1

19 August 2013

Jo Saglie

Institute for Social Research, Oslo

jo.saglie@socialresearch.no

Do extra-parliamentary party organizations work?

The members’ view1

Paper for the panel ‘Internal Party Democracy in New and in Established Democracies’,

7th

ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, 4–7 September 2013

Abstract

Extra-parliamentary party organizations are said to lose importance, resulting in the

ascendancy of the party in public office. The aim of this paper is to shed light on whether

party organizations still matter – and, if so, which role they play – by asking members and

activists themselves how different aspects of the organization works. In the first sections of

the paper, I discuss different perspectives on the functions of extra-parliamentary

organizations – both on the ground and in central office – more closely. The following

empirical analysis uses data from a 2009 Norwegian survey of party members and party

congress delegates to map the organizational performance and compare the seven main

Norwegian parties. The results indicate that Norwegian party organizations perform quite

well, in the eyes of members and activists. On the basis of the party literature, outward-

oriented activities could be expected to be perceived as functioning better than inward-

oriented activities. However, the data does not support this proposition. Party differences are

generally small, but the Progress Party does better than the rest: a right-wing populist party

with origins in anti-party sentiments appears to outclass its competitors in organizational

matters.

1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at seminars at the Institute for Social Research, Oslo, 19 October

2012 and the Barony Rosendal, 14 June 2013. I would like to thank the seminar participants for valuable

comments.

2

Introduction

The viability of extra-parliamentary party organizations has been questioned in the literature

on political parties. For example, one recent article concludes that ‘while political parties

continue to play a major role in the elections and institutions of modern European

democracies, it seems that they have all but abandoned any pretensions to be mass

organisations’ (van Biezen et al. 2012: 42). A widespread diagnosis is that the balance of

power within the parties has shifted, resulting in the ascendancy of the party in public office

(Katz & Mair 2002).

The importance of the party in public office is self-evident. Parties are – according to a

minimal definition – ‘any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental

office-holders under a given label. Having a label [...] rather than an organization is the

crucial defining element’ (Epstein 1980 [1967]: 9). This implies that a party may run for

election with merely a minimum of extra-parliamentary organization, but a party that does not

try to elect office-holders is a contradiction in terms.

The utility of extra-parliamentary party organizations (including both the members and

the central office, cf. Katz & Mair 1993) is usually examined by means of theoretical

discussions or analysis of macro-level data on party development, such as membership

figures. The approach of this paper is different: we asked party members and activists

themselves to evaluate their party organizations. The data is drawn from a 2009 Norwegian

survey of party members and party congress delegates. This survey includes a battery of

questions on how different aspects of the party organization works. I use the members’ and

activists’ own evaluations to shed light on the question of whether the extra-parliamentary

party organizations succeed in performing their tasks. Research on party membership has

shown that membership has declined sharply, in Norway as in other European countries. The

party members’ and congress delegates’ assessment can tell us more about whether the

downsized party organizations still matter – and, if so, which role they play.

Ideal types – party models – are often used to describe the importance of different

parts of the party structure (for overviews see, e.g., Katz & Mair 1995; Krouwel 2006). The

number of party models in the literature seems to be steadily increasing. A general tendency is

nevertheless that the relevance of the extra-parliamentary organizations is questioned, owing

to developments in the media, more capital-intensive campaign technology, party dependence

on state subventions, etc. Within the multitude of party models, a main distinction separates

the mass party model (Duverger 1959), where members and a strong central office are seen as

main assets, from more recent models such as the catch-all party (Kirchheimer 1966) and

3

cartel party (Katz and Mair 1995). The newer models, to a greater or smaller extent, all see

the party on the ground as less relevant – or even a liability. The party in central office also

seems to become marginalized in these models. Although these models describe changes over

time, the purpose here is not to test hypotheses on party change. Instead, the aim is to use the

more recent party models as a basis for expectations concerning the present situation.

The first research question deals with the performance of party organizations seen

from within – both in general and regarding specific functions. These specific functions fall

into two main categories: outward-oriented and inward-oriented. The former comprise

relations with the party’s environments, and includes tasks such as election campaigning and

communicating with the voters between elections. The inward-oriented activities are party

organizational matters, such as policy development, recruitment and training, and maintaining

an internal democracy. As mentioned above, the more recent party models generally regard

the extra-parliamentary organization as less relevant. But to the extent that the organization

nevertheless is seen as valuable, a catch-all party will give priority to outward-oriented

activities related to vote-seeking. We may therefore expect that these functions are perceived

to perform better than the internal ones.

