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DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION

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Page 1: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION

Page 3: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

Recommendation

Page 4: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

RISK CHARACTERIZATION • In a narrow sense, risk characterization is an integral

component of risk assessment process and involves complex and value-related judgments [1].

• Based on hypothetical exposures considered, life-threatening damage could reach the possible or likely range if the worker is exposed to a very large gamma spike during a work shift, say owing to a hydrogen explosion.

The Fukushima Disaster• A radiological emergency situation currently exists at the

Fukushima Dai-ichi (No. 1) nuclear power station (NPS) in Japan as a result of the Mar 11, 2011, magnitude 9.0 earthquake, which triggered a massive tsunami that killed thousands of Japanese citizens

• If a person is exposed to a large gamma dose delivered to the entire body, cells in irradiated tissues can be destroyed in large numbers. This can lead to deterministic radiobiological effects

Page 5: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

Modeling Methods• The cumulative normalized dose is indicated

by , and for a given absorbed radiation dose differs for different deterministic effects.

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Risk managment

• Yamashita kept repeating that the radiation dose between 10 to 100 millisievert (mSv) was an “uncertain” level, whereas the dose over 100 mSv was associated with a dose dependent cancer risk throughout life.

• “Evacuation – Most people within 20 kilometers of the nuclear power plant were rapidly evacuated

• Moreover, in terms of iodine tablet intake for children, refer to the disaster manual and administer iodine syrup. Also, for individuals over age 40, administer stable iodine tablets only if they want to.” If radioactive particles exist, worry about rain

• . For the amount of radioactivity in Tokyo area, rain is important to wash out such kind of fallout in this area.

• Production of food was stopped, locally produced food was no longer distributed outside Fukushima or even from Ibaraki

• Distribution of food was indeed halted during the acute stage, but over time this protocol was relaxed, with rice grown in contaminated areas being sold to wholesalers or mixed in with uncontaminated rice for distribution to food industry, destined for hospital food and school lunches.

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ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF

OCEANIC OIL SPILLSomya SinglaHarsh AryaKshitij Mittal

Page 8: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

OIL SPILL: CAUSES

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RISK IDENTIFICATION• For spill, we need to estimate:– The duration of input– The rate of dispersion– The period of time over which the components will persist– The concentrations at which biological effects will and will not be observed

• For the fate of the material, consider its:– Environmental component (water, air, sediment)– Form in which it’ll be present– Concentrations

• Information to be collected:– Types of oils frequently stored in, or transported through, that area– Locations where oil is stored in large quantities and the mode of transportation

used to move the oil– Extreme weather conditions– The location of response equipment and personnel trained to use that

equipment and respond to the spill swifty

Page 10: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

• Vulnerability analysis information:– List of public safety officials in the community– List of facilities such as primary health centres, nursing homes and

hospitals– List of recreational areas, such as camping grounds– List of critical habitats that can be affected when a spill occurs– Identification of parts of the environment that are particularly

susceptible to oil or water pollution

• Direct impacts– Localized nutrient enrichment– Saprogenic effects– Temperature increase– Pollution from oils and chemicals

Oil: toxic initially, later emulsifiesDiving sea birds encounter floating oilEvaporation of lighter fuel oil fractions Near-shore oil spill more dangerous than offshore

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IMPACT OF OIL SPILL• Oil: contains hydrocarbons• Can affect air quality• Potential fire hazard• Effect on recreational areas,

harbors, industries, commercial fishing grounds and tourist attractions• Effect on marine life:– Cut-off of oxygen from atmosphere– Marine food chain affected– Aquatic flora & fauna killed & damaged

Risk assessment matrix for oil spill

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CONTINGENCY PLAN• First step towards effective oil spill response• Aspects: sources of spillage, prevailing risk with possible size, maximum

rate of oil discharge, likely reasons, types of oil handled, oil characteristics, spill movement data, trajectory, fate of the spilled oil through time, mechanical recovery plan, application of dispersants, sensitivity mapping and logistics• Response actions:– Notifying all private companies or government agencies– Getting trained personnel and equipment to the site quickly– Defining the size, position and content of the spill, direction and speed of

movement, likelihood of affecting sensitive habitat– Ensuring the safety of all response personnel and the public– Stopping the flow of oil and preventing ignition– Containing the spill to a limited area– Removing the oil– Disposal of oil once removed from the water or land

Page 13: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENTof

HEAVY METALSfrom

BHALASWA LANDFILL

Balsher Singh Sidhu (2009CE10292)Dikshant Sharma (2009CE10297)

Smit Gupta 2009CE(10344)Tushar Tuteja (2009CE10351)

Page 14: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

Introduction• Bhalaswa Landfill:– North Eastern part of Delhi– 21.06 acres– Unlined, so hazardous leachate situation– 2200 tonnes of waste per day

• Health Hazards:– Leachate contaminated groundwater, used for consumption

without proper treatment– Focus of this study: Heavy metals

• Methodology:– Reviewed research papers on landfills & heavy metals– Study by “Bhalaswa Lok Shakti Manch”; chose Zinc and Lead

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Hazard Identification:– Lead:• Affects children more than adults: reduced IQ, stunted

growth, impaired hearing, kidney damage, death.• Among adults: fertility problems, nerve disorders,

muscle pain, memory problems, nausea, diarrhoea, weight loss, gastrointestinal disorders.• Lack of studies to document its carcinogenic effects.

