves; destroys his nuclear attack weapons,control points, and rear service facilities; and combatsenemy aviation, preventing it from approaching thecity. (S p. 22)

During this period (preparatory fires) aviation suppressesthe enemy in strongpoints set up in especially solidbuildings or other structures located on the edge of thecity as well as within it. It destroys them: suppresses

Forward Edge of the Battle Area

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reserves, artillery, end ene control points; destroysnuclear attack wempone; protects advamncn Piotre e~ n.e

(rp.t enem air strikes; sad adjusu artillery fire.p-39)

Aviation delivers bomb stri•es at matn groups of enemyforces attacking the city, at his nuclear attack weponsend other weapons of smss destruction, and at 8goupsof artillery and forces trying to bypass or encircle thecity. Aviation is also used to cover defending troopsmnd the city itself against the air enamy by deliveringstrikes against his aviation at airfields and In theair. (I p. 57)

The advancing enemy ts destroyed at the approaches toa strongpoint by the use of all weapons In coordinationwith the neighbors and with artillery end mortar firefrom covered positions, by air strikes and demlitionof mined obstacles. If in separata areas the enemymanages to penetrate the defences and to capture severalbuildings or a strongpoint, the commanders of subunitsstop his by well-organized fire. Artillery and mortarfire prevents the enemy reserves from being broght upand isolates the subunits which have penetrated thedefences. (6)

As the attacking podrazdeleniye reach the artillerysafety line, fire is shifted to the rear of the enemyposition. After approaching to within hand grenade range,motorized rifle podrazdelenive throwing hand grenadesat the enemy, attack objectives on the forward edge.At this tim artillery and aviation destroy the enemylocated deep within the city and som of the artillerydelivers covering fire against enemy artillery and mortarbatteries and control points. (3 p. 40)

For the purpose of assisting advance chast_ in rapidseizure of a city and important objectives along theroutes leading from the city to the rear, extensive usewill be msAe of tactical airborne assaults up to areinforced motorized rifle battalon in strength droppedIn the enemy rear by helicopter. (' p. 13)

Successful use can be made of helicopters In defenseof a city for delivering needed cargo to garrisons whichare defending the city or sites in it and which arecaught in enemy encirclement or are isolated from friendlyforces. (s pp. 57-58)

13

134\

I-.

The senior codunder will use PVO (antlairctraft)weapons to prevent delivery of materiel to thesurrounded enemy or evacuation of the garrison fromthe city. This creates more favorable conditions forseizing the city since the m ., not getting help fromoutside, will not be able to offer resistance for anextended period and will be forced to lay down hisarms. An example of this to provided by the liquidationof fascist German forces at Stalingrad. The surroundedforces, which had been cut into several places by theattacking troops of the Twenty-First Army In conjunctionwith the Sixty-Second Army, were forced to capitulateat the end of one week. (' p. 14)

The antiaircraft weapons of a battalion are used mainlyto cover the artillery firing positions and the command-observation post against low-flying enemy airplanes andhelicopters. In sown cases they can be used to suppressenemy weapons located on the upper floors and in attics.Firing positions are usually selected in public and othergardens end on the roofs of buildings. (3 pp. 21-22)

Antiaircraft defense. Bly their fire antiaircraftweapons block the enemy from approaching a garrisonunder attack by air. During the course of the attackantiaircraft podrazdelenlye attached to the battalion arelimed for immediate protection of it. In the battalionweapons are assigned from the second echelon or reservefor the purpose of combating low-flying enemy airplanes.Antiaircraft podrazdelenlye are located in squares, publicgardens, and parks and some of then on the roofs ofbuildings. Designation of front lines for friendlypodrazdeleniye is organized especially thoroughly.C p. 35)

8. Soviet Guidelines for Armor and Antitank Forces

As stipulated for artillery, the Soviets prescribe attachwmnt

of tank units and even individual tanks down to rifle platoon level.

They do however prescribe in the following guidelines that the platoon

is the basic unit of combat for armor forces. Soviet tacticians

emphasize the need for operating in tank-infantry teams with the two

135

ars mutually supporting. These Soviet guidelines envasion armor as

providing the speed and fire power required for an attack "on the mow"

that carries through and into the depths of a city to @size Important

objectives. Tanks provide direct fire, vwel breaching and obstacle

destruct - capabilities in both attack and defense. Mine renoval

drap are aed to clear passages of enemy mines. In accordance with

the guidelines provided by one Soviet author, antitank forces .n the

defense are retained under the direct control of the infantry battalion

comander. The first priority in defense against a tank is given to

the separation of enmy infantry from tanks to permit antitank units

to close with the enea. This procedure would appear to be less a

tactical essential given introduction into the Scviet arsenal of the

long range and highly accurate 5agger wire guided antitank missile.