The second question is about party differences. On the one hand, the seven parties

represented in the Norwegian parliament have different origins and historical legacies. The

Labour Party, for example, was formed as a mass movement outside of the Parliament,

whereas the Conservatives and Liberals started as parliamentary groups. The question is

whether the historical legacies have led to differences in organizational performance, as the

members and activists see it. And if so, do these patterns correspond to distinct party models?

Are, for example, some parties seen as performing well on outward-oriented aspects and

others on inward-oriented? On the other hand, the organizational structures of the main

Norwegian parties have converged towards the Labour Party’s model (Svåsand 1994: 327),

and their current organizations are quite similar (Heidar & Saglie 2003; Allern & Saglie

2012). The alternative expectation is therefore that party differences will be negligible.

In the next section of the paper, I discuss the utility of extra-parliamentary

organizations – both on the ground and in central office – more closely. This discussion draws

on the general literature of party organizations, as well as some earlier studies of the

Norwegian case that may illuminate general points. After a presentation of the data, the

empirical analysis begins with a mapping of how party congress delegates and ordinary

members view different aspects of their organizations. The seven parties are then compared.

4

What is the extra-parliamentary organization good for?

Before we proceed to the empirical analysis of these three questions, a more thorough

discussion of the activities and tasks of the extra-parliamentary organization may be useful.

Party organizations are often described as composed of three ‘faces’ (Katz & Mair 1993): the

party on the ground (the party members), the party in central office (the headquarter

organizing and representing the membership), and the party in public office (party

representatives in parliament and government). The advantage of Katz and Mair’s

conceptualization is that it clearly separates the party’s central organization from both the

rank-and-file members and the party representatives in public office.2 The two faces of the

extra-parliamentary organization merit separate discussions, starting with the party on the

ground.

The party on the ground

The well documented long-term decline of party membership in Europe is often seen as a

marginalization of the membership organization. According to van Biezen, Mair and

Poguntke (2012: 40), the parties do not seem to mind: ‘the large majority of parties seem

relatively unconcerned with their membership and are instead more focused on reaching out

to the wider public through professional campaigning and marketing techniques.’ Whiteley

(2011) finds that the trend can be explained by ‘state capture’: the closer relationship between

parties and the state stifles voluntary activity at the grassroots level.

Duverger (1959: 63) did not, however, define his mass party model in terms of the

number of members: ‘the difference involved is not one of size but of structure’. We should

therefore not focus solely on the size of the party on the ground, but ask what kind of

organization the leadership prefers. The fact that party membership is declining does not

necessarily mean that party leaders wants this to happen. Scarrow (1996) argues that even

strategically calculating party leaders may find members useful, for a number of reasons.

2 Katz and Mair’s distinction does not necessarily include the party voters, although they add that the party on

the ground ‘more loosely [...] can be taken to include the core of regular activists, financial supporters, and even

loyal voters’ (Katz and Mair 1993: 597). Katz and Mair’s disaggregation of the concept of ‘party’ thus differs

somewhat from V.O. Key’s (1968: 163–5) well-known distinction between the ‘party-in-the-electorate’, the

party organization, and the ‘party-in-the-government’, often used in American political science. Key (1968: 164)

used the term ‘party-in-the electorate’ to refer to party identifiers – ‘persons who regard themselves as party

members’ – not all those who vote for a party. The idea of including voters in the concept of ‘party’ may

nevertheless be problematic. For example, King (1969: 114) remarked that ‘It is common in the United States for

writers on parties to refer to “the party in the electorate,” sometimes as if it were on a par with the party in

Congress or the party organization. The notion of party-in-the-electorate seems a strange one on the face of it. It

is rather as though one were to refer not to the buyers of Campbell’s soup but to the Campbell-Soup-Company-

in-the-market.’

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Furthermore, we should ask which role the remaining members play in their parties. Scarrow

and Gezgor, for example, find that the remaining members seem to become more – not less –

like the rest of the population, except that they are getting older. The shrinking membership

decline ‘has not meant that parties’ grassroots are becoming some kind of odd subculture’

(Scarrow & Gezgor 2010: 839).

If members still matter, which roles are most important? First, we may (following

Scarrow 1996: 41–48) make a distinction between member activity inside and outside of the

party. The former includes e.g. members working for the party, providing ideas or being

recruited to party or public office, whereas the latter includes campaigning and opinion

leadership. As Scarrow points out, both activities may help their parties win votes (new policy

ideas may e.g. attract voters). The link between outward-looking activities and electoral

benefits is nevertheless more direct. There is reason to believe that a catch-all oriented party

will give priority to outward-looking activities, if the party still values an organization on the

ground.

