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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No . 0704-0188
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Department of the Air Force
Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, CHECO DivisionHickam AFB, HI
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of
the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency
Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current
Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lastingcorporate insights into operational, conceptual an d doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
CHECO reports, Vietnam War, War in Southeast Asia, Vietnam War- Aerial Operations, American
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF : 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
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DECLASSIFIED BY AFPHOHIAW E.0.12958 (AMENDED)DATE: 20080718
APPROVED FO R
PUGLIC RELEASE
PROJECT
SOUTHEAST ASIA
DECLASSIFIED BY SAF/AAZD IN 1991
AS PER SCR FOR SEA RECORDS, 1 APR
1988
AI Sl'GROUP-I-- ~onto,,d ,,,o Excluded from automatic downgrading
.h ..... . .and decla ifi cation.
20080910358CK717.0413-43
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PRO JECT" "NvMY
I0 Oera
ATTACK ON UDORN
I 27 DECEMBER 1968
Directorate, Tactical EvaluationCHECO Division
I Prepared by:CAPT
E.VALLENTINY
TSGT 0.G. RANCISProject CHECO 7th AF, DOAC
IK717.0413-43
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UNCLASSIFIED
PROJECT CHECO REPORTS
The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environmentof South-east Asia has resulted in the employment of USAF airpower to meet a multitudef requirements. The varied applications of airpower have involved the fullspectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. As a
result, there has been an accumulation of operational data and experiencesthat, as a priority, must be collected, documented, and analyzed as tocurrent and future impact upon USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine,
Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experienceswas recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF toestablish an activity that would be primarily responsive to Air Staff require-ments and direction, and would provide timely and analytical studies of USAFcombat operations in SEA.
Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Evaluation ofCombat Operations, was established to meet this Air Staff requirement, Managedby Hq PACAF, with elements at Hq 7AF and 7/13AF, Project CHECO provides ascholarly, "on-going" historical evaluation and documentation of USAF policies,concepts, and doctrine in Southeast Asia combat operations. This CHECO reportis part of the overall documentation and evaluation which is being accomplished,Along with the other CHECO publications, this is an authentic source for anassessment of th fieness of USAF airpower in EA.
MILTON B. ADAMS, Major General, USAFChief of Staff
ii
UNOL.ASUPID
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HEADQUARTERS PACIFIC AIR FORCES
APOSAN FRANCISCO 96553
REPLY TO
ATTN OF: DOTEC 27 December 1968
SUBJECT- Project CHECO Report, "Attack on Udorn" (U)
TO SEE DISTRIBUTION PAGE
1. Attached is a SECRET NOFORN document. It shall be transported, stored,
safeguarded, and accounted for in accordance with applicable securitydirectives. SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED, NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS,
The information contained in this document will not be disclosed to foreignnationals or their representatives. Retain or destroy in accordance withAFR 205-1. Do not return.
2. This letter does not contain classified information and may be declas-
sified if attachment is removed from it,
FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
WARREN H. PETERSON, Colonel, USAF 1 AtchChief, CHECO Division Proj CHECO Rpt (SNF),
Directorate, Tactical Evaluation 27 Dec 68DCS/Operati ons
Ii
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DISTRIBUTION
HQ USAF SAFOI ............ 2 Cys 19AF (DA-C) ....... 1 Cy
SAFLL ............ 1 Cy USAFAGOS......1 CyAFAAC............ 1 Cy SAFAA ............ 1 Cy USAFSAWC (DO), 1..yAFAMA ............ 1I y USAFTAWC (DA) ... 1 CyIAFBSA ............ 1I y MAJCOM USAFTARC (DI) .... 1 CyAFCCS-SA ......... 1 Cy USAFTALC (DA) .... 1 CyAFCHO ............ 2 Cys AU (ASI-HA) ....... 2 Cys USAFTFWC (CRCD) .. 1 CyIAFGOA ............ 2 Cys AU (ASI '-ASAD) ... 1 Cy FTD (TDPI) ........ 1 CyAFIIN ............ 1 Cy AU (AUL3T-66-7) .. 1 Cy AFAITC ........... 1 CyAFISI.......... 3 Cys AU (ACSC).........1I Cy SRAFREP (SWC) .. 1 CyAFISL ............ 1 Cy ADC (ADODC) ....... 1 CyIAFMSG ............ 1 Cy ADC (ADOOP) ....... 2 Cys PACAFAFNINA ........... 1 Cy ADC (ADLPP) ....... 2 Cys
AFNINCC .......... 1 Cy TAG (DO-O) ........ 1 Cy DP ........ 1 CyIAFNINDE .......... 3 Cys TAC (DPL) ......... 2 Cys DI ............... 1 CyAFOAPS ........ 1 Cy TAG (DOTS) ........ 1 Cy DO ............... 1I CyAFOCC............ 1 Cy TAC (DORQ)........1I Cy DPL .......... 1C IAFOCE ............ 1 Cy TAG (DI) ..........1 Cy DXIH ............. 1 CyAFOMO ............ 1 Cy MAC (MAFOI) ....... 1 Cy 5AF (DOP) .........1 CyAFOWX ............ 1 Cy MAC (MAOID) ....... 1 Cy 7AF (DOAC) ........ 9 CysAFPDP ............ 1I y MAC (MAOCO) ....... 1 Cy 13AF (DOP) ........ 1 CyIAFPMRE ........... 1I Cy AFSC (SCL) ........ 8 Cys 13AF (DXI) ........ 1 CyAFRDC ............ 1I y AFSC (SCO) ........2 Cys 834AIRDIV ......... 1 CyAFRDR ............ 1 Cy AFLC (MCO) ........ 1 Cy 3TFW ............. 1 CyIAFRDQ ............ 1 Cy AFLC (MCF)...... 1 Cy 8TFW ............. 1 Cy
AFSLP ............ 1 Cy ATC (ATXDC) .......1 Cy 12TFW ............ 1 CyAFSMS ............ 1 Cy SAC (DO) ..........1 Cy 14SOW ............ 1 CyAFSHVE ............ 1I y SAC (DPL) .........1 Cy 31TFW ............ ICyIAFSSS ............ 1I y SAC (DXI) .........1 Cy 35TFW ............ 1 CyAFSTP ............ i1Cy SAC (DIX) ......... I cy 37TFW ............ ICyAFXOP ............ 1 Cy SAC (OA) ..........1 Cy 56S0W ............ i1CyIAFXOPS ........... 1 Cy USAFA (DFH) .......1 Cy 315SOW ........... 1I CyAFXOSL ........... 1 Cy USAFE (OPQ).......2 Cys 355TFW ........... 1I CyAFXOSO ........... 1 Cy USAFSO (BIOH) ... 1 Cy 366TFW ........... 1I CyAFXOSN ........... 1I Cy USAFSS (ODC) ...... 1 Cy 388TFW ........... 1I CyAFXOPR ........... 1 Cy USAFSS (COI-5) .. 1 Cy 432TRW ........... 1I CyAFXQTZ ........... 1 Cy 460TRW (DCO) ......1 CyAFXPD ............ 9 Cys OTHERS 483TAW ........... i1CyAFXDOC ........... 1 Cy 553RECON WG ....... 1 CyAFXDOD ........... i1Cy 9AF (DO) ..........1 Cy 6400 TEST SQ ...... 1 Cy
AFXDOL ........... 1 Cy 12AF (DI) .........i cy DOTEC ............ 6 Cys
ivI
(This page is UNCLASSIFIED.)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
* Page
FOREWORD ................ .......... ............................... vi
IINTRODUCTION....................................................... viii
USAF Operations and Thai/US Relations .......................... viii
IThreat o USAF in hailand..................................... viii
CHAPTER I. PRE-ATTACK SITUATION ...................................... 1I
Arrangements for Base Defense ...... _....................External Defense ... _ _ .. . . . . . .. . . . . . 2
Internal Defense ... . . . . ._. . . . - . . . . . . 7
Thai Guards..................................... 9PACAF Security Guidance ........ ...................... 13
*Local Changes........................................ 15
CHAPTER II. THE ATTACK .............................................. 16
Base Security Posture ................................ 16Hostile Action ....................... 17Base Security Recin...............20
ICHAPTER III. POSt ATTACK CHANGES.................................... 25
U.S.-Thai Reaction.................................. 25IReview f Inadequacies .... .......................... 25Changes in Equipment ....... ......................... 26Meetings with Thais ........ ......................... 27Commit the RTAF .......... ........................... 29
Improved External Defense Plan ..... .................. 30Field Recommendations ......................... 32Concepts Tested at NKP ............................... 33
CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSIONS ...................................... 36
* FOOTNOTES
Introduction ..... ........................ 39
Chapter I ........ _ ................... .................. 39CheII ............................4Chapter III.......... .......-........._... I.......................42Chapter IVI.......... ......................................... 44
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APPENDIXES Page
I. Personnel and Equipment Requirements After Udorn Attack ........ 48
II. Results of Udorn Attack ........................................ 50
GLOSSARY ................................................................ 51
FIGURES Follows Page
1. Major U.S.-Tenanted RTAF Bases & Communist Activity Areas ...... viii2. Major Ethnic Groups ............................................ x3. External Base Defense Responsibility ........................... 6
vii
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FOREWORD
From a number of Thai air bases, the USAF waged air campaigns against
enemy targets, troops, and supply lines in North Vietnam, Laos, and South
Vietnam. The security of these bases was an extremely important matter.
On the night of 26 July 1968, the first attack was launched against one
of these bases. While the assault was repelled and the resulting damage
was not excessive, a number of inadequacies in base defense were clearly
indicated.
