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State Formation in Community Spaces? Decentralization of Control over Forests in the KumaonHimalaya, IndiaAuthor(s): Arun Agrawal
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 9-40Published by: Association for Asian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2659503Accessed: 18-04-2015 22:15 UTC
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StateFormationn Community
Spaces?Decentralization f
Control
verForests
n
the
Kumaon
Himalaya, ndia
ARUN AGRAWAL
To reflectponhistorys also, nextricably,o reflect
ponpower.
Guy
Debord
[196731994)
In
the early artof thiscentury, 916 and 1921 were specially ryyearsn the
Kumaon
region
f
the
ndian
Himalaya.
n
each
of
these
years,
orest
ires
acked
he
countryside,urning eyond
he
power
of the colonialBritish
overnment
o
control
or
extinguish.
t was
not ust
the
dryweather
hat
was
to
blame.Villagers
n
Kumaon
set
the
forest
n
fire;
the
dry
weather
merely helped
their efforts
long.
The
containment f this "planned incendiarism"was one of the main planks of the
scientific
orestry
hat the colonial state' had
begun
to
introduce
n
the hills
in
the
lastquarter f the nineteenthentury,
nd
especially
rom round
1910.2
For
the
hill
residents ho relied n
a
mixture
f
ivestock earing nd agriculture,
and for
many
of
whom
fire
ncouraged
he
production
f
fresh
rasses, overnment
attempts oprevent iring erealways
o
remain
"source
f
complaint" Smythies
Arun Agrawal [email protected])s AssociateProfessor f
Political Science t Yale
University.
I
would like
to
acknowledge he thoughtful omments f
Bina
Agrawal, haradChari,
Michael Dove, Rebecca Hardin, Robert Harms, Donald Moore, Hugh Raffles, jay Skaria,
and twoanonymous eviewers. havealso benefited reatly romssues
raisedby participants
in
the Environmental olitics Seminar
t the
University
f
California, erkeley
nd in the
Agrarian tudies Colloquium Series t Yale University. he fieldresearch
or he paper was
conducted
sing
research undsmade available
by
the
Tropical
Conservationnd
Development
Program t the University f Florida and
the
Worldwide Fund
for
Nature.
Grant
#SBR
9905443 from heNationalScienceFoundation nd Grant#96-42825-WER from he Mac-
Arthur oundation unded art of the time spentwriting he paper.
'Later n thepaper, will find eason o examinebrieflyhe notion f"the colonial tate,"
at least in
relation
o
interdepartmentalivalrieswithin
he
state,but
for
he moment use
thephrasewithout
n
indication f tsfraught ature. ome recentwritings ave lso examined
issues of periodization nd internal ivision n relation o the colonial state n the Indian
Himalaya Rangan 2000; Saberwal 000).
2Twoother lements hat heForestDepartment aw as crucial n itsattempts o nscribe
scientific
orestry
n
Kumaon were
a) prevention
f
grazing,
nd
(b) stoppingvillagers
rom
lopping
trees or odder r
fuelwood.
TheJournal fAsianStudies 0, no.
1
(February 001):9-40.
(C
2001
by
the Association orAsian
Studies,
nc.
9
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10 ARUN AGRAWAL
1911, 59).
In
1916 close to 200,000 acresof forest
n
Kumaon
Circlewereburntn
441 separate ires, nd 282
of thesewere counted s intentional.3o "voice" their
socialprotest, illagersetfiregainandagain nsomeplaces. nAiradeo, or xample,
fires ontinued
or
hree aysand
two
nights,
nd
"new
fireswere tarted ime after
time, directly counter-firing
ine was successfullyompleted"
Champion 1919,
358).
For
1921
the relevant igures
re
even higher. he areaof forests
hat
was
fired
roseto 272,000 acres.Of the 819 offenceshatweredetected,
95 wereknown o be
incendiaryGuha 1989, 52,
107, 116).
These were just the fire-relatedffences. he total
numberof forest-related
infractions
n
Kumaon was
farhigher.The new regulationsntroduced nder the
auspices of
the colonial
government,
nd
designedand implemented y its Forest
Department,made llegala range fwhatmightbe called customary
ses offorests.4
The protests hatensued signaledhow important orests ere n the hill economy.
The role of forests
n
the economy
ontinues ven today
to be significant. espite
better
transport, igh
levels
of
emigration,
nd
increasing
market
pressures,
significantroportion
fvillagers' eedsfor odder, uelwood,ubsistence imber,
nd
some medicines s met from
urrounding
orests.5
n
the
earlypart
of the
century,
villagers
must
have
depended
n
forestso an even
greater
xtent.
t
is not
surprising
that
when
ome ofthese
veryday
ivelihood ctivitieswererenderedllegalas
a
result
of
new laws,
ruralresidents rticulated
heir
unwillingness
o
accept
the draconian
laws
in
forms
hat
rangedfrom
he
strikingly isible,
as in
fires, o the far
more
difficulto detect, uch as continued
se offodder nd firewood.
The enforcement achinery
f the
state, nstitutionalized
n
the shape of the
Forest Department, etected
a huge numberof breachesof forest aw. Figure
1
graphically epicts
he nformation
or
ome of the
earlyyears
f
the century.
n this
same
period,
the
number
of
people employedby
the Forest
Department
lso
rose
dramatically:between 1911
and
1921, permanent
employees
in
the Forest
Department
ncreased rom hirty-five
o
nearly ne hundred KFGC 1921).