Second, the question of internal democracy should be separated from the relevance of

party members. A party may value a large membership organization (e.g. because of

legitimacy benefits, using Scarrow’s terms), without giving the members any influence over

any major party decisions. The degree of internal democracy seems to be less

straightforwardly linked to party models. The mass party model is a bottom-up organization

in principle, but not necessarily in practice. Duverger (1959: 133) recognized this duality, by

stating that parties are ‘democratic in appearance and oligarchic in reality’.3 The cartel party is

also difficult to characterize. It is described as ‘stratarchical’ (decoupling the central and local

level). It gives members individual rights (e.g. through membership ballots), but uses these

rights to bypass the organized party activists, thus increasing the leadership’s own influence.

My point here is not to discuss these issues in detail, but to emphasize that party organizations

may vary with regard to the role that members play: inward- vs. outward-looking and top-

down vs. bottom-up.

The Norwegian case does not deviate from the general picture. If anything,

membership has declined more strongly in Norway than in most other European countries

(van Biezen et al. 2012: 34). Moreover, only half the members attend any meetings or party

events (Heidar & Saglie 2003b: 766; Heidar 2012). Nevertheless, Norwegian studies also

underline the resilience of the mass party, both as an organizational structure (Heidar & Saglie

3 The only exception, according to Duverger (1959: 133), was fascist parties who ‘are bold enough to confess in

public what others practice in secret’.

6

2003a) and a normative ideal among members and congress delegates (Saglie & Heidar

2004). On the basis of the 2009 party member survey, Heidar (2012: 13) concludes that

‘Norwegian parties are also today viable arenas for political debate and decision-making – in

spite of quite dramatic losses in numbers of members.’

The Norwegian case also illuminates a point that has been less discussed in the

international literature: fewer members do not necessarily mean changes in the local

organizational structure. In Norway, the parties’ network of local branches is more or less

intact. This may be related to a ‘party face’ that has been neglected in previous research: the

party in local public office. There is no sign of decline in this respect. On the contrary,

Norwegian parties manage to run candidates for municipal elections in an increasing number

of municipalities. The old parties maintain their presence in local politics, while new parties

increase their presence by establishing branches and running candidates in more and more

municipalities (Bergh & Bjørklund 2009: 146).

The activities of Norwegian local party branches seem to revolve around issues on the

municipal agenda – and the party’s local councillors (Offerdal & Ringkjøb 2002: 131). On the

one hand, this may indicate that the ascendancy of the party in public office also applies to the

local level. On the other hand, it can be argued that the party in local public office keeps the

party on the ground going. In this way, an organizational structure that gives the party a

presence in local communities can be maintained – even without a large number of activists.

As Offerdal and Ringkjøb (2002: 131, my translation) put it: ‘the organization is on its feet

while the members are sleeping’.

The party in central office

As Katz and Mair (1993: 600) notes, the value of the party on the ground has been questioned

in many studies, while the value of the party in public office is seen as self-evident. The utility

of the third face – the central office – has received less attention in the literature.

Nevertheless, we should ask which roles the central office play. Why may it still be useful to

maintain a party central office, instead of leaving all tasks to the parliamentary party group?

Again, it may be useful to make a distinction between inward- and outward-oriented

activities. Katz and Mair (1993: 600) describe three primary functions for the central office.4

One of them is outward-looking: to coordinate national campaigns. The other two are inward-

4 They also describe a fourth function: to be ‘a nucleus from which the other two faces are formed’. However,

the importance of this aspect declines when the other faces have become established.

7

oriented: to supervise the party in public office on behalf of the party on the ground, and to

provide services (communication, research, fundraising etc.) for the two other faces.

Katz and Mair do not predict that the central office will disappear altogether, but rather

that its role would change ‘from a potential power center into a service organization’ (Katz &

Mair 1993: 616). Furthermore, many of these services can now be provided by others, making

central office ‘useful, [but] it is not indispensable’ (Katz & Mair 1993: 615). Communication

services, for example, may be bought on the open market. Generally, the orientation of the

party in central office shifts towards external activities. It thus adapts to the needs of the party

in public office, according to Katz and Mair (2002: 125–6). They also point to some

developments that strengthen the party in public office, at the expense of the party in central

office (Katz & Mair 2002: 122–6). First, organizational resources such as staff and money

tend to be channelled to the parliamentary party group. Second, most substantial parties have

been in government quite recently, and this increases the status of the party in public office.