This CHECO report outlines the concepts of base security, which existed
before the attack; describes the assault on Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base
and explains how the defensive plans were implemented. It profiles
changes and improvements effected in security arrangements subsequent to
the attack. To better understand how planners grappled with the problems and
evolved solutions, it is necessary to view base security against the background
of a mounting threat, limited funding, and certain restrictive Thai/US
agreements.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
USAF Operations and Thai/US Relations
With permission granted by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to position
U.S. Air Force aircraft and launch strikes from Thai bases, the United States
was able to accrue a number of advantages. One obvious benefit was that
Thai bases were closer to enemy targets in North Vietnam and Laos (Fig. 1),
than most Allied bases in South Vietnam. Another favorable factor was that
USAF forces in Thailand enjoyed relative immunity from enemy attacks as
compared to those based in South Vietnam.
These advantages were gained through numerous diplomatic and military
agreements with the Royal Thai Government (RTG). As a cornerstone of U.S.
policy, retaining excellent working relationships with the Thai Government
and its people continued to be important. To pursue U.S. policies with a
proud nation, and a government particularly conscious of its sovereignty,
called for dexterity, not only in the diplomatic arena, but in day-to-day
contacts among Thais, U.S. commanders, and personnel.
Threat to USAF in Thailand
Thailand had long been recognized as a prime target of Communist expansion,
and the interest of the Communists was intensified by the USAF presence.
Accordingly, not only the RTG, its facilities, and officials, but also U.S.
personnel and resources were marks for their activities.
The threat to the American presence in Thailand, especially against the
Thai bases utilized by USAF aircraft, was seen to come from three possible
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- ,.
_ "!• 't '""*" DMZ
II
"','-",,,,,.o°" ,
-- A HL U. .N
' VIETNAM
MAORU..
\ , ' S UDORN
F'u~ 0 . ,"
" TENANTED RTAF
i h BASES & COMMU-SNIST ACTIVITY
AREAS
FIGURE 1
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-sources:
.Communist offensive air capability;
.Potential overt forays by Lao-based enemy forces;
In-Country dissident or insurgent forces.
While neither of the first two could be ignored, the third--posed by
in-country dissidents or insurgent forces--generated the most immediate and
2/pressing concern among American and Thai officials, Because Thailand had
dissatisfied ethnic and minority groups within the population, it ould have
been incorrect to credit all dissident or insurgent activity to Communists.
However, most of the activity was either directly or indirectly inspired by
them. (Fig. 2.)
Communist insurgents in Thailand were called Communist Terrorists (CTs).
3/Cumulative data on CT strength since December 1965 indicated:
HARD CORE/INDEGENOUS RECRUITS:
Northeast ----------------- 1,500North --------------------- 300
South ---------------------- 700TOTAL 2,50
SYMPATHIZERS:
Northeast ----------------- 7,000North --------------------
3,500South -------------------- 2,500TOTAL 13,000
GRAND TOTAL: 15,500
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4/IFor a similar period, the CTs experienced the following losses:
DEATHS ------------ 758
ARRESTS ---------- 2,632SURRENDERED-------2 337
TOTAL -3
Despite these losses, the number of CTs was increasing and they were
5/becoming generally more active:
YEAR 1966 1967 1968 (Jan-Jun)
ASSASSINATIONS 131 150 50ARMED ENCOUNTERS 154 505 428FORCED PROPAGANDA MEETINGS 81 154 90
Thai and U.S. officials were aware that the threat to U.S. tenanted
bases was growing and certain steps had been taken to cope with the possibility
of an attack. In late July 1968, however, there were no indications of an
imminent attack on any of the bases.
x
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II
K .L .
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' .'",",Jo,N
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I ".,. '., -.
Cambodian <
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Mixed Chinese, Thai= fGROUPS
i FIGURE 2
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CHAPTER I
PRE-ATTACK SITUATION
Arrangements for Base Defense
Under the agreements between the two countries, the responsibility for
efense except the internal security of priority USAF resources was
vested in the Royal Thai Government. The main reason for this was that no
foreign force could bear arms on Thai soil. In the case of USAF-tenanted
air bases, the USAF Security Forces were, by the agreements, responsible for
only the internal security of primary USAF resources,
During the USAF build-up in Thailand, however, which increased those
resources by 300 percent during 1966, it became apparent through a continuous
review of defense requirements, the USAF Security Forces were accomplishing
the bulk of the internal security with only token assistance from the
responsible Thai agencies. This was because the Thai military were ill-
equipped, and those forces primarily responsible for the internal security
generally were, in comparison to U.S. standards, untrained and did not
aggressively pursue their responsibility. Accordingly, the USAF Security
Forces were, by necessity, providing base-wide security rather than merely
the intended role of protecting U.S. resources and supplementing the Thai
I/effort when required.
The same problems confronting the Thai internal security effort were
also being faced by the RTG agencies responsible for external defense. That
situation could not be eased by the U.S. Air Force Security Forces, due to
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restrictions derived from the RTG's army policy (which withheld authority
for U.S. Forces to function outside the base perimeter), and the agreements
between the Thai and U.S. Governments in general.
Specific recommendations had been made by USAF and the Military Assist-
ance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) officials concerning improvements required
to maintain an adequate base defense posture against the existing threat.
The Thai Supreme Command Headquarters Forward (SCHQF), which was responsible
to the RTG for the overall defense program, maintained that coordinated
security and defense plans existed and were adequate to deter any offensive
initiated by Communist or dissident forces.
External Defense
The RTG, in which the responsibility to defend bases tenanted by the
USAF was vested, had directed the Royal Thai Army (RTA), Royal Thai Navy (RTN),
Marines, and RTAF, plus Border and Provincial Police units, to develop and
enact coordinated plans to fulfill that requirement. By July 1968, the
plans were still in various stages of development. At best, they ranged
from uncoordinated or untested proposals to a lack even of suggestions from3/
some agencies.
In the meantime, the RTG directed the Provincial Governors to cooperate
with the USAF officials at the bases and make temporary arrangements for ex-
ternal defense by utilizing the Provincial Police as a primary force. Some
proposals had been implemented but they proved to be ineffective due to in-
sufficient coordination and education of the other forces, who had the
2|___i
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actual long-range responsibilities. In reality, the plans resulted in such
confusion that the agency having the specific responsibility for Udorn RTAFB
reacted to the 26 July attack by merely stating it as the problem of the
police.
Various U.S. officials, from the lowest level in the field upward,
including COMUSMACTHAI and the Ambassador in Bangkok, had made attempts to4/
insure adequate plans existed.
The desired plans would have allowed responsible agencies to cope with
the variety of actions which could conceivably be taken against the U.S.
presence. The plans were to be designed to protect the U.S. resources from
the greatest threat, the mortar, recoilless rifle, or rocket barrage, which
most likely would be accomplished on a large scale, and which could be
accompanied by a coordinated sapper or suicide attack.
The enemy was to be denied unhindered operational access to all areas
within a 10,000-meter radius of each base. The most significant area to be
as the 5,000 to 10,000-meter belt, where the enemy could employ 81-,
82-,and 120-mm mortars, and 122-and 140-rm rockets. That was the area from
which they could hit each base with a resultant high level of damage and, due
to the long range, be almost undetectable. The enemy could also, in the
absence of adequate, coordinated external defense, occasion considerable
damage through harassment from within 3,000 meters, with Communist terrorists
forces trained in the use of 60-, 81-, 82-, and 120-mm mortars, and 57- and
75-mm recoilless rifles.
m3
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In conjunction with denying the enemy the operating area, in itself
costly and difficult from the point of view of manning and equipment, there
were to be cross-tell intelligence efforts through base internal and external
coordinating centers in which all responsible agencies would be represented.
Observation posts in the higher threat areas, flareships and gunships on
alert, free-fire zones around the bases, and forces readily available for
prompt and decisive countermeasure deployments to conduct ambushes and offen-6/
sive ground action against enemy training areas and hide-outs were envisioned.
By mid-1968 those external defense plans, which some agencies claimed
to have implemented, showed a lack of coordination. Also, the external
defense forces were hindered by the same problems as the USAF internal
security forces, shortages in equipment and personnel. Coupled with these
were jealousies among the responsible external defense agencies, which were
evident in contacts made between internal and various external defense
7/representatives.
Until the spring of 1968, all agencies concerned with the defense of
the bases maintained, though on an irregular basis, a good circulation of
intelligence information. At Udorn, the Directors of Intelligence and Security
Police continued to maintain regular contact with the off-base agencies.
The content of information they received, however, deteriorated to reports
which stated there was no change in the situation during the last three-to-
four months prior to the attack. A local Intelligence gathering system, the
USAF OSI Area Source Program for Thailand (ASP-T), had long been a key to
base defense planning, but the exchange of information between that agency
S - w -- -i
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and local Thai agencies (including the RTAF on base) had been neither
8/adequate nor timely.
While the USAF security forces had responsibilities inside the base
perimeter, they were blocked from participating in the external defense
efforts by the Thais' long-standing policies to maintain a lov American
profile off base. Where the USAF could provide vehicles, radios, weapons,
and even unarmed American personnel to supplement the Thais' external
effort, this assistance was generally refused on grounds that to employ such
assistance, even on a temporary basis, would provide a degree of credence to
9/the Communist propaganda line of an American take-over in Thailand.
afeside Units and Quick Reaction Teams are designed to
counter enemy action at the base perimeter or within the confines of the
base. The latter consisted of 50-to-100 fully-equipped men on alert at
various locations. For this reason, there could be no USAF-controlledrecon-
naissance and search/destroy missions, or assistance to primary external force
in hot pursuit of an attacking enemy force.
U.S. interest and participation in the overall defense organization had
been labeled the only thing that had inspired any effectiveness at all. While
limited to internal security, the USAF did exert some influence in the
external defense sphere.
One example of the influence of continuing U.S. interest in external
defense, but which also pointed out the lack in coordination in the Thai
-
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external defense plans, occurred in early July 1968. As a result of USAF
concern over the security of an area along the southwestern perimeter of
Udorn RTAFB, the Thai Provincial Police conducted a sweep operation in his
area.