The
growth
n the
number
f
ruleviolations
nd
convictions
etween
911
and
1933
can
thusbe seen,
at
least
in
part,
s
a
resultof the
higher
evels of enforcement ade
possibleby
a
larger
workforce.
Evenmore trikinghanthe relativelymall riseoverall n cases and convictions
from
911
to
1931,however,
s
the
conspicuous
ncrease
n
forest-relatedonvictions
between
911
and
1921
and
then
he
equally rapid
fall
by
1933.
Even with
missing
informationor ome of the ntervening ears,
his
rise
nd
fall
s
visible
n
Figure
1
as
a
rough
nverted v."
By 1926-27,
it
is evident
hat the
number
f cases
and
convictions
ad come
down to
more r ess their
re-1912-13
levels.
This
paper
uses
the rise nd
fall
n
the evel of
rule
nfractionss indexed
n
the
available
records
nd
the
provisional xplanation
f
this
rise
and fall
s its
point
of
departure.
he
decline
3The terms planned" and "intentional" efer implyto the perceptions f ForestDe-
partment fficials
hat
the fire
n questionwas
a
protest gainst
he state.
4"Custom" nd "customary"
refraught
erms n
thewakeof
rgumentsbout "inventions
of traditions." use them mainlyto signal
that
the new laws
paid little attention o how
forests ereconnected
o
rural
ivelihoods.
heir
passage was
motivatedmainlyby a concern
to raise taterevenues nd resulted
n a legal frameworkhatrestrictednd restructuredre-
vailing ivelihood ractices.
5Data collected from wenty-eightillages where conducted
fieldwork n 1989-90,
1992, and 1993 show
that
ocal
forests rovidevillagerswith approximately 8 percent
f
theirfodder equirements, 2 percent f needed fuelwood, nd
39 percent f construction
timber.
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STATE
FORMATION IN
COMMUNITY SPACES? 11
16000
'
14000
0
i 12000
o
10000
,
8000
co
?
6000
0
c'
4000
2000
-
* - -
0
- I I I
I I I
-
I
I I
I
.
s9~~~~~l
C9 N9
9 9
9 9b
6S
63 6
Year
Convictions
-Infractions
Figure 1. Infractions
f
Forest aws
and
Convictions,
Kumaon,
1911-33.
in
the
cases
and
convictions,
eginning oughly
n
1922, signals profound
hift
n
the
character
f control ver
forests
n
Kumaon. f the
modern tatecan
be
seen as a
"principle
f
organization"Lloyd
and
Thomas
1998, 3),
then the
natureof this
principle egan
to
change
n
the
1920s
in
Kumaon.
The
change
ontinues
o
mature
today, ueled
y
the
resources
ontained
n
close
to
4,000 squarekilometers
f
forests
that
villagers
ave come to control.
ut
the transferf
control
ver
forests
o
villagers
has served he nterests
f
the state
s
well
as
those
of
ruralKumaoni residents. ew
fires
n
Kumaon
today
can
be seen
as
"planned
incendiarism." he idiom of
participatorymanagement
that
animates
much discourse on environment nd
developmentand
some tate
policy-making)
as
come
partially
o nform he
use
and
management
f
forests
n Kumaon.6And
along
the
way,
Kumaon
villagers'
ollective
identities,
he nfusion f
power
nto
the
procedures
f forest
se,
and the
nature f
state
uthority
ave
registered
heir wn
transformations.
For
these
reasons,
he
1920s
constitute
n
important
ecade
in
the
history
f
forest se in Kumaon. The governmentppointedtheKumaon ForestGrievances
Committee
KFGC)
in
1921
to
examine
he
continuing rotests
f
villagers gainst
new
regulations.
ome
of
its recommendationso
change
the relations f forest
management
n
Kumaon took nto
ccount he
most
pressing
emands
osedthrough
the
protests.
t
is not
a
coincidence
hat
1921-22,
the
years
hat
aw
the
ppointment
of
the KFGC
and
the
mplementation
f some of
ts
recommendations,
re also the
6Fora discussion f some of the recognition y colonial tates o strike balance
between
conservationnd other spirations f tate-formation,ee Bryant nd Bailey 1997,Peluso 1992.
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12 ARUN AGRAWAL
years
hat mark reduction
n
the evels of violence.
The
relaxation f statecontrol
overforests oincidedwith
the diminution f
nfractions
elated o forest
aws.
The paper traces nd showshow someof the mperativesf forestmanagement
by
the tate
n the
early
wentieth
entury
avewormed
heir
way
ntocurrent
fforts
at managementfforests y communities.7he landscape nd discourse fresource
management
n
Kumaon
prefigures,dmittedly
n an
analogical
rather han
causal
sense,many
ecent
diomsof
community-based
onservation.he
seventy-yearistory
of decentralized orest
management
n
Kumaon,
where
everyday ractices round
forest
se bear
the mark f state-facilitatedocal
institutions,ntersects nexpectedly
with more
recent
efforts o
bring community
o
the fore of conservation.
he
importance f the role of communitys evidentfrom he factthat more than fifty
countries laim to
be
working
oward
greater articipation
f ocalities n
resource
managementnd control FAO 1999). In India alone, ForestDepartment fficials
claimthat he
widely
hailed
Joint
orest
Management rogram
as
ed
to
partnerships
between
hestate nd more han
23,000
forest
rotection ommittees, elping
both
manage
18
percent
of
India's forestsmore
effectivelyNeeraj Kumar, personal
communication, uly 2000).
