IndigenousDemocracy

Ruto PkalyaMohamud Adan

Isabella Masinde

Edited by Betty Rabar,Martin Karimi

Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet

Intermediate Technology DevelopmentGroup-Eastern Africa. January 2004

Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

PRACTICAL ANSWERS

TO POVERTY

Indigenous Democracy

Isabella MasindeMohamud Adan

Ruto Pkalya

Edited by Betty Rabar,Martin Karimi

A publication of ITDG-EA,January 2004

Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet

Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Copyright 2004Intermediate Technology Development Group - East-ern Africa.

Use of information contained in this publication, eitherwholly or in part is permitted provided the source isackowledged.

January 2004

ISBN 9966 - 931 - 17 - 1

DTPMartin Karimi

This publication was funded by USAID, and UNDP/GEF (EACBBP).

Intermediate Technology Development Group ..............................iAcknowledgements...................................................................iiAcronyms...............................................................................iiiUnderstanding Inherent Terms....................................................ivAbstract..................................................................................v

Chapter 1

Introduction..............................................................................1Problem Statement...................................................................1Purpose of the Study.................................................................6Study Methodology...................................................................8

Chapter 2

Study Communities..................................................................11The Pokot...............................................................................11The Turkana............................................................................14The Marakwet..........................................................................16The Samburu...........................................................................18

Chapter 3, The Pokot

Institutions of Conflict Management............................................23Types, Prevention and Management of Internal Conflicts...............24Inter-ethnic Conflicts.................................................................34Prevention and Management of Inter-ethnic Conflicts....................36Strengths of Pokot Methods of Conflict Resolution.......................40Weaknesses of the Pokot Traditional Methods...........................41

Chapter 4, The Turkana

Turkana Understanding of Conflict .............................................43Customary Institutions of Conflict Management...........................44Internal Conflicts.....................................................................45Prevention and Management of Internal Conflicts.........................47Inter-ethnic Conflicts.................................................................52Prevention and Management of Inter-ethnic Conflicts....................54

Table of Contents

Strengths and Weaknesses of Turkana Mechanisms...................58

Chapter 5, The Marakwet

Marakwet’s Defination of Conflict................................................61Customary Institutions of Governance and Conflict Resolution......62Prevention and Management of Marakwet Internal Conflicts..........63Inter-ethnic Conflicts................................................................68Prevention and Management of Marakwet’s External Conflicts......70Strengths and Weaknesses of Maraket Customary Mechanisms ofConflict Management................................................................73

Chapter 6, The Samburu

Socio-Political Institutions.........................................................75Internal Conflicts.....................................................................77Prevention and Management of Internal Conflicts........................78External Conflict......................................................................81Causes and Manifestations of External Conflicts.........................81Prevention and Management of Inter-ethnic Conflicts....................84Strengths and Weaknesses of Samburu Conflict ResolutionMechanisms............................................................................86

Chapter 7

Improving Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution.............90

Chapter 8

Conclusion and Recommendations...........................................93

Selected Bibliography...........................................................100

AnnexResearch Questionnnaire.........................................................102

Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) wasestablished in 1966 based on the then radical ideas of FritzSchumacher, an economist and the author of “Small is Beautiful”.ITDG has since grown into an international development agencywith its head office in UK and regional offices in East Africa, SouthAsia, South America and Southern Africa. It also has country officesin Bangladesh, Nepal and Sudan.

ITDG’s work is driven by its vision of “a world free of poverty andinjustice in which technology is used for the benefit of all”.ITDG’s mission is “to help eradicate poverty in developingcountries through the development and use of technology bydemonstrating results, sharing knowledge and influencingothers”. ITDG’s development is guided by the following coreprinciples; putting people first; working in partnership, respect fordiversity and a concern for future generations.

Intermediate Technology Development Group-Eastern Africa (ITDG-EA) is a regional office of ITDG. The organization works towardsfulfilling its mission in Eastern Africa by reducing vulnerability,increasing services to the people, making markets work for poorproducers and introducing new technologies.

Conflict resolution and cross-border harmonization is an integralcomponent of the group’s aim of reducing vulnerability among poorpeople especially the pastoral communities in the Greater Horn ofAfrica. Through the Conflict Management Project, the agency isimplementing peace programmes in Northern Kenya (Turkana,Marsabit, and Samburu) and works through partners in West Pokot,Marakwet, Moyale, Mandera and Wajir Districts. In conjunction withpartners, ITDG-EA is implementing cross-border activities inSouthern Ethiopia (Omo region), Southern Sudan, Eastern Uganda(Karamoja cluster) and Western Somalia.

Intermediate Technology Development Group

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This publication is a result of a significant and painstakingcommitment by a number of individuals and organizations. Inparticular, ITDG-EA would like to applaud USAID, and UNDP/GEF(EACBBP) for the much appreciated financial support.

We are greatly indebted to all our informants who wittingly answeredquestions and offered valuable support during field research in WestPokot, Turkana, Marakwet and Samburu districts. We specially thankTapach (West Pokot), Kapyegon (Marakwet), Samburu and Loima(Turkana) peace committees for providing extensive support to thisstudy. Pokot Educational and Development Programme facilitatedthe study in West Pokot and Marakwet districts. John Lomaria andMark Loywat (both of PEDP) were very resourceful in Pokotcustomary law and governance issues, Kudos to you. Enock Rotichprovided logistical support to the researchers in the two districts.

Invaluable gratitude to Francis Wairagu, James Ndung’u (both ofSecurity Research and Information Centre) and Nuria Abdulai ofWajir Peace and Development Agency for providing insightfulcomments during the study in Samburu district.

It will be great injustice not to acknowledge the moral and technicalsupport provided by ITDG staff particularly Adano Salesa, JecintaAbenyo and Benedict Mukoo. Sammy Keter and Hannah Kamaucommented on the research findings. Betty Rabar and Martin Karimiedited the publication.

It is not possible to list all the people that contributed to the successfulconduction of the study and production of this report. Your concerted,collective and unselfish effort is however highly appreciated.

Acknowledgements

i i

ASAL Arid and Semi Arid LandAU IBAR African Union InterAfrican Bureau of Animal

ResourcesCAPE Community Based Animal Health and

Participatory EpidemiologyCBO Community Based OrganizationCORDAID Catholic Organization for Relief and

Development AidCSO Civil Society OrganizationDDC District Development CommitteeDRC Democratic Republic of CongoDSC District Security CommitteeDSG District Steering GroupEACBBP East Africa Cross Border Biodiversity ProjectITDG Intermediate Technology Development GroupNGO Non Governmental OrganizationPEDP Pokot Educational and Development

ProgrammePPG Pastoralists Parliamentary GroupSALW Small Arms and Light WeaponsSRIC Security Research and Information CentreUSAID United States Agency for International

DevelopmentUSIP United States Institute of Peace

Acronyms

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For the purposes of this study, conflict refers todisagreements between two or more people, groups orcommunities. It can be a disagreement over the use ofnatural resources such as water, pasture and grazingland or disputes over ownership of livestock, land or evendomestic quarrels . This study focuses on the destructiveconflicts within and without the four pastoralists’communities under question. Cattle rustling is a thematictype of conflict that features promptly in this study. Itrepresents the struggle among the pastoralists over thepossession of cattle, which have been stolen, and re-stolen so many times, that no modern court candetermine who justly owns the animals.

Conflict prevention is used to refer to the act of inhibitingthe occurrence of conflicts as well as mitigating conflicts.Thus, even though the phrase suggests that the effortonly takes place before violence breaks out, conflictprevention takes place throughout the cycle.

Conflict management focuses on measures aimed atreducing the intensity of violent conflict. The phrase alsoincludes pre and post-conflict prevention measures. Thisphrase is favoured because it refers to the mitigationprocess. Peace building generally goes beyondmanagement measures. It involves developinginstitutional capacities to alter the situations that lead toviolent conflicts.

Early warning may be regarded as the ability to collectand analyse information in the interests of providingstrategic options for preventive actions or, as may berequired, informed response. Early warning andtraditional intelligence systems are very often used inter-changeably. However, traditional intelligence is secretiveand not liable to critique, for it is laden with superstitiousbeliefs.

Understanding Inherent Terms

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AbstractThis publication details the indigenous methods of conflictresolution among the Pokot, Tukana, Samburu, andMarakwet communities of North Rift Kenya. Traditionalconflict resolution structures are closely bound with socio-political and economic realities of the lifestyles of theAfrican communities. These conflict resolution structuresare rooted in the culture and history of African people,and are in one way or another unique to each community.The overriding legitimacy of indigenous conflict resolutionstructures amongst these communities is striking.

The publication outlines scarce and unequal access tonatural resources and power, ethnic mistrust(ethnocentrism), inadequate state structures, bordertensions and proliferation of illicit arms into the hands oftribal chiefs, warlords and fellow tribesmen as some ofthe causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in northern Kenya.

A brief description of the three communities regarded asrepresentative of the entire pastoralists community in thegreater horn of Africa region has been given. In addition,a detailed description and analysis of their indigenousgovernance and conflict resolution institutions has beencarried out. The Kokwo amongst the Pokot andMarakwet, the tree of men amongst the Turkana andNabo among the Samburu communities are perhaps themost important governance institutions amongst thestudy communities.

The study found out that cattle rustling, and to someextent, land clashes are the main manifestation ofconflicts in northern Kenya. In response to the cattlerustling menace that has ravaged the vast and ruggedregion, the communities under study have evolved overtime and institutionalised an elaborate system andmechanisms of resolving conflicts whether intra-

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community or inter-community. The elders in the threecommunities form a dominant component of thecustomary mechanisms of conflict management. Theelders command authority that makes them effective inmaintaining peaceful relationships and community wayof life. The authority held by the elders is derived fromtheir position in society. They control resources, maritalrelations, and networks that go beyond the clanboundaries, ethnic identity and generations. The eldersare believed to hold and control supernatural powersreinforced by belief in superstitions and witchcraft. Thisis perhaps the basis of the legitimacy of traditional conflictresolution mechanisms amongst the pastoralists.

Among other findings, this study has given dueconsideration to the unique pastoralists’ cultures thatemphasise the resolution of conflicts amicably througha council of elders, dialogue, traditional rituals andcommon utilization of resources especially dry-seasongrazing land. Peace pacts between these communitieshave largely been hinged on availability of pasture andwater and entirely cushioned on a win-win situation. Thecurrent peaceful relationship and military alliancebetween Pokot and Samburu, Turkana and Mathenikoand Pokot and Matheniko are testimonies to the powerof indigenous customary arrangements of peace buildingand border harmonization. Nevertheless, such peacepacts are flouted as soon as conditions that necessitatedthe pact cease to hold as they are governed byopportunistic tendencies. In total, the said communitieshave consistent and more elaborate methods ofintervening in internal (intra-ethnic) conflicts than theinter-ethnic conflicts.

The study reports that among the three communities,there is a marked absence or inadequacy of enforcementmechanisms/framework to effect what the elders and

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other traditional courts have ruled. The customary courtsrely on goodwill of the society to adhere to its ruling.

In terms of gender consideration, the whole process isgrossly flawed. There is a serious gender and ageimbalance as women and youth are largely excluded fromimportant community decision-making processes.Women and children are there to be seen and not hearddespite of the fact that they play a critical role inprecipitating conflicts.

Limited government understanding of pastoralists’livelihoods and the ensuing marginalization ofpastoralists’ issues, livelihoods and institutions havecorroded the efficacy and relevance of customaryinstitutions of conflict management. Such traditionalstructures are referred to as archaic, barbaric and thatthey lack a place in the modern global village. As a result,governments fail to appreciate, collaborate andcomplement the traditional methods of resolving conflicts.These pseudo critics have failed to acknowledge thatthe African traditional mechanisms of conflict resolutionare fundamentally different from the Western ways ofconflict resolution.

The study proposes that there should be increasedcollaboration and networking between the governmentand customary institutions of governance. In particular,the government should recognize and aid customarycourts enforce their rulings. The elders should be trainedon modern methods of arbitration and at minimum,traditional mechanisms of conflict management shouldbe more sensitive to the universally accepted principlesof human rights.

Gender and age mainstreaming in conflict resolutionshould be prioritised in all traditional courts and in

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decision-making processes. Women and children voicesshould be heard and be seen to fundamentally alter thepace and direction of community governance system.

The regional problem of illicit arms that has scaled upthe severity and frequency of cattle raids should beaddressed by the governments in the region. These armshave also sneaked in the veiled aspect ofcommercialisation of cattle raids in the region.Pastoralists are no longer raiding to replenish their stocksespecially after periods of severe drought and animaldiseases, but are increasingly raiding to enrichthemselves by engaging in trade of stolen livestock. Thisaspect has overwhelmed traditional conflict resolutionmechanisms and should be addressed.

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Introduction

Chapter 1

1.1 Problem StatementFor a long time, Africa has been saddled and boggeddown by intermittent conflicts both within and betweenits states. From Algeria to Sierra Leone, Liberia to Sudan,the Horn, East and Central Africa and the Great LakesRegion armed conflicts are increasing and are almostexclusively within rather than between states. Evencountries that were once regarded as island of peaceand tranquillity such as Ivory Coast have fallen victimsof the escalating armed conflicts in Africa.

In these conflict scenarios, poorer and more marginalizedpeople are the principal victims rather than members ofthe armed forces. In addition to death and wantondestruction that it brings in its wake, the conflicts alsocontribute to displacement and disruption of livelihoodsof the poor people.

Conflicts among the Pokot, Turkana, Somali, Boran,Rendille, Marakwet and Samburu are the trademark ofthe vast, marginalized and rugged terrain of northernKenya. Hardly a week elapses before the Kenyan mediareports inter-ethnic cattle raiding and intra-ethnic clan(Somali) skirmishes among these communities, resultingin enormous loss of lives, property and displacements.

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Nomadic pastoralism is the main economic activity andthe main source of livelihood in the arid and semi aridnorthern Kenya. Apart from environmental vagaries,conflicts are many and centre mainly, on the exploitationof the limited resources. Conflict over natural resourcessuch as land, water, and forests is ubiquitous. Peopleeverywhere have competed for the natural resources theyneed or want to ensure or enhance their livelihoods.However, the dimensions, level, and intensity of conflictvary greatly. Conflicts over natural resources can takeplace at a variety of levels, from within the household tolocal, regional, societal, and global scales. Furthermore,conflict may cut across these levels through multiplepoints of contact. The intensity of conflict may also varyenormously — from confusion and frustration amongmembers of a community over poorly communicateddevelopment policies to violent clashes between groupsover resource ownership rights and responsibilities. Withreduced government power in many regions, theresource users, who include pastoralists, marginalfarmers and agro-pastoralists, increasingly influencenatural resource management decisions.

However, the causes of conflict are diverse, and include:limited access to water and pasture resources, loss oftraditional grazing land, cattle raiding, lack of alternativesources of livelihood from pastoralism, diminishing roleof traditional institutions in conflict management, politicalincitement, non-responsive governments policy and inter-tribal animosity. The complexity of the conflicts isheightened by the presence of international and regionalboundaries that have affected nomadic pastoralismthrough creation of administrative units, which splitcommunities that once lived together. This is true forexample, between the Pokot and the Turkana whooccupy parts of Kenya and Uganda. These boundarieshave interfered with seasonal movements (nomadism)

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that were occasioned by resource dynamics. Proliferationof small arms and light weapons (SALW) from war torncountries in the Horn of Africa and the Great LakesRegion (Rwanda, Burundi and DRC) have amplified theproblem. The failed Somalia state coupled with theongoing civil war in Southern Sudan has resulted inproliferation of thousands of dangerous arms into thehands of tribal chiefs, warlords and ordinary tribesmen.

Due to remoteness, rugged terrain, underdevelopedinfrastructure and pastoralists’ migratory nature, theformal security system is inaccessible and/orinappropriate to manage the nature and the magnitudeof the current conflicts. This is why despite the presenceof formal security personnel in Kenya, Uganda andSudan, conflicts executed in the form of cattle rustlinghas continued to claim human lives, loss of property anddestruction of biodiversity.

Despite the sustained local, state and regional efforts toresolve inter-community conflicts in northern Kenya andacross the borders, there has been no success inreducing the tally of these conflicts in successive years.The inability of these efforts to contain and resolve theconflicts infers a failure to identify a conflict-resolutionframework that would satisfy the traditional (thoughchanging) socio-political and cultural dynamics of theparties in conflict. Such a framework will have to berooted in customary principles of “war and peace” asembedded in traditions and social structure of acommunity that takes into consideration not only thedistributive issues that are amenable to negotiation andacceptable solutions, but also the subjective andemotionally loaded issues such as group status, identityand survival that are often non-negotiable and principalsources of unmanageable conflicts.

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Indigenous conflict management and resolutionmechanisms use local actors and traditional community-based judicial and legal decision-making mechanismsto manage and resolve conflicts within or betweencommunities. Local mediation typically incorporatesconsensus building based on open discussions toexchange information and clarify issues. Conflictingparties are more likely to accept guidance from thesemediators than from other sources because an elder’sdecision does not entail any loss of face and is backedby social pressure. The end result is, ideally, a sense ofunity, shared involvement and responsibility, and dialogueamong groups otherwise in conflict.

Community members involved in the conflict participatein the dispute resolution process. These communitymembers can include traditional authorities, for instanceelders, chiefs, women’s organizations, and localinstitutions.

