dk evaluation report in english

8/16/2019 DK Evaluation Report in English

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ObjectiveThe objective of this basis for decision is to present the results of the New Fighter Program’sevaluation of the three fighter candidates included in the Danish fighter aircraft selection process. TheDanish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 requires the establishment of the best possible basis for apolitical decision on fighter aircraft type selection. The rationale behind the focus on new fighters in thedefence agreement is partly an identification of a Danish security policy need for fighter aircrafts and

partly a recognition of the fact that the current Danish F-16 fighter aircrafts are nearing the end of theirlifespan. In 2020, the Danish F-16 will have been flying for approximately 40 years and there will besignificant operational, technical and economic challenges associated with their continued use.

Fighter aircraft candidatesThe three fighter candidates in the Danish fighter aircraft selection process are:

The Eurofighter, developed in a partnership between the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain.The primary manufacturer behind the Eurofighter is the European company Airbus. The GermanFederal Ministry of Defence is the supplier of the aircraft on behalf of Germany.

The F-35A Joint Strike Fighter, developed in a collaboration between nine partner countries (the USA,the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, Australia, Norway, Denmark and Canada). The

primary manufacturer behind the Joint Strike Fighter is the American company Lockheed Martin. TheJoint Strike Fighter Program Office is the supplier of the aircraft on behalf of the United States.

The F/A-18F Super Hornet, developed in the USA. The primary manufacturer behind the Super Hornetis the American company Boeing. The U.S. Navy International Programs Office is the supplier of theaircraft on behalf of the United States.

Evaluation areas and framesIn order to provide the best possible basis for a political decision on the fighter aircraft type selection,the three candidates have been evaluated within four specific areas:

Strategic aspects: the ability of the candidates to support or fulfil overarching Danish defence andsecurity policy objectives, including the potential for cooperation with other countries.

Military aspects: the ability of the candidates to successfully conduct fighter missions (missioneffectiveness), the candidates’ survivability, opportunities for keeping the aircraft operational andtechnically relevant within its expected lifespan (future development) as well as the risks associatedwith each candidate that cannot be economically quantified (candidate risk).

Economic aspects: the estimated life cycle costs of the candidates, including costs associated withprocurement, ongoing operations and sustainment as well as quantifiable risks.

Industrial aspects: the ability of the candidates to support significant Danish security interests throughindustrial cooperation with the Danish defence industry.

The evaluations are based on an operational period of 30 years for the new fighter aircrafts (2020-

2049). Additionally, the evaluations have assumed a continuation of the current tasks and level ofambition of the Danish F-16 fighter capability.


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This means that the point of departure has been that a future Danish fighter aircraft capability must beable to continue to conduct:

> National tasks involved with maintaining a permanent quick reaction alert capability which canperform tasks involving surveillance and defending sovereignty and which can be scrambled withextremely short notice. Additionally, other national tasks such as supporting the Danish national police

and other public authorities.

> International operations and NATO’s collective defence tasks with a fighter contribution on high alertstate in which four fighters can be deployed for a period of up to 12 months every third year. Inaddition, periodic fighter contributions to NATO Air Policing missions.

The primary underlying basis of information has been the responses to the request for information, theso-called ‘Request for Binding Information’ (RBI), which was sent out to the candidates on 10 April2014. At the time of the resumption of the fighter aircraft type selection process, the Swedish fighterGripen was also a candidate. However, the Gripen withdrew from the process when the Swedishauthorities decided not to respond to the RBI. The New Fighter Program received responses from thesuppliers of the Eurofighter, the Joint Strike Fighter and the Super Hornet on 21 July 2014.

In order to ensure the validity of the information in the RBI responses, the responses to each of theapproximately 950 questions in the RBI have been carefully reviewed in a validation process. In caseswhere the New Fighter Program uncovered insufficiencies, unresolved issues or possible risks ofmisunderstandings, a validation strategy has been implemented at three levels:

> Forwarding clarifying questions to the suppliers within each area of evaluation (so called ’Requestfor Clarification’ (RFC)).

> Clarifying dialogue in the form of, for example, briefings or information updates by suppliers or theprimary manufacturers with a view to understanding the context in which the responses were given orin order to ensure an understanding of any correlations and assumptions which were not clearly setout in the original responses.

> Using reference data, including information on the F-16 fighters.

In the strategic evaluation, the New Fighter Program did not make use of the RBI because Danishdefence and security policy interests cannot be assessed on the basis of information from suppliers.Instead, the point of departure has been, among others, Danish and other countries’ policy papers aswell as countries’ reporting to NATO.

Evaluation methodsThe New Fighter Program has developed distinct evaluation strategies and models for each evaluationarea. The evaluation models were developed prior to sending out the RBI. In the models, there is adetailed description of how the individual evaluations were to be conducted, including the order inwhich each step of the process was to be completed.

The evaluations of the strategic, military and industrial areas have been largely based on qualitativeanalyses and evaluations. In these areas, the New Fighter Program has made use of various expertpanels, which have ultimately evaluated and ranked the candidates. The participating experts haverepresented a broad range of competencies and experience related to the specific evaluation areas.The expert panels have been conducted according to the Delphi method which focuses on improvingthe quality of the expert evaluations through a structured and documented process of repeated roundsof voting and discussions.

In contrast, the evaluation of the economic aspects has been based on a quantitative approach. In thisregard, a dynamic economic model was used which was developedby the New Fighter Program in cooperation with Deloitte. This model was used to calculate theestimated life cycle costs of the candidates.


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External quality assuranceIn order to ensure external and independent control, external quality assurance has been conducted ofthe products prepared by the New Fighter Program in developing this basis for decision. Qualityassurance has been carried out by Danish experts from Deloitte in cooperation with internationalexperts from RAND Europe assisted by QinetiQ and Vorderman Consultancy. As Deloitte wasinvolved in developing the economic model, the quality control of the evaluation of the economic

aspects was undertaken by RAND Europe.

Evaluation resultsTable 0.1 lists the final ranking for the candidates within each of the evaluation areas.

A brief review of the results is presented below.

Strategic aspectsIn the strategic evaluation, defence and security policy implications along with the potential forstrategic cooperation associated with the respective candidate have been identified. The evaluationmodel has followed a step-by-step approach in which strategic criteria have been developed on thebasis of a review of Danish foreign and security policy. The New Fighter Program has provided thebasis of information for handling these criteria through analyses of, for example, NATO documentsand the policies and historic roles of the respective user countries. Ultimately, an expert panel hasassessed the candidates’ ability to safeguard and achieve overarching Danish defence and securityinterests.

The assessment of the expert panel has been that the selection of the Joint Strike Fighter will entailthe greatest potential for promoting Danish interests, in terms of both security policy and militarystrategy and that the Joint Strike Fighter will provide the highest degree of flexibility at the politicallevel with regards to future tasks. The broad scope of the group of Joint Strike Fighter users will fosterboth Denmark’s transatlantic ties and the country’s collaborative relations with a range of Europeanpartners.

The European dimension in the group of countries using the Eurofighter has been a significant aspectin the expert panel’s ranking the Eurofighter number two. The expert panel has particularlyemphasised the fact that the Eurofighter will open up for strengthening the defence and security policycooperation with Germany.

The importance of maintaining a close relationship with the USA in the area of fighter aircraft isparticularly stressed by the expert panel in relation to the Super Hornet. However, the small group ofSuper Hornet users and the geographical location of those users far from Denmark’s neighbouringareas have been contributing factors for the expert panel having ranked the Super Hornet numberthree.


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Table 0.2 shows the votes that have led to the expert panel’s final ranking of the candidates withrespect to strategic aspects. The uneven distribution is due to the fact that the experts have had theopportunity to rank the candidates evenly.

Military aspectsThe evaluation of military aspects comprises the subareas survivability, mission effectiveness, futuredevelopment and candidate risk.