The Norwegian case again fits the general picture quite well, at least on some points.

Party staff growth has mainly taken place in the parliamentary groups, even though the central

offices keep a substantial number of employees (Karlsen 2010: 200; Rommetvedt 2011: 87,

135).

The outward-looking activity of election campaigning is one of the primary functions

of the party in central office, also in Norway. According to Katz and Mair (2002: 125), ‘the

resources which remain within the central office appear to be increasingly devoted to the

employment of contractual staff and consultants, and to the provision of outside expertise’.

The Norwegian experience, however, does not match this description. It is certainly true that

election campaigns are professionalized. Parties use external professionals, but mainly for

technical assistance. Campaign strategy is generally a matter for in-house professionals in the

party organization (Karlsen 2010). Parties seem to be sceptical to external professionals, and

doubt their ability to understand politics. This might not be a uniquely Norwegian experience;

we may ask whether it applies to other countries with party-centred campaigns as well.

A less clear-cut outward-oriented task is candidate selection, which presupposes some

kind of extra-parliamentary organization. The selection can hardly be left to the candidates

themselves (unless open primaries arranged by the state, as in the US, are introduced). In

Norway, however, candidate selection lies in the hands of regional branches rather than the

central office (Valen et al. 2002).

Turning to the inward-looking tasks, organizing and representing the members are

central aspects. The relation between the party in central office and the party on the ground

8

may include both top-down and bottom-up functions; managing the party from above as well

as providing an arena for democratic participation. If the party on the ground has

disintegrated, there is of course less need for a central office to manage and/or encourage

grassroots activity. Norwegian party organizers nevertheless seem to view the situation

differently: they are searching for ways to make membership and activity more attractive

(Heidar & Saglie 2003a; Aarebrot & Saglie 2013). The decline in membership may even spur

the central office to increase these efforts, as an attempt to stem the tide.

A recent study of links between the levels in Norwegian party organizations partly

confirms the ascendancy of the party in public office. Local party branches more often turn to

the party in public office than the party in central office, when they attempt to influence

national political decisions (Allern & Saglie 2012: 960–2). This indicates that the party in

central office is seen as less important than the parliamentarians, but does not necessarily

mean that the central office has become unimportant.

Policy development is another main task for the party in central office. This may be

less important for government parties, which may draw on the civil service when they develop

new policies. Opposition parties may also benefit from the staff increase in the parliamentary

groups, which has increased their capacity to, for example, propose private members’ bills.

Much day-to-day policy-making must necessarily be left to the parliamentary party groups.

Nevertheless, the Norwegian case shows that policy development also takes place under the

auspices of the central office. This is done in two ways. First, party programmes (manifestos)

are adopted by the national party congress, after a comprehensive hearing procedure that

includes local branches (Allern & Saglie 2012; Allern et al. 2013). These are fairly detailed

documents, containing specific policy positions on a large number of issues. Second, party

organizations establish committees to develop policies in specific fields. This enables the

party to draw experts into party policy-making, and gives these experts an opportunity to

affect decision-making without running for public office.

As Katz and Mair point out, the faces intersect at multiple points − and the central

office may sometimes be a battleground between the two other faces (Katz & Mair 1993:

606). It may be difficult to draw the line between the party in central and public office,

especially when the same person leads both ‘faces’. Nevertheless, the extra-parliamentary

organization (including both the party in central office and on the ground) still seems to play

several roles within political parties. The empirical question to be analysed is how well

Norwegian parties play these roles, according to their own members and congress delegates.

9

Data and measurements

The analyses are based on postal surveys of members and party congress delegates from the

seven parties represented in the Norwegian Parliament, carried out in 2009 (see Jupskås 2010

for details). For the member survey, 1000 party members were randomly selected from each

party’s membership file.5 The congress delegate survey comprises all delegates to the seven

parties’ national congresses (ranging between 195 and 300 people). The overall response rates

were 49 per cent for the members, and 55 per cent for the delegates.

Except for party-specific analyses, the member survey data are weighted to be

representative of the universe of ‘Norwegian party members’. The weights are calculated on

the basis of the parties’ share of the aggregate number of members. The delegate survey data

are collected from the universe of congress delegates, and are therefore not weighted. This

means, however, that small parties are strongly over-represented in the universe of congress

delegates, compared with the weighted sample of members. The party-specific analyses,

however, enable us to see whether the general patterns are found within each party.

