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在日本福島核電廠 事故陰影下談核能問題
Fukushima Nuclear Crisis(Cause, Consequence, Lessons, Challenges)
锺赐贤 (Philip T. Choong)北京大学
May 5, 2011
4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis 1
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• General Introduction 基本核能概念介紹– What is nuclear energy? Where is it used today? 甚麼是核能 ? 用於何處 ?– Different types of nuclear reactor around the world. 全球核電廠的類別– Basic description of LWR nuclear power plant. 沸水式以及壓水式核電廠簡
• Fukushima Daiichi Crisis 福島一号核電廠危機– Troubled Fukushima Daiichi plants. 福島第 1 核電廠概況– Sequence of major events at Fukushima Daiichi 福島核電廠危機始末 – What are the contributors to the crisis? 事故發生的主因– What is the latest status? Is the crisis over? 目前最新情況如何 ? 危機結束了嗎 ?– Potential impacts on LWR technologies 事故對輕水式反應爐技術的衝擊
• Aftermath of Radiation Leakage from Fukushima plants 福島核電廠幅射物洩漏後果– Basic knowledge of radiation in biological world 核幅射基本常識以及生物界中的幅射– Background radiation in daily life 日常生活環境中的幅射– What people should know about radiation from Fuku crisis? 大眾對福島核電廠幅射物洩漏應有的認識– Tips to reduce radiation exposure in your body 如何使身體減少接受幅射
• Beef-up Nuclear Power Plants Safety Standards Practice 各國對加強核電廠安全問題的做法– Would PWR Be More Robust in SBO? 在長時間停電下輕水式反應爐安全嗎 ?– Susceptibility of 台电 NPP to Meltdown 台电核电厂堆熔化易感性– Imposing “Walk-Away Safe” requirement 设立”不必介入”安全條款
• The Necessity of Nuclear Energy 核能的必要性 I– Impacts on Energy Independence and Carbon Emissions 能源独立与 地球暖化問題– High-Temperature Pebble-bed Gas-cooled Rectors 高溫球床氣冷反應堆– New opportunities for China 飞來橫祸 - 因祸得福
• Final Words - A Rational and Balanced View 平衡理性的結語
• Q&A (问题和解答 )4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis 2
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基本核能概念介紹What is nuclear energy?
• Radioactive decay energy (alpha, beta, gamma, neutron, etc.)
• Nuclear fission• Nuclear fusion
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Where is nuclear energy used?
• Weapons• Electricity production• Submarine and ship propulsion• Medical diagnostics• Food processing• Agriculture• Detectors• Heating, desalination & Many others
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10 MW PWR Launched in 1954
1950, ANL built and operated the first submarine reactor prototype, the Zero Power Reactor I (ZPR-1) for Westinghouse Electric to fit in 28 feet submarine beam.
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Shippingport Pressure Vessel
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Schematics of PWR Power Station
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About 1/3 of commercial power reactors in USA are of BWR type; ¾ of nuclear power plants in Taiwan are of BWR type including the latest BWR-6 GEN-III type.4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis 8
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中国实验快堆 - Critical in Spring of 2010
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Russian RBMK High Power Channel-type Reactor
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CANDU Schematics
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Pebble-Bed High-Temperature ReactorHTR-PM (China)
Wu Zongxin, INET, Introduction of HTR-PM Demonstration Project, IAEA Technical Meeting on the Safety of HTGRs, Beijing, October 2007.4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis 12
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Fukushima I: Early Generation II
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BWR Mark I Nuclear Island-3D
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BWR Mark I Containment During Construction
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BWR Internals
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BWR Sub-Channels
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Mark II BWR ECCS System
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Distribution of 55 Nuclear Power Plants
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Fukushima I & II
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Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station• Six BWR units at the Fukushima Nuclear Station:
– Unit 1: 439 MWe BWR, 1971 (unit was in operation prior to event)– Unit 2: 760 MWe BWR, 1974 (unit was in operation prior to event)– Unit 3: 760 MWe BWR, 1976 (unit was in operation prior to event)– Unit 4: 760 MWe BWR, 1978 (unit was in outage prior to event)– Unit 5: 760 MWe BWR, 1978 (unit was in outage prior to event)– Unit 6: 1067 MWe BWR, 1979 (unit was in outage prior to event)
• Six BWR units at the Fukushima Nuclear Station:– Unit 1: 439 MWe BWR, 1971 (unit was in operation prior to event)– Unit 2: 760 MWe BWR, 1974 (unit was in operation prior to event)– Unit 3: 760 MWe BWR, 1976 (unit was in operation prior to event)– Unit 4: 760 MWe BWR, 1978 (unit was in outage prior to event)– Unit 5: 760 MWe BWR, 1978 (unit was in outage prior to event)– Unit 6: 1067 MWe BWR, 1979 (unit was in outage prior to event)
Unit 1
4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis
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Status of Fukushima Daiichi Plantas of March 2011
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Fukushima I Operating History
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Fuel Assembly in Fukushima Reactors
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BWR Mark I Nuclear Island
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SFP during Refueling
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Fukushima I Before Big Quake
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福島一号核電廠危機 Event Initiation福島一号核電廠危機 Event Initiation• The Fukushima nuclear facilities were
damaged in a magnitude 8.9 earthquake on March 11 (Japan time), centered offshore of the Sendai region, which contains the capital Tokyo.– Plant designed for magnitude 8.2 earthquake.