Nowhere in these guidelines is there a reference to the utility of

helicopters as antitank weapons. The guidelines are quite explicit

in detailing the manner in which tank ambushes are to be conducted

which appears to indicate a Soviet emphasis.

Tank Modrazdeleniie, as a rule, are attached to motorizedrifle companies and platoons and operate in their combatformations. They fire by direct lay to clear the pathfor motorized rifle podrazdelenie. They can be includedin assault groups and groups for destroying nuclearcharges. Usually the platoon is the least subdivisionof tank podrazdeleniye. Swever, the possibility ofseparate tank acting with motorized rifle platoons andsquads cannot be precluded. Experience gained in battleshows during the course of an attack In a city a soundtactic is to employ a tank platoon wedge formation where-in one tank or SAU moves down the center of a street andother tanks or SAU move behind it at some distance onthe right or left side of the street, providin; mutualfire support. A squad of a motorized rfle platoon movesbehind each tank, protected by the armor. In this case

For a discussion of the combat effectiveness of this AT missile seeAdelphi Paper number one hundred and eleven; Elizabeth Monroe and A.B.Farrar-Hockley The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973 Background and Events,The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Winter1974-75, pp. 33-34.

136

tanks, covering one another by fire, can successfullyhit weapons in strong implacements, remve barricadesand rubble, and destroy anemy tanks and armor personnelcarrierm. Motorized rifleman can effectively combat enemyclose-coubat weapons and thereby support the tanks insuccessfully carrying out a mission. (I pp. 19-20)

Attached to a motorized-rifle battalion attacking Ina city along several parallUl streets for reinforcementmy be an artillery division and sometimes, in addition,a battery of antitank artillery. The attached artillerybattalion is used for firing not only from the covered,but also from the open firing positions. Batteries areusually distributed for support of the companies Inthe first echelon, and one of them is left at thedisposal of the battalion commnder. Battalion artilleryand a tank-destroyer battery also operate with companiesof the first echelon.

It cannot be excluded that a motorized-rifle battalionwill be reinforced by only a subunit of antitank artillery.In this case, its actions, as a rule, will be supportedby an artillery battalion. (' p. 28)

In attacking a city enemy tanks will operate primarilyalong streets, on squares, and in sectors which have notbeen built up. Therefore, most antitank weapons will beconcentrated on the main tank-dangerous routes. Thepositions of tanks and antitank Rins must be selectedso that they will be able to cove r by fire streets,intersections, squares, and parks with flanking andinterlocking fire.

The fire of tanks and guns is reinforced by the fire Vof antitank grenade launchers and by hand grenades,capable use of which under the conditions prevailingin a city acquires exceptional importance in combatingenemy tanks successfully.

The positions of antitank guns are set up in masonryand reinforced concrete structures and behind stone fencesin which embrasures are formed for delivering fire andobserving. Every position of a tank, gun, or antitankgrenade launcher is covered by fire from adjacentpositions and the fire of motorized rifle podrazdelenive.(3 p. 65)

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In connection with the fact that during fighting in acity, mneuver, vision, and firing are limited for tanksand also that orisntation is hindered, they operate asaccompanying ms directly in comat formatious of themotorized-rifle submit, and in close coordinationwith the submits of the other types of troops. (7 p. 38)

A motorized rifle battalion assigned as an assaultdetachment is reinforced with artillery, tanks, andSappers. (s)

In our opinion, it is advisabl* to reinforce a companywhich attacks usually along one street with two orthree tanks, a howitzer battery, mortar platoon, two orthree PTURS (protivotankovyy upravlyayenyy reaktiwMuZn antitak guided missile), one or two sappersquads, and two or three chemical specialists, and providesupport with the fire of a battery or rocket artillery.

