dot kich trai tu son tay

8/13/2019 Dot Kich Trai Tu Son Tay

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CUC T KCH TRI T SN TYSau Lng - Chin SThm St Nha KThut,trc mt ta l kth sau lng ta cn li nhng du chn

SAT, JAN 1st, 2011

Hnh nh Bit Cch MBXung Tri T Sn Ty.JAN 1st, 2011

Fort Bragg / Colonel Bull Simons The Sn Ty Raid


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In May 1970, aerial photographs revealed what U.S. Military intelligence believed was aPOW camp near the town of Sn Ty, twenty-three miles west of North Vietnam'scapital city. When American officials decided the prisoners were attempting to sendsignals, they set in motion a daring plan to rescue the more than sixty airmen thought tobe held captive. On November 20, a joint group of volunteers from Army Green Beretsand Air Force Special Operations Forces perfectly executed the raid, only to find theprisoners' quarters empty; the POWs had been moved to a different location. Initially,the Sn Ty raid was a devastating disappointment to the men who risked their lives to

carry it out. Many vocal critics labeled it as a spectacular failure of our nation'sintelligence network. However, subsequent events proved that the audacity of the rescueattempt stunned the North Vietnamese, who implemented immediate changes in thetreatment of their captives. They consolidated all Americans from their incarceration incamps to a single downtown Hanoi location where prisoners could take better care ofeach other. The operation also restored the prisoners' faith that their nation had notforgotten them.

John Gargus not only participated in the planning phase of the Sn Ty rescue, but alsoflew as a lead navigator for the strike force. In the last few years, he has immersed

himself in relevant documents that have been declassified. He has also conductedextensive interviews with others involved in the secret mission. The Sn Ty Raidincorporates this wealth of unpublished material -- air operations planning and training,ground preparation, interviews, and even North Vietnamese perspectives -- with Gargus'sown experience. No previous account of this top-secret action has given so many detailsor such insight into both the execution and results of Sn Ty. This book will be aninvaluable addition to the history and historiography of the Vietnam War.


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...Mt shot ng trong vng ch ca cc n vc nhim Vit-MnhMACV-SOG, Trung Tm Hun luyn v Hnh Qun Delta (khoch Delta, khoch Omega cabphn B-50, v khoch Sigma ca bphn B-56 c thi hnh trong thi gian tnm 1964 n gia nm 1970. Sau thi gian ny, Lin on 5 Lc Lng c Bit(LLDB) Hoa Kti Vit Nam chm dt cc hot ng bit kch trn chin trng VitNam. Tuy nhin cc hot ng c nhim mang tnh cch chin lc v hnh ng khncp vn c Lc Lng c Bit Hoa Kthc hin, v mt trong nhng cng tc ngonmc nht v nguy him nht ca binh chng ny l cuc hnh qun t kch gii cu tbinh Mti nh t Sn Ty, cch H Ni 23 miles vhng Ty Bc Vit.


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Cng tc c bit ny c gi l Cuc Hnh Qun c Nhim Kingpin POW, v din ra ngy 21 thng 11 nm 1970 do i T Arthur Simons vi bit danh "B Tt" ch

huy. Lc Lng c Nhim gm 56 qun nhn c chn tton Lc Lng c Bits6 v s7 ti Trung Tm Chin Tranh c Bit Lc Qun Hoa Kcn cFort Brag,tiu bang North Carolina. V mt squn nhn khc cng c chn ttrng Bitng Fort Benning, tiu bang Georgia.

c chnh thc hot ng ngy 8 thng 8 nm 1970 vi danh xng Lc Lng cNhim Lin Qun BBin Ng, khoch ny c Chun Tng Donald Blackburn,pht c bit vhot ng cho BTham Mu Lin Qun son tho. Nm 1965, khicn mang cp i T, ng c bnhim gichc chhuy trng MACV-SOG(Military Assistance Command Vietnam - Special Observation Group). Nm 1970, ng

l ngi a ra kin tchc cuc t kch v trnh khoch tng qut ln tng thammu trng lin qun l i tng Earle Wheeler.

Thng 6 nm 1970, i Tng Lc Qun Earle Wheeler chun y khoch tng qut gii cu t binh Mdo Chun Tng Blackburn xng, ng thi chnh mt tongm 15 chuyn vin tnh bo c t di quyn iu ng ca vtng ny bt tayvo vic son tho chi tit khoch. Khoch ny c phn chia thnh 3 giai on.

GIAI ON 1: THU THP TIN TC TNH BO


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Tri t Sn Ty khng ln, c xy dng theo phi tr hnh vung, mi cnh c chiudi khong 45 mt, chung quanh c tng cao trn 2 mt. Tri nm gia mt rung la,quanh tri c 3 vng gc cao, t binh Mbnht trong bn cn lng.