In
describing
nd
thinking istoricallybout some
of
the
practices
f forest ontrol
n
Kumaon,
this article
provides
means to reflect
critically
n the morerecent fforts.
The description
f how
villagers manage forests
n
Kumaon
through the
constitutionfforest ouncilswould be incomplete
f
t
were o remain ccupied nly
with a consideration f efficiencynd equity, or an enumeration f rules and
infractions,
r attention o
compliance
nd resistance.8 n attention o
these,
o the
decentralization
nd
bureaucratization
f
resource
se,
is
crucial
to
understanding
changes
n
the nature
of
control.
State
formation
n this
context an be seen to
correspond
o
activities
hat
contribute
o the
formalization
nd
systematization
f
social
action
and,
in
so
doing,
consolidate
r
complicate
he
division
between
tates
and societies.9
t
would
include
a)
the creation f new rules to define he limitsof
7Although sprinkle erms uch s "local," "community,"nd "state" iberally hroughout
the paper, without n insistent ttention nitially o theirproblematic tatus, t should be
evident hat hetoneofthepaper s oriented o recognizingheir raughttatus. n examining
the multiple nterconnectionsf the putativelyocal community ith "states" nd "markets"
and "external" orces, he arguments n the paper contribute o highlighting he complex
sociality nd strategies f erritorialization
hat
go
into heconstructionf he ocal
Appadurai
1996; Barbesino1997; Brenner 998; Raffles 999). See also Sivaramakrishnannd Agrawal
1998 for
n
efforto moveawayfrom
he
ocal /global dichotomy
n
relation
o
strategiesf
spatialization.
8An
mmense iteraturen community-basedesourcemanagement
xamines
ach
of hese
three hemes.Considerationsfefficiencyave received erhaps hegreatestttention
n
the
valuableworkof resource conomistswho have writtenboutdifferentnstitutional orms or
managing ommonresourcesCheung 1970; Ciriacy-Wantrupnd Bishop 1975; Dasgupta
and Heal 1979; Gordon 1954). In recentyears, fcourse, sustainability" as emerged s a
thirdgoal
with the
existing nes
of
equity nd efficiencyRedclift 987). The literature rom
scholars
f
common roperty
as been
perhaps
he
mostcareful
n
examining ropertys rules
and rights. cholars f commonshave
shownhow
human actions re shaped by the creation
of new rulesof resourcemanagement. strom 1990) remainshe seminal ext n the ubject.
For an
introductionnd insightfulreatmentf the nature fresistance nd compliance, here
is still no better ext hanScott's 1985) magisterial thnographyfSedaka.
91do not enter nto a discussionof the vast literaturehatengages the issue of state
autonomy nd state-society elations.
ome
representativeccounts
are
available
in
Evans,
Rueschemeyer,nd Skocpol 1985); Jessop 1990); Migdal (1988); Migdal, Kohli, and Shue
(1994).
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STATE FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES?
13
what is permissible,b) the institution
f
organizationaltructures
o enforce uch
rules, nd c)
the
ncorporation
nd
undermining
f alternativeoci for
he
exercise
f
power. State officials,n consequence, ncreasingly ecome the interpretersnd
enforcersfwhat s permissibles state-making roceeds pace.'0
But
such
a
Weberianperspective
n the
systematization
f forest-use
ractices
must be supplemented. tate
formation
roceeds
n
part by
coercion
ut
in at
least
equal measureby local initiative, y
the
willing participationf those over whom
newforms f tatepower ome to hold sway Corrigan nd Sayer 985).
In
this
paper,
the
supplement akes the form f
an
argument bout how the changingnature f
control
epends
n
changing trategies fpower
nd
relationships etween tate nd
community
ctors."
n
the
process,
he
nterests
f the
state
nd of
community,
nd
even
what we
understand
s
state
nd
community,
ome to
be redefineds well.
At
thesame time, n understandingf the reciprocal econstructionsf state uthority
in
new domains nd the willingness f rural ubjects
o
redefine heir dentities
n
relation
o stateprojects an fruitfullye elaborated y ooking t somethinghat s
often een s rather
mundane: owproblems f ocal mplementation
nd
enforcement
are solved.
In
examining roblems f local implementationnd their mpact on
humans,
who are
always
ocated
n
unequal
relations f
power, his paper follows
oucault's
insight
hat
the exercise
f
power
s "a
way
n
which certain ctions
maystructure
the fieldof other
possible
actions"
1982, 222). Rather han seeing
nstitutionss
separate romocial networkscf.Foucault1982, 224), however, treat hem s part
of,
and
closelytied to, existingnetworks f social relations.They are
congealed
relations
f
power, ut they
re also
a
prompt
o
action, goad to newconfigurations
of
power.Thus,institutions
re
as much the ocus and objectofpower
truggles s
they
re
supplementarytructuresbove society Foucault 1982, 222).