Preparatory fires for the attack are delivered at thedesignated time. During this period sapperpodrasdelnlnye, under the cover of fire from artillerymortars, tanks, and guns designated for firing bydirect lay and also firn of motorized riflepndraelLaniy*E lay passages in enemy obstacles. (s p. 43)

Thi attached tanks usually operate in motorizedinfantry battle formations and, firing on the move,destroy the enemy fire weapons. ()

Tanks usually advance together with motorized riflepodrazdelanive Ln their forumtions and, deliveringfire on the move, destroy enemy vwe&ons hinderingforward movement of the infantry. (I p. 40)

In those cases when the enemy offers weak resistancealong a street, tanks with infantry mounted on then orinfantry in armored persotnel carriers and trucks movealong the street at a great speed, delivering fire onthe move. They reach important objectives in thisway and seize them from the march. (3 p. 40).

If the enemy offers weak resistance the tank-bornemotorized infantryman approach the most importantobjectives at high speed and capture then on the nove.

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The motorized infantry and tanks, moving from coverto cover, are followed by Suns detailed for directfire. Flurng along the streets, they destroy anytargets which hinder the advance of the infantryand tanks. (1)

At the signal for the attack or assault motorizedrifle podrasdeleniye, under cover of fire and smoke,will cross obstacles using the peasages which have beenlaid, reach the buildings occupied by the enemy whichare under attack, and enter then and destroy the enemy.At this times the fire froa artillery, tanks, and gunsdesignated for fire by direct lay, which is deliveredover the heads and from the flanks of attackingpodrazdeleniye, it intensified.

When the attacking podrazdeleniYe approach the buildingsartillery pieces and machineguns shift fire to the upperstories and attics, to adjacent buildings, and to thesaps between them. (3 p. 43)

When podrazdeleniye approach objectives under attackguns and tanks on signal of the battalion or companycommander shift fire to the upper floors and toadjacent buildings and prevent the approach of enemyreserves. (3 p. 40)

Tanks equipped vith antimine drags act together withsappers and lay passages In enemy mined obstacles.Motorized rifle and sapper podrazdeleniye designated forImediate assault move behind them. The tanks, deliveringfire at embrasures or windows of a structare under attack,appreach it and cover the attacking motorized riflemenand sappers with their fire and armor. (3 pp. 43-44)

In organizing a system of antitank fire a battalioncommander provides for: repulsing mass enemy tankattacks in front of the forward edge and destroying tankswhich enter the city; concentrating fire along streets,squares, parks, gardens, and other sectors where enemytanks might move; providing an all-around defense ofsites and areas of the battalion an a whole; maneuverby antitank weapons from one avenue of approach toanother; and cover of antitank and other obstacles byantitank weapons. (3 p. 64)

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Antitank podragdelenite remaining under the directcontrol of the motorised rifle battalion commanderprepare firing positions In places from which theycan deliver fire along wide and long streets, mainarteries, squares, and ezpected routes of attack ofthe esan main forces. (I p. 57)

Combat action In a city, as a rule, is conducted atclose range and therefore the weapons of motorized rifleuodradelaneie- such as machineguns, submechineguns,grenade launchers, and hand grenades will play anImportant role In inflicting damage on the enemy.In a city where maneuver and fire of tanks are limited,a large role will be played by manually operatedantitank grenade launchers, hand grenades, and recoillessguns in the fight against enemy tanks. (3 p. 56)

To beat off the attack the subrults first of all cut offthe Infantry from the tanks and destroy it. Separatetanks which have broken through into the town withoutinfantry are destroyed with antitank weapons at shortrange. (6)

In repulning the enemy attack the Infantry should be cutoff from the tanks and destroyed first since separatetanks or groups of tanks which break Into the city with-out Infantry can be rapidly destroyed by antitankweapons at short range. In this event the strength ofthe battalion defensive position will not be impaired.(S p. 73)

Ambushes of motorized infantry and tank subunitsopen fire when the enemy approaches at a shortdistance. By surprise fire they destroy his tanksand infantry, preventing then from advancing deepinto the defences. After the fulfillment of theirmission the tanks and infantry detailed for ambushtake up other positions and are assigned new combatmissions. (6)

Tanks which are attached to a motorized rifle battalion.rex used by platoon and by crew for operations fromambush or they are attached to companies and platoonsto reinforce the antitank defense. In strongpointstanks operate as mobile or immobile weapons. One primaryand one or two reserve positions and routes for

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movement to them are prepared for every tank.