An 8.9 magnitude quake is 7 times in greater in magnitude.
• Serious secondary effects followed including a significant tsunami, significant aftershocks and a major fire at a fossil fuel installation.
• The Fukushima nuclear facilities were damaged in a magnitude 8.9 earthquake on March 11 (Japan time), centered offshore of the Sendai region, which contains the capital Tokyo.– Plant designed for magnitude 8.2 earthquake.
An 8.9 magnitude quake is 7 times in greater in magnitude.
• Serious secondary effects followed including a significant tsunami, significant aftershocks and a major fire at a fossil fuel installation.
4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis
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Location of Quake Center
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Many Versions and Interpretations of Events
• Tokyo Electric Company• 台湾电力公司• TSC• Unofficial AREVA• Micro Simulation Technology
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Summary March 11-15, 2011
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Summary March 11-15, 2011
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Initial ResponseInitial Response
• Nuclear reactors were shutdown automatically. Within seconds the control rods were inserted into core and nuclear chain reaction stopped.
• Cooling systems were placed in operation to remove the residual heat. The residual heat load is decreasing from 6.6% of the heat load under normal operating conditions.
• Earthquake resulted in the loss of offsite power which is the normal supply to plant.
• Emergency Diesel Generators started and powered station emergency cooling systems.
• One hour later, the station was struck by the tsunami. The tsunami was larger than what the plant was designed for. The tsunami took out all multiple sets of the backup Emergency Diesel generators.
• Reactor operators were able to utilize emergency battery power to provide power for cooling the core for 8 hours.
• Operators followed abnormal operating procedures and emergency operating procedures.
• Nuclear reactors were shutdown automatically. Within seconds the control rods were inserted into core and nuclear chain reaction stopped.
• Cooling systems were placed in operation to remove the residual heat. The residual heat load is decreasing from 6.6% of the heat load under normal operating conditions.
• Earthquake resulted in the loss of offsite power which is the normal supply to plant.
• Emergency Diesel Generators started and powered station emergency cooling systems.
• One hour later, the station was struck by the tsunami. The tsunami was larger than what the plant was designed for. The tsunami took out all multiple sets of the backup Emergency Diesel generators.
• Reactor operators were able to utilize emergency battery power to provide power for cooling the core for 8 hours.
• Operators followed abnormal operating procedures and emergency operating procedures.
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Loss of MakeupLoss of Makeup• Offsite power could not be restored and delays occurred obtaining and connecting
portable generators. • After the batteries ran out, residual heat could not be carried away any more.???• Reactor temperatures increased and water levels in the reactor decreased,
eventually uncovering and overheating the core.• Hydrogen was produced from metal-water reactions in the reactor.• Operators vented the reactor to relieve steam pressure - energy (and hydrogen)
was released into the primary containment (drywell) causing primary containment temperatures and pressures to increase.
• Operators took actions to vent the primary containment to control containment pressure and hydrogen levels. Required to protect the primary containment from failure.
• Primary Containment Venting is through a filtered path that travels through duct work in the secondary containment to an elevated release point on the refuel floor (on top of the reactor building).
