do mercenaries win wars

© Constantinos Pagonis 2004

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America's use of private militarized firms in Iraq has increased scrutiny on the use of

mercenaries and renewed political scientists' interest in the topic. However, the presence of

mercenaries in armies is as old as warfare itself. Cyrus the Younger of Persia was said to have

hired as many as 10,000 Greek mercenaries in the fourth century BC. The Romans, Mongols,

Abbasids, Chinese and virtually every European colonial empire utilized mercenaries at some

point in their history. Despite the long history of mercenaries in warfare; scholars have thus far

confined themselves to individual case studies or region specific analysis. The billions of dollars

that are spent on mercenaries every year necessitate a closer examination of mercenaries'

effectiveness. Current scholarship has neglected to address whether governments or rebel groups

that employ mercenaries win the wars they are fighting.

In order to more clearly establish a linkage between the outcome of wars and the use of

mercenaries, this paper seeks to identify the presence and number of mercenaries in civil wars

throughout the latter half of the twentieth century in both government and rebel armies. This

paper argues that there is an established relationship between a government or rebel group's use

of mercenaries and victory in a civil war. If the relationship between the presence of mercenaries

and the war's outcome is negative, than policy makers are expending resources on forces that are

unlikely to change the outcome of wars. Conversely, if the relationship is positive, than policy

makers ought to consider increasing their militaries use of mercenaries. This relationship is

especially important for third world governments which lack the funding or level of national

cohesion to support an effective national army. If governments that employed mercenaries were

ultimately successful in defeating rebellions, than relatively limited defense expenditures would

most likely be better spent on mercenaries than ineffectual government troops.


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To prevent semantical differences from obscuring the substantive aspects of this work

requires the establishment of several definitions. For the purpose of this paper, a mercenary is

defined as a soldier that fights for personal profit rather than an allegiance to a state, ethnic

group, political party or ideology. Mercenaries are generally from a country other than the one

they are fighting in, but for the purposes of this paper will not solely be limited to foreign forces.

P.W. Singer's definition of private militarized firms (PMF) as "profit driven organizations that

trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare," will be utilized. i Mechanics and

other members of militaries that are in noncombat roles are counted in statistics on national

armies. Therefore, any member of a PMF that is party to a civil war is considered to be a

mercenary irrespective of whether they actually took part in actual combat. A civil war is defined

as an "armed conflict between an incumbent government and a rebel organization."ii

We begin with a comprehensive overview of the current literature on mercenaries and

private military corporations with a particular emphasis on the absence of broad based

quantitative studies. The methodology we employed to produce our dataset is then presented and

broken down further into regional groupings. A brief account of each civil war where

mercenaries were present; identifying the belligerents, the number of mercenaries, the

mercenaries' relevance to the overall conflict and the presence of airpower, is included along

with descriptive statistics derived from the data set. From this dataset, we evaluate the central

hypothesis put forth in the work and provide potential explanations for observed relationships. In

the final section, suggestions are given for future research that is not addressed by current

scholarship.

Past and Present Literature on Mercenaries and PMFs


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Historical writings on mercenaries provide researchers with parallels that may represent

patterns of state behavior that are likely to emulated in the future. Mathew Trundle in his book

entitled, Greek Mercenaries from the Late Archaic Period to Alexander, provides a succinct

history of mercenary warfare within ancient Greek society. He treats the service of the Greek

mercenaries not merely as a military activity but as "a social phenomenon that transcended the

societies across the whole Mediterranean."iii According to the author, Greek mercenaries were

nothing like the modern soldiers of fortune. He goes so far as to question the appropriateness of

the term "mercenary" for the ancient world given its pejorative modern meaning. iv Despite their

differences, mercenaries of this period were similar to their modern counterparts in the sense that

they did not operate within the community of their own polis or state and had their own identity

as a group regardless of where they originally came from. v

In his book entitled, Britain and the Yemen Civil War 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries

and Mandarins, Jones discusses British mercenaries' engagement in Yemen's civil war. Britain

covertly supported Royalist forces fighting against a Republican regime backed by Nasser's

Egyptian forces through direct arms shipments and funding for Britain, French and Belgian

mercenaries.vi The author's case study demonstrates the extent to which a small cadre of

mercenary forces can affect a war. The European mercenaries created significant difficulties for

the Republican and Egyptian armies, despite having to overcome intertribal rivalries and

profound cultural differences between them and the tribesmen.

