ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES

Vol. 68, No. 2, November,pp. 79—94, 1996ARTICLE NO 0091

Do People Prefer to Pass Along Good or Bad News? Valence andRelevance of News as Predictors of Transmission Propensity

CHIP HEATH

Universityof Chicago

Anecdotal evidenceseemsto indicate that exagger-atedly had newsmay propagate in the marketplace ofideas.Three studiesinvestigatewhether peoplepreferto passalong piecesof badnewsor goodnewsthat areequatedfor “surprisingness.” People typically preferto passalong central rather than extremeinformation(i.e., newsthat is lesssurprising rather than more sur-prising). However, when confronted with extreme in-formation, the results support apreferencefor congru-ence,that is, people prefer to passalong newsthat iscongruent with the emotional valence of the domainin question. This means that in emotionally negativedomains, contrary to some theoretical predictions,people are willing to passalong bad newseven whenit is exaggeratedly bad. At the same time, however,people transmit exaggeratedly goodnewsin emotion.ally positive domains. The general discussion indi-cateshow theseresults may inform research on wordof mouth for consumer products and social relationsin organizations. © 1996Academic Press,Inc.

50,000 children are abductedby strangerseachyear. Sen. PaulSimon cited this figure in Congressin 1983, andit was widelyusedfor years.But a 1988JusticeDepartmentstudyfoundfewerthan 5,000 strangerabductionsthat year.

Newsweek,July 25, 1994

Homelessadvocateshaveestimated2 million to 3 million peoplehavebeenhomelessat sometime duringthepreviousyear.In March 1990 the CensusBureau sent 15,000censustakersout onenight to countthehomeless.They found230,000.

Crossen,1994

Thispaperwould nothavebeenpossiblewithout theactivecollabo-ration of DavidFarnumin thedesignandadministrationof Studies1 and2, andof Diane Westerfieldon thedesignandadministrationof Study3. I thankparticipantsin workshopsat the University ofChicagoand the WhartonSchoolfor commentson earlier drafts. Ialso thankJohn Skowronskiand an anonymousreviewerfor veryhelpful comments.I gratefully acknowledgeresearchsupport fromthe University of Chicago,GraduateSchool of Business.Addresscorrespondenceandreprint requeststo ChipHeath,GraduateSchoolof Business,University of Chicago,1101 East58th St., Chicago,IL60637-1511.

“Parentstoday spend40 percentless time with their childrenthandid parentsin 1965.” [These numbers]quickly becamecon-ventional wisdom, cited by officials in the Bush and Clintonadministrations.They were picked up more than 50 times inarticlesandopinionpieces. . . Theywereembracedin congres-sionalhearings, think-tank reportsand books about the plightofAmerica’schildren. . . Theonly problemis that thenumberswere wrong. There is no compelling evidencethat kids todayreceive less attentionfrom their parentsthankids did in 1965.

U.S. News& World Report,July 1, 1996

In the night betweenthe 11th and 12th October 1737 therehappeneda furioushurricaneat the mouthof theGanges.Therewas atthe sametime a violent earthquake,which threwdown a greatmanyhousesalongthe riverside. . . . It is com-putedthat 20,000ships,barks,sloops,boats,canoes,etc.havebeencastaway . . . 300,000soulsare saidto have perished!

Oldham’sCatalogueof Indian Earthquakes,1883,cited in Discover,September1994

On thebasisof the accountabove,the 1737Calcuttaearthquakeis consideredthe third mostdeadlyquakein history.However,it probablyshouldn’tbe,accordingto Roger Bilham, a seismologistat the University ofColorado,becauseit probablyneverhappened.“If therewasaquakein Calcuttathatyear,Bilham says,it wasat most a tremor” (Discover, September1994). Ac-cordingto Bilham, the earthquakeis describedonly byFrench and British newspapersin stories that aredated months after the ostensibleoccurrence.Thefirsthandaccountsthat couldbe located,for example,the records of the East India Company, describeastorm on that night, one of the violent cyclonesthatplaguethe Bay of Bengal,but nota quake.“Accordingto thesereports,Bilham says,it was the hurricane-forcewindsandfloodwaterproducedby the stormthatcastawayshipsandwashedawaybuildings—anddis-patchednot 300,000butsome3,000unfortunatesouls”(p. 13). The figure of 300,000deathsis particularlyimplausiblebecausethe entirepopulationof Calcuttawascertainlylessthanthat number—aslow as20,000by onecontemporaryaccount.

In an attempt at self-absolution,the media fre-quently debunks implausible facts and figures likethosein the epigraphs(manyof which wereoriginallycommunicatedby the media). Examples like these

0749-5978/96$18.00Copyright© 1996 by AcademicPress,Inc.

All rights of reproductionin any formreserved.

79

80 CHIP HEATH

seemto indicatethat badnewsoften spreadsfuriously,evenwhenit is so exaggeratedthat it leadspeopletohold an overlypessimisticview of the world.

It is easyto picturewhy crusadersagainstchild ab-duction or homelessnessmight passalong extremeordistortedfigures.However,thereseemto befew strate-gic incentives for British and French newspaperstopassalongdistortednewsaboutaCalcuttaearthquakethat neverwas. Is the tendencyto passalongexagger-atedfactsanddescriptionssimply explainedby crusad-ers’ desireto exhort andpersuadeor is it sharedbydisinterestedobserversaswell?

From a theoreticalperspective,theseexamplesareparticularly striking becausethey seemto violate awell-documentedtendencyfor people to prefer to be-lieve that the world hasgood things in store for them(Taylor & Brown, 1988). Researchon “positive illu-sions”documentsthat individualstendto overestimatetheir control or masteryover their environmentandpredictoverly optimistic outcomesfor their future. Forexample,people think that they will be more likelythanthe averagepersonto earnagoodsalaryandhaveagifted child (Weinstein,1980)and lesslikely to expe-rience marital problems or suffer a serious disease(Perloff& Fetzer,1986).Fromthis viewpoint, it is sur-prisingthat the newsin the epigraphsis soexaggerat-edly bad.In passingsuchnewsalong,peopleseemwill-ing to believesurprisingly negativethings about thesocialandnaturalenvironment:thathomelessnessandchild abductionsare rampantandthat naturaldisas-ters randomlykill notjust thousands,buthundredsofthousands.

This paperexploresthis apparentpreferencefor badnews. The experimentsin this paperoffer at least twoadvantagesin this effort. First, in the naturalenviron-ment it is typically difficult to measurethe extremityof a given piece of news. In hindsight, andwith thebenefitof aproperstudy, we might concludethat theclaim that “50,000 childrenareabductedby strangerseachyear” is too extreme.However, eventhough thefigure is surprising,it maybewithin the realmof plau-sibility for mostpeople.While peoplemaypassalongextremeinformation if theythink it is true, will theypass along extremeinformation that is recognizablyextreme?By allowing usto createstimuli, the currentstudiesallow usto manipulateextremity precisely.

Second,the experimentsallow us to ensure thatextremenewsis difficult to believe. In natural envi-ronments,extremepiecesof news are less likely tobe true. However,someof the examplesin the intro-duction partially uncouplethe relationshipbetweenextremity andbelievability becausethe sourceof thenewsis highly credible(e.g., a Senatoror a newspa-

per).1Whenpeoplereceivenewsfrom a highly credi-ble source,they may believe the news evenwhen itis extreme. In the current experiments,I want tounderstandwhetherpeoplewill passalongextremelygood or bad newsdespitethefact that such extremenews is less likely to be accurate.Thus, I preservetheextremityofthe extremeinformation by ensuringthatthe sourceof theinformationis notunduly credi-ble. In the studiesbelow, peoplereceivetheir goodandbadnewsfromacquaintancesin casualconversa-tion.

Finally, the natural environment does not oftenallow “bad news”to competewith “goodnews” that isequallybelievable.In the epigraphs,perhapsbadnewspropogatedbecausethenaturalenvironmentforcedex-aggeratedlybad news to be more available or salientthan good news. Does the environmentsimply thrustbad news upon people, or do peoplereally prefer toconsumeandtransmitbadnews?In the last two stud-ies in this paper,awithin-subjectsdesign allows ustoexaminewhat happenswhenbadnewscompeteswithequally plausiblegood news.