The evaluation of survivability considers how well the fighter aircraft is capable of protecting itselfagainst enemy weapon systems so as to minimise the risk of loss of aircraft or crew. The evaluation ofmission effectiveness considers how well the fighter aircraft performs the task assigned. Altogether,survivability and mission effectiveness reflect the fighter’s military ability to perform tasks. Futuredevelopment evaluates the extent to which the fighter aircraft is expected to constitute a relevantoperational and technically applicable fighter aircraft capability throughout the entire 30-year lifespanof the fighter aircraft, whereas the evaluation of candidate risk considers the risks that cannot bequantified economically. The economic costs that will incur provided the individual risk occurs are

considered in the economic evaluation. This applies also to the costs associated with risk-mitigatingmeasures.

The New Fighter Program has carried out a large number of technical and operational analyses.Expert panels have subsequently given the candidates marks and ranked them on the basis of theanalyses. Using the Delphi method within each of the four sub-areas, the experts have assignedmarks to the candidates on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5 representing the best mark.

Figure 0.1 displays the candidates’ average marks under each sub-area of the military evaluation.

Under survivability and mission effectiveness, the Joint Strike Fighter comes out better than the twoother candidates. This is due to a number of circumstances, including for example the low radarsignature of the aircraft as well as the application of advanced systems and sensors that enhance the

pilot’s tactical overview and ensure the survival of the aircraft and efficient mission performance. Interms of survivability and mission effectiveness, the Super Hornet does slightly better than theEurofighter.

With respect to future development, the Joint Strike Fighter ranks better than the two other candidates.The reasons are, among other things, that the aircraft is expected to be produced in a large numberand that the contractual and development basis for keeping the aircraft technically and operationallyrelevant throughout its lifespan is present. With regard to the Eurofighter and the Super Hornet, theexpert panel’s evaluation is that the candidates’ future development is at the same level.


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Industrial aspectsThe industrial evaluation assesses the extent to which the fighter manufacturers’ proposals forindustrial cooperation with the Danish defence industry can support essential Danish securityinterests. The New Fighter Program has considered the manufacturers’ proposals for cooperationinitiatives in accordance with current guidelines for industrial cooperation.Subsequently, an expert panel has assessed the initiative packages through the Delphi method. The

combined value of the industrial cooperation proposals for the Eurofighter is DKK 18.7 billionconsisting of 30 initiatives. The corresponding value for the Joint StrikeFighter is DKK 26.5 billion consisting of 26 initiatives, and for the Super Hornet the value is DKK 15billion consisting of 68 initiatives.

The expert panel has assessed that the industrial cooperation initiatives proposed by Lockheed Martin(Joint Strike Fighter) support the safeguarding of essential Danish security interests to a greater extentthan the initiatives of the other two candidates. This is due to the large volume and duration of theinitiatives, the relatively high degree of feasibility, and the maturity of the initiatives. Furthermore it isdue to the potential associated with the forthcoming sustainment phase. Therefore, the Joint StrikeFighter is ranked number one with regard to industrial aspects.

The initiatives proposed by Boeing (Super Hornet) and Airbus (Eurofighter) are assessed to support

the safeguarding of essential Danish security interests to the same extent. However, the Super Hornetis ranked number two, as the overall package of initiatives proposed by Boeing was assessed to havea higher degree of feasibility and maturity than the package proposed by Airbus. Therefore, theEurofighter is ranked number three.

Table 0.3 shows the votes that have led to the ranking of the candidates with respect to industrialaspects. For the purpose of the voting, a ranking scale from A to E has been used. The figure showswhich indicators the ranking scale has covered.

It should be underlined that the results of the industrial evaluation are associated with a number ofsignificant uncertainties, among other things, as a result of an essential difference regarding theframework for industrial cooperation for the candidates. For the Joint Strike Fighter, there is aparticular element of uncertainty associated with the fact that the Joint Strike Fighter will not be subject

to an industrial cooperation requirement. The realisation of the industrial cooperation initiatives thatLockheed Martin has proposed is,therefore, conditioned upon the ability of the Danish defence industry to win contracts in accordancewith the “best-value” principle. Thus, there are no guarantees that the initiatives will be implemented.


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TABLE OF CONTENT


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TABLE OF CONTENT


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1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this basis for decision making is to present the New Fighter Program's evaluationresults for the three combat aircraft candidates included in the Danish fighter aircraft selection,Eurofighter, Joint Strike Fighter and Super Hornet.

The Danish Defence Agreement 2013-2017 states that Denmark also in the future must have acombat aircraft capability. Combat aircraft should continue to be a part of the Danish defense andsolve tasks that contribute to maintaining the Danish security policy interests.

According to the defence agreement the purpose of the process leading to type choice is to providethe best possible basis for a political decision on type selection among the participating combataircraft. The type selection will then form the basis for starting negotiations with the selected candidateon a subsequent purchase, and also creates the basis to partly establish the financially andoperationally most favorable in- and outphasing-times for the fighter jets and partly to start discussionson multinational cooperation and the ambition level.

The reason for the defense agreement's focus on new fighters is due to the report from the DefenceCommission of 2008 and the Defense Agreement 2010-14, which require a continued Danish security

policy requirement for fighter aircraft to upholding the sovereignty of the national airspace, monitoringof areas of national interest, as well as to deploy combat aircraft for international missions. This shouldbe seen in light of that the current Danish F-16 aircraft are approaching the end of their life. In 2020,the Danish F-16 aircraft have flown about 40 years and there will be significant operational, technicaland economic challenges associated with continued use.

In order to provide the best possible basis for a political decision on the fighter aircraft type selection,the three candidates have been evaluated within four specific areas, that are not weighted againsteach other:

> Strategic aspects: the ability of the candidates to support or fulfil overarching Danish defence andsecurity policy objectives, including the potential for cooperation with other countries.

> Military aspects: the ability of the candidates to successfully conduct fighter missions (missioneffectiveness), the candidates’ survivability, opportunities for keeping the aircraft operational andtechnically relevant within its expected lifespan (future development) as well as the risks associatedwith each candidate that cannot be economically quantified (candidate risk).

> Economic aspects: the estimated life cycle costs of the candidates, including costs associated withprocurement, ongoing operations and sustainment as well as quantifiable risks.

> Industrial aspects: the ability of the candidates to support significant Danish security intereststhrough industrial cooperation with the Danish defence industry.

The content of the evaluation areas have been based on the factors for type choice of combat aircraftspecified in Defence Agreement 2010-2014.

1.1 GENERAL FRAMEWORK

The evaluations are conducted with the basis of the level of ambition set out in the Danish DefenceAgreement 2013-17. It requires that the Defence's capabilities should be able to participate in the fullspectrum of international operations from international policing, stability operations to high-intensitycombat operations, while concurrently should be able to solve national tasks such as defendingsovereignity and surveillance tasks. In addition, the Agreement establishes that the Air Force mustmaintain flexible and ready capabilities that can be deployed at short notice in both domestic andinternational operations, as is described in the Law on Defence.


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Figure 1.1 The four main evaluation areas

The basis for evaluation is the current task complexity and ambition of the Danish F-16 combat aircraftcapability. Thus the evaluations make the assumption that a future Danish combat aircraft capabilitiesshould continue to solve:

> National tasks involved with maintaining a permanent quick reaction alert capability which canperform tasks involving surveillance and defending sovereignty and which can be scrambled withextremely short notice. Additionally, other national tasks such as supporting the Danish national policeand other public authorities.

> International operations and NATO’s collective defence tasks with a fighter contribution on high alertstate in which four fighters can be deployed for a period of up to 12 months every third year. Inaddition, periodic fighter contributions to NATO Air Policing missions.


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Table 1.1 Overview of the candidates, suppliers and main manufacturers

The term 'main manufacturer' is used to describe the company's main producer behind eachcandidate. The main manufacturer produces aircraft in cooperation with a number of suppliers.

The New Fighter Programs information gathering consisted of three main parts:> Dissemination of information request to suppliers> Validation of information received> Collection of information from other sources

The evaluation's primary information basis is the responses to the information request 'Request forBinding Information' (RBI), which was forwarded to the suppliers April 10, 2014. The use of the RBIhelped to ensure equal treatment of candidates, as all suppliers were asked to answer the samequestions, as also the responses received was treated in an equal way.

