This material has been prepared by the Investment Strategy Group (“ISG”), which is part of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department. This information is provided to discuss general market activity, industry or sector trends, or other broad-based economic, market or political conditions. This material is for informational purposes only, is not a solicitation and no action is being solicited based upon it. It does not take into account the particular investment objectives, restrictions, tax and financial situation or other needs of any specific client. Any models referred to herein are largely based on assumptions and there can be no assurance that the performance shown herein can or will be achieved. Any customization of these models should be discussed with your Private Wealth Advisor and may differ significantly from the ISG models shown herein.

This material is delivered solely as reference material with respect to Goldman Sachs Alternative Investment opportunities (“Alternative Investments”). It does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any of the Alternative Investments mentioned herein; any such offering will occur only in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the offering memorandum pertaining to that specific alternative investment product. Alternative Investments are subject to substantial investment restrictions and will be illiquid; investors are strongly urged to review carefully the relevant offering memorandum, including the risk considerations described therein, and other documents pertaining to the Alternative Investments and to discuss any prospective investment therein with their legal and tax advisers prior to investing.

Investment Strategy Group

2009 Outlook

January 2009

I. Economic Outlook

3

US Economic Scenarios: End-2009

This material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

• We expect that the US economy will contract through the end of 2008 and 2009. Our central case includes 4-5 quarters of negative consumption and residential investment growth, and an even longer contraction in non-residential investment. We also expect that net exports will slowly become less of a contributor to growth.

• Headline news will remain unpleasant with reports of unemployment levels reaching and possibly exceeding 8% and of bankruptcies reaching levels last seen in the early 1980s and early 1990s.

• In addition to the 50 bps cut on October 29th, the Fed eased again in December, bringing the Fed Funds rate close to zero. As this rate cannot fall below zero, we expect the Fed to continue supporting the economy and the financial sector through aggressive quantitative easing and various liquidity measures.

Good Case (30%) Central Case (60%) Bad Case (10%)

Real GDP Growth – Q409/Q408 >(0.75%) (0.75)-(1.25)% <(1.25%)

Monetary Policy – End 09 0.25 – 0.75% 0 – 0.25% 0 – 0.25%

10Y Treasury Yield –End 09 > 2.75% 2.25 – 2.75% < 2.25%

Inflation (Core CPI) – Q409/Q408 0.75 – 1.25% 0.25 – 0.75% <0.25%

Inflation (Headline CPI) – Q409/Q408 0.75 – 1.25% 0.25 – 0.75% <0.25%

4This material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

Component Share of GDP 2008 (Q1 08 / Q1 07)

2008 (Q2 08 / Q2 07)

ISG Central Case: 12-Mo. Forward (Q4 09 / Q4 08)

Consumption 70% 1.0% 0.9% -0.1%

Residential Investment 5% -0.9% -0.9% -0.2%

Non-Residential Investment 12% 0.7% 0.5% -1.3%

Change in Inventories -- 0.0% -0.4% 0.0%

Government 18% 0.5% 0.5% 0.7%

Net Trade -5% 1.4% 1.7% -0.1%

Total 100% 2.5% 2.1% -0.75/-1.25%

U.S. Economic Growth OutlookContributions to GDP Growth

5

Sizing the Length and Depth of the US Downturn

Source: Investment Strategy Group, DatastreamThis material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

1. US Real GDP Growth (% YoY) – ISG Central Case Scenario

-2.7%

-2.3%

-1.3%

-2.6%

-3.0%

-2.5%

-2.0%

-1.5%

-1.0%

-0.5%

0.0%

1973-75 1981-82 1990-91 2008-09

ISG Central Case

2. US Real GDP – Cumulative Peak to Trough Contractions During Previous Recessions

(% Change from Peak to Trough)

• US GDP stands at $14.3 trillion. • We expect the US economy to contract over the next 4-5 quarters with a couple of quarters experiencing a decline of over 2.5% on a year over year basis and between 3-5% on a quarter over quarter annualized basis.

• In our view, this recession will be worse than the one in the early 1990s, and more along the lines of what we witnessed in 1973-75 and 1981-82. From high to low, we anticipate a cumulative decline in GDP of 2.6%.

2.5%

0.7%

-0.5%

-2.5% -2.5%

-1.1%

2.8%

-0.5%

-5.0%

-3.4%

0.7%

-1.6%

2.1%

-1.0%

0.9%

-0.7%

-6%

-5%

-4%

-3%

-2%

-1%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

Q1 08 Q2 08 Q3 08 Q4 08 Q1 09 Q2 09 Q3 09 Q4 09

% YoY

% QoQ - Annualized

ISG Central Case

6

ISG Global Outlook Scenarios 12-Month Forward GDP and Inflation

Source: Investment Strategy Group

CountryLatest GDP

(Q3 ’08)2009 GDP Q409/Q408

Latest Headline Inflation

2009 CPI Inflation Q409/Q408

US 0.8% -1.25/-0.75% 1.1% 0.25-0.75%

Eurozone 0.6% -0.5/0% 3.2% 0.25-0.75%

UK 0.2% -0.5/0% 4.1% -0.75/-0.25%

Japan -0.5% -1.0/-0.5% 1.7% 0.0-0.5%

EM Asia 8.7% 4.5-6.5% 6.8% 0.75-2.75%

EM Latin America 5.4% 0-2% 7.6% 6.5-8.5%

Russia 6.2% -1/1% 13.7% 9.5-12.5%

7

Growth Outlook Outside of the USNon-US Growth Has Been Impressive, But Is Now Poised to Slow