To summarize, the design of the current studiesallowsusto investigateindividual preferencesforpass-ing alongpiecesof good or badnewsthat areequallyextremeand equally likely to be untrue. Understand-ing individual preferencesabout good and bad newsmay help us think about what kinds of informationmight propagatein socialinteractions.The Discussionsectionreturnsto this issueby consideringsomesocialsituationsthat might be illuminatedby understandingpeople’spreferencesfor goodor badnews,for example,the contentof word of mouth for consumerproductsand the content of gossip in organizations.If peoplepreferto passalong certainkinds of exaggeratednews,thennaturalsocialinteractionmay disseminateinfor-mation in a way that might lead to distortions likethosedocumentedin the epigraphs.

THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS: EXTREMITY ANDVALENCE OF NEWS

In the studiesbelow,peoplereceivevariouspiecesofnewsfrom an acquaintancein casualconversationandthen indicate whether they would be likely to passalong the news“as true” in afuture conversation.Thedependentvariable thus collapsesacrossat leasttwodifferent processes.First, an individual must be per-suadedby the newsandbelieve it to be true. Second,he or shemust be willing to passit along to anotherperson.

11 know that thesesourcesmaynot appearhighly credibleto anacademicaudience,but academicsare anunduly cynical lot.

PREFERENCEFOR GOOD OR BAD NEWS 81

Each of these processesraisesmany interestingquestions.Forexample,it would be interestingto askwhat kinds of newspeoplechoseto consumeindepen-dentoftheir likelihood ofbelieving it or oftransmittingit to others.Peoplemayenjoygossipor storiesof alienabductionsevenif they do not believe them or passthem along.2In this paper,I focuson transmissionin-tentions. Becausea piece of news must overcomeanumberof hurdlesbeforeit is transmittedastrue, thecurrentstudiesprovide a reasonablystringenttest ofwhat kinds of news might survive the transmissionprocess,andthustheybetterindicatehow theinforma-tion in social interactionmight becomedistorted.

It is helpful to distinguishtwo dimensionsof news:(1) the valenceof thenews,whetherthe newsis “good”or “bad”; and (2) the extremityof the news, how goodor badthenewsis. Forboth dimensions,it is possibletogeneratetwo plausible(but opposite)hypothesesaboutthe kind of information peoplewill transmitin socialsituations.

First, considerthe extremity of news.The first plau-sible hypothesis,the centrality hypothesis,posits thatpeoplewill transmitmoderateinformation overmoreextremeinformation (the top graphin Fig. 1). Thereare at least two reasonsfor this. First, transmittersare less likely to believe extremeinformation. SocialJudgmentTheory argues that people’sattitudesarecharacterizedby a latitude of acceptancethat containstheir most preferredposition and the rangeof otheropinionsthat they find acceptable(Sherif& Hovland,1961; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 363—382).Extremenewsmayfall outsidetransmitters’latitude of accep-tance.Thus, transmittersmay be lesslikely to believeextreme information and to pass it along as true.Transmittersmaybe especiallysensitiveto the truth-fulnessof informationbecauseof their responsibilitiesto their conversationpartners.Conversationalnormsrequirepeopleto make truthful contributions(Grice,1975).Second,transmittersmay passalongcentralin-formation becausethey areconcernedaboutwhat re-ceiversthink ofthem.Evenif extremeinformationfallswithin their latitude of acceptance,if transmittersbe-lieve that otherswill think the information is too ex-treme,they may not transmit it becausethey want toavoid losing credibility (Tetlock, Skitka, & Boettger,1989).

Although there are strong reasonsto believe thecentralityhypothesis,therearealsoreasonsto believe

2Alsoby askingpeoplewhethertheywouldpassalongtheinforma-

tion as true, I avoid documentingsituationswherepeopletell talltalesor tell storieswith a wink anda nudge.Thesesituationsarealsointeresting,especiallyif listenersdonot alwayscatchthewinksand sometimesbelievethat thetall talesare true.

Hypothesesaboutextremity

Thecentrality hypothesis

Badnews Goodnews

Theextremityhypothesis

Badnews Goodnews

Hypothesesaboutvalence

Preferencefor good news

Badnews Goodnews

Preferencefor hadnews

Badnews Goodnews

FIG. 1. Hypothesesaboutextremity andvalence.

that the oppositemight be true. Theextremityhypoth-esis positsthat peoplewill transmitmoreextremein-formation over more moderateinformation (the sec-ond graphin Fig. 1). This patternwould result if peo-ple value “surprisingness” or think that others do.Although extreme information is less likely to fallwithin a latitude of acceptance,whenit doessopeoplemay passit along becauseit is more interesting orinformative than other information. For example, inthe domain of person perception, Skowronski andCarlston(1989)havearguedthat peoplefind extremebehaviorsto be morediagnosticwhentheyarejudgingboth morality andability. In the domainof news, se-nior journaliststeachyoungjournalists that it is notnewswhen“dog bitesman,”but it is newswhen“manbitesdog.”Peoplespendmoretime attendingto novelor extreme stimuli (McArthur & Ginzberg, 1981;Fiske, 1980) and work harder to explain them (Hil-

82 CHIP HEATH

ton & Slugoski, 1986). Peoplemayalso be dispropor-tionately likely to passalong extremenews becausethey may assumethat moderateinformation is al-ready widely shared.Griceannorms of conversationencouragepeople to passalong only the quantity ofinformation that is necessaryandthusto avoidpass-ing along redundantinformation (Grice, 1975).

There are also two oppositehypothesesabout thevalenceof information: that peoplewill preferto passalong good newsor that they will preferto passalongbad news (again seeFig. 1). (Here I considersimplehypothesesaboutmaineffects.Laterin thepaperI willdevelopamore complexhypothesis.)

In orderto achieveapuretestof theeffect ofvalenceof news,it is importantto equategoodandbadnewsonbelievability.Forexample,badnewsmaybeinherentlymore plausible than good news when discussingthenumberof childrenwho areabductedeachyear.FiskeandTaylor(1991)notethat since“mostpeopleareopti-mists, negativestimuli are relatively unexpectedandthus salient” (p. 249). The currentpaperattemptstoavoid this kind of problem by using an experimentalprocedureto developgood andbad news figures thatareequally unexpected.The hypothesesbelow, there-fore, considerwhether peoplewill prefer to transmitgood or badnewsholding believability constant.

The first hypothesispositsthat peoplewill transmitgoodnewsmorereadilythanbadnews.Consistentwiththe work on positive illusions cited above (Taylor &Brown, 1988),this hypothesisassumesthat peoplepre-fer to that peoplewill prefer to believe and transmitfacts that paint the world in a positive light andthatmake them feel betterand moreoptimistic about theworld. For example,peoplelike to believethe world iscontrollable(Langer, 1975)andjust (Lerner,1970). Ifpeoplepreferto believethat goodthingshappento goodpeopleandbadthingshappento badpeople, thenpeo-ple shouldtransmitbadnewsonly whenit is not rele-vant for themselves.

Peoplemayalsotransmitgood newsmorethan theytransmitbadnews,not becausetheyprefergood newsbut becausethey prefer to avoid badnews. Work byTesserandRosen(1976) on the“mum effect” indicatesthat peopleavoidpassingalongnewsthat might nega-tively affectthe self-conceptof thereceiver.Forexam-ple, studiesindicatedthat people avoidedtelling an-otherpersonthat he or sheperformedpoorly on atest.BecauseTesserand Rosen’s experimentsconcernednewsthatwashighly relevantto the self-conceptof thereceiver,it is difficult to extrapolatetheir findings tonewsthatis notself-conceptrelevant.3However,to the

3Thecurrentexperimentswill askundergraduateswhatkinds of

newstheywould passalongabout thecrime rate in their neighbor-

extentthat peoplewish to avoid being associatedwiththe negativefeelingsthat might accompanybadnews,they might passalong good news only. Folk wisdomindicatesthat it is often hazardousto be the bearerofbadnews.

The oppositehypothesisis alsopossible.Peoplemaytransmit bad news more readily than good news. Al-thoughthis hypothesisis not easily derivedfrom thepsychologicalliterature, it seemsto beimplicit in manydiscussionsof the popularmedia.As indicatedby theepigraphs, the anecdotal evidence of exaggerationtends to be in the direction of bad newsrather thangood news. More generally,people lament the largeportionof newscastsdevotedto murders,fires, andair-line crashes,but then they rationalizethe behaviorofthemediaby assumingthat “badnewssells.”Badnewsmight transmitmoreeffectivelybecauseit helpspeoplepreparefor the future betterthan good news. If it is“better to be safethan sorry,” then bad newsmay betransmitted—evenif it paints an overly negativepic-ture of the world—becauseit allows peopleto antici-pateandavoid an occasionalbadoutcome.