The RBI describes the framework and terms for the Danish type selection process. In addition, the RBIcomprises approximately 950 questions broken down by field of evaluation. Following the RBI'ssubmission, the suppliers have had the opportunity to ask questions to the New Fighter Program forpossible clarifications. The Attorney General contributed with legal assistance in connection with theRBI's form and submission. At the re-start of the type selection process, the Swedish fighter Gripen

also participated as a candidate, but Gripen opted out, as the Swedes chose not to answer the RBI.

The New Fighter Program received replies from the suppliers of the Eurofighter, Joint Strike Fighterand Super Hornet on July 21, 2014. The information received describing the candidates, is owned bythe selling government and / or the main manufacturer and is made available to the New FighterProgram . This information can therefore not be disclosed to third parties without prior writtenagreement with the government and / or the main producer. In addition, a part of the information isclassified as the information relates to military or commercially sensitive material.

To ensure the validity of the information contained in the suppliers' RBI-responses, the answer to eachof the approximately 950 questions in the RBI have been carefully examined in a validation process. Incases where the New Fighter Program has revealed shortcomings, outstanding or potentialmisunderstandings, a validation strategy was conducted in three steps:

> Submission of clarifying questions to the suppliers within each evacuation area (a so-called 'Requestfor Clarification' (RFC)).


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1.5 EXTERNAL QUALITY ASSURANCE

To ensure external and independent verification, and external quality assurance has been carried outon the products produced by the New Fighter Program for the purpose of this decision-making. Qualityassurance has been made by Danish experts from Deloitte in cooperation with international expertsfrom RAND Europe assisted by QinetiQ and Vorderman Consultancy. As Deloitte helped to develop

the economy model, the quality assurance of assessment of economic conditions was conducted byRAND Europe.

The external quality assurance has among other things served to ensure compliance with the sixquality criteria, as shown in Table 1.2.

Table 1.2 Quality criteria that have formed the basis for external quality assurance

Validity: assessing the quality of the methods, processes, analyzes and information, and whetherthese are transparent and traceable and reinforces the conclusions drawn.

Completeness: assessment of whether the methods, processes, analyzes and information in terms ofdepth and width are adequate and proportionate to the conclusions drawn, which is thought to be partof decision making.

Consistency: assessment of whether the methods, processes and analyzes are mutually logicallycoherent, ensures candidates equal treatment and are otherwise in accordance with the informationprogram available.

Presentations: assessment of whether the dissemination of methodologies, processes and analyzes isunderstandable and reflects underlying documentation loyal.

Timeliness: assessment of whether the decision making is essentially based on available informationthat is relevant at the time when the resolution is expected to be taken.

Optimization: assessment of whether the use of methods or organization of the program can be

optimized in order to shorten the duration and reduce the time spent or minimize risks of delay.


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Based on these criteria, the external quality assurance been organized into four chronological steps:

1. Evaluation Strategies, evaluation methods and model complex2. Structure and formulation of the RBI3. Analyses and evaluation reports for the four areas4. The basis for decisions

The quality assurance is thus carried out and completed step by step as illustrated in Figure 1.2.

The National Audit Office has there indicated that it will review the process at a later date.

Figure 1.2 Step by step process for external quality assurance


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1.6 UNCERTAINTY

The evaluations are associated with a number of uncertainties that are different across the fourevaluation areas. These are handled in different ways in each area through analyzes andassessments of risks, sensitivity analyzes and the use of Monte Carlo simulations.

In the strategic assessment it is very uncertain to predict the long-term geopolitical developments andalso the future strategic context of which a new Danish fighter will have to operate in. The robustnessof the evaluation results is tested through a number of alternative future scenarios that worked assensitivity analyzes.

In the military evaluation, the candidate risk was treated as a separate sub-area. This has includedcandidate associated risks which cannot be quantified, because the risks which may be assigned aneconomic value, are treated in the financial evaluation. The military evaluation also included futureproofing as an independent sub-area. Future proofing focuses among others on the uncertaintiesassociated with the ability of each combat aircraft to be able to provide meaningful technical andoperational usable capacity throughout their lifetime.

The economic assessment is subject to considerable uncertainty to estimate the lifetime costs over a

period of 30 years. Factors such as fluctuations in exchange rates and fuel prices is essential for thisuncertainty. The economic evaluation has also focused on the sensitivity with respect to the keyfactors such as candidates' airframe lifetime and the efficiency of the future logistics structure that theaircraft is going to be part of. Finally, the potential economic impact of the candidate-specific risksidentified in the type-selection process has also been included.

In the industrial evaluation there is a number of significant uncertainties. These stems, among otherthings, by the fact that the combat aircraft manufacturers are asked to provide proposals for initiativeswith a 30-year time horizon. In such a long perspective, the nature and relevance of cooperationinitiatives involve considerable uncertainties. The various uncertainties are discussed in the expertpanel’s assessments. For the Joint Strike Fighter there is a particular uncertainty associated with thefact that Lockheed Martin is not covered by the requirement of industrial cooperation. The realisationof the industrial cooperation initiatives that Lockheed Martin has proposed, is conditional to that the

Danish companies can provide for 'best-value' principle. Thus, there are no guarantees for theimplementation of the initiatives.

1.7 description of the candidates

The following sections describe the three fighter candidates in the Danish type selection process.Then follows a disposition of the remainder of this decision-making.


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1.7.1 EUROFIGHTER

Eurofighter is a twin-engine multi-role fighter, produced by the European company Airbus as the mainproducer. The plane was developed in a partnership between the UK, Germany, Italy and Spain. Theplane flew first time on 27 March 1994 and is currently used operationally by Britain, Germany, Italyand Spain as well as export customers Austria, Oman and Saudi Arabia. The plane has so far

produced 410 copies of an expected production of a total of 720 aircraft.

Several different sensors and systems are integrated into the fuselage, for example a heat-sensitivetargeting system, Electronic Warfare Systems, an advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground radar and amachine gun. In addition, Eurofighter equipped with måludpegningsudstyr that can be used for imagecapture, to identify ground targets and to control the laser-guided bombs.

The aircraft's weapons can be worn under the wings and fuselage of a total of 13 weapons stations.Three of these stations may be used for fuel tanks. With empty external fuel tanks can Eurofighter pullup to nine G. Up to eight air-to-air missiles can be placed on the plane while air-to-ground weaponscan be placed on seven of weapon stations. These weapons can be either laser and GPS-guidedbombs weighing between 250 and 500 kg or long-range cruise missiles. For operations of short and /or slippery runways are Eurofighter equipped with brake monitor. The plane is designed to fly 6,000

hours during its lifetime. The aircraft type is found in both a single and a seat-to-seat variation and isgradually modified in a number of model series, designated the tranche. It is the single-seater versionof tranche 3-series model that is evaluated in the Danish type of election process.


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Figure 1.3: Overview of the Eurofighter user community. It consists of partner countries Italy, Spain,Britain and Germany as well as export customers Saudi Arabia and Austria. A third export customer,Oman has ordered Eurofighter.


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1.7.2 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Joint Strike Fighter is a US-produced single-engine multi-role fighter, which has the US companyLockheed Martin as the main producer. The aircraft first flew on 15 December 2006 and is expected tobe partially operational in the summer of 2015. The aircraft is per. February 1, 2015 produced in 115copies out of an expected production of approximately 3,000 aircraft to the partner countries. The

plane was developed in a collaboration between nine partner countries: USA, UK, Italy, Netherlands,Turkey, Australia, Norway, Denmark and Canada. The plane is so far ordered by the United States,Britain, the Netherlands, Australia, Norway, Israel, Italy, South Korea and Japan.

Several different sensors and systems are integrated into the fuselage, for example a heat-sensitivetarget acquisition system, Electronic Warfare Systems, an advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground radarand a machine gun. The aircraft targeting systems are also incorporated and can used for imagecapture, to identify ground targets and to control the laser-guided bombs.