The elders in traditional African societies form a dominantcomponent of the customary mechanisms of conflictmanagement. The elders have three sources of authoritythat make them effective in maintaining peacefulrelationships and community way of life. They controlaccess to resources and marital rights; they have accessto networks that go beyond the clan boundaries, ethnicidentity and generations; and possess supernaturalpowers reinforced by superstitions and witchcraft.

The elders function as a court with broad and flexiblepowers to interpret evidence, impose judgements, andmanage the process of reconciliation. The mediator leadsand channels discussion of the problem. Parties typicallydo not address each other, eliminating directconfrontation. Interruptions are not allowed while partiesstate their case. Statements are followed by open

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deliberation which may integrate listening to and cross-examining witnesses, the free expression of grievances,caucusing with both groups, reliance on circumstantialevidence, visiting dispute scenes, seeking opinions andviews of neighbours, reviewing past cases, holdingprivate consultations, and considering solutions.

The elders or other traditional mediators use theirjudgment and position of moral ascendancy to find anacceptable solution. Decisions may be based onconsensus within the elders’ or chiefs’ council and maybe rendered on the spot. Resolution may involveforgiveness and mutual formal release of the problem,and, if necessary, the arrangement of restitution. Localmediation typically incorporates consensus buildingbased on open discussions to exchange information andclarify issues. Conflicting parties are more likely to acceptguidance from these mediators than from other sourcesbecause an elder’s decision does not entail any loss offace and is backed by social pressure. The end result is,ideally, a sense of unity, shared involvement andresponsibility, and dialogue among groups otherwise inconflict.

Traditional forms of mediation and legal sanctioning oftenappear in the aftermath of widespread conflict where noother mechanisms for social regulation exist. This isparticularly true in the case of failed states such asSomalia and partly Sudan, where indigenousmechanisms, some ad hoc, others traditional and long-established, provide order where the outsider’s eye seesonly chaos. In many areas of Somalia including parts ofMogadishu, Sharia courts are enforcing law and order, awelcome novelty for residents who have been deprivedof a functioning judicial system for years.

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Traditional mediation is effective in dealing withinterpersonal or inter-community conflicts. This approachhas been used at the grassroots level to settle disputesover land, water, grazing-land rights, fishing rights, maritalproblems, inheritance, ownership rights, murder, brideprice, cattle raiding, theft, rape, banditry, and inter-ethnicand religious conflicts.

It would be correct to argue that the elders in thepastoralist communities of northern Kenya are not entirelyable to operate and resolve conflicts within thesestructural limits of customary conflict management. Theprocess may be time-consuming and encourage broaddiscussion of aspects that may seem unrelated to thecentral problem, as the mediator tries to situate theconflict in the disputants’ frame of reference and decideon an appropriate style and format of intervention.Nevertheless, they are critically important in maintainingpeaceful relationships in these communities.

1.2 Purpose of the studyThe purpose of this study was to conduct participatoryresearch and in-depth analysis of traditional conflictresolution mechanisms amongst the Pokot, Turkana,Samburu, Marakwet and Borana communities in Kenya.This was conceptualised on the basis of under-utilisedefficacy of traditional institutions in conflict management.Conceptualisation of the pastoralists’ conflicts asresource-based and with cultural overtones puts theemphasis on the access and distribution therefore allowsessential insights into alternative, culturally acceptabledisputes resolution mechanisms. The pastoralist’ssituation in Kenya and across the borders jeopardisesstates’ legal and moral obligation to provide security toits citizens. In the case of northern Kenya, one noticesthe classical retreat of the state, first, on its existenceand, second, its ineptitude. Where the state fails or is

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unable to provide such security to its people, logicdemands that the people seek alternative means to meetthese challenges. Traditional conflict resolutionmechanisms become the alternative.

The ability of local mechanisms to resolve conflictswithout resorting to state-run judicial systems, police, orother external structures is the ingenuity of thesestructures that have largely been ignored andmarginalized. Local negotiations can lead to ad hocpractical agreements, which keep broader inter-communal relations positive, creating environmentswhere nomads can graze together, urban people canlive together, and merchants can trade even if militarymen remain in conflict.

Additional results of local conflict management occurwhen actors who do not have political, social or economicstake in continuing violence come together and build a‘constituency for peace.’ In some cases, this canundermine the perpetrators of violence, leading to thedevelopment of momentum toward peace.

The introduction of police, courts and prison systemshave been erroneously interpreted to infer that thecustomary law has been rendered obsolete and its placetaken by the western styled court system. Nevertheless,pastoralists have continued to rely on customary law andmechanisms in resolving their conflicts both within andwithout the communities.

Documented reference will bridge the information gapthat has existed in African societies and this will go along way in passing customary law and system fromgeneration to generation.

The specific objectives of this study were:

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♦ To have an in-depth understanding and analysisof traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

♦ To collect and collate the most common types ofintra-ethnic and inter-ethnic disputes and thetraditional mechanisms of their managementamong the Pokot, Turkana, Samburu andMarakwet communities.

♦ To critically assess the role and efficacy ofcustomary institutions of conflict management inpresent-day pastoralist conflict and the modernstate legal framework.

♦ To examine the ways in which customaryinstitutions of conflict management can bestrengthened and integrated within the formalmodern state judicial framework.

Local mechanisms aim to resolve conflicts withoutresorting to state-run judicial systems, police, or otherexternal structures. Grassroots mediation depends onan existing tradition of local conflict managementmechanisms, even if these are currently marginalized ordormant.

1.3 Study MethodologyPokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet communities

w e r es t r a t e g i c a l l yselected asstudy samplessince theydemonstrate arich indigenousknowledge andmechanisms inc o n f l i c tresolution. Thepastoralists are

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in constant acrimony. They have also tried to resolvethe conflicts using traditional mechanisms. It is adocumented fact that pastoralist communities haveelaborate mechanisms of resolving their intra and intercommunity/clan conflicts. The word ‘pastoralists’ is oftenused to indicate a broad ethnic origin and livelihood.However, it should be noted that, pastoralism is a way oflife and livelihood largely cushioned on resource scarcityand dynamics.

The methodology that was applied in this study involvedsurveys of the existing indigenous conflict resolutionmechanisms, interviews with pastoralists’ elders, warriorsand women and plenary discussions by peacecommittees among the study communities. Both fieldinterviews as well focused group discussions and in-depth analysis of relevant secondary data sources suchas published and unpublished books, magazines andjournals were put to use.

The primary methodology of the study involved interviewsand discussions with pastoralists’ communities’ eldersin each of the four communities covered. The elders wereselected on the basis of leadership experience in thecommunity, command of knowledge of the community’sfolktale and way of life, and proven longstandingparticipation in forums to settle or manage conflicts anddisputes in the community. The elders had to showknowledge of community values, practices andphilosophy of life.

The researchers also used participant observation incollecting the information. The researchers participatedin a number of forums that customary mechanisms wereused to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts. These forumsincluded the Todonyang declaration between Turkana,Merille and Dong’iro communities, Pokot and Marakwet

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communities peace talks organized by Pokot Educationaland Development Programme (PEDP) at KameleyPrimary School ground, Wajir regional peace meetingthat brought together Wajir, Moyale and Marsabit districtsat Wajir and the Modogashe declaration meeting. Videodocumentation of various pastoralists’ traditional conflictresolution processes was also used in the study. Ageand gender balance was maintained throughout thestudy.

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Chapter 2

The Study Communities

2.1. The PokotThe bulk of the Pokot people are found in West Pokotdistrict, situated along Kenya’s western boundary withUganda and borders Trans Nzoia and Marakwet districtsto the south, Baringo and Turkana districts to the eastand north respectively. The district is arid and semi arid.Apart from West Pokot district, a substantial number ofPokot people are inBaringo, Trans Nzoiaand to a lesser extentSamburu district. InUganda, the Pokotpeople are found inNakapirpirit district inthe largerKaramojang region.

Pokot history isdifficult to sketch.Linguistically, theyseem to be related tonumerous peopleswho live in the regionwith ties to both theNilo-Hamitic peopleswho came from North

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Africa and to Bantu peoples who came from centralAfrica. For purposes of the Kenyan census Pokot areplaced in the Kalenjin group, which consists of manydiverse groups of people who share Nilo-Hamitic ancestryand history. Some authorities also consider the Pokotcommunity as the fourteenth tribe of the largerKaramojang cluster. This assumption is derived from thefact that each Pokot man, like the rest of Karamojangcluster men, has a bull that is particularly significant tohim. The choice of a bull is made using appearance as acriterion and a name that reflects the look of the bull isassigned to it. The man will then adopt the name of thisbull as his own, and sing songs in praise of his bull in anattempt to attract women. This description could as wellsuggest that even the lowland Marakwet are the fifteenthKaramojang cluster.

Amongst the Karamojang people, from birth until death,cattle constitute not only their livelihood but also the verycentre of their lives. Birth, the passage to adulthood,marriage, death and the passing of decision-makingpower from one generation set to the next are all markedby the praising, slaughter and sharing of cattle.

The nomadic way of life that most of the Pokot live hasallowed them to come into contact with numerousdifferent peoples throughout history. This interaction hasallowed them to incorporate social customs that in somecircumstances included marriage with other communities.Many specific Pokot customs seemed to be borrowedfrom their Turkana and Karamojang neighbours.

About one quarter of Pokot peoples are cultivators (cornpeople), while the remaining are pastoralists (cowpeople). Between both groups, however, the number ofcows one owns measures wealth. Cows are used forbarter exchange, and most significantly as a form of bride

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wealth. A man is permitted to marry more than onewoman, as long as he has sufficient number of cows tooffer as bride price. This is the primary way for wealthand resources to change hands in Pokot society. Cowsare rarely slaughtered for meat. They are much morevaluable alive. Cows provide milk, butter, and cheese,which form the core of Pokots’ dietary needs.

Pokot community is governed through a series of age-grades. Group membership is determined by the age atwhich one undergoes initiation. For young men thisoccurs between ages fifteen and twenty, while for youngwomen it usually occurs around age twelve at the onsetof menarche. After initiation, young people are allowedto marry and are permitted to begin participating in localeconomic activities. Young men and women form closebonds with other members of their initiation groups, andthese bonds serve for future political ties. When a manor woman reaches old age, he or she is accorded acertain degree of status and respect. Responsibilities ofelders include presiding over important communitydecisions, festivals, and religious ceremonies.

Tororot is considered the supreme deity among thePokot. Prayers and offerings are made to him duringcommunal gatherings, including feasts and dances. Suchceremonies are usually presided over by a communityelder. Diviners and medicine men also play a significantrole in maintaining spiritual balance within the community.Pokot believe in sorcery and use various forms ofprotection to escape the ill will of sorcerers. Pokot alsorevere a series of other deities, including sun and moondeities and a spirit who is believed to be connected withdeath. Dances and feasts are held to thank the god forthe generosity and abundance, which he bestows uponPokot communities.

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2.2 The TurkanaThe Turkana are one of the most courageous and fiercegroups of warriors in Africa. They are traditionallynomadic shepherds, the majority of whom live west ofLake Turkana in the present day Turkana district. Turkanadistrict is part of Kenya’s arid and semi arid lands. It issituated along Kenya’s northwestern border with Ugandaand Sudan, and Ethiopia to the north. It also bordersKenyan districts of West Pokot and Baringo to thesoutheast and Marsabit to the east. About 22,000Turkana of Ethiopia live west of the Omo River in theextreme southwestern regions of the country. OtherTurkana people can be found in eastern Uganda,Marsabit, Isiolo, Samburu and Trans Nzoia districts ofKenya.

The myth of Nayere (a heroine) indicates that the Turkanaoriginated from the Jie people of Uganda, probably duringa severe drought and entered their cave-land (eturkan),through Tarach River, near Moru anayere (hill of Nayere).

Turkana land is a semi desert plain consisting of sand,gravel, pebble beds and scattered volcanic ranges. Thevegetation varies from desert to shrubs with scatteredthorn bush. In the Northwest the vegetation consists ofgrass such as Cynodon dactylon. In the central area,the vegetation is very poor and the ground cover is lessthan 5%. Along the watercourses, the vegetation consistsof higher acacia trees, palms, and in some places thickthorn bushes.

The Turkana refer to themselves as Ngiturkan and totheir land as Eturkan. Although they emerged as a distinctethnic group during the nineteenth century, the Turkanahave only a vague notion of their history. Their mainconcerns are land and how to win it, and livestock and

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how to acquire it. They have pursued these aims withsingle-mindedness for nearly 300 years.

Among the traditional Turkana community, socio-politicalinfluence and power belongs to those who have age,wealth, wisdom (emuron), and oratorical skill. Socialorganization is based on territorial rights (the rights ofpasture and water), kinship, relationships betweenindividuals, and rights in livestock and labour.

The Turkana men often have multiple wives. When awife marries into a household, the head of the familygives her a portion of his livestock. Her sons will laterinherit these herds. Because of the unusually high brideprice, it is almost impossible for a man to marry until hisfather has died and he has inherited livestock. TheTurkana household consists of a man, his wives and theirchildren, and often the man’s mother.

Young men undergo initiation at the age of 16 to 20.This ceremony involves animal sacrifice. Initiation is aprerequisite for later taking a human life. The status of awarrior is determined once a man has killed his firstenemy-an event he will mark by notching a scar on his

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right shoulder or chest. After that time, he begins carryinga weapon. His clan sponsor gives him a spear and otherweapons, a stool that serves as a headrest, and a pairof sandals. The Turkana dress consists of a shuka (sheetof cloth) wrapped around the waist. Scars are made onthe arms to indicate how many victims the warrior hasinjured. White ostrich feathers are also worn on the headsof the warriors who have killed at least one person.

Camels, cattle, sheep, and goats provide for most of theneeds of the Turkana. Donkeys are mainly used fortransport especially during migrations. Turkanas’ dietconsists of goat milk, goat meat, grains, and wild fruit.Along the shores of Lake Turkana, some engage infishing and farming. The isolated Turkana do very littletrading with other tribes. They sell livestock in order tobuy grains and other household goods.

The Turkana ascribe to their traditional African religion.Though fearless in all aspects, they are highlysuperstitious. They believe in dreams and place greatfaith in diviners (emurons) who have the power to healthe sick, make rain, and tell fortunes (by casting sandalsor reading animal intestines). The Turkana believe in asingle, all-powerful god, Akuj, who rarely intervenes inhuman affairs. The Turkana are skeptical of any divinerwho professes to have mystical powers but fails todemonstrate that power in everyday life.

2.3 The MarakwetMarakwet district is virtually the present home of theMarakwet People. The district was created through anexecutive order on 4th August 1994. Initially, it was partof Elgeyo-Marakwet district. Marakwet district bordersWest Pokot to the north, Trans Nzoia to the west, UasinGishu to the southwest, Keiyo to the south, and Baringoto the east. The lower parts of the district are arid unlike

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the highlands, which are suitable for mixed farming andsedentary life. A number of Marakwet people are foundin Trans Nzoia, Uasin Gishu and Keiyo districts.

Like the Pokot, Marakwet history is difficult to trace. Theyare considered as a sub-tribe of the larger Kalenjincommunity that also comprises the Pokot, Tugen, Keiyo,Nandi, Kipsigis and Sabaot. Their pastoral livelihood andgovernance is similar to that of the larger Karamojangcluster, and thus they are considered to be the fifteenthKaramojang cluster member. Linguistically, they arecloser to the Pokot community and to a lesser extent tothe other Kalenjins.

The Marakwet society is divided into thirteen patrilinealclans, each of which (with the exception of the Sogomclan) is divided into two or more exogamic sectionsdistinguished by totems. Homesteads are in totemicsettlements scattered widely throughout the district. Thecommunity lives in territorial groups, which are politicallydistinct but interconnected by the clan structure and theage-sets. Their religious leader is known as the orgoy.He is consulted regarding the outcome of war, beforethe warriors set out.  

Tradit ional lythe Marakwetrarely fightwars as at e r r i t o r i a lg r o u p .Nevertheless,Pokot andTugen aret r a d i t i o n a lenemies of theMarakwet. An

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individual is armed with a shield, a sword, a club andeither a spear or a bow and arrows.  The Marakwet people are pastoralists, hunters as wellas agriculturalists. They keep cattle, sheep and goatsand depend on their animals for milk and meat. Theytraditionally built their homes on the escarpment. Thereis no story of creation told but Asis, is thought to be asupreme, omnipotent, omniscient arbitrator of all thingsand guarantor of right. 

2.4 The SamburuThe Samburu are the semi-nomadic pastoralists whodwell in the present day Samburu district in the centralparts of northern Kenya. Five districts in the Rift Valleyand Eastern Provinces border the district. To thenorthwest is Turkana district while to the southwest isBaringo district. Marsabit district is on the northeast, Isioloto the east and Laikipia district to the south. The languageof the Samburu people is called Samburu. It is a Maalanguage very close to the Maasai dialects. Linguistshave debated the distinction between the Samburu andMaasai languages for decades. The Chamus (Njemps)speak the Samburu language and are often counted asSamburu people. The Samburu tongue is also relatedto Turkana and Karamojong, and more distantly to Pokotand the Kalenjin languages. The Samburu communityis characterized by the gerontocracy with age systems.

The district is semi arid and supports crop farmingespecially in the highlands whereas the lowlands arepredominantly endowed with livestock resources. Atpresent, most of the Samburu people keep cattle, sheep,and goats. Pastoralism is the most prominent activity inthe district, taking up more than 90% of the land.