To summarize,we canimaginealternativehypothe-sesaboutbothvalenceandextremity of news.Becauseoppositehypothesescanbe constructed,the results oftheexperimentsbelowholdsomeinteresthowevertheyturn out. However, if we had to chooseamong thehypothesesat this point, the majority of theoreticalargumentsseemto predict that peoplewill transmitcentraloverextremeinformation and goodnews overbadnews.

STUDY 1

The study below examinespeople’s intentions totransmitgood newsandbadnewsin a domainof spe-cial relevance.The University of Chicago,like otheruniversitiesin largecities,is knownfor beingin a“badneighborhood,”andcrime is afrequenttopic of conver-sation among university residents. This study asksUniversity of Chicagoundergraduateswhether theywould passalong different kinds of news about mug-gingsin the university neighborhood(HydePark).

In developingthe materialsfor the study, I wantedto equategood andbad newsfor surprisingness.I didthis by asking a preliminary sample from the studypopulation to createconfidenceintervals for variousquantities(e.g., the numberof muggingsin HydeParkeachyear, the percentagethat involve ahandgun,the

hoodor theaveragestartingsalariesof graduatesfromthesruniver-sity. This information is self-relevantbut it doesnot directly affecttheself-conceptor self-esteemof the receiver(or sender).

PREFERENCE FOR GOOD OR BAD NEWS

number of on-campusstudentsmuggedper 100 off-campusstudents).Thisprocedurehasbeenwidelyusedin thedecisionmakingliteratureto solicitpeople’sesti-matesofnumericquantities(Lichtenstein,Fischhoff,&Phillips, 1981).

After collectingthe confidenceintervals,I variedex-tremity by choosingfiguresthat fell outsidethe confi-denceintervalsof a certainpercentageof the popula-tion. Thisprocedurewasusedto equatethe extremityof good newsandbadnews. For example,studentsatthe University of Chicagowould be pleasantly sur-prised to hear that only 15% of muggingsinvolve ahandgunand equallyunpleasantlysurprisedto hearthat45%of muggingsinvolve ahandgun.Thesefiguresfell outsidethe 80% confidenceintervalsof 50% of oursample.Figurescanalsobecreatedthat areevenmoreextreme.Peoplewould be very pleasantlysurprisedtohearthat only 2% of muggingsinvolve ahandgun,theywould bevery unpleasantlysurprisedto hearthat 90%of muggingsinvolve ahandgun.Thesefiguresfell out-side the80% confidenceintervalsof 90% of our sample.

Thus this procedureallowed me, in a domain thatis very relevantandimportant to my participants,toexaminewhether peoplepassedalong piecesof badnewsor good newsthat wereequallyplausible.

Method

This studysurveyed111 undergraduateswho livedin on-campusdormitoriesat theUniversity of Chicago.Participantswere contactedin their dorms and re-ceived one dollar for completing the questionnairewhich took approximately10 mm. The questionnairepresentedparticipants with information that wouldsurprisethemin eitherapositiveor negativedirectionand then askedthem how willing they would be totransmit that informationin a future conversation.

Materials

Developingitemsofgoodand bad news. To developthe questionnairefor this study, I usedthe responsesof a separateset of 52 participants,who completedaquestionnairethat askedeight questionsabout mug-gingscommitted in the areaaroundthe University ofChicago(HydePark).Participantsprovidedabestesti-mateandan80% confidenceinterval for eightdifferentquantities:thenumberof muggingseachyear,theper-centagethat involved a handgun,the percentagethatresulted in serious injury, the average amount ofmoneythatwasstolen,thenumberthatinvolvedmalesversusfemales,the numberthat on-campusstudentsversusoff-campus,the number that membersof theUniversity of Chicago community versus non-mem-bers, and the number that took place in Hyde Park

TABLE 1

Stimuli for Study 1

VariableV.

badMod.bad

Mod.good

V.good

Numberof muggingsAmount of moneystolen% Victims injured% Involving handgunRatio Lincoln Park/HydeParkRatio on-campus/off-campusRatio female/maleRatio U of C/non-Uof C

1100$100

6590

5100300200

200$50

37452070

15070

100$10

6156025

10039

10$1

12

2003

4010

versusLincoln Park (a yuppie areaon the northernside of the city). Instructionsfor this taskare printedbelow:

Thefollowing questionsconcernmuggingscommittedwithin theHydeParkarea.In thefar left column give your bestestimateof the following values. We realize that someof your estimateswill be more uncertainthan others. Therefore,we would likeyou to provide a low and a high boundto betterdescribeyourestimate. Give a low bound for eachvalue so that you thinkthereis only a 10% chancethat the realvalue might bebelowthe low bound you give. Then, give a high boundfor eachvaluesothat you think thereis only a 10%chancethat therealvaluemight be abovethe high boundyou give.

Study 1 questionnaire. Basedon responsesto thepreliminary questionnaire,I createdpieces of newsthat variedin their valenceandextremityby selectingfiguresthat would violateacertainproportionof parti-cipants’ 80% confidenceintervals on the low or highside. To surprise participantswith either extremelygood or badnews,I selectedavaluethat violated90%of the confidenceintervalson the low or high side.Forexample,on the questionabout the numberof mug-gings in Hyde Park eachyear, the good news valuewas 10 andthe badnewsvaluewas 1100. To presentparticipantswith moderatelygood or bad news, I se-lectedavaluethatviolated50% of the confidenceinter-vals on the low or high side.The moderategoodnewsvaluefor the questionaboutnumberof muggingswas100 andthe moderatebadnewsvaluewas 200. Table1 contains the completeset of values usedfor eachtopic.

Using the four valuesderivedfrom the preliminaryquestionnaire,I rewordedeach of the eight originalquestionsasfour differentstatements.Forthequestionon the numberof muggings,the four statementswerecreatedby taking the statement,“There were_______

muggingsin Hyde Park last year,” and replacingtheblank with eachof the four figures derivedfrom theoriginal questionnaires(10, 100, 200, 1100). Eachof

83

84 CHIP HEATH

TABLE 2

Study 1: Mean Propensity to Transmit and Linear and Quadratic Scales

V. bad Mod. bad Mod, good V. good

Plannedcontrasts

Linear Quadratic

Numberof muggingsAmount of moneystolen% Victims injured% Involving handgunRatio Lincoln Park/HydeParkRatio off-campus/on-campusRatio female/maleRatio non-U of C/U of C

4.793.684.824.253.794.866.005.14

5.684.504.434.714.395.044.395.21

5.614.143.255.433.464.004.894.43

4.392.863.613.142.043.613.113.07

.46—1.27~~2.39***

.39~~2.6S***~2.29***~2.39***~2.86***

2.11***2.11**

•752.75***2.04**•5777

1.435*5

p < .05.55

p K .01.~ < .001.

the four statementswasrandomlyassignedto one offour different questionnaires.Instructionsreadas fol-lows:

Imagine that you aretalking to an acquaintanceand that thesubjectof muggingscomesup. As you look ateachof thefollow-ing statements,assumethat youheardthestatementofferedastrueby anotheracquaintancein a conversationacoupleofweeksago. Indicate on the scaleafter eachstatementhow likely youwould be to passalong this statement(as true) in thecurrentconversation.

Participantsrespondedon a 7-point scaleanchoredat “Unlikely to passthis along”and“Likely to passthisalong.”

Results

Responseson eachtopic weresubjectedto aone-wayanalysisof variancewith four levelscorrespondingtothe four levels of valence:very bad,moderatelybad,moderatelygood, andvery good news. To analyzethetwo hypotheses,I report the results of contrastsde-signedto detectwhethertherewasa linearandaqua-dratic trend in responsesacrossthe four levels. Thelinearcontrastwas —1, —1, + 1, + 1. Thequadraticcon-trastwas—1, + 1, + 1, —1. Thequadraticcontrastwouldbe positive if peoplepreferred to pass along centralratherthanextremenews.Becausethesetwo contrastsare orthogonal,the testsof the linear and quadraticcomponentswereindependent.

Table2 reportsthe meansfor eachcategoryandthevalueandsignificanceof the quadraticand linear con-trasts.Theresultssupportedthecentralityhypothesis,that peopleweremorelikely to transmitcentralratherthan extremenews. Five of the eight quadraticcon-trastsweresignificantly positive,andthe averagequa-draticcontrastwaspositive (M = 1.38, t(7) = —3.45, P

< .05). The resultsalso supportedthe hypothesisthatpeopleweremorelikely to transmitbadnewsthangoodnews; five of the eight linear contrastswerenegative(at less thanP < .001). Acrossthe eightproblems,theaveragelinear contrastwas significantly negative(M— 1.62, t(7) = —3.37, P < .05).