Tank ambushes in a motorized rifle battalion mayconsist of a crew or a platoon. An ambush in preparedon a tank-dangerous approach in a well-camouflagedposition. The position is prepared in a gap betweenstrongpoints, behind one, or on a flank of thebattalion defensive area, as a r4le, at a streetintersection or square wherr beveral streets convergeand in buildings located on a main artery. (s p. 56)

The firing positions of tanks, guns, and armoredpc-sonnel carriers are selected in corner buildings,in structures stmnding alone, and behind masonryfences. Door and window openings are used for firingand embrasures are made in walls. (S p. 54)

To support a perimeter defense of a site, strongpoint,or the defensive area as a whole the system of fire isso organized that all streets, intersections, gapsbetween buildings, entrances to squares and also parksand public gardens, the approaches to bridges and over-passes, and the approaches to water obstacles are keptunder flanking and interlocking multilayer fire andalso concentrated fire of mortars and artillerylocated in covered firing positions. Particularattention Is devoted to the organization of antitankfire since it will be possible to deliver fire at enemytanks in the city itself only for a very limited time.(' p. 54)

As a rule, counterattacks are supported by artilleryand mortar fire as well as by the tanks operatingdirectly in the subunits' battle formations. (6)

Extensive use is made of ambushes along routes ofprobable enemy forward movement to deliver fire at histanks and armored personnel carriers. Even individualsoldiers armed with antitank hand grenades and antitankgrenade launchers can inflict significant losses onenemy tanks and armored personnel carrip-s movingalong city streets which hamper maneuver. (3 p. 54)

Men in tank and motorized rifle ambushes do not open fireat the enemy before he approaches the ambushes. Whenthe enemy gets close to them they destroy tanks and

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infantry by opening fire suddenly, preventing the enemyfromi amking further progress within the defensiveposition. After they have completed their missionthe tanks and motorised riflman desixnated forambush occupy other positions and receive amission. (I p. 74)

9. Soviet Guidelines foi Simul Comunications

The guidelines describe the difficulties of communicating

by radio in the urban environ t to irclude problems of interference

and reduced ranges. Wire to include mIncipal systems is advocated

as an alternative with the caution that it ptrqvides problems of

security.

Conditions prevqiling in a city complicate the controlof podraedeleniye in imbat. LimitdtiOns on fields ofobservation, the shielding effects of structures on radiocommunication, and the difficulty of coordinating theactivity of units in strongpoints when there is extensivedestruction and rubble oblige coneanders to seek the mostreliable methods of effecring control and commication.It is advisable to mask extensive use of signal systemsand use mmicipal underground cable networks for wirecommunication and other means of conmmication existingin the city. However, in this caoe it is necessaryto take measures to prevent the possibility of enemyintercept of conversations. (S p. 55)

The radios in podrazdeleniye can best be locAted on theupper floors of buildings and other etructures andextensive use should be made of remote control of radioequipment. If because of the prevailing situation theymust be kept in the lower stories, then a VCh (highfrequency) cable 10--15 m long is connected to anantenna which is deployed on the roof of a building.In an attack in a city the rt,-ber of R-105 and R-114radios must be increased foi podrazdeleniye assigred toconduct reconnaissance and also to support communicationfor coordination between motorized rifle companies andtank podrazdeleniye.

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The battalion comander effects amtrol of artilleryfire by personally assigning misslons to the coimmndersof artillery podrazdeleniye. This can be achieved bycollocating their conand-observetion posts.

Extensive use is made of dobile mans of communicationssuch as armored personnel carriers and tanks, footmssengers, and lights and other signmas. (3 p. 38)

Under these conditions prcvailing in a city theeffective range of ultrashortwave radios is reduced sincethe buildings and other structures in the city shieldand absorb Lhe radio waves. To control podrazdeleniyein combat use will be made most frequently of portableradios since the opportunity to move armored personnelcarriers with the radios mounted on thea wirl be verylimited in a city.