In this paper, I use a battery of questions where the respondents were asked whether

they agreed or disagreed6 with six statements on ‘the party organization’ – all statements

claiming that a certain aspect of the party organization functions well. In Norwegian common

usage, the term ‘the party organization’ is usually seen as equivalent to the two extra-

parliamentary faces, but not comprising the party in public office. Therefore, questions on

‘the party organization’ will most likely tap perceptions of the party’s two extra-parliamentary

faces. The battery included the following questions (the key words in parentheses are used in

the tables).

A) The party organization enables, to a large extent, the party leadership and elected

representatives to reach out to the voters, independently of the media (outreach)

B) The party organization is decisive for the party’s capability for long-term policy

development (policy development)

C) The party organization is usually an effective instrument for election campaigns

(campaigning)

5 For three parties there were problems sampling members of the youth parties, but this should not affect the

aggregate figures significantly. 6 Response categories: Agree completely; agree somewhat; neither; disagree somewhat; disagree completely;

don’t know.

10

D) The party organization offers good training for activists and newly elected representatives

(training)

E) The party organization functions well as a political debate arena for ordinary people

(debate arena)

F) The party organization offers ordinary people good opportunities for political influence

(influence)

These items capture some of the main distinctions discussed above. Three items explicitly

refer to the party on the ground (item D, E and F), whereas the three others (A, B and C) refer

to the party organization in general, neither presuming nor excluding that the party on the

ground plays a role. Two items cover outward-looking activities (A and C) while four refer to

the inward-looking role of the party organization (B, D, E and F). Regarding the degree of

intra-party democracy, item F, and to some extent item E, refer to bottom-up activities –

giving members influence over party decisions. Items A and C, and to some extent B and D,

describe party tasks that are more relevant for a top-down organization.

These survey questions have not been asked in previous surveys, so I am not able to

map developments over time. Other questions in the same survey, however, have been asked

on previous occasions, and these results give reason to doubt the thesis of a marginalization of

the members. Norwegian party members’ perceptions of how party democracy works has not

changed much since 1991 – and to the extent that there are any changes, the development has

been positive rather than negative (Heidar 2012).

How Norwegian party organizations work – seen from below

The first research question is whether the party organization functions satisfactorily, seen

from within. Norwegian party members and congress delegates’ views on how their party

organizations work are presented in Table 1. Even though there may be an element of yea-

saying in these responses, the short answer is that the parties do quite well: there is an

overweight of positive evaluations for all six organizational items, both among members and

congress delegates.

As mentioned above, a catch-all or cartel party can be expected to give priority to

outward-oriented activities related to vote-seeking, whereas a mass party will give priority to

internal party work. If the more recent party models give an accurate description, we would

expect members and delegates to perceive that outward-oriented activities (related to vote-

seeking) perform better than the internal ones.

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Table 1. Perceptions of how party organizations work, among Norwegian party members and

congress delegates. Per cent and balance of opinion (per cent agreeing minus per cent

disagreeing).

Agree

comp-

letely

Agree

some-

what

Nei-

ther/

don’t

know

Dis-

agree

some-

what

Dis-

agree

comp-

letely

Bal-

ance of

opinion

N

Members:

Campaigning 41 43 15 1 0 83 3158

Policy development 35 45 19 1 0 79 3167

Training 20 34 41 5 1 48 3157

Outreach 13 35 39 11 3 34 3168

Influence 11 27 46 12 4 22 3164

Debate arena 11 24 46 15 4 16 3160

Congress delegates:

Policy development 51 40 7 1 0 90 883

Campaigning 53 36 9 1 0 88 875

Training 34 40 20 5 1 68 878

Outreach 18 40 32 10 1 47 882

Influence 17 40 31 11 2 44 880

Debate arena 13 32 34 18 4 23 879

Party member figures are weighted (except N). Those who did not answer are excluded from the calculations.

See the text above for full question wording.

Party members and congress delegates are apparently capable of differentiating between

various aspects of their organizations – some aspects are perceived as more successful than

others. This ranking is of course influenced by the wording of the survey items, and must be

used with caution. Having said that, two aspects seem to be perceived as functioning clearly

better than the others: the roles as instruments for election campaigning and long-term policy

development. Party members and congress delegates agree that their parties perform these

tasks well. Training of activists and elected representatives comes third, whereas fewer

members and congress delegates find their party successful with regard to the three remaining

items.