Discussion

The results of the study support the centralityhy-pothesis,that peoplepreferto passalong lesssurpris-ing ratherthan moresurprising information.As indi-catedin the theorysection,this resultprobablyoccursbecausepeopleregardthe more extremeinformationaslessbelievable.

This study also supportsa preferencefor badnewsover good news. This preferencefor bad news occursdespite the fact that both good and bad news wereequally extremeand thus equally (un)believable.Ingeneral,whendiscussingnegativedomainslike mug-gings,peoplemaytransmitbadnewsbecausethe nega-tive topic makesit easierto believeagivenpieceofbadnewsthanagivenpieceof goodnews.Thedesignofthisstudyeliminatesany asymmetryin the believability ofgood andbadnews.

Thepreferencefor badnewsis particularly interest-ing becauseit seemsto contradictresultsin socialpsy-chologythat indicatethatpeoplelike to believethat theworld is good (Taylor & Brown, 1988)and controllable(Langer,1975).In this study,peopleseemquitewillingto passalonginformation thatpaintstheworld asbadanduncontrollable.Participantsaremuch morelikelyto passalongthe bad newsthat “65% of muggingvic-tims areseriouslyinjured” than the equallysurprisinggood newsthat only “1% of muggingvictims are seri-ouslyinjured.”

PREFERENCEFOR GOOD OR BAD NEWS 85

The preferencefor transmittingbadnewsoccursde-spite the fact that participantsaredealing with a do-main that is quite importantand relevant.I initiallychosethe subjectof muggingsbecauseit wasafrequentsubject of conversationamongHyde Park residents,andthusappearedto behighly relevantfor our partici-pants.However, participantsmake it evenmorerele-vant for themselvesby the bad news they choosetotransmit. Participantsare quite likely to passalonginformation that paintsa negativepictureof the mug-ging propensityof peoplelike themselves(i.e., univer-sity studentswho live on campus).For example,theyaremore likely to passalong thebadnews that mug-gings are “twice as likely” for University of Chicagopeopleversusnon-universitypeoplethan the equallysurprisinggood newsthat “muggingsareone-tenthaslikely.”

In many situations,by passingalongnegativeinfor-mation,peoplemaylearnsomethingthat allows themto increasetheir control (e.g.,by being morecareful toavoid high crime areas).However, this doesnot com-pletely explain the patternof results in the currentstudy.The questionsthat show thelargesteffectscon-cerncharacteristicsthat arestableanduncontrollableat leastin the short run—participantscannoteasilychangetheir housing(on versusoff-campus),neighbor-hood (HydePark versusLincoln Park), or communitymembership(Universityof Chicagoversusnon-Univer-sity), much less their sex. Researchershave arguedthat stable,uncontrollableattributions for negativeevents are more likely to hopelessnessor anxiety(Weiner, 1986). The news people prefer to transmitwould seemto exacerbatethis reaction.

STUDY 2

Study 1 demonstratedthat participantspreferredtopassalongbadnewsovergoodnewsandalsopreferredmoderateoverextremenews. However, Study l’s fig-uresfor “moderatelygood news”and “moderatelybadnews~~were themselvesfairly extremesince they felloutside50% of participants’80% confidenceintervals.Study2 testshow participantsrespondto truly moder-atenews by assessinghow likely they are to transmita figure that falls in the middle of the distribution ofbestguesses.

Study2 also attemptsto replicatethe first studyus-ing a within-subjectsdesign. In Study 1, peopleonlyconsideredonepieceof newson a particular topic. Al-though this is probably the way that peoplereceiveinformation in real-world contexts,Study 2 exploresthe strengthof the preferencefor bad newsby high-lighting the comparisonbetweengood andbad news.

TABLE 3

Stimuli for Study 2

Bad Mod. Good

Numberof muggingsAmount of moneystolen% Victims injured% Involving handgunRatio Lincoln Park/HydeParkRatio on-campus/off-campusRatio female/maleRatio U of C/non-U of C

500$100

50651085

200120

150$2020254550

12553

45$5

55

90106020

The within-subjectsdesign provideseachparticipantwith bothbadand good news.Thus it providesa morestringent formatfor testingthe relativepreferenceforbadnews.

Methodand Materials

Participantswere32 undergraduatesat the Univer-sity of Chicagowho werecontactedin their dorms,andpaid$2 for their participation.Participantsrespondedto threeversionsof the questionsusedin Study 1. Thefirst pageofthe surveycontainedmoderatevalues(de-rived by taking the medianof thebestguessresponseson thepre-survey).The other two pagescontainedval-ues that violated 75% of the confidenceintervals oneitherthe good sideor the badside.Thesepageswerecounterbalanced.Table 3 reportsthe stimuli usedinthis study. Participants respondedusing the samescaleas in Study 1 (“Likely to passthis along” to “Un-likely passthis along”).

Analysis

To analyzethe two hypotheses,I computea scalethat indicateswhether therewasa linear and a qua-dratic trendin participant’swillingness to passalongnews in the threecategories:bad,moderate,andgood.Thelinearscalewascomputedby multiplying apartici-pant’s responsesin the threecategoriesby the values—1, 0, +1, andthen summing.The quadraticscalewascomputedby multiplying responsesby the values —1,+2, —1, andthen summing.Thelinearscoreis positiveif peoplepreferredto passalong good news overbadnews,andthe quadraticscoreis positive if peoplepre-ferredto passalongcentralratherthanextremenews.

Table4 reportsthe averagetransmissionpropensityalong with the linear and quadraticscalescores.Foreachquestion,pairedt testscomparedthe linear andquadraticscaleaveragesto zero.For thelinear scales,five of the eight scaleswere individually significantin the predicted direction, onewas significant in the

CHIP HEATH

TABLE 4

Study 2: Mean Propensity to Transmit andLinear and Quadratic Scales

Bad Mod. Good

Scales

Linear Quadratic

Number of muggingsAmount of moneystolen% Victims injured% Involving handgunRatio Lincoln Park/HydeParkRatio off-campus/on-campusRatio female/maleRatio non-U of C/U of C

4.883.254.313.813.384.945.695.00

5.443.504.065.003.314.065.195.37

4.943.003.444.562.373.814.382.88

.06—.25—.88’ *

.75—1.00~~~1.13***~.~1.31***~~2.12***

1.06.75.38

1.63*.88

—.63.31

2.88***

p <.05.‘~p <.01.

p<.001

.

oppositedirection, and two were nonsignificant.Forthe quadraticscales,threeof the eightscalesweresig-nificant in the predicteddirection.

To provide an overall test, we can analyze thesescalesfor eachparticipantacrossproblems.Averagingacrossthe 9 problemsfor eachparticipant, 20/32parti-cipantsshowedstrictly positivelinear scalesin thema-jority of the problems(meanpercentageof consistentscores= .576, t(31) = 2.69, P < .02, for apairedt testrelativeto .50).

The results for the quadratic contrast showed aweakerpreferencefor central over extremeinforma-tion. Participants’scoreson the quadraticscalesweremore likely to be positive (meanpercentage= .493)thannegative(meanpercentage= .403;t(31) = —2.10,P < .05), however,peopledid not show positivequa-draticscalesin themajorityof problems.On anindivid-ual participant level, 12/32 participantshad strictlypositive quadraticscalesin the majority of the prob-lems, and 24/32 had eitherpositive or zero scalesinthe majority of the problems.

Discussion

Comparedwith thefirst study,Study2 doesnotshowasextremeapreferencefor centraloverextremeinfor-mation. The two studiesdiffered on the extremity ofthe good and badnewsitems aswell as the format ofthe within-subjectsdesign, so it is impossibleto sayexactly what accountsfor the weakerresults on cen-trality. Study 3 allows anotheropportunityto exploreboth preferencesin the within-subjectsparadigm.

However, becauseit is a within-subjects design,Study2 providesevenstrongerevidencethan Study 1that people prefer to transmit bad news about mug-gings. The within-subjectsdesign allowed good news

to competedirectly with equally surprisingbadnews.Participants consistentlyopted to transmit the badnews, andthe preferencefor badnewswas sometimesquitepronounced.Forexample,studentswereaslikelyto passalongthebadnewsthat halfof muggingvictimsareseriouslyinjured (afact that violated amajority ofthe population’s 80% confidenceintervalson the badnews side) than the nonextremenews that 1 in 5 isinjured (themedianof the population’sbestguesses).

