UK Missile Defence Centre
Defence against airborne threats Centre for Defence Enterprise (CDE) themed competition
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Overview
The UK Missile Defence Centre (UK MDC) is seeking innovative solutions to defending against attacks from: ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; hypersonic munitions
3 challenges: 1. defence without interceptor missiles 2. kill assessment for non-destructive defences 3. improve the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing defences
Consider innovation across the whole system and its elements
Closing date for proof-of-concept submissions 3 July 2014 at 5pm up to £420k to support these
Possible wider exposure to UK MDC or Ministry of Defence (MOD) funding
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Content
What is the UK Missile Defence Centre?
Defeating the threat
Defensive terminology
Military perspective
CDE competition challenges
The ‘small print’
Summary
Questions
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UK Missile Defence Centre
The UK Missile Defence Centre
Ballistic missile threat reduction
lethality
Scenario simulation
& wargaming
Maritime theatre ballistic
missile defence studies
Systems engineering
Threat characterisation
Novel technologies
UK Missile Defence Centre
Support to policy (MOD, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Cabinet Office)
Science and technology support to future capability development
International collaboration and support to NATO
Industrial opportunities
Support to WMD disablement
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UK Missile Defence Centre
UK MDC established July 2003
Joint MOD/industry construct
Provides timely scientific and technical advice on ballistic missile defence to Ministers and MOD Head Office
Supports UK industry in sustaining strategic capabilities
UK MDC: understanding missile defence & sustaining strategic capabilities
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Defeating the threat
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Ballistic missiles
Similar to a space launch vehicle, but designed to re-enter the atmosphere immediately and at extreme speed. the fastest means of hitting any point more than 300km away
Powered and guided for first few minutes; generally purely ballistic thereafter
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SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile Short-range ballistic missile launch
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Ballistic missiles
Shorter range ballistic missiles (<600km) remain as single entity
>600km only the re-entry vehicle that delivers payload onto target
Recent uses in Libya and Syria
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SCUD missile on launcher Various intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles
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UK Missile Defence Centre
The US perception of the ballistic missile threat
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Ballistic missile times-of-flight challenge defences
5500km ground range
3500km
2000km
`1000km
300km
`600km
Further reading: NASIC ‘2013 ballistic missile and cruise missile threat’ AFD-130710-054.pdf from http://www.mda.mil
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Cruise missiles
Essentially expendable unmanned aircraft
Cost-effective deep target attack vastly reduced risk versus aircraft carrying direct attack
munitions
Can achieve <10m accuracy
Will fly a range of trajectories to avoid air defences
Key component of modern warfare more than 200 used in Libya
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Various cruise missiles
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Hypersonic munitions
>Mach 5 and within the (upper) atmosphere
Not currently deployed
Technology being examined by US, Russia, China, France and India
Very high speeds & significant manoeuvre potential likely to defeat ‘conventional’ defensive solutions
Target size likely to be bigger than ballistic missile re-entry vehicle
Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) concepts
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Integrated air and missile defence
In reality, current defensive systems can engage some, but not all of the threats
Systems Ops Center
Intelligence Means
CommandAuthority
Integrating Networks
Battle Management
Surveillance
Weapon Delivery
Warning
Systems Ops Center
Intelligence Means
CommandAuthority
Integrating Networks
Battle Management
Surveillance
Weapon Delivery
Warning
Systems Ops Center
Intelligence Means
CommandAuthority
Integrating Networks
Battle Management
Surveillance
Weapon Delivery
Warning
Warning
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They are layered to provide: efficiency redundancy shared understanding
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Military considerations
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Theatre ballistic missiles (TBM) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)
TBM pose a significant threat to deployed operations TBM are a threat to static formations, ports, airfields, bases and key
infrastructure ASBM able to strike maritime platforms at any point within effective
area (Anti Access Area Denial – A2AD)
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Limited engagement windows for defensive systems
Ability of UK forces to defeat this threat? surveillance systems – some
capability effectors – little capability
‘Duncan passing Clydebank leaving for first sea trials’ by Mark Harkin is licensed under CC Attribution 2.0 Generic license. Source : http://www.flickr.com/photos/markyharky/7899777334/
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UK Missile Defence Centre Subsonic and supersonic land attack cruise
missiles
Threat missiles avoid detection using terrain masking and route to avoid defensive systems
Key infrastructure would be defended by ground-based air defence systems surface-to-air missiles anti-aircraft guns UK has point defence and local area defence systems
How are defensive systems cued? early warning available from airborne sensors ground-based sensors will provide short reaction time
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“BrahMos missile. MAKS-2009” by Allocer is licensed under CC Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license. Source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:BrahMos_MAKS2009.jpg
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Subsonic and supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles
‘Cat and mouse’ - advancement in offensive missile development requires improvement of defensive systems Iran/China introducing new/novel capabilities and technologies almost
annually responsive insertion of technology difficult to achieve
Increased situational awareness (SA) important to maintain reaction time against difficult air targets for maritime platforms challenging flight profiles
height / speed / low observability
Desire for integrated hard/soft kill capability of defending against current and emerging difficult air targets looking for increased probability of escaping hit
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Hypersonic