This result does not fit into the expectation that outward-oriented activities would be

seen as functioning better than the internal ones. One of the ‘top two’ aspects (campaigning)

is outward-looking, the other (policy development) more inward-oriented. Neither of these

aspects fall into the ‘bottom-up’ category; they do not presuppose any involvement of the

12

party on the ground.7 This might be taken to indicate that democratic – bottom-up – aspects of

the parties work less well.8

Whereas the general ranking of survey items may be affected by question wording,

comparing groups is less methodologically problematic. Table 1 shows a general difference

between the two levels: the congress delegates are more satisfied than the ordinary party

members, and this applies to all six items. The ranking of the six aspects (measured by the

balance of opinion) is almost the same at both levels.

Party differences: are there different organizational models?

The next research question focuses on party differences. This part of the analysis also takes

the party models as its starting point: Do some parties perform ‘inward-oriented’ aspects of

party organization well (in line with the mass party model), whereas other take well care of

outward-oriented aspects (as one might expect from the catch-all party model) – according to

their members? Can we, empirically, discern different ‘ideal types’ of party organizations

where some aspects are perceived as well taken care of and others neglected? As mentioned

above, there are two alternative expectations: On the one hand, the origins and historical

legacies of Norwegian parties may cause differences. On the other hand, the fact that current

organizational structures are quite similar leads to the expectations that party differences will

be negligible.

The first step of this analysis is to look for clusters of correlated items, which may

serve as indicators of different party models. Do some members, for example, see their parties

as strong on outward-looking activities but weak on the inward-looking ones? If so, this

would be a useful point of departure for the comparison of the seven parties.

That is, however, not the case. Analysis of the relationship between the six items

(tables not shown here) show that they are positively correlated at both levels.9 The main

finding is that all aspects tend to go together, and the principal components analysis in Table 2

7 It should nevertheless be noted that ‘long-term policy development’ might be perceived as a reference to the

development of party programmes, where the party on the ground certainly plays a role. 8 A methodological objection could be made. A party member needs some kind of personal experience to be able

to judge the possibilities for democratic participation and influence within the party. As mentioned above, many

Norwegian party members are not active at all, and lack first-hand knowledge about how the organization works.

It is reasonable to assume that passive members tend to choose the ‘don’t know’ option when asked about

influence from below. In contrast, a passive member may easily judge the party’s campaigning efforts on the

basis of the mass media coverage. However, the fact that the same pattern is found among congress delegates

weakens this objection. All congress delegates are active and presumably able to assess their party’s democratic

qualities. 9 All correlations are statistically significant. The correlation between the two ‘bottom-up’ aspects – offering

members a debate arena and opportunities for political influence – is especially strong (Pearson’s r = 0.68).

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confirms this impression. The standard criterion for determining the number of factors

(eigenvalue above 1) was less useful in this case. The eigenvalue of the second factor barely

exceeded 1 in the member survey, and was just below 1 in the congress delegate survey.10

Therefore, Table 2 only includes the one-factor solutions for both party levels.

Table 2. Principal component analysis of perceptions of how party organizations work, among

Norwegian party members and congress delegates. One-factor solutions.

Members Congress

delegates

Debate arena 0.782 0.764

Influence 0.747 0.731

Training 0.704 0.689

Outreach 0.655 0.659

Policy development 0.619 0.566

Campaigning 0.688 0.668

Eigenvalue 2.95 2.79 Party member figures are weighted. Analyses of unweighted figures yield similar results.

See the text above for full question wording.

These factor loadings show whether all variables in the data set have something in common.

In this case they have: all items loaded strongly (above 0.55) on this common factor. In short,

the main result is that those members and delegates who are satisfied with one aspect of their

party tend to be satisfied with others, too. With a basically one-dimensional structure, it is not

possible to build indices that reflect different party models. 11

As some aspects were seen as

functioning clearly better than others, I include all original items – instead of a single index –

in the analysis of party differences.

The main conclusion from Table 1 was that most members and delegates had a

positive view of their organizations. To display party differences more clearly, Tables 3 and 4

presents percentages that agree completely with the statements (instead of combining those

who agree completely and partly). Table 3 presents the results for the members, followed by

the congress delegates in Table 4.