The sweep operation, carried out solely by the police, extended over a
three-week period and a number of suspects were arrested or detained. How-
ever, it was later learned the operation took place in an area which was
not the responsibility of the Provincial Police. The area to the southwest
of Udorn had been assigned, via written agreement, to a Thai Army unit, the
11/
13th Regimental Combat Team.- (Fig. 3.)
Also, the sweep was designed for Communist suppression, an action delegated
specifically to the 2d RTA (Forward). Neither of those agencies participated
in the police operation.
While willingness of the police to perform was demonstrated, and a measure
of effectiveness was shown, the fact that they operated in an area assigned
to another agency pointed out a lack of understanding and coordination among
the various agencies responsible for external defense.
As has been already stated, the OSI/Security Police area source program
failed to provide warning of an attack. It ad been recognized that the ASP
was a capable intelligence gathering system, but a lack of manpower detracted
from its effectiveness. The 7/13AF Director of Security Police stated,
after the attack on Udorn, that the program had failed to produce any
important information for several weeks prior to the attack.
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In addition to the ASP, warning of an attack in the form of intelligence
inputs was to come, under the planning which had been done, from several
sources. These were the Thai Suppression Command, the various Thai military,
Border, and Provincial Police, and other agencies under the Ministries of
Interior and Defense. However, they proved to be ineffective, either because
they were not exchanging information, or the information they were exchanging12/
was insignificant.
Throughout Thailand, few proposals for external defense were implemented
such as aggressive patrol and ambush programs, observation posts in the
hreat areas, installation defense coordinating centers, free fire
zones around the bases, dawn-to-dusk reconnaissance patrols (both ground and
air), and flare aircraft and gunships on nightly missions or at least on
ready alert. Finally, no provision was established for better training of
the responsible forces by testing their reliability. 3/
Defense
The RTAF Base Commander had been delegated the responsibility for internal
defense at the bases tenanted by USAF forces, with the exception of U-Tapao
where the RTN was responsible. Under various agreements, the USAF was to
supplement the Thai internal security effort through the employment of
Security Police Squadrons, contract Thai Security Guard (TSG) companies, and
augmentees (non-security police USAF personnel specifically trained for
emergency security support). This combined USAF-provided force was intended
to give on-base protection to the USAF's priority resources and other U.S.14/
facilities, equipment, and personnel.
7
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The objective of all internal defense planning was to maintain the
capability to counter hostilities within the boundaries of the base. The
greatest threat posed was the possibility of sabotage and infiltration by15/
small teams.
Joint U.S./Thai defense plans were in existence for some time prior to
the attack on Udorn. These plans appropriately assigned respective roles
to the Thai and USAF security forces at each base. Except for the training
given to the USAF provided forces, however, there was no means of evaluating
the overall USAF/Thai capability to effectively counter hostile actions.
USAF security forces throughout Thailand, when considered in line with
the authorized manpower, were relatively well equipped with weapons, vehicles,
and communications equipment. However, when examined from the point of
view of having the capability to accomplish their actual responsibilities,
or meet USAF/PACAFsecurity standards, all security police units in Thailand17/
were undermanned.--
As an example of the manning problem, the Udorn squadron was authorized
195 men and assigned only 160 in July 1968. Although justification for an
additional 405 men had been put forward, only 50, mostly sentry dog
handlers,were provided. Though the dogs and handlers provided a much needed
improvement, there still remained the valid justification for the 355 addi-
tional security policemen. Due to manpower ceilings imposed on the USAF
by the Thai Government and shortages in other fields, the request of the18/i
security police was not filled. While this was a recent example, there had
always been a shortage of USAF security personnel in Thailand.
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mThai Guards
In light of the restrictions on the number of U.S. personnel in hai-
land, some means of protection for U.S. resources had to be devised.With
the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSmACTHAI),
acting on behalf of the U.S., and the Supreme Command Headquarters (Forward),
representing the RTG and Ministry of Defense, a memorandum of understanding
was drawn which established a Thai paramilitary force for internal base
security. The force was known as the Thai Security Guard (TSG) Regiment.
A contract to carry out the agreements of thememorandum was signed on 21
January 1966.L
The Thai Security Guard program was organized under the SCHQF, which
was directly responsible to the Ministry of Defense. The Guard had no other
connection with the Thai military. To provide the appropriate administrative
control and services to the Thai Security Guard Regiment, regular RTAF officers
COs were assigned for one-year tours with the TSG detachments located
at each of the U.S. tenanted bases. Operational control of the TSGs was
n each of the U.S. Base Commanders, who delegated responsibility for
organization, assignment, training, and duty scheduling to his Chief of
Security Police.
f the USAF Commander were carriedout with the assumption that
he had an integrated security force. All personnel, whether U.S. or Thai,
received the same treatment according to rank, and other U.S. military
customs and courtesies. Directives were exercised through the Thai Commander
or Senior Thai Supervisor at each installation. The Thai Commander or Senior
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Supervisor was responsible for all command and administrative matters
necessary to insure unit operational effectiveness. COMUSMACTHAI was20/
responsible for theoverall supervision of the TSG program.
To fill the ranks of the regiment, initially, the Ministry of Defense
recalled military reservists, on a voluntary basis, to perform duty in the
security program. However, as the USAF combat operations from Thailand
expanded, so did the requirement for additional Thai Guards. Seemingly, the
U.S. Government could put as much military equipment and as many facilities
into the country as it desired, but the stringent personnel ceiling forced
the U.S. to monitor closely the numbers not directly associated with carrying
out the combat mission. The ability to expand the Thai Guard program,
therefore, was both a blessing and a curse. While the number of Thai Guards
could be increased to accommodate greater security needs for enhanced USAF
resources and activities, increases requested in USAF security personnel
21/received lower priority ratings.
The Thai Guard program was intended to meet the security requirements
set forth by each U.S. Base Commander. The performance of the guards was
judged by U.S. standards, and they were provided the same supervision, train-I
2/ing, and treatment as U.S. military personnel at each installation.
The one real advantage in the TSG program was that it did provide an
element of armed protection for U.S. resources. There still were problems
and disadvantages in the program which continued to require adjustments.
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After establishing a well-rounded program, which provided for phased
refresher training, and qualifying enough guards to carry out a base defense
mission, the security force posture at each base had to be revised. This
posture was changed to provide dual manning of all operations, from static
23/posts and roving patrols to the joint Central Security Control (CSC).
After the Thais became a part of this posture and were qualified in the
use of the assigned weapons, there were still obstacles such as the language
barrier. While the language barrier had little effect on communications
between individuals, it became significant when the Thai supervisors made
spoken transmissions on the security radio net. This was already overloaded
with transmissions aimed at maintaining coordination of a base-wide security
force deployment. Serious consideration had to be given to the possibility
of establishing a dual radio network, with Thai language training provided
USAF personnel.24/
ome security commanders complained of lethargy among the Thais,
the revised force posture, with almost around-the-clock dual manning by
USAF and Thai personnel, provided extensive USAF police supervision. Lethargy
might have been better controlled had there always been a full-time comple-
m25/
ment of RTAF supervisors, but this was seldom the case.
Perhaps the most worrisome problem was the cloudy backgrounds of the
personnel employed in the TSG program. Initially, all guards hired were
recalled military reservists. With the expansion required in conjunction
with the USAF buildup, however, the SCHQF began approving nearly all applica-
tions, with the reservists getting priority on job vacancies. For some time,
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many non-reservists were hired, because there were not enough applicants in
the preferred category. The cloudy backgrounds of these personnel created
an air of uneasiness among some U.S. officials. Security background investi-
gations were conducted by the Thai Armed Forces Security Center, but the U.S.
26/did not receive even a courtesy copy of the final clearances.
If there were any doubt that the applicants were not being fully investi-
gated, it was at least temporarily quelled in June 1968. The RTG police
and personnel of the RTG Armed Forces Security Center arrested 127 applicants
for jobs with the TSG Regiment. It had been discovered that a ring of forgers
was selling RTAF reserve cards to individuals seeking jobs with the regiment.
Though the card was no longer a prerequisite for employment, the emphasis
on hiring reservists first (and for the better jobs) made the cards desirable.
COMUSMACTHAI, though not ruling out the possibility, determined that Communist
terrorists had not infiltrated USAF tenanted bases by that method. It was
believed that forgers and users of the cards were motivated solely by monetary_
gain.
The 7/13AF Director of Security Police stated he had no reason to
question the loyalty of any of the Security Guards, especially at Udorn. He
said they were all "straight-up"; he had nothing but praise for their28/
responseon the night of the attack.,
Although considerable improvements had been realized in the quality of
the TSG program since its inception, it was not deemed the final answer. More
USAF security police were needed, as well as sentry dogs and handlers. Also,
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the efficiency of the program had been effectively tested only once.
PACAF Security Guidance
PACAF Manual 207-25, "Security Police Guidance for Guerrilla/Insur-
gency/Limited War Environments", issued in May 1968, completely revised USAF
standards of the AFM 207 series. Primarily, it pointed up a stronger
need for additional USAF security personnel. Little could be done, however,
without lifting the personnel ceiling limitations.
he directive put into detailed written form the guidance
for adopting a security force posture to meet the needs of the local situa-
tion. This posture was already in effect at the major USAF tenanted instal-
lations, though the status of American manning made adoption of some procedures
difficult. For example, the manual suggested that daytime Security Alert
Teams (SATs) were to be made up of one American and one Thai, while at night,
the team would consist of two Americans and one Thai. The manpower restric-
tions resulted in n almost complete reversal of this desired composition.