Source: Datastream, IMF, IIF, Goldman Sachs Global Investment ResearchThis material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

1. Developed vs. Emerging Market Real GDP Growth2008 and 2009 IMF Forecasts, PPP-Weighted

2. Actual and Expected Real GDP GrowthAs of November 2008

• While growth is expected to fall globally next year, expectations reflect a view that growth in emerging markets will remain meaningfully above that in developed markets.

• In addition to the US, all of the other major developed markets—the UK, Euroland, and Japan—are expected to lapse into recession, if they are not in a recession already.

• Estimates of Chinese GDP growth in 2009 are now as low as 7.5%, which would mark the country’s lowest rate of growth since 1990.

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08E 09E

* United States, Euroland and Japan

Major Advanced Economies*

Emerging Markets

2000-06 Estimate

Average 2007 20081 20092

Brazil 3.2% 5.4% 5.4% 2.5 - 3%

India 6.8% 9.3% 7.2% 5.8 - 7.5%

China 9.7% 11.9% 9.4% 7.5 - 8.5%

Russia 6.9% 8.1% 6.4% 3.5 - 4%

Korea 5.2% 5.0% 4.2% 3.1 - 3.5%

US 2.6% 2.0% 1.3% (0.7)-(1.6%)

Euroland 2.3% 3.0% 1.1% (0.3)-(0.5%)

UK 2.7% 3.0% 0.8% (0.3)-(1.3%)

Japan 1.7% 2.1% 0.4% (0.2)-(0.6%)

1 Average of IMF and Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research forecasts. IIF forecasts also included in BRICs.2 Range of IMF, Goldman Sachs, and IIF forecasts for emerging

markets. IMF and GS forecasts for the US, Euroland, UK, and Japan.

II. Financial Markets Outlook

9

US Equity Scenarios: End-2009

This material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

• Based on our 2008 central case scenario of operating earnings of $64-65 and reported earnings of $48, our 2009 central case assumptions imply flat to slightly down growth in operating earnings and about 10% growth in reported earnings.

• Operating earnings were $82.5 and reported earnings were $66.2 in 2007.• Operating earnings peaked at $91.5 reported earnings peaked at $84.9. Both peaks occurred in Q2 2007.

Good Case (30%) Central Case (60%) Bad Case (10%)

End 2009 S&P 500 Earnings

Op. Earnings $71.5

Rep. Earnings $64.5

Trend Rep. Earnings $73

Op. Earnings $60-65

Rep. Earnings $51-55

Trend Rep. Earnings $70-71

Op. Earnings ≤ $51

Rep. Earnings ≤ $46

Trend Rep. Earnings ≤ $70

S&P 500 Price to Trend Reported Earnings 18.5-20.0x 15.5-18.5x 9-10x

End 2009 S&P 500 Fundamental Valuation Range 1350-1460 1085-1315 630-700

End 2009 S&P 500 Price Target (based on a combination of trend and forward earnings estimate)

1400 1150-1250 650

10

1 Financial crisis onset dates: Finland (9/1991), Norway (10/1991), Sweden (9/1991), Japan (11/1991), the UK (9/1989), and the US (9/1989).

Source: Investment Strategy Group, Datastream, Empirical, IMF, S&P 500This material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

Equities Do Discount Recessions in Advance

2. S&P 500 and Earnings Trough Relative to GDP Trough(Based on 21 Recessions Since 1900)

-6

6

-5

5

-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

S&P 500 Trough Earnings Trough

Average

Median

Mo

nth

s B

efo

re G

DP

Tro

ug

hM

on

ths

Aft

er

GD

P T

rou

gh

1. Equity Performance Two Years Following the Onset of a Financial Crisis1

1989-1990

0.5

0.7

0.9

1.1

1.3

1.5

1.7

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Months After

Finland

Sweden

U.S.U.K.

Norway

Japan

• According to a recent IMF study, it takes about 2-2.5 years for the economy to fully recover from a banking crisis.

• However, equity markets typically trough about a year into the crisis. By this measure, the US market would make its low around Q4 this year.

• Looking at all 21 US recessions since 1900, the equity market typically troughs about 5-6 months before GDP troughs.

• On the other hand, earnings tend to trough 5-6 months after GDP troughs (i.e. almost 12 months after the equity market troughs).

11Source: Investment Strategy Group, DatastreamThis material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

US Equity ValuationsAttractive Relative to Long Term Levels

1. S&P 500 Price to Trend EarningsThrough December 1, 2008

11.7x

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

00 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 00

Average Since 1950: 16.5x

Average Since 1900: 15.3x

• Current S&P 500 price to trend earnings multiple is around 11.7x, which is below it’s long term average of 15.3x since 1900 and 16.5x since 1950.