Guy Arnold provides a history of the ad hoc mercenary bands that fought in conflicts

throughout Africa during the nineteen sixties and seventies. In Mercenaries: The Scourge of the

Third World, Arnold counters the commonly held viewpoint that mercenaries during this era

fought because they had a zealous hatred of communism and therefore fought to oppose its


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spread. Rather he finds that they all held a similar psychology that needed the adrenal rushes

combat generates. Furthermore, mercenary activity provided them with the opportunity to earn

salaries that were several times higher than in their respective national armies.

The subtitle of Arnold's book demonstrates his attitude toward mercenaries. According to

Arnold, mercenaries are "ruthless peddler[s] of violence and subversion for money".vii Wherever

they have engaged in combat, he states that they have been "brutal, cruel, racist and

…ineffective."viii He claims they have produced "abysmal" results.ix His tirade against

mercenaries goes even further; he characterizes mercenaries as "drug addicts, adventurers,

racists, the bored and the rootless, psychopaths and killers".x However, even Arnold is forced to

admit that the destabilization evident in parts of Africa invite mercenary intervention.

A paradigm shift in contemporary international affairs scholarship on mercenaries is

evident in several writings. Current literature suggests that there is a shift from "government to

governance," in view of the amount of power now wielded by corporate entities.xi Krahmann,

considering the changes in his paper entitled "Private Firms and the New Security Governance."

The paper highlights the changing dynamic between the accepted model of the state monopoly

on violence and its slide back into the hands of individuals. xii In a similar vein, Bunker sees

history repeating itself and gives credence to this in "Fourth Epoch War," which highlights

cyclical periods of non-state soldier/mercenary ascendancy in the West.xiii Bunker suggests that

the current operational environment, wherein there are an increasing number of armed non-state

actors, is taxing the capabilities of traditional law enforcement and military forces. He states that

the current environment "Represents a literal playground for criminal-soldiers and mercenaries."xiv

There are two schools of thought on mercenaries, namely those who support and the

remainder who oppose them. The support literature emphasizes the efficiency and effectiveness


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of PMFs. It is claimed that private security firms have a distinct corporate character; they have

used legitimate instruments to secure deals and primarily supported recognized governments,

avoiding hostile regimes. This literature set claims that coercion is often essential to breaking

deadlocks and bringing opposing parties to the negotiation table. Private security firms are the

solution for poor governments that lack the resources to field effective fighting forces, especially

as the political and economic costs of peacekeeping continue to escalate. In short, this segment

of the literature implies that private security firms for the most part aim to resolve conflicts.xv

Those in the opposing camp point to issues of accountability and control. It is argued that

private security forms are not subject to checks and balances that restrain regular, national armed

forces from abusing their power. Certain authors such as Khareen Pech go further in their

opposition to the use of private security firms by arguing that they constitute an "economic

imperialist" force. They point to the partnerships between private security firms and mining

houses as examples of this trend.xvi Robert Mandel, although not directly opposed to

mercenaries, addresses the lack of current regulation which he places into three broad categories:

an inability to identify problem, the absence of societal consensus, and a lack of clarity in current

PMF regulations.xvii A number of authors argue that in certain contexts, private security outfits

may contribute to the perpetuation of the war. For example, Sean Cleary argues that,

"EO [Executive Outcomes]'s continued availability and efficiency - together with

substantial arms deliveries from several countries - gave the Angolan government reason to

believe that the FAA [Angolan Armed Forces] could continue to disregard the cease-fire

throughout the Lusaka talks."xviii

Singer, in “Corporate Warriors”, covers the nature of the private military industry from

its inception.xix Singer attempts to categorize a diverse collection of companies providing very


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differentiated products and services into a single construct - adding some order to what Mandel

calls the "definitional morass" of private security.xx The definitions he suggests provide a useful

framework for classifying firms in the industry. Singer also cites specific examples of firms and

notes their successes and failures across the range of services they provide.