As pointed out in the manual, the paramount security threat confronting
USAF units operating in n insurgency environment was that of overt enemy
attacks against USAF forces, weapons systems, or other essential resources
committed to the war effort. The threat consisted mainly of the possibility
of active ground force infiltration or attack, and attack by standoff
he flexible, mobile, and fluid nature of unconventional and
limited war was such that there could be no guarantee that external forces
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31 /would be capable of providing complete defense in depth at all times.
In compliance with the manual, it was necessary for a commander to plan
for, equip, train, and organize a ground defense force capable of protecting
the installation from hostile groups. Assigned security police were to
provide a force sufficient for accomplishment of the defense mission under
32/normal conditions of operation. Defense plans already in effect provided
the desired degrees of augmentation to increase protection during the inten-
33/sified threat conditions and to counter actual attacks.-
Restrictions resulting from the Thai arming policy prohibited the supply
of heavy weapons to USAF security personnel. The Thai Security Guards were
armed with M-1 and M-2 carbines, while the American personnel had M-16s. The
need for full-time American supervision and adherence to PACAF desires,
resulted in the Quick Reaction Teams (QRTs) and SATs being dually manned. The
Thais and Americans on these mobile teams had M-16s. M-60 machine guns were
mounted on their alert vehicles; M-148 grenade launchers were also available.
Physical internal security facilities were also inadequate country-wide.
There was a general lack of boundary fencing, outpost lighting, bunkers,
and watch towers. Each Base Director of Security, officials at MACTHAI, and
the American Ambassador in Bangkok had submitted numerous requests for funds
35/to provide the required improvements.
Furthermore, the overall status of security force manning and equipment,
both internal and external, did not provide the fullest protection necessary
36/
to safety for priority resources, facilities, equipment,and personnel.
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Local Changes
Some changes in the actual accomplishment of the internal defense effort
were realized prior to the attack on Udorn. USAF forces, including the TSGs
ugmentees, assumed responsibility of the primary internal security for
the entire base. It as believed the responsible Thai forces (RTAF or RTN)
were inadequately equipped and manned. Accordingly, a higher degree of
coordination was effected.
In essence, the forces themselves, through need, reversed the intentions
of the U.S.-Thai agreements. The RTAF security element assumed the role ofi 37 /
protecting their own priority resources almost exclusively.L/
With these actions came changes in the internal force posture. Available
forces had to be spread thinly across the base. At Udorn, for example, during
emergency situations, few additional static sentries could be posted. One
hundred augmentees and all off-duty security police were placed on immediate
recall, with another 400 augmentees available on back-up. The immediate
recallees formed extra Security Alert Teams and Mobile Security Reaction Teams.
38/This is the basic concept of PACAFM 207-25.
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CHAPTER II
THE ATTACK
Base Security Posture
On the night of 26/27 July 1968, there were two factors which held the
key to countering the unexpected attack on the unfenced, unrevetted, and
darkened north-northwest corner of Udorn RTAFB. One factor was a special
mission C-141 Starlifter aircraft. The second, and interlocking factor, was
the security posture for that portion of the base. A defense setup was
established, which would not have been in existence had the C-141 been on
its normal Aeromedical Evacuation mission.
The C-141 Starlifter was on a Sentinel Echo mission, the name given the
special aeromedical evacuation of three American pilots whom North Vietnam
officials had been promising to release. These pilots were to have departed
Hanoi on a regular Friday night International Control Commission (ICC) flight
to Vientiane, Laos. From there, they would have had the opportunity to go to
the U.S. on either commercial or USAF aircraft. Had they chosen USAF trans-
portation, they would have been taken to Udorn on 26 July at approximately
2230 hours. However, the pilots were not released in anoi until several
2/days later.
The security provided for the C-141 was determined by the sensitivity
of the Sentinel Echo mission. Expanded security would have been provided
had the aircraft been on a routine air evac mission, but it would not have
equalled that which was provided because of the extra caution involved.
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Normal security for the northwest corner of the base would have been
radio-equipped, sparsely posted, static sentries with a roving patrol travel-
ing around the inside base perimeter road. (See Fig. 3.) Except on rare
occasions, priority resources were not parked on Taxiway 4 or the trim pad
adjacent to it. The two F-4 aircraft that were on the trim pad near Taxiway
4, though treated as priority resources, would not have required additional
security in that area, because they were down for maintenance and the main-
tenance crews were providing 24-hour coverage. For that reason, there was
no xtra or close-in sentry posted on the trim pad. According to theDirector
of Security Police, the nature of the Starlifter's mission was more of a
planning factor on that particular night than anything else. Additional
security personnel included a close-in sentry at the aircraft, additional
static sentries between the taxiway and the perimeter, and a special QRT
positioned close by. The close-in sentry and one-half of the USAF members
of the QRT were the only armed Americans in the immediate vicinity of the
C-141. All other sentries were Thai Security Guards.4
Hostile Action
A hostile force of unknown size attacked Udorn RTAFB at 2225 hours the
night of 26 July 1968. The size of the force, which opened its attack with
automatic weapons fire on the northwest end of the base, was estimated at
eight to ten persons by Intelligence officers. The security police and the
5/local Thai police, however, estimated there were up to 25 of the attackers.
The initial fire came from just outside the base perimeter at a point
parallel to Runway 12 and perpendicular to Taxiway 4. The initial fire was
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joined by hostile fire coming from two or more positions parallel to the taxi-
way and perpendicular to the runway, as well as from a point almost exactly
opposite the position of the initial fire. As part of the attacking force
continued to fire from these positions, other members moved toward the6/
special air evac Sentinel Echo.
Eyewitnesses have accounted for three intruders within grenade-throwing
distance of the C-141, while other evidence indicates at least three othersn
penetrated to within 30 yards of the aircraft. The enemy reached the immediate
vicinity of the C-141 and an F-4D aircraft some 50 yards away on a trim pad.
They were in the area for approximately 20 minutes before being driven back7
by mobile USAF/Thai Security Force Quick Reaction and Security Alert Teams.
According to eyewitness reports, one intruder penetrated to the parked
aircraft. He was shot and killed just under the tail of the C-141 by the
close-in USAF Security Guard. Another raider got to thesame general area,
only about 20 yards closer to the runway. He, too, was killed by the USAF
guard.
A third man entered from across the runway, went toward the C-141,
approached two vehicles parked just off the left wing tip, sprayed the area
with AK-47 automatic fire, and ran into the grass off the taxiway to the front
of the aircraft. He returned to the taxiway,going to the right side of
the Starlifter, and there he lobbed an explosive charge under the aircraft
and a second charge onto a mobile power unit. The first explosion ignited
fuel pouring from the damaged number two engine on the C-141. He then ran
the length of the taxiway, toward the trim pad where two F-4 aircraft were
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parked. On the way there, he detoured slightly to a mobile security force
truck. He evidently had seen USAF personnel using the truck for cover. He
threw an explosive charge into the back of the truckand then continued on to
the closest of the two F-4 aircraft.
On the trim pad, the third hostile was seen to circle a "D" odel
aircraft, throw something into the tail pipe, and run off into the grass. No
explosion was seen or heard. The man returned to the F-4D, again throwing
something into the tail pipe. After this second attempt, a muffled explosion
was heard and flames shot from the exhaust of the Phantom II. Then the
intruder ran back into the grass on the east of the taxiway, and reaching a
point about halfway between the trim pad and the C-141, hurried toward the
base perimeter, and disappeared.
Evidence found the following morning by investigating officers indicated
at least three more enemy had been in the immediatevicinity of the C-141.
Blood stains, ammunition clips, and drag marks further indicated that at least
one of the three had been either killed or seriously wounded during the ex-
g/change of gunfire.
As the hostile group was pushed back toward the base perimeter, some of
the attackers made one last concentrated effort, and unleashed a volley of
automatic fire that pinned down a pursuing security alert team. A QRT arrived
in he area, however, just northeast of Taxiway 4, and the hostile force
continued to withdraw. The SAT, which had been pinned down, pursued the
group toward the perimeter, but no further contact was made.
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At 0205 and 0230 hours, small arms fire was reported in the area of
the road leading to the Napalm and Munitions Storage site. (Fig. 3.) An
investigation of the area by a QRT disclosed no further evidence that anyone
had actually been firing from or into the area.
Base Security Reaction
At the time of the attack on Udorn, the close-in security guard, three
maintenance men, and an aeromedical evacuation crew member were standing by a
maintenance truck parked off the left wing of the C-141. They realized they
were under attack when tracer bullets began passing overhead from a position
across the runway. Before they could react, tracers were flying through air
2/from several directions.12
According to one maintenance man, they were under fire from every direc-
tionexcept down the runway and the parallel taxiway inside the base. An
attempt was made to radio word of the attack to the maintenance shop, but no
one answered the call.
After turning off the headlights on the maintenance vehicle, an attempt
was made to turn the lighting unit shining on an aircraft, toward the hostile
positions in n effort to light up potential targets. While trying to turn
the unit around, the bulbs were shot out.
At that point, the medic made his way to the C-141 and called for the
other medical and flight crew personnel aboard to get out. The medical and
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flight crew members evacuated the aircraft and headed for cover in the grass.
En route, one crew chief received abdominal wounds, which resulted in his
death several days later, and the C-141 pilot was severely wounded in both13/hands.
While the evacuation was being accomplished, the number two engine of the
C-141 caught fire. Immediately, an HH-43 "Pedro" helicopter with a fire sup-
pression kit flew to the scene; its crew fought the fire. The chopper and
fire hose took hits, but the Pedro crew remained in the area, using rotor blast
and a trickle of foam to contain the fire until several fire trucks arrived14/
to extinguish the fire.
In he meantime, the security guard was spraying first one area and then
the other with M-16 automatic weapon fire. He observed three enemy approaching
the aircraft, two of whom he is credited with killing.