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The division of labour between the sexes and the agesorganizes the daily livestock keeping activities of theSamburu. Uncircumcised boys and girls graze theanimals. The circumcised young men are admitted tothe age set and are supposed to maintain the localsecurity. After marriage, old men are in control of thefamily and animals. Girls are married off immediatelyafter circumcision. This ranges from the age of 12 years.Women not only maintain households but also checkand milk the animals every morning and evening. TheSamburu mainly live on milk. Their staple food is thestock products like yoghurt, butter, boiled meat, androasted meat. Cattle blood is drawn to drink sometimesmixed with milk or meat. Clothes, footwear, ropes, andbed sheets are made of animal’s skins. The communityplaster’s their house walls with cowpat.

To the Samburu, the livestock are important not only asa means of subsistence but also as a means of socialcommunications. For example, if a person gives acastrated sheep to another person, they call each other‘paker’ which means “a castrated sheep” without referringto their proper names. In the Samburu community,livestock can be a medium of the social ties. Withoutpaying dowry in form of livestock as bride wealth to thefiancé’s family, a man cannot marry in the Samburusociety. Likewise, to undergo initiation, it is mandatoryfor a Samburu to perform rites of passage. In most cases,the rites involve livestock and or livestock’s products.For example, when sons and daughters are gettingcircumcised, a village elder has to smear butter on thehead of the boy/girl’s father.

Initiation is done in age grades of about five years, withthe new “class” of boys becoming warriors, or morans(il-murran). The moran status involves two stages, juniorand senior. After serving five years as junior morans, the

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group goes through anaming ceremony,becoming senior moransfor six years. After thisperiod, the seniormorans are free to marryand join the council ofthe junior elders.

Samburu people arevery independent andegalitarian. Communitydecisions are made bymen (senior or bothsenior and junior elders),often under a treedesignated as a ‘council’meeting site. Women may sit in an outer circle andusually will not speak directly in the open council, butmay convey a comment or concern through a malerelative. However, women may have their own ‘council’discussions and then carry the results of suchdiscussions to men for consideration in the men’s council.

The Samburu traditional religion is based onacknowledgment of the Creator God, whom they callNkai, as do other Maa-speaking peoples. They think ofhim as living in the mountains around their land, such asMount Marsabit. They also believe in charms and havetraditional ritual for fertility, protection, healing and otherneeds. But it is common to have prayer directly to Nkaiin their public gatherings. Samburu and MaasaiChristians use traditional Maasai prayer patterns in prayerand worship. They also use the term Nkai for variousspirits related to trees, rocks and springs, and for thespirit of a person. They believe in an evil spirit calledmilika.

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The greatest hope of an old man approaching death isthe honour of being buried with his face toward a majesticmountain, the seat of Nkai. The Samburu are devout intheir belief in God. But they believe he is distant fromtheir everyday activities. Diviners (laibon / laibonok )predict the future and cast spells to affect the future.

Civilization has brought so many changes in the lifestyleto the Samburu community. People now eat not only thelivestock products but also agricultural products, whichare bought with cash. The skirt made of goatskin hasbeen replaced by the ready-made dresses. Plastic beadshave also replaced the necklace made of the doom palm.

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Chapter 3

The Pokot

The Pokot community does not have a single word torefer to conflict. A number of phrases are used to describeand understand the concept. Poriot refers to the actualfight/combat whereas siala, kwindan, porsyo denotesquarrels and general disagreements. Nevertheless, thecommunity defines conflict as disagreement between aman and his wife or wives, disputes between parentsand children or children amongst themselves especiallyconcerning inheritance issues. Competition over pasture,grazing land and water resources, often leading to cattlerustling or raids, is the Pokot definition of inter-ethnicconflicts.

Among the agro-pastoralists Pokot found in high potentialareas, access to land or outright land ownership isanother emerging description of conflicts. Land disputesare prevalent both at the community and inter-communitylevels.

The Pokot community has an elaborate and systematicmechanism of classifying and resolving their internalconflicts vis-à-vis external conflicts. For instance, it is aserious crime for a fellow Pokot to steal a goat or a cowfrom a fellow Pokot. Stealing cattle (cattle raids) fromother communities is culturally accepted and even notregarded as a crime. It is the moral obligation for Pokot

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warriors to raid other communities solely to restock theirlivestock especially after a severe drought or generallyfor dowry purposes.

3.1. Institutions of Conflict ManagementAmong the Pokot people, the family, the extended family,the clan and the council of elders (Kokwo) are the maininstitutions of conflict management and socio-politicalorganization of the community.

a) The FamilyAn ideal Pokot family is composed of the husband (headof the family institution), his wives and children. Thehusband’s authority in the family is unquestionable. Heis the overall administrator of family matters and propertyincluding bride price, inheritance and where applicable,land issues.

b) The Extended Family and NeighbourhoodThe extended family is made up of the nucleus family,in-laws and other relatives. All matters that transcendnucleus family are discussed at the extended family fora.The extended family serves as an appellate court tofamily matters. In some instances neighbours (porror)are called to arbitrate family disputes or disputes betweenneighbours.

c) The Council of Elders (Kokwo)The Kokwo is the highest institution of conflictmanagement and socio-political stratum among thePokot community. Kokwo is made up of respected, wiseold men who are knowledgeable in community affairsand history. The elders are also good orators andeloquent public speakers who are able to use proverbsand wisdom phrases to convince the meeting or theconflicting parties to a truce. Every village is representedin the council of elders. Senior elderly women contribute

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to proceedings in a Kokwo while seated. Womenparticipate in such meetings as documentalists so as toprovide reference in future meetings. They can advisethe council on what to do and what not to do citing prioroccurrence or cultural beliefs. Before a verdict is made,women are asked to voice their views and opinions. TheKokwo observes the rule of natural justice. Both theaccused and the accuser are allowed to narrate theirstory before the panel. Traditional lawyers (eloquentmembers representing the plaintiff and defence) canspeak on behalf of the conflicting parties. The Kokwodeals with major disputes and issues and is mandatedto negotiate with other communities especially for peace,cease-fire, grazing land/pastures and water resources.The Kokwo is the highest traditional court and its verdictis final.

3.2 Types, Prevention and Management of InternalConflictsImposing heavy fines and severe punishment has provedto be an effective method of preventing conflicts withinthe Pokot community. For instance, the practice ofpunishing the whole family or clan if one member commitsmurder, is in itself a prohibitive measure. In case ofadultery, the fine is higher than the normal bride pricerendering the act economically and socially unviable. Inaddition, the purification process is tedious andfrustrating. The culprit is ridiculed in public and may beexcommunicated from the community.

Although there is a marked absence of an elaboratemechanism or practice discouraging the Pokot fromengaging in acts of external conflicts, prohibitive finesreinforced by superstitious beliefs, norms and tabooshave played a key role in controlling an upsurge of internalconflicts.

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a) Domestic ConflictsLike any other community, domestic quarrels do existamong the Pokot people. At the family level, disputes dooccur between the family members. A man and his wifeor wives might quarrel over issues such as lateness, poormilking skills, selfishness, and disobedience or generallaziness. If a man fails to provide food for his wife orwives, disputes arise. In polygamous homes (mostfamilies are polygamous), a husband might be accusedof spending too much time in a certain house (wife). Thewives might also pick quarrels among themselves andso can their children.

Inheritance is another prominent cause of domesticconflict among the Pokot. It is a customary principle thatmale children are entitled to their father’s propertyespecially when they are about to break-off from thefamily to start their own homes. In such cases, somechildren might claim that the property was unevenlydistributed. In polygamous families, a woman might inciteher male children to demand certain things from theirfather to match her co-wife’s children. In isolated cases,a man might refuse to hand over part or all of his propertyto his children advising them to seek their own by raidingneighbouring communities. Inheritance disputes alsoarise after the death of the head of the family. How toshare and or manage the deceased property normallygenerates disputes since there are no written wills.

Sharing of dowry earned from marrying off a daughter isanother source of domestic conflict in Pokot community.However, there is an elaborate rule or procedure ofdetermining who gets what. Nevertheless, quarrelsemerge during the process of sharing the dowry.

Domestic conflicts are resolved at the family level. Thehead of the family arbitrates such cases and where he is

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an interested party or the accused, extended family canbe called to arbitrate the dispute. Neighbours can alsoarbitrate domestic quarrels if called upon to do so. Issuesthat cannot be conclusively or adequately resolved atthe family level are referred to the council of elders(Kokwo). There is no prescribed form of punishment forany given kind of crime committed at the domestic level.It varies from household to household and solelydetermined by family members.

b) TheftsTheft cases are prevalent and lead to conflicts within thePokot community. This is a crime punishable by a rangeof fines including death. Interestingly, the Pokotcommunity regards stealing from a fellow Pokot as aserious crime whereas stealing from other communitiesis not a crime but a just cultural practice of restocking.Livestock (cattle, goats, sheep, and camels) are the moststolen property among the Pokot people. Grains, poultry,clothes, spears, arrows and shields are rarely stolen.

Theft cases are normally arbitrated at the KokwoSupreme Court. When an individual or family losessomething (a goat, sheep, cow, bull, steer, grain, poultry,camel, beer, gourd or money), the first thing that is doneis to make the loss publicly known. At the same timeinvestigations are undertaken with the help of wise menwho cast skin sandals to tell which direction the stolenitem is, and the sex, age, and colour of the suspectedthief. Circumstantial evidence is sought includingfootprints of the thief. If somebody shows up and admitsguilt, he or she is fined accordingly. As noted earlier, thereare no hard and fast rules guiding the fine. The fine isdecided upon at the whims of the elders. If nobody ownsup, a Kokwo is convened. However, the punishmentbecomes severe if the Kokwo proves you guilty.

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If no suspect is arrested, or in some instances wherethe suspect refuses to admit guilt, the elders announcethat a ‘satan’ (onyot) might have committed the crimeand the community is given a grace period of two weeksbefore the ‘satan’ is condemned to death in a traditionalritual. During the grace period, parents are expected togrill their children and relatives in the hope of finding theculprit in order to avert the catastrophe that might bemeted on the family if one of them is responsible for thetheft. If the two weeks elapse and still nobody admitsguilt, the Kokwo reconvenes and a date of performing(muma) is scheduled.

i) MumaMuma is an act of witchcraft. It is however culturallyacceptable due to the fact that it is done in daylight. Itonly targets the ‘satan’ and the community is informed inadvance. Currently, a permit to perform the ritual is soughtfrom the government making it legitimate. It is used forthe good of society and not to harm innocent individuals.

The complainant is asked to avail a steer (castrated bull,preferably not white in colour) and traditional beer(pketiis) for the ritual. On the material day, a last minuteappeal is made to whoever might have committed thecrime. If nobody admits guilt, one of the respected eldersannounces that the culprit (satan) who has terrorizedthe community is about to be witched for the interest ofthe community.

A red-hot spear is used to kill the availed steer by piercingit around the chest (heart). The red-hot spear, which looksnow reddish due to blood from the steer, is pointedtowards the sun while elders murmur words, condemningthe thief (onyot) to death including members of his orher family and clan. The meat is roasted, eaten and itsremains (bones and skin) are burnt to ashes, buried or

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thrown into a river. Anybody who interferes with the steer’sremains is also cursed to death.

The effects of the muma are so devastating that it canwipe out members of the whole clan if not reversed. Aftersometime, death will visit members of the familyresponsible for the theft and they start dying one by one.Interestingly, only men die as a result of muma. Theafflicted family or clan members convene a Kokwo andplead to pay back what was reported stolen so as tostop more deaths. The elders convene and a steer isslaughtered eaten and the affected family members arecleansed using traditional beer, milk and honey. Theelders reverse the rite and further deaths cease.

Muma acts as a deterrent to theft and other crimes inPokot society. The process is scaring and its effectsdreadful. Nobody would like to be caught in it. It is aneffective preventive measure to internal conflicts amongthe Pokots.

ii) MutaatMutaat is just like muma. It is another way of cursingand bewitching thieves in the society. Mutaat isspecifically directed at thieves unlike muma, which canapply to other crimes in society like adultery and propertydisputes.

Before mutaat is performed, the initial processesundertaken during muma are carried out. Only specificelders perform the mutaat ritual. Currently permit toperform the ritual is sought from the government (chiefs)thus validating and legitimising the ritual. Like muma,mutaat is directed towards the ‘satan’ and is performedin daylight. The whole community participates.

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During the ritual, specific elders collect soil, put it insidea pot, and mix it with meat from a steer and otherundisclosed ingredients. (The respondents were not sureof or refused to divulge the nature of the concoction).The elders murmur words to the effect that before theculprit dies, he or she should open his or her mouth (talkabout the crime). The ritual is carried out in a secludedplace. The pot, with its contents, is buried and peopledispatch waiting for the results.

After a period of time, the contents of the pot decompose.This heralds that somebody or groups of people are aboutto die. And immediately, the thief or thieves die one byone while admitting that he or she is the one who stolethe property in question. The family of the deceasedimmediately convenes a Kokwo pleading to pay backwhat was stolen so as to reverse the curse and saveother members of the family. A cleansing ritual similar tothat done during muma is performed.

c) AdulteryAdultery is another cause of conflict within the Pokotcommunity. An adulterous person is considered uncleanand is subjected to strenuous rituals of cleansing themoment proved guilty or caught in the act. Fornicationalso attracts a harsh penalty. In such situation, the facevalue (dowry) of such a girl is drastically reduced. Amongthe Pokot, high importance is attached to a girl’s virginityand is used to determine the bride price.

Rape is a relatively new phenomenon among the Pokot.The line between adultery and outright rape is so blurredthat you cannot openly talk of the two. For the purposesof this study, rape is treated as adultery since therespondents refused to admit its existence.

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Adultery cases are handled by the Kokwo. Where thereis enough evidence to prove that somebody slept withsomebody’s wife, a Kokwo is immediately convened.

i) Amaa / nwata /ighaaIf the two parties were caught in the act or admit doing it,then no time will be wasted. The man responsible forthe act is fined heavily, amaa, (pays cattle more thanbride price that was paid for the woman) and is told tocleanse (mwata, ighaa) the family of the affected man.Interestingly the responsible woman is not fined but isbeaten by her husband. The mwata / ighaa cleansingritual is performed using contents of a goat’s intestinesmixed with honey and milk.

ii) KikeematIf the suspect pleads not guilty, the case will be arguedin the traditional court (Kokwo). Both sides can enlistservices of traditional lawyers and circumstantialevidence can be adduced to help the elders establishthe truth. If the couple insists that they did not committhe crime, then the Kokwo requests them to undress.Their clothes (skin clothes) are washed, mixed with someundisclosed concoctions and then drained. The two areasked to drink the resultant liquid. At this point, if oneparty admits guilt, he or she is saved the trouble ofdrinking the mixture leaving the adamant party to drinkthe concoction. The ritual is known as kikeemat.

If kikeemat was performed till completion and theaccused man was guilty and refused to own up,catastrophes will befall his family and if the situation isnot reversed, (ama followed by kikeemat) the man willdie. After death of the suspected man, his family willconvene a Kokwo, pay an adultery fine and cleanse thefamily of the aggrieved man.

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Kikeemat is also used in witchcraft cases. The onlydifference is that the suspects’ clothes are washed, mixedwith some herbs and the said suspects forced to drinkthe solution. Like adultery, the suspect if indeed was awitch would die.

d) MurderThe Pokot people regard murder as the act of terminatingsomebody’s life intentionally or accidentally. Killing afellow Pokot tribesman is an atrocious crime that leadsto the punishment of the whole clan or the extendedfamily of the culprit. Murderers are regarded as outcastsin the community and are not allowed to mingle withothers until and unless traditional purification (cleansing)rituals are performed. However, it is not a big deal for aPokot to kill a person(s) from other tribe(s). In such acase, the killer is regarded as a hero and special tattoosare etched on his body as a sign of honour and respect.

In murder cases, the accused may not deny if he or shewas caught in the act. However, the possibility of asuspect denying the charge exists. These scenarios arehandled differently.

i) LapayLapay is sought if the suspect admits killing or was seenmurdering the deceased. Lapay is a fine or compensationin murder cases. Where lapay is administered, the familyand clan members of the deceased take all the propertyof the murderer including that of his clan. Lapay is acollective punishment. The whole clan pays for the sinsof an individual. Its collective nature makes it a deterrentand preventive measure for murder.

Lapay is an interesting method of seeking justice in thecommunity. If a murder occurs within a family, forinstance, a man kills his brother, then the family/clan of

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the wife will demand that you pay for the blood of theirslain relative. One loses a family member and at thesame time all his property is taken.

There is no standard fine for murder. The fine is largelycircumstantial. A heavier penalty will be administered ifthe deceased was married than if the victim was single.Also, if your bull kills somebody then you will be liable tolapay. Women victims attract a lenient fine.

ii) KokwoIf a suspect pleads not guilty to a murder charge, a Kokwois convened and the case is argued with both sidesgetting ample time to argue their case. Circumstantialevidence is adduced before the court. If the traditionalcourt proves the suspect guilty, lapay is prescribed asthe judgement. The family of the deceased immediatelyassumes ownership of the murderer’s property togetherwith that of his clan. In case the court fails to prove thatthe suspect is guilty, and the plaintiffs argue that thesuspect has a case to answer, then muma is prescribed.This is the last resort.

e) Land DisputesLand disputes are a relatively new phenomenon amongthe agro-pastoralists Pokot. This kind of conflict is morepronounced in agriculturally productive and settled placesand also along riverine areas where crop farming/furrowirrigation is practiced. Among the pastoralists, land is acommunal property and is administered by elders forthe benefit of the whole community. This is also reinforcedby the fact that their land is generally arid making nomadicpastoralism the only suitable means of livelihood. Thequestion of land ownership is seen as an impediment tonomadism and a capitalist lifestyle in a community whichis essentially socialist.