Tri Sn Ty v p L, mt tri t binh khc, c ton Tnh Bo c Nhim TBinh Hoa Kxc nh vtr vo thng 5 nm 1970. y l ton c nhim c thnhlp vo nm 1967 vi nhim vl theo di hscc t binh M, xc nh vtr ca cctri t, thng bo cho Khng Qun Hoa Ktrnh thbom vo cc khu vc . Ringtri t Sn Ty, theo sxc nh ca ton c nhim, tri ny giam gikhong 55 t binhHoa K.

Tm hnh chp trong mt bui hp-bo ti NgGic i.Ttri sang phi:Melvin Larid (BTrng Quc Phng),

i T Arthur Simons (chhuy mt ton t-kch 22 ngi),c Thomas Moore (ChTch Hi ng Lin Qun), v

Chun Tng Leroy Manor (TLnh Lc Lng c Nhim).(HNH NH: U.S.Army)

Sau khi xc nh vtr, Khng qun Hoa K tin hnh cc chuyn bay thm st.Khng nh tcc chuyn bay tit lnhng trngi quan trng chung quanh tri t.

l mt bchhuy ca Son 12 Cng Sn Bc Vit (CSBV), gm 12 ngn bi ntr gn , v mt trng hun luyn Pho Binh Bc Vit. Cch tri Sn Ty 500 mt lmt trng trung hc. Ti tnh Phc Yn, min Bc, cch tri t 32 km l mt cn cKhng Qun. Nhthc ngha l cuc t kch phi c thc hin chp nhong vvin binh ca ch qun c thhin din mau lti trn a.


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Khng nh tri t sn Ty

Sa bn tri t Sn Ty c dng ln tdliu khng nh cho vic lp phng n t nhp

tri giam ca LL /c Nhim


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GIAI ON 2: TUYN MV HUN LUYN

giai on ny, Lc Qun Hoa Ktuyn mcc binh stnh nguyn v tchc cuc

hun luyn cho cc cm tqun ny. Trong khi bphn tnh bo tip tc thc hinnhng phi vchp khng nh vng Sn Ty bng phi cbay cao loi Lockheed SR-71v phi ckhng ngi li Buffalo Hunter. Cc nh chp c trong ma h cho thy cchot ng ti Sn Ty gim thiu v n ma thu 1970 th vng v. Trong khi , tri tbinh cch khong 26 km vpha Ty th nhn nhp hn.

GIAI ON 3: HNH NG

Lnh thi hnh c BTham Mu Lin Qun chun y v ban hnh ngy 18 thng 11nm 1970. Vcc cm tqun, sau thi gian hun luyn, vo m 18 thng 11 nm

1970 tt ci c nhim ny c a ln vn ti cC-141. Tgipht , cc cm tqun khng c mc qun phc hay mang huy hiu ca n vno. Sau nhiu gitrnmy bay, hc thxung phi trng Thakhi, Thi Lan.

Ngy N sp bt u sau su thng hoch nh v ba thng tp dt k cng. Trc gixut pht, cc cm tqun mi c thng bo l cuc t kch b mt ny c mc tiucu t binh Mbgiam ti nh t Sn Ty Bc Vit. Do i c nhim stin hnhcuc tn cng chp nhong v to bo.

Trc thng HH-53 chton Delta c C-130 tip nhin liu trn khng phn Lotrc khi xm nhp Bc Vit trc chSn Ty


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Theo khoch, Lc Lng c Nhim ln cc trc thng HH-53 ti cn cKhng QunUdom Thi Lan, bay qua t Lo vo Sn Ty. Trong khi cc phi cchin uKhng Qun, Hi Qun Msmcuc khng tp nh lc hng trn khng phn Bc

Vit. ng 2 gi18 pht sng ngy 21 thng 11, Trung T Khng Qun Hebert Zehnderp trc thng chton xung kch ca i y Richard J. Dick Meadows xung ngay snnh t Sn Ty.

Mc d tp dt kcng, chic trc thng chton qun ny cng bvng mt dyphi qun o, cnh qut ng phi mt thn cy lm my bay rt xung t trong svachm ddi. Theo li kca i y Meadows th chc mt trung sbbnh cha lap vo chn lm bmt c, cn Trung y George Petrie th bt vng ra khi trcthng, ngoi ra khng c ai bthng.

Di quyn iu ng ca trng ton Meadows, tt cnhy ra khi trc thng v tc xtrit hcc lnh canh Cng Sn Bc Vit. i y Meadows khom ngi phng mnh votri, va ni qua loa phng thanh cm tay: "Chng ti l qun nhn Mn cu cc anh,tt cnm xung trnh n. Chng ti svo ngay."