10

1.02 and 0.96, respectively. 11

Two-factor solutions were also extracted, and the matrix was rotated to obtain a simpler structure. As there is

no reason to presume that these factors are uncorrelated, I used oblique rotation. Among members as well as

congress delegates, influence and debate loaded strongly – and training somewhat less strongly – on the first

factor. Policy development and campaigning loaded strongly on the second factor in both cases. The outreach

item was linked to the first factor among the members and the second factor among the congress delegates. The

two factors were quite strongly correlated (0.43 and 0.44). The second factor, linked to campaigning and policy

development, does not appear to reflect any underlying party model (e.g. along the lines of member vs. voter

orientation). The reason why these to items appear to be connected may simply be that more respondents agreed

with these two statements than the others.

14

Table 3. Perceptions of how party organizations work among Norwegian party members, by

party. Per cent agreeing completely with statements saying that the party functions well.

Cam-

paigning

Policy

develop-

ment

Training Outreach Influ-

ence

Debate

arena

Smallest

N

Socialist Left 31 34 10 8 7 6 561

Labour 44 36 17 11 11 10 410

Centre 36 32 12 7 7 6 431

Christian 33 28 12 10 8 9 399

Liberal 29 28 13 7 9 7 472

Conservative 35 32 20 10 7 8 435

Progress 56 48 48 30 26 29 441 See the text above for full question wording.

Table 4. Perceptions of how party organizations work among Norwegian party congress

delegates, by party. Per cent agreeing completely with statements saying that the party

functions well.

Cam-

paigning

Policy

develop-

ment

Training Outreach Influ-

ence

Debate

arena

Smallest

N

Socialist Left 36 57 9 6 9 6 114

Labour 74 66 41 24 26 19 170

Centre 50 57 18 23 16 11 113

Christian 45 40 28 14 10 5 111

Liberal 47 35 33 5 20 11 114

Conservative 45 38 28 10 12 10 144

Progress 69 62 82 43 24 29 107 See the text above for full question wording.

One party stands out, with an organization that apparently works better than the others: the

Progress Party. Among party members, the Progress Party scores higher than the other parties

on all six aspects. The differences between the other six parties are quite small. Among party

congress delegates, the Progress Party is surpassed by Labour with regard to three aspects:

campaigning, policy development and influence. The main impression from Tables 3 and 4 is

nevertheless clear: the Progress Party is perceived by its members and congress delegates as a

party that performs all functions relatively well, compared to how other parties are perceived

by their members. In other words, neither of the alternative expectations was met. The

difference between the Progress Party and the others does not reflect historical legacies, but

neither are the differences negligible.

15

The difference between the six activities, presented in Table 1, is largely found within

all parties as well. Members and congress delegates in all parties tend to agree that the

organization does well as regards campaigning and policy development. There are, however,

some exceptions. Progress Party members and congress delegates also perceive training of

activists and representatives in public office as a task their party performs particularly well.

One may object that the results reflect different expectations within the parties, rather

than actual performance. This objection is discussed more comprehensively below, but there

is reason to believe that the party differences in Tables 3 and 4, at least in part, reflect how the

parties actually work. The difference between the Progress Party and the others is particularly

large (among both members and congress delegates) when it comes to training. This is likely

to correspond to actual differences in party performance, as the Progress Party is known to put

down much work in training its activists.

The general difference between members and congress delegates, which was seen in

Table 1, is also present within each of the parties – with some exceptions. For instance, the

fact that Labour outdoes the Progress Party among congress delegates on some functions –

but not among members – means that the perception differences between delegates and

members is larger in Labour than in the Progress Party.

Discussion and concluding remarks

What does asking the members add to our understanding of party decline?

In spite of declining membership, Norwegian parties still seem to work in a way that members

and delegates value and appreciate. The short answer to the first research question – how

extra-parliamentary party organizations perform – would be ‘quite well’, in the eyes of those

who endure. Studies of the remaining members yield a less gloomy picture than research on

the declining membership. There is of course reason to presume that those who have left their

party are less satisfied than those who join or remain,12

and the declining number of party

members must have left its mark on the parties. But even though studies of the level of party

membership are valuable, they should not be the only basis for conclusions on how the extra-

parliamentary party organization develops.

Van Biezen at al. (2012: 40) suggest that party organizations ‘have now reached such a

low ebb that the formal organisational level is itself often no longer a relevant indicator of

12

This objection is less relevant if declining membership is caused by generational replacement, rather than

dissatisfied members leaving their party.

16

party capacity’. The research reported here does not contradict the fact that membership has

declined. It does, however, shed light on how the downsized organization works. It looks as if

parties can maintain a formal extra-parliamentary organization and an organizational capacity

which may perform the necessary tasks, even with a smaller number of members.