12Source: Investment Strategy Group, DatastreamThis material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

US Equity ValuationsAttractive Relative to Interest Rates and Inflation Backdrop

2. S&P 500 Price to Trend Earnings in Different Inflation Cohorts1900 - November 2008

• Higher multiples can be sustained during periods of low and stable inflation.

• We expect headline inflation to fall from its current level of 5.4% to 1-2% in 2009.

15.7

18.8

20.6

15.9 15.7

10.711.3

16.9 17.316.0

12.4

10.8

0

5

10

15

20

25

0-1% 1-2% 2-4% 4-5% 5-6% >6%

Level of Headline Inflation

When Inflation Volatility <1%

When Inflation Volatility 1-2%

5.78%

8.62%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 01 05

S&

P C

om

p.

Tre

nd

Ea

rnin

gs

Yie

ld -

Bo

nd

Yie

ld

Trend EY less BY

Trend EY less real BY

1. Real & Nominal Equity Risk Premium1953 – December 1, 2008

• The current earnings yield exceeds the real long-term bond yield by about 8.6%, a level not seen since the early 1980s.

13Source: Investment Strategy Group, DatastreamThis material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

How Much Further Can Prices and Multiples Fall?

2. S&P 500 Price to Trend Earnings During Bear MarketsThrough December 1, 2008

Percent Months toPeak Trough Peak Trough Correction Recover

Sep-29 Jul-32 32 4 -86% 267Jul-57 Oct-57 49 39 -21% 11Dec-61 Jun-62 73 52 -28% 14Feb-66 Oct-66 94 73 -22% 6Nov-68 May-70 108 69 -36% 21Jan-73 Oct-74 120 62 -48% 69Nov-80 Aug-82 141 102 -27% 2Aug-87 Dec-87 337 224 -34% 19Jul-90 Oct-90 369 295 -20% 3Jul-98 Oct-98 1,184 959 -19% 1Mar-00 Oct-02 1,527 777 -49% 55Oct-07 Nov-08 1,576 741 -53% --

Average -35% 43Median -28% 14

1. S&P 500 Correction During Bear MarketsThrough December 1, 2008

• The S&P 500 declined by 53% from its peak in October 2007 to the trough reached on November 21, which exceeds the typical bear market decline of about 32%.

• The only episode during which the peak to trough decline was worse was the Great Depression (-86%).

• PE multiples typically contract by about 30-35% during previous bear market corrections. In the current cycle, from peak to trough multiples have contracted by 51%.

PercentPeak Trough Peak Trough Correction

Sep-29 Jul-32 27.0 4.3 -84%Jul-57 Oct-57 15.4 10.6 -31%Dec-61 Jun-62 16.1 12.3 -24%Feb-66 Oct-66 19.1 15.7 -18%Nov-68 May-70 20.2 13.1 -35%Jan-73 Oct-74 18.6 9.2 -51%Nov-80 Aug-82 10.3 7.2 -29%Aug-87 Dec-87 17.3 12.5 -28%Jul-90 Oct-90 15.3 12.9 -16%Jul-98 Oct-98 34.5 30.0 -13%Mar-00 Oct-02 37.4 18.8 -50%Oct-07 Nov-08 23.6 11.5 -51%

Average 21.0 13.3 -34%Median 18.6 12.5 -29%

14Source: Goldman Sachs Asset Management, DatastreamThis material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

Historical Extremes Highlight Potential Opportunities

1. US Large Cap 10 Year Rolling Average Total Return1827- December 1, 2008

• Examination of history frequently reveals precedents, some of which have provided valuable information with regards to attractive entry points to investment opportunities, and vice versa.

• One example is that the rolling 10-year annualized total return for equities has a history of “V” shaped recoveries off the 2.5% level. A long term investor would thus have benefited from purchasing US equities when the total return dropped to this level over the following 6-12 months.

-2.5%

0.0%

2.5%

5.0%

7.5%

10.0%

12.5%

15.0%

17.5%

20.0%

22.5%

25.0%

1836 1846 1856 1866 1876 1886 1896 1906 1916 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006

III. Current Positioning

16

Strategic Allocation with Tactical Tilts

(1) Tracking Error is the annualized standard deviation of monthly excess returns

This material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

• Equities• S&P 500 Absolute Return Tilt

Underweight US investment grade fixed income and move the proceeds to the S&P 500 Absolute Return Tilt.

• US Homebuilders TiltUnderweight US investment grade fixed income and move the proceeds to the US Homebuilders Tilt

• US Equity OverweightOverweight US Equity, funded from US investment grade fixed income / Municipal High Yield

• Fixed Income• Duration Extension

Extend duration of fixed income portfolio 0.9 years bypurchasing longer maturity municipal bonds.

• Corporate High YieldUnderweight Investment Grade Fixed Income and move the proceeds to Corporate High Yield Debt.