Thnhng khng mt ai trli.

Trong khi , Trung T Khng Qun John A. Allison htrc thng ca ng chton anninh v chhuy ca Trung T Elliott P. Sudnor xung bn ngoi tng nh ng k

hoch. Thng SHerman Spencer dng cht nph thng bc tng. Htip tay viton xung kch ang chin u tin vo nh t, lc sot cc ta nh. Trung STyrone J.Adderly, thuc ton chhuy di t dng sng phng lu M-79 tiu dit mt vtrsng my nguy him nht ca ch.

Cng vo thi gian ny, Trung T Khng Qun Warren A. Britton, chton binh sdoi T Arthur Simons chhuy, hcnh xung ta c n nh. Thnhng ctonli bthln xung mt trng trung hc cch tri t chng 500 mt. Trng hc ny c qun Bc Vit sdng lm tri lnh.


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Trong cuc chin Vit Nam, trc thng HH-3E thng c xdng cho cc phi vcpcu phi cng lm nn (my bay bbn rt, phi nhy d xung vng t ch). Trcthng c trang bmt ng tip nhn nhin liu pha trc c thnhn xng tmtphi ctanker trn khng trung. Trn trc thng c gn hai i lin 7.62-ly, hoc mt gini lin 6-nng ghp (hnh nh). pha sau c mt hthng giy cp di 70 mt dng

"mc" phi cng ln thng trong trng hp trc thng khng p xung c.Ngy 21 thng 11/1970, hai chic HH-53 chy lnh lc lng c bit ct cnh tcn cUdorn, Thi Lan, c htng bi 5 oanh tc cA-1 Skyraiders bay qua khngphn Lo v sau trc chSn Ty gii cu cc t binh M.

Nhn thy cnh tr lhoc, ton ca i T Simons bit l sai a im, nhng trc thng bay ln cao nn cton phi quyt tchin. Qun Cng Sn Bc Vit ta ra v tt c hong ht trong qun x ln cng o thun. i y Wather lp tc bn gc 3 Cngqun.

Trong khi , i T Simons va nhy xung giao thng ho th ng mt biCng Sn vi vmt ngngc kinh hi. Trong tch tc, hn bbn hti ch. Trongvng 5 n 10 pht, cton ca i T Simons tiu dit trn 100 bi Bc Vit.Ngay sau , phi cng trc thng bit l thlm nn hxung n v ton nyxung tri t Sn Ty.

Bn trong nh t Sn Ty, cc binh sthuc quyn chhuy ca i y Meadows vTrung T Sydnor tiu dit trn 50 lnh gc Cng qun trong khi lc sot nh t v tm

cc ng hm. Nhng hkhng tm thy mt t binh Hoa K no. Cm tqun c


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rt lui sau 20 pht trn mt t. V hnh ng cui cng ca i T Meadows l tiuhy chic trc thng bhhi (lc u khi p xung) trc khi rt lui.

Sau khi cuc hnh qun kt thc, bphn tnh bo Lc Lng c Bit Hoa Kmi bit

r l ton t binh M c di chuyn i ni khc khi Sn Ty thi thng By, vmin ny blt. Mt nghi vn c nhiu nh qun sv qun sHoa Knu ln l tisaoc Moorer (ngi thay thi Tng Wheeler trong chc vTng Tham MuTrng Lin Qun) l ngy 19 thng 11 nm 1970 (ngy N-2) chnh ng c bo lt binh di chuyn tri m vn ra lnh xut pht cuc t kch.

President Nixon speaks during an awards ceremony honoring four members of the militaryspecial forces team which raided the Sn Ty P.O.W. Camp in North Vietnam.

The honorees from left to right are:Brigadier General Leroy Manor, Technical SergeantLeroy Wright, Sergeant First Class Tyrone Adderly,

and Colonel Arthur Simons. (Image Wally McNamee/CORBIS)

Vkt qu, theo nhn nh ca BTLnh Lc Lng c Bit Hoa K, th mc dtnh bo cp cao thiu st theo di v thu thp tin ny, nhng cuc t kch c coi lhon ton khng v ch. Mt skin c cc quan st vin ghi nhn l sau trn t kchbt thnh, H Ni bit rng Hoa Krt quan tm n an ton ca t binh Mnn buc

lng phi thay i cch i xvi cc qun nhn Hoa Kbgiam giti min Bc tm sthng tho ti hi m Paris.