• A hydrogen detonation subsequently occurred while venting the secondary containment. Occurred shortly after and aftershock at the station. Spark likely ignited hydrogen.
• Offsite power could not be restored and delays occurred obtaining and connecting portable generators.
• After the batteries ran out, residual heat could not be carried away any more.???• Reactor temperatures increased and water levels in the reactor decreased,
eventually uncovering and overheating the core.• Hydrogen was produced from metal-water reactions in the reactor.• Operators vented the reactor to relieve steam pressure - energy (and hydrogen)
was released into the primary containment (drywell) causing primary containment temperatures and pressures to increase.
• Operators took actions to vent the primary containment to control containment pressure and hydrogen levels. Required to protect the primary containment from failure.
• Primary Containment Venting is through a filtered path that travels through duct work in the secondary containment to an elevated release point on the refuel floor (on top of the reactor building).
• A hydrogen detonation subsequently occurred while venting the secondary containment. Occurred shortly after and aftershock at the station. Spark likely ignited hydrogen.
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Misleading Core Damage SequenceMisleading Core Damage Sequence
Core Uncovered Fuel Overheating Fuel melting - Core Damaged
Core Damaged but retained in vessel Some portions of core melt
into lower RPV head
Containment pressurizes. Leakage possible at drywell
head
Releases of hydrogen into secondary containment
4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis
This is an incorrect depiction of multi-sub-channel BWR core.
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Fuku Crisis
Sequence of major events at Fukushima Daiichi 福島核電廠危機始末
Containment Isolation Closing of all non-safety related
Penetrations of the containment Cuts off Machine hall If containment isolation succeeds, a
large early release of fission products is highly unlikely
Diesel generators start Emergency Core cooling systems are
supplied
Plant is in a stable safe state
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Fuku Crisis
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-1
11.3. 15:41 Tsunami hits the plant Plant Design for Tsunami height of up
to 6.5m Actual Tsunami height >7m Flooding of
Diesel Generators and/or Essential service water
building cooling the generators
Station Blackout Common cause failure of the power
supply Only Batteries are still available Failure of all but one Emergency core
cooling systems
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Fuku Crisis
Reactor Core Isolation Pump still available
Steam from the Reactor drives a Turbine
Steam gets condensed in the Wet-Well
Turbine drives a Pump Water from the Wet-Well gets
pumped in Reactor Necessary:
Battery power Temperature in the wet-well
must be below 100°C
As there is no heat removal from the building, the Core isolation pump cant work infinitely
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-2
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Fuku Crisis
Reactor Isolation pump stops 11.3. 16:36 in Unit 1
(Batteries empty) 14.3. 13:25 in Unit 2
(Pump failure) 13.3. 2:44 in Unit 3
(Batteries empty)
Decay Heat produces still steam in Reactor pressure Vessel
Pressure rising
Opening the steam relieve valves Discharge Steam into the Wet-Well
Descending of the Liquid Level in the Reactor pressure vessel
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-3
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Fuku Crisis
Measured, and here referenced Liquid level is the collapsed level. The actual liquid level lies higher due to the steam bubbles in the liquid
~50% of the core exposed Cladding temperatures rise, but still
no significant core damage
~2/3 of the core exposed Cladding temperature
exceeds ~900°C Balooning / Breaking of the cladding Release of fission products form the
fuel rod gaps
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-4
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Fuku Crisis
~3/4 of the core exposed Cladding exceeds ~1200°C Zirconium in the cladding starts to
burn under Steam atmosphere Zr + 2H20 ->ZrO2 + 2H2
Exothermal reaction furtherheats the core
Generation of hydrogen
Unit 1: 300-600kg Unit 2/3: 300-1000kg
Hydrogen gets pushed via the wet-well, the wet-well vacuum breakers into the dry-well
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-5
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Fuku Crisis
at ~1800°C [Unit 1,2,3]
Melting of the Cladding Melting of the steel structures
at ~2500°C [Block 1,2]
Breaking of the fuel rods debris bed inside the core
at ~2700°C [Block 1] Melting of Uranium-Zirconium
eutectics
Restoration of the water supply stops accident in all 3 Units???No,No,No.