STUDY 3

Studies1 and2 indicatethat peoplein at leastsomeconditionspreferto transmitextremenegativeoverex-tremepositive information.However,the topic of mug-gingsdiffers in at leasttwo importantwaysfrom otherpotential topicsof conversation.First, the topic is ex-tremely relevant and self-involving. Becausecrime isafrequenttopicof conversationamongHydeParkresi-dents,when our participantsimagine a conversationon the topic of muggings,they are high-involvementparticipantsandcanimaginetalking with otherhigh-involvementparticipants.Would peopleshowasimilarpatternif aconversationinvolved a topic that waslessself-relevant?

Second,the topic of “muggings” is emotionallynega-tive. Althoughthe evidencethusfar indicatesthat peo-ple prefer to passalong bad news, it is possiblethatthis is trueonly becausetheconversationaldomainwehaveexaminedis onewherebadnewsis pertinentandexpected. If people pass along information thatmatchesthe emotionaltoneor contentof conversation,then the patternwe observedin Studies1 and2 mightbe reversedif the topic waspositive. Whendiscussingtopics,like mugging,that areemotionallynegativepeo-

86

PREFERENCEFOR GOOD OR BAD NEWS 87

The congruenechypothesis

Bad newsdomain

Bad news

ple may preferto passalong badnews, but when dis-cussing topics, like successfulorgan transplants orgraduateschoolacceptances,that areemotionallyposi-tive and centeraroundgood news, they mayprefertopassalonggoodnews.Thishypothesis,thecongruencehypothesis,is depictedin Fig. 2.

Study 3 will expandthe results of Studies 1 and 2by manipulatingthe emotionalcontentof topics(posi-tive or negative)and the relevance(relevantor non-self-relevant).It also expandsthe first two studiesbydevelopingthe stimuli individually for eachpartici-pant. Although Studies1 and2 equatethe extremityof goodandbadnewson average,anyparticular partic-ipant mayhavebeliefson a particulartopic that differfrom the participantswe usedto norm the stimuli. Tomakecomparisonsmoreprecise,this studyusedatwo-stagemethodology—first,participantsgaveindividualconfidenceintervals,thenafewweekslater,theyindi-catedhow likely they were to passalong valuesthatwere basedon their own initial confidenceintervals.Thus,theprocedurein this studyallowedusto beveryprecisein equatingthe believability of good and badnews.

Method

Participantswere25 undergraduatesat the Univer-sity of Chicagowho wererecruitedin their dorm andpaid for their participation. The studyhadtwo parts.

In the first survey,participantsgavetheir bestguess,a 50%confidenceinterval, anda90% confidenceintervalfor 20 numericalquantities.After they completedthistask,participantsratedtherelevanceandthevalenceofeach topic. Relevanceratings were taken on 7-pointscalesanchoredat “self-relevant”and“not self-relevant.”Valenceratingswere takenon 7-point scalesanchoredat “good” and “bad.” There were two different valenceratings.The first askedparticipantsto ratethe valenceofthetopic: “Circle thenumberon thescalewhich shows

how ‘bad’ or ‘good’ you think the topic of the questionis.The secondaskedparticipantsto rate the valenceofthe

Goodnews expectedconversationalcontentthat the topic would gen-domain erate: “Circle anumberon thescalebeloweachquestion

to signify whetherconversationaboutthis topic is mostlikely to generategood news or bad news.” I usedthefirst valencerating to developstimuli. Later, I will usethe secondin a follow-up analysis.

Threeweekslater, participantsreceivedthe secondsurvey. The secondsurvey beganwith the samein-structionsusedin previousstudies:“Imagine that you

Goodnewsare talking to an acquaintanceand that the followingsubjectscomeup. As you look at eachof the followingstatements,assumeyou heard the statementofferedas true by anotheracquaintancein a conversationacouple of weeksago. Indicate on the scaleafter eachstatementhow likely you would be to passalong thisstatement(astrue) in the currentconversation.”Parti-cipantsthensaw84 statements(70 werebasedon theirown personalresponsesto the first surveyand14wereunrelateddistracters).For eachstatement,they useda 7-pointscaleto ratehow likely theywould be to passalongthis newsin the conversationdescribed(1 = un-likely to passthis along; 7 = likely to passthis along).

In order for the resultsto be meaningful, the confi-denceintervalsmust bestableover time. Therefore,4weeksafter the secondsurvey, 14 of the original parti-cipantswerecontactedagainandaskedto specifycon-fidenceintervalsfor 8 of the original 12 topics(to keepthe surveyunderonepage,I randomlyselectedtwo ofthe three topics from eachcell of the 2 x 2 design).Below, these results are analyzed to determinewhetherthe confidenceintervalsarestableover time.

Materials

Thegoalfor this studywasto determinewhethertherelevanceandvalenceof topicsaffectspeople’swilling-nessto passalongcertainpiecesof information. As aninitial attempt to ensuresufficient variation on thesedimensions,20 topicswere chosenfor the first surveythat were expectedto be high or low relevanceandeitherpositive or negative.For example,the “numberof playgroundsin Hyde Park” was expectedto be lessrelevantto the undergraduateparticipantsthan“num-berof U of C undergraduatesthat getfinancialaid eachyear,” andbothplaygroundsandfinancial aidwereex-pectedto generatemorepositivenewsthan “the num-ber of bungeejumping fatalities in the United Statesthis year”and“the lengthof the averagewait for atten-tion at the University Health clinic.”

Using the actual ratings of relevanceand valencethat participantsgaveon the first survey, I chosethefinal topics for the secondsurvey. The secondsurvey

FIGURE 2

CHIP HEATH

TABLE 5

Topics for Study 3

Valencemanipulation

Relevancemanipulation

Self-relevant Not self-relevant

Good Percentageof U of C undergradsacceptedinto graduateschooleachyear.

The averagestarting salaryfor a newlygraduatedU of C undergrad.

Accordingto the Deanof Students,theideal size for a CommonCorediscussionclass.

Numberof whooping cranesalive today(therewere 15 left in 1941).

Numberof playgroundsin Hyde park.

Numberof successfulorgan transplantsperformedin theU.S. eachyear.

Bad The averagewait for attentionat theUniversity HealthServicewalk-in-clinic.

The numberof U of C undergradswhohavepersonalpropertystolen in agivenyear.

Accordingto the financial aid office, theexpectedtuition increasenextyear(in dollars).

The percentageof Native Americansthat dieddirectly or indirectly as a resultof theEuropean’scolonizationof the new world.

Numberof peoplekilled by serialkillers eachyear.

The numberof bungeejumping fatalities thisyear.

hada 2 x 2 design(Good/Bad,Self-relevant/Notself-relevant)with threeitemsin eachcell. Out of the 20numerical quantities on the first survey, I selectedthreeitemsfor eachcell basedon amediansplit of theoriginal ratingsof relevanceandvalenceof topic.Thus,a “good,not self-relevant”item had a scoreabovethemedianon goodnessanda scorebelowthe medianonself-relevance.Table5 containsthe 12 topicsandTable6 containsthe relevanceandvalenceratings for eachtopic.

In thefirst survey,participantsmadefive estimatesfor eachquantity: they gavetheir best guessand sethigh andlow boundsfor a 50% confidenceintervalanda 90% confidenceinterval. The secondsurvey turnedeachofthesefive estimatesinto astatement.Forexam-ple, on the questionon serialkillers, participantssawstatementsof the form” peopleare killed by se-rial killers eachyear.” Participantssawthis statementseventimes. Five of the seventimes, the blank wasreplacedby oneof the five estimatestheyhadgiveninthefirst survey;two times, theblankwasreplacedwithadistracterthat wasnot derivedfrom their values.Foreach of the sevenstatements,participants indicatedhow likely theywould beto passalong the statement.

Thus,the secondsurveyconsistedof 84 statements:12 topics x 7 numerical estimates(5 from the firstsurveyplus2 distracters).The84 itemswererandomlyarrangedon the survey,but the basictemplateof thesurveywasthesameacrossparticipants(e.g.,questionfive alwayscontainedaparticipant’sbestestimateforthe whoopingcranequestion).

Results

Stability ofconfidenceintervals. If confidenceinter-vals changeover timein any systematicway, thentheresultsof thetransmissionsurveywill behardto inter-pret. Forexample,for thetestof goodversusbadnews,it is important that changesnot be skewedsystemati-cally (e.g.,that over timebadnewsfiguresnot becomemoreor lessimplausiblethan good newsfigures).

To determinehow stable the confidence intervalswere,I examinedthe confidenceintervals reportedbythe subsamplewho gaveconfidenceintervals at timeoneandtime three.I usedpairedt teststo assessthedirection and magnitude of changesacrosstime foreachof the five estimatesprovidedfor eachtopic (e.g.,bestguess,mediumhigh bound,etc.). The results ofthis test showedno systematicchangesin the confi-denceintervals for any of the eight topics. Only 5 ofthe 40 testsweresignificant at P < .10 (a resultwellwithin the realmof chance),andtherewasno system-aticpatternto those5 results.Thus,thereseemsto beno problemwith interpretingthe generalanalysis.