Vng Hng Anh


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y l mt on ca tc giBi Tn vit trong cun "Ngi Hng MChng Mt"(NXB Quni Nhn Dn -1973) ni vvt kch Sn ty:

"... Ti nhv xy ra vo qung thng 11 nm 1972. Lc by gic mt tri giamphi cng Mmin Bc t ti Sn Ty. thu thp ti liu cho cun sch ang vit lcun "Ngi hng Mchng mt", ti phng vn gn hai trm t binh M, hu ht lnhng phi cng li my bay. Trc hai thng, vo thng 9.1972, ti ln tri giam Sn Ty v tri hai ngy. Trong tri c khong hn su chc phi cng Mv ticn nhc hai ngi da mu, trong cn c mt ngi Mgc Nht Bn. Trn giicu t binh Mkhng thnh, khi trong ba my bay trc thng ca ton gii cu b

xung, c mt chic hxung sn tri giam bvng vo mt cy bng, nn khng ctcnh ln c, nh phi bli. Ngy hm sau ti ln tri, tn mt chng kin ni bbit kch Mtp kch. L do tht bi ca pha Mrt n gin l st binh tri c chuyn i trc hn hai tun. Sdi chuyn ny hon ton nm trong khoch

nh sn, khng phi do nh gii cu ca Mbl. Qua tm hiu tcc ti liu caM, ti c bit tnh bo trn mt t ca hrt yu. Pha Mchda vo nh chpc qua my bay do thm ca hphn tch, phn on vng c mt tri giamv c ngi M v h quyt nh gii cu. Khoch gii cu c tchc,chun brt cng phu. Hp sa bn qua bn khu vc Sn Ty c tri giam, lp mhnh ging ht vi thc a, ni qun gii cu, gm c l ct, nh ca, tri giam. Ccn vbit kch ca M c hun luyn c bit trn mt hn o b mt. Vo lcna m, my bay ln thng ca Mchqun bit kch i gii cu xut pht tThi Lanv bay kh cao ri hxung khu vc b. Ton gii cu hot ng trong khu vc trigiam khong 40 pht. Do khng c tnh bo mt t nm st tnh hnh, nn trong thi


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gian chun btp kch st binh c chuyn i m pha Mvn khng hay bit.Cuc gii cu khng thnh cng, phi bli mt my bay ln thng v bt mang theo ba,bn bi a phng khai thc ti liu..."

Hi ngln th40, cuc gii cu ht t binh MSn Ty

Destin Trong snhng ngi tham dbui hi ngln th40 knim ngy gii cut binh MSn Ty, khng nhng chc nhng ngi lnh thuc lc lng c bitnm xa, m cn c stham dca nhng cu t binh M.

Ngy 21 thng Mi Mt nm 1970, 59 lnh thuc Lc lng c bit (trong c 3ngi thuc binh chng Khng Qun, phn cn li l lnh Green Berets) bay m trongmt phi vgii cu khong chng 50-75 t binh Mang bgiam ginh t Sn Ty,Bc Vit Nam. Nhng g htm thy sau khi t kch l mt nh t vng toanh.

iu ny m nh nhng ngi lnh tham dcuc gii cu qua mt thi gian rt lu,ng Gargas, tc gicun Cuc tp kch Sn Ty: T binh MVit Nam khng blngqun ni.

Tt clnh bit kch Mtham dln u by tstht vng khi pht hin tri tkhng c t binh no. Nhng thi im , hkhng bit rng, tuy khng cu c tbinh no nhng cng tc ny l mt sthnh cng vcc phng din khc.


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Theo tc giGargas, t binh MVit Nam ngay sau bit chuyn gii cu ny. Chodu hkhng c cu trong ln , tin tc cuc gii cu ny lm hphn chn, phchi nim hy vng v iu kin sng ca hc ci thin.

Trc cuc tp kch Sn Ty ny, t binh Mbgiam ri rc nhiu tri giam khc nhautrong nhng iu kin sng khng khip, rt nhiu ngi trong shbbit giam. Tt chc dn vmt chngay trc khi cuc tp kch xy ra.

Hc a vo nhng phng ln cha khong 40 n 50 ngi. Cui cng hthyc nhng khun mt ngi ng i Hoa K, ng Gargas ni. H thc l hchablng qun, ang c ngi tm kim h. V vy hbit l hsc ngy v.