– Zinc:• Indirectly causes copper deficiency, leading to anaemic

symptoms, like fatigue and weakness.• Irritates the intestinal tract, causing nausea, vomiting,

diarrhoea, appetite loss, fever, loss of consciousness.

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Risk Characterization:Zones Radial Distance (in metres) Pb Maximum Concentration (mg/L)

Zone I 0-2520 m 0.053

Zone II 2520-3740 m 0.027

Zone III Beyond 3740 m ND

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Risk Management and Communication:Risk management Step Risk Communication Task

Initiation Stakeholder identification

Preliminary analysis Issue identification and familiarity

Risk EstimationInvolves Exposure Assessment

Communication of results with stakeholders

Risk EvaluationAssess stakeholders perception of risk

Create awareness programmes

Risk Control

Informing stakeholder of benefits, cost and new risk associated

Evaluate acceptance of control

Trade off possibility

MonitoringEnsure implementation of communication strategies

Regular monitoring of hazards

Page 20: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

RISK ASSESMENT ON MINAMATA DISEASE (JAPAN)

BY DEVENDER KUMAR AND GROUP MEMBERS.

Page 21: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

STEPS FOLLOWED DURING RISK ASSESMENT.

• CAUSE OF MINAMATA DISEASE WAS METHYL MERCURY POISIONING IN MINAMATA BAY IN JAPAN AND RESULTS IN MINAMATA DISEASE TO LACALITY PEOPLE.

• 1. - HAZARD IDENTIFICATION :- SINCE IT WAS OFFICIALLY DISCOVERED IN 1956 THAT DANGEREOUS MINAMATA DISEASE WAS CAUSED BY METHYL MERCURY POISIONING AND NEEDS A WAY TO COME OUT.

• SO THERE WAS NO ISSUE OF IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARD CAUSED BY METHYL MERCURY POISIONING.

• THERE WAS TOTAL OF APPROX. 2000 PATIENTS WERE IDENTIFIED AND LATOR ON THAT WAS CONTINUED BECAUSE OF UN AWARENESS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT.

• 2.EXPOSURE ASSESMENT:- ACCORDING TO AVAILABLE DATA AROUND 67% LOCALITY PEOPLE WAS INFECTED. SO ON AN AVERAGE 65% TIME IN A YEAR POPULATION WAS IN EXPOSURE OF METHYL MERCURY.

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DOSE RESPONSE ASSESSMENT

• The influence of age and sex on the threshold dose of mercury in Minamata disease was studied by dose-response analysis based on mercury concentrations in hair obtained mainly from adults living near the Agano River at the beginning of Niigata Minamata disease outbreak in 1965.

• The subjects were 174 male and 694 female inhabitants of polluted areas including 55 males and 66 females officially recognized as Minamata disease patients.

• Symptoms were ataxia, numbness in the hands and feet, general muscle weakness, narrowing of the field of vision and damage to hearing and speech. In extreme cases, insanity, paralysis, coma and death follow within weeks of the onset of symptoms. A congenital form of the disease can also affect foetuses in the womb.

• One-compartment model is widely used in the EPA for the following reasons:1 Methylmercury exposure via foods is continuous and relatively stable.2 Methylmercury is not unevenly distributed to a specific organ in the body. 3 Methylmercury is difficult to metabolize (into inorganic compounds) in the

body

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ONE COMPARTMENT MODEL

• Daily methylmercury intake d (μg/kg bw/day), which becomes C (the blood mercury level) (μg/L) in the steady state, is calculated using the following formula:

Maternal daily methylmercury intake: d (μg/kg bw/day) d =C × b × V/A × f × bw • In this b = elimination rate constant= 0.014 per day bw = body weight =60kg V = blood volume= 0.09×60liters A = fraction of the dose absorbed=0.95 f = the absorbed fraction distributed to the blood =0.05• 10 ppm was taken as the NOAEL and the RfD came out to be 2.0μg/kg

bw/week of Hg by using the following formula: RfD = NOAEL/VF1*VF2*…VFn where VF is the variance factor. • ONE COMPARTMENT MODEL IS FITTED TO ANALYSE IT.

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RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION

• In order to understand the level or magnitude of risk associated with the disease and to create a clear risk perception, it’s good to evaluate it using the following major dimensions:

1. Catastrophic potential- Besides the direct damage to nature and people’s bodies, the damage brought to Minamata by pollution is incalculable.

