diversifying sensors to improve network resilience
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Diversifying Sensors to Improve Network Resilience. Wenliang (Kevin) Du Electrical Engineering & Computer Science Syracuse University. Hiding Secrets. Secrets are essential for sensor networks Pre-distributed keys Pair-wise keys Private keys Other secrets - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Diversifying Sensors to Improve Network Resilience
Wenliang (Kevin) DuElectrical Engineering & Computer Science
Syracuse University
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Diversifying Sensors 2
Hiding Secrets
• Secrets are essential for sensor networks • Pre-distributed keys• Pair-wise keys• Private keys• Other secrets
• Fundamental Challenge: hiding secrets is difficult
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Diversifying Sensors 3
Existing Approaches
• Physical security is difficult to achieve• Hardware approaches are expensive• Software approaches
• Code obfuscation: extensively studied in traditional systems
• Bad news: adversaries eventually win
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Diversifying Sensors 4
Rethinking of Software Approaches
• Observation: fault tolerance of sensor networks• Should be able to tolerate a small # of bad sensors
• Ideal Goals• Hiding secrets in sensor nodes• Make it difficult to derive secrets from each sensor• Make it N times difficult to derive secrets from N
sensors
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Threat Model: Physical Compromise
Memory Dumping
Static Analysis
Dynamic AnalysisRev
erse
Eng
inee
ring
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Proposed Approach
• Data Obfuscation (Secret Hiding)• Memory dump: difficult to find secrets• Adversaries must understand the program
• Code Obfuscation• Make it difficult to understand one program
• Code Diversification (Randomization)• Make adversary’s effort non-repeatable
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Data/Code Obfuscation• Existing Techniques
• Code flattening• Self-modification code• White-box encryption algorithms• Various techniques against reverse engineering
• Challenges• Achieving obfuscation with limited Memory• Computation can’t be too expensive• Tradeoff needs to be made (optimization)• Quantify code complexity
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Diversifying Code
• Turn the same piece of software into many diversified versions
• Difference from traditional diversity• Diversity for fault tolerance• Diversity for attack tolerance (vulnerabilities)
• Attacks are quite fragile
• Diversity for code-analysis tolerance• Attacks are adaptive and intelligent (human involved)
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Diversifying Code: Challenges• Quantify diversity and manageability
• Manageability prefers uniformity• Diversity destroys uniformity• Manageability is application dependent• Optimal tradeoff
• Comparative study: already compromised node and newly-captured node
• Static matching attacks• Dynamic matching attacks
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Difference from Protecting Intellectual Right
• Intellectual Right• Success = breaking one copy
• Sensor Networks• Success = breaking more than k copies
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Unique Properties of Sensor Networks
• Code usually has small size• Some applications has static configurations
• The OS can be obfuscated too• Hardware specific code obfuscation
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Preliminary Results: SASN’06
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Complexity: Line of Code
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Cyclomatic Complexity
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Running Time
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Summary
• Diversified code obfuscation is quite unique for sensor networks
• Require understanding from both engineering and theory perspectives