Unit 1: 12.3. 20:20 (27h w.o. water) Unit 2: 14.3. 20:33 (7h w.o. water) Unit 3: 13.3. 9:38 (7h w.o. water)
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-6
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Fuku Crisis
Release of fission products during melt down
Xenon, Cesium, Iodine,… Uranium/Plutonium remain in core Fission products condensate to
airborne Aerosols
Discharge through valves into water of the condensation chamber
Pool scrubbing binds a fraction of Aerosols in the water
Xenon and remaining aerosols enter the Dry-Well
Deposition of aerosols on surfaces further decontaminates air
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-7
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Fuku Crisis
Containment Last barrier between Fission
Products and Environment Wall thickness ~3cm Design Pressure 4-5bar
Actual pressure up to 8 bars Normal inert gas filling (Nitrogen) Hydrogen from core oxidation Boiling condensation chamber
(like a pressure cooker)
Depressurization of the containment Unit 1: 12.3. 4:00 Unit 2: 13.3 00:00 Unit 3: 13.3. 8.41
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-8
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Fuku Crisis
t
Positive and negative Aspects of depressurizing the containment
Removes Energy from the Reactor building (only way left)
Reducing the pressure to ~4 bar Release of small amounts of Aerosols
(Iodine, Cesium ~0.1%) Release of all noble gases Release of Hydrogen
Gas is released into the reactor service floor
Hydrogen is flammable
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-9
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Fuku Crisis
Unit 1 und 3 Hydrogen burn inside the reactor
service floor Destruction of the steel-frame roof Reinforced concrete reactor building
seems undamaged Spectacular but minor safety relevant
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-10
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Fuku Crisis
Unit 2 Hydrogen burn inside the reactor
building Probably damage to the condensation
chamber(highly contaminated water)
Uncontrolled release of gas from the containment
Release of fission products Temporal evacuation of the plant High local dose rates on the plant site
due to wreckage hinder further recovery work
No clear information's why Unit 2 behaved differently
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-11
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Fuku Crisis
Current status of the Reactors Core Damage in Unit 1,2, 3 Building damage due to various burns
Unit 1-4 Reactor pressure vessels flooded in all
Units with mobile pumps At least containment in Unit 1 flooded
Further cooling of the Reactors by releasing steam to the atmosphere
Only small further releases of fission products can be expected ???
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events-12
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Fuku Crisis
The Fukushima Daiichi Incident Radiological releases
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Fukushima Daiichi After 311
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Fuku Crisis
Spend fuel stored in Pool on Reactor service floor
Due to maintenance in Unit 4 entire core stored in Fuel pool
Dry-out of the pools
Unit 4: in 10 days Unit 1-3,5,6 in few weeks
Leakage of the pools due to Earthquake?
Consequences Core melt “on fresh air “ Nearly no retention of fission products Large release
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Events inSpent Fuel Pool
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Fuku Crisis
Fukushima Daiichi Sequence of Major Event inSpent Fuel Pool-cont
Spend fuel stored in Pool on Reactor service floor
Due to maintenance in Unit 4 entire core stored in Fuel pool
Dry-out of the pools
Unit 4: in 10 days Unit 1-3,5,6 in few weeks
Leakage of the pools due to Earthquake?
Consequences Core melt in Unit 1, 2, 3 Nearly no retention of fission products Large release to air and ground
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Spent Fuel Pool on Fire in Unit 4
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Fukushima Daiichi as of March 16, 2011
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事故發生的主因• Off-site power wiped out during initial quake on
March 11, 2011 (2:46pm)• Back-up Diesel Generator System destroyed by
tsunami less than an hour later• Back-up Battery of Unit 1 failed after two hours• 14 meters tsunami also destroyed many other
infrastructure in and around the plant.• Crisis Management and Coordination very poor,
made the consequence a lot worse than necessary.
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How Would PWR Perform in SBO?
• Sub-cooled water in PWR vessel would provide many more hours before core uncovered
• PWR’s intermediate coolant loop and larger containment could also give more reaction time
• Passive Decay Heat Removal still a “must” to survive prolonged SBO
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Pressure Vessel and Containment
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目前最新情況如何 ? 危機結束了嗎 ?