During combat in the city it will be necessary to us'the bypass communication frequencies of attachedand supporting po[razdeleniye, especially artillery.(' p. 37)

Missions to seize and fortify important locations in thecity, as a rule, are assigned by radio and from thespot where the battalion comander will control thepodrazdeleniye in combat. (3 p. 61)

10. Soviet Guidelines for Reconnaissance Forces

The responsibility for continuous reconnaissince in Soviet

tactical units is extremely general from the division to the small unit

commander and individual soldier. The following gaidelines reflect this

broad spectrum. There are several types of reconnaissance identified

as providing information about the enemy, the terrain and objective

area to include combat patrol; reconnaissance groups, engineer,

radiation, chemical, bacterirlogical and officer reconnaissance. Foot

patrols are given priority in urban warfare; however observation and

listening posts are included in thia category. Reconnaissance forces

are, as with other tactical units, task organized and may include

infantry, artillery, engineer and chemical personnel. While cities

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restrict loeg range visibility, the Soviet vriters indicate that

they also provide concealmnt for reconnaissance into en. positions.

Reconnaissance is organized in timely fashion, beginningwith receipt of the combat mission. Information aboutthe nature of the city, the system of defense, enemystrength, system of fire, the existence of artificialand natural obstacles and underground structuresand advantageous approache to objectives under attackis obtained by studying information available at the nexthigher staff, reference books, aerial photographs,descriptions, large-scale maps and plans, observation,search, ambush, combat, combat reconaissance pat1ols,reconnaissance groups, and aniner, radiation, chemcal,and officer reconnaissance ("p. 33)

Reconnaissance by observation is, as a rule, conductedwith an extremely limited view along the front and inthe depth. Observers of the subunits are assigned notsectors, but Individual objectives (a house or part ofit, ruins, etc.). Observation points are selected withsuch calculation that the scout has visual commicationwith the comander of the subunit.

Posts are placed fatnly in the cembat formations of thesubunit as wall as in places securing a good view notonly of the adjacent streets, but also roofs of housesand upper stories. With this, personnel must be wellcamouflaged and reliably covered. Such places might behigh nultistoried buildings, garrets, breaches inwalls or roofs, stone fences into which holes are madebeforehand, destroyed buildings, and camouflaged tanks.

It is necessary to arrange posts so that they are exposedas least as possible to danger from crumbling buildingsand so that personnel are constantly defended fromartillery and mortar fire. Therefore, it is not alwaysadvantageous to place scouts on factory chimeys,church towers, and water towers, since, being goodlandmarks, they will be destroyed In the first instance.

For the equipping of a post, one must not forget aboutthe arrangement of an emergency exit and overhead coverand walls reinforced by bricks and sandbags. Windowsand openings, which are not used by scouts, are stuffedby these same materials. For implementation of themission, personnel are equipped with the periscope of

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a scout, and binoculars and other Instruments permittti1,observation from the interior of a building or frombehind she2ter. (11 p. 24)

Preparing for reconnaissance in a city, it is necessarybeforehand to study the width and pattern of the streetsand the location of squares, gardens and public gardens,residential, public, and industrial buildings, andunderground communication structures. For this are uoeda large-scale map, a city plan, and aerl photographs.The basic methods of reconnaissance, as also underordinary conditions, ate: observation, raid, ambush,reconnai&sance in f 2 rce, officer reconnaissance, andthe activity of BRD and RG . (" p. 24)

The defenders achieve the complete rout of the enemy bydaring and surprise counterattacks at his flank andrear. The subunits advance unnoticed to the deploymentlines, mainly by underground passages and communicationtrenches. Because of the limited field of sight in atown and the complication of the situation in the arvaof the enemy penetration, a reconnaissance and securityelements are sent out in front of the subunits advancingfor the counterattack. The counterattacking subunits'fighting for big buildings frequently assumes the natureof an assault. Therefore the second echelon subunitsmust be able to act as assault groups. (6)

At the beginning of the fighting for the city, the RC,operate in the combat formationsi of the assalilt derach-ments and groups. After the taking of the strongpoints;(centers of resistance) on the outskirts of the city,they, using the breaks in the combat formations orpoorly defended streets, gardenu, and public gardens,penetrate into the depth of the enemy's defense andproceed in their own directions. Then the groupsadvance along the streets. If they are sufficientlywide that tanks move on both sides, and in the middleon narrow streets. (13 pp. 25-26)

In addition to information obtained by the seniorcommander's intelligence, each podrazdeleniye commandhrmust take all steps for continuous and active collection

BRD combat reconnaissance patrol; RG - reconnaissance group

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of supplement and new Infomttio. ec*imaissancepatrols and patrol vehicles can be sent out for thispurpose.- (5)