2. Familiarity- Minamata Disease was reported by the Chisso Corporation Hospital as a strange disease of unknown cause, and was officially discovered in May, 1956.

3. Voluntariness- Since the disease reaches a human body with unconscious ingestion of Methyl mercury poisoned media(food and water), the infection is involuntary

4. Origin- As it is indicated before, the disease is caused by human actions or failures

5. Effects on future generations- Minamata disease is not a hereditary disease. If proper care is in place its effect on future generation is rare.

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DIAGRAM SHOWING THE ENTRANCE OF MERCURY IN DAILY LIFE

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SREELAKSHMIBABU 2012CEV2267 (GROUP LEADER) KARISHMA BHATNAGAR 2012CEV2274 MEGHA KANOJE 2012CEV2283 SADAF NOORUDHEEN 2012CEV2279BIKRAM SINGH 2012CEV2285

VARIOUS CONTAMINANTS IN YAMUNA RIVER AND ITS RISK

ASSESSMENT

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INTRODUCTION• The main objective – compare concentrations of

metal contaminants present in the Yamuna water (Delhi) with the permissible limits & do risk assessment. • Area of study-Yamuna River between Wazirabad

barrage and Okhla barrage because drains between them contribute 80 % of total pollution load.• The steps done -Hazard identification, exposure

assessment, dose – response assessment, risk characterisation, risk management, risk communication

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1.HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

NAME OF THE METAL CONCENTRATION

Cadmium ND-0.20

Nickel 6.42-9.90

Copper 6.25-16.31

Lead ND-0.9

Cobalt 4.40-9.96

Chromium 18.08-34.15

Iron 42-68

Manganese 62.3-84.3

Zinc 156-168.2

The metal concentrations in the specific region of Yamuna were obtained.

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2. EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT• Possible exposure routes are: Ingestion:

finished drinking water, Accidental ingestion during recreational activities, Food pathway: consumption of fishes, vegetables grown on the banks, River bathing and washing.• Exposed Population- blood lead level when

exposed to Yamuna bank area -8 times that in rural area .

LOCATION River WaterAbstraction(MLD)

Abstraction Use

Wazirabad 1,100 Drinking water supply

Wazirabad to Okhla Stretch

5,000 Irrigation and others

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3. DOSE RESPONSE ASSESSMENT

METAL CDI

Reference Dose

(mg/kg/day)

HQ=CDI/RfD

Risk

Cadmium0.00085714

30.0005

1.71 Yes

Nickel0.04242857

10.02

2.12 Yes

Copper 0.0699 0.0272 2.57 Yes

Lead0.00385714

30.0004

9.64 Yes

Cobalt0.04268571

4ND

- -

Chromium0.14635714

3.003

48.8 Yes

Iron0.29142857

10.009

32.4 Yes

Manganese0.36128571

40.14

2.58 Yes

Zinc0.72085714

30.3

2.4 Yes

Chronic Daily Intake=(CW*IR*EF*ED)/(BW*AT); HQ>1 – risk present.

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4. RISK COMMUNICATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk Communication• Objective-Educating target audience, health

professionals, municipal Corporation, improving the quality of information in public domain on the issue.• Methods-putting some hoardings near polluted zones,

distributing pamphlets, brochure etc to people residing by the river.

Risk Management• Risk assessors -Analyse are in terms of cost

effectiveness.

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THANK YOU

Page 33: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

A REPORT ON

“RISK ASSESSMENT ON BOMBAY HIGH OIL SPILL”

Submitted by:-Manish Bhardwaj 2011AST3530Rahul Saini 2011AST3566Amrendra Kumar 2011AST3564Pawan Pal 2011AST3563Rajeev K Singh 2011AST3572 Karanjeet Singh 2011AST3578 

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INTRODUCTION

• Bombay high field discovered in 1974 and it is located in Arabian sea 160 km west of the Mumbai coast.

• The oil operations are run by Oil & Natural gas Corporation.

• The rupture in pipeline in Bombay high was on 17 may 1993 which results in spillage of crude oil.

• The exact amount of oil spill is not known, thus spilling roughly expected 3000-600 tonnes of oil into the sea.

• Oil continued to leak out of the pipeline at the rate of around three barrels per minute.

Page 35: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

Objectives :-

To identify immediate change if any in marine environmental quality of Murud in the event of pollution by petroleum hydrocarbon residue.

Water samples were collected at different depths for dissolved-dispersed petroleum hydrocarbon residues (DPH) using Niskin water samplers

All the water samples were analysed for their DPH by spectrofluorometry after preconcentration by hexane extraction.

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ResultThe sizes of oil patches were estimated to vary between 1x 0·5 m to 10 x 2m. Only onepatch of untreated oil (about 100 x 2 m) was observed

Aerial survey carried out on 25 May however showedseveral oil patches of varying sizes drifting towards thecoast of Murud-Zanzira, south of Bombay.