Cuc gii cu ny c nh gi nhl mt mu mc ca mt cng tc lin quan nnhiu ban ngnh trong qun i, c tin hnh chun xc, theo Hi Bit Kch Sn Ty

(STRA). Theo tc giCharles Tustin Kamps, khng nh tmy bay do thm Hoa KBlackbird SR-71 xc nh l tri t Sn Ty, cch H Ni 20 cy sc tht v ang hotng. Tng mt sao Donald B. Blackburn da vo iu ny nghkhoch giicu t binh. c chp thun bi Tng Tham mu trng Lin qun tng EarleWheeler, Trung t Elliott Sydnor v i t Arthur Simons ch thn ng ra tuyn chnngi, hun luyn, thc tp mt tri giam c xy dng bi Cquan Tnh bo Trungng Hoa K(CIA) da trn hnh khng nh ca tri t Sn Ty, xy Cn cKhngqun Eglin, tiu bang Florida. m 20 thng Mi Mt nm 1970, Khng qun Hoa Kcho vo trn vi mt chic EC-130, hai chic EC-130E, mt chic 135M, v mt chic

EC-121T kim sot phn khng gian, gy nhiu sng v theo di, iu hp cuc tkch.

Vpha Hi qun, gm mi chic F-4 bo vvng tri nu MIG xut hin cng vinm chic F-105 Wild Weasel nh hotin nu cc dn SAM trnn hot ng,cng vi mi chic KC-135 tip xng trn khng cho my bay. Nhng chin u cca hi qun Hoa K thnh cng trong vic lm hthng phng khng ca Bc Vithon ton n hvpha ng v shpha Ty l ni lnh bit kch Mvotpha bc Lo.

2:18 sng ngy 21, lnh bit kch Mt kch tri t Sn Ty. Hchthy tri vng tanh,khng mt t binh no c tm thy y. Tt clnh bit kch c di tn ra khi trit ng 29 pht sau khi p, mt pht trc khoch.

Khng c tvong vpha Mtrong trn tp kch ny. Tuy nhin, c mt stvong vpha Bc Vit khi my bay trc thng do ng i t Simons iu khin p trt ch, linhm ngay chlnh bo vBc Vit ang tr v lnh Bc Vit btn cng bt ng.


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Minutes after 2 A.M. on November 21, 1970, more than one hundred U.S. War planesshattered the dark calm of the skies over Hanoi. Their mission: rescue sixty-oneAmerican POWs from Sn Ty prison. Less than thirty minutes later, the raid was over,

but no Americans had been rescued. The prisoners had been moved from Sn Ty fourand a half months earlier and that wasnt all. Part of the raiding force landed at thewrong compound, a school bristling with enemy soldiers, but the soldiers werentVietnamese.... Replete with fascinating insights into the workings of high-levelintelligence and military command, The Raid is Benjamin Schemmers unvarnishedaccount of the courageous mission that was quickly labeled an intelligence failure byCongress and a Pentagon blunder by the world press. Determined to ferret out the truth,Schemmer uncovers one of the CIAs most carefully guarded secrets. From the planningand live-fire rehearsals to the explosive reactions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff watching thedrama unfold to the aftermath as the White House and Pentagon struggled for damage

control, Schemmer tackles the tough questions. What really happened during the twenty-seven minutes the raiders spent on the ground? Did the CIA know the whole time that theAmericans were gone? Had the Agency in fact been responsible for the POWs beingmoved? And perhaps most intriguing, why was the rescuethough it never freed a singleprisonernot a failure after all?


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If you don't know what the Sn Ty Raid is, slap ourself.Fifty six Special Forces troopers flew into the middle of a North Vietnamese POW camp,and pulled off a near-flawless rescue operation.

Except the POWs had been moved.

There is a pretty good book on this called "The Raid: The Sn Ty Prison RescueMission" by Benjamin F. Schemmer.

To summarize (Believe it or not, this is a summary):

There was an awful lot more to this than it first appears. It's not just gathering a group of

Green Berets together, practicing on some building mockups, and rounding uptransportation (as if that's all minor stuff). This involved all the services plus the CIA,everyone up to the President, personnel all over the USA in preparation, personnel inthree or four countries in Southeast Asia in execution, and 116 aircraft in the air thatnight.

The planners first heard about Sn Ty in August 1970. Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simonsof the US Army was assigned the ground section and Brigadier General LeRoy L ManorUSAF was assigned the air section. They were called to Washington, basically toldpeace talks and POW negotiations aren't going well, we have pictures of this camp 23


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miles from Hanoi, and it looks like our people might be getting moved out of it. Theywere asked if they would like to plan a rescue. Yes, sir.

Col Simons went to Ft Bragg, home of Special Forces, seeking volunteers with the

special qualifications he outlined. He went there instead of Vietnam because yankingbodies out of A-teams all over Vietnam would have attracted unwanted attention. He gotabout 500 SF guys together, told them as little as possible about the mission aside frombeing dangerous as hell, that they would get nothing extra, not even per diem, and anyoneinterested could meet him there in an hour. And he got about 500 volunteers. Henarrowed it to 100, knowing he would trim that almost in half at departure time but hewanted plenty of redundancy.