The aircraft's weapons can be worn either inside the fuselage or in the future under the wings of a totalof 11 weapons stations (internal and external). Joint Strike Fighter can draw up to nine G. Up to six air-to-air missiles can be placed on the plane, while air-to-ground weapons can be placed on six of

weapon stations. These weapons can be laser or GPS guided bombs weighing between 125 and1,000 kg. for operations of short and / or slippery runways aircraft can be equipped with a brakemonitor . the aircraft is produced in a one-seat version and is available in three variants: aconventional variant that can be operated from ordinary runways, a variant that can operate fromaircraft carriers and a variant that can take off and land vertically. It is the conventional variant (F-35A)with internal weapons inventory is evaluated in connection with the Danish type selection process. theplane is designed to fly for 8,000 hours during his lifetime.


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Figure 1.4: Overview of the Joint Strike Fighter-user community. The aircraft is being delivered toAustralia, Holland, Israel, Italy, Norway, UK and USA. The plane is also contemplated acquired byJapan, South Korea and Turkey. It is also expected that Singapore will acquire Joint Strike Fighter.Canada has postponed a decision on the acquisition of new fighter aircraft.


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1.7.3 SUPER HORNET

Super Hornet is an American two-engine multi-role fighter planes produced by Boeing. The plane firstflew November 29, 1995 and is currently used operationally by the US Navy and Australia. The planeis per. February 1, 2015 produced in over 500 copies of an expected production of 741 aircraft.

Several different sensors and systems are integrated into the fuselage, for example, ElectronicWarfare Systems, an advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground radar and a machine gun. In addition,Super Hornet is fitted with targeting equipment that can be used for image capture, to identify groundtargets and to control the laser-guided bombs and missiles.

The aircraft's weapons can be worn under the wings and fuselage of a total of 11 weapons stations.Five of these stations can be used for fuel tanks. With empty external fuel tanks can Super Hornet pullup to 7.5 G. Up to ten air-to-air missiles placed on the plane while air-to-ground weapons can beplaced on seven of weapon stations. These weapons can be either laser and GPS-guided bombsweighing between 250 kg and 500 kg as well as air-to-surface missiles. the aircraft are in both asingle-seat (S-type) and a two-seat (F-model) variant. in the latter model sits a weapon systemoperator in the rear seat. the plane is progressively modified in a number of model series, referred toas blocks. Denmark has for type election process evaluated the two-seater F-model in block II series.

the plane is designed to fly at 6000 hours.


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Figure 1.5: Overview of Super Hornet-user community. User circle consists of Australia and the UnitedStates (the US Navy).


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1.8 THE DECISION BASIS' STRUCTURE

The following chapters focus on each of the four evaluation areas:

Chapter 2: Strategic Aspects

Chapter 3: Military Aspects

Chapter 4: Economic Aspects

Chapter 5: Industrial Aspects

Each chapter presents the results from each evaluation area. It also describes the approach used ineach area.


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Chapter 2: STRATEGIC ASPECTS

2.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In the strategic assessment the three combat aircraft have been assessed for fulfillment of the overallDanish defense and security policy objectives. The purchase of new fighter aircraft is in itself an

important security policy signal, and with combat aircraft follows a number of opportunities forcooperation with other countries.

The total and justified ranking of the three candidates with regard to strategic matters are made by anexpert panel consisting of senior experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Danishrepresentation in NATO, Defence, Joint Services Defence Command and the Ministry of Defence'sAcquisition- and Logistics Organisation.

Joint Strike Fighter is rated to give the highest degree of political flexibility in relation to the futuretasks. The width of the circle of the Joint Strike Fighter users will promote both Denmark transatlanticties and Denmark's partnership relations with European partners. The presence of several Arcticcountries in the circle of the Joint Strike Fighter users are also assessed as a strength of the panel.Therefore, the Joint Strike Fighter of the panel of experts ranked as number one.

The European dimension in the Eurofighter-user community is a significant aspect of the expertranking of Eurofighter as number two. The Eurofighter will provide an opportunity to strengthendefense and security cooperation with Germany, in the longer term is expected to strengthen itssecurity profile and influence. User countries' geographical location and international security policyorientation will overall give Denmark a greater potential to ensure freedom of action and cooperationopportunities than if the choice falls on the Super Hornet.

The importance of maintaining close relations with the United States in the combat aircraft isparticularly emphasized by the Expert Panel on the Super Hornet, but in the overall assessment thenarrow circle of users and user countries' geographical location far from Denmark's neighbourhooddraws down.

2.2 UNCERTAINTY AND UNPREDICTABILITY

Having to evaluate strategic relationship over an expected period of use of 30 years implies that theremust be analyzed from a number of assumptions associated with a significant unpredictability. Thefact that the future cannot be predicted accurately, does not make an analysis of strategic issuesirrelevant if it is based on familiar and plausible assumptions, and the robustness of theseassumptions subsequently tested.

2.3 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The strategic evaluation has focused on clarifying the defense and security implications and thestrategic cooperation opportunities associated with the choice of the respective candidates. Thestrategic evaluation is carried out with regard to the partly politically strategic (mainly security policy)

implications for Denmark, and military strategic implications for the Danish defense.


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Based on the relevant Danish policy's Step 1 identified a starting point for the strategic evaluation.New Fighter Program has conducted a policy review with the aim to derive strategic objectives ofrelevant Danish policy on defense and security matters compared to what is in a strategic perspectivesought by the Danish fighter. The policy review was primarily conducted as a literature review ofrelevant Danish documents. Experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, theDefence and research institutions have been continuously involved in the preparation of policy-

reviewed, including in connection with an expert seminar in May 2014. Expert involvement wasintended to ensure that all relevant policy documents and aspects involved in the policy-review andthat the identified strategic objectives reflect Danish policy. The following documents have beenexamined: the Law on Defence, Defence Agreement (Agreement on defense matters 2013-2017 aswell as Defence Agreement 2010-2014), government security policy reports, relevant parts of thereport of the Defence Commission of 2008, the government basis (current and former) and theKingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011 -2020.

In Step 2, the New Fighter Program mapped out the strategic context for a new fighter. This is donethrough the systematic collection of evidence in the form of existing and current policy papers andanalyzes. The previous Danish experience of strategic cooperation in the combat aircraft have alsobeen documented in step 2. There has not been drawn up independent future analyzes, as has beenbased on existing evidence, particularly NATO's Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA), prepared NATO's

Allied Command Transformation in order to be able to form a alliance common basis for the futuredevelopment of NATO and NATO countries' forces.

In Step 3, the strategic criteria and improvement targets that form the basis for the strategic analysis ofthe three candidates was developed and defined. The strategic criteria are developed on the basis ofthe objectives that have been identified in the policy-budget review and the strategic context. Thecriteria have been defined by a broad panel of experts with experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Defence and Armed Forces, which together have expertise and insight with regard to defense policy,NATO and international fighter operations. The expert panel has submitted its recommendation as asingle panel, not as representatives of respective authorities. Expert Panel's work has resulted in eightstrategic criteria and a number of improvement targets.

In Step 4, the New Fighter Program made a collection of information that can shed light on the user

countries intent on the air military field and in relation to each candidate for use in the strategicanalysis of the candidates (step 5). Where step 2 has covered the general, contextual informationbase (the outside world), stage 4 comprised a review of relevant specific and updated sources withregard to the individual candidate and the identified criteria and benchmarks.

In Step 5, the New Fighter Program analyzed the three candidates in each of the strategic criteriabased on the candidate specific information. The strategic analysis have an overall picture of the long-term positive and negative implications of Denmark's choice of the individual candidate. The strategicanalysis of each candidate have been compiled in a document that has been presented to the expertpanel for the final ranking.

In Step 6 a final recommended rank has been made on the three candidates in terms of strategicissues. The ranking is made by a panel of experts based on the strategic analysis of the individual

candidate. The expert panel was comprised of ten senior experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Ministry of Defence and Defenders (eg ambassadors, heads of department and generals). panel isthrough a series of surveys and discussions, reached a justified ranking of the three combat aircraftwith regard to strategic issues. The panel has initially ranked the candidates in relation to each of thestrategic criteria after which the panel has made an overall ranking of the candidates.


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To test the sensitivity and robustness of the overall ranking, this ranking has then been compared to anumber of alternative scenarios that have challenged the basic assumptions or assumptions in thestrategic analysis. Thus was completed a kind of strategic sensitivity analysis.