Most frequently combat recoanaiesamce patrols in a citysmo on foot. This pemits them to use concealedroute to reach the eaney's rear, using undargroudstructes. Saps In buildings and fences, etc. It isadvisable to Include artillerymen, sappers, andchemical specialists in rteoaisnssce patrols for thepurpose of obtaIning more comlete informtion aboutthe aeW and the nature of objectives deep withinthe ensTy's defensive position. (1 p. 34)

Reconnaismance in force Us conducted in a 1ity moreoften th in other conditlons since possibilitiesto procure Infomation by other methods are far less.For participation in it, it is advisable to assipaa motorized-rifle subunit consisting of a reinforcedplatoon to a company, and sometimes up to a battalion.They are reinforced by antitank grenades, tanks, andartillery Sums for point-blank firing. In ordinaryconditions, It is preceded by preparatory fire, but ina city it my not be. Sometimes, a quick dash of thesubunit from its initial position leads to a completesurprise and a wel-tlmd detection of the enemy'ssystem of defense. (13 p. 25)

Great significance during the course of combat Li thecity is aazuired by coprehensive support of combataction, especially the conduct of active, deep, andcontinuous recomnaissance. Reconnaissance =uet beconducted by commdars at all levels as well as byIndividual soldiers. Observation and reconmaissanceby fire are organized continuously and combatrecounnaissce patrols and patrol vehicles are sentout. This makes it possible for a comder to be readyto take appropriate action with any change in thesituation. (1 p. 42)

It is advl•able~to apportion not less than three ojfour tanks (BTR ) in the composition of a PC (3WR)Advancing in pairs, they provide fire for each other.('s p. 25)

BTR - armored carrier; PG - reconnaissance group; BRD - combatreconnaissance patrol

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An a rule., information from reconnaissance in abattalion is obtained by obaervation, listening, aal,.his.receipt of data from adjacent units and higher staffs,from interrogation of prisoners and refugee, questioningof local inhabitants, and study of seized documents andtrophies. Furthermore, a search my be conducted inthe battalion on decision of the next higher commander.

Reconnaissance is conducted with the start of an enemyattack by a combat reconnaissance patrol, patrol vehicles,and also reconnaissance by fire when a battalion hasreverted to the defense while in direct contact with theenemy and with the start of occupation of the defensiveposition when not in contact with the enemy. (3 p. 67)

On a destroyed street, it is more advantageous to placescouts not in surviving buildings, but among the ruins.(13 p. 24)

Structures in a city limit reconnaissance byobservation and equipment. At the same time theclosed nature of the terrain in a city and thenetwork of underground routes of comunication createfavorable conditions for dispatch of our reconnaissancedeep within enemy combat formations. But enemyreconnaissance also will try to use covered approachesand underground routes of communication in a city forthe purpose of penetrating to our rear. Therefore, thebattalion commander must take account of and providefor security and observation over possible routes ofpenetration by enemy scouts and sabotage groups.

In reverting to the defense while in direct contactwith the enemy a battalion commander begins to devoteattention to the problems of reconnaissance while hlis fortifying his lines. He assigns additional miu.ionuto reconnaissance and directs it along lines of defensivecombat. In all cases podrazdeleniye commanders aretold: reconnaissance missions prior to the beginningof the enemy attack and when he reverts to the attack,forces for the conduct of reconnaissance, the beginningof reconnaissance action, and periods and proceduresfor submitting reports. (3 p. 67)

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In defeame of a city coeeat recounaissance patrolson emaoed pereeoml carriere my be seat out torecommoter the am" and locations os the approachesto the city. Directly In a city it I best to conducta•r-cisemace on foot using groups ismalr In sizethen ude ordinary field conditions. A foot patrolunder conditions prevailfng In a city is ahis topenetrate everywhere. By using surfsce and amdar-groud routes of commaiAtion it usually suffers fewerlosses end is abl, to reconnoiter amy objective, routs,oa sector of the city. (1 pp. 67-8)

Radiation ad chemical reconaissance in a battalionis conducted by obeerveti organie- d, as a rule, atthe comden-6r-o-eer,-tion poet of the battalion, combatrecon•aisence patrols which Include attached chemicaltroops, ad chemical reconnaissmce patrols. (1 p. 68)