Conservative M oderate Aggress ive

Strategic Tactical Strategic Tactical Strategic Tactical

Allocation Tilts Allocation Tilts Allocation Tilts

Investm ent Grade Fixed Incom e 49.0% 31.0% 14.0%

U.S. Investment Grade Municipal Bonds 49.0 -10.0 31.0 -10.0 14.0 -10.0

Other Fixed Incom e 6.0% 5.0% 2.0%

Municipal High Y ield 6.0 -1.0 5.0 -1.0 2.0 -1.0

Corporate High Y ield +3.0 +3.0 +3.0

U.S. Equity 18.0% 24.0% 30.0%

U.S. Large Cap Grow th 8.0 +2.0 10.5 +2.0 13.0 +2.0

U.S. Large Cap Value 8.0 +2.0 10.5 +2.0 13.0 +2.0

U.S. Small Cap 2.0 3.0 4.0

U.S. Homebuilders Buf fer Note +1.0 +1.0 +1.0

Non-U.S. / Global Equity 8.0% 13.0% 21.0%

Non-U.S. Equity 8.0 11.0 16.0

Emerging Markets Equity 2.0 5.0

Hedge Funds 6.0% 10.0% 12.0%

Relative Value 0.6 1.0 1.2

Event Driven 1.8 3.0 3.6

Equity Long/Short 1.8 3.0 3.6

Macro Tactical Trading 0.9 1.5 1.8

Commodities Hedge Funds 0.9 1.5 1.8

Private Equity 8.0% 12.0% 15.0%

Buyout 4.0 7.0 9.0

Mezzanine 2.0 2.0 2.0

Distressed 1.0 1.0

Venture 1.0

Energy Private Equity 2.0 2.0 2.0

Real Estate 5.0% 5.0% 6.0%

Private Real Estate 5.0 5.0 6.0

Other / Re lative Value Tilts

S&P 500 Absolute Return Note +3.0 +3.0 +3.0

TOTAL 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

Track ing Error of Tactical Tilts 1 0.93 0.93 0.93

Beta of Portfolio (s trategic/s trategic+tactical) 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.54 0.65 0.72

Appendix

18Source: Datastream, BloombergThis material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

Is History A Useful Guide In Times Of Crisis? 1. What has NOT worked: “It’s Different this Time!!”

In the current cycle, the common wisdom is fast becoming: “It’s different this time”. Whenever this phrase

is used, whether to describe an up cycle or a down cycle, more often than not, it proves to be false.

Every cycle has its own unique causes and catalysts and in this regard, this cycle is no different. In fact,

the result in each case—whether a bubble or a crash—was the same: the different outcome associated

with a “new regime shift” didn’t really materialize.

To illustrate, we list several examples:

• Internet Bubble: Ignore historical valuation levels, we’re living in a new world (Result: S&P 500 fell 50%)

• Four Tigers / Asian Crisis: The industrialization of emerging Asian markets is going to change the

landscape of the world forever (Result: MSCI EM Asia Index fell 57%)

• Japan circa the late 1980s: Japan’s takeover of technological progress was a result of a new Japanese

paradigm that was ushering in a new era (Result: Topix fell by 73%)

• Nifty Fifty: You can buy these stocks and hold them forever (Result: S&P 500 fell 36%)

• 1987 Stock Market Crash: Portfolio insurance will protect you from losses (Result: S&P 500 fell 34%)

• Decoupling: The rest of the world can hold up despite a US slowdown (Result: thus far, US equities have

outperformed other developed and emerging equity markets)

19This material represents the views of the Investment Strategy Group of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department.

Is History A Useful Guide In Times Of Crisis?2. Underlying Driver of Fear & Greed - Irrationality Is A Common Factor

Another reason why history tends to be useful and it’s rarely “different this time”, is because more often than

not, the common denominator in market extremes is human emotion, and whether it be fear or greed, it

remains constant.

In his 1978 book Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises , Charles P. Kindleberger outlines

the common stages of manias and panics exhibited by markets and their participants over a number of

episodes throughout time:

1. Exogenous shock such as technology, financial innovation, regime shift

2. As profit opportunities are created, credit creation accelerates - new banks enter, personal credit increases,

new credit instruments are used

3. This leads to speculation – which leads to overestimation of the true expected return and excessive leverage

4. Speculation spreads from one market to another & internationally (display of psychological mechanisms

such as animal spirits, herding mentality)

5. At the peak some insiders leave the market, there is "financial distress" and a bankruptcy or the revelation of

a swindle leads to the final stage; the rush for liquidity.

6. The panic feeds itself until either prices become so low that people are tempted to once again go into less

liquid assets OR a lender of last resort convinces the market that there is enough money for all.

20

Profiles of ProfessionalsInvestment Strategy Group

Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani, CFAManaging Director, Chief Investment Officer – Private Wealth Management

Sharmin is CIO for the Private Wealth Management Group of Goldman Sachs’ Investment Management Division. She is responsible for overall strategic asset allocation and tactical investment strategy within Private Wealth Management. Sharmin joined the firm as a Partner in 1993 after six years with Fidelity Management Trust Company where, most recently, she was CIO responsible for fixed income accounts. Sharmin is a member of the Board ofTrustees and the Investment Committee of New York-Presbyterian Hospital and the National Advisory Board of the Merage Institute for the American Dream. She has published two books and numerous articles on portfolio management issues. She earned a B.A. from Princeton University and an M.S. from Stanford University.