Variable Spill Area Normal Area Remarks

Floating Tar ball

(mg/m2)

0 - 95.82 0 - 6 Increased

DPH Concent.

(mg/l)

0.19 – 3.65 0.003 – 0.022 Increased

Table 1:: Comparison of data of floating tar ball and DPH concentration

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Variable Spill Area Normal Area

Max Min Mean SD Max Min Mean SD

Extinction Coeff. 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.95 0.36 0.33

SURFACE WATER

Chlorophyll a (mg/m3) 0.24 1.78 0.64 0.07 0.27 3.18 1.21 1.1

Phaeophytin

(mg/m3)

1.37 8.32 3.2 3 1.39 12.4 5.44 4.2

Primary Productivity

(mgC/m3/day)

9.3 0.79 4.36 2.58

Zooplankton biomass

(mg/100m)

13.1 100 19.4 32 4,8 65.5 23.2 20.4

VERTICAL WATER COLUMN

Chlorophyll a (mg/m2) 3.9 37.4 14.2 13.6 10.4 85 30.9 24

Phaeophytin

(mg/m2)

21 190 77.9 66 63.7 407 152.6 112

Primary Productivity

(mgC/m2/day)

0.19 0.2 0.29 0.25

Table 2::Data on chl a, phaeophytin and primaryproductivity in the oil spill area.

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Localized impacts in terms of decrease in its rate of primary productivity and changes in the composition of zooplankton were evident . The beach tar melted under the summer heat and percolated into the sand spreading the contamination at least up to 5 cm below surface.

Observational Impact

Page 39: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

CEL 899-ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENTRISK ASSESSMENT OF BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY

GUIDED BY SUBMITTED BY Dr. ARUN KUMAR RAVEEN PPATEL (ENTRY NO.-2012CEW2296)

AMIT KUMAR VYAS (ENTRY NO.-2012CEW2289)

PARAG AGRAWAL (ENTRY NO.-2012CEW2292) HARSHA YADAV (ENTRY NO.-2012CEW2297)

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY –DELHI NEW DELHI-110016

Page 40: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

INTRODUCTION: -• The incident took place in the mid night of 3rd December 1984. It was one

of the greatest industrial disaster ever happened. During the incident 40 tones of MIC ( methyl isocyanate ) and various products such as mono –methyl amine , hydrogen cyanide and other lethal gases were released from UNION CARBIDA CORPORATION pesticide factory in Bhopal, India which flooded the atmosphere of Bhopal. The immediate effects on the people due to the exposure were vomiting, headache, burning of lungs and searing in their eyes. Within 72 hours of the incident about 8,000 people had died and total of 25,000 have since died due the released gases.

METHODOLOGYHazard identification Exposure assessmentDose response assessmentRisk characterizationRisk communication

Page 41: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

RESULTS• Effect On society:-• After 28 years after the bhopal gas tragedy the victims continue to suffer

from problems like mental retardation cerebral palasy and multiple disabilities.

• Economically they became very week only 70% of the exposed population were earning minimal wages.

• Ground water became polluted as tones of toxic substance are underlying under ground.

• It was noticed that a large amount of heat was generated during the release of MIC. It is known that MIC reacts with moisture rapidly. In addition, MIC could have undergone a series of chemical reactions.

• They are still carrying the load of the past hazzards on their shoulders.

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METHODOLOGY• Hazard identification: During this disaster various gases like CO, HCL,

CO2, HCN, Mono Methyl Amine, MIC(methyl isocyanate) were released. Incident took place mainly due to release of MIC and its reaction products. Having such a pressure that it rises up to 33 meter from the ground. Due to prevailing wind and temperature conditions the gas was taken from release valve to the residential areas of the city.

• Exposure assessment:. Initially it was due to respiratory tract and eyes, and for long term it was through the GI tract from ingestion of food and water. A number of contaminants still remain on site. So it would be difficult to link an illness specially to MIC leak exposure. The leak itself lasted for 90 minutes. However the gas remained in the area for many hours after the leak. Between 210-270 min after the release of the gas, it mixed with the air, cooler and descended on the city still moving downwind.

Page 43: DOS-RESPONSE JAPAN NUCLEAR RADIATION. Hazard identification

.• Dose response: After lot of studies it has been found that MIC(methyl

isocyanate) is of non-carcinogenic nature. CalEPA(California Environmental Protection Agency) calculated a chronic inhalation reference exposure level of 0.001 milligrams per cubic meter (mg/m3).

Refrence limit/refrence dose:A chronic non-cancer Reference Exposure Level (REL) of 3.6 x 10-1 µg/m3 is listed for methyl isocyanate in the California Air Pollution Control Officers Asociation.

Symptoms may include cough, chest pain, shortness of breath, watery eyes, eye pain (particularly when exposed to light), profuse lid edema, and corneal ulcerations. Respiratory symptoms such as pulmonary edema and bronchial spasms may occur in immediate response to exposure or develop and progress in severity over a period of hours to days post-exposure.