Analysis ofpass-alongresponses. For each topic,the five piecesof newscanbearrayedfrom badto good:very bad,bad,moderate,good, and very good.Again,asin previousstudies,to analyzetheeffectsof valenceand relevance, I computed a scale that indicateswhether therewas a linear and a quadratic trend inresponsesacrossthe five categories.The linear scalewas computedby multiplying a participant’sresponsein the five categoriesby the values—1, —1, 0, ±1,+1,

88

89PREFERENCEFOR GOOD OR BAD NEWS

TABLE 6

Study 3: Valance and RelevanceRatings

Valence-topicValence-

expectedcontent Relevance

Good news

Self-relevantClasssize, commoncoreGradschooladmit rateStartingsalary

Not self-relevantPlaygroundsin HydeParkOrgantransplantsWhoopingcranes

3.322.763.60

3.923.284.16

2.252.132.54

3.673.583.62

1.701.832.29

5.835.545.04

Bad news

Self-relevantWait time at health centerPersonalproperty stolenTuitition increase

Not self-relevantBungeejump fatalitiesNative American fatalitiesSerialkiller victims

5.405.645.64

5.006.246.12

3.002.962.42

5.794.175.26

3.173.462.33

6.085.216.13

Note. All ratings taken on 7-point scale.For relevanceratings,1 = self-relevant,7 = not self-relevant.For valenceratings,1 = good, 7— bad. Wordingof questionfor Valence-Topicratings: “Circle thenumberon the scalewhich showshow ‘bad’ or ‘good’ you think thetopicof the questionis.” Wordingof questionfor Valence-ExpectedContentratings: “Circle a numberon thescalebeloweachquestionto signif~’whetherconversationaboutthis topic is mostlikely to generategood news or badnews.”

andthen summing.The quadraticscalewascomputedbymultiplying responsesby thevalues—1, —1, +4, —1,—1. Thus the linearscorewill be positiveif peoplepre-fer to passalong good news over bad news, and thequadraticscorewill bepositive if peoplepreferto passalong more central news rather than more extremenews.

Table 7 reportsmeanwillingnessto transmit infor-mationfor eachpieceof newsaswell asthe linearandquadraticscales.For the linear scales,recall that thecongruencehypothesispredictspositivemeansfor thegood items and negativemeans for the bad items.Pairedt testsindicate that 4 out of the 12 items areindividually significant in the predicteddirection andno item differs significantly from zero in the oppositedirection.Peoplearemorewilling to transmitcongru-ent than incongruentinformation,but the gapfor theextremefigures(very good—verybad)is approximatelythe sameas the gap for the more moderatefigures(good—bad).Thus, contraststhat weight the extremeor the moderatefigures more than the other do notproducea systematicallybetter fit.

For the quadraticscales,pairedt testsindicatethat7 out of the 12 figuresareindividually significant at P< .05. The results for the quadraticscaleare driven

by the differencebetweenthe middle point andall theothers.The good and badvalue are typically not sig-nificantly higher thanthe very goodandvery badval-ues(i.e., the contrast—1, -i-i, 0, -i-i, —1 is not signifi-cant).

This generalpatternaboveis alsofound within eachparticipant.Averagingacrossthe 12 problemsfor eachparticipant,16/25participantshadlinear scalescoresthat were consistentwith the congruencehypothesisin the majority of the problems(meanpercentageofconsistentscores= .593,t(24) = 2.72,P < .02),and21/25 hadquadraticscoresthat wereconsistentwith thecentralityhypothesisin the majority of the problems(meanpercentageof positivescores= .678,t(24) = 4.85,P < .001).

Table 7 indicatesthat thereis somepatternto thelinear and quadratic scale scoresacross categories.However, it aggregatesdataacrossparticipantswith-out controlling for individual opinions aboutthe rele-vanceandvalenceof thetopics.To systematicallyinte-gratethis information, I computedthe regressionsinTable 8. This table containstwo sets of regressions.Eachsetcontainsthreeregressionsthat predictdiffer-entaspectsof thetransmissionfunction:elevation(i.e.,howlikely peopleareto talk aboutthetopic ingeneral),

90 CHIP HEATH

TABLE 7

Study 3: Mean Propensity to Transmit and Linear and Quadratic Scales

Scales

V. bad Bad Mod. Good V. good Linear Quadratic

Good news

Self-relevantClasssize, commoncore 3.76 4.76 5.76 4.12 3.80 —.60 573**Gradschooladmit rate 3.68 4.16 5.04 5.92 4.84 2.96** 1.79*Starting salary 3.56 4.12 4.72 4.64 4.04 1.00 2.52*

Not self-relevantPlaygroundsin HydePark 2.72 3.36 4.24 3.76 3.74 1.48* 3.04*Organtransplants 3.36 3.36 3.40 3.40 3.44 .12 .04Woopingcranes 3.40 4.36 5.38 4.72 3.92 .88 5.29*

Badnews

Self-relevantWait time at healthcenter 3.72 5.36 4.92 3.84 2.96 ~2.46** 4.12**Personalprooperty stolen 3.76 3.52 4.08 3.92 3.88 .52 1.24Tuition increase 4.36 4.84 4.72 5.08 3.96 —.08 .17

Not self-relevantBungeejump fatalities 3.72 3.88 4.28 3.80 3.12 —.68 2.60*Native Americanfatalities 4.36 4.84 4.36 4.20 3.28 ~1.72* .76Serialkiller victims 3.56 3.52 4.08 3.72 4.04 .58 1.50A

Ap < .10.<.05.

~ < .01.

linear shape(i.e., whether peopleare more likely to the topic of the questionis.” The secondaskedpeoplepassalonggood or badnews),andquadraticshape(i.e., to evaluatethe valenceofthe expectedcontentof acon-whether peopleare more likely to passalong central versationaboutthe topic: Indicate“whether conversaor extremenews). tion about this topic is most likely to generategood

In the table, the two setsof regressionscorrespond newsor badnews.”Thevalenceof the topic affectstheto the two differentmeasuresof valenceusedin Study shapeof transmissionfunctions(seeregressionson left3. The first measureaskedpeopleto evaluatethe va- side of Table 8), but the valenceof expectedcontentlenceofthe topic: Indicate“how ‘bad’ or ‘good’ youthink doesnot (seeregressionson right).

TABLE 8

Regressionsof Elevation (sum), Linear Scale,and Quadratic Scaleon Valence and RelevanceRatings

Valenceof topic Valenceof expectedcontent

Elevation Linear Quad. Elevation Linear Quad.

Relevance(7 very relevant) .223** — .029 .039 .231** — .000 .056(—3.70) (.50) (—.64) (—3.17) (.102) (—.76)

Valence(7 = bad) —.001 ~.212*** ~.126* .011 —.002 .009(—.02) (—3.51) (—2.06) (.16) (.030) (.12)

AdjustedR2

.04 .03 .01 .04 .00 .00F statistic 6.91*** 6.16** 2.49 6.98*** .00 .36

Note. Tablereportsthe standardizedregressioncoefficient for simultaneousregressions(t statisticsin parentheses).* ~ < 0.05.

**P < .01.***P < .001.

PREFERENCEFOR GOOD OR BAD NEWS 91

Considerthe regressionson the left of Table 8. Thefirst regressionindicatesthat theelevationof thefunc-tion is affected by relevancebut not valence.Peoplearemorelikely to discusstopicsthat areself-relevant.However, valencedoesn’tmatter: Overall, people areequallywilling to talk abouttopicsthatareemotionallypositiveor emotionallynegative.

The secondandthird regressionsshowthat the lin-ear and quadratic shapesof the function are not af-fectedby relevance,but they are affectedby valence.Considerthe quadraticregressionin the third column.The negativecoefficienton valence(standardized/3 =

— .126, P < .05) indicatesthat the quadraticscalebe-comesless positive (i.e., that peopleshow less prefer-encefor passingalong the mostcentralvalue) as thevalenceof the topic becomesmoreemotionallybad.