Jeff GoldenbergManaging Director, Director of Portfolio Strategy – Private Wealth Management

Jeff was appointed director of Portfolio Strategy for the Private Wealth Management Group in 2003, and is on the board of the Goldman Sachs Trust Company, where he served as chairman, president and CEO in 2005. In addition, Jeff is an active member of the firm’s Retirement Investment Committee, and co-heads the Columbia Business School recruiting effort. Jeff joined Goldman Sachs as a summer associate in 1980, and returned as a full-time associate in 1981. He was promoted to vice president in 1986, was named managing director in 1996, and partner in 1998. After building a successful team as a senior private wealth advisor, Jeff served as the regional manager for New York from 1996 to 1999. Since 1999, he has held various roles including East Coast regional manager from 1999 to 2001, director of Clients and Investments from 2001 to 2003, and oversight of the Strategic Wealth Advisory Team from 2003 to 2004. Jeff serves on the Wall Street Division Steering Committee of the UJA-Federation and is on the board of the 92nd Street Y. He is also a member of Atlantic and Fenway Golf Clubs. Jeff received his MBA from Columbia University in 1981 and BA from Bowdoin College in 1977.

Maziar Minovi, Ph.D.Managing Director – Private Wealth Management

Maziar joined the Investment Strategy Group of Private Wealth Management in May 2006 to focus on tactical asset allocation in emerging markets including debt, equities, and currencies. He comes to Goldman Sachs from MassMutual/Babson Capital Management where he was head of their Emerging Markets Group and also managed an emerging markets hedge fund. Prior to that, he had experience working at the International Monetary Fund, Long Term Capital Management, Putnam Investment Management, and The World Bank. Maziar received a Ph.D. in International Finance and Economic Development (1993), MBA (1988) and BBA (1986) from the George Washington University.

Chris BlumeManaging Director – Private Wealth Management

Chris Blume joined the Investment Strategy Group (ISG) in 2004 and focuses on strategic and tactical asset allocation for Private Wealth Management clients.  Prior to joining ISG, Chris was most recently a fixed income portfolio manager at Goldman Sachs Asset Management (GSAM) where he led the Financial Institutions and Structured Portfolios area.  In this position, he was responsible for central bank and insurance portfolios as well as accounts with specific asset/liability structuring requirements.  Before joining GSAM in 1994, he worked for three years as an assistant vice president in JP Morgan Investment Management's Capital Market Research Department.  He received a B.S. in 1989 and a M.B.A. in 1994 from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. 

Neeti BhallaManaging Director – Private Wealth Management

Neeti Bhalla joined the Investment Strategy Group of Private Wealth Management in New York in June 2002 and focuses on strategic and tactical asset allocation decisions for private clients since June 2002. Neeti joined Goldman Sachs in September 2000 as an analyst with the Investment Banking Division in London. Prior to that, Neeti was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford where she received an M.B.A. and an M.Sc. in Social Anthropology in June 2000 and a B.A. in Economics from Kenyatta University in 1996.

21

Profiles of ProfessionalsInvestment Strategy Group

Fan JiangVice President – Private Wealth Management

Fan is the Chief Investment Officer for Goldman Sachs’ Private Wealth Management Division in Asia. Together with professionals in the firm’s Investment Strategy Group, Fan is responsible for formulating portfolio strategy for private banking clients in Asia who invest in equities, bonds, currencies, commodities, private equities and other investment instruments. Prior to his current position, Fan was the head of Fixed Income Research for Goldman Sachs Asia and was a credit strategist for 11 years. Fan has been with Goldman Sachs since 1993, first in Goldman Sachs New York, and then Goldman Sachs Asia. Fan has a graduate degree from Kellogg. Originally from Shanghai, China, Fan has spent many years in the U.S. and currently lives in Hong Kong.

Donough Kilmurray, Ph.D., CFAManaging Director – Private Wealth Management

Donough is a member of the Investment Strategy Group, based in London since 2002, focusing on strategic and tactical asset allocation for European private clients. He joined the Investment Management Division in New York in 2000, working on investment research and strategy, in areas such as convertible bonds, small cap stocks, hedge funds, and private equity. He also customizes firm risk models for private clients. He received a Ph.D. in Mathematics and an M.S. in Finance from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2000. Prior to graduate school, he worked as a mathematics instructor at University College Dublin, where he received a B.S. in Mathematics and Mathematical Physics in 1992.

Milda DarguzaiteVice President – Investment Strategy Group: Strategic Asset Allocation

Milda Darguzaite is a member of the Investment Strategy Group of Private Wealth Management in New York focusing on strategic asset allocation for private clients. She joined Goldman Sachs in July 2004 after receiving an M.S.E. in Operations Research and Financial Engineering from Princeton University. Prior to graduate school, she worked as an investment banking analyst in Financial Institutions group at Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette (Credit Suisse). Milda graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Middlebury College with a B.A. in Economics and Mathematics in 1999.