When we turn to performance of specific functions, members and delegates especially

agreed with two statements – those who described the party as effective for campaigning and

decisive for policy development. This does not fit into the expected pattern of a dominance of

voter-oriented, ‘catch-all’ activities. 80 per cent of the members and even more delegates

agreed with the statement ‘The party organization is decisive for the party’s capability for

long-term policy development’. This indicates, firstly, that the extra-parliamentary

organization still plays a role, and, secondly, that it is more than just a tool for vote-seeking

purposes.

However, the results also point to some difficulties for parties as arenas for democratic

participation. Neither of the ‘top two’ aspects presupposes any democratic involvement from

the party grass roots. In other words: whereas the party in central office seems to endure, this

result may cast doubt on the role of the party on the ground. It should nevertheless be said that

it may be easier to agree with statements saying that the party functions well, if the statements

do not presuppose democratic procedures. Democratic involvement may after all be hard to

achieve. Moreover, a certain amount of critical reflection is good for party democracy;

complete satisfaction is not necessarily a good thing.

There is a difference between members and delegates: the latter perceives the party

more positively. One might ask whether the congress delegates are somewhat self-satisfied –

as they play important roles in the organization they are asked to evaluate. But there is no

evidence of disgruntled and slighted middle-level elites, as one might expect from the cartel

party thesis (Katz & Mair 1995). Even though the congress delegates comprise both top-level

and middle-level elites, the former group is (by definition) outnumbered.

Regarding the question of different types of party organizations, corresponding to

party models, no such differentiation was found. Instead, the data show a uniform evaluation

of Norwegian party organizations, across party lines. There were no clear ideal types, where

different parties fit into party models. The expectation of party differences rooted in the

parties’ historical legacies was not fulfilled. It might be the case that party models – while

useful to describe historical developments – are less relevant to distinguish between

contemporary Norwegian party organizations.

17

However, neither was the alternative expectation fulfilled − that the similar

organizational structure of Norwegian parties would lead to negligible party differences. The

search for party differences revealed that the Progress Party does better than the rest, when

members and activists assess how their party works. We are then left with a puzzle: why does

a right-wing populist party with origins in anti-party sentiments outclass its competitors in

organizational matters?

The puzzle of the Progress Party

There are two possible answers to this puzzle. First, Progress Party members may respond

differently to the survey questions, without any corresponding differences in how the party

actually works. As mentioned above, expectations may differ. If a party values intra-party

democracy highly, the members and delegates will also have high expectations – and

therefore easily become disappointed. If Progress Party members have other priorities than

organizational matters, the members and delegates may be satisfied with less. Also, Progress

Party members and activists may be especially proud of their organization, reflecting

conscious attempts at ‘party branding’. However, even though such explanations may have

some merit, they may not be sufficient.

The second answer is that the results fit the actual development in party organizations.

We should not be too surprised by the good results for the Progress Party. The party has

concentrated on building a strong organization, inspired by what the labour movement once

was. The Progress Party has also increased its membership, at times when other parties have

lost their members (Heidar 2012: 17) – even though it shall be added that this is an increase

from a low starting point. In a review of the party’s development since its foundation, Jupskås

(2013: 14) concludes that the Progress Party has managed to combine mass party features

(member recruitment, a local presence and internal democracy) with a ‘modern’

professionalized party organization. In short: the Progress Party members and congress

delegates may have good reasons to be satisfied with their extra-parliamentary organization.

According to Duverger, the emergence of the mass organization was an invention of

the left. The right was obliged to follow this example to retain its influence; Duverger (1959:

xxvii) called this process ‘the contagion from the left’. The case of the Progress Party shows

that the contagion from the left still can be active, though overdue. The Progress Party is the

newest party in the Norwegian Parliament, founded in 1973 and therefore less burdened with

the weight of organizational traditions. It may be seen as a paradox that the party nevertheless

chose to build an ‘old-fashioned’, strong extra-parliamentary organization.

18

The analyses of this paper are limited to the case of Norway. The question is then

whether we might find similar patterns elsewhere. That is not necessarily the case.

Norwegian parties share a similar organizational structure. There are probably larger actual

organizational differences between parties in other countries. Does, for example, the

development of other populist right parties follow the Progress Party’s way? Organizational

structures and procedures have also been ‘modernized’ to a larger extent in other countries,

for example by introducing direct democracy within parties. Greater differences in actual

party organization in other countries may lead to larger differences in the members’

evaluation of their organizations. In order to see whether that is the case, comparative studies

would be useful.

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