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.• Risk characterization: SEVERE EFFECTS: Initial effects of exposure were:Coughing,Vomiting, Severe eye

irritation, Feeling of suffocation Acute symptoms were:-Burning in the respiratory tract and

eyes,Blepharosphasm,Breathlessness,Stomach pains and vomiting. Causes of death were:Reflexogenic circulatory collapse,Pulmonary

oedema,Tubular necrosis of kidney,Fatty degeneration of liver.

• Risk management: It was suggested to people to close there windows and doors and spread the water to their floors and lay down on the floor. The State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the gas-affected area to cure the victims.

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CEL 899: Oil Spill Risk Assessment Name Entry Number• Arnav Kumar Guha 2012CEV2268• Samarpreet Singh 2012CEV2270• Swaagat Das 2012CEV2275• Dheeraj Chaudhary 2012CEV2284• Govind Narain 2012CEV2280• Neeraj Golhani 2012CEV2281

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Oil spill is release of liquid petroleum, hydrocarbon into the ocean or coastal waters, due to human activity, mainly:•Sinking or leakage of oil carrying vessels or oil pipelines.•Countries at war•Illegal damping by industries•Terrorist activities•Natural disasterThe oil spill basically covers the surface of water by a thick film and thereby•Effects the entire marine life•Fishes die, because they cannot breathe•Nature takes up to 10years to recover. if oil reaches the sea beds

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Methodology Our study will focus on risk assessment due to oil spill

and taking BP’s oil spill’s as a prime case example. The study will be having following steps: • Study of major oil spills• Establishing the system Boundaries• Risk assessment through :– Hazard Identification – Frequency Analysis – Consequence Analysis– Risk Evaluation and Calculations

• Suggesting mitigation strategies

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Fault Tree of a oil spill

Risk PerceptionPsychometric Map

Location of risk in factor space (based on Slovic et.al)

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Frequency analysis is important as it enables us to estimate the probability of another oil spill based on trends of spill accidents in time for example the following graph [Source : www.itopf.com/stats.html ] shows that in the coming decades the number of spill will be less than 7.3 spill per ten year:

Figure 3:International Oil spill trends

Rank Oil spill per

decade

probabilty of

exceeding n oil

spills per

decade1 24.1 0.252 8.8 0.203 7.3 0.17

Frequency Analysis

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Risk CommunicationThe main part of risk communication includes bridging the gap between the actual facts and

scientific revelations with the perception of the people to be affected. In case of oil spills, the risk communication should primarily include:

• Making the people aware of the exact scale and circle of loss due to the mishap.• Analysing and discussing the future related occurrences (if any).• Making the communicators aware of the various standard allowable guidelines related to

the spill, as led down by the concerned authorities.• Circulating proper preventive suggestions and controlling measures which ought to be

taken by the audience on their own and also helping them implementing those techniques.

• Assuring the people of the measures being taken on behalf of the organization as a whole in order to counter act and minimize the losses, if possible.

• Making publis certain important figures related to the mishap like-– Origin of the spill– Cause(s) and there proper and understandable analysis.– Degree of occurrence– Areas most adversely affected– Maximum people and property expected to have been affected– Time expected to be need for complete rehabilitation

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Health Impacts & Risk Assessment of Cutting-fluids and Lubricating oil

ByArun Unnikrishnan

2012MEZ8250

Term Paper Report: Environmental Risk Assessment (CEL899)

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Methodology Followed For the health impact for the direct body contact with cutting

fluids, the scientific approach descried on the Greba risk assessment hand out was used. Steps:-

1. Hazard identification— Defining the hazard and nature of the harm, identifying a chemical contaminant, and documenting its toxic effects on metal workers.

2. Exposure assessment— Determining the concentration of a contaminating agent in the environment and estimating its rate of intake

3. Dose–response assessment— Quantifying the adverse effects arising from exposure to a hazardous agent based on the degree of exposure

4. Risk characterization— Estimating the potential impact of a hazard based on the severity of its effects and the amount of exposure

Systems analysis:- Fault tree analysis and Reliability block diagram. Risk Zonation

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• Hazard Identification : The major detrimental effects of the metal working fluids

were taken from the article published by NIOSH in 1998.

• Direct exposure measurement of metal working fluids on skin and through

inhalation: Data were taken from B van Wendel de Joode, et al. Three methods

were used for this study conducted on 80 metal workers.

1. Video imaging technique for assessing dermal Exposure (VITAE)

2. Surrogate Skin Technique (Pads method )

3. Dermal Exposure Assessment Method (DREAM)( Semi- Quantitative)

The average exposure concentration on the Skin from VITAE method was

found to be 1354mg/hr and from Pads method it was 3706mg/hr. DREAM as a

pessimistic method came up with the value 14985 mg/hr(which was used for this

paper) and the air borne inhalation rate was found to be 0.63 mg/m3.