Those killed carried AK-47 assault rifles, several extra clips of ammo,
grenades and plastic type explosive charges. One of the killed did not die
outright, but bled to death after being downed near the taxiway, because it
was realized that he had satchel charges rigged on his body. He was kept
under surveillance awaiting the arrival of EOD personnel. This individual was
shot during the first few minutes of the attack, but he was not discovered
15/until some six hours later during a sweep of the infiltrated area.
Within two minutes of the initial shots a joint USAF/TSG SAT, on standby
for Sentinel Echo security, deployed from the taxiway and returned fire on the
hostile positions. Within ten minutes of the first fire, the security leader,
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a six-man QRT and another three-man SAT from CSC had blocked off the north/
northwest end of the base. The CSC had meanwhile effected a base recall
of all off-duty security police personnel and augmentee forces. Several
additional QRTs and SATs were quickly formed and some were dispatched to
strategic areas for defense of the base. Other teams were kept in reserve16/I
at CSC.
Throughout the night a C-130, called in from Korat RTAFB, and an HH-43
continued to circle over the base; their crews dropped flares and served
as reconnaissance spotters. The security forces, including USAF, RTG, and
American augmentees, remained on alert. Several times during the hours of
darkness a QRT or SAT responded and investigated reports of sniper fire and
possible infiltration attempts. Flare drops were directed over the munitions
storage area in the early morning hours as the SATs searched the area, but the
enemy was not discovered again. The expanded security operation was terminated
at 0700 hours on 27 July after the USAF, RTAF Base Commander, and security
leader determined the base was clear, and that there would be no further contact17/
with hostile forces.17
The immediate and effective reaction by the close-in USAF Sentry and
the first SAT had blunted the infiltration. With the arrival of additional
security personnel, the invaders began a hasty retreat, leaving trails of8/
grenades, loaded ammo clips, and other explosives.
Later, during an interview on base defense, the 7/13AF Director of
Security Police was asked about the performance of security personnel during
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-:
the attack, and about the trustworthiness of the Thai Security Guards. He
conmented that the forces had reacted effectively, like professionals. He
said there was no reason to question the loyalty of the Thai guards, and
that their performance on 26/27 July was outstanding. The TSGs had deployed
and carried out their duty of repulsing the infiltrators with professional
initiative.
On notification of the attack, the Central Security Control and other
pertinent agencies on base smoothly accomplished their duties. The fire
department had dispatched the necessary equipment and extinguished the
flames at the parked C-141. The Pedro helicopter had been able to contain
the fire until the arrival of fire trucks, despite its fire suppression kit
having been rendered almost ineffective, due to a gash torn in the hose by
hostile fire.
A C-130 flareship, requested through the 432d Wing's Tactical Unit
Operations Center (TUOC) and the 7/13AF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC),
arrived one hour after the attack began and commenced flare drops. The
drops continued until daybreak, allowing the security forces to conduct a
sweep of suspected areas. Base hospital personnel responded rapidly, taking
the wounded and other personnel out of the area to the safety of the hospital
compound.
CSC had announced the attack by radio and had issued appropriate defense
instructions to all security personnel. There was no effort to communicate
by radio with any of the static perimeter guards, because it was estimated
this would have endangered their lives by tipping their position and detracting
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from their effectiveness. A post-by-post inspection was begun during a sweep
of the area, while the flare drops continued.
When security forces reached the northernmost corner of the base, during
a more extensive sweep and security operation, which began at daybreak, they
found one of the Thai Security Guards had been killed by hostile AK-47 gun-
fire at the time of the initial outbreak. It was believed this TSG had
attempted to sound the alarm when he was shot, thereby prematurely triggering
the attack. His radio had been turned on and was in the transmit position;
his carbine had been loaded and cocked.20/ (See Appendix II.)
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CHAPTER III
POST ATTACK CHANGES
U.S. - Thai Reaction
Various officials, both Thai and American, had discussed the subject of
protecting USAF resources and personnel in Thailand against attack. The ac-
complishment of many of the suggested improvements depended upon additional
owever, two days after the attack, it as learned the latest
request for funds to finance improvements had been denied earlier. It ad
been agreed a concentrated effort was needed to finalize defense plans, and
to make long delayed improvements in facilities, such as the construction
I/of watch towers and bunkers and the erection of perimeter fences. After
the attack, there was no longer just a danger from a variety of suspected
forces; the threat had become real.
Review of Inadequacies
Within a few hours of the attack, the Commanders in Chief of PACOM
and PACAF, the Commanders of Seventh and Thirteenth Air Forces, the Deputy
Commander of 7/13AF, COMUSMACTHAI, and the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand
stressed preparations for additional hostile offensive acts. Their positions
and policies on base defense were reiterated and field commanders were
directed to study defense posture and capability, to make recommendations,
and to take corrective action within local capabilities.
Commanders and Security Police officers at each base and site in hai-
land surveyed their resources; all of them possessed the necessary capabili-
ties to protect and react within their agreed and assigned realm of
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responsibility; i.e., the protection of priority resources. No base, accord-
ing to surveys, however, was equipped or manned to accomplish its assumed
3/
or actual role of base defense.
The same problems prevailed at all USAF-tenanted bases in Thailand.
First, as stated, the realm of responsibility had long been overshadowed by
the actual defensive role. There were practically no free fire zones around
any of the bases. In he general area of low priority static sentry posts,
shanty towns had been erected as close as 50 yards to base boundaries.
Communist sympathizers were known to be living in them. There was a shortage
of manpower (See Appendix I). There was no perimeter fencing and few, if
any, reinforced defense bunkers. There were neither watch towers nor an
effective defoliation program. Furthermore, the attainment of one of these4/
improvements would be inadequate without the others.-
Funds had been requested many times through the military construction
program, as well as from operational and maintenance budgets, but'without
success. The attack on Udorn was the added justification needed in he next
request for funds, which possibly might have won approval to increase the
number of USAF security men, and provide newer and more equipment.5
Changes in Equipment
As an example of their needs, the 81-mm mortar was ordered for Udorn
and Nakhon Phanom in mid-August 1968. This item had long been considered
desirable for base defenders, but its introduction to Thailand had been denied
because it was classified as a "heavy weapon". Therefore, it had been on
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the "not allowed" list of the U.S. Ambassador. Nevertheless, as demonstrated
by the Udorn attack, an immediate flare requirement existed at many bases.
Since the 81-mm mortar could fire a flare round, the weapon, if used strictly
for that purpose, was not considered heavy equipment and therefore was ordered6/
into the arsenal.
Renewed backing of the Ambassador and higher USAF command echelons
influenced immediate requests for more men, equipment, and facilities. The
requests were consolidated at numbered air force headquarters. It as hoped
the increased concern would be sufficient to procure the necessary improve-
7/ments through USAF resources.
Meetings with Thais
The possibility of increased enemy activity did not go unnoticed by
responsible Thai officials. In less than 24 hours after the attack on Udorn,
the Deputy Commander of 7/13AF, the American Consul at Udorn, and the area
Thai Military Commander had scheduled a review and planning conference. Sub-
ordinates of the military officials had held preliminary discussions the
morning after the attack, while they conducted a joint investigation. While
this conference was in session at Udorn, the American Ambassador informally
conferred with the RTAF Commander in Bangkok. The RTAF officer asked for
a subsequent meeting in Bangkok, under auspices of the Supreme Command,to
bring together the pertinent responsible officials, including the Americans
from the field. This meeting was held on 30 July.
he meeting took place so soon after the attack, and most of
the intervening time had been taken up by investigations, reviews, and
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surveys to prepare recommendations for local corrective action, the larger
meeting served only as a stepping stone. However, it provided an opportunity
for concerned officials to exchange their views, review past planning, dis-
cussions and agreements, and to present some new proposals to meet the modi-
8/fied situation. They also established meeting dates for further coordination.
Time was devoted to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Thai Supreme Command
Headquarters at the conference held on 30 July 1968. He provided some details
on the visit of the Thai Prime Minister to Washington in May 1968. Among
the topics discussed had been proposals for base defense and requests for
additional U.S. Government help.
In essence, the RTG had asked for assistance in planning an effective
program and for training and achieving a professional security force. The
request included instructors to conduct the program, as well as materiel
support through the provision of munitions, weapons, vehicles, and communica-
tions equipment.
The Royal Thai Air Force security organization offered another prime
example of its needs. With many of the RTAF security units on Thai air bases
severely undermanned, they were ineffective. Even those units, however, which
were fully manned were poorly trained and equipped. Certain USAF officials
were in agreement that no real RTAF commitment existed to provide internal
defense of its own bases against ground attack. Neither was there an effective
Military Assistance Program (MAP) to help achieve an expedient capability
within the authorized RTAF security forces,
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a aw ENRT :
Since the attack on Udorn did not bring immediate relief of restrictive
policies on USAF security forces--even with more men and equipment--they could
assume only a little more responsibility. Nevertheless, as a result of the
attack, and in support of the Thai request for assistance, the Deputy Commander,
Seventh/Thirteenth Air Forces, supplied COMUSIACTHAI with a number of recom-
which committed the USAF to certain actions. They concerned not
10/
only internal defense measures, but also support of external forces.
Commit the RTAF
Among the recommendations listed, the RTAF security organization had the
potential to man and equip ten well-trained security companies. The Deputy
Commander of 7/13AF requested that COMUSH,ACTHAI obtain a commitment from the
Royal Thai Supreme Command and RTAF to fully man, equip, and train one elite
security company to be stationed at each USAF-tenanted base, plus two companies
for reserve. MACTHAI was to initiate action to procure munitions, communica-
tions gear, and transportation. The RTAF was to provide experienced officers
and NCOs to be trained by USAF security personnel. Priority was to be given
to training and equiping heavy weapons squads and platoons. Each 7/13AF Base
Commander would be tasked to provide instructions and advice to the RTAF
company selected for his base.