The
theoretical
rguments
n
the
paper
re
based
on an
examination f
trategies
that
tate ctors ollowed o extend heir ontrol ver orestsndthe ffortsf
villagers
to reassert heir ontrol
ver forests: actors
hat
proved
nstrumental
n
the
birth
process
f the
forest ouncils nd
in
shaping
he
relationshipsmong
different
tate
actors,
ouncil
members, rdinary illagers,
nd forests. he creation
f
the
councils,
discussed n the sectionthatfollows, an be taken as a landmarkn thechanging
rationalities
f
ruleand definitionsf nterestsnd
strategies
hatdifferenttate nd
local
community
ctors
count as
significant.
n
analysis
of
the
operation
f the
councils
nd of he
relationship
f
ommunity anagers
ith
heir
illage
onstituents
and state ctors
ccupies
henext wo
ections. hese
sections ontain he
groundwork
that demonstrates he
emergence
f new interests
nd
alliances
among
state
and
community
ctors.
They
are also the
basis
for
he
final ection
f the
paper,
which
showshow
some of the
earlier nterests f state nd local actors ame
together,
ome
10The xtension f rules, r the ncorporationf territorieshrough uchrules ntostate
formations,s not necessarily threat. ut see Brow,who argues hatdevelopmentnSriLanka
incorporates
illages
nto
regional nd national ircuits fpower nd exchange: Various ocial
practices hathad served o mark he nhabitants f the same village as members f distinct
community
ereunder hreatwhile others ad
already een abandoned" 1996, 6).
11An mportant spectof the changes n the forms fpower nd identity s related o
the
strategies f spatialization
hathave
been worked ut
in
Kumaon over he course f theeight
decadesfollowinghe ppointmentfthe KFGC. Observationsnplace-related
dentities
hat
insistupon questioning he ideasofstability nd harmony ften ssociatedwith
community
are especially aluablein this regard Carter,Donald, and Squires 1993, xiv;
Massey 1994;
Rose 1997).
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14 ARUN AGRAWAL
wereredefined,nd still others ame nto sharper elief nd opposition.
he dispersal
of state ontrol o communities nd the nternalizationf ruleby villagers s directly
tied to the trategiesfmanagementhat hecouncilshavecraftedver hepast seven
decades.
The
History
of
Changing
Forest
Regulations
in
Kumaon
The causesfor he ncreasing umber f nfractionsfforestaws after 911, even
if
they re not specifically emonstrated, ave been reasonably
well established y
Guha 1989). Between1911 and 1917, the ForestDepartmentransferredore han
3,000 square
miles of forests
o
the
mperial
Forest
Department
n
greater umaon
(KFGC 1921), ofwhichnearly ,000 squaremileswere ocated
n thethree resent-
day
districts f Kumaon:
Nainital,Almora,
nd
Pithoragarh.'2
he colonial tatehad
made a
number
f nroads
between1815
and
1910
to curtailprogressivelyhe area
of
forests nder
he control f ocal
communities
nd to
use
forests o extract
imber
forrevenue.But its latest ncursions
aised the
special
ire of the
villagers.
Their
grievances
were
particularly
cute
because
of the
elaborate
new rules thatspecified
strict estrictionsn
lopping
and
grazingrights,
estricted se of
non-timber
orest
products, rohibited
he extension f
cultivation,
nhanced he aborextracted rom
thevillagers, nd increased he number fforest uards.The lastalteration aised he
level
and
nature ffrictionetween orestuards nd thevillagewomen nd children
who harvested
roducts
rom he forest.
Althoughgovernment
fficials sserted hat the new laws were never
trictly
enforced,
he added restrictions
hippedvillagers
nto
widespread
rotest.Villagers
simplyrefused
o
accept
the
rules
and
the fundamental ssumption ndergirding
them:
that
the statehas
a
monopoly
ver
all
natural esources
t
deems significant.
The bestefforts
f
governmentfficials
ailed o convince he
villagers
hat heforests
belonged
o the
government.
he officers
ho
had
designed
he new and settlement
hadhopedthat he residents f the hills "wouldgradually ecome ccustomed o the
rules s
gazetted
nd that
ontrol
may
be
tightened
s
years o
on"
(KFGC 1921, 2).
But
hill-dwellers ashed these
sanguine hopes. Many
of theiractions were
at an
individual evel,oriented
o
extracting
orest
roducts
ike fodder nd fuelwood
nd
grazing
livestock.But the infractionslso reveal
an
interesting atternoverall,
showing
he
collusive
nd social nature f their
protests.
etween
1917
and
1921,
the
averagenumber
of individuals onvictedof each detected nfraction overed
between
ive nd six. After
926,
the
average ropped
o fewer
han
wo.
Collectively
organized
breaches
f forest aw thus occurred armore often n the earlier
eriod.
Although
do not
have access
to
testimony
rom
illagers,
heirdissatisfactions
clear, s is the fact hattheir esponses ccur n a farmorecollective ashion n the
earlier
eriod
than after
926.
In
light
of this
observation,
t
is hard to
accept
the
official
uggestions
hat
Kumaon
villagers
brokerules
nitially
ecause
they
never
half understood he
rules
that
were
made and oftenhad
vague
ideas of the entries
within heir
ights
ists"
KFGC 1921, 2). Villagers
understood he rules
nd their
implications nly
too
well,
and
they
cted
collectivelygainst
he
rules,
with
ll that
12Since completed ield
work, hedistricts fAlmora nd
Pithoragarh avehad two new
districts arved ut of them:
Bageshwar nd Champawat.