Brett NelsonVice President – Private Wealth Management

Brett Nelson joined the Investment Strategy Group in May 2007 to focus on tactical asset allocation in U.S. Equities. Prior to joining ISG, Brett spent four years as a Senior Analyst with CMK Capital, a fundamentals-based, long/short equity hedge fund. His previous work experience also includes private equity and strategy consulting. Brett received an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School and a B.S. in Business Administration from Pepperdine University, where he graduated salutatorian/summa cum laude.

Suzanne PeckVice President – Private Wealth Management

Suzanne returned to the Investment Management Division in 2008, joining the Investment Strategy Group as a member of the Portfolio Management Group. Previously, she had been a fixed income portfolio manager and strategist at Goldman Sachs Asset Management from 1994-1998. She then spent nine years in the Investment Banking Division at Goldman, in the Real Estate and Consumer/Retail Groups. She received an M.B.A. from Columbia Business School in 1999, an M.A. in economics from New York University in 1994, and a B.A. from Columbia College in 1989 (summa cum laude).

Diana KrizVice President – Private Wealth Management

Diana joined the Investment Strategy Group as a writer and editor in January 2007 to provide support to the group’s communications efforts. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, she was most recently managing editor of client communications for JPMorgan Private Bank. Diana brings more than 25 years of financial publishing experience from previous positions with Institutional Investor magazine, The Chase Manhattan Bank, PaineWebber, Equitable Investment Management, and other Wall Street firms. She holds a B.A. in economics (summa cum laude) from the University of Texas at Arlington.

22

Profiles of ProfessionalsInvestment Strategy Group

Matt WeirAssociate – Investment Strategy Group: Tactical Asset Allocation

Matt Weir is an associate in the Investment Strategy Group of Private Wealth Management and focuses on tactical asset allocation for private clients. He joined Goldman Sachs in June 2003 as an analyst in the Global Investment Research Division covering retail stocks. Prior to that, he graduated Phi Beta Kappa from the University of Southern California with a B.A. in Economics in 2003.

Camilo AmezquitaAssociate – Investment Strategy Group: Tactical Asset Allocation

Camilo is an associate in the Investment Strategy Group of Private Wealth Management, focusing on tactical asset allocation for private clients. He joined Goldman Sachs in June 2007. Prior to that, he worked as an Economic Research Assistant in the Asia and Pacific Department, at the International Monetary Fund. Camilo received a M.S. in Finance from the Carey Business School at the Johns Hopkins University in May 2007 and a bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from University of La Sabana in Bogota, Colombia in 2001.

Michelle PhilipAssociate – Investment Strategy Group: Strategic Asset Allocation

Michelle joined the Investment Strategy Group in May 2004. From 2001 to May 2004, she worked within the Security Operations team in the Goldman Sachs Asset Management division. Michelle mainly focuses on developing asset allocation solutions for private clients – analyzing clients’ current portfolios and structuring customized strategic portfolios. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, Michelle worked in the Client Services department at ING Barings. She graduated from Middlesex University Business School in 1997 with a BA (Hons) in Business Studies.

Thomas DevosAssociate – Investment Strategy Group: Tactical Asset Allocation

Thomas joined the Investment Strategy Group in April 2008, on the tactical asset allocation team to focus on commodities investing. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, Thomas was a Senior Analyst at PIRA Energy Group, working on US natural gas and electricity markets analysis and price forecast. He joined PIRA in August 2005 from Energy Intelligence, where he co-authored various reference publications on global oil and gas markets. Thomas received a Masters in International Energy Management and Policy from Columbia University in New York in February 2004 and a combined BA/MA with a concentration in Finance from Sciences-Po in Paris in June 2002.

Bojan MarkovicVice President – Investment Strategy Group: Tactical Asset Allocation

Bojan is a member of the Investment Strategy Group, based in London, focusing on tactical and strategic asset allocation in developed markets. He joined Goldman Sachs in October 2008 after six years at the Bank of England, where he was responsible for the official model for forecasting UK inflation. His previous experience also includes work on financial stability issues, and advising on monetary policy management. Bojan earned Ph.D. in Economics and M.S. in International Money and Banking from the University of Birmingham, and B.S. in Economics from Belgrade University.

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Profiles of ProfessionalsInvestment Strategy Group

Kevin KingAnalyst – Investment Strategy Group: Tactical Asset Allocation

Kevin joined the Investment Strategy Group in July 2006 as a member of the strategic asset allocation team. In October 2007 he joined the tactical team where he focuses on tactical asset allocation for private clients. Prior to that, he was a summer analyst for Trusco Capital Management working within portfolio management. Kevin attended Duke University where he earned a B.A. in Mathematics and a B.S. in Economics.