In his book “Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror”, Robert Young Pelton

demonstrates the extent to which mercenaries have come to play an integral role in Iraq. The

author gives a snapshot of life in the world of the PMF and the independent contractors who staff

these firms. He also provides a glimpse into the financiers and entrepreneurs that run PMFs and

finds that their goals are not always purely financial in nature.xxi In addition to his Iraq specific

case study Pelton also addresses the rise of PMFs as a supplemental tool of foreign policy. Pelton

views Iraq as only the largest of a new trend wherein governments increasingly outsource vital

security functions to PMFs in high risk areas. Although Pelton identifies the increasing role

PMFs have in modern conflicts, he does not specify the role PMFS ought to have. The issue of

eroding state sovereignty is simply passed over as a secondary concern.

The vast majority of writings on PMFs still focus heavily on Africa and the likes of

companies such as Executive Outcomes, Sandline, and others that fall within the typical "dogs of

war" typology. Literature on mercenary activity in Africa has primarily taken a negative outlook

and highlighted policy makers discomfort with the state's loss of a monopoly on the means of

violence. Furthermore, authors have expressed their concern with private companies exporting

military capability with impunity.

Kinsey's Corporate Soldiers and International Security discusses the role private security

companies play in the developing world, looking at how the privatization of security effects

countries dominated by warlord politics and under conditions which Mary Kaldor terms "new


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wars."xxii Kinsey asserts that the descent into warlord politics is partially the result of local

warlord's alliances with PMFs.xxiiiAs warlord politics and shadow economies increase conflict in

Africa, Kinsey argues that strategic complexes or groups that link governments, international

non-governmental organizations and private companies will emerge to resolve political

impasses, undertake development, and improve on the lack of security that characterizes most

new wars. Given a lack of Western interest, mercenaries are likely to play a role in a nascent

state's formation. xxiv

Abdel Fatau Musah and J. Kayode Fayemi, in their compilation of works on mercenaries

in Africa entitled, Mercenaries: an African Security Dilemma, seek to publicize the alarming

trend toward governments' reliance on PMFs in African countries. O'Brien's essay points out

that private security companies flourished more discreetly in Africa throughout the 1970s and

1980s and that it would be wrong to regard them as a uniquely post-Cold War

phenomenon. Sierra Leone was home to a private security organization in the diamond

business almost forty years before Executive Outcomes was born. xxv The general implication

of the papers gathered in this book is that the presence of foreign mercenaries should be

limited through legislation and the development of African regional security mechanisms.

Tim Spicer, one time director of Sandline International and Executive Outcomes, seeks to

counter PMFs critics in his book entitled, An Unorthodox Soldier. The work largely seeks to

explain his company's involvement in Sierra Leone, however it also provides an industry insiders

view of the PMF industry.xxvi Spicer argues that private military companies can play a

legitimate role in resolving conflicts in developing nations. The author cites his own military

career in an effort to distinguish between firms like Sandline and popular conception of

mercenaries.


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The mercenaries and PMFs literature is generally not underpinned by thorough

investigative research. Very few researchers have tried to engage the subject from a balanced

point of view, with the result being that the debate on deployment of private security firms and

mercenaries in conflict situations is polarized.xxvii Questions of effectiveness and track records

have largely been neglected. This paper seeks to fill the gap in the current literature by

objectively identifying the relationship between mercenary participation and a civil war's

outcome using a largely quantitative methodology.

Constructing a Dataset of Mercenary Activity in Civil Wars

Civil war data was derived from Mason, Wiegarten and Fett's work entitled Win, Lose or

Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars, who in turn extracted their data from the

Correlates of War: 1816- 1992 Civil War data set.xxviii Each civil war represents a dyad

consisting of the government and opposing rebels. The dates and duration of the 57 conflicts

covered, and the army size were maintained in their original form. Civil war outcomes were

simplified from the original dataset, with government victories coded as a 1 and rebel victories as

a 0. Negotiated settlements were coded as a government victory if they resulted in the

maintenance of territorial integrity and as a rebel victory if they resulted in secession. For the

purpose of this work, only the name and outcome of the conflict are significant. The other

aforementioned data was included to provide a reference frame of each war's magnitude, when

viewed in comparison to the number of mercenaries.