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STATE FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES? 15
suchactionsmply
n terms
f ointdiscussions nd
understandings
nd
renegotiation
of what hould
count
s
personal
nterest.
The incessant, ftenviolent,protestsforced he government o appoint the
Kumaon Forest Grievances Committee to look into the local "disaffection."
Comprising government
fficials nd
local political leaders,'3the Committee
examinedmore than five housandwitnesses rom ll
parts
of
Kumaon.
It
used the
resulting vidence o make nearly hirty ecommendations.he
Committee elt
hat
manyof the protests illagersmade were imply result funenforceableulesthat
interferedirectly ith ctions fvillagers imed t securing
livelihood.
t
advocated
the repealof all restrictionsn lopping of fodder rom ak trees, hemainsource f
food
for ivestock
n
thewinter eason, nd on grazing f ivestock
n
the
forest. hese
two sets of restrictions
ere
responsible ormostof the breaches f forestaws.
The Committee lso recognized he social powerdynamics urrounding he
enforcementf the new aws when
an
agent
of the
state, uch
as
a
forest
uard,was
empowered
o cite
villagers
for
actions
that
constituted
or them
no more than
everyday se of the
forests
ut
were seen
as infractions
nder the
law.
In
such
a
situation, ot onlywould
a
largenumber fguardsbe
needed o enforce
he
aw, but
the
enforcementtself
would
promote
issatisfaction
mong
those
being
cited.As the
Committee bserved, any attempt
o
strictlynforce
heserules
would lead to riot
and
bloodshed" KFGC 1921, 3).
The rules lso
created pportunities
or
guards
to
extract
ribes
orminor nfractions.he
Committeeuggested
hat orest
epartment
employees
would
be prevented
rom
arassing illagers, specially
wherewomen nd
childrenwere
nvolved,
f
theyguarded nly smaller
rea of forest nd
if
they
were
kept busy
n
other
epartmental
ork.'4
The most
significantuggestions
f the
Committee
were twofold:
1)
dereserve
the
larger art of
the
newly
reated
Reserved orests etween
1911
and
1917,
and
(2) lay
the
foundations
or
reating ommunity
orests
hatwould
be
managed
under
a
broad
set of
rules
framed
y the government, ut
forwhich
villagers hemselves
would
craft
he
specific
ulesfor
veryday
se to fit
ocal
conditions. he
government
took
both theserecommendations
eriously.nitially,
t reclassified eserved
orests
that had
been
taken
over
by
the Forest
Department etween1911
and
1917
into
Class andClass I forests.lass Reserved orestsontained road-leavedree pecies
used
primarily
or odder
nd fuel
by villagers.
lass
I
forests
ften
omprised
maller
patches
f
forests
less
than
one or two
square miles)
ocated
close to the
village.
All
theseforests ere
transferredo the Revenue
Department
nd,
in
time,
could
come
to
be
controlled
yvillagers yfollowing specific rocedure
s
described
n the
1931
Forest
Panchayat
Rules. Class
II
Reserved Forests
were those stocked
with
commercially
orevaluable
pecies.
These ncludedChir
Pinus
oxburghii),
al
Shorea
robusta),
eodar
Cedrus eodara),
nd
Cypress Cupressusorulosa).
lass II
forests ere
retained
nder he control
f the Forest
Department.
131nitially,he Committeehad threemembers: he District
Commissioner f Kumaon,
the Member of the LegislativeCouncil fromGarhwal, nd a
Conservator rom he Forest
Service.
An
additional
member,
he chairman
f the
Municipal
Board from
Almora,
was
also
appointed s a representativef the region KFGC 1921).
14That
rules nd newprograms
an
often e the tage t which orrupt ractices re nacted
behind the curtain s
thoughtfullyescribed
or
plains village
in
India
(Gupta 1995).
Al-
thoughGupta is less interested
n
providing causal analysis
f
corruption, is arguments
throw ignificantight
on
the relationship etween discursivelyroduced tate,discussions
of
corruption
s
they
become current
n
the
public sphere,
nd the effects n the lives of
villagers.
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16 ARUN AGRAWAL
The government lso passed the Forest Council Rules of 1931. These rules
permitted illageresidentso create orestouncils nd bring nder heir wn control
forestands thathadbeentransferredo theRevenueDepartments Class Reserved
Forests
nd
Civil Forests.
his
step
can
be seen,
n
some cases,
s
the formalizationf
village nstitutionshat
had
influencedheuse ofmanyforests
n
theKumaon Hills
before
910 (Somanathan 991).
Wherethese nformalocal institutions ad
existed,
theyhad been critical n influencing ow villagers sed forests.nstitutionalimits
on
harvesting
rom he forestwere
enforced y villagers hemselves ithoutmuch
helpfrom he state.The ForestCouncil Rules have been modified wice since their
formation:
nce n 1971
and
again
n
1976. The provisions
f
the Rules are currently
once
moreunder onsideration
or
evision.