Now considerthe linear regressionwhich allows usto testthe congruencehypothesis.The negativecoeffi-cient on valence(standardized~3= — .212, P < .001)indicatesthat the linear scalebecomesmorenegativeas the valenceof the topic becomesmore emotionally“bad.” This supportsthe congruencehypothesisthatpeoplepreferto passalongbadnewsfor badnewstop-ics and good news for good news topics. To providea more direct illustration of the information in thisregression,I sortedthelinearscalesbasedon their signandthevalenceof the topic. (I omittedscalesthat werezero andtopicsthat participantsratedasemotionallyneutral, i.e., a 4 on the 7-point scale.)When partici-pantsratedadomainasemotionallypositive (N = 83),theyweremorelikely to showpositivelinearscales(51/83 = .61) andwhentheyratedadomainasemotionallynegative(N = 130),theyweremorelikely to shownega-tive linear scales(77/130 = .59).

Note, however, that the three regressionson theright sideof Table8 do notshowanyeffectsforvalence.This indicatesthat of the two ways of measuringva-lence,valenceof topic (the regressionson the left) ismore effective than valenceof expectedcontent (theregressionson the right).

Discussion

This studyprovidescompellingevidencethat peopleare not simply optimists or pessimists.Instead,theypassalonginformation that is congruentwith the va-lenceof thetopic. In emotionallypositivedomainspeo-ple passalong good newsand in emotionallynegativedomainstheypassalong badnews.

The different results for the two valencemeasuresindicate that peoplepassedalongnews that matchednot the expectedthe contentof the conversation,butthe topic.To understandthis point, look at Table6 andconsiderthe two differentvalenceratingsfor the topic,

“wait time at health center.” Participantsrated thetopic asemotionallynegative(5.40),but they expecteda conversationabout this topic to generatereasonablygood news (3.00). It is easyto understandwhy waittime is an emotionallynegativetopic. Studentslegiti-mately find it aversiveto imagine themselvessittingin a waiting room, surroundedby others who arespreadinggermsthat aremoreviolent thanthosethatcausedtheircurrentillness.However,despitethepain-ful or distressingnatureof the topic, studentsdo notthink that the wait timeis actually all that bad, thusthey expectthat the contentof a conversationwouldcenteraroundshorterwait times. In this situation, ifpeoplestrategicallymatchedthe valenceof expectedconversationalcontent, they would pass along newsabout5- or 10-mm waits.Instead,peopleseemto matchtheir conversationalcontributionsto thevalenceof thetopic, and they passalong horror stories about waitsof 45 mm or an hour-and-a-half.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Thesestudiesdocumenta tendency to pass alongcentral over extremenews. However, when extremenewsarises,not all kinds of extremityare equally fa-vored. In Studies1 and 2 peoplewere morewilling topassalongbadnewsthanequallybelievablegoodnews.This inclination is particularly striking becauseit con-tradictsgeneraltendenciesto want to seethe world asa stable,controllableplace,wheregoodthingshappento good people(Taylor & Brown, 1988; Langer,1975;Lerner, 1970). Peoplepassedalong bad news despitethe factthat it washighly relevantanddespitethe factthat much of the badnews relatedto factsthat wererelatively uncontrollable(e.g., participantscould notchangetheirhousing,neighborhood,orstudentstatus).

However, Study 3 showsthat peopledo not displaya simple preferencefor badnews. Instead,they passalong informationthat matchesthe emotionalvalenceof the conversationtopic. This leads people to passalong exaggeratedlybadnewswhenthe topic is emo-tionally negative,but to passalongexaggeratedlygoodnewswhenthe topic is emotionallypositive.

Limitations ofthe Current Studies

Researchon persuasionand attitude changeindi-catesthat therearea variety of situationalvariablesthat may influencewhat kinds of information peoplebelieveandpassalongin different situations(Eagly &Chaiken, 1993).For example,people’swillingness topassalong informationwill probablyvary with the au-dience(closefriendsversuscasualacquaintances),thecredibility of the source(sciencereporteror gossipcol-

92 CHIP HEATH

umnist), and the goal of the interaction(to entertainor to inform). Thus,when interpretingtheseresultsitis importantto rememberthescenariodescribedin thecurrent studies.Peoplereceivedinformation from anacquaintanceandwereaskedwhethertheywould passit along“astrue” to anotheracquaintancein adifferentconversation.I chosethis scenariobecauseI wantedtounderstandwhat kinds of distortions in news mightarise in normal social interaction. Thus it was im-portant that people have the goal of passingalongtruthful newsandthat theynot receivethe newsfroma sourcethat wassohighly credible that evenextremenews would be believable.However, the preferencesdocumentedheremay be limited to situationssimilarto the onesdescribedin the scenario.

Althoughthecurrentstudiesdocumentarobustpref-erencefor certainkinds of news, they arealsolimitedbecausethey do not indicatewhy peopledemonstratethe preferencesthey do. The current studiesanswerquestionsat one level but they raisequestionsat an-other. In general,the questionsof this paper canbeaddressedat threedifferent levels. (1) What kinds ofinformation are availablein social systems?(2) Whatpreferencesdo peopleshow in the kind of newstheytransmit?(3) Why do peopledemonstratethe prefer-encestheydo?Thecurrentstudiesfocuson the secondlevel (what preferencespeople show), and this mayallow usto makepredictionsaboutphenomenaat thefirst level; for example,we cannow predict that socialinteractionis likely to supportthe propagationof cen-tral newsandcongruentnews.However, thereis moretobelearnedaboutthethird levelofindividualpsychol-ogy. In explainingwhyindividuals mightprefercentralnews,the theorysectionarguedthat peoplewould passalongcentralinformationforpersonalreasons(becausethey themselveswould find it morebelievable)andforsocial reasons(becausethey would be less concernedabout losing social credibility when they passeditalong). However, the literature did not anticipatethecongruencehypothesis,particularly the aspectof con-gruencythatleadspeopleto transmitbadnewsin emo-tionally bad domains.Thus, it is worth further studyto understandwhy peopledemonstratethis preference.Forexample,why arepeoplemorelikely to passalongnewsthat supportsthe emotionaltone of a conversa-tion ratherthan the expectedconversationalcontent?Are peoplesearchingfor rational reasonsto supporttheir emotionalreactionsin domainsthatproducehopeor fear?

Finally, thecurrentexperimentaldesignsarelimitedbecausetheymeasureonlyintentionsto transmitinfor-mation and not actual transmission. Future workmight attemptto examinethe congruencehypothesis

in a situationwhere people actually talk with othersandchoosewhetherto passalongaparticular pieceofinformation. Such studiesmust satisfy a numberofconstraints.Theymustintroduceapieceofinformationinto the lab environment in a way that does notheightenaparticipant’ssuspicionaboutthe purposeofthe experimentbut also doesnotprejudicethe partici-pant to think that the figure should be given moreweight thanit should(e.g.,if peoplearegiventheinfor-mationin printedform, this might conveyunduecredi-bility and decreasethe extremity of the information).The currentprocedurewaschosenbecauseit seemedto provideareasonablyeffectivetrade-offbetweenvol-umeof information andexternalvalidity. However,tointerpret the results, we must assumethat actualtransmissionis relatedmonotonically to transmissionintentions.Future resultscould eliminate theneedforthis assumptionby examining actualtransmission.

PotentialApplicationsof the Current Results

Theresultsof thesestudiesprovide interestingtoolsfor speculatingaboutthe marketplaceof ideas.In gen-eral, the evidencein favor of the centralityhypothesisindicatesthat truth may win out in many situations.In thesestudies,peopleoften passedalong the leastsurprising,mostbelievableinformationthat wasavail-able. However, to the extent that truth doesnot winout,errorsin differentdirectionsarenotequallylikely.Basedon the congruencehypothesis,for positivetopics,theenvironmentwill supportfactsthat are inappropri-ately Pollyanna-ish.For negativetopics, the environ-mentwill supportfactsthat are overly bleak.

Thepreferencefor congruentinformationmayclarifywhat kindsof information maybe availablein varioussocialinteractions.Forexample,in areviewof theliter-ature on consumersatisfaction,Yi (1990) remarkedthattheempiricalevidenceonconsumerwordof mouthhas been “mixed” (p. 109). She cites three differentstudies,one which found that satisfiedcustomerstalkmorethandissatisfiedcustomers,onewhich founddis-satisfiedcustomerstalk more, anda third which foundno difference. The congruencehypothesispoints outthat consumersmay transmit different kinds of newsdependingon the emotionaltoneoftheir conversations.Thispreferencefor congruencemayevenleadconsum-ers to show schizophrenicreactions toward a singleproduct.If mostproductscontainamixture of goodandbadfeatures,then dependingon the emotionaltoneofthe interaction, in one conversationconsumersmaypassalonginformation that exaggeratesthe product’sbenefitsandin anotherthey may passalong informa-tion that exaggeratesits flaws.