One additional civil war was added to the original dataset. Zaire's civil war from 1960-

1965 was in actuality two separate civil wars. The first civil war lasting from 1960 to 1964 was

between Zaire's government and the secessionist province of Katanga. The Simba revolt lasted a

mere 3 months, but had entirely different rebel combatants from the Simba tribes and a


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government controlled by the leader of the former Katangan rebels. Each of Zaire's civil wars

was therefore independently coded. Argentina's civil war was removed from the original dataset

and replaced with the Simba Revolt under the title Zaire.

Six additional variables were added to Mason, Weingarten and Fett's original data set.

Cases where the government or rebels had mercenaries present in their ranks were respectively

coded with a 1. Conversely if mercenaries were not present than both variables were coded with

a 0. In, instances where there were conflicting claims on the existence of mercenaries all

variables were coded with a 0. If mercenaries were present, then the number of mercenaries on

either or both sides was recorded. When there were conflicting reports on the number of

mercenaries, a simple average was taken between a minimum of two sources. Civil wars in

which mercenaries operated or maintained aircraft were coded in a similar manner, with a 1

indicating mercenary operated airpower in the service of rebels and or the government and a 0

indicating its absence.

Categorical Considerations

The dataset was constructed using civil rather than interstate war data because civil wars

occurred more frequently in latter half of the twentieth century, thereby offering more data

points. Airpower was included as a separate variable because aircraft provide militaries with

unique reconnaissance, transport, and bombing capabilities that cannot easily be emulated by

ground forces. Where possible the number of aircraft that were employed was provided as

supplemental information that may be used in future research.

The classification of forces as mercenary or nonmercenary used in this work requires

several clarifications. Soldiers that fight in the service of an ideological objective and which are

paid for directly or indirectly by their home governments, are not considered mercenaries under


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the prior definition established in the paper. Therefore Soviet and Cuban troops and "advisors" in

Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique were not included in the dataset. Although these soldiers

were foreign troops fighting for pay that was provided largely by the local government, the

funding for these troops was generally provided as aid by the Soviets. Furthermore, the Soviet

and Cuban soldiers did not fight on their own initiative but rather served at the behest of their

home governments. Libyan troops and "advisors" in Liberia, Chad, Uganda and the Western

Sahara were similarly not classified as mercenaries because they were ultimately controlled and

funded by Tripoli.

Domestic rebel groups that were directly funded by external parties and which lacked a

clear political or ideological objective were counted as mercenaries in the dataset. The

RENAMO rebel group in Mozambique was essentially a proxy created by the Rhodesian

military that had little in the way of a tangible objective aside from maximizing the amount they

could loot.xxix Thus the entirety of RENAMO's forces were scored as mercenaries. Although

similar, the Contras in Nicaragua were not coded as mercenaries because they were founded by

the indigenous population and held political motives. The Polisario movement in West Africa

although falsely deemed mercenary by Morocco, never had the verifiable presence of any

mercenary forces within its ranks.xxx

The presence or absence of mercenaries, as well as the size of mercenary forces was

verified through various primary and secondary sources including newspapers, publications,

historical studies, and memoirs. Data on conflicts that occurred from 1980 to the present were

primarily derived from major newspapers and publications including the New York Times, the

Christian Science Monitor, and BBC Summaries of World Broadcasts. Groups that are in

opposition with one another tend to label elements or all of their opposing forces mercenaries in


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an attempt to undercut their legitimacy. As a result it was necessary to dismiss reports on

mercenary activity that came directly from a government or rebel spokesperson, unless there was

credible evidence to back the claim, such as a captured soldier with a known history of

mercenary activity. For conflicts prior to 1980, data was extracted from historical studies and

memoirs of individuals that had been mercenaries or were present in areas of mercenary activity.

Determining Mercenaries' Effectiveness

The number of civil wars where mercenary activity corresponded with a win for the side

which employed them was recorded and expressed as a percentage of the total number of civil

wars. Instances where both sides employed mercenaries are still paired and coded to the winner.

Any figure in excess of 50% indicates that forces which employ mercenaries have historically

proven victorious, whereas a figure below 50% indicates the opposite. Two separate identical

correlations were conducted to establish whether governments and rebels respectively won more

often than they lost when employing mercenaries. The sums of the forces to outcome,

government to outcome and rebel to outcome pairs were then broken down by continent.