The actions f the British olonial tatefly gainst he grainof claimsthat ssert
a steady tomization fvillage communities nder the impact of scientific orestry
and
capitalist evelopment
ed
by the
colonial
tate Guha 1989, 55;
cf.
Grove1995).
The
actual process s
somewhatmore
complex.
At
least
in
Kumaon,
state officials
redefinedhe
forms
f nterventionnd
renegotiated he
terms f their nteractions
with
villagersby taking
nto
account the context f interventions.tates
may,
n
general, e
oriented
o
systematize
nd mold
the world
ccording
o
principles
hat
simplify
ocial
organization
nd
make
it
more
predictable Scott 1998).
But where
state actions
run
into
unexpected bstacles,
r where
ubject populationsrespond
vociferouslygainst
cumbersome
egal encroachments,
tate
officials an
also create
innovative new formsof control through decentralized nforcement. ven if
decentralized
orms f
controldo not
rely
on
coercive nforcement
nd
systematic
simplification,
he effects
may
match state
objectives
of
greater
order and
predictability.
The colonial government's
fforts
o establish forest ouncils parallel recent
environment-related
nitiativesn a
largenumber f countriesFAO 1999). Pressures
resulting
rom
fiscal runch, dvocacy y
national
Non-Government rganizations
(NGOs)
and international
onors,
nd the
nability
f states o
regulate
esource
se
coercively
ave ed
manygovernments
o devolve ontrol verresources oward ocal
communities
n a manner
esembling
hat occurred n Kumaon
Gibson
and Marks
1995; Kothariet al. 1998; Poffenbergernd McGean 1996; Western nd Wright
1994).
The
ostensible
easons
for
such
incorporation
re
also stated
to
be greater
participation
nd involvement f communities
n
the
management
f
resources,
s
they
were
n
Kumaon.
But as localities re
drawn nto
networks f
powerregulated
by
the
state,
new
political relationships
etween tate officials
nd local
actors,
nd
among
ocal
actors,
lso
emerge.
In
the case of forest
management
n
Kumaon
at
least,
he colonial tate eems o
have
steppedback,butonly
to
jumpbetter.
t
redefined
ts intervention
y refining
theterms f ontrol.
he division f
forestsnto wo
categories-Class
/
Civil Forests
under he control f the Revenue
Department
nd Class
II
Forests nder he control
of the ForestDepartment-should be interpretedo signify he outcome of two
processes.
he first s
the
departmental ivalry
hat was
sparked
nto
being by
the
creation
f the Forest
Department
n
1868
and
by
the
passing
of a
huge
swathe f
territory
nder ts control
n
the name of the
protection
f
forests.'5 he
increasing
"5The istory fthis truggle
n
Kumaon can be read nShrivastava1996). Examinations
of such conflictsn
neighboring
imachal Pradesh
Saberwal 1997)
and
in
the more
distant
Bengal (Sivaramakrishnan996) are also available. Some of the ideas that providedForest
Department ersonnel he
founding ogic of rguments gainstdeforestationre carefullynd
persuasively istoricized
n
Richard
Grove'swork
1994, 1995).
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STATE FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES? 17
controlof the ForestDepartment vervast stretches f
land,
and
the revenues
t
generated y auctioning imber rom
he
ands under tscontrol,
ivaled
nd outgrew
the revenues rom and.'6 The transfer f all the Class I forests o the Revenue
Departmentwas the outcomeof a bureaucratic truggle
hat was
in
part resolved
againstthe interests f the ForestDepartment. t was
only a partialvictory or he
Revenue Department, owever, ecause the Forest
Department till kept
the
more
denselywooded tracts nder ts own purview s Class
II
Reserved orests.
The
second spectofthe redefinitionf and rights s thatover ime significant
proportion f the forestedand
in
Kumaon has come to be
managedby villagers.As
Table
1
shows, illagersmanagenearly 0 percent fforestsn Almora nd 30 percent
in Pithoragarh. hese are the same forests hat he Forest
Department ought o take
over
between 910
and
1916.
The control
xercised yvillagers nfolds, owever,
n
ways hatmatch heobjectives f state fficials. any ofthetypes fregulationshat
the
colonial tate
had
wanted
o
enforcere nowcraftednd mplemented yvillagers.
This new way of administeringorest egulationss not
only
more
effectiveut
has
also simultaneouslyed to
a
tremendous eduction
n
the
expenses
ncurred
y
the
Forest Department on enforcement.
A
large number
of
forest-management
organizations
t the
village
evel-forest ouncils-have
come
nto
being
over
he
ast
seventy ears ohelp
state fficials
rotect
orests. ut their
uthority
ver ocal forests
is only
a
corollary f state claims. Indeed, the village-basedforest-management
processesn Kumaonmayevenbe seen as expressions f
state uthority. o evaluate
thisclaim,consider ow forest ouncils n Kumaonmanageforests.
Institutional
Landscapes
of
Collective Forest
Management
n
Kumaon
Nearly
three housand orest ouncils
odayformally
manage
and control
bout
a
quarter
of the
forests
n
the
three
districts
f
Kumaon
(Nainital, Almora,
and
Pithoragarh).
ost
of these ouncils re single-village
ouncils,
nd thus
significant
proportion fKumaonvillages,nearly 5 percent, as chosen o create orest
ouncils.