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• Dose–response assessment and risk characterization: As a general

approach Compound A has been identified having a concentration of 2% in

the Metal working fluid.

• Average daily dose = 8hrs* 14985 Mg/hr* 0.02/ 70 kg= 34.25 mg/kg/day• Hazard quotient (HQ) = ADD/Rfd= = 34.25 (mg/kg/day)/ 2(mg/kg/day)=

17.125• The incremental risk of cancer=[(8hrs* 14985 Mg/hr* 0.02*250*5years)/

(70 kg*365* 70years)] * 1(mg/kg/day)-1 = 1.68• The risk of the aerosol mist for a worker = 0.63 mg/m3/0.4mg/m3=1.57

(0.4mg/m3 is the allowable concentration)• Risk Management

There are four ways for managing these risks were proposed by NIOSH:

(1) safety and health training, (2) worksite analysis, (3) hazard prevention

and control, and (4) medical monitoring of exposed workers.

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SYSTEMS ANALYSIS

Fault Tree

The failure probability of the top event P = (P1* P2* P3)+( P4* P5)+ ( P7+ P8)+ (P9* P10)+ (P11* P12)+( P6)

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Reliability Block Diagram

So the overall reliability of the system S = (1- (1-S1)(1-S2)(1-S3))*(1-(1-S4)(1-S5))*S7*S8*(1-(1-S9)(1-S10))*(1-(1-S11)(1-S12))*S6S = (1-P1*P2*P3) *(1-P4*P5)(1-P6)* (1-P7)* (1-P8)* (1-P9*P10)* (1-P11*P12)

Risk ZonationZone I :cutting zone where the cutting fluid is applied as spraying, dropping or flooding

Zone III : far away area from cutting zone, other departments in the shop, offices etc

Zone II equipments, helping and machining tools, clamping devices, material handling devices, storage devises etc :

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RISK ASSESSMENT OF ENDOSULFAN ISSUE IN KERALA

GAYATHRI KRISHNA K (CEW122291)PONNI MARIET GEORGE (CEW122293)

VILAKSHNA PARMAR (CEW122287)SANDHYA GUPTA (CEV122276)

SOWJANYA UPPULURI (CEW122288)SYEEDAH RAAZIA (CEW122290)

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Introduction• Use of endosulphan in Kasaragod district of Kerala.• Endosulfan is a pesticide used to control insects on food

crops.• It is a chlorinated pesticide (C9H6Cl6O3S) of the cyclodiene

group.• It has two stereo isomers alpha-endosulfan and beta-

endosulfan in an approximate ratio of 70:30.• Endosulfan was aerially sprayed for period of 25 years by

Plantation Corporation of Kerala (PCK). • Health effects:- deaths, retarded growth and mental

illness.• Effects on animals, biodiversity and ecology of the area.

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Methodology

• 1- Hazard Identification• 2- Exposure Assessment• 3- Dose Response Assessment• 4- Risk Characterization• 5- Risk Management• 6- Risk Communication

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RESULTS

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RESULTS

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Risk management and communication

• Risk management includes social, economic, political and engineering issues.

• management system should be such that unacceptable risk is brought to acceptable risk with alternatives and minimal cost.

• Hoardings, Pamphlet, Radio telecast, Programs on national television, Newspapers and articles, Working with the media, Social service schemes.

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ENVIRONMENT RISK ASSESSMENTOF

RELEASED RADIONUCLEOTIDES DUE TO CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT

GROUP MEMBERS: SAUJANYA KUMAR SAHU 2012CEW2286 ARVIND KUMAR BAIRWA 2012CEW2302 RAHUL GAUTAM 2012CEW2301

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Outline of Presentation• Introduction• Environmental Risk Assessment– Hazard Identification– Exposure Assessment– Dose Response Assessment– Risk Characterization– Risk Management and Communication

• Analysis– Event Tree– Fault Tree– Reliability Block Diagram

• Conclusion• Reference

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Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster Introduction

• Occurred on 26th April 1986 at reactor No. 4 of nuclear power plant at Chernobyl.

• The operators switched off an important control system -> reactor reached unstable state -> A sudden power surge -> steam explosion -> rupture of reactor vessel -> destruction of reactor core and reactor building.

• Intense graphite fire -> release of radioactive materials like 131I and137Cs

• Regions affected - Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.