Airpower was separately paired with each of the three other binary variables that

corresponded with a winning outcome and then expressed as a percentage of the total number of

civil wars where mercenaries were present. A value greater than the average total win percentage

for the use of mercenaries indicates a positive relationship between the use of mercenary

operated aircraft and an increase in the probability of victory for the forces employing them. The

opposite result indicates a negative relationship between the use of mercenary operated airpower

and winning wars.

Quantifying Mercenary's Presence


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Latin America and the Middle East each had a single conflict where mercenaries were

present. In 1954, the CIA actively funded and supplied 300 Honduran mercenaries that

precipitated a military overthrow of Guatemala's left leaning government under Guzman

Arbenz.xxxi The CIA and the American military supplied the Honduran mercenaries with

approximately 6 Thunderbolt P-47s, 3 P-51 Fighter bombers, both of which had never been seen

in Latin American air forces, a Cessna 180, PBY-5 and a P-38 fighter.xxxii Nicaragua's civil war

(1982-1990) was also rumored to have mercenary involvement by the UK Guardian newspaper,

which claimed that the British PMF Keenie Meenie Services (KMS) was providing the Contras

with training.xxxiii However these allegations were never confirmed by another reputable source.

The civil war in the Arab Republic of Yemen (1962-1969) was party to a small number

of independent European mercenaries. European powers aided the Royalist government military

against the breakaway Marxist North Yemen Republic and its Egyptian allies through covert

support for 6 British, 10 French and 3 Belgians mercenaries.xxxiv The British mercenaries helped

the Royalist forces procure aircraft but did not operate or service them.xxxv

Three instances of mercenary involvement occurred in Asian civil wars, all of which

were actively funded by the United States in support of their allies. The CIA hired approximately

17,000 Thai soldiers to aid the Laotian government against Communist Pathet Lao guerillas in

the Laotian civil war (1960-1973).xxxvi In addition, the CIA hired 300 mercenary pilots to fly 24

twin-engine transports, another 24 dozen short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) aircraft, and 30

helicopters for its covertly owned company Air America.xxxvii Vietnam (1960- 1975) was a

virtually identical situation, but on a much larger scale. The US government hired 60,000

Korean, Filipino and Thai mercenaries to fight with US and South Vietnamese troops against the

Communist North Vietnamese government. xxxviii During Indonesia's civil war (1956-1960), the


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CIA hired 3 Taiwanese, 2 Filipino, and 22 Polish mercenary pilots to respectively operate 2 C-45

transport planes, 4 B-26 attack aircraft, and 2 P-51 Mustangs.xxxix

The vast majority of mercenary activity in the latter half of the twentieth century occurred

in Africa. The civil war in Liberia (1989-1990) was party to approximately 33 European and 180

private military contractors that fought with Charles Taylor's rebel group against the government

of Samuel Doe.xl Similarly, Angolan UNITA and FNLA rebels employed approximately 150

British and American mercenaries in their unsuccessful civil war (1975-1991) against the

Marxist MPLA government.xli An even small number of mercenaries were employed during the

Ugandan civil war, (1980-1988) where the government hired five Defense Systems Ltd.

employees to fly and arm the Ugandan Army's two Bell Augusta helicopter gun ships.xlii

Nigeria's first civil war (1967-1970) between the federal government and the secessionist

state of Biafra occurred on a much larger scale and involved significantly larger mercenary

forces. Approximately 283 French mercenaries fought with the Biafrans, under the control of

legendary mercenary commander Robert Falques.xliii Both the Federal government and Biafra

utilized the services of mercenary pilots. The Nigerian government employed an undocumented

number of Egyptian, Czech, British, Australian and East German pilots.xliv Nigeria's air force

consisting of 32 aircraft primarily from the Eastern block and 8 Australian helicopters provides

for a rough estimate of approximately 35 mercenary pilots.xlv Approximately three Swedes, a

West German, and a Pole flew bombing missions for Biafra.xlvi

Zaire, currently called the Democratic Republic of Congo, witnessed the widespread use

of mercenaries in both of its civil wars. The Katanga secession (1960-1964) had an average of

roughly 400 European mercenaries within Katanga's rebel ranks.xlvii This group included a

contingent of 63 mercenaries under Mike Hoare's command that were notorious for committing


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atrocities.xlviii Rhodesian mercenary pilots provided airpower to Katangan forces and were

rumored to have been responsible for the UN Secretary General's crash landing in Northern

Rhodesia.xlix In the subsequent Simba Revolt (1964), approximately 1,500 African mercenaries

fought with government forces.