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In the high potential areas, land has been adjudicatedand given to individuals as private property. This has notonly bred conflicts within the community but is alsoresponsible for the escalating inter-ethnic conflicts inKenya. At the family level, land conflicts might plungethe whole family into chaos that could lead to death.

Land and other minor disputes in Pokot community aredealt with at different levels. Land disputes betweenfamily members are solved by the family, extended family,the immediate neighbours and where necessary at theKokwo . Agreements and verdicts are based onconsensus. Kokwo is the Supreme Court and nobodycan appeal against its ruling. However, based on new oremergent evidence, the Kokwo can be reconvened todeliberate on the matter based on the new evidence.

f) WitchcraftWitchcraft is not tolerated in Pokotland. Witches arecategorised with murderers in the community anddeserve to die in the most painful way possible. Conflictsdo arise when certain individuals, family or clan membersare suspected to be witches. Whenever a calamityoccurs, blame is apportioned to the suspected witchesand this might breed hatred, animosity and eventualviolence in the community. Families or clans that aresuspected to be witches or harbouring witches are notallowed to participate in important cultural rituals andceremonies.

From the foregoing, it can be inferred that the prohibitivefines, the collective nature of some of the punishments,and the strenuous process involved in purification makesPokot customary methods of conflict managementpreventive and highly respected. However, the majordrawback is that this method can’t be applied to otherethnic groups thus limiting its impacts and efficacy to

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community level. Nevertheless, it has put the Pokot socialfabric closely knit.

3.3. Pokot Inter-ethnic ConflictsConflicts with other communities is best manifestedthrough cattle rustling, a practice that has ravaged theGreater Horn of Africa. All other forms of inter-ethnicconflicts are pegged on cattle rustling and expansivetendencies of the Pokot people. The community is inconstant conflicts with neighbouring Turkana,Karamojang, Marakwet, Sabiny and Bukusucommunities. Karamojang and Sabiny communities arein Uganda but they regularly raid the Kenyan Pokot. Thisis the region where cattle have been stolen and movedso many times that it is difficult to ascertain the rightfuloriginal owners.

3.3.1. Causes of Inter-ethnic ConflictsThe Pokot community has advanced a number ofreasons to explain the increasing cases of cattle rustlingand inter-ethnic conflicts. Cattle rustling is permitted if itis intended for restocking especially after a period ofsevere drought or disease outbreak. Meanwhile warriorsare under pressure to raise enough cattle for dowrypurposes, which can be as high as 100 cattle. Thistraditional culture is amplified by stereotypes andprejudices which depict other communities as inferior interms of military superiority. Turkana and Karamojangare considered as lesser men for they don’t circumcisetheir boys.

Competition over scarce pasture, dwindling grazing landas a result of expanding agricultural land and waterresources are perhaps the main causes of conflictbetween Pokot and her neighbours. The community isin constant conflict with the Karamojang, Turkana andSabiny communities owing to scarcity of resources.

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The flow of arms into the hands of Pokot warriors hasincreased the severity of conflicts. Pokot proximity toUganda and southern Sudan’s gun merchants has madeguns easily available and cheap to acquire. A study bySecurity Research and Information Centre (SRIC)Profiling Small Arms and Light Weapons in the NorthRift, reports that there are over 44,710 assorted rifles inPokot land. This situation has commercialised cattlerustling. The urge to own a gun and ammunition has ledto raids. The proceeds from stolen animals are used toacquire guns. Barter trade also takes place whereanimals are exchanged for guns.

Land conflicts between Pokot community and herneighbours is another manifestation of inter-ethnicconflicts. History has it that the Pokot community waschased away from the current Trans Nzoia district tocreate the white highlands. Upon independence the postcolonial administration settled other communities in theformer white highlands and the Pokot communitycontinued to live in the dry, arid and rocky present dayhome. Pokot’s conflict with the Bukusu in Trans Nzoia isan offshoot of the bitter memories of their ancestralgrazing land.

Political incitement is another relatively new dimensionof inter-ethnic. Political leaders are on record as havingincited Pokot-Marakwet conflicts in the Kerio valley. Thisconflict became pronounced immediately after the dawnof political pluralism in Kenya in the early 90s. Marakwetcommunity was seen as betraying the larger Kalenjinpolitical destiny as they were leaning towards the politicalpluralists.

The respondents also cited insensitive governmentpolicies as a cause of inter-ethnic conflicts between Pokot

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and her neighbours. The Pokot community is consideredas embracing illogical cultural attachment to large herdsof animals, which is environmentally destructive. Thedistrict is least developed, further reinforcing theargument that government’s development plans favoursome districts.

Women, especially girls among the Pokot are a knowncatalyst of conflicts. They sing war songs that praisesuccessful warriors and ridicule those considered asunder performers in cattle raids. Warriors who have killedenemy forces are spoon-fed by girls and given specialgoatskin clothes (atele) as a sign of honour. Bravewarriors are also smeared with special oil made frommilk or animal fat on their foreheads. Such practiceswould prompt warriors to engage in cattle raids and killas many enemy warriors as possible.

3.3.2. Prevention of Inter-ethnic Conflictsa) Traditional Early Warning

Traditional early warning among the Pokot communityinvolves collection of sensitive intelligence informationconcerning other communities’ security and externalthreats. A number of methods are employed in collectingand disseminating military information to the communityso as to take preventive measures.

Casting of skin sandals by knowledgeable and expertcommunity elders can foretell an impending attack onthe community. Other elders can verify such informationand if similar findings are obtained, then the intelligencereport is disseminated to the community. To foretell animpending strike, such experts often consult intestinesof goats. Such information is very accurate and thecommunity members adhere to it. In such a situation,the community members are advised to move away fromdanger spots together with their livestock. Warriors are

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stationed in strategic places to ward off possible attacksor engage in pre-emptive strikes. To back up the earlywarning information, a ritual called putyon is performed.Based on the collected and analysed intelligenceinformation, the elders advice the community to sacrificea goat of a specific colour to the gods so as to protectthe community fromexternal attacks.Warriors also spytheir territory for anyforeign footprints. Incase of suspiciousfootprints, theinformation is relayedback to thecommunity forappropriate action.

b) NegotiationsTo protect the community from external aggression,Pokot elders initiate negotiations with enemycommunities and plead for peace to prevail. Suchmeetings are high level and involve respected communityelders from both sides. The elders table the collectedintelligence information while negotiating for peace. Ifconvinced that the consultations are genuine especiallywhen there is a traditional peace pact (miss) betweenthe said communities, the respective elders promise togo back home and advice their warriors (ngoroko) toabandon the planned raid.

During the meeting, neutral communities can berequested to act as mediators and arbitrators. Decisionsare arrived at by a consensus. Among other things, theelders come up with a compensation scheme to appeaseaffected communities. The scheme serves as apreventive measure to future conflicts. For instance, the

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elders can agree that the concerned community will pay100 cattle to the family of the slain person ascompensation. The compensation scheme is not uniform.It differs from community to community. For example,between the Pokot and Turkana communities, thecompensation is currently 100 for every killed personwhile between the Pokot and Marakwet, the Kolowodeclaration puts the figure at 40 cows.

c) MissMiss is a peace pact signed by two or more warringcommunities. The decision to enter into a peace pact isarrived at after lengthy inter-community negotiations.Miss is tricky in that the signatory communities more oftenthan not enter for strategic material gains rather than forpeace. The Pokot community enters into peace pactsmostly during dry seasons. The pact allows them accessto pasture and water in the neighbouring communities.When the rainy season sets in, there is a high likelihoodthat the pact will be flouted.

After the elders agree that a peace pact is to be brokered,the communities are asked to donate bulls, milk, honeyand come with instruments of death. During the materialday of the ritual, the donated steers are slaughtered. Allthe instruments of death i.e. spears, arrows, bows,knives, swords etc are collected, destroyed and areburried in a pit with a mixture of milk, honey, traditionalbeer and intestinal fluids. The mixture is then buried whileelders from the concerned communities verbalise cursesto whoever flouts the just brokered pact.

The peace between the Pokot and Samburucommunities is attributed to a miss ceremony that wasbrokered hundred of years ago at around Mt. Elgon. ThePokot have also enjoyed cordial relationship withMatheniko sub tribe of the larger Karamojang community

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and also with the Ugandan Sabiny courtesy of miss ,which was brokered in year 2000. However, miss thathas been brokered between Pokot and Turkana, otherKaramojang tribes and Marakwet community has beenflouted with impunity reason being the miss was brokeredfor convenience (access to pasture and water resourcesduring droughts). Nevertheless miss is a very reliablemethod of preventing inter-ethnic conflicts.

d) WomenWomen can prevent inter-ethnic conflicts in a number ofways. Among the Pokot, there is a belief that a womancan protect her son from external harm of any kind bywearing a birth belt called leketio. Leketio is a belt, whichsupports pregnancy hence life. The belt is studded withcowry shells. Leketio is considered as a powerful charmthat protects children from harm. Before warriors set outfor a raid, each of them informs his mother so that shecan wear the belt while he is away. To prevent conflicts,women refuse to wear the belts prompting the warrior toabandon the mission. Women could also lay their beltsin front of warriors who are about to go for a raid. Crossinga leketio is considered a curse. For instance, whenfighting is raging, a woman may remove her leketio andlay it between the fighting men. The fight ceasesimmediately. The concept of using pregnancy belt to haltor prevent conflicts is the same in all the 18 Kalenjin subtribes.

e) Elders/soothsayersBefore warriors go for raiding expeditions, elders and orsoothsayers normally bless them. The elders can preventconflicts by refusing to bless the warriors.

f) NatureNature can prevent conflicts in a number of ways. Whenwarriors are about to go for raids and one of them falls

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sick suddenly, it is interpreted as a sign of bad lack andthe mission has to be aborted. Similarly, if a tree falls onthe path of warriors on a raiding journey, the mission isabandoned. Also, certain animals are regarded as signsof bad luck and if they are encountered, the mission isaborted.

4.5. Strengths of Pokot Customary Mechanisms ofConflict ManagementBased on the efficacy of Pokot traditional methods ofconflict management, the respondents preferred it to themodern judicial system. A number of strengths of thesystem have been pointed out. Traditional conflictresolution methods are preventive and deterrentmeasures of conflicts both within and without thecommunity. Most of the rituals performed during theconflict management process are horrifying, strenuousand expensive and such are avoided. This has beenreinforced by cultural beliefs, taboos, norms andsuperstitions that further make the mechanisms bindingand adhered to.

The penalties, fines and compensations imposed bycustomary courts (Kokwo) are very severe and prohibitivemaking it a perfect mechanism of preventing intra andinter-ethnic conflicts and crimes. The collective natureof some of the punishments places the role of preventing

conflicts at thefamily andclan levelenlisting thesupport ofeverybody inthe clan.O a t h sadministeredd u r i n g

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cleansing rituals are also very scary and expensive andso are the curses.

Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms are free ofcorruption and graft related incidences that have marredthe integrity of modern judicial system. The traditionalsystem is also accessible, culturally acceptable andmorally binding. The rule of natural justice is observedand nobody is condemned unheard. The system isregarded as community owned as it is backed and basedon customary law, norms and culture.

3.6 Weaknesses of the Pokot Traditional ConflictResolution MethodsThe role and efficacy of the Pokot traditional conflictresolution mechanism has been greatly eroded,marginalized, and diminished by modern civilization anddevelopment thinking. The system is regarded as anarchaic, barbaric and outdated mode of arbitration. Theemergence and institutionalisation of modern courtssystem has greatly marginalized traditional conflictmanagement system among the Pokot people.

Lack of proper and efficient enforcement instruments andmechanisms has reduced the relevance of Pokotcustomary methods of dispute administration. Apart fromcurses, there is no prescribed system of enforcing rulingsby council of elders courts.

External factors and opportunist tendencies largelyinfluence customary methods of brokered peace. Forinstance, the Pokot community would broker peace pact(miss) with other communities if the pact will meet theirethnocentric desires. The Pokot people normally brokermiss during dry spell so as to enable them access certaindry-season pasture and grazing resources. The pact isflouted as soon as rains start.

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Among the Pokot, deterrent methods of conflictprevention are only applicable to community membersand not other communities. It is believed that you cannotcurse non-Pokot people. This belief limits the impact ofthe traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

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Chapter 4

Just like the Pokot, Karamojang, Toposa, or the Merille,the Turkana community is endowed with elaborate andsystematic mechanisms and institutions of conflictmanagement both within and without the community. Toget a good grasp of Turkana community institutions ofconflict resolution, it is necessary that we understandthe community’s socio-political organization that formsthe basis of customary methods of conflict resolution.

4.1. Turkana Understanding of ConflictThe Turkana community does not have a single wordthat defines conflict. The word arem, which meansconfrontation, violence or absence of peace, is widelyused to define conflicts among the Turkana. Aremusiorefers to insecurity; ejie is the actual fight or combatwhereas egurgur refers to quarrels and or disagreements.In a nutshell, the respondents defined conflict asdisagreements, quarrels, fights or cattle raids betweenindividuals, groups of people, families, and clans oroutside communities.

Warfare is an essential part of social life Turkana. Thiscondition was as valid in the past as it is today given thatthe interaction between the Turkana and the surroundingcommunities continues to be hostile and violent. But

Turkana

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even within the Turkana community, conflicts still arisearound matters ranging from family issues to issuesconcerning other sub-tribes.

4.2 Customary Institutions of Conflict ManagementThe socio-political organization of the Turkanacommunity and customary institutions of conflictmanagement can be summed up as the extended family,neighbourhood (clan) and tribe. The extended familyincludes relatives living in a group of huts around arecognised authority, the head of the homestead. Ahomestead may comprise of the head with his wife orwives and children, his ageing parents and a few in-lawswho are dependants. The homestead when joined withother closely-knit households forms a kraal or adakar.The Kraal is always under the leadership of one of theelders.

a) The Extended FamilyThe nuclear family comprises the husband, wife or wives,and children. The aging parents, in-laws, relatives andother dependants form the extended family, the basicsocio-political institution and mechanism of conflictmanagement. The extended family is the first institutionof conflict management.

b) The ClanThe clan is the second level of socio-politicalarrangement of the Turkana community. The clan is madeup of a number of closely-knit families collectivelygrouped under one name (enachar). Enachar is anexogenous group of people with their own customs. Thename is usually associated with a certain riverbed. Intotal, the Turkana community is made up of fifteen clans.Members of the same clan do not inter-marry but canmarry across the clans.

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a) The TribeThe tribe is perhaps the highest socio-politicalorganization and hierarchy of the Turkana community.As earlier indicated, the Turkana community is made upof fifteen clans. The community is divided into territorialsub-sections along clan divisions. Each sub-section(clan) has different territorial grazing zones. The tribe isthe highest organ and Supreme Court in the land. It ismandated to broker inter-community peace pacts,negotiate for peace, grazing land, water resources andcompensation arrangements. The tribe is the custodianof the community land, resources and customary law.

4.3. Turkana Internal ConflictsIn the Turkana community, conflicts often occur withinand between families, within and between clans, andbetween age-sets. Turkana internal conflicts are centredon family disputes, clan rivalries over scarce pastureresources, and sheer acts of egoism. These can beclassified as domestic, clan, or inter-clan conflicts. Forthe purposes of this study, adultery and murder areclassified as relational and criminal conflicts respectively.The following are the main types of internal conflictsamong the Turkana people.

a) Domestic ConflictsFamily related conflicts can be disputes betweenhusband and wife or wives, parents and children ormisunderstandings amongst members of the extendedfamily. Domestic conflicts also emanate from inheritanceof property and wives, and the right to share the salaryof a working family member (current wage labourscenario). Concerning issues of inheritance, young menwho are eager to inherit their father’s property may bedespised as lazy, poor and keen to take the easy wayout in life. Conflicts may also arise over who shouldinherit the wife/wives upon death of the husband because

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this will also entail inheriting the property (livestock) ofthe late husband.

Inter-family conflicts often arise over ownership of waterpoints, particularity during drought periods when wells(echor) and springs dry up. Families whose well havedried up seek water from active wells belonging to otherpeople. However, the clans with active wells may deny‘outsiders’ access to the water point, thereby generatingdisputes.

b) Clan conflictsThe Turkana community is divided into fifteen territoriesalong clans. Each clan has its grazing zones.Negotiations must precede accessing grazing land andwatering point of the other clans. Where this is not done,conflict is bound to occur and this is one of themanifestations of inter-clan conflicts.

Major clan related conflicts take two forms. Inter-clancompetition for access to pasture and arable land, andon the other hand disputes over theft of livestock or unfairsharing of raided animals or bride price.

Invasion of clan pastureland by another clan is acontravention of customary protocol. This can triggerintense inter-clan fights. Such disputes over pasture(ngingia) are exacerbated if it is established that the herdof the invading clan has animals suffering an infectiousdisease. Inter-clan conflicts also occur when clans jostlefor arable land to cultivate and grow cereals such asmaize, millet and sorghum. Yields from these food cropsare an important source of food to supplement animalproducts in the household.