• Crisis not over yet, still evolving– New INES as of April 12, 2011 is 7
• Unit 1,2,3 and 4 cannot never be used again• Clean-up may not be possible, entombment may
be necessary• Surrounding area may become waste land• Future of Unit 5 and 6 is questionable• Future of nuclear power in Japan ???• Japan may become even less competitive
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IAEA INES Levels
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BWR in Taiwan
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Taiwan Nuclear Power Plants
Chinshan Kousheng
Maanshan4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis 61
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Taipow’s Chinshan is Similar to Fuku Unit1
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Additional Beef-ups at Taipower
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Recommended SBO Response
• New response to SBO should proceed along multiple parallel paths: – Restoration of the electrical grid ASAP– Recovery of backup diesel generators ASAP– Acquisition of additional batteries – Acquisition of mobile generators – Bring in water tanks to refill Spent Fuel Pool– Bring in crushed ice to cool Spent Fuel Pool
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Lessons (Near-Term)• Station Black-Out has been a long-standing but unresolved
issue and it needs an urgent revisit for a satisfactory resolution.
• Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) needs revisit. • Severe Accident Management Guidance Strategies (SAMG),
which is a worst-case beyond-the-design-basis package needs revisit– Backup power concept and requirement need reassessment– Residual heat removal concept needs reassessment– Off-site water supply uncertainty– Injecting sea water is one of the final options
• Steam-metal chemical reaction heat load issue• Overall Defense-in-Depth strategy needs revisit
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Lessons (Long-term)
• Light Water Reactor might not be best for wide-spread civilian use
• What (safety requirement) is adequate for USA , might not be adequate for other countries
• Passive safety concept is better than layer upon layer of defense mechanism
• “Walk-away Safety” is superior and should be a new system design goal?
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Micro-Simulation Technology PCTRAN Analysis
( 濮励志 )
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Provided by Mr. Seong-Deuk Jo of International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA)
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Comparison of Decay Heat Estimates
Time after Shutdown
Decay Pwr fraction
0.01 s 0.066010 s 0.039630 s 0.031360 s 0.02701 hour 0.01071 day 0.004710 day 0.0022
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PCTRAN Simulation of Fuku Unit 1
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PCTRAN Simulation of Fuku Unit 1
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PCTRAN Simulation of Fuku Unit 1
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PCTRAN Simulation of Fuku Unit 1
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PCTRAN Simulation of Fuku Unit 1
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Part II of PCTRAN Simulation
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Potential Impacts on Nuclear Reactor Technology
• Based on past experience: – Windscale Fire on Oct’57 doomed UK’s Magnox
reactor technology– Chernobyl Disaster on Apr’86 doomed USSR’s
RBMK reactor technology• Fukushima Disaster could doom BWR if not all
LWR reactor technology• Most likely, life-extension for Generation II
plants will be very difficult to get approval
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Impacts on Nuclear Energy • Nuclear resurrection momentum nearly
stopped– New orders will be slowed down– Existing constructions will be stretched– Life-extension application approval questionable– EU will have second thought on nuclear option – NRC will revisit SBO EOP and SAMG– China has no BWR but will tighten SBO rules
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Impacts on Nuclear Energy (cont)
• Passive Safety may become a New requirement• “Walk-away Safety” will receive more attention• Liability insurance premium cost will shoot up• Uranium price could drop substantially• Procurement of big-ticket items will be a lot easier
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Impact on Carbon Emission
• Environment will suffer with more carbon emission;
• each reactor shut-down or cancel will likely increase 6 million tons CO2 discharge every year.