Specifically, the panel of experts were asked to consider how the alternative scenarios and potentialchanges in the candidates' user communities have been able to affect the evaluation and ranking of

the candidates. The ranking has been documented and summarized in a report on strategic issues.


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2.4 CRITERIA

As described in step 3 the strategic criteria have been developed based on the objectives that havebeen indentified in policy-budget review and the strategic context. Table 2.1 states the eight criteria.

Table 2.1 Overview of the criteria in the evaluation of strategic relationship

Political-strategic criteria

Criterion 1The choice of a new Danish fighter planes will help to strengthen Denmark's security ties andcooperation.

Criterion 2The choice of a new Danish fighter planes will help to strengthen Denmark's freedom of action and

flexibility in relation to the safeguarding of Danish security and Danish interests.

Criterion 3The choice of a new Danish fighter must contribute to strengthening Denmark's internationalcooperation opportunities in relation to the Defence deployment - nationally and internationally.

Criterion 4The choice of a new Danish fighter should be able to help strengthen key international organizations(UN, NATO and the EU) in the ability to deal with global security challenges now and in the future andstrengthen Denmark's position and influence in these organizations.

Military-strategic criteria

Criterion 5The choice of a new Danish fighter must contribute to strengthening the potential for collaboration onfurther development and technical upgrading of the fighter capacity.

Criterion 6The choice of a new Danish fighter must contribute to strengthening the potential for collaboration onoperations and maintenance with other countries in relation to a Danish combat aircraft capability.

Criterion 7The choice of a new Danish fighter must contribute to strengthening the potential for cooperation ineducation with other countries.

Criterion 8The choice of a new Danish fighter must contribute to strengthening the potential for collaboration on joint training and problem solving.


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Each criterion has been defined as a statement (see. Table above) with associated metrics. Asummary of the criterion aims and associated measurement points are reproduced below:

Criterion 1: Denmark's security ties and cooperative relationsThe procurement's implications in the short and long term; an assessment of the immediate as well aslong-term foreign and security policy implications for Denmark, respectively a choice and a rejection of

each candidate.

Criterion 2: Denmark's scope and flexibilityThe overall impact of Denmark's freedom of action and flexibility. The action space should beunderstood in relation to the width of the circle of users and users using fighter aircraft, their deterrenteffect and the possibility of time-critical support from user countries to Denmark in operations. Time-critical support in this context as an aid to operate fighter in situations of high security political pressureor controversy.

Criterion 3: Denmark's international cooperation opportunitiesPotential for cooperation with other countries in relation to operations, including the will andexperience of working closely with a smaller ally like Denmark, among other potential cooperativerelations with countries that are considered to lead larger coalition or alliance air operations (US, UK

and France), as well as the potential to strengthen the Nordic defense cooperation.

Criterion 4: Key international organizations (UN, NATO and EU)The potential to contribute warplanes for operations where the United Nations, NATO and the EUprovide the organizational framework, in cooperation with other user countries. Core internationalorganizations understood here both as an operational framework within which a Danish capacity to bealigned and as a collection of countries in which Denmark has a certain position and influence. In theUN context, focusing on the potential if the UN framework had to be relevant in combat aircraftaspects. In NATO focuses on NATO's prioritised transformation goals. Furthermore focus on fighterpotential of the European defense and security policy if the defense opt out is repealed.

Criterion 5: Cooperation on further development and technical updateCoinciding interests for long-term development of the overall combat aircraft capability. The criterion

focuses on the users' long-term potential and willingness to develop the fighter aircraft in all roles, thetotal operational experience that users will be able to lay the basis for further development andupdating, and policy uniformity and standardization.

Criterion 6: Cooperation for operation and maintenanceThe broad potential for cooperation resulting from the user community, and the countries' intentions inoperating and maintenance area. The potential for assistance in connection with sudden events, aswell as users' aspirations and determination with regard to engage in various forms of cooperation onoperation and maintenance.

Criterion 7: Cooperation on trainingThe broad potential for cooperation resulting from the user community, and the countries' intentionswith regard to education. The criterion focuses on the potential for assistance to sudden training needs

and users' aspirations and determination with regard to engage in various forms of cooperation onbasic and advanced training.

Criterion 8: Cooperation on joint training and problem solvingThe ability to work in close cooperation with other countries in connection with major benchmarkexercises and training activities as well as close cooperation in the deployment of forces. The criterionlooks at the opportunity to practice and engage in greater operational frame than otherwise possiblefor a small country like Denmark. The user countries' capacity for example, air refueling and electronicwarfare as well as users' intention to enter into a close multi-national cooperation in NATO and toconclude with fighter in the multinational force formations, including the NATO Response Force.


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2.5 ANALYSIS RESULTSThe strategic analysis (step 5) is divided into three separate analysises, one for each candidate. Theoverall objective of the strategic analysis is to draw a complete picture of the long-term positive andnegative implications of Denmark's choice of the individual candidate who could be the basis for thefinal ranking of the candidates.

The candidates user communities' participation in selected international operations are shown in Table

2.2. Similarly, an inventory of countries' statements in relation to NATO's transformation goals are

shown in Table 2.3.

In the following sections the results of the analysis are summarized for each candidate.


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Table 2.2 The various candidates user communities’ air military participation in relevant internationaloperations


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Table 2.3 The various candidates’ user communities’ stated intentions with respect to NATO'stransformation goals - or development - in fighter aircraft specific areas


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2.5.1 EUROFIGHTER

With a choice of Eurofighter will be a great potential for close cooperation with major European militarypowers such as Britain and Germany. Denmark's security ties and cooperative relations could bereinforced in a European context, and the choice will be a positive European political signal withregard to the maintenance a European military technological capacity. As for deployments in

Denmark's neighbourhood, the analysis shows that especially Germany's presence in the usercommunity can lead to a potential for a Danish-German cooperation in the Baltic region due to theclose geographical location and concerns. Denmark will, with a choice of Eurofighter become part of acircle of several major countries, which are active in UN operations and air operations with a UNmandate, and therefore could potentially be partners if fighter operations may be required in the UNcontext. The user circle, including Britain, are generally active in the current EU operations (4) and thecountries' contributions represent the majority of fighter set out in the EU's strength catalogues. WithEurofighter Denmark would be able to have partners in the combat aircraft area if the EU opt out indefense matters had to be abolished.(4) Presently no air military operations

As far as cooperation in international operations, a choice of Eurofighter potentially lead toopportunities for time-critical support and cooperation in international missions, with the partner

countries Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain all announced an intention to contribute to internationaloperations and largely has participated in the same operations as Denmark over the past 15 years.There is a potential in relation to cooperation on deployment in the Middle East and North Africa. Anoverview of the different users' participation in relevant international operations are illustrated in Table2.2.

The NATO countries in the Eurofighter user community is generally very active in NATO ResponseForce and participates regularly in major combat aircraft exercises, providing a collaborative potentialfor a small nation like Denmark.

[BLACK]

All NATO nations with the Eurofighter aircraft are participating in the so-called European Air Group

cooperation. (5) More Eurofighter-country participation in the air NATO military projects provides apotential for further cooperation in relation to the type-specific cooperation.

(5) European Air Group is a multinational, air military cooperation between Belgium, France, Holland,Italy, Spain, the UK and Germany with headquarters in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

In most user countries, the Eurofighter is included in fighter fleets that comprises several differenttypes of fighter aircraft, including specialized fighter for example, offensive or defensive tasks. It couldlimit the common interests in the development of the platform in all relevant offensive and defensiveroles. NATO countries in the Eurofighter user circles have all experienced greater reductions of theirfighter fleet, which can lead to demands for a wider applicability of the remaining fighters, and thus acommon interest in the future to develop the Eurofighter as a multirole fighter (offensively anddefensively). NATO countries with Eurofighter aircraft have different intentions that would meet

NATO's transformation goals on the combat aircraft area. In order to be able to position Denmarkappropriately in NATO, it is relevant to look at the user circle's stated intention in relation to NATO'stransformation goals in the combat aircraft area, according to table 2.3.