Inter-clan disputes over theft of livestock are a newdevelopment in Turkana. This is occasional and involves

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youth who steal livestock, sell, and then disappear.Traditionally, theft of property or internal raids were highlydiscouraged and disdained. It is a curse (ngilam) to raidfellow a Turkana. The few cases of internal animal theftarise due to poverty and possession of guns.

Currently however, disputes arise frequently amongfamilies and clans over the fair share of bridal wealth(ekimar). In addition, clan disputes occur over sharing ofthe loot after successful raids (lung’atara). Once thestolen animals are brought home, they become commonproperty for the raiding clans. Since there is no setformula for sharing the loot, conflicts arise overdifferences in allocation of animals to clans and families.

c) Other Internal ConflictsThere are some conflicts that cannot be classified aseither domestic or clan conflicts. They are bestconsidered as criminal acts that are not tolerated in thesociety. These include adultery and rape (atikonor). Inboth cases, the men involved are heavily punished.Women are regarded as property and are rarelypunished. A girl who is raped loses value and will fetchfewer livestock (bride wealth) upon marriage.

Murder is a serious crime among the Turkana people. Itis handled outside the precincts of domestic or clanconflicts.

4.4 Prevention and Management of Internal ConflictsAccording to the Turkana community, prevention andmanagement of internal conflict is solely the responsibilityof the individuals involved, their families or clans andtheir age sets. The head of these units (i.e. family, clanor age set) plays an important role in preventing andresolving internal conflicts. Some of the methods and

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mechanisms of preventing and managing Turkanainternal conflicts are:

♦ Education and SocializationThe Turkana prevent internal conflicts and disputesthrough education and socialisation. For example, themock fights (etaparath) and mock dance (etum) are usedto inculcate a sense of societal harmony (enikitene) andunity and thus prevent individuals from developing anti-social behaviours. If a member of the society adopts anunbecoming behaviour, emissaries are sent to theconcerned family and seek ways of rectifying thewayward member of the family are sought.

♦ The Tree of Men (Ekitoe Ng’ekeliok)When intra-ethnic disputesoccur, they arei m m e d i a t e l yreferred to thecouncil of elders’,which is alsoreferred to as the‘tree of men’(Ng’ekeliok). Thecouncil iscomposed of

clan representatives and all the respected leaders in theneighbourhood (adakar). At a typical ‘tree of men’, eldersplay the stone-counting and scoring game (ngikiles), dowood carving and hold discussions. Any matter aboutthe community is reported at the ‘tree of men’ wherediscussions are held and decisions made. Very manyissues are discussed, hunger or starvation, raids, lackof pasture and water for livestock, impending droughtand many others.

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In conflict situations the involved parties and witnessesare summoned. However, the procedure andproceedings are highly informal and the gathering canbe convened anywhere at any time. The men can meetat watering points, in the grazing pasture, under the shadeof a tree, at a dance or at a feast. The ‘tree of men’ willlisten to the conflicting parties/individuals, weigh adducedevidence and pronounce the verdict accordingly.Punishment and or fines to be imposed are thenadministered as per the crime committed.

In the Turkana community, public opinion is highlyrespected. Consequently, members of the public are notshut out from informal gatherings (Nge’keliok) todeliberate on personal or family matters. The ideals ofsocietal harmony and group solidarity often prevail overindividual interests.

♦ Fines and CompensationsGiven the cohesive nature of the Turkana society, andthe fact that the resolution of intra-ethnic disputes issimple, hardly any controversy arises on the kind ofpunishment to be administered or the obligatoryresponsibilities of the guilty party. Every crime has apredetermined compensation, which can also benegotiated depending on social and economiccircumstances of the guilty party. Each compensation isbroken down to its equivalent in number and type ofanimals.

a) Murder/AkibutMurder is regarded as a serious crime among theTurkana people. If proved guilty beyond any reasonabledoubt, the murderer is fined heavily depending on thesex and marital status of the slain. For a man, 30 animals(cows or camels) are paid as compensation whereas 60animals are paid for an unmarried woman. A married

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woman is compensated with 40 animals. The reasonadvanced for the variation between a married and a singlewoman is that the higher compensation for the lattercovers the would have been bride price and the murder.Compensation for men does not change with maritalstatus. Unlike in other communities, women attract ahigher compensation fee.

The murderer is expected to meet the cost of the fine.However family members are free to assist. Neither theextended family nor the clan are held responsible formurder committed by one of their own. As a last resort, ifdue to poverty or any other reason the murderer fails topay the compensation, he or she is killed. A member ofthe bereaved family is asked to kill the murderer to offsetthe crime. It becomes a case of tit for tat.

After the compensation, a cleansing ritual (Akibel Akoit)is performed to clean the murderer for having shedinnocent blood. The murderer provides a white goat. Itis slaughtered and the femur bone (areten) removed.The killer and one of the family members of the murderedhold the areten together and break it using a stonemurmuring the words “let it end here”. Then they suckand eat the bone marrow. This ritual avows that therewill be no revenge and that the two families will liveharmoniously.

In instances where the suspected murderer refuses toadmit guilt, a skull of a human being is filled with bloodfrom a brown bull. Normally the ear of the bull, donatedby the bereaved family, is chopped off and the bloodcollected in the skull. A stick of Engeso tree is inserted inthe skull. The razor blade that was used to shave theforeheads of the bereaved family members (among theTurkana, foreheads of bereaved family members areshaved clean) is placed on top of the skull. The chopped

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off ear is used to stir the contents of the skull. Theconflicting parties sprinkle the contents of the skull oneach other. This is repeated four consecutive times. Aftera week or so, if indeed the suspect committed the murder,he or she will die. This ritual is called aiyomit /asubes /akinyam / mumo.

b) Adultery/ElomitThe suspects are brought before the elders at the ‘treeof men’, beaten severely and at times burned with a red-hot livestock-branding tool. The aggrieved husband takesthe assets (livestock) of the culprit, as a form ofpunishment. To make the punishment more humiliating,the two are publicly stripped and forced to carry intestinesof a cow around the adakar murmuring the words toyon,toyon (calm, calm). This is done in the presence of themembers of the society. The suspects are whipped andridiculed in a very embarrassing manner. This humiliationforms part of the cleansing especially the word toyon,which is believed to restore calm in the home of thewronged man. The cleansing process is called akidakaboii while the fine is referred to as akirem / amudarejuron.

To reunite the woman who committed adultery with herhusband, another cleansing ritual is performed. Contentsof a goat’s intestines are smeared on the bodies of thecouple and the intestinal fat is tied on the hands and thenecks of the couple. After the ritual, they are declared fitenough to continue living as husband and wife.

c) RapeAs with other crimes, the rapist is brought before the‘tree of men’ and is beaten severely. The elders thenorder the rapist to slaughter one of his bulls to be eatenand in addition ordered to avail a white sheep or goat tobe used to purify the raped girl. The white animal is

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slaughtered and the rapist is told to smear the victimwith the intestinal fluids. No fine is imposed on the rapistbut if a pregnancy arises, ekichul is imposed. The fineamounts to 10 cows.

d) TheftsAmong the Turkana people, thieves are beaten in publicand ordered to return the stolen goods. A family canchoose to kill one of its members if it is publicly knownthat he or she is a thief. It is the price of avoidingembarrassments. However, if a Turkana steals as a resultof hunger (steal in order to eat), such a thief can beforgiven.

These fines and severe punishments have and continueto act as deterrent measures to Turkana internal conflicts.The rituals are undesirable. The Turkana people alsobelieve in curses. Cursing (ng’ilam) wrongdoers has to alarge extent prevented internal conflicts.

4.5. Turkana Inter-ethnic ConflictsAmong the pastoralists’ communities under focus,Turkana community is the hardest hit by inter-ethnicconflicts. This is partly explained by her geographicallocation (surrounded by hostile communities),proliferation of arms in the community as a result ofcontact with Menelik II of Ethiopia during colonial periodand proximity to war-torn neighbouring countries suchas Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, and the communities’expansionist tendencies and cultures. The communityis in conflict with Merille and Dong’iro to the north(Ethiopian border), Toposa to the northwest, Karamojangto the west, and Pokot and Samburu to the south. Thecommunity uses the word emoit, meaning an enemy, torefer to a non-Turkana person. All the other communitiesare regarded as enemies.

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5.6 Causes of Inter-ethnic ConflictsA number of factors have been advanced to explain thecauses of conflict between Turkana community and herneighbours. Most of these issues revolve around livestockownership and access to scarce natural resources.

♦ Cattle RaidsLike other pastoralists, Turkana community is culturallyattached to large herds of cattle. The community exudeserroneous belief that all livestock in this world belongs tothem. Other communities are not entitled to rearing animals.As such, it is their cultural obligation to raid all livestock. Inaddition to this belief, the Turkanas raid other communitiesto restock especially after severe droughts and or livestockdiseases. The respondents confirmed the culture of inter-ethnic cattle raids.

♦ Limited Natural ResourcesTurkana is one of the driest districts in Kenya. The districtis characterised by scarce natural resources. Competitionover the use of limited pasture, grazing land and waterresources between Turkana and her neighbours is perhapsthe major cause of inter-ethnic conflicts perpetrated as cattleraids. Most natural resources are found on the borderlineof the Turkana land thus posing inevitable clashes with theseneighbours. For instance, the Elemi triangle that is sharedbetween Turkana, Dong’iro and Merille is endowed withabundant resources. Competition over these resourcesexplains the rampant inter-ethnic conflicts between thesethree communities. In the south, the Turkana community isin constant clashes with their erstwhile neighbours the Pokotover grazing land around Turkwel and Kainuk areas.

♦ Cultural EgosAmong the Turkana, the importance attached to heroismcontributes to inter-ethnic conflicts. Heroes (ekaruang)are men/warriors singled out for special recognition for

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protecting the community. They are recognised for killingenemy soldiers. Those who kill the enemy are markedwith special tattoos to show that they are dangerous.The more tattoos are warrior gets, the more successfuland brave he is and commensurate cultural honour isbestowed upon him. Women, particularly young onesact as catalysts in encouraging inter-ethnic conflicts. Theysing in praise of raiders (akekutangen) who displaychopped genitals of the men they’ve killed. Heroes attractthe best of the girls in the village. Currently, girls onlytalk to men with guns, and not spears. The men perceivedas cowards are regarded as barking dogs.

Other neighbouring communities regard the Turkana meninferior culturally since they do not practice circumcision.This causes the Turkana to engage in deadly cattle raidsto prove their critics wrong.

♦ Trade disputesTrade disagreement between the Turkana and othercommunities is another cause of conflict. Being purepastoralists with a negligible population practising mixedfarming, the Turkana trade in farm products tosupplement their diet. It is difficult to agree on terms ofexchange between animals or animal products and farmproducts. Occasionally, this has generated seriousdisputes.

4.7 Prevention and Management of Turkana Inter-ethnic ConflictsLike other pastoralists, Turkana community relies on earlywarning and indigenous knowledge in preventingconflicts. It is argued that the Pokot community learnedtraditional early warning techniques of casting sandalsand reading intestines from the Turkana. Turkana eldersare the unmatched experts in early warning andindigenous information gathering. Some animals also

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send signals/warnings of animpending strike.For instance,certain birdsmake unusualnoises, donkeysshake their earssimultaneously,cows drink waterwhile kneelingand they alsopush theirtongues outwardsfacing upwards.Based on suchi n d i g e n o u si n t e l l i g e n c einformation, the community is advised to adopt measuresthat will prevent conflicts e.g. moving livestock away fromcertain danger spots or engaging in inter-communitydialogues.

Use of secret agents (ng’ikarebok and ng’irototin) togather relevant intelligence information is another methodused by the Turkana people to prevent and manageconflicts. The kind of information sought revolves aroundsuspicious foreign footprints, movement of neighbouringcommunities and location of their livestock. If suspiciousfootprints are noticed or suspicious movement of peopleand livestock is ascertained, the intelligence informationis relayed back to the community to take necessary pre-emptive and preventive measures.

Inter-community meetings and negotiations areextremely important in preventing inter-ethnic conflicts.During dry seasons, the Turkana engage in peace

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seeking missions with other communities. Often,abundant pasture and water points are found in grazinggrounds belonging to other communities. It is duringthis time that emissaries are used to perform quasi-diplomatic roles to reach a resource-sharing agreement.As such, it becomes absolutely necessary to negotiatefor a common framework of inter-cultural interaction inorder to avert inter-ethnic conflicts. Creating such aframework is the responsibility of emissaries. Based onthis framework, a joint understanding between the partiesis drawn up on modalities of access to pasture, grazingland, water and management of disputes that may arise.Such framework is what can be referred to as peacepacts (ekisil). If a decision to have ekisil between theconcerned communities is brokered, then traditionalrituals to confirm and reinforce the same accompany it.Like the Pokot and other pastoralists, weapons from theconcerned communities are collected, broken and orbended and buried with honey, traditional beer and milkwith other charms. To reinforce it, elders from all theconcerned sides curse whoever will flout the peace pact.

The decisions made by such pasture sharingarrangements meetings are transmitted by word ofmouth. The decision reached becomes the inter-culturalyardstick, tools and codes by which possible actions andreactions of individuals are measured.

Socialization and education is another mechanismadopted by the Turkana community to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts. Through socialisation, children realisethe importance of maintaining peace and harmony. Thechild is socialised not to provoke dispute, to avert conflictand to shun confrontation. The adverse consequencesof conflicts in the society are brought to their attentionthrough proverbs, epics, legends, songs (etum) andthrough narration of real life cases that produced

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prolonged suffering. The Turkana normative systemcontinuously urges the people to conform to communitynorms, avoid confrontations, and seek non-violent ways ofresolving disputes.

Conflicts between Turkana community and her neighboursare to a large extent solved and managed through dialogue,negotiations and arbitration. Pre or post-conflict meetingsare normally held with the aim of reaching amicablesolutions. Both parties to the conflict are given enough timeto plead their case. Elders with good oratory and negotiationskills represent the community. In such meetings, decisionsare arrived at through consensus.

In such dialogues, the use of a third party (neutral communityintervention) to arbitrate is often sought. Mediation involvesthe non-coercive interaction of a third party seeking toinfluence or resolve a particular conflict. This is aninteractive process. Currently, there is growing interestin developing mediation models with cultural legitimacy.Inter-ethnic mediation is inter-cultural and it requires anunderstanding of the cultural forces involved in theconflict. The mediators among the Turkana are rootedin the cultural milieu of the society. The elders performthis role as it is defined and conferred on them bycustoms.

During the inter-community negotiations and arbitration,reference is made to past similar cases of conflicts thatwere amicably resolved. Through the explanation givenby the conflicting parties, the elders, using theirexperience and wisdom, will decipher any hiddenmeaning behind every statement, gesture and posture.In violent conflict, emotional or temperamental peopleare not allowed to speak. Preference is given to thosecapable of brokering peace through speech. Throughprolonged debate, evaluating pros and cons, the

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disparities between the conflicting parties are eventuallyreduced. Compromises are arrived at on the basis oftruth, honesty, justice and fairness with social harmonyas the greatest concern.

4.8 Strengths and Weaknesses of Turkana CustomaryMethods of Conflict management

StrengthsUnlike other pastoralists groups, the Turkana ‘tree of men’can enforce decisions. There is an elaborate mechanismto enforce verdicts and punishments imposed. The eldershave a right to enter the house of a murderer and takeaway his or her property to compensate a slain person.

The Turkana people have faith in the customarymechanisms of conflict prevention. The system isregarded as accurate. Circumstantial evidence isadduced and analysed accordingly. The curse is believedto be binding therefore deterring conflict.

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The respondents regarded the traditional method ofsolving disputes as incorruptible unlike the modernjudicial system that is synonymous with corruption. Allparties to a conflict have faith in the system and none ofthem feels aggrieved or denied justice. The system isregarded as accessible, objective and community ownedas it is backed and based on customary law, norms andculture.

WeaknessesThe role and efficacy of the Turkana traditional conflictresolution mechanism has been greatly eroded,marginalized and diminished by modern civilization anddevelopment thinking. The system is regarded as archaic,barbaric and an outdated mode of arbitration. Theemergence of the modern court system has marginalizedtraditional conflict management system among theTurkana people.

Despite the existence of an elaborate mechanism ofconflict management among the Turkana people,conflicts have taken toll. Criminals have largely goneunpunished and arbitrary defied the ‘tree of men’. In somecases, they have refused to be enjoined in theproceedings and the ensuing rituals.

The respondents regarded the customary system ofarbitration as gender insensitive since women areculturally not allowed to contribute to the ‘tree of men’proceedings. Women, especially if their in-laws arepresent in such courts, are barred from talking. Thispractice has denied women their rights to assembly,speech and natural justice.

Initially the pastoralists administered the customaryconflict resolution mechanisms in the entire region.However, with the advent of colonialism and drawing of

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international boundaries, the efficacy and scope of thesystem has been curtailed. It is now difficult to chargepeople dwelling across the border.

Other external factors and opportunist tendencies largelyinfluence customary methods of brokering peace. Justlike the other Karamojang cluster communities, theTurkana community would broker peace pact (ekisil) withother communities if the peace will meet theirethnocentric desires. Ekisil is normally brokered duringdry spell so as to enable the signatory parties accesspasture and grazing resources. The pact is immediatelyflouted with the onset of rains!