The sheer magnitude of mercenary forces in Chad, Mozambique and Rhodesia

(Zimbabwe) far exceeded that of other African conflicts. During Chad's civil war (1980-1988)

Libya actively sponsored about 3,000 mercenaries, 800 of whom were imported Lebanese

militiamen, with the remainder from Malawi and surrounding African countries.l Chad's

government hired 1,750 mercenaries from Zaire.li In addition to these forces approximately 20

European mercenaries were known to be deployed with Chad's army.lii As previously discussed,

the 6,000 soldiers comprising the RENAMO rebel group's forces in Mozambique were virtually

all mercenaries paid by Rhodesian and later South African.liii The agriculture company Lonrhos,

hired Defense Systems Ltd. mercenaries to protect their landholdings in Mozambique; however

they were not explicitly pro-government and therefore not classified as government

mercenaries.liv

The withering white minority Rhodesian government was the single greatest employer of

European mercenaries in any civil war throughout the world in the second half of the twentieth

century. Estimates ranged from 6,000 to 1,000 foreign European mercenaries, although several

newspaper and intelligence reports indicate a likely figure of around 1,500.lv The Rhodesian air

force already had trained pilots and advanced aircraft, thereby eliminating the need for

mercenary pilots.

Descriptive statistics Mercenary-War Outcome Pairs

Numerical Total Percentage

Gov./Rebel-Mercenary Wins

6/14 42.85%


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Mercenaries Used by Gov. 8/14 57.14%

Gov.- Mercenary Wins 4/8 50.00%

Mercenaries Used by Rebels

8/14 57.14%

Rebel-Mercenary Wins 2/8 25.00%

Gov. and Rebels Both Employ Mercenaries, Gov Wins

2/2 *This accounts for the additional civil war in the gov. and rebel figures.

100.00%

Gov/Rebel-Mercenary Airpower Wins

3/6 50%

Gov.- Mercenary Airpower Wins

2/3 66.6%

Rebel.- Mercenary Airpower Wins

1/3 33.3%

The results of this study prove the opposite of the paper's original hypothesis; there is a

negative relationship between a force's use of mercenaries and victory in civil war. Please

reference Appendix A and B for the full datasets. Rebels and governments each employed

mercenaries in 7 conflicts. In the two civil wars where both the government and rebels utilized

mercenaries, the government won in both cases. Government and rebel forces which employed

mercenaries won 42.85% of the civil wars. The performance of governments was significantly

better than rebel groups. Governments that utilized mercenaries effectively defeated insurgencies

in 50% of the civil wars versus a 25% success rate amongst rebel groups. The negative

relationship is therefore significantly stronger for rebels than governments.

There appears to be a neutral relationship between the use of mercenary operated

airpower and winning civil wars. Half of the six civil wars that used mercenary piloted aircraft

resulted in a loss for the side employing mercenaries. However the overall success rate would be

below 50% if the Biafran loss was included in the total rather than simply as a win for the

Nigerian federal government. Governments faired better than rebels winning 66% of their civil

wars compared with a 33% success rate amongst rebels.

Geographic Distribution of Civil Wars Party to Mercenaries


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Area Total Percentage Success Rates

Civil Wars Where Mercenaries Were Present

14/57 civil wars 24.5% Total: 6/14

Africa

9/14 64.28% Total: 5/9, Gov: 4/9, Rebels 1/9

Asia 3/14 21.42% Total: 0/3, Gov: 0/2, Rebels 0/1

Latin America 1/14 7.14% Total: 1/1, Rebels: 1/1

Middle East

1/14 7.14% Total: 0/1 Gov: 0/1

The geographic distribution of civil wars wherein there was mercenary involvement

indicates a disproportionate usage of mercenary forces in Africa. Furthermore, mercenary allied

forces were significantly more successful in Africa than in other regions of the world, winning

55.5% of the conflicts they engaged in. Asian and Middle Eastern militaries that hired

mercenaries lost in every civil war covered by this paper. Rebels in Latin America performed

better, winning the only major civil war in the region that was party to mercenaries.