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With a choice of Eurofighter, the Danish aircraft would constitute approximately 4 per cent of the usercountries' total fleet and thus fill up very little in the total fleet. In addition to cooperation in theEurofighter organization (NETMA), there is primarily a picture of a bilateral potential for cooperation onoperations and maintenance with regard to the Eurofighter. This is also true in the training area, wherethe potential for cooperation primarily is related to Britain's international training program. With theEurofighter Denmark will get into a circle of countries, where all the NATO-members have in-flight

refuelling capacity which match Eurofighter and where [BLACK]

2.5.2 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

The Joint Strike Fighter is a result of America's largest military collaborative program and has thepotential for continued and long-term close military cooperation between the US and several Europeancountries in a situation where the US security focus increasingly moved from Europe and the MiddleEast to Asia. With a choice of Joint Strike Fighter, Denmark will be included in a group of users, manyof whom have a relevant geographical location in relation to cooperation both in the Baltic region andin the Arctic environment. With regard to international operations, NATO countries in the Joint StrikeFighter user community greatly participated in similar international air operations as Denmark (see.Table 2.3), and virtually all Joint Strike Fighter user countries have in recent years been operating withfighters in sharp operations.

The breadth and the geographical range of the total user base could also help strengthen the flexibilityof deployment in the Baltic Sea region and for cooperation on deployment distant from Denmark (inthe Middle East, North Africa and East Asia). With regard to UN operations there in the Joint StrikeFighter-user community a number of countries (such as Norway and Australia) that could potentiallybe partners. The European users of the Joint Strike Fighter are generally active in the current EUoperations and put over a third of all the fighters set out in the EU's strength catalogues. Conversely,the potential for cooperation with Germany will be limited by a choice of the Joint Strike Fighter.

Joint Strike Fighter also holds great potential for cooperation on exercises and deployment of fighteraircraft. The countries of the user community is generally very active in exercises within the combataircraft area (these are typically held by the United States), as well as the NATO Response Force. TheNetherlands and Norway are part of today (like Denmark) in the F-16 cooperation (EPAF) (6),

including cooperation on a joint force structure - Expeditionary Air Wing. Several other countries areeither members or associates of the European Air Group cooperation. (7 ) Additionally, the smallercountries in the Joint Strike Fighter community (mainly the Netherlands and Norway) have experiencein deploying integrated fighter contingents in close cooperation with other countries. The Joint StrikeFighter furthermore incorporates a great potential for cooperation in connection with fightercapabilities. several of user countries participating in NATO projects on cooperation on deployablebases and several countries [BLACK]

(6) European Participating Air Forces, cooperation between the legacy F-16 buyers Belgium,Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, later expanded with Portugal.

(7) European Air Group is a multinational, air military cooperation between Belgium, France, Holland,Italy, Spain, the UK and Germany with headquarters in High Wycombe, United Kingdom.

(8) [BLACK]


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[BLACK]

Regarding the strategic cooperation on operation, maintenance and training, it should be noted thatthe Danish aircraft with a choice of Joint Strike Fighter would represent only about 1 per cent of theuser countries expected total fleet. Denmark would get into a circle of users, where especially thepresence of the US Air Force could help ensure the necessary redundancy and experience as to

assist smaller nations like Denmark in relation to training needs and other support needs. Moreover,there are among the Joint Strike Fighter user countries small and medium-sized countries with aninterest in and experience with solving training tasks together in a multinational framework.

The user's long-term intentions within the combat aircraft area means that the Joint Strike Fighter willbe included in fleets of fighters with several different types as well as in fleets where the Joint StrikeFighter in the future will be the only fighter type in smaller fleets of fighter jets. The Joint Strike Fighteris expected in the future to become the dominant fighter type in the US Air Force. Based on usercountries' long-term intentions it may be expected that there is a broad common interest among NATOcountries in the Joint Strike Fighter-user community to continue to develop the platform with respect toall roles. The Joint Strike Fighter is within the NATO context also a central capacity for most other usercountries in relation to the fulfilment of NATO's long-term transformation goal in the combat aircraft(see Table 2.3). With the US Air Force, as well as the larger and smaller European air forces in the

Joint Strike Fighter-user community, there may be solid experience basis for the continued updating ofthe Joint Strike Fighter.

2.5.3 SUPER HORNET

Super Hornets user base consists of two countries (US and Australia). The largest user, the US Navyis as a service bigger than the Western European Air Forces. A choice of Super Hornet will maintainthe security-political ties and relationships across the Atlantic in both the short and long term. Theselection would, however, also to a certain extent be seen as a political signal of unwillingness toinvest in the maintenance of a European military-technological capacity. The Super Hornet's strategiccooperation potential in operations in the Baltic region and the potential for cooperation in with thedeployment of aircraft from land bases in the Arctic will have to be seen in relation to the geographicaldistance to the user country Australia and the US Navy's aircraft carrier-based use of the Super

Hornet. In international operations, both user countries (USA and Australia) are very active fighterusers (see Table 2.2 in the previous section) and have in recent years operated in sharp operationenvironments. The US Navy fighter is deployable and operates from the US aircraft carriers. Ininternational operations it is expected that the US Navy will not have a significant interest incooperation on deploying combat aircraft to land bases close to a mission area. Australia hasexperience of working closely with other countries in international operations, although not involvingfighter aircraft. With regard to operations in the UN context, Australia because of its regional role hadthe most mature reflection on the use of fighter aircraft in UN operations. A choice of Super Hornetwould also could lead to a potential for cooperation in relation to possible future deployment in Asia.

With a choice of Super Hornet there will be the potential for cooperation in relation to exercises, asboth Australia as well as the US Navy participates in and organizes advanced fighter exercises. Inconsideration of the user's experience in the combat aircraft area are no examples that users

(Australia and the US Navy) have been active with land-based fighter aircraft in NATO's ResponseForce, or in multilateral cooperation for the establishment and deployment of fighter aircraft. However,Australia has cooperation experience in areas other than the purely air-military.

[BLACK]


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There are regarding Super Hornet a solid operational experience base that can form the basis of arelevant development and updating. Super Hornet is part of the US Navy and Australia fighter fleetswith several different types of fighter aircraft and is planned still to be used as a multi-role combataircraft (that is both defensive and offensive). The introduction of new multirole fighter in both the USNavy and Australia may lead to a specialization of the Super Hornet. In NATO, the US Navy's intentionwith the development of the Super Hornet could help ensure that Denmark can position themselves

appropriately in relation to NATO's transformation goals (see. Table 2.3). Regarding the strategicalliance for the development of a land-based combat aircraft capability, Australia could potentially bean attractive partner.

In terms of strategic cooperation potential for operation, maintenance and training there areopportunities for cooperation, primarily in bilateral cooperation with the US Navy. In the overall picture,Danish Super Hornets, where appropriate, would constitute about 7 per cent of the user countriesexpected total fleet, and the needs of a Danish Super Hornet fleet would fill relatively little compared tothe total capacity.

2.6 RANKING

The ranking was made by an expert panel consisting of ten senior experts from the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Defence and Armed Forces.

First, the panel of experts ranked the candidates in each of the eight criteria. Here's Joint StrikeFighter ranked as number one within each criterion. The picture has been more sophisticated in termsof the distance between the position as the number two and three. Table 2.4 shows the ranking ineach of the eight criteria.

Next, the panel of experts carried out an overall ranking of the candidates. Here, the Joint StrikeFighter ranked as number one, Eurofighter as number two, while Super Hornet was ranked as numberthree. The Expert Panel’s voting on the overall ranking is shown in Table 2.5. The uneven distributionof votes is because the experts have had the opportunity to rank the candidates equally.

Table 2.4 Expert panel's ranking of the candidates within each strategic criteria


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Table 2.5 Expert Panel votes cast in the final ranking in strategic relationship

In the reasoning for ranking Joint Strike Fighter as number one the expert panel has paid particularattention to the possibility of both to promote US and European relations and cooperation opportunitiesincluding maintaining the transatlantic link, and to promote a continued American commitment toEurope. Furthermore, the connection to the European partners was highlighted as particularlyimportant in light of the US rebalancing in relation to Asia and growing pressure for European partners

to take greater responsibility in NATO. The circle of Joint Strike Fighter users is broad and includesseveral nations with common interests with regard to the further development and updating of the JointStrike Fighter as a multi-role fighter aircraft. Furthermore the user community includes severalcountries the size of Denmark (for example, Norway and the Netherlands), countries which are closeto Denmark, both geographically and politically, both in the Baltic region as the Arctic, as well ascountries with extensive operational experience with sharp insertions in international operations. Thereis emphasis on the possibility of building cooperation with a wide circle of countries in the context of adeployment.