On the external side of the defense effort, IACTHAI was to insure that
the RTAF clearly accepted the responsibility of airlifting external defense
forces to threatened locations, and that they planned and exercised that
responsibility. MAP action was to provide additional airlift assets, when
they were needed to meet requirements of the program. In the interim,
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procedures were to be developed, so that the RTAF could request and receive
USAF assistance in meeting airlift requirements. This combined effort
required coordination at the highest level between the U.S. and Thai
Governments.
As emphasized during meetings in Bangkok, irrespective of what was done
by the USAF to get more men, equipment, and facilities, they could only
minimize the possibility of base penetrations. Additions cou7d neither
prevent, nor necessarily cope with attacks by hostile forces from any
distance off the base.
Daily meetings between SCHQ and the U.S. Mission to develop and coordi-
nate joint measures for improving base security began 31 July in Bangkok.
Meanwhile, Thai and USAF Base Commanders worked at their levels, under direc-
tion of COMUSMACTHAI and the Deputy Commander of 7/13AF, in their particular
14/
spheres of responsibility.
Improved External Defense Plan
In ne of the daily Bangkok meetings, the SCHQ representative described
to the U.S. officials the RTG plan for external base defense. The Thais
proposed to cover the area from the base perimeter outward for 15km, as they
had previously, but now they planned to make the area the responsibility of
one Thai Commander at each base. General suppression and frontier defense
activities remained an army responsibility. Other proposals were the same
as recommendations made by an U.S. Mission base defense working group in
March 1968. Implementation had been urged by the American Ambassador on
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several occasions prior to the attack on Udorn. This time, the plan was
scheduled to be presented to the RTG cabinet for approval at a 6 August 1968
meeting.
A slightly modified plan was introduced for consideration during the 13
August Thai cabinet meeting. It as an important step forward according to
the American Ambassador, especially since the modified version contained two
points desired by the U.S. One concerned deployment of RTAF forces off base
and the other was to insure a key role in external defense for the Commander~15/
of the2d Army (Forward).
Prior to the plan, the RTAF (RTN at U-Tapao) commanders had no authority
to deploy forces outside the base perimeter, to intercept attacking forces
at sufficient distance to prevent mortar and rocket attack, or to pursue a
force off base after it had attacked the base. The proposed SCHQ plan, upon
implementation, would have authorized such actions. The U.S. had also been
about the apparent lack of command channel relations between the
commanders of each base, as designated in the SCHQ plan, and the Royal Thai
Armed Forces (RTAF) area command in Northeast Thailand. The RTAF Area Command-
er (the Commander, Second Army Forward) was the central intelligence gathering
and coordinating agent for all forces in he NE, and the U.S. did not want
him to be excused, even by implication, from playing an appropriate role in
base defense. That commander also possessed overall authority in he NE for
communist suppression. The SCHQ representative agreed to the U.S. view, and
the Second Army was delegated a key role in the new defense plan. It as
believed that if he plan passed the cabinet in that proposed form, it ould
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provide a good organizational framework in the RTG and RTARF for effective15/
base defense. /
The SCHQ also guaranteed that a meeting would be convened with the
appropriate RTARF commanders and the means would be developed to increase
officer and noncommissioned officer strengths in he Thai Security Guard units.
This action was to insure authorized positions for regular RTAF officers and
NCOs being filled on a full time basis at each base at which the TSG program1 /
was employed. L
Field Recommendations
Along with base defense reviews and meetings designed to improve joint
defense, several recommendations came from agencies in the field, which were
not involved in base security. One recommendation was to modify available
HH-3 and HH-43 helicopters to drop CBU-19As, and to test this concept at
Eglin AFB. Because Air Rescue and Recovery Service resources were critical,
this request was disapproved. It ight have degraded the rescue mission to
8/utilize helicopters for other than humanitarian and rescue purposes.
Starlight scopes, Xenon searchlights, and battery commander scopes were
also recommended. Assistance had been requested in equisitioning and obtain-
19/
ing the necessary authorization for these items.
To insure airlift support for external defense forces, which could be
shifted from base to base in an emergency, authority was granted for the use
of USAF resources. Requests had to be fully justified by the situation be-
fore USAF aircraft could be used, and then, only if an RTAF aircraft were rot
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available. It as stressed that USAF crews could not, under any circumstances,
fire on enemy targets outside a base in Thailand. If it were necessary to
protect aircraft being utilized for RTG-force airlift, the crew was to with-
draw from the hostile fire area and terminate the mission. The availability
of USAF aircraft was not to be made known to the RTG, and they could be used
only through authority of the Deputy Commander, 7/13AF, if required to prevent
20/a standoff attack.
From one recommendation, it was decided to incorporate the capabilities of
Radar Approach Control (RAPCON) units into the coordinated efforts. While
it had a limited capability, the RAPCON could be utilized to some degree to211spot mortar positions and to pinpoint the location of an attacking force.
Concepts Tested at NKP
In other efforts to provide an improved, coordinated Thailand-wide defense
program, USAF and RTG officials took advantage of a tense situation which
at Nakhon Phanom (NKP), a few days after the attack on Udorn. All
internal and external security forces in he province around NKP were braced
for an attack on the base. This situation was used to exercise and test
several concepts of the SCHQ proposed plan. These were the employment of a
joint USAF/RTAF base defense plan and the exercise of other proposals for a22/
coordinateddefense effort.
One of the proposals toward a coordinated Thailand-wide defense effort
was the employment of a Quick Reaction Mobility Force (QRMF) comprised of a
fully equipped 25-man force composed of 23 TSGs and two USAF security police-
men. The procedure was tested by sending four teams to NKP beginning on
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1 August 1968. The forces, drawn from available personnel at other bases,
were rotated every fifth day, and, overall, the method proved to be an effective
way to bolster the internal defense forces of a given base when the situation
demanded.
23/
The test was not carried out without problems, however, and refinements
were recommended during the period the QRMFs were utilized. It as learned
that radios issued at various bases operated on different frequencies, present-
ing communications problems when men and equipment were integrated into a
QRMF. Establishment of parallel radio nets was forthcoming due to that test.
Also, it was found that once the QRMF arrived at a base, the men and equip-
ment had to be reintegrated with forces located at the base. This had to be
done to provide control for area policy and local mission variations, and
also for adequate supervision because of vast differences in terrain. The
decision was made therefore to rotate the forces less frequently. It was also
determined that for a faster response, all equipment necessary for a deploy-
ing QRMF should be packaged and stored in a central location to await airlift
to a troublespot.
RTAF aircraft were committed to the NK P operation--the first such commit-
ment made to base defense. Four RTAF T-28 aircraft at Udorn and the same
number at Ubon were placed on 15-minute scramble alert to provide air support
to external forces. To provide additional support and to further test coordi-
nated efforts, a USAF AC-47 was sent to NKP, where it was placed on airlift
support alert along with an 0-1 and a U-l0 already assigned to NKP. The
three USAF aircraft were not armed, but it as hoped their presence might
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25/.
frighten CT mortar crews.
t NKP, a joint defense operations center (JDOC) was formed to fill
eed for joint US/Thai command coordination. A base protection and
security center under control of the 2d RTA (Forward) was also formed. The
centers provided the internal and external forces a central focal point
for coordinating their activities and area intelligence. Similar centers
26/
were to be implemented at all bases in Thailand.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
Numerous Thai and U.S. agencies investigating the attack on Udorn, had
differences of opinion. These varied as to the origin of the attackers, the
identity of the attackers, what their target was, and what, exactly, their
goal had been. Opinions were based on individual experiences, sources of
1/information, and the intelligence available.
It had already been realized that additional perimeter defenses were
vital in preventing the type of attack which was undertaken against Udorn
on 26 July. Among these needs were adequate fencing, lighting, trip flares,
additional USAF Security Police authorizations (to include sentry dogs and
handlers), reinforced defense bunkers, more and better access roads, defolia-
tion, free fire zones, and better equipment to include radios, transportation,
and weapons. These were required to carry out day-to-day internal defense
operations.
Externally, U.S. officials concerned with defending U.S. resources in
Southeast Asia recognized that requirements existed for flare and gunships,
as well as airlift capabilities in support of the responsible country-wide
defense forces. The lack of adequate external defense planning had also been
feared. This was the responsibility of the RTG, and the USAF continually
showed its desire to see final plans in effect.
U.S. officials had consistently sought to gain these improvements;
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however, with various restrictions imposed by the RTG and the limited funds
available, all needs were not met.
Of real significance in base defense had been the establishment of the
Thai Security Guard program. The-advantage of that program has been emphasized
many times. By utilizing Thais (armed, trained, and maintained by the U.S.
and under control of USAF base commanders), an additional source was uncovered
to provide base security in the Thai environment of strict personnel ceilings.
This freed positions which could be filled by other priority specialists
needed to wage the war from Thailand. While caution was required to guard
against over-reliance on the TSGs, the concept might offer an alternate
solution for future planners hindered by similar restrictions.
But at the same time it was readily admitted that considerable super-
vision was required, which detracted somewhat from the TSG's effectiveness.
Nevertheless, on the night of 26 July, it as felt that the alertness and
the professional reactions of the Thai Guards were vital in repulsing the
attack.
Some improvements had to be made after the attack. Internal defense plans
were reviewed and necessary updating was accomplished. At many bases, fences
were erected, and communications, weapons, and transportation problems were
being solved by the U.S. and Thais. External defense plans were being better
coordinated and it appeared that the new concepts were to be implemented.
The steps required to press to fruition these improvements in internal
and external defenses were detailed and stressed in a "Base Defense Survey -
37IM ILE V
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Thailand" which was prepared by the 7/13AF AD Hoc Committee in September2/
1968. This report summarized:
"The lessons learned as a result of the Udorn
incident reiterate the need for increased security
measures. Available Intelligence information in-
dicates that communist terrorists are now entering
a new phase of operation directed towards well-
planned and executed operations against specific
targets. This increase in insurgent activities
coupled with better organization poses a greater
danger to United States facilities and personnel
in Thailand.. .An increased and more effectivesecurity posture for U.S. resources will be a sig-
nificant factor in deterring or repelling future
conmunist attacks on Thailand bases."