Benjamin NganAnalyst – Investment Strategy Group: Strategic Asset Allocation

Benjamin joined the Investment Strategy Group in July 2007 and focuses on strategic asset allocation for private clients. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Brandeis University in 2005, having earned a B.A., magna cum laude, in Economics, Politics, and with a minor in Mathematics. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, Benjamin spent two years at Johns Hopkins University to complete an M.A. in Economics and worked as Research Assistant for the Johns Hopkins Institute for Policy Studies.

Nabeel AbdoulaAnalyst – Investment Strategy Group: Strategic Asset Allocation

Nabeel joined the Investment Strategy Group in July 2007. He primarily focuses on developing asset allocation solutions for private clients, analyzing client portfolios, and structuring customized strategic portfolios. Nabeel graduated from the University of Warwick with a BSc (Hons) in Mathematics, Operational Research, Statistics and Economics in 2007.

Majid SebtiAnalyst – Investment Strategy Group: Strategic Asset Allocation

Majid joined the Investment Strategy Group in July 2008 as a member of the strategic asset allocation team. He graduated from the Columbia University Master of Science in Financial Engineering in May 2008. Prior to that Majid received a BS in Applied Mathematics from Ecole Centrale Paris in France.

Georgi RadevAnalyst – Investment Strategy Group: Strategic Asset Allocation

Georgi joined the Investment Strategy Group in July 2008 and focuses on strategic asset allocation for private clients. Prior to joining the group, he spent 2 years in investment banking at Goldman Sachs. Georgi graduated from Wesleyan University in 2006 with a degree in Mathematics, Economics and International Relations.

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AppendixImportant InformationIRS Circular 230

IRS Circular 230 disclosure: Goldman Sachs does not provide legal, tax or accounting advice. Any statement contained in this communication (including any attachments) concerning U.S. tax matters is not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of avoiding penalties imposed on the relevant taxpayer. Clients of Goldman Sachs should obtain their own independent tax advice based on their particular circumstances.

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AppendixImportant Information

This material is intended only to facilitate your discussions with Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“Goldman Sachs”) as to the opportunities available to our private clients and is provided solely in our capacity as a broker-dealer. This does not constitute an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of any security in any jurisdiction in which such an offer or solicitation is not authorized or to any person to whom it would be unlawful to make such offer or solicitation. This material is based upon information which we consider reliable, but we do not represent that such information is accurate or complete, and it should not be relied upon as such. Any historical price(s) or value(s) is as of the date indicated. Information and opinions are as of the date of this material only and are subject to change without notice.

Client-specific target asset allocations are based upon the investment objectives and other information conveyed by you to Goldman Sachs. Specific investments were chosen based upon your investment objectives and what is available to private clients of Goldman Sachs. Other investments, which may be available elsewhere, may be similar to those selected or may have characteristics similar or superior to those selected. Client-specific target asset allocation material is based on the current views of Goldman Sachs and considers any information included in our records and/or made available to us by you and/or a third party. In the event of any discrepancy between the information contained herein and the information contained in your monthly account statement(s) either at Goldman Sachs or another institution, the latter shall govern. A client's actual portfolio and investment objective(s) for accounts managed by Goldman Sachs may look significantly different from the asset allocation information provided herein. This asset allocation material may differ from the Investment Strategy Group or other Goldman Sachs model portfolios, as appropriate, based on a client's particular financial circumstances, objectives, risk tolerance, goals or other needs.

Goldman Sachs, or persons involved in the preparation or issuance of these materials, may from time to time, have long or short positions in, buy or sell (on a principal basis or otherwise), and act as market makers in, the securities or options, or serve as a director of any companies mentioned herein. In addition, Goldman Sachs may have served as manager or co-manager of a public offering of securities by any such company within the past 12 months.

Goldman Sachs does not provide accounting, tax or legal advice to its clients and all investors are strongly urged to consult with their own advisors regarding any potential strategy or investment. Notwithstanding anything in this document to the contrary, and except as required to enable compliance with applicable securities law, you may disclose to any person the US federal and state income tax treatment and tax structure of the transaction and all materials of any kind (including tax opinions and other tax analyses) that are provided to you relating to such tax treatment and tax structure, without Goldman Sachs imposing any limitation of any kind.

The price or value of any strategy identified directly in this asset allocation may fall or rise against your interests.

Fee Disclosures:The analytics used in determining estimated returns are based upon indices. Some indices take into consideration fees whereas others do not. The estimated returns may reflect a portion of investment advisory fees, they do not reflect a deduction of transaction costs and other expenses a client would have paid, which would reduce return. For a complete description of all charges and fees, please see the Goldman, Sachs & Co. Form ADV Part II or the Goldman Sachs Asset Management, L.P. Form ADV Part II, available from your PWM Private Wealth Advisor.

Product Materials:Particular products, such as mutual funds, are not mentioned in this presentation. References to strategy allocations are intended to illustrate particular security products that your Private Wealth Advisor may discuss with you. If you are interested in a particular product you should refer to the attached or previously provided product material(s), including important standard performance information and legal disclosures, which should be read in conjunction with the information contained herein.