May not be tracked by current surveillance systems
Reduced reaction time
Challenging target for an interceptor missile
Need improvements in: cueing decoys amount of decision time available – human factors? automation
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Defensive terminology
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UK Missile Defence Centre Defensive measures of interest in CDE
submissions
Active defence - soft kill interaction, including physical contact, but without an
immediate response from the threat system being observable. Includes techniques covering deception, spoofing, masking, jamming etc but excludes classic passive defence solutions such as hardening and camouflage
Active defence - hard kill interaction with the threat system and, in particular, payload
delivery mechanism following which a catastrophic observable event takes place
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UK Missile Defence Centre Defensive measures of interest in CDE
submissions
Counterforce pre-emptive attack of the origin of the threat weapon against persons
and/or equipment essential for the initiation of the threat’s mission
Defence also encompasses other measures (not considered here) deterrence diplomacy passive defence etc
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UK Missile Defence Centre
CDE competition challenges
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UK Missile Defence Centre
The US missile defence solution to countering ballistic missiles
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UK Missile Defence Centre
CDE competition challenges
1. Defence without interceptor missiles
2. Kill assessment for non-destructive defences
3. Improving the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing defences
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Competition guidelines
Proposals should address at least 1 of the challenges, could address more than 1 challenge, but do not have to address all challenges
We will favour solutions capable of dealing with the most challenging threats ie ballistic and hypersonic missiles
The proposed solutions do not necessarily need to be mounted on or controlled by the defended asset many current air and missile defence solutions are entirely separate
military units to the assets they defend
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Challenge 1: defence without interceptor missiles
Consider entirely new methods for providing defence at range
How can we effectively defend against complex weapon threats without using interceptor missiles, such that the threat does not successfully damage its target? ideally at ranges greater than circa 10km
Examples hard-kill techniques such as lasers and other directed energy systems soft-kill applications such as sensor burnout due to energy
concentration novel methods of employing counterforce techniques
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YAL-1A airborne laser
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Challenge 2: kill assessment for non-destructive defences
Soft-kill defences generally interfere with the internal electronics of the complex weapon, so the external appearance of the weapon might remain largely unchanged
This is a particular issue for ballistic missile defence, since these threats will continue to follow a ballistic trajectory even if completely electronically disabled
How do we assess whether or not a damaged threat weapon still poses a threat to us given that its trajectory is largely unchanged?
Solutions should be usable from a stand-off range, in a timely manner and produce information high in confidence
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Challenge 3: improving the efficiency and/or cost effectiveness of existing defences
Apply innovation to existing methods for hard-kill active defence (eg interceptor missiles and guns) such that the efficiency is increased
Consider innovation at the whole-system level, as well as the sub-system level. Consider intra-system interactions
Proposals will be expected to explain how the concept might improve a performance metric such as cost effectiveness, volume, probability of hit or fly-out time an order of magnitude in improvement is required to be considered
effective
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UK Missile Defence Centre
The ‘small print’
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UK Missile Defence Centre
What we want
Proof-of-concept research proposals not previously used: novel technologies (up to the concept-definition stage) developed technologies elsewhere
Proposals applicable to a wider range of threats are more likely to be funded
Solutions to defence against ballistic and hypersonic missiles, or an order of magnitude improvement against less-stretching threats
Identify the consequences of intercepting (or failing to intercept) the threat
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UK Missile Defence Centre
What we want
Solutions are not limited to a particular theatre of operation, threat nation or level of conflict intensity
Priority will be given to proposals demonstrating or de-risking a concept
Clarify the possible limitations of the proposed solution eg: environmental issues physical characteristics target characteristics operational considerations economic considerations
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UK Missile Defence Centre
What we don’t want
Proposals that pose an excessive risk of friendly fire or collateral damage (eg interceptors with nuclear warheads)
The same proposal that is already being funded as part of another MOD research programme
Solutions with political sensitivities are highly unlikely to be considered
We will not fund any proposals that: fall outside the remit given here provide only marginal improvements to current solutions require significant government-provided equipment or infrastructure
but you should identify alternative, non-government-provided sources
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Exploitation
Phase 1 is this CDE themed competition MOD/Dstl will assess proposals MOD will ensure bidders intellectual property is protected
On successful completion of phase 1, up to £500k is available from UK MDC for phase 2
Subsequent phases are likely to be the subject of long-term exploitation in partnership with
If a successful bid does not fit comfortably within our strategy, with bidders permission UK MDC will expose the project to other funding sources within MOD via an appropriate contracting route
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Summary
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UK Missile Defence Centre
Summary
Proposals must be submitted to the CDE portal by 5pm on 3 July 2014
Challenges: 1. defence without interceptor missiles 2. kill assessment for non-destructive defences 3. improving the efficiency or cost-effectiveness of existing
defences
Innovation is vital as defence against airborne threats has been studied from many perspectives over the years
There are opportunities for further exploitation of successful proposals
For challenge/technical queries contact: [email protected]
For submission/process queries contact: [email protected]
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