Conclusions and Explanations of Observed Relationships

There are several potential explanations for the observed negative relationship. States that

have a well developed national identity and steady revenue sources are likely to militarily prevail

over rebel groups. Conversely, governments who lack national cohesion and well funded

militaries are already predisposed to lose. Hiring mercenaries may therefore be a measure of last

resort that is used in an attempt to stave off an inevitable military defeat. The high number of

government loses may therefore reflect the weakness of the states that hired the mercenaries,

rather than the mercenaries overall contribution to the conflict. For example, the white minority

Rhodesian government was barely clinging to power in the face of determined attacks by the

black majority backed ZANU rebels, when it decided to start recruiting European and American

mercenaries.lvi


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Similarly, poorly organized and funded rebel groups often turn to mercenaries as a means

through which to offset their natural weakness vis-a-vis the state military. Mercenaries may have

still been highly effective force multipliers, but inadequate to turn the tide of civil wars, 75% of

which rebels have lost. Secessionist rebel groups in Zaire and Nigeria were extremely weak, both

numerically and qualitatively in comparison with the national militaries they fought. These rebel

groups brought in mercenaries in the hope that they could augment their forces to a degree that

would prove sufficient for victory.

Governments and rebel groups which achieved victory appear to have used mercenaries

to complement preexisting forces rather than as a means of filling a gap in the military's fighting

ability. In Zaire, Nigeria, and Uganda, the government militaries were already superior to their

rebel counterparts. It is possible that mercenaries provided intelligence and airpower capabilities

that gave these governments the marginal advantage that was necessary to prevail over their

weaker foes. However it is impossible to determine whether or not the marginal advantage the

mercenaries provided was critical to achieving a favorable outcome, without creating a

counterfactual history.

External intervention appears to partially explain the prevailing negative relationship.

Every recorded instance wherein a government or rebel group relied on mercenaries supplied by

a foreign power resulted in subsequent defeat. American hired mercenaries that supported allied

rebels and governments in Asia failed repeatedly. Similarly, European and Rhodesian allied

mercenary groups failed to turn the tide in African civil wars they fought in. Guatemala is the

lone exception to the otherwise largely consistent evidence for intervention as an explanatory

variable.

Suggestions for Future Mercenary Research


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Although this paper fills a gap in the current research on the relationship between

mercenaries and the outcomes of civil wars, there are still significant questions that have yet to

be answered. The negative relationship between the use of mercenaries and victory in war is

weak. More data points are necessary to establish a stronger correlation. Civil wars that have

occurred since 1990, notably Sierra Leone, Angola, the DRC, and Columbia are likely to

drastically change the razor thin margin of failure that militaries using mercenaries have

historically held. Therefore, future studies ought to utilize the figures we have provided here and

add civil wars that have occurred in the past twenty years to establish the whether the prevailing

negative relationship is maintained.

A case study has not yet been undertaken that seeks to identify the qualitative differences

between mercenary forces in the twentieth century. The inclusion of airpower in this paper offers

researchers a starting point; however there are significant differences in the force multiplying

abilities of mercenaries that have yet to be addressed. A comprehensive case study of every

conflict where mercenaries were present is virtually impossible. However, there ought to be a

compilation of mercenary specific case studies that provide a basis for comparison. For example,

what capabilities (intelligence, artillery, heavy lift etc.) did mercenaries utilize in each conflict

that proved to be the decisive factor in victory? The quantitative accounting of mercenaries in

this paper provides scholars with the necessary data to establish additional relationships between

mercenaries and qualitative capabilities.

The relative performance of PMFs and independent mercenary groups warrant further

study. Singer's work provides a categorical distinction, but it does not give a sufficient basis for

measuring the relative performance of the largely ad hoc mercenary groups of the 1960's,

typified by The Terrible Ones, and modern PMF's. PMF's are better organized and funded than


19

their past counterparts, but they are also under greater scrutiny. A comparative regional case

study on Africa, where the majority of both mercenary and PMF activity has taken place would

help clarify what if any advantages PMFs have over their traditional counterparts.