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Environmental Risk Assessment of Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster

Step 1: Hazard Identification:– Dose of 131Iand 137Cs estimated to be around 1,760 and5 PBq,

respectively (1 PBq = 1015Bq). Doses estimated on basis of environmental and thyroid or body measurement

– Main areas of contamination with137Cs deposition density > 37 kBq m2(1 Ci km2) : Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine

Step 2 : Exposure Assessment :– Pathways

• Ground– Consumption of leafy vegetable(short lived 131I)– deposited on soil, contaminated milk, meat and potatoes ( for long lived 137Cs

• Aquatic– Runoff of surface layers of soil in the watershed to water bodies containing

radioactive substance

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Environmental Risk Assessment…Step 3 : Dose response

– External exposure where Da= the absorbed dose in air ; Fk=the conversion factor, Li,k=location factor ; Bi,k=the occupancy

factor,

– Internal exposure where D =the thyroid dose; n = the age of the individual (years); K = scaling parameter

Step 4 : Risk Characterization– group 1:persons engaged in the recovery operations– group 2, persons evacuated from contaminated areas (131Cs deposition >1,480 kBq m2)– group 3, residents of highly contaminated areas (131Cs deposition >555 kBqm2)– group 4, children born after the accident registered above

Step 5 : Risk Management and Communication– Compulsory registration and continuous health monitoring of recovery operation workers – Systematic linkage of the Chernobyl registry population data with existing mortality and/or

cancer incidence registries

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Event Tree for Release of Nucleotides at Chernobyl Disaster

Manual Flaws

Design Flaws

No Flaws

Improper Maintenance

Operator turned off important

switch

Preventive Aids present

Preventive Aids absent

Control Systems working

Control Systems not working

Reaction vessel ruptured

Reaction vessel intact (not ruptured)

Reactor Core destroyed

Outcome

SNo Release

Reactor Core intact

Building not damaged

Building damaged

Release

No Release

No Release

Release

Building not damaged

Building damaged

No Release

Release

S

S

F

S

F

S

S

F

p1

p2

1-p1-p2

p3

1-p3

p7

p4

1-p4

p5

1-p5p6

1-p9

p8

1-p8

p9

1-p6

1-p7

Sudden Power Surge

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Fault Tree for Release of Nucleotides at Chernobyl Disaster

Release of Radio nuclides

OR

Improper Maintenance

Control System failure

Reaction Core

Destroyed

Prevention aids absent

Manual Flaws

Sudden Power Surge

Reaction building damage

Design Flaws

Rupture of reactor vessel

Sudden Power surge

Manual Flaws

Operator turned off important

switch

Control system not working

properly

Reaction building damage

Reaction building damage

AND

AND

AND

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Reliability Block Diagram of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

No manual flaws (A`)

Proper Maintenance

(B`)

Preventive aids present

(C`)

Operator didn't turn off

imp. Switch (D`)

Control system working (E`)

Building not damaged (F`)

No design Flaws (G`)

Reactor vessel

intact (H`)

Reactor core

intact (I`)

Here A : Failure event A` : Success event A` : No Manual Flaws F` : Building not damagedB` : Proper Maintenance G` : No Design FlawsC` : Preventive Aids Present H` : Reactor vessel intactD` : Operator didn’t turn off switch I` : Reactor core intactE` : Building not damaged

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Conclusion

• accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986, a tragic event. Many lost lives and still a many suffering from radiation hazards.

• necessary to expand research of long term effects of the acute radiation sickness to support survivors.

• Its findings ;methods developed to combat and manage radiation hazards can be readily applicable to disaster of similar kind,e.g. Fukushima Diiachi nuclear disaster

• Need to generate positive public opinion about harnessing of clean nuclear energy.

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Reference• www.unscear.org/unscrea• http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/chernobyl/backgrounder/en/inde

x.html• http://www.world-nuclear.org/uploadedFiles/org/WNA_Personal_Perspe

ctives/jaworowski_chernobyl.pdf• http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chernobyl_disaster• http://www.davistownmuseum.org/cbm/Rad7b.html

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MICROBIAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED SEWAGE TREATMENT

PLANTS IN NCR REGION

REPORT BY:

TROPITA PIPLAI- 2012CEZ8079AGNES SHIJI JOY-2011CEV2845SANGEETA PEGU-2011CEV2865

MALAVIKA VARMA-2011CEU2873KAVITA GANESH-2011CHE3091

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OVERVIEW AND SCOPEAn analysis was done to study and quantify the Microbial Risk Analysis of the selected

Sewage Treatment Plants (STP’s) based on the five step methodology.

The objective of this study is to perform a• Microbial Risk Analysis of the selected Sewage Treatment Plants• Identification and Solutions applicable to these risks• Management and Communication of these risk effectively

The limitation of our study we have conducted on are• Of the many pathogens only 3 commonly found pathogens were considered • Ingestion route was considered as the mode of infection• The effects was considered on specific sub populations• Awareness study was evaluated on students • Delhi was taken as the study area

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HAZARD IDENTIFICATIONPathogens selected:• Salmonella• Shigella• E.coli

Site-Description: Two Sewage Treatment Plants has been selected for our study having different treatment methods.

• NOIDA: It is a Sequential Batch Reactor (SBR) based STP having a capacity of 27MLD.It was started in March 2012 and its source of water in the treatment plant is completely domestic.

• VASANT KUNJ: It is based upon Extended Aeration Process and has a capacity of 22.7 mld and flow of 18.16 mld. The source of water in the treatment plant is completely domestic.