Simons named Lt Col Bud Sydnor his ground component commander.

Gen Manor started scraping up aircraft and coordinating with the other services. Heselected aircrews with special qualifications in a similar manner as Simons selected histroopers, and all volunteers. He arranged to train at Eglin AFB, FL. With peoplewearing uniforms from different branches of the service training together, people wouldget curious and it's remote location would be helpful keeping the curiosity down. Theyused an area around Auxiliary Field #3. From the CIA, he got SR-71 photographs of theprison camp and a scale model of the camp, from which they built a replica of the entirecompound.

It was estimated that 75+ POWs were housed there.They had five HH-53 and 1 HH-3 helicopters, 2 MC-130 transports, and 5 A1-E groundsupport aircraft.

Timing would be critical throughout the mission. Not just during the actual raid, but attakeoff, the aircraft linkups, their refueling, the arrival and departure times, etc, Weatherconditions also had to be right. Among them was a quarter moon: enough to see, but nottoo much. The dates of 21-25 October and 21-25 November were suitable. The missionwas planned for 21 October.

The mission had to be approved up through several levels, ending with President Nixon.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the mission and mission date on 16 September.

The Secretary of Defense approved on 24 September.

They still needed approval from the National Security Advisor (Kissinger) and Nixon.


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Kissinger heard the presentation on Oct 8 and was "enthusiastic" and said he wouldpresent it to the President personally. They told him final approval would be neededwithin the next 24 hours to make the Oct 21-25 window. Kissinger advised them Nixonwould be "unavailable" during that time.

While missing the October window was bad news, it gave them 30 days more practicetime, allowed them to acquire and install Forward Looking Infrared radar (FLIR, whichwas pretty cutting edge at the time), and let them solve some problems with a weaponnight sight*. The bad part, of course, was that the longer they waited, the greater the riskof the operation getting compromised.

Still awaiting final approval, the group left Eglin for Thailand Nov 10. They stayed at aCIA-controlled facility near Takhli, Thailand making final preparations and practicing.The planners rounded up more aircraft and made preparations of their own.

They had F-105 Wild Weasels to jam or shoot down any SAM missiles, F-4s for Migcover, KC-135 tankers, and had arranged for a carrier group in the Tonkin Gulf - on theother side of Vietnam - to conduct operations that would hopefully draw NorthVietnamese radar attention that direction.

Final approval finally came from Nixon. As the mission window of Nov 21-25approached, so did a typhoon. Besides causing problems with the operation itself, thecarrier group's diversion operation couldn't be held. After careful consideration of the

weather, the decision was made to launch one day early on Nov 20. An awful lot ofinvolved people were told at the last minute.

The final selection of 56 men was made during this time also. They had remained at astrength of 100 men as long as possible. With the potential for injuries, or a helicoptercrash in training that could take out as many as two dozen men, they had to have plentyof backups on hand to step in if needed.

The Mission

Until five hours before takeoff, only four people knew the mission. The men did notknow the mission or location. When they were gathered together and told by ColSimons, it was supposedly something like this:

"We are going to rescue 70 American prisoners of war, maybe more, from a camp calledSn Ty. This is something American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellowsoldiers. The target is 23 miles west of Hanoi."

I've read the raiders cheered, and I've read they applauded. Either way, they approved.


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At 22:00, the raiders left the Thai CIA base in a C-130 and flew to Udorn (Thailand)AFB, where they boarded their three helicopters. The helos launched between 23:18 and23:25, following an HC-130 (helicopter refueling C-130) that would refuel them aftertakeoff. The field had been cleared of personnel; even the tower was empty. The helos

joined up with an MC-130 over northern Laos, which with it's better navigation gear,would help guide them over Laos' rugged mountains and into North Vietnam. The HC-130 refueler departed and circled over Laos. It would provide refueling services if searchand rescue was needed. In addition to the three helicopters transporting the SpecialForces troopers, there are two more helicopters following with flight crew only, thatwould be used to carry POWs out.

Over 100 other aircraft from other bases were coming in on the mission at this time.

Meanwhile, in the Tonkin Gulf, the Naval exercise was going on. Nearly sixty US Navy

aircraft crossed over the North Vietnamese shoreline about this time and it had thedesired effect of drawing their radar operators' attention.

As they approach the prison camp, the helicopters that had flight crew only (no SFtroopers) peeled off to land on an island in a lake to await POW pickup.