The expert panel's ranking of Eurofighter in front of the Super Hornet is specially based on anassessment that Germany's future defense and security policy role likely would be strengthened. Achoice of Eurofighter could create the potential for strengthened cooperation with Germany as well asmaintaining a close relationship with Britain. The choice of Eurofighter will allow cooperation withEuropean countries in geographic proximity to Denmark and a large and extensive contacts in Danishinterests. A choice of Eurofighter could create a potential for cooperation with Western powers withregard to deployment both in the immediate area (Baltic Sea) and in international operations.However, it has been noted that Denmark will be a little use compared to most other countries in theuser community, which potentially will help ensure that Denmark would find it more difficult to fulfil anyof its wishes.

As for the Super Hornet it is the US that is considered to be Denmark's most important strategicpartner, the US role and the US Navy's global presence has been highlighted by the expert panel.Denmark could with the choice of Super Hornet get access to strategic cooperation with the UnitedStates. Conversely, the circle of Super Hornet users is small with fewer opportunities in Denmark'sneighbouring area (both the Baltic and the Arctic), partly due to the present users’ operative focus. Asfor the Super Hornet, it has been assessed that the user community is comprised of two attractivepartners within the combat aircraft area. On the other hand, in the longer term, a more specialized roleof the aircraft, as the users also will purchase other and newer types of fighter aircraft.

2.7 RANKING AGGREGATE SENSITIVITY

The sensitivity and robustness of the overall rank system has been studied through the treatment of anumber of alternative scenarios that have challenged the basic assumptions or assumptions on whichthe strategic analyzes have built.


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The Panel has considered the alternative scenarios that were prepared for the seminar, as well as thealternative scenarios as the panel in addition considered it appropriate to include. The Expert Panelhas assessed how the alternative scenarios and potential changes in the candidates' usercommunities have been able to influence the evaluation and ranking of the candidates within eachstrategic criteria as well as to the overall ranking of the candidates. There are a total treated 11alternative scenarios:

Option 1: A new Cold War situationOption 2: An isolationist USAOption 3: No US shift towards AsiaOption 4: US military withdrawal from EuropeOption 5: Changed Danish security priorities (no international operations)Option 6: A major defense and security policy role for EUOption 7: A more significant and active German defense and security policy profile.Option 8: advancing the development and deployment of unmanned fighter aircraft systems thananticipatedOption 9: An increased level of conflict in the ArcticOption 10: A stronger European security policy focus on AsiaOption 11: A collapse of the EU's defense cooperation

The strategic sensitivity analysis has shown that the total ranking of the three candidates is veryrobust. The expert panel has concluded that the Joint Strike Fighter would continue to be ranked asnumber one regardless of the alternative scenario.

However, the Eurofighter and Joint Strike Fighter would share the ranking as number one inthe alternative scenario 6 (a major defense and security policy role for the EU).

The ranking as number two and three could have been able to change in favor of the Super Hornet inthree alternative scenarios:

An increased level of conflict in the Arctic (option 9)

A stronger European security policy focus on Asia (alternative 10)

A collapse of the EU's defense cooperation (alternative 11)

The ranking of the Eurofighter as number two has been relatively robust, and it would be unchanged inthe majority of the alternative scenarios.


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EMPTY


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3. MILITARY ASPECTS

3.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The evaluation of the candidates' military aspects is implemented in four areas:

> Survivability: How well the fighter aircraft is capable of protecting itself against enemy weaponsystems so as to minimise the risk of loss of aircraft or crew.

> Mission Effectiveness: How well the fighter aircraft performs the task assigned.

> Future Development: The extent to which the fighter aircraft is expected to constitute a relevantoperational and technically applicable fighter aircraft capability throughout the entire lifespan of thefighter aircraft,

> Candidate Risk: Which candidate specific risks associated with the acquisition, operation andoperational use of the fighter jets, that cannot be quantified economically.

The candidates are rated and ranked by panels of experts in each of the four professional military

subareas based on a variety of technical and operational analysis by the New Fighter Program. Theranking has taken place in the form of grading. Within each area, using the Delphi method, there hasbeen made a candidate specific grade. The rating is given on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 represents thelowest score and 5 the highest. (9) Each area is weighted equally in the context of the overall militaryranking of the candidates and thus counts each with 25 percent.

(9) The same scale is used for all, but for each subarea different criteria have been used to determinethe character.

Figure 3.1 shows the result of the Expert Panels' assigned grades for each area.

In terms of survivability and mission effectiveness, the panel of experts assessed that the Joint StrikeFighter is doing better than the other two candidates. This is partly due to the aircraft's low radar

signature ('stealth' properties) and the use of advanced systems and sensors that enhance the pilot'stactical overview, ensuring the aircraft's survival and effective mission execution. The Super Hornet israted to perform marginally better than the Eurofighter. This is because the Super Hornet due toamong other better range, interoperability and the variety of weapons available to the fighter israted to have a better mission effectiveness than the Eurofighter, while the survivability of the twoaircraft is estimated to be at the same level.

In terms of future development the expert panel assessed that the Joint Strike Fighter is doing betterthan the other two candidates. This is partly due to the aircraft being expected to be produced in largenumbers, as well as the contractual and developmental basis for keeping the aircraft technically andoperationally usable through the lifetime is estimated to be established. For the Eurofighter and theSuper Hornet the expert panel has concluded that the candidates degree of future development isgenerally at the same level, although the Eurofighter gets slightly higher marks because the expert

panel has assessed slightly better industrial relations for this type than the Super Hornet.


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Within the area of candidate risk, the expert panel has assessed that the Super Hornet is less risky,even if the candidates are at about the same level in this area. This is partly due to the Super Hornetaircraft already been used operationally by other countries, and the risks associated with for exampleacquisition and implementation of the plane consequently is estimated to be low. Within the samearea, it is estimated that the Joint Strike Fighter and Eurofighter is a little riskier, although the

differences between all the candidates are marginal.

Overall, the evaluation of the military aspect has shown that the Joint Strike Fighter is the best in threeout of the four sub-areas. In the last area the Super Hornet is placed as number one, but with marginaldifference to the Joint Strike Fighter which is ranked second. Therefore, the Joint Strike Fighter isranked as number one in the military aspects, while Super Hornet is ranked as number two in front ofthe Eurofighter, as there are minor differences between the Super Hornet and the Eurofighter.


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3.2 SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The method used to evaluate the military situation is carried out within four sub-areas. The way inwhich the four sub-areas are evaluated is reviewed in this section, after which the results for each areais presented.

Survivability and mission effectivenessThe evaluation of the candidates' survivability and mission effectiveness is based on a scenario-basedapproach, where each candidate's ability to survive enemy weapons systems and simultaneouslysolve the task given is evaluated in a number of NATO's current mission types of fighter aircraft and inoperational environments of different nature. Six selected mission scenarios have been composed sothat they constitute a representative sample of the NATO mission types for combat aircraft and has inthat order a growing threat intensity. The mission scenarios are developed to flesh out the specificconditions that apply to candidates survivability and mission effectiveness, and to ensure that theentire evaluation frame is covered so that the completion of the missions in the entire conflict spectrumis illuminated.

Table 3.1

Overview of selected mission scenarios

Applied mission scenarios to evaluate survivability and mission effectiveness

Mission TypeScenario Description

Non-Traditional Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (NTISR)A mission scenario, which takes place in the Arctic region in peacetime, the task consists of monitoringa sea area for illegal fishing or pollution, as well as to assist a rescue mission aimed at ships indistress.

Strike, Coordination and Reconnaissance (SCAR):

A mission scenario where own aircraft autonomously must search over a larger area of land in order toidentify and engage hostile activity, while unintended harmful effects minimized. This mission type isknown from Danish F-16 aircraft taking part in missions in Libya in 2011.