The attack was a small unit raid which seemingly had relatively limited
objectives. No mass attack was carried out and the few aircraft which were
damaged were repaired and operational a few days later. While two were
killed on the friendly side (one Thai Guard and a C-141 crew chief), the
enemy probably suffered heavier casualties.
More significant, however, was that long standing weaknesses in base
defense posture were clearly pointed out and through greater emphasis and
concentration on outstanding problems, it seemed obvious that the enemy
would not again find Thai base defenses in similar conditions. The attack,
whether or not the enemy accomplished his objectives, helped improve base
defense plans, operations, and coordination.
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FOOTNOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. (SNF) Briefing, Presented by Capt Daniel A. Adair, 7/13AF (DI) to
Brig Gen Louis T. Seith, Dep Comdr, 7/13AF, at Udorn RTAFB,Thailand, "Thai Threat Brief", 8-13 Ju l 68, Doc. 1. (Hereaftercited: Thai Threat Briefing.)
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
(SNF) Monthly Report, 7/13AF (DI), Parts I - IV, Aug 68, Doc. 2.
CHAPTER I
1. (SNF) Rpt, 13AF, "The U.S. Air Force Buildup in Thailand, 1966",
Vol I, 25 Apr 67.
2. (U) Memo of Understanding, Undated, with Nr 72, Sect 44, Govt Gazette,
14 Jun 55, TAB A, Ministerial Decree, Nr 11 (1955), Fld Marshal S.Dhanarajata, Dep Minister Actg Min. of Defense; Adm Sunavinvivat,
Min. of Interior, 29 Apr 55; Doc. 3;
(U) TOR, Thai Security Guard Regt, Tabs C, D, with Atchs 1 & 2, E, F,
Doc 4;
(U) Standard Fm 30, COMUSNACTHAI/CH/JUSMACTHAI, Bangkok, Thai to SCHQ,
Bangkok, Thai, Amendments of Solicitation/Modification of Contract,5 Apr 68; 27 Feb 68; 29 Oct 67; 21 Ju l 67; 10 Jun 67; and Change
Order, Mod 2, 20 Apr 66, Doc. 5.
(U) Sup Agreement, COMUSMACTHAI to SCHQF, Contract AF 62(272)-272,
Mod 1, 20 May 66, Doc. 6;
(U) Negotiated Contract, COMUSMACTHAI to Contractor, Supreme Cmd,
Bangkok, Thai, 1 Feb 66, Doc. 7.
(SNF) Extracts, Rpt, 7/13AF (DSP), "Base Defense Study", Sep 67. (Here-
after cited: Base Defense Study.)
3. Ibid.
(S) Msg, AMEMB, Bangkok, Thai to SecState, Wash, D. C., subj: Base
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Security, Embassy Nr 18049, 271215Z Jul 68, Doc. 8. (Hereafter
cited: BKK 18049.)
4. Ibid.
5. (SNF) Base Defense Study;
(SNF) Thai Threat Briefing, Doc. 1.
6. Ibid.
7. (SNF) Base Defense Study;
(SNF) Interview with Maj Alfred M. Finley, Jr., Director of SecurityPolice, 7/13AF, 5 Aug 68, Doc. 9. (Hereafter cited: FinleyInterview.)
8. (SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
9. (U) Ltr, J. A. Cretecos, Acting Asst Dir for Public Safety toCol Pow Sarasin, Chief, Office of Police Rep, Thai Natl PoliceDept, Bangkok, Thai, subj: Combined Town Patrols with U.S.Military Vehicles, 12 Jun 68, Doc. 10.
10. (SNF) Memo for Record, 7/13AF (DI), subj: Insurgency, 1 Aug 68, Doc. 11.
11. (SNF) Base Defense Study.
12. (SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
13. (SNF) Base Defense Study.
14. Ibid;
(SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
15. (SNF) Thai Threat Briefing, Doc. 1.
16. (S) BKK 18049, Doc. 8.
17. (S) Rpt, DC to 432 CSG (C), subj: Base Defense Survey, 2 Aug 68 with
1 Atch (S) pt, DC (Ad Hoc Committee) to 7/13AF (C), subj: UdornAir Base Defense Survey, 1 Aug 68, Doc. 12. (Hereafter cited:Base Defense Survey, 2 Aug 68.);
(C) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to AIG 7296 etc., subj: Thai-land Security Program (U), 010300Z Aug 68, Doc. 13;
(S) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 355 CSG, Takhli RTAFB, Thai,etc., subj: Deployment of Quick Reaction Mobility Force (QRMF),31/1130Z Jul 68, Doc. 14;
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(S) Ltr, DC to 56 CSG (C), subj: Base Defense Survey, 18 Aug 67with 1 Atch;
(S) Rpt, DC (Ad Hoc Committee) to 7/13AF (DC), subj: NKP Air Base
Defense Survey, undated, Doc. 15. (Hereafter cited: Base Defense
Survey, 18 Aug 68.)
(S) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF/DP/IGS/Clark AB, PI,
subj: Base Security Tng Requirement, 091025Z Aug 68, Doc. 16;
(S) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF, Clark AB, PI, subj:
Base Security Requirements 120150Z Aug 68, Doc. 17;
(S) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF Clark AB, PI, subj:
Base Security Rqmts (U), 13/0830 Aug 68, Doc. 18;
(CNF) Ltr, DC, 7/13AF to COMUSMACTHAI, subj: RTAF Responsiblities for
Base Defense, 7 Aug 68, Doc. 19.
18. (S) Base Defense Survey, 2 Aug 68, Doc. 12.
19. (SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9; Base Defense Study.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. (S) Base Defense Study; Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
23. (SNF) Base Defense Study.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. (CNF) Msg, COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC, etc., subj: Possible Penetration
Sof Security Guard Reg (U), 141104Z Jun 68, Doc. 20.
28. (SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
29. (SNF) Base Defense Study;
(S) Base Defense Survey, 2 Aug 68, Doc. 12;
(S) Base Defense Survey, 18 Aug 68, Doc. 15;
(SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
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30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
(U) PACAF Manual, Hq PACAF, Aerospace Systems Security, Nr 207-25,"Security Police Guidance for Guerrilla/Insurgency/Limited War
Environments," 0 May 68. (Hereafter cited: PACAF Manual 297-25.)
32. Ibid.
33. (SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
34. (SNF) Base Defense Study;
(SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9;
(C) MACTHAI Reg 190-1, Sep 67.
35. (S) BKK 18049, Doc. 8.
36. (SNF) Base Security Study;
(SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
37. Ibid;
(CNF) Ltr, DC, 7/13AF to COMUSMACTHAI, subj: RTAF Responsibilities for
Base Defense, 7 Aug 68, Doc. 19.
38. (SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
CHAPTER II
1. (C) Rpt, BSP, H 432d TRW to 13AF (IGS), subj: Combat Ops After
Action Rpt ?RCS: PAF-Yl) (U), 22 Aug 68, Doc. 21. (Hereaftercited: RCS After Action Rpt.)
2. (SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
3. (C) RCS After Action Rpt, Doc. 21.
4. (SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9;(U) PACAF Manual, Nr 27727-
5. (SNF) Base Defense Study.
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6. (C) Msg, AMEMB, Bangkok, 18037 to SecState, Wash D.C., subj: USAF
Installation at Udorn, Thailand Being Attacked, 261818Z Jul 68,
( Doc. 22. (Hereafter cited: AMEMB Msg 18037.);(S) Msg, A 0FS7/13AF, DI) to 7AF, subj: Udorn RTAFB Attack,
262000Z Jul 68, Doc. 23;
(S) Telecon, 7/13AF DI with AFSSO, 7AF (ATTN: 7AF Warning Center)Base Security, 27 Jul 68, Doc. 24;
(SNF) Msg, AFFSO, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to AFSSO, 7AF, TSN AB, RVN, subj:
Summary of the Attack on Udorn RTAFB, 27/111OZ Jul 68, Doc. 25;
(C) Msg, 7/13AF (DS), Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF/IGS/Clark AB, PI,
subj: Follow-Up Covered Wagon Rpt, 28/0745Z Jul 68, Doc. 26;
(S) Msg, 432TRW, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 7AF, subj: Intelligence
Evaluation of Attack on Udorn RTAFB, Thai, 26 Jul 68, 28/1020Z
Jul 68, Doc. 27;
(SNF) Msg, COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC (3 Parts), subj: Udorn RTAFB
Incident, (U), 311000Z Jul 68, Doc, 28.
7. (U) Statement, by Sgt Gary Lytle, Maint Specialist, Det 2, 618th
Military Airlift Support Sqn, Eyewitness of Attack on UdornRTAFB, Thai, 26 Jul 68, Doc. 29. (Hereafter cited: Lytle Inter-v ew. )
(C) Msg, 432CSG (IGS) to 13AF, subj: Covered Wagon Incident, 300945Z
Jul 68.
8. Ibid;
(C) Msg, 7/13AF (DS), Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF/IGS/Clark AB, PI,
subj: Follow-Up Covered Wagon Rpt, 28/0745Z Jul 68, Doc. 26.
9. (SNF) Memo for Record, 7/13AF (DI), subj: Insurgency, 1 Aug 68, Doc. 11.
(C) RCS After Action Rpt, Doc. 21.
10. (C) Msg, 7/13AF (DS), Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF/IGS/Clark AB, PI,
subj: Follow-Up Covered Wagon Rpt, 28/0745Z Jul 68, Doc. 26.