According to the Turkana, deterrent methods of conflictprevention are only applicable to Turkana communitymembers and are inefficient in other communities. It isbelieved that you cannot curse people from othercommunities. This belief limits the efficacy, scope andimpact of the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms.

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Chapter 5

Marakwet

To a large extent, Marakwet community customary lawand conflict resolution mechanisms are similar to that ofthe Pokot. What differs is mainly the pronunciation ofthe words used but they generally refer to the same thingand or process. During the field interviews, therespondents (both Pokot and Marakwet) could not agreeon whether to classify Pokot-Marakwet conflicts as intraor inter-ethnic conflicts. Most of the respondents,especially the Pokot elders, felt that Pokot-Marakwetconflicts should be regarded as intra-ethnic conflicts.Nevertheless, this study decided to focus the Marakwetconflicts both within and without as an independentsubject.

5.1 Marakwet’s Definition of ConflictLike the other communities under focus, Marakwetcommunity does not have a word that wholly describesconflict. Kwindan is the Marakwet word that refers todisagreements, arguments or lack of consensus. Likethe Pokot, the word poriot is used to describe the actualfights, combat or violence. Poriot refers to inter-ethnicconflicts that are normally exhibited as cattle raids, landclashes or tribal clashes. Siala refers to quarrels amongpeople or a group of people or communities.

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The Marakwet people define conflicts as disagreement,quarrels, fights between two people or a group of peopleor generally a situation that violence reigns supreme. Itis a situation devoid of peace. Internal or domesticconflicts are disagreements or fights between theMarakwet people whereas inter-ethnic conflicts arequarrels and fight with other communities especially thePokot. Cattle raids and land clashes are the mainmanifestations of inter-ethnic conflicts between theMarakwet and her neighbours in the Kerio Valley.

5.2 Customary Institutions of Governance andConflict ResolutionAmong the Marakwet people, the family, the extendedfamily, the clan, and the council of elders are the maininstitutions of conflict management and socio-politicalorganization.

a) The FamilyAn ideal Marakwet family is composed of the man, hiswife or wives and children. The husband is the ultimatehead of the family and nobody can challenge or questionhis authority. He is the overall administrator of familymatters and property including bride price, inheritanceand where applicable land issues.

b) The Extended FamilyLike in the other communities under focus, a Marakwetextended family is made up of the nucleus family, in-laws and other relatives. All matters that transcend thenucleus family are discussed at the extended family level.The extended family serves as an appellate court tofamily matters. In some instances neighbours (porror)are called to arbitrate family disputes or disputes betweenneighbours.

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c) The Clan and Council of Elders (Kokwo)The Marakwet community is divided into thirteenpatrilineal clans, each of which (with the exception ofthe Sogom clan) is divided into two or more exogamicsections distinguished by totems. Marakwet residencesare in totemic settlements scattered widely in the KerioValley. They live in territorial groups, which are politicallydistinct. The clan structure and the age-sets also intersectthese.

Kokwo is the highest institution of conflict managementand socio- political stratum among the Marakwetcommunity. Kokwo is made up of respected, wise oldmen who are knowledgeable in the affairs and history ofthe community. The elders are eloquent public speakersable to use proverbs and persuasive phrases effectively.Every village is represented in the council of elders.Senior elderly women contribute to proceedings in aKokwo but must do so while sitting down. The Kokwodeals with major disputes and is mandated to negotiatewith other communities especially for peace, cease-fire,grazing land/pastures and water resources. The Kokwois the highest traditional court and its verdict is final.

5.3 Types, Prevention and Management of MarakwetInternal Conflictsa) Domestic ConflictsAt the family level, disputes do occur between the familymembers. A man and his wife or wives might quarrelover issues such as lateness, poor milking skills,selfishness, and disobedience or general laziness. If aman fails to provide food for his wife or wives, disputesarise. In polygamous homes (most families arepolygamous), a husband might be accused of favouringone wife over the others.

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Like among the Pokot community, inheritance is anotheremerging manifestation of domestic conflicts. It is acustomary principle that male children are entitled to theirfather’s property especially when they are about to break-off from the family to start their own homes. In such cases,some children might claim that the property was unevenlydistributed. Sometimes, a father might refuse to handover his property to his children advising them to seektheir own by raiding neighbouring communities.Inheritance disputes also arise after the death of the headof the family. Sharing of dowry earned from marrying offa daughter is another source of domestic conflict inMarakwet.

Domestic conflicts are resolved at the the level ofoccurrence. The community culturally bequeaths powerto prevent and manage such conflicts to family heads,extended family, neighbourhood association, age setsand the respective clan leaders. Conflicts between wivesor children are solely brought to the attention of the headof family. He will listen to both sides and make a rulingaccordingly. If the head of the family is part of the conflict,members (elders) of the extended family or clan can becalled in to arbitrate. Members of his age set are canalso called in to resolve the impasse.

Socialization and education are used to avert conflicts.Children are taught to obey and live harmoniously in thecommunity. The children are taught to regard themselvesas brothers and sisters.

b) MurderThe Marakwet community regards murder as the heinousact of terminating somebody’s life intentionally oraccidentally. The respondents could not figure out underwhat circumstances one could kill a fellow tribesman.Murderers are regarded as outcasts in the community.

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Traditional cleansing rituals must be performed beforebeing accepted back to the society.

Murder is a serious crime among the Marakwet people.Murder cases are normally brought before the council ofelders and can take weeks or months to resolve. Theaccused and the accusing party are given enough timeto argue their case. Circumstantial evidence is alsosought and examined. The plaintiff meets the expensesof the sittings. They will slaughter bulls or goats andprovide traditional brew to the elders.

If proved guilty, the murderer is forced to pay a certainamount of livestock as will be agreed upon by thecustomary court (rang’ia). The compensation or fine paidto the family of the deceased is called kwaiwamet. Afterthe fine has been paid, the murderer goes through acleansing process. A black goat or sheep is slaughteredand the killer is bathed with the intestinal fluids as eldersmurmur cleansing words. The elders eat the meat of theslaughtered animal. The killer is pronounced clean andfit to mingle with the rest of the society once more. If thesuspect does not plead guilty to the offence, muma isopted for as a last resort. The process is similar to thatof the Pokot and Turkana communities.

c) Land disputesLand disputes are a relatively new phenomenon amongthe highland agro-pastoralists Marakwet. Thismanifestation of conflict is more pronounced inagriculturally productive and settled places in thehighlands unlike in the lowland. It is also experiencedalong the river where crop farming (furrow irrigation) ispracticed. The Marakwet people perceive land as acommunal property that is administered by elders forthe benefit of the whole community. This practice and

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belief is still embraced in the valley where nomadicpastoralism is the best and only viable land use.

In the highlands, land has been adjudicated and givento individuals as private property. Individual title deedshave also been issued. This has not only bred conflictswithin the community but has been also advanced as adriving force for the escalating inter-ethnic conflicts inthe Kerio Valley.Land disputes are taking a toll among the Marakwetpeople. The clan elders arbitrate land disputes pittingfamily members against each other. Such a clangathering listens to all parties involved and makes adecision based on the adduced evidence and guided bythe customary law. If one party is unsatisfied with theverdict, they are encouraged to lodge an appeal in theappellate court of elders.

The council of elders address land disputes betweenfamilies or clans. The council also tries appeal land casesfrom lower level neighbourhood or clan courts. All theconflicting parties are allowed to present their version ofthe dispute. Circumstantial evidence is also sought andelders use their wisdom and customary law to deliver aruling. Such decisions are normally arrived at byconsensus and the court’s decision is final. Since thecouncil is the highest court in the land, its decision is notappealed against.

d) Adultery, Fornication and RapeAdultery, fornication and rape are serious manifestationsof conflicts within the Marakwet community albeit notwidely acknowledged in public. An adulterous person isconsidered unclean and is subjected to strenuous andvigorous rituals of cleansing the moment proved guiltyor caught in the act. At the same time, fornication attractsa similarly harsh penalty. In such a situation, the value

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(dowry) of the girl involved is scaled down. Like the Pokot,the Marakwet community attaches importance to girls’virginity as the determinant of the bride price. Rape is arelatively new phenomenon among the Marakwet people.Adultery, and lately rape, cases have always beenshrouded in secrecy. Just like other crimes, the partiesto it are given enough time to present their story. Basedon adduced evidence, the council punishes the culpritaccordingly. However, there exists no standardpunishment. This is agreed upon by the sitting.

The adulterous man is asked to cleanse the home of theaggrieved man. He provides a black goat or sheeppreferably male, honey, and traditional brew. Theintestinal fluids from the animal will be littered all roundthe house of the aggrieved husband as elders murmurcleansing words. The people present are asked to spiton green grass in the compound as elders cleanse theoffender too.

Respondents cited imposition of heavy fines and severepunishment as proven and an effective method ofpreventing conflicts within the Marakwet community. Thefear of punishments and fines has been reinforced bybeliefs in curses and the ensuing consequences. All therespondents did not wish to be enjoined in any cursingor cleansing rituals. This has greatly reduced crimes rateswithin the Marakwet land. In adultery cases, the culpritis fined more than the standard bride price rendering theact economically and socially unviable. The purificationprocess is tedious and frustrating and open to publicridicule and excommunication. Prohibitive finesreinforced by superstitious beliefs, norms and taboos,have played a key role in preventing Marakwet internalconflicts.

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5.4 Inter-ethnic ConflictsCompared to all other communities under focus, Marakwetcommunity is in conflict with the least number ofcommunities. The Pokot are probably Marakwet’s mainenemy but history has it that the community also used tofight with Tugen and to a lesser extent with Keiyo.Interestingly enough, the Marakwet, Pokot, Tugen and Keiyoare all sub-tribes of the larger Kalenjin community and yetthey fight amongst themselves.

Unlike the Pokot and Turkana who border unstable countriesand hostile communities, the Marakwet is right inside Kenyaeliminating the issue of cross-border conflicts. In a nutshellthe Marakwet’s inter-ethnic conflicts are manifested in theform of cattle raids and land/boundary clashes with theneighbouring Pokot, Tugen and Keiyo communities.

5.4.1 Causes of Inter-ethnic ConflictsMarakwet living in the Kerio Valley and along theescarpment are agro-pastoralists. This group has sufferedthe brunt of cattle raids in the north rift region unlike theirhighland and sedentary tribesmen. Scarce grazing land andwater resources have forced the community to scout foralternative pasture resources. Kerio River, which is theboundary between West Pokot and Marakwet districts, hasbetter pasture. This has forced the Marakwet to come intocontact with the Pokot herders resulting to cattle raids. Therespondents cited the Pokot aggression on their traditionaldry season grazing resources along river Kerio as the maincause of conflicts between the two Kalenjin sub-tribes.

Proliferation of automatic weapons in the Kerio valley hasincreased the severity of cattle raids. Before the early 1990s,the Marakwet primarily relied on their traditional weapons(bows, poisoned arrows and swords). As Pokot raidsintensified, the Marakwet community was forced to look forfirearms that could match those of the Pokot. Interestingly

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enough, their main suppliers of guns are the very Pokotthey intend to contain. It is estimated that there are over1,000 illicit arms in the hands of Marakwet warriors.

High cultural ego among the Marakwet people is anothersource of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Kerio valley.Marakwet embrace a cultural belief that they are militarilysuperior to the Pokot and as such they should not beintimidated by the latter’s emerging military prowess. Thisbelief has engineered a number of attacks and counterattacks to avenge Pokot belligerence.

The respondents also cited land/boundary disputesbetween their community and the neighbours. Apart fromthe grazing land along Kerio River, some people disputethat the river is the actual boundary between the two districts.The Marakwet claim that Chesegon division in West Pokotdistrict is their ancestral land whereas the Pokot laid claimto the whole of Kerio valley as their traditional dry seasongrazing land. Meanwhile, the Marakwet are in conflict withthe Keiyo over district boundaries. Initially, both theMarakwet and Keiyo were sharing the same district, KeiyoMarakwet, but a presidential order in 1994 divided the districtinto two, Keiyo and Marakwet districts. Since then, conflictshave emerged over boundaries.

Political incitements have also bred conflicts betweenMarakwet community and the Pokot. This can be traced tothe dawn of political pluralism in Kenya in the early 1990s.The Marakwet were victims of their independent politicalstance taken by some of its prominent members whocontradicted the then prevailing wave of ethnic politicalhomogeneity within the Kalenjin group. This is what hasbeen termed by Kenya Human Rights Commission as“informal repression” in the rural sector by the state.

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By design andfault, the Marakwetcommunity hasbeen the mainvictims of armedconflicts that havebeen erroneouslydescribed as acontinuation of thetraditional cultureof cattle rustling

among Kenya’s pastoralists. This form of ethnic violencehas taken on a deadly dimension, particularly with theproliferation of small arms and light weapons.

5.4.2. Prevention and Management of MarakwetExternal ConflictsFrom the interviews conducted with Marakwet elders, it isevident that civilization and modernization has eaten intothe culture of the community. Most of the respondents werequick to refer to modern judicial system and had difficulty indetailing customary methods of conflict resolution.Nevertheless, the community’s customary governancesystem is similar to that of the Pokot.

i) Early WarningIn comparison, Marakwet community does not commanda grasp on indigenous intelligence information whencompared with their Pokot and Turkana neighbours.Collection and analysis of intelligence information throughcasting traditional skin sandals and reading goat intestinalis not widely practised. It is only appreciated in the valleyand to a lesser extent in the highlands. Nevertheless, thecommunity, especially the agro-pastoralist group, rely onindigenous security information systems. In case of alarm,community members are advised to vacate certain conflicthotspots. Elders initiate pre-emptive inter-community

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negotiations. Soothsayers, the orgoyot, are relied upon forintelligence information. Warriors also spy their territory forany foreign footprints or suspicious movements and grazingtrends by neighbouring communities. Such informationwould be relayed back to the community for preventiveactions.

In addition to the indigenous information, the Marakwetpeople are experts in signalling imminent danger or conflictsthrough use of specific voice alarms. If danger has beensensed or enemy soldiers identified somewhere, womenand to an extent men will make certain noises that will informthe rest of the community that a strike is imminent. Thewarning signals hint the locations of the enemy soldiersand the warriors are dispatched in that direction. Suchnoises are reinforced by specific smoke signal.

ii) WomenWomen are a known catalyst of conflicts among theMarakwet people. Women can also play a great role inpreventing inter-ethnic conflicts. Women in Marakwetcommunity wear a special belt called the leketio. Like inPokot community, leketio is a belt of life, a belt that protectschildren. It is imperative for Marakwet women to wear theleketio tightly especially when their sons have gone out toraid other communities or for retaliatory missions. Womenprevent conflicts by refusing to wear leketio. This act canscuttle a raiding expedition. At the same time, if a Marakwetwoman would throws leketio in front of a Pokot or a Kalenjinwarrior during combat, he would stop fighting and flee.

However belligerent rustlers are no longer fearful of crossingleketio and can even kill such a woman. The respondentsregarded this unusual act of killing innocent women, childrenand the elderly as a curse that has fallen on humanity. Theinterviewees attributed the current severe droughts, human

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and animal diseases anddiminishing productivity ofcattle to such curses.

iii) MissThe Marakwet communitynormally brokers peace pact/agreement (miss) with theirneighbours the Pokot. Thisentails inter-communityagreements to liveharmoniously, share dryseason grazing resources,and conduct barter trade.Like among the Pokot andTurkana communities,

respected elders from both sides perform miss whereinstruments of war are broken and buried together withcertain charms. Such arrangement sets a mutuallyconsented framework for punishing the community thatwould be the first to flout the agreement. Currently, accordingto the Marakwet-Pokot peace agreement that was brokeredat Kolowo, Baringo District, the two communities are sharinggrazing resources along Kerio River. The Kolowodeclaration states that the culprit (community) is to pay backtwice the amount of the stolen livestock whereas for everyperson killed, 40 cattle are paid as compensation to thefamily of the bereaved.

iv) DialogueInter-community dialogue between Marakwet and herneighbours is not a recent phenomenon. Elders from theconcerned communities still meet under a designated treeor riverbank before, during, or after conflicts periods. Theyengage in dialogue aimed at resolving the real or imaginedconflicts. The eloquent and mentally sharp elders, whocommand respect in the society, represent the community

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in such high level dialogues. Decisions to prevent, resolveconflicts or broker peace (miss) are reached at byconsensus. Elders and soothsayers can be requested tostop blessing warriors before they set out for their raidingexpeditions. Women get an opportunity to contribute in suchdialogues.

5.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of Marakwet CustomaryMechanisms of Conflict ManagementThe respondents preferred the traditional methods ofarbitration since it is easily accessible and is devoid ofbureaucrat ichitches thathave marredmodern courtsystem. In caseof a dispute,elders caneasily conveneanywhere in thevillages andsolve theproblem. It is aquick andeffective way of administering justice.

The traditional method is also culturally accepted andadhered to. Nobody dares to challenge the elders for sucha person risks being cursed or excommunicated. Customarylaw is based on societal norms, taboos and beliefs. Theverdict of informal court sittings is taken as a direct reflectionof the cultural norms and customary law. The customarylaw is reinforced by a strong belief in curses.

Customary law is incorruptible. Unlike the modern system,the customary courts are objective and corruption free. Theelders arbitrating in this system are many. This reduces the

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possibility of corruption. The verdict arrived at is fully basedon the adduced evidence and societal norms.