Close Air Support (CAS):A mission scenario in which to be provided air support to their own ground forces, which is engagedmainly in urban combat with enemy forces. This mission type is known from Danish F-16 aircrafttaking part in missions in Afghanistan in 2002-2003 and in Iraq in 2014-2015.

Defensive Counter Air (DCA):A mission scenario where its own planes to defend a given territory against enemy aircraft. Thismission type is known from Danish F-16 aircraft taking part in missions in the Balkans in the period1998-2001.

Air Interdiction (AI):An offensive mission scenario where its own planes should bomb targets in enemy territory, which isprotected by both ground-based missile defense systems and combat aircraft. This mission type isknown from Danish F-16 aircraft taking part in missions in the Balkans in 1998-2001, in Libya in 2011and Iraq in 2014-2015.

Suppression / Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (S / DEAD):An offensive mission scenario where own aircraft must locate and engage the enemy ground-basedmissile defense systems in hostile territory, which is also protected by fighter aircraft.


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The scenarios reflect a new Danish fighter’s possible portfolio of tasks, which may consist of taskswithin the entire conflict spectrum. There is thus evaluated on task performance in both peacetime andin crisis and war at the time when the first fighter can be expected to be delivered (2020) . The chosenmission scenarios underlying the evaluation includes both surveillance and rescue tasks, defensive airtasks and offensive tasks. In addition the candidates' survivability and mission effectiveness havebeen evaluated in varying weather and light conditions (in cloudy weather, in daylight and at night).

This means that the evaluation of the candidates can illuminate both their strengths and weaknessesof a so-called multi-role fighter (10) that can deploy globally in both defensive and offensive missionsand in the complete conflict spectrum. As the assumed task complex is based on the entire conflictspectrum, the mission scenarios are weighted equally relative to the ranking of the candidates withinthe survivability and mission effectiveness. The missions a fighter traditionally is designed to carry outis, however, in the high end of the conflict spectrum (in crisis or wartime). In order to illuminate anypossibilities and limitations, the candidates have therefore been evaluated in more high intensitymission scenarios than in scenarios with lower threat and emission intensity. The conflict spectrumand the applied mission scenarios are illustrated in Figure 3.2.

(10) As mentioned, a multi-role fighter solve both air combat tasks and tasks aimed at surveillance,information gathering or attacks on sea or on land.


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The candidates' survivability and mission effectiveness have been evaluated partly by analyzing thesuppliers' RBI responses and partly in connection with the validation of the information provided by thesuppliers, where Danish F-16 pilots have completed evaluation flights in aircraft and flight simulators.As for the Joint Strike Fighter the evaluation flights was solely completed in simulators. In addition, theNew Fighter Program have gathered experience from other countries via interviews with other users ofthe aircraft. The marks for the candidates' survivability and mission effectiveness have been given by

a panel of Danish experts with extensive practical and theoretical experience with fighter operations.The panel has been supplemented by researchers with detailed knowledge of aircraft subsystems,sensors, weapons and so on.

Future DevelopmentThe evaluation of the candidates' future-proofing is completed within three sub-areas, each of whichhave an impact on whether the combat aircraft can maintain its operational and technical relevanceover its life expectancy. These sub-areas are: operational conditions, technical conditions andcontractual conditions.

With regard to the operational conditions it has been evaluated how the combat aircraft in the longterm will maintain its survivability and mission effectiveness.

With regard to technical conditions it has been evaluated how the combat aircraft in the long term froma technical perspective can be maintained and developed.

With regard to the contractual conditions is has been evaluated whether each candidate hascontractual measures which can help to uncover or possibly prevent significant increases in costsassociated with maintenance and development of combat aircraft during its lifetime.

A panel of experts has assessed the importance of each sub-region and on this background has beengiven each candidate a grade in terms of future-proofing.

Candidate RiskThe evaluation of the candidates' survivability, mission effectiveness and future security, together withthe structural analysis, (11) as detailed in the evaluation of the economic environment (Chapter 4), led

to the identification of a number of candidate-specific risks, which may affect either acquisition oroperation of the combat aircraft. The consequence or any preventive measures for each of these riskshave been sought to be quantified economically. Quantifiable risks are included in the candidates' totallifetime costs and further highlighted in the review of economic conditions.

(11) Analysis of, for example, the required number of airframes or by the personnel structure that isassociated with the combat aircraft.

The risks, which it has not been possible to quantify, comprises the basis for grading in the evaluationof candidate risk. Here a panel of experts from the Ministry of Defence resort assessed each risk interms of the likelihood that the risk will occur, the consequences if this were to occur and the riskproximity, ie, when the risks are likely to occur. In addition, the expert panel considered possibleenhancing opportunities (called 'opportunities') and based on this given each candidate a character on

the risk area.

The candidates' overall risk is a combination of the risk character, each candidate has received, andthe funds allocated either to prevent risks or to manage the risks that occur.


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3.3 RESULTS FROM THE EVALUATION OF THE CANDIDATES’ SURVIVALABILITY

The candidates' survivability is evaluated within the six mission scenarios where the aircraft's ability tosurvive is tested on various threat levels of intensity. Each mission scenario confronts the fighter with anumber of threats, where the scope and nature of the threats varies in intensity. The results from theevaluation of the candidates' ability to survive are justified in this section with a description of each

candidate's identified strengths and weaknesses, followed by the grade within each mission scenario.

The rating reflects the risk that the aircraft are shot down or otherwise lost during the mission where 5means that a loss is not probable and 1 means that heavy losses are expected. The overall grade foreach candidate survivability is an equally weighted averaging of the characters, the expert panel hasgiven for each of the six mission scenarios.

A Danish F-16 aircraft are evaluated within the same mission scenarios to provide a known reference.Therefore, the results from the evaluation of the F-16 aircraft's survivability is shown in connection withthe candidates' results.


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Eurofighter's survivability

[BLACK][BLACK]

The expert panel's sub-grades for each of the mission-scenarios and the average grade for eachmission scenario appears in table 3.2.

(12) [BLACK]


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Joint Strike Fighters survivability

[BLACK]

[BLACK]

[BLACK]

This can be seen from Table 3.3, where the expert’s partial grade for the respective mission scenariosas well as the average score for each mission scenario appears.

Table 3.3Joint Strike Fighter - grades for survivability in the evaluated mission scenarios


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Super Hornets survivability

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The expert panel's partial grade for the respective mission scenarios and average score for eachmission scenario is shown in table 3.4.

The average of the Super Hornet's grade for the six mission scenarios have resulted in a total gradefor survivability of 3,2.

(13) For example, the ability to distinguish between friend and foe.


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Summary - survival

Figure 3.3 shows the candidates' ability to survive in the six evaluated mission scenarios. The figureshows that the Joint Strike Fighters survival is only slightly affected by an increasing threat level andthat the aircraft generally have good survivability in the entire conflict spectrum. The Eurofighters andSuper Hornets survivability decreases in proportion with the growing complexity and composition of

threats and are generally worse at the high end of the conflict spectrum.

A Danish F-16 fighter have been assessed for the same mission scenarios to provide a knownreference. Therefore the result from the evaluation of the F-16 aircraft survivability is depicted in figure3.3. The F-16 fighter’s survivability is generally good on the first two mission scenarios, but on thefollowing missions is assessed to be generally poorer than the three candidates.


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3.4 RESULTS FROM assessment of applicants MISSIONS EFFECTIVENESS

The candidates mission effectiveness is evaluated with the same mission scenarios as in theevaluation of aircraft survivability. Each mission scenario challenges the planes with a number ofunique tasks, and the extent and severity of these tasks varies in intensity. The results from theevaluation of the candidates' mission effectiveness in this section are justified by a description of each

candidate's identified strengths and weaknesses, followed by the grades for each mission scenario.

The grading scale is from 5 to 1, where 5 means that mission completion is expected, while the markof 1 means that the mission completion is unlikely. The overall grade for each candidate missionefficiency is an equally weighted averaging of the characters, as the expert panel has given each ofthe six mission scenarios.

A Danish F-16 is assessed for the same mission sc

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