In anotherdomain, considerthe content of gossip

PREFERENCEFOR GOOD OR BAD NEWS 93

in organizations.Burt and Knez (1995) havea veryinterestingpaperin which theyexaminealargeorgani-zation to understandhow socialnetworksaffect trust.They find that when a particular dyad trusts eachother, theextentof their trust increaseswith the num-ber of third party ties that link them together.Thisresultin andofitself is not surprising;thethird partiesprovide asocial audiencefor the dyadthat may causeboth membersof the dyadto treateachotherwell be-causetheyknow thatothersarewatchingtheir interaG-tion. More interesting,then,is the fact that whenthemembersof a dyaddistrust eachother, the extentoftheir distrust is also magnifiedby the numberof thirdpartiesthat link themtogether.Thus, third partiesdonot simply provide a social audiencethat reinforcestrust; insteadthe third party ties amplify both trustandmistrust.

Burt andKnez(1995)explaintheir databy assumingthat whenthe third partiesinteractwith onememberof the dyad,they tend to strategicallyalter their reac-tions to the secondmemberbecausetheywant to rein-force their relationshipwith the first. (For example,supposeBob andJoedistrusteachother,but Carl hasgoodrelationshipswith both of them.WhenCarl talksto Bob, he might downplayhis positive regardfor Joebecausedoesn’twant Bob to questionhis loyalty.)

Thecongruencehypothesispredictsasimilarpatternof distortionsevenif peopledonotstrategicallymanagetheir interactionswith the membersof the dyads.Ac-cordingto thecongruencehypothesis,whenthe conver-sationrevolvesaroundJoe’sincompetence,peoplewillvie to tell the best story abouthow badly Joebotchedthis month’sreportor last month’ssalespresentation.Whenthe conversationrevolvesaroundJoe’sgeneros-ity, peoplewill vie to tell the best story about howwarmly Joedealtwith thejanitorial staff or astrangeron the street. Imagine, for example,that when themembersof thedyaddiscusseachotherwith third par-ties,their trustor mistrustof eachothersetstheinitialtoneof their conversations.In this situation, the con-gruence hypothesispredicts that third parties arelikely to passalongnewsthatreinforcesthedyadmem-ber’s initial feelings. As more third partiessurroundthe dyad,the membersof the dyadengagein a largernumber of conversationsabout each other, and theycollect a largersampleof informationthat is biasedbythe third parties’preferencefor passingalongcongru-ent news. Thus, whenthe dyadencountersa greaternumberof third partyconversationpartners,theyalsocollect moreinformationthat mayamplify their initialtrust or mistrust.

In a final example,we can use the preferenceforcongruencenewsto predictthe contentof social inter-

action in an evenbroadersocialsystem.During WorldWar II a patriotic applicationof social sciencewastodesign “rumor clinics” to documentandfight the ru-mors that inevitably ariseduring timesof turmoil. Aclassictaxonomy (Knapp, 1944) divided rumors intothreecategories.The first categorywaswedge-drivers,which wererumors that disparagedaparticular socialgroup. For example one rumor held that AmericanCatholicswere trying to avoid the draft, and a wholeclass of rumors claimed that various kinds of publicworkerswereusingtheir positionsto acquirepersonalsuppliesof rationedgoods.

The secondandthird typesof rumors were labeledbogies and pipe-dreams.Bogies were rumors aboutlooming threatsor traumaticevents,e.g.,“The entirePacificFleetwasdestroyedat PearlHarbor” (Rostow&Fine, 1976,p. 23). Pipedreamswererumorsaboutposi-tive events.During the liberation of Francein WWII,for example,consistentrumorsplacedtheAllied forcesin the “next town over.

This classificationof the distortions of wartime ru-mors bearsastriking resemblanceto the patternpre-dictedby thecongruencehypothesis.Whenconsideringthe contrastbetween“pipe dreams”and“bogies,”some-one might reasonablyattribute thesecontrastingdis-tortions to separatecrowdsof optimistsandpessimists,eachcrowdpassingalong information that matchesitspreferredpictureof the world. The resultson the con-gruencehypothesisindicate that thesetendencies—toward unwarrantedoptimism on the one hand andunwarrantedpessimismon theother—mightarisebe-causesingleindividuals preferto transmitinformationthat matchesthe emotionaltone of the topic.

REFERENCES

Adler, J. (1994,July 25). The numbersgame.Newsweek,56—58.

Burt, R., & Knez, M. (1995). Kinds of third party effects on trust.Rationality and Society,7(3), 255—292.

Clark, N. K., & Rutter, D. R. (1985). Social categorization,visualcues,and socialjudgments.EuropeanJournal of SocialPsychol-ogy, 15, 105—119.

Collins, R. L., Taylor, S. E.,Wood, J. V., & Thompson,S. C. (1988).Thevividnesseffect:Elusive or illusory? Journal of ExperimentalSocial Psychology,24, 1—18.

Crossen,C. (1994). Tainted truth: The manipulation of fact inAmerica. New York: Simon& Schuster.

Eagly,A. H., & Chaiken,5. (1993). Thepsychologyofattitudes.NewYork: HarcourtBraceJovanovich.

Fiske, S. T. (1980).Attention andweight in personperception:Theimpactof negativeand extremebehavior.Journal ofPersonalityand Social Psychology,38, 889—906.

Fiske,S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nded.). NewYork: Mc-Graw Hill.

Grice,H. P. (1975). Logic andconversation.In P. Cole (Ed.), Syntax

94 CHIP HEATH

and semantics:Vol 9: Pragmatics.(pp.225—242).New York: Aca-demic Press.

Hilton, D. J., & Slugoski,B. R. (1986).Knowledge-basedcausalattri-bution: The abnormalconditions focus model.PsychologicalRe-view, 93, 75—88.

Knapp, R. H. (1944). A psychologyof rumor. Public Opinion Quar-terly, 8, 22—37.

Langer,E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. JournalofPersonalityand Social Psychology,32, 311—328.

Lerner,M. J. (1970).The desirefor justiceandreactionsto victims.In J.Macaulay& L. Berkowitz(Eds.),Altruism andhelping behav-ior. (pp. 205—229).New York: AcademicPress.

Lichtenstein,S., Fischhoff, B., & Phillips, L. D. (1981). Calibrationof probabilities:Thestateof the art to 1980. In D. Kahneman,P.Slovic, & A. Tversky (Eds.),Judgmentunderuncertainty:Heuris-ticsandbiases.(pp.306—334).Cambridge:CambridgeUniv. Press.

McArthur, L. Z., & Ginzberg,E. (1981).Causalattributionto salientstimuli: An investigationof visual fixation mediators.Personalityand Social PsychologyBulletin, 7, 547—553.

Perloff, L. S., & Fetzer,B. A. (1986).Self-otherjudgementsandper-ceivedvulnerability to victimization. Journal of Personality andSocial Psychology,50, 502—510.

Rostow, R. L., & Fine, G. A. (1976). Rumorand gossip:The socialpsychologyofhearsay.New York: Elsevier.

Staff. (1994,September).A quakethat didn’t. Discover,12—13.

Sherif, M., & Hovland, C. I. (1961). Socialjudgment:Assimilationand contrast effectsin communicationand attitude change. NewHaven,CT: Yale Univ. Press.

Skowronski,J. J., & Carlston,D.E. (1989).Negativityandextremitybiasesin impressionformation: A reviewof theexplanations.Psy-chologicalBulletin, 105, 131—142.

Taylor, S. E.,& Brown,J. D. (1988). Illusion andwell-being:A socialpsychologicalperspectiveonmentalhealth.PsychologicalBulletin,103, 193—210.

Tesser,A., & Rosen,5. (1976).The reluctanceto transmitbadnews.In L. Berkowitz & E. Walster (Eds.),Advancesin experimentaland socialpsychology,9, 193—232.

Tetlock,P.E., Skitka, L., & Boettger,R. (1989). Socialandcognitivestrategiesfor copingwith accountability:Conformity, complexity,and bolstering.JournalofPersonalityand SocialPsychology,57,632—640.

Weiner,B. (1956).Anattributional theoryofmotivationand emotion.New York: Springer-Verlag.

Weinstein, N. D. (1980). Unrealistic optimism about future lifeevents.JournalofPersonalityandSocial Psychology,39,806—820.

Whitman,D. (1996,July 1). ThemythofAWOL parents.U.S.News&World Report,54—56.

Yi, Y. (1990). A critical review of consumersatisfaction.In V. A.Zeiphaml(Ed.), Reviewof marketing,4, 68—123.

Received:June2, 1995