5.6 WeaknessesDiminishing role and efficacy of customary mechanism ofconflict management amongst the Marakwet people is oneof the main weaknesses of the system. Civilization andmodernization have marginalized traditional conflictresolution mechanisms rendering it totally irrelevant in someplaces. More and more people are turning to the modernpolice and court system. Allegations that the customarycourt is harsh have made people shy away from seekingjustice in these indigenous bodies.

The modern crop of Marakwets regard the system asarchaic and barbaric. Customary law is said to belong tothe old generation and not the ‘learned’ Marakwet.

Another conspicuous deficit of the customary law is themarked absence of mechanisms to enforce its rulings. Thecommunity lacks a police force or any other alternative toenforce customary law rulings. The culprit could refuse topay the imposed fine or simply flee. The customary systemof arbitration is also limited in its application. Apart from thebrokered peace pacts (miss), it is impossible to administerthe other types of punishments to non-Marakwets.

The respondents cited lack of documented reference oncustomary law, norms and taboos as either slowing downor hindering the work of customary courts. It is difficult torefer to preceding cases for guidance while handing downa sentence. This deficit slows customary court proceedings.It is also hard to pass on such customary knowledge andpractices to future generations.

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The Samburu community uses a number of words torefer to conflicts or absence of peace and security. Oneof such word is the nkisima that refers to or describesforce, confrontation or physical fights. Nevertheless thecommunity defines conflict as a situation devoid of peace.It is a disagreement, quarrels, confrontation or violencebetween two or more people. Competition over grazingland and water resources, often leading to cattle rustlingor raids, is the Samburu’s definition of inter-ethnicconflicts.

On the other hand, among the agro-pastoralists Samburu(less than 10% of the total Samburu people) found inhigh potential areas, land ownership is another emergingdescription of conflict. Land disputes are prevalent bothat the community and inter-communities levels.

6.2 Samburu Socio-Political InstitutionsThe socio-political organization of the Samburucommunity and customary institutions of conflictmanagement can be summed as the family, extendedfamily, neighbourhood (Manyatta), age sets, and thecouncil of elders.

Chapter 6

Samburu

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a) The Nuclear and Extended FamilyThe Samburu people are generally polygamists. A mancould have as many as 10 wives and a commensuratenumber of children. In a typical Samburu family, the oldman (the husband) is in control of his family and animals.He is the unchallenged head of the family institution andall family issues and disputes are under his jurisdiction.The family can also be extended to include the man’s in-laws, unmarried siblings and his aging parents. This isthe extended family. The family institution among theSamburu community is the basic institution ofgovernance and conflict management.

b) The Neighbourhood (Manyatta)A manyatta comprises between five and ten families.This is a settlement that lasts as long as the pastures. Itis a transition dwelling before families move on to newpastures. The manyatta is under the leadership andjurisdiction of a senior elder. Neighbourhood courts(nabo) reign supreme in the manyattas. The senior eldersmanage the courts. In the manyattas, men graze cattlewhile women are in charge of maintaining the portablehuts, milking cows, obtaining water and gatheringfirewood. A fence of thorns surrounds each family’s cattleyard and huts. The manyatta is fortified with a live fence(closely-knit poles) that is hard to penetrate. Themanyatta has one entrance.

c) The Age SetsIn Samburu, initiation is done in age brackets of aboutfive years, with the new class of boys becoming warriors,or morans (il-murran). The moran status involves twostages, junior and senior. After serving five years as juniormorans, the group goes through a naming ceremony,becoming senior morans for six years. After these elevenyears, the senior morans are free to marry and join thejunior elders. This ritual of passage doubles as a form of

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socio-political organization of the Samburu community.People in a given age set regard themselves as brothersand sisters respectively and are expected to behave ina certain way in the community. The age set is supposedto regulate its members and where necessary punishtroublemakers.

d) The Council of EldersThe council of elders is perhaps the highest socio-politicalorganization and institution of managing conflictsamongst the Samburu. This institution is the equivalentto the tree of men and the Kokwo among the Turkanaand Pokot respectively. The council of elders iscomposed of respected elders in the community,respective heads of the nabos and representation fromage sets and to a lesser extent, elderly women. InSamburu community, men (il-moranis excluded) makedecisions often under a tree designated as a ‘council’.Women may sit in an outer circle and may speak onlywhile seated and grasping green grass. Alternatively, awoman may convey a comment or concern through amale relative. However, women may have their own‘council’ discussions and then relay the results to menfor consideration.

6.3 Samburu Internal Conflictsa) Domestic Disputes

It is virtually a universal fact that disputes ordisagreements occur when two or more people livetogether. In Samburu community, domestic conflictscentre around husband and wives, disputes among thewives and also amongst the children. It is a commonphenomenon for the old wife to grumble over the love,attention and care that the younger wife enjoys at herexpense. Children might also quarrel amongstthemselves especially if one of them is regarded as thefather’s favourite.

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b) Murder CasesTerminating somebody’s life intentionally or accidentallyis a serious crime in Samburu community. Killing a fellowSamburu tribesman is an atrocious crime. It is notculturally tolerated. Murderers are regarded as outcastsin the community and are not allowed to interact withothers until and unless traditional purification (cleansing)rituals are performed.

c) TheftThe respondents defined thefts as taking somebody’sproperty without consent or knowledge. To an extent,robbery with violence is also classified as theft. In themanyattas or in grazing field, it is a common for a cow,donkey, sheep or goat to disappear. A thief can stealsuch property from his or her own family, manyatta, ageset or from another manyattas in the community. Stockthefts were cited as the main manifestation of intra-ethnicconflicts in Samburu community.

d) Other CrimesAdultery and rape were identified albeit the respondentswere shy to elaborate or even the occurrences. Theyinsisted that according to the Samburu community, it isa taboo and curse to commit adultery or rape. The elderssaid that they couldn’t recall any rape or adultery casealthough they admitted that it might happen but nobodywould divulge or talk about it. When it happens, it isclandestinely solved and never brought to public limelight.

6.3.1. Prevention and Management of InternalConflictsConflict management isn’t a recent phenomenon amongthe Samburu community. Elaborate customarymechanisms of conflict management still exist inSamburu district. To a larger extent, conflict prevention

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and management is the responsibility of the individualfamilies, neighbourhood (nabo) and the community as awhole. Heads of such institutions are charged withmaintaining law and order within their jurisdiction.

Socialization and education among the Samburu peopleis an effective method of conflict prevention both withinand without the community. Children are taught the Dosand Don’ts of the community at an early age. They aretold to respect all grown ups as fathers and mothers forthey belong to the society. Societal norms, taboos andlifestyle are inculcated into the minds of the youngSamburu boys and girls. Gender roles are clearly definedat this stage, as boys are encouraged to look after theyoung animals as girls assist their mothers in householdchores. Boys are taught fighting skills at that early age.They know that they are the community soldiers. Amongother things, they are reminded that they should upholdbrotherhood in society, live harmoniously and that nofamily needs war. “Meatae ngang nashan larabal.”

Social education and ethics become more rigorous duringthe initiation period. The initiates are taught how to becaring and responsible husbands and wives. The boysare now prepared to join moranism. A group of moranswill be selected to monitor troublemakers in the societyand are given powers to punish through beating orslaughtering the culprit’s favourite bull. Ibubu , mobjustice, can also be meted on any age set member whoviolates societal norms. Lbubu is a person killed by mob.In the Samburu community, mob justice is not a crimebut is seen as a way of curbing conflicts. Ibubu can alsobe prescribed for any other crime in the society, forinstance theft or adultery. Conflict prevention andmanagement is emphasized at the initiation stage.

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At the basic level of governance, the head of the family,the husband, is held responsible for preventing andsorting out domestic disputes that may arise in the familyunit. He calls the parties in dispute to his hut (in Samburucommunity, the husband has a separate house from thewives) and arbitrates accordingly. If he is part of theconflict, he will request the nabo or his age set to arbitrate.The elders decide on punishment to administer and oramount of fine to be paid.

Murder cases are brought before the council of eldersfor arbitration. The respondents pointed out strikingsimilarities between the formal judicial system and theSamburu customary methods of conflict management.This is in the sense that natural justice or the rule of lawreigns supreme. In the Samburu council of elders(customary court), elders are the judges and advocatesin conflict situations. The council handles all types ofcases ranging from murder, adultery to theft cases. Boththe plaintiff and the defence are allowed to cross-examineeach other and other witnesses that might be called.

After listening to the conflicting parties, the eldersconvene a mini meeting, consult, and agree on theverdict. The decision is announced and blessed and theelders leave the venue immediately. No appeal istolerated after the sitting. If the offender disregards thecourt’s decision, the elders may curse him or her. Laisiclan is renowned for producing the experts in cursing,for instance the snake, lion, and elephant totemic clans.

In the Samburu community, the court will compel themurderer to pay 49 heads of cattle to the family of theslain man. There is no provision for the compensation ofa woman since traditionally women were not to be killed.It is a curse to kill a woman, child or the elderly person.In theft cases, the court orders the thief to pay back three

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times the number of animals stolen. If an animal is stolen,slaughtered and eaten, all those who taste the meat,even if they were not aware that it was a stolen animal,will be regarded as thieves and forced to pay back threetimes.

6.4. External ConflictsThroughout their history, the Samburu community hasbeen in a defensive position with all their neighbours.They have had clashes with most of the migrating ornomadic people. Their main concern is cattle. Cattle raidsare the major inter-ethnic pre-occupation or manifestationof conflicts with the neighbouring communities. Thecommunity is in conflict with the Turkana, Borana, Meru,Kikuyu, and to a lesser extent the Pokot. Samburu andPokot have a common peace pact. They have maintaineda military and cultural alliance with the Rendille, largelyin response to pressures from the expanding Oromo(Borana) since the 16th century.

6.4.1 Causes and Manifestation of Inter-ethnicConflicts

i) Diminishing Grazing Land and ResourcesCompetition over the rapidly diminishing pasture andgrazing resource base triggered by climatic vagaries,environmental degradation, encroaching state lands(game parks) and farmlands are perhaps conspicuouscauses of inter-ethnic cattle raids in Samburu district andbeyond. Samburu community keeps large number ofcattle and the shrinking resource base can no longersupport the large herds. The encroachment of cropfarming and sedentary life in Samburu has furtherworsened the situation. Samburu land has good pasturesand water points thus attracting neighbouring pastoralistcommunities like the Turkana, Borana, and Pokot. Thisis common during dry season as all pastoralists movetheir cattle towards Samburu grazing lands. During

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severe droughts,Samburu communitymigrates with theircattle towardsneighbouring Laikipiadistrict leading toconflicts with thesettled farmersespecially the Kikuyu.Competition over theuse, control andaccess of pastureresources is thus theleading cause of inter-ethnic conflicts inSamburu district andbeyond.

ii) Ethnocentrism and PrejudiceSamburu community are in record of embracing the beliefand claim that they own all the cattle in the world. Theybelieve that other communities should not own cattle andthose that own probably stole from them. To reclaim their‘stolen’ cattle, the morans are encouraged to recoverthem. However, times have changed and the communityis now acknowledging that indeed other communities owncattle just like them. They do not mind other pastoralistscommunities owning livestock, but they can’t figure outhow a farming community can keep cattle. They areincensed when they see tethered or restrained cows (zerograzing) and to spare such cattle ‘the agony’ they stealthem. Mostly, the community raids to restock their herdsespecially after severe droughts or animal diseases thata might have wiped out their cattle.

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The community also prides herself of military superiority.They raid other communities at will in a bid to stamptheir authority.

iii) Land Disputes and Territorial ExpansionThe Samburu community is by nature an expansionistegalitarian society. To keep more cattle, they need moreland, grazing resources and water. They will move towherever there are grazing resources and this justifiestheir nomadic lifestyle. On the other hand, the communityclaims that part of Laikipia and Isiolo districts that borderthem are their ancestral dry season grazing area. Theythus come into conflicts with settled communities in thosedistricts. Like their fellow Maa speakers, the Samburupeoples have lived and fought from Mt. Elgon to Malindiand down the Rift Valley into Tanzania and they harbourclaims to all these areas. 

iv) SALWThe proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW)into the hands of Samburu warriors and fellow tribesmenhas compounded cattle rustling and conflicts in the entirenorth rift. Arms traffickers from as far as Somalia, Sudan,Ethiopia and Uganda have found a ready market for theirproducts in Samburu land. It is estimated that 16,478illicit arms are in the hands of the community. Analysedfurther, half of the males aged 15 years and above inSamburu community possess guns. Some have morethan one gun. The desire to acquire and own guns (gunculture) in the community has precipitated the desire toengage in cattle rustling in the region. Since guns foundtheir way into the hands of the community, inter-ethniccattle raids and conflicts have taken toll resulting to lossof lives.

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v) Other CausesApart from the above causes, the respondents citedpolitical incitement as a manifestation of conflictsbetween Samburu and other communities. Politicalleaders have been quoted as inciting the Samburuagainst other communities. This is prevalent duringelectioneering periods and community security meetings.

6.4.2 Prevention and Management of Inter-ethnicConflictsDue to their nomadic lifestyle and cultural attachment tolarge herds of cattle, the community have come intoconstant conflict with other communities. In response tothe security threat, the community has operationalisedan elaborate customary mechanism for inter-ethnicconflicts prevention and management.

i) Indigenous Early WarningUse of indigenous intelligence information among theSamburu community is not a new phenomenon.Throughout their history, the community has sought theservices of indigenous intelligence information experts toprevent and manage conflicts. Like their counterparts theTurkana and Pokot, the Samburu people are regarded asexperts in reading and encoding intelligence information ingoat intestines. Experienced elders can foretell danger bylooking at the intestines of a goat.

The Lesepe family is endowed with indigenous skills ofstudying stars in the sky and foretelling any impeding inter-ethnic conflicts, natural or even man made disasters. Afterstudying, analysing and verifying such sensitive information,the elders from the Lepese family advice the community totake necessary pre-emptive or preventive actions includinginitiating inter-community dialogues. Apart from the Lepesefamily, soothsayers (Laibons) prophesy and advice thecommunity accordingly.

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Samburu community sends their warriors to spy especiallyalong the borders and grazing lands for any suspiciousmovements. The spies (laikijalak) are skilful in differentiatinga Samburu footprint from that of any enemy community.Such information will be traditionally analysed and ifnecessary, disseminated to the community for pre-emptiveor preventive action. The community uses specific screamsand or horn sounds to relay any alarm or danger.

ii) Lmumai (Peace Pacts)As a means of preventing inter-ethnic conflicts, the Samburucommunity has entered into binding peace arrangements(lmumai) and military alliance with their strategic neighbours.Hundred of years ago, the Samburu and Pokot communitiessigned lmumai at around Mt. Elgon and since that time, thetwo communities have maintained a close military allianceand have generally lived harmoniously. Just like miss andekisil among the Pokot and Turkana communitiesrespectively, weapons (spears, arrows, swords) arecollected from the participating communities, broken,destroyed, burned and then honey, traditional brew, andmilk are poured into the pit before its covered. Bulls(preferably white in colour) are slaughtered and the bloodis mixed with milk and honey. All the present elders andwarriors drink it. They smear their bodies with cattle oiland milk. Thisritual wascarried outbetween theancestors of thePokot, Samburuand theRendille. It is thebasis andframework of the

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current military alliance between the three communities.

iii) DialogueSince time immemorial, Samburu community hasengaged in dialogue with her neighbours either to preventor manage real or imagined conflicts. In response to earlywarning and intelligence information gathered in thecommunity, respected elders and laibons are mobilizedto initiate inter-ethnic negotiations to prevent the conflicts.Elders from the two warring communities come togetherand negotiate for an amicable solution to the existingconflict. Such high-level negotiations are cushioned oncustomary methods of conflict resolution as may bepracticed by the negotiating communities. In addition tocease-fire, such negotiations could also lead to brokeringof lmumai.

iv) Other Methods of Conflict Prevention andManagement

In addition to the above methods and mechanisms of inter-ethnic conflict management, the Samburu community alsointimidate neighbouring communities using charms, sorceryor witchcraft (laisu), which are thought to be effective indisabling potential aggressors or enemy soldiers. It is alsobelieved in the community that some specific individuals(laisi) are endowed with supernatural powers to curseaggressors or enemy soldiers. Laisi can spit on the enemymaking him blind or disabled. Such superstitious beliefshave aided in preventing not only inter-ethnic conflicts butto larger extent Samburu intra-ethnic conflicts.

6.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of Samburu ConflictResolution Mechanisms

StrengthsCurses, taboos and superstitions have proved to be veryeffective methods of conflict prevention and managementboth within and without the Samburu community. This

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institutionalised fear and awe of traditional conflictmanagement processes has deterred potentialtroublemakers in society and forced them to embracepeace. The effects of the supernatural powers are beyondindividuals and could affect a whole clan if cleansing isn’tdone in time.

The respondents observed that unlike the formal courtsystem, Samburu people trust customary institutions ofconflict management since they understand andappreciate the mechanisms and framework under whichit operates. Since the system is based on the customarylaw and order, definitely nothing but the truth will prevail.Customary courts rulings are objective, just and culturallyacceptable unlike the police and formal court systemsthat are riddled with corruption and graft cases.