Hany masures are taken to orgenis protection againstweapons of mass destruction. A depedable system forwerning the garrisons Lu strongpoints employing alsues of comm.ication is established, and continuousradiation, chemical, and bacteriological recounaissanceis conducted within the city. Provisions are made formore coqplata use for protection of personnel of strongunderground structures ad basemts and in case of needthey are reinforced. Particular attention is devotedto protection for sources of water and safeguarding themagainst bacteriological contaminatioa as well as strictobservance in strongpoints ad In a battalion defensivearea " a whole of rules governing s-ultatiot and hygiene.Measures are taken to eliminate the consequences oforployment by the enemy of weapons of mss" destructionand measures are proecribed for putting out fires andcarrying out seergency rescue work. Perso-nel arecategorically forbidden from using food, alcoholicbewraSes, and other things seized from the enemy orleft by him ad also water from any source without apreliminary test by medical workers. Particularattention is devoted to checking the quality of foodand water before consuming them. (a p. 68)

It is moot advisable to arrange ambushes on the outskirtsof the city, at street crossings and the exits of buildings,and somatimes in the buildings, thmselves, mainly onthe first floor. It is also advantageous to organize

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them at water fountains, at exits from undtrground

city tcolmicationo, on the mawition and food ouppl.route, ot the enem and the advancement routes othis observers and listening group for Impementingmisaions at night. When an ambush is arranged on theoutskirts of the city or at the street crossings,personnel 8sa3gned to the attack should be postedoutside of the buildings (structures), and the scoutsand combat vehicles for protecting the attackers maybe left in buildings or behind various types of cover.

The experience of the Groat Patriotic War indicates thatmost successful in ambush acted reconnaissance group-of force not larger than a section (otdeleniya), whichset up ambushes in the depth of the enesy's combatformation and where his vigilance, as a rule, isloy. (13 p. 25)

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FOOTNOTES

I Colonel V. Petrukhin, "Battle in a Town," Soviet Militar• Review, No. 5,pp. 10-12 (May 1974).

2 General Major V.G. Reznichenko, ed., Taktika (Tactics) (Moscow:'

Voyenizdat, 1966), translated by USAF System Command, Foreign Tech-nology Division, 1967 (FTD-MT-67-35).

3 General Major A.K. Shovkolovich, Colonel F.I. Konasov, and Colonel 5.1.Tkach, Boyevyye deystviya motostrelsovoto batal'ona v lorode (CombatActivity of a Motorized-Rifle Battalion in a City) (Moscow: Voyenlzdat,1971), translated by Joint Publications Research Service for Army Chiefof Staff for Intelligence (No. JPRS-55386, No. ACSI K-1400).

Colonel 1. Vorob'yev, "Combat Action in a City," Voyennyy Vestnik, 14,. 4(April 1972).

Colonel A. Dorofeyev, "Combat in a Large City," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3,pp. 39-44 (March 1970).

6 Colonel V. Petrukhin, "Defence in a Town," Soviet Military Review, No. 8,

pp. 24-25 (August 1974).7 Guards General Major L. Kuznetsov, "hoe Offensive in a City," Voyennyy

Vestnik, No. 8, pp. 36-39 (August 1969).Colonel S. rhidarev, "Artillery Fights an Action in a City," Voyenny Vestiii.No. 9, pp. 28-31 (September 1971).

1 Junior Sergeant V. Davydak, "In the Staff of an assault Group," Starshina iSerzhant, No. 6, p. 8 (June 1973).

10 General Major of Engineering Troops R. Stepanov, "Engineering Support

for an Offensive in a City," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 93-96 (June 1970).

i Colonel V. Odnoletkov and Colonel M. Pankov, "Activity of a Mortar Battetyin a City," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 108-111 (June 1970).

"12 General Major of Technical Troops (Retired) A. Babushkin, "Flame Throwek!;

on the Streets of Blidapest," Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 6, pp. 66-68 (June 19701i.

13 General Major P. Savinskiy, "Reconnaissance for an Offensive in a City,"Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 4, pp. 23-26 (April 1969).

"14 Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Magayev, "The Offensive in a Large City,"Voyennyy Vestnik, No. 3, pp. 25-29 (August 1972).

I General of the Army A.I. Radziyevskiy, Taktika v boyevykh prlmerakki.

Polk. (Tactics in Combat Examples. The Regiment.) (Moscow: Voyeni-zdat, 1974).

16 "Combat Activities in a City," Starshina i Serzhant, No. 6, p. 1 (June

1972).

. P P lk 1 5 1