The MC-130 leading the helicopters climbed from the 500 ft altitude they had been flyingto 1500 ft, drops flares to illuminate the camp area, banks hard right, drops napalm tanksand firefight simulation bombs outside the camp. The napalm acts as a beacon for the A-

1 Skyraider support planes. The firefight simulators create a diversion.An HH-53 flies low over the camp, its two M-134 miniguns hosing down the guardtowers.

The single HH-3 helicopter comes in fast and hard, basically crash landing inside theprison camp walls, clipping trees on the way down. The landing was so hard it dislodgeda fire extinguisher that struck Air Force Flight Engineer/Sgt Leroy Wright in the anklewith enough force to break it. He either didn't notice or he ignored it, and continued hisduties, walked out, taking care of it later. This helicopter was considered expendable

after it delivered its 13-man raid team, and had in fact been rigged with explosives.

This assault team was lead by Captain Dick Meadows (who is a legend in the specialoperations community himself). They quickly exited the helicopter, took up positions,and through battery powered bullhorns announced to the North Vietnamese that this wasa rescue, and that the prisoners were to be released. The North Vietnamese answered byfiring at them, but since they were still shocked and bewildered by what had justhappened by the sudden appearance of aircraft, and the raiders had all the initiative, thefire was ineffective and they were quickly mowed down or overran. The helicopter was

blown. Soon another charge was blown that had been set in the southwest corner of the


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prison camp's walls. The plan was that the raiders and POWs would leave through thishole.

Immediately following their landing, the two HH-53s were supposed to land outside the

south walls. The raiders on board would exit to search the buildings there (outside thewalls) for POWs. The Sn Ty prison camp was built north of a military base, andsoldiers from that base could easily reinforce the camp. By landing between the twocamps, they could block them long enough to snatch the POWs and be gone.

One of the HH-53s mistook a fenced area for the prison compound and landed there. Itwas not part of the prison camp, but 200 meters south, in the military base. Thishelicopter carried the army commander Bull Simons. In the approximately five minutesit took to sort it out, reboard, and fly to the correct location, the raiders in that helicoptergave the North Vietnamese a beating with no losses.

They landed at the correct location and joined the search. Every building was searched.After 29 minutes (some say 27) from initial touchdown (one minute under planned) theydeparted.

The message was sent back to the command center:

NEGATIVE ITEMS

(No POWs found.)

None. They had been moved.

I've read that to a man the raiders wanted to go out the next night and try again.

Of course, there were a thousand reasons why they couldn't, but good Lord isn't it nice toknow that they wanted to?

It was later learned that the POWs were moved not because the North Vietnameselearned of the raid, but for a much simpler explanation. The well was running dry. Theyhad been moved in July. The activity seen in the SR-71 photographs that was thought to

be prisoners was probably North Vietnamese soldiers or workers cleaning it up orconverting it into some other use, like barracks for the military base.

The raid was both a failure and a success. No, no POWs were rescued. But because ofthis raid, the North Vietnamese knew we were serious about our POWs and they changedthe way they were treated, albeit slightly. Instead of being held singly in bamboo cagesor chained to trees in remote areas, they were moved to Hanoi where they saw otherprisoners. Just knowing there were others meant a lot to many of them; seeing anotherAmerican for the first time in months or years instead of wondering raised their spirits.

And they knew we were willing to do something.


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Tactically speaking, the raid was a success. Everything went according to plan.Everything except for the thing you can't plan for.

Sgt Wright got the broken ankle from the fire extinguisher and another man, Sgt JosephMurray, took a bullet to the thigh - the only injuries, against an estimated 50 to 100enemy dead.

(Sgt Wright received the Air Force Cross. I believe everyone received at least the SilverStar, along with several other awards.)

One F-105 was lost due to a near miss from a SAM. The crew ejected and wererecovered. The HH-3 was lost, but that was planned.

Many participants in the raid would stay in the special operations community for manyyears to come, serving and training others.

*One other note about the Sn Ty Raid. It is presumed to be the first use of red dotsights in combat. According to the book "The Raid" by Benjamin F. Schemmer: Whenthey were training up for the mission, Col Simons was not pleased with the results theygot when shooting at night. Their hits were around 25 percent on torso silhouette targetsat 50 meters with the CAR-15s. He looked into night vision of the day. Starlightequipment was too big for the high speed mission. Some "Infrared" was promising but

he could only get six units (I don't know what infrared would be promising in 1970.) Hefound the Armson OEG Singlepoint, which used a red dot in a tube sight illuminated byTritium that you sighted through by keeping both eyes open. Hit percentages went up,speeds jumped, groups dropped, even with bursts. If I remember right, they had to tapethe sights onto the carrying handles of the CARs. There are some pictures of Sn TyRaiders online and you can see the OEG on the CARs, but I can't really tell how they aremounted.