11. Ibid.
12. (U) Lytle Interview, Doc. 29,
13. Telecon w/Registrar, 432 USAF Dispensary, Udorn RTAFB, 2 Sep 68.
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____
14. (U) Lytle Interview, Doc. 29.
(S) Msg, 432TRW, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to USAF Cmd Post, subj: Serious
Incident Rpt, 271001Z Jul 68.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid;
(SNF) Finley Interview, Doc. 9.
19. Ibid;
(C) Msg, 432CSG (IGS) to 13AF, subj: Covered Wagon Incident, 300945Z
Jul 68.
20. Ibid;
(SNF) Memo for Record, 7/13AF (DI), subj: Insurgency, 1 Aug 68, Doc. 11.
CHAPTER III
1. (C) Memo of Conversation, AMEMB, Bangkok, Thai, subj: Air Base
Defense, (American Ambassador to RTAF), 28 Jul 68, Doc. 30;
(S) BKK 18049, Doc. 8.
(S) Msg, (cy), AMEMB, BKK, 18287 to SecState, Wash D.C., subj: RTG
Measures in Base Defense, 0ll213Z Aug 68, Doc. 31. (Hereafter
cited: BKK 18287.)
2. Ibid.
(SNF) Msg, DC 7/13AF, Udorn AFLD, Thai to AIG 7296, etc., subj: Lessons
Learned from the Attack on Udorn, 26 Jul 68 (C), 271045Z Jul 68,
Doc. 32.
3. (S) Base Defense Survey, 2 Aug 68;
(S) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF/DP/IGS/Clark AB, PI,
subj: Base Security Tng Requirement, 091025Z Aug 68, Doc. 16;
(S) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF, Clark AB, PI, subj:Base Security Requirements, 120150Z Aug 68, Doc. 17;
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(S) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF Clark AB, PI,
subj: Base Security Rqmts (U), 13/0380 Aug 68, Doc. 18.
-- 4. Ibi_d;
(S) Msg, CINCPACAF to 13AF, subj: Base Security in Thailand, 090319Z
Aug 68. (Hereafter cited: CINCPACAF Msg, 090319Z Aug 68.)
5. (S) BKK 18049, Doc. 8;
(S) BKK 18287, Doc. 31.
6. (U) Msg, 7/13AF (DM) to 13AF, subj: Base Security Requirement,
110820Z Aug 68;
(S) Msg, 7/13AF (DO) to 13AF, subj: Base Defense, 151035Z Aug 68;
(U) Msg, 7/13AF (DMW) to 432TRW, subj: Base Defense, 180517Z Aug 68,
7. (S) BKK 18287, Doc. 31;
(S) CINCPACAF Msg, 090319Z Aug 68.
8. (C) Memo of Conversation, AMEMB, Bangkok, Thai, subj: Air Base
Defense, (American Ambassador to RTAF), 28 Jul 68, Doc. 30.
9. (CNF) Ltr, DC, 7/13AF to COMUSMACTHAI, subj: RTAF Responsibilities for
Base Defense, 7 Aug 68, Doc. 19.
10. Ibid.
11. (S) CINCPACAF Msg, 090319Z Aug 68.
12. (CNF) Ltr, DC, 7/13AF to COMUSMACTHAI, subj: RTAF Responsibilities forBase Defense, 7 Aug 68, Doc. 19.
13. Ibid.
14. (S) CINCPACAF Msg, 090319Z Aug 68.
15. (S) BKK 18049, Doc. 8;
(S) Msg, AMEMB, Bangkok to SecState, Wash D. C., Nr 18358, subj:Implications of Udorn Attack, 021205Z Aug 68, Doc. 33. (Hereafter
cited: BKK 18358.)
16. Ibid.
17. (S) Msg, COMUSMACTHAI to CINCPAC, subj: Base Security in Thailand,
070250Z Aug 68.
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18. (SNF) Msg, 7/13AF (DO) to 13AF, subj: Base Security Program (U),16020OZ Aug 68, Doc. 34;3
(S) Msg, CINCPACAF to 13AF, subj: Base Security Program, 100553Z
Sep 68.
19. (S) Msg, 7/13AF (DOS0), Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 13AF (IGS), Clark AB,
PI, subj: Tactical Security Support Eqmt (TSSE), 171025Z Aug 68,Doc. 35.1
20. (SNF) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 80SG, Ubon, Thai, etc.,
subj: Security Policy Guidance (U), 181015Z Aug 68, Doc. 36.
21. (C) Msg, 7/13AF (DO) to 432TRW, subj: Ground Defense, 19050OZ Aug 68.
22. (C) Memo of Conversation at Gen Kriangsak's Home with W. i. Stokes,
Mission Coordinator, etc., 10 Aug 68, Doc. 37.
23. (SNF) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn AFLD, Thai to 13AF/C/Clark AB, PI, 13113OZ
Aug 68, Doc. 38.
24. Ibid;
(S) Msg, 56CSG, NKP RTAFB, Thai to DC, 7/13AF, Udorn AFLD, Thai,
Lessons Learned from the Attack on Udorn, 291115Z Jul 68, Doc. 39;
(S) Msg, 635SCG to 7/13AF, subj: Deployment/Redeployment of QRMF,I
110215Z Aug 68.25. (S) Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to PACAF/IGS, subj: Base3
Security in Thailand, 30/0100OZ Aug 68, Doc. 40;
(SNF) Msg, DC,7/13AF, Udorn AFLD, Thai to 13AF/C/Clark AB, PI, 13113OZ
Aug 68, Doc. 38.
26. (C) Memo for the Record, Comdr, NKP RTAFB, subj: Joint Base Defense
Operation Center, 30 Jul 68 w/List, Security Forces as of 29 Jul68, Doc. 41.
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CHAPTER IV
1 (SNF) Memo for Record, 7/13AF (DI), subj: Insurgency, 1 Aug 68,Doc. 11;
(S) Msg, OP-2 Det 5, 6499th SPACTYGP, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 1127
FAG/AFNIAB/Ft Belvoir, Va., 27 Jul 68, Doc. 42;
(S/ Msg, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to 7/13AF Comdrs, 210208Z
AFEO) Aug 68, Doc. 43;
(S) Msg, COMUSMACTHAI to DC, 7/13AF, Udorn, Thai, subj: Vietnamese
Refugees (U), 030610Z Sep 68, Doc. 44;
(U) Ltr, DC, 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, Thai to Lt Gen Kriangsak Chamanan,
Dep Chairman, JCS, Natl Security Cmd, Supreme Cmd Forward, 31 Jul
-- 68, Doc. 45;
(SNF) Rpt, "Hostile Attack on Udorn RTAFB, 26-27 Jul 68, 3 Aug 68,
Doc. 46.
2. (S) Rpt, 7/13AF, Ad Hoc Committee, "Security Police Base Defense
Survey - Thailand", 19 Sep 68, pp 10-11.
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APPENDIX I
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AFTER UDORN ATTACK
Personnel Authorized Assigned Additional Requirements
U.S. Security Police 1547 1438 932
Thai Security Guards 2007 2070 461
Weapons:
Type Requirement
1. M-16* 3
2. GAV-5A 121
3. Shotgun 64
4. 81-mm Mortar (for flare capability) 18
5. GAV-5 71
6. .38 Cal Revolver 51
7. M-60 23
8. Carbine Magazines 1800
Munitions:
Type Requirement
1. 5.56-mm 1,522,498
2. Flares 100
3. 40-mm 5,605--
4. Carbine 903,550
5. M-26 Grenade 301
* This requirement may be increased proportionately to the number required to
arm the TSGs.
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Requirement
6. Slap Flare 1,423
7. Trip Flare 624
8. .38 Cal 3,600
9. 12 Gauge 1,955
10. .30 Cal 8,000
NOTE: All bases surveyed have inadequate all-weather base perimeterfeeder roadway systems. Information furnished by respective
base personnel indicated that prior attempts to develop anappropriate access road, tower, fencing, lighting, and defo-liation program were unsuccessful due to lack of funds.
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APPENDIX II
RESULTS OF UDORN ATTACK
U.S. AND FREE WORLD FORCES:
KIA - I U.S. Contract Thai Security Guard (4th Bn)
1 USAF Aeromedical Specialist
WIA - 5 USAF (1 shot/AK-47; two shrapnel and 2 fuel burn)
MIA - None
Aircraft:
Damaged: 1 C-141 - Heavy1 F-4D - Moderate1 HH-43- Light
FACILITIES/MATERIEL:
Damaged: 2 USAF General purpose vehicles -light
I USAF Fire truck - light1 USAF Power unit - light1 USAF Light-all unit - light
ENEMY:
KIA - 2 known
WIA - 1 (circumstantial evidence)
Captured - None
Equipment/Materiel losses: 2 AK-47 Assault Rifles
120 rounds incendiary ammunition
9 AK-47 Ammo clips
6 Satchel charges3 Fragmentation Grenades (Soviet made)
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GLOSSARY
AFB Air Force Base
ASP Area Source ProgramASPT Area Source Program for Thailand
CBU Cluster Bomb UnitCOMUSMACTHAI Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, ThailandCSC Central Security ControlCT Communist Terrorist
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ICC International Control Commission
JDOC Joint Defense Operations Center
MACTHAI Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MAP Military Assistance Program
NCO Noncommissioned Officer
NE Northeast
NKP Nakhon Phanom
OSI Office of Special Investigations
PACAF Pacific Air Forces
PACOM Pacific Command
QRMF Quick Reaction Mobility Force
QRT Quick Reaction Team
RAPCON Radar Approach Control
RTA Royal Thai Army
RTAF Royal Thai Armed Forces; Royal Thai Air ForceRTAFB Royal Thai Air Force BaseRTARF Royal Thai Air Reserve Forces
RTG Royal Thai Government
RTN Royal Thai Navy
SAT Security Alert Team
SCHQ Supreme Command Headquarters