Customary law in Samburu community has ensured thatthe social fabric and cultural heritage has been kept intact.The law has kept the society closely knit both in times ofwar and peace and is seen as a unifying factor andcommunity’s identity. Perhaps the customary law andnorms in society under which traditional conflict resolutionmechanisms are modelled have preserved the Samburuculture. The respondents cited the unique Samburucommunity conflict resolution mechanisms as theircultural heritage and unique identity in the moderncosmopolitan society.

WeaknessesCustomary methods of arbitration and conflictmanagement among the Samburu people have beenbogged down by lack of a framework or approach toenforce its rulings. After the traditional court has madeits ruling, it is socially and culturally assumed that theconcerned will just abide by it. However lack of acommunity police to enforce the rulings have weathered

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down the role and efficacy of the customary methods ofarbitration.

The whole system is prone to bias and favouritism. Someindividuals, especially deadly warriors are accordedundue attention in such informal court proceedingsbecause it is presumed that the society needs theirbraveness and stamina in killing enemy soldiers. Somefamilies who are thought to have superstitious powersare also feared and if they are involved in disputes withother members of the society, justice might not beadministered fairly. Nobody would for instance talkagainst a soothsayer or somebody from the lepese familybecause the consequences might not be pleasant.

In addition to curses, the traditional system of arbitrationmostly relies on the fear of laisi (witchcraft), which is notobjective. Laisi has been greatly challenged by modernthinking, as it is scientifically unverifiable. The advent ofChristianity and Islam has also discredited witchcraft asungodly thus nobody would like to be associated with orenjoined in it.

The emergence and appreciation of modern civilisationhas greatly diminished the role and credibility ofcustomary law. More and more people are turning tomodern formal courts in solving their problems. Theeducated elite’s, Christians, Muslims and town dwellersregard customary law as archaic and barbaric and arguethat it should be discarded. Such kind of thinking hasgreatly diminished the credibility and relevance oftraditional conflict resolution mechanisms in the presentday Samburu community.

On the other hand, proliferation of automatic weaponsin the region has increased the severity of cattle rustlingand this new phenomenon has overwhelmed the capacity

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of traditional systems of peace building. The entrance ofarms into the then traditional culture of cattle raiding hasbrought in unprecedented issues such ascommercialisation of cattle raids, mass rape and killingsthat have pushed traditional courts to the periphery ofinter-ethnic conflicts resolution. During the study, therespondents hinted that those who possess guns evendon’t have time to attend to such informal meetings forthey are always in the bush or in raiding expedition. Iftried and proved guilty in absentia, they normally threatento shoot those who participated in judgment and this hasalso affected the role and efficacy of customary systemof conflict management in the society.

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The communities made various suggestions regardingenhancing the efficacy of the traditional mechanisms ofconflict resolution.

The respondents urged the government to support thetraditional conflict resolution mechanisms by linking it tothe modern judicial system. Modern institutions like thepolice and the judiciary should help enforce the rulingsand verdicts of the traditional courts. Traditional peacestructures should work hand in hand and a legalframework be established to legitimise the indigenousconflict resolution structures.

To improve the government’s understanding andappreciation of customary methods of conflictmanagement, workshops, seminars and meetingsbetween community elders and the government officials(judiciary) should be held. This will ease the existingsuspicion between the two institutions.

For reference and clarification purposes, traditionalconflict resolution mechanisms should be documented,filed and disseminated widely in the society.Documentation can also strengthen the customary lawsand norms making arbitration easy and standardized.Future generations would benefit if the processes were

Improving TraditionalMechanisms of ConflictResolution

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documented. The respondents also suggestedincorporation of customary law into the formal educationsystem so as to inculcate the societal norms and lawsinto the minds of future generation.

Women should be empowered to actively participate inthe tree of men proceedings, as they are the majority ofthe victims of conflicts. Cultural norms and practices thathinder or prohibit participation of women in conflictmanagement activities and public discourses should bediscarded.

The various fines and punishment imposed by thecustomary courts should be synchronized so as to comeup with a set of consistent and uniform punishments andcompensation scheme. The system should also bebroadened to include other communities as well.

The Pokot felt that punishing the whole clan for a crimecommitted by an individual should be reversed.Individuals should bear the penalty of their waywardactions.

The Samburu felt that warriors (morans ) should beinvolved in all peace building and conflict managementinitiatives since they are the people who cause troublein the society. The respondents noted that warriors arealways excluded in intra and inter-community peacemeetings and conflict resolution initiatives.

Among the Turkana, the various courts (trees of men)were advised to collaborate and share information andexperiences. This could be in the form of exchange toursor learning visits where elders from one locality visit andparticipate in the proceedings of other courts.

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Meanwhile the Marakwets suggested that theKaramojang cluster of communities disregard the porousboundaries that have separated them and curtailedapplication of customary law across the borders. Thelaw should be applied uniformly across the borders inthe cluster so as to stop criminals from engaging in crimesand hiding in the neighbouring countries.

Lastly, the pastoralists urged the civil society and thefaith-based organizations to take the lead in revitalizingmarginalized traditional conflict resolution structures andlink them to modern judiciary.

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Pokot, Turkana, Samburu and Marakwet pastoralist’scommunities have a common characteristic. Theyexperience and are affected by frequent internal andexternal conflicts. These conflicts have invariablyresulted in loss of life and livestock, the major source oflivelihood in these communities. The other commoncharacteristic is the fact that they reside in a fragile eco-system marked by prolonged drought periods, dwindlingvegetation cover, restricted movements, and isolationfrom essential services such as education facilities,health centres, transport and communicationinfrastructure and market facilities.

From the foregoing, it can be emphatically concluded thatcustomary indigenous governance mechanisms canprovide a solid framework for building a community’s conflictresilience through strengthening traditional conflictresolution mechanisms, enhancing local people’s potentialand rediscovering elders’ wisdom, knowledge and otherresources.

Pastoralists’ conflicts over the control, use and access ofpasture, grazing land and water resources have existedsince the history of these communities. Nevertheless, theseconflicts were largely contained by the existence of strongindigenous natural resource governing mechanisms.

Conclusion andRecommendations

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Traditionally, eldersorganize the daily useof available pastureand water, as well asthe seasonalmigrations to and fromdry seasons grazingareas. Migration is anessential part ofmanaging resourceuse, to ensureconsistent andadequate access (both within and between neighbouringcommunities) to water and grazing areas. In addition topastoral resource management, elders arbitrate matters ofpeace and justice within pastoral societies. In most of theKaramojang cluster communities the age set system is thetraditional mechanism for distributing the power of decision-making. This study confirms that such customaryarrangements are indeed existent and should be revitalised.The government should strengthen these indigenousmechanisms instead of adopting measures that disregardpeople’s livelihoods as dictated by resource dynamics thatcharacterise the arid and semi-arid Pokot, Turkana,Samburu and Marakwet land.

Indigenous conflict management and resolutionmechanisms aim to resolve conflicts locally, precedingor replacing external dispute resolution and therebyreducing reliance on external structures. Traditionalmediation helps the community keep control over theoutcome of the dispute. Implementing this approach doesnot require sophisticated structures or expensivecampaigns; it provides a low-cost, empowering meansof resolving conflicts within a relatively short timeframe.Traditional mediation will speed up the administration ofjustice since in most of these districts under study, formal

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police and courts are located far away - in districtheadquarters. For instance, in Turkana district it isfinancially prohibitive to travel from Kibish to Lodwar, 300km away, to attend court proceedings. Strengthening andinstitutionalizing customary courts could easily bridge theproblem of inaccessible formal police and court systems.

Among the pastoralists communities, elders havetraditional jurisdiction in facilitation, arbitration, andmonitoring outcomes. Local conflict mediators typicallypossess moral status, seniority, neutrality and respectof the community. They are acceptable to all parties anddemonstrate capable leadership capacity. Resolutionsare generally accepted and respected by all concernedparties. However, experience from the Pokot, Samburu,Marakwet and to a lesser extent Turkana has shown thatcustomary courts often bring important social influencebut lack the power and the means to enforce theresolutions adopted. Advice is only accepted when bothparties agree to it. Both parties must feel that theirconcerns were properly addressed. Traditional structures’power to prevent the occurrence of violence is limited.There is thus a call to assist these local mediation toolsto enforce their resolutions and improve their capacity toprevent conflicts. The government through the police,courts and provincial administration should assistcouncils of elders in enforcing their resolutions andverdicts.

In all the studied communities, traditional conflictmitigation efforts have been weakened by age or genderbias. In all the four communities, women have beencompletely excluded from conflict managementprocesses. For instance among the Pokot and Marakwetcommunities, women act as reference resource peoplebut not to challenge or influence decisions adopted bymale-dominated Kokwo. The Samburu women are

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supposed to convey their suggestions through their malerelatives and such information might not be conveyed atall. Indigenous, traditional authorities generally are notprogressive elements of social change. Youth and morespecifically warriors are also left out in such customarysittings yet they are the main perpetrators and victims ofarmed conflicts. Gender and age bias must thus bestreamlined in all indigenous peace building endeavors.

In order to dispel fears that customary law is an archaic,barbaric outfit and a competitor of modern formal courts,governments, international and local agencies shouldpromote local dispute resolution mechanisms to ensurethat local actors participate in conflict management bypartnering with the local institutions. The communitiesfelt that the government and development organizationsshould:i) Acknowledge and appreciate the relevance, role and

credibility of traditional conflict resolutionmechanisms. These actors could do this byorganizing meetings with traditional institutions andsecuring their input into planning and policyprocesses.

ii) Build on existing traditional structures for peace andconflict resolution, and use those structures in dealingwith ongoing conflicts.

iii) Develop a strategy for identifying conflict arbitratorsand peacemakers within each community whilevalidating and empowering existing conflictarbitrators, and creating opportunities for theirinteraction with other communities.

iv) Evaluate some of the traditions and approaches topeacemaking that worked in the past, and thinkingthrough how they can be helpful today. The variouscustomary mechanisms of conflict management andrespective peace agreements (Modogashe, Laikipia,Kolowo, Todonyang, Moroto declarations etc) should

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be linked and harmonized. This will not only providea framework for recognition and legislation of lawsand policies that recognize and promote customarymediation but will also aid in wider inter-communitycollaborations and enhance complimentary efforts insolving pastoralists conflicts. Traditions that promoteconflicts should be discarded and replaced withcultural overtones that embrace peace and unity insociety.

v) Learn, analyze and document the best attributes oftraditional conflict resolution methods anddisseminate the same to a larger constituent of peaceactivists and the general public. This will provide aconsistent and objective mechanism of pastoralists’customary law in the country. Learning could takeplace through exchange visits and inter-communitymeetings. This should also be extended to includecross-border communities especially the Karamojongand Sabiny of Uganda, Toposa of Sudan, and Dongiroand Merille of Ethiopia.

vi) Sponsor forums to develop comprehensivecustomary strategies for conflict mitigation initiativesin the region.

vii) Conduct workshops to focus on processes ofempowering local groups in managing conflict.

viii)Train elders and customary court personnel in basicmodern judicial system, democratic governance andrule of law.

Inter-community dialogue should be facilitated as muchas permissible as a way of bringing warring communitiestogether. Negotiations will increase communities’interactions as a first step towards discarding stereotypesand prejudices that have fuelled conflicts in northernKenya and across the borders. The volatile illicit armsissue should be emphasized in such meetings. Thegovernment should consult widely on how to go about

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disarming these communities. It may not be wise forinstance to disarm the Turkana or the other Kenyan tribeswhen their immediate cross-border neighbours are stillwielding AK 47 and G 3 rifles. At minimum, thegovernment must guarantee the security of her citizens.Disarmament should be discussed at a regional level.

The disarmament of pastoralists is a pressing policyquestion for governments in the Greater Horn of Africaregion. Nevertheless, it could be argued that a broaderapproach to conflict management based onunderstanding the forces behind the emerging gunculture in pastoral areas should be considered. Pastoralcommunities in northern Kenya are surrounded byconflict and until these conflicts are resolved, armsproliferation is likely to continue unabated to underminethe gains of disarmament, as confiscated weapons arereplaced with new arms from conflict zones in the Hornof Africa and great lakes region. Working through elders(indigenous mechanisms) and Chiefs (modern formalinstitution) to boost the traditional social controls on

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raiding, counter raiding and security measures is onemethod that has been found successful in controllingthe use of existing arms. Additionally, this serves toreinforce the traditional authority of elders as leadersand negotiators in the communities.

Currently, many NGOs and development partners havebegun to direct their efforts towards peace building inpastoral areas, with the particular goal of reinforcing thetraditional authority of the elders over their communities,as well as linking these indigenous institutions to localgovernments. This positive development is to beencouraged, scaled up and replicated, even whereconflict is not the core business of the partnersconcerned, since all development interventions fromeducation to water, food security and sanitation projectsshould be conflict sensitive.

At minimum, the study found out that there exists vastuntapped potential in revitalizing customary mechanismsof conflict management amongst the pastoralists in theGreater Horn of Africa region.

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Kamenju J., Mwachofi S. and Wairagu F., 2003, TerrorizedCitizens: Profilling Small Arms and Insecurity in the NorthRift Region of Kenya, Security Research and InformationCentre, Nairobi.

Mkutu Kennedy, 2001, Pastoralism and Conflict in the Hornof Africa, Africa Peace Forum, Saverworld, University ofBradford.

NCCK, SNV & SARDEP, 2001, Pacifying the Valley: AnAnalysis on the Kerio Valley Conflict, NCCK, Nairobi.

Minority Groups Right International, 1998, Pastoralists in theHorn of Africa, Report of a workshop on Social and EconomicMarginalization, 8-10 December, Nairobi, Kenya.

CAPE Unit, AU/IBAR, 2003, Pastoral Visions: Photographsand voices from the Karamojong Cluster, CAPE Unit, Nairobi.

Kristina G. et all, 2001, Identifying Wars: Systematic ConflictResearch and its Utility in Conflict Resolution andPrevention, Uppsala University, Uppsala.

Minear Larry, 2001, Pastoralist Community Harmonizationin the Karamoja Cluster: Taking it to the Next Level, TuftsUniversity, Medford.

Mkangi, K. 1997; Indigenous Social Mechanisms ofConflict Resolution in Kenya: A contextualized paradigmfor Examining Conflict in Africa, University of Nairobi.

Mburugu, K. & Hussein, M., 2001, Customary Institutionsof Conflict Management among Pastoralist Communities

Selected Bibliography

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in Kenya: The Case of the Turkana, Borana and SomaliCommunities, Oxfarm GB, Nairobi.

Kevin A., Peter W. B. and Joseph A. S., 1991, ConflictResolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. GreenwoodPress, New York.

John P. Lederach, 1994, Building Peace: SustainableReconciliation in Divided Societies, United NationsUniversity, Tokyo.

Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2001, RaidingDemocracy: The Slaughter of the Marakwet in the KerioValley, KHRC, Nairobi.

Eberlee, J., 1999. Alternative Approaches to ManagingConflict over Natural Resources. IDRC Reports, 278, 1–5.

Wanyama, J. and Wanjigi, S. 2002, StrengtheningPastoralists Institutions in Kenya. A Paper presented toOXFAM GB Stakeholders Workshop, Sunday, 24 March 2002at KCB Training College, Nairobi.

Halakhe D., Waqo, 2003; Peace Building and Small Arms:Experiences from Northern Kenya, a paper presented toUN Biannual Conference of States on Small Arms programmeof action on 7 th-11th July 2003 at UN centre, New York, USA.

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Conflict Management: A Study into the CustomaryInstitutions of Conflict Management among thePastoralist Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet and SamburuCommunities.

Study Questionnaire

1. What is your definition or understanding of conflict?

2. What are the differences between conflicts?a). Within your communityb). Outside your community

3. Which communities are in constant conflicts with yourcommunity?

4. What are the various types and or manifestation ofconflicts?a). Within your communityb). Outside your community

5.What are the various causes of conflicts?a). Within your communityb). Outside your community

6. What are the methods or measures taken by yourcommunity to prevent conflicts?a). Within your communityb). Outside your community

7.When conflicts occur between members of yourcommunity:a). What traditional methods were used or are still beingused to resolve the disputes

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b). What ceremonies or rituals were or are performedduring the resolution of disputes

8. When conflicts occur between members of yourcommunity and other communities:a). What traditional methods/institutions were used orare still used to resolve the conflicts.b). What ceremonies or rituals were or are performedduring the resolution of disputesc). Describe any inter community conflict incidence (date,place, participants) and how the communities solved it.

9. What roles do the following groups of communitymembers play in causing, preventing, managing conflictsor negotiating for peace?i). Womenii). Youth (warriors, girls)iii). Elders (Soothsayers, opinion leaders)iv). Government agencies/officialsv). Faith-based bodies.

10. What symbols represent peace in your community?

11 (a). What makes traditional conflict resolutionmethods/institutions binding and adhered to

(b). What penalties are meted on defaulters

12. How have the traditional conflict managementsystems linked with modern formal judicial system ofconflict arbitration?

13. Between the traditional and modern methods ofconflict arbitration, which one do you prefer and why

14. Have traditional institutions preventing and resolvingconflicts been successful in your view?

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15. (a) What are the weaknesses of traditional conflictresolution mechanism in your view? (b) What are the weaknesses of modern conflictresolution mechanisms in your view?

16. (a) What do you suggest to improve the efficacy/efficiency of traditional systems of resolving conflicts bothwithin and without your community. (b) What do you suggest to improve the efficacy/efficiency of modern judicial systems of resolving conflictsboth within and without your community?

17. What more can we learn from the traditional conflictresolution system and institutions?

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