Table 1 presentsnformationn theforestreaunderdifferentorms f nstitutional
arrangements
orforests
n
Almora and
Pithoragarh.'7
he broad
parameters
hat
define heformal
management ractices
f
the
forest
ouncils re
aid out n theForest
Council Rules of
1931,
as amended
n
1976 (Ballabh
and
Singh 1988).
These rules
form he state-definedimits f ocal
autonomy. illagers
annot lear-fell
he
forest,
they annotmpose
fines
eyond specified
mount
and
only
withtheconsent
f
the
person eingfined), hey
an
raise
revenues
nly hrough
ertain imited
ources, hey
16Whiledoing fieldwork
n
1990-91, and
then
again
in
1993,
I
stayed
ften
n
Forest
Rest Houses, constructedn the earlieryears f the twentiethentury.n the more remote
locations, hesewere mongtheonlymarks f tate uthority,ocated midst
omeof
hemost
striking andscapes nd providing nparalleled iewsof the Himalayan
peaks.Architecturally
distinct rommore recent overnment onstructions,heseearlier
uildings,
with theirfire-
places, high ceilings,rugs, and leaky roofs, ecalled period when
the ForestDepartment
enjoyedgreater elative ignificance
han
today
n the
administrationfKumaon's and-based
resources.
17Although
Nainital is one of the threedistricts
n
Kumaon,
it
has only a fewforest
councils
approximatelywo hundred
n
comparison
o
nearly
hree housand
n
Almora
nd
Pithoragarh). nly
a
small proportion f Nainital is hilly, nd theforest ouncils xist only
in
the hillyparts f Kumaon.
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18 ARUN AGRAWAL
Table 1. Forests n Kumaon
NameofDistrict
Almora
Pithoragarh
Percentf
Percentf
Area TotalForest
Area TotalForest
Institutionalrrangement
Forest epartment 550 13 1401 42
Revenue epartment 423 10 534 16
VillageControl 2959 70
1001 30
Private 296 7
400 12
Note:Figuresor rea re nsquare ilometers.
Source: istrict ollectorateecordsnAlmora nd Pithoragarh.
must take recourse o established egal procedures o resolve
onflicts,
nd
so
on.
Where conflicts
ver
nterpretation
nd
application
of
rules
spill
over nto formal
channels
f
dispute
esolution nderwritten
y
the ndian
tate
district
nd
provincial
revenue/judicialuthorities),erious ossesbecomeunavoidable.
or xample,
f
parties
to
a
disputetake their uarrel o district r state courts, hecase may dragon for
decadeswithout
eing resolved.
The ForestCouncil Rules, like
all
rules, re interpreted
iversely y thosethey
are supposed o govern, he varying nterpretationsorminghe foundation f many
differentctions.
onsider ne
example.
he modified ules of
1976 sought
o restrict
the abilityof villagersto harvest ive treesfortimber.
Where the 1931 Rules
permitted illagers
o
cut trees, he 1976 Rules explicitly
orbade nyone
rom
utting
more
than
one live treewithoutpriorpermission rom hree
differentovernment
officials:he District
Collector, he Conservator
f
Forests, nd the DivisionalForest
Officer.
n
1978
the
villagers
n
Majhkhalibegan
to seek
permission
rom he
District
Collector
o cut
fourteen hir
(Pinus roxburghii)
rees
fortimber o
repair
homes.
Council
records
ndicate
hat
for
nearly
hree
years
he
villagers
ontinued
o
pursue
the matterformally.Their repeated applicationsto the Revenue and Forest
Department
fficials
eceived
no
response.Ultimately,
he
villagers ave up.
In
the
minutes f council
meetings
or
1982,
two entries
ttract otice.The first
ndicates
that winter ce storm elled ourteenhir trees. he second
was
a
resolution
y
the
council members
o
use the fourteen allen
nd "dead"
trees o
repairdwellings
n
the
village
Collectively,
he
Rules constitutemore
of a
frameworkor he
management
f
forests
ather han
straitjacket
hat
definesocal
forest-managementractices.
ural
residents, hrough heir lected
forest
ouncils,possess ubstantial
owers
o create
concreterestrictions o
prevent
ertain
types
of forest
use and facilitate
thers.
Villagers ote to elect between ive nd nine councilmembersnd the council eader
from mongvillage residents. he council
n
many f thevillagesmeetsfrequently,
its
members
iscuss, raft,
nd
modify pecific
ules thatwill
govern
withdrawal f
forest
roducts,
nd it
creates
monitoring
nd
sanctioning
mechanisms
n an
efforto
enforce he rules
t
has crafted s well as
the Forest
Council Rules framed
y
the
government.
he
allocative ffects f rules
range
from
eing
moreor less
equitable
to extreme
nequality
n the
distribution
fforest
roducts. he council
elects
uards,
fines
ule-breakers, anages inances,
nd maintains record f ts
meetings, ccounts,
and local rule
nfractions.
n
many
of the
cases,
the
guard
selected
by
the council s
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STATE
FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES? 19
paid by contributionsrom he
village households. he
council has other ources f
income s well and usuallydeploys ts net earnings oward ublic activities uch as
construction f schoolbuildings,religious elebrations,r purchase fcollectively
used utensils.'8
Councils
njoy bvious
eeway
n
defining
ow to
manage
ocal forests. he limits
of
thisrange, owever,
re often
rought
nto
display.