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EXPOSURE ASSESSMENTThe reference risks of the micro organisms which we are studying, as per the

U.S.EPA are: • Salmonella – 0.0001; Shigella – 0.0001; E.coli – 0.0001

The Hazard Quotient is calculated by dividing the Annual risk calculated (both Exp and Poisson) by the reference risks listed by US EPA. If the Hazard Quotient is above 1, a definite step has to be taken towards improving the whole scenario as the situation is definitely at risk. If it less than 1, then the situation is under control and not at risk.

The most common pathways for these pathogens to enter the human body are ingestion, inhalation and dermal, can be listed as:

S.No Target Subpopulation Ingestion rate (mL/day) Frequency (times/year)

1 Workers working in

WWTP’s

6 260

2 Children Playing 6 3

3 Recreational activities 50 10

4 Exposure to leafy vegetables 3 15

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DOSE-RESPONSE ASSESSMENT

TARGET SUBPOPULATION

HAZARD QUOTIENT SALMONELLA

HAZARD QUOTIENTSHIGELLA

HAZARD QUOTIENTE.COLI

Workers working in

WWTP’s

52.26 4.03 4.15

Children Playing 2.01 0.04 0.04

Recreational activities 25.15 1.29 1.33

Exposure to leafy vegetables 0.3 0.11 0.119

For estimation of Risk on a daily basis, the following mathematical models were used. They are:•Exponential : p(daily) = 1- (-exp r*N)

•Poisson: p(daily) = 1-(1+N) –α

βAfter estimating the daily risk, the annual risk was calculated using the following equation:•RISK ANNUAL = 1-(1-Pdaily)

Exposure time

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RISK CHARACTERIZATION, MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATION

Risk Characterization

From the previous table it can be seen that, • “Workers working in WWTP’s”; “Children playing”; “Recreational Activities” are at RISK

from SALMONELLA. • “Workers working in WWTP’s”; “Recreational Activities” are at RISK from SHIGELLA. • “Workers working in WWTP’s”; “Recreational Activities” are at RISK from E.COLI. • Also Ingestion through swimming (Recreation) case needs to be addressed with top priority

for both Salmonella and Shigella as it poses maximum risk the concern population.

Risk Communication and Management

Based on a student survey conducted in the campus,• Most of the students rank all the above diseases between 2 to 6.5 and considered as dread.• As expected the most fimiliar disease was diarrhoea.• Unlike expected most of the students did not consideres Hepatitis as a dreadful disease.• Most of the students were fimiliar with urinary tract infection and did not considered it very

dreadful.• People had very little knowledge about Salmonellas and Neonatal meningitis. And considered

these diseases as dreadful.

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REFERENCES……..• Pant ,A. and Mittal, A.K. (2008). “New protocol for the enumeration of Salmonella and Shigella from wastewater”. J.

Environ. Engg., 134(3), 222.• • Pant, A. and Mittal ,A.K. (2007). “Monitoring of pathogenecity of effluents from the UASB based sewage treatment plant”.

Environ Monit Assess, 133, 43.• • Jamwala P, Mittal A K., (2009). “Reuse of treated sewage in Delhi city: Microbial evaluation of STPs and reuse options”.

Resources, Conservation and Recycling ,54 (2010) 211–221• • Hencha K.R, Bissonnettea G.K,, Sexstonea A.J, Colemanb J.G, Garbuttb K,. Skousena J.G., (2002) “Fate of physical, chemical,

and microbial contaminants in domestic wastewater following treatment by small constructed wetlands” : Water Research 37 (2003) 921–927

• • • Mara D D, Sleigh P.A, Blumenthal U.J and Carr R. M (2007); “Health risks in wastewater irrigation: Comparing estimates

from quantitative microbial risk analyses and epidemiological studies” : Journal of Water and Health (2007) doi:10.21.66/wh.2006.055

• • Y. Karamoko, K. Ibenyassine, M. M. Ennaji, B. Anajjar, R. Ait Mhand, M. Chouibani,(2007) “Bacterial Pathogens Recovered

from Vegetables Irrigated by Wastewater in Morocco", Journal of Environmental Health, June 2007• Sadovski A Y, Fattal B, Goldberg D, Katzenelson E and Shuval H I (1978); “High levels of microbial contamination of

vegetables irrigated with wastewater by the drip method”, Appl Environ Microbiol. 1978 December; 36(6): 824–830.• Clemens P.L., (1990); “Event Tree and Fault Tree Analysis”, Sverdrup, 2nd Edition.• Ahmed AM, Furuta K, Shimomura K, Kasama Y, ShimamotoT. Genetic characterization of multidrug resistance in Shigella

spp. Japan. J Med Microbiol 2006; 55 : 1685-91.• Calamusa A, Verani M, Carducci A,” Communication of Microbial Risk to Workers in a Wastewater Treatment Plant”,2008

AND MANY MORE……………………..