Richard J. Meadows led the key team that crash-landed the HH-3 (team Blueboy) into the

camp.

He was a Captain at the time, and retired a Major in 1977.

He enlisted at age 15.

He was a Master Sergeant at age 19.

He was an early Special Forces trooper, entering SF in 1953.


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In the early 1960s, he went to England as a representative of the 7th Special ForcesGroup in an exchange program with the British Special Air Service, serving as a TroopCommander for a year. He remains one of only two foreigners to receive SAS wings.

In 1966, it was well known that the North Vietnamese Army was infiltrating into southVietnam (and not just Viet Cong and some farmer with a rifle here and there as somemembers of congress wanted to think) but because they sneaked through Cambodia andLaos there was no hard evidence.

Meadows went out and got it.

He and his recon team went out and lay by a trail in Laos, taking pictures as dozens ofNVA passed by. Just to be sure, he took out an 8mm movie camera, crept right up to thetrail's edge and filmed nearly a full battalion passing by. The evidence was given to

General William Westmoreland, who passed it along to Congress.

When Russian support was doubted, Meadows took his team out and found an artillerystorage depot, removed the Russian sights from a couple of cannon, and presented themto Westmoreland.

Meadows was directly commissioned as a Captain is 1967. General Westmorelandapproved the commission, the first in the Vietnam war.

Meadows retired in 1977.Then Delta Force was formed. Charlie Beckwith was put in charge, and he hiredMeadows as a civilian trainer. They trained at Eglin, same place as where they trainedfor the Sn Ty raid.

He retired again in 1980, but came back for another job. When Delta Force got the goahead for the ill-fated Eagle Claw rescue operation of the hostages at the Americanembassy in Tehran, they found they didn't have much to work with on the CIA end.

Most people know about the disaster in the desert outside of Tehran, but even had thatgone off OK, it was only a small part of the operation. It was a complicated, multi-part,operation, with a lot of planning and setup. The Carter administration had cut the CIA sobadly that there simply wasn't enough people to do it.

Someone was needed to go into Tehran, recon the routes Delta would use to the embassy,the security and defenses, confirm and check a warehouse where trucks were to be storedfor transportation out, and correct anything and everything that needed it. In other words,clear the road in and out. Delta's Beckwith wanted Meadows to do this, which Meadows


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was more than willing to do. The CIA opposed it, calling Meadows an amateur.Meadows said he would do it anyway, so they gave up and approved him.

He flew in, posing as an Irish businessman, cleared everything, and waited at the

warehouse.As we all know, the mission went to hell, and was aborted.

Meadows didn't get word for over 24 hours due to bad communications.

In the cluster at Desert One, documents were left behind that disclosed the warehouselocation. The location Meadows was waiting.

Stranded.

He made it out, barely, to Turkey.

His last years get hazy. After the Eagle Claw operation, he was involved in Ross Perot'srescue of his employees from Iran (Ken Follet's Wings of Eagles book) but that issomehow shrouded in mystery still. He was active in Central and South America in thewar on drugs, but nobody seems to know how or if he was working for the government oron his own or just for free. He was quoted as saying he thought this country wasn'tserious against the cartels, and wanted to do more.

He found out he had Leukemia in 1995. He was diagnosed when it was in it's last stagesand was dead within days. He was 64.

A large number of his work is still classified and probably will remain so for some timeto come. Although he has many decorations from the Distinguished Service Cross ondown, some think he would have received the Medal of Honor long ago had all of hiswork been unclassified. I have the feeling there is one thing that rewarded him most:In all the missions he ran deep behind enemy lines, he never lost a man.

Can you imagine the shock?

You're an NVA guarding an empty prison of war camp where there isn't an armed enemy

in miles - it's only 23 miles from Hanoi - it's the middle of the night, you are sound asleep

without a care, and....

A C-130 roars over, drops flares turning night into day, then dropping napalm outside

the fence so close you can feel the heat, and you hear gunfire sounds nearby. Probably

before the napalm has even hit, one of the HH-53s has skimmed over the camp ripping

through the guard towers with the miniguns.


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Then if that wasn't enough, it's immediately followed by a big azz Jolly Green Giant

helicopter crash landing right in the middle of the yard with 13 big hairy American devils

pouring out of it, and two more helicopters coming behind, when you hear over a

bullhorn "We are here to release the prisoners

".

Some guards had to be thinking: "I wish to hell I had some prisoners to release."

ng ngy ThBy, JAN 1st, 2011Ban K Thut K10A-72/SQTB/ 11/T1ND QLVNCH

dot kich trai tu son tay

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