Similarly, an industry wide analysis of PMF activity in the past twenty years has yet to be

undertaken. There are presumably significant differences in the operational effectiveness, human

rights record and incidences of illicit behavior in PMFs. Establishing a historical track record of

the industries main players would help provide policy makers with a better understanding of how

to effectively provide oversight. Furthermore, it would help governments to avoid contracting

with firms that are known to actively violate human rights or engage in illegal activity.


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End Notes

i P.W. Singer, “Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International Security.” International Security 26 (2001/2002): 186 - 220 ii T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, “Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcomes of Civil Wars.” Political Research Quarterly 52 (June 1999): 239 - 268 iii iv Matthew Trundle, Greek Mercenaries from the Late Archaic Period to Alexander ( New York: Routledge, 2004) 2

v Trundle, 21-24

vi Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Publishers, 2004)

vii viii ix x Guy Arnold, Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World, (London: MacMillan Press, 1999) 2 xi xii Elke Krahmann, "Private Firms and the New Security Governance," Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 38, no. 1 (March 2002):15 xiii Robert Bunker, "Fourth Epoch War," Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 78, no. 9 (September 1994): 20

xiv xv See David Shearer, "Outsourcing War", Foreign Policy, No. 112, (Fall 1998): 68-81 Herbert, M. Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability: The Case of Executive Outcomes", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, (1998): 307-331 David Shearer, 1998. "Private Armies and Military Intervention", Adelphi Paper No.316, (New York: Oxford University Press)

xvi See Khareen Pech, "Executive Outcomes - A Corporate Conquest", in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), (1999): 81-110.


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xvii Robert Mandel, Armies Without States: The Privatization of Security (Boulder, Colorado: Rienner Publishers , 2002)

xviii Sean Cleary "Angola - A Case Study of Private Military Involvement", in Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (eds.), (1999): 141-174;

xix Peter Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of The Privatized Military Industry (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003)

xx Robert Mandel, Armies Without States: The Privatization of Security (Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002) 127

xxi Robert Young Pelton. Licensed to Kill: Hired Guns in the War on Terror, (Crown Publishers, New York, 2006)

xxii Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999)

xxiii Christopher Kinsey, Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military Companies, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 112.

xxiv Kinsey, 131.

xxv Abdel Fatau Musah and J. 'Kayode Fayemi, Mercenaries: an African security dilemma, ( London, Pluto Press, 2000)

xxvi Timothy Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldier, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company, 1999)

xxvii Abdel-Fatau Musah et al (eds.), Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma, (London: Pluto Press, 2000)

xxviii T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett, 256 xxix Alex Vines, RENAMO: Terrorism in Mozambique (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991) 19 xxx "Moroccans open corridor to desert outpost, beat back Polisario Fronters," Christian Science Monitor, 5 September 1980. xxxi Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982) 111 xxxii Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, 114


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xxxiii "Iran-Contra Arms Scandal; British Contra Supply Role Probed," Facts on File World News Digest, 20 March 1987. xxxiv Jones, 194 xxxv Ibid. xxxvi House of Representatives, "Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 1991," Federation of American Scientists, 17 October 1990. Available from: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1990_cr/h901017-ia1.htm xxxvii William M. Leary, "CIA Air Operations in Laos, 1955-1974" Central Intelligence Agency, Available from: https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/winter99-00/art7.html xxxviii Robert M. Blackburn, Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags," (London: MfCarland and Company, 1994) 143 xxxix Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, Feet to the Fire, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1999): 61-71 xl Dr. Gary K. Busch, Interview Via Email, Washington DC, 10 April 2007 xli Vines, 35 xlii "Britons' role in Uganda war" New York Times, 19 February 1986. xliii Arnold, 19 xliv Arnold, 18 xlv Michael R. Stafford, "Quick Kill in Slow Motion: The Nigerian Civil War," 1 April, 1984, Available from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/SMR.htm xlvi Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries, (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987) 120 xlvii Arnold, 1-6 xlviii Mike Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989) 3 xlix Mockler, 51 l "Libya Recruits Druze Militiamen," New York Times, 22 September 1987. li "Chadian Government Intensifies Drive Against Rebels in North" Washington Post, 13 July 1983


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lii "Government Recruits White Mercenaries," The Associated Press, 17 July 1983. liii Vines, 19 liv Vines, 51 lv Wilfred Burchett, The Whores of War, (London: Cox and Wyman Ltd., 1977) 139

do mercenaries win wars

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