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各國對加強核電廠安全問題的做法
• 张国宝 has spoken in Shenzhen last April that China will stay course on nuclear option but will strengthen safety standards
• US will continue nuclear option but will revisit safety standards via a two-prong approach: 90-day quick look followed by a more in-depth review
• France will continue nuclear option but will review safety standards
• Germany has reversed its decision last year on nuclear power life extension
• Italy will not reconsider revising constitution for nuclear
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核幅射基本常識以及生物界中的幅射
• 1 mSv = 100 mRem• Average American gets 4-6 mSv• Each hour in airplane 0.006 mSv• Airline worker limit < 9mSv• Nuclear worker <20 mSv• Lethal dose ~4-5000 mSv• Radon is biggest contributor of background
radiation and US lung cancer death• Background dosage 2-4 mSv (1.5-100 mSv)
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Average Radiation Exposure in USA(Each Trip to China increases 2-3%)
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EPA Data on Radiation Exposure
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日常生活環境中的幅射(National Council of Rad and Measurement and ANS)
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如何使身體減少接受幅射• Don’t smoke• Avoid second-hand smoke• Spend more time outdoor• Spend more time near sea or lake• Minimize air travel• Minimize use of granite or rocks indoor• Seal all cracks on floor and walls• Open windows whenever possible
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The Necessity of Nuclear Energy 核能的必要性
• Rising global warming• Rising atmospheric CO2 ppm• Rising per capita CO2 emission, ton/person/yr• Only nuclear power is an alternative to coal-
fired power • Carbon tax could force to switch to nuclear
power as fast as practical
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Global Warming
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Atmospheric CO2 ppm Data
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Total and per capita CO2 emissions (2008) Country
Total Emissions (Million metric tons ofCO2)
Per Capita Emissions(Tons/capita)
1. China 6017.69 4.58 (17)
2. United States 5902.75 19.78 (2)
3. Russia 1704.36 12.00 (5)
4. India 1293.17 1.16 (20)
5. Japan 1246.76 9.78 (9)
6. Germany 857.60 10.40 (7)
7. Canada 614.33 18.81 (3)
8. United Kingdom 585.71 9.66 (10)
9. South Korea 514.53 10.53 (6)
10. Iran 471.48 7.25 (14)
11. Italy 468.19 8.05 (12)
12. South Africa 443.58 10.04 (8)
13. Mexico 435.60 4.05 (18)
14. Saudi Arabia 424.08 15.70 (4)
15. France 417.75 6.60 (16)
16. Australia 417.06 20.58 (1)
17. Brazil 377.24 2.01 (19)
18. Spain 372.61 9.22 (11)
19. Ukraine 328.72 7.05 (15)
20. Poland 303.42 7.87 (13)
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现阶段电源结构中,火电比重过大4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis 90
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China’s U Reserve Very SmallBut Large Th Reserve
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Important Considerations for Energy Independence Goal
– Nuclear Safety : Walk-away safety – Resource security: Abundant Th reserve– Nuclear proliferation : Export potential– Global Warming : CO2 Emission– Thermal pollution : Local regional warming– Energy conservation : Conversion efficiency– Waste disposal & Environment protection– Least cost of electricity : Cheaper than coal– Ownership of key Intellectual properties
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核電廠設計趨勢 - 地平線上的新希望
• Redouble efforts toward safer, more energy efficient and cost-effective nuclear reactor technology
• Speed up implementation and transition to Generation IV reactor concepts
• High Temperature Pebble-bed Reactor is the best hope
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Current Types of Nuclear Power Reactors
There are about 400 power reactors in operation world-wide. None of them can survive prolonged Station Blackout without some core meltdown except for HTR-10 in China.
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Safer and More Efficient Concepts
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Advanced HTRGWD (Gao-Wen-Dui) Module
04/21/23 Integrated Low Carbon Energy System 96
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GWD Fuel Elementswith
Improved Kernel and Pebble Coatings
04/21/23 Integrated Low Carbon Energy System 97
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平衡理性的結語• No Practical Alternative to Nuclear Power for
Countries like China• Nuclear Safety is of Paramount and Foremost
Importance• Inherent Safety is Superior to Engineered
Safety • So Far, only Pebble-Bed Reactor Has
Demonstrated to Possess “Walk-Away” Safety Characteristics
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Opportunities and Challenges Arise( 因祸得福 )
• China to step up to forefront of nuclear power technology by default– Leading on Generation III+ PWR (EPR and AP1000)– Leading on Generation IV reactor (HTR-PM)
• China can offer to help Taiwan phasing out nuclear power entirely via cross-strait power transmission lines.
• China should take the lead-role in advocating the “Walk-Away” safety requirement in international bodies such as WANO, IAEA and WEC.
• Good Opportunity to Transition from Uranium to Thorium Fuel Cycle• China is capable of developing the cost-effective, safe and
proliferation resistant Gao-Wen-Dui (GWD) in cooperation with its emerging wind power technology to create the most environmentally friendly energy enterprise.
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4/27/2011 Fuku Crisis 100
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Defense-in-Depth
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False Redundant Power Sources
• Off-site Power from multiple grids• Multiple On-site Diesel Generators
– Diesel fuel only for seven days– Subject to common cause failure
• Back-up Battery– Not capable of running any ECCS pumps– For monitors, valves and digital equipment only
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