dns security and stability analysis working group (dssa) dssa update prague – june, 2012

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DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Page 1: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA)

DSSA UpdatePrague – June, 2012

Page 2: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

The DSSA has:• Established a cross-constituency

working group • Clarified the scope of the effort• Developed a protocol to handle

confidential information• Built a risk-assessment

framework• Developed risk scenarios

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Page 3: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

The DSSA will:• Complete risk assessment• Refine methodology• Introduce framework to a

broader audience

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Page 4: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Scope: DSSA & DNRMF

The Board DNS Risk Management Framework working group

Page 5: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Scope: DSSA & DNRMF

The DSSA is focusing on a subset of that framework

Page 6: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Scope: DSSA in a broader contextDSSA is a part of a much larger SSR ecosystem that includes:

Page 7: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment FrameworkBased on NIST 800-30 standard

Tailored to meet unique ICANN requirements

Page 8: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment FrameworkAn adversarial threat-source (with capability, intent and targeting),

OR…

Page 9: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment FrameworkA non-adversarial threat-source (with a range of effects)…

Page 10: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment FrameworkIn the context of:

Predisposing conditions (with varying pervasiveness)…

Page 11: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment Framework… Security controls (both planned and implemented),

and…

Page 12: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment Framework… Vulnerabilities (that range in severity)…

Page 13: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment Framework… Could initiate (with varying likelihood of initiation)

a Threat Event which (with varying likelihood of impact) could result in…

Page 14: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment FrameworkAdverse impacts (with varying severity and range)...

Page 15: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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“Compound Sentence” Risk Assessment FrameworkAll of which combined create risk to users and providers of the DNS – a combination of the nature of the impact and the likelihood that its effects will be felt.

Page 16: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Findings: 5 Broad Risk Scenarios

Page 17: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Findings: 5 Broad Risk ScenariosGaps in policy, management or leadership splits the root

Page 18: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Findings: 5 Broad Risk Scenarios“Reductive” forces (security, risk-mitigation, control through rules, etc.) splits the root

Page 19: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Findings: 5 Broad Risk ScenariosWidespread natural disaster brings down the root or a major TLD

Page 20: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Findings: 5 Broad Risk ScenariosAttacks exploiting technical vulnerabilities of the DNS bring down the root or a major TLD

Page 21: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Findings: 5 Broad Risk ScenariosInadvertent technical mishap brings down the root or a major TLD

Page 22: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Findings: 5 Broad Risk ScenariosQuestion: Have we missed an important topic?

NOTE: If you want to share embarrassing ideas, contact Paul Vixie ([email protected])

Page 23: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Next phase“Go deep” into the five risk topics

Page 24: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Next phase“Go deep” into the five risk topics

Refine by doing

Page 25: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Next phase“Go deep” into the five risk topics

Refine by doing

Finish assessment

Page 26: DNS Security and Stability Analysis Working Group (DSSA) DSSA Update Prague – June, 2012

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Questions?Are we on the right track?

Have we missed something important?