Assets Held Outside of Goldman Sachs:Goldman Sachs has not taken any steps to independently verify accuracy of the information provided by you, your agent or any third party. To the extent that these values are relied upon in determining your overall asset allocation, you agree that the advice or results will depend upon the accuracy, timeliness and completeness of the information provided to Goldman Sachs, for which you remain solely responsible.

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AppendixImportant Information

Investment Strategy Group Disclosures:References to the Investment Strategy Group (“ISG”) represent the views of ISG, which is part of the Investment Management Division of Goldman Sachs and is not a product of the Goldman Sachs Global Investment Research Department. This information is provided to discuss general market activity, industry or sector trends, or other broad-based economic, market or political conditions. This information should not be construed as research or investment advice, and investors are urged to consult with their financial advisors before buying or selling any securities. This information may not be current and Goldman Sachs has no obligation to provide any updates or changes to such information. The views and opinions expressed herein may differ from the views and opinions expressed by the Global Investment Research Department or other departments or divisions of Goldman Sachs. ISG model portfolios do not take into account the particular financial circumstances, objectives, risk tolerance, goals or other needs of any specific client. ISG model portfolios do not take into account any use of leverage (either via the use of margin, options or otherwise) which may significantly alter the risks associated with any strategy. ISG model assumptions may change, without notice, resulting in higher or lower equilibrium returns for asset classes and/or portfolios. A client's actual asset allocation and investment objective(s) for accounts managed by Goldman Sachs may look significantly different from ISG or other Goldman Sachs models, as appropriate, based on a client's particular financial circumstances, objectives, risk tolerance, goals or other needs.

Assumptions:This material is based on the assumptions stated herein. In the event any of the assumptions used do not prove to be true, results are likely to vary substantially from the examples shown herein. These examples are for illustrative purposes only and no representation is being made that any client will or is likely to achieve the results shown. Simulated, modeled, or hypothetical performance results have certain inherent limitations. Simulated results are hypothetical and do not represent actual trading, and thus may not reflect material economic and market factors, such as liquidity constraints, that may have had an impact on actual decision-making.

Projections:IMPORTANT: The projections or other information generated by the Goldman Sachs Investment Strategy Report regarding the likelihood of various investment outcomes are hypothetical in nature, do not reflect actual investment results and are not guarantees of future results.

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AppendixImportant Information

Alternative Investments:Supplemental Risk Disclosure for All Potential Investors in Hedge Funds and other private investment funds (collectively, “Alternative Investments”). In connection with your consideration of an investment in any Alternative Investment, you should be aware of the following risks:

Alternative Investments are not subject to the same regulatory requirements or governmental oversight as mutual funds. The sponsor or manager of any Alternative Investment may not be registered with any governmental agency.

Alternative Investments often engage in leverage and other investment practices that are extremely speculative and involve a high degree of risk. Such practices may increase the volatility of performance and the risk of investment loss, including the loss of the entire amount that is invested.

Alternative Investments may purchase instruments that are traded on exchanges located outside the United States that are “principal markets” and are subject to the risk that the counterparty will not perform with respect to contracts. Furthermore, since there is generally less government supervision and regulation of foreign exchanges, Alternative Investments are also subject to the risk of the failure of the exchanges and there may be a higher risk of financial irregularities and/or lack of appropriate risk monitoring and controls.

Past performance is not a guide to future performance and the value of Alternative Investments and the income derived from them can go down as well as up. Future returns are not guaranteed and a loss of principal may occur.

Alternative Investments may impose significant fees, including incentive fees that are based upon a percentage of the realized and unrealized gains, and such fees may offset all or a significant portion of such Alternative Investment’s trading profits.

Alternative Investments are offered in reliance upon an exemption from registration under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, for offers and sales of securities that do not involve a public offering. No public or other market is available or will develop. Interests in an Alternative Investment are highly illiquid and generally are not transferable without the consent of the sponsor, and applicable securities and tax laws will limit transfers.

Alternative Investments may themselves invest in instruments that may be highly illiquid and extremely difficult to value. This also may limit your ability to redeem or transfer your investment or delay receipt of redemption proceeds.

Alternative Investments are not required to provide their investors with periodic pricing or valuation information.

We refer you to the offering materials for a more complete discussion of the risks relating to an investment in any particular Alternative Investment.You are urged to read all of the offering materials, including the entire offering memorandum, prior to any investment in any Alternative Investment, and to ask questions of the investment manager or sponsor of such Alternative Investment.Investment Restrictions apply to many of Goldman Sachs’ Alternative Investments.

There may be conflicts of interest relating to the Alternative Investment and its service providers, including Goldman Sachs and its affiliates, who are engaged in businesses and have interests other than that of managing, distributing and otherwise providing services to the Alternative Investment. These activities and interests include potential multiple advisory, transactional and financial and other interests in securities and instruments that may be purchased or sold by the Alternative Investment, or in other investment vehicles that may purchase or sell such securities and instruments. These are considerations of which investors in the Alternative Investment should be aware. Additional information relating to these conflicts is set forth in the offering materials for the Alternative Investment.

© Copyright 2008 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. All rights reserved. Services offered through Goldman, Sachs & Co. Member SIPC/FINRA.