These imits re
exposed
n the
normalizedmeans of control
hroughwhich the Revenue
and
ForestDepartments
articulatewith the councils.
But
they are even more strikingly isible when
recalcitrant illagers o not
observe ome of the more basic principles pon which
the councils are founded:the authority f the councils to impose finesor the
demarcation f the
and on which ouncil
forestsre ocated.
The ForestCouncil
Rules
provide
or
upport
o the
councilsfrom
he Revenue
and Forest Departments o facilitaterule enforcementnd the maintenance f
vegetation
n
theforests.
he
asymmetricuthoritativexchanges
within
illages
nd
between
village
residents
nd
government
fficials re
at once overlaid
by
informal
relations f powerand influence
hat
written tatements elineating he bounds of
authority escribe nly
mperfectly
t
best.Over the
past sixty ears,
he
relationship
that
has evolvedbetween illageusers nd theForest nd RevenueDepartments as
been one in
whichvillagers
nd
their ouncilshave
ncreasingly
ome to
depend
on
government epartments
or
ctivities elated o the
management
f
their orests.
The
formationf
the forest ouncils
requires hepresence
f
governmentfficials
from he RevenueDepartmentndthe formal ransferf and-managementights o
thecouncil.The forest
ver
which ights nd capacities o manage reto be transferred
is mapped and registered ith
the patwari the village-levelRevenue Department
official). lections o
the forest ouncil are held
under
the
supervision
f
the forest
council
nspector.
he
council s
expected
o meet
regularly, eep
records f
meetings,
and maintain ccounts. he forest ouncil
nspector, ho
is under he control f
the
office f
the district
magistrate,
s
empowered
o
inspect
ll
recordsmaintained
y
the councilsunder
his control.
Civil administration
t
the ocal
evel
n
thedistricts
fKumaon
hingesupon
the
district
magistrate-an
office
hat
melds
together
he
tasksof collection f
revenue,
administrationf ustice, nd thedelivery fdevelopment.With thereorganization
of
theNew Reserved
orests ntoClass
I
and
Class
I
forests
n
1931,
and
thetransfer
of
all
Class
I
forests
o the Revenue
Department,
he district
magistrate merged
s
the mostcrucial fficial
n the
management
f the forest
ouncils, specially
fter he
1976 modifications
n
the Rules of
1931.
The district
magistrate
s
responsible
or
ensuring
hat
the forest
ouncilsfunction
n
accordance
with
the
provisions
f the
Rules.
n
Almora
district,
or
xample,
hedistrict
magistrate
s
supposed
o
supervise
the working f nearly
wo thousand orest
ouncils.
A number f officialsssisthim:
the forest ouncilofficer
usually
he sub-divisional
agistrate,
r
SDM)
at
the
tehsill
subdivision
evel and two
to
three orest ouncil
nspectors
n
each subdivision. ub-
divisionalmagistratesuperviseheactivities f number fforest ouncil nspectors,
who
perform
he
nitty-gritty
asksof
supervising
lections
o the
forest ouncil
nd
themaintenance fregisters,
ccounts,
nd
minutes f
meetings.
Given theenormous
burden uch
supervisory
asks
mpose
on the
nspectorabout
four
hundred ouncils
fall
underthe domain
of each forest
ouncil
nspector),
nd
their imited
resources,
the inspections re
perfunctory
nd
spotty
ffairs.
orest
ouncil
nspectors
eldom
18Thus,hey eem omeetmany
f he esign rincipleshat re haracteristicf uccessful
common roperty anagementnstitutions
s
discussed
yOstrom1990).
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20 ARUN AGRAWAL
manage to inspectmore than fifty orest ouncils
n a
year.The ones inspected
re
usually he ones more ccessible y
road.
The forest ouncilsdo not possess he coercive uthorityo enforce he rules hey
create
except by moving
the
judiciary.
n
cases
of
disputes
with
users, hey
must
depend significantly,venexclusively,
n
prompt esponse
rom he
officials
f the
RevenueDepartment, uch as
the
patwari,
or the
forest
ouncil nspector. hus, if
a
userrefuses o pay the mposedfines, r continues o harvest
enefitsn infringement
of
xisting ules,
r
encroaches pon the
and
demarcated
s council orest,he ouncils
do notpossess hecoercive owersnecessaryobring uch
a
recalcitrantser o book.
Without
quick
and
adequate support
rom he revenue
fficials,
ule-breakers
ften
continue
sing
the forest
n
defiance f
the
forest ouncils' ttempts
t
enforcement
of rules.Officials
n the
Revenue
Department
who are
supposed
o
help
the councils
mustperform hostofother utiesthatmostofthembelievehavepriority ver he
tasksrelated
o
forest ouncils.
For
manyforest ouncils
hen, ne of the most evere
problems s enforcement.
Whereas he Revenue
Department
fficials nderwritehe enforcementf
rules,
the Forest Department coordinates
the commercial harvest
of
productsfrom
community
orests
nd
provides
echnical ssistance o
develop
them. The
Forest
Council Rules
stipulate
hat the Forest
Department
hould
prepare omprehensive
working lans
for ll the forest ouncils.
n
practice,
owever,
his
rule
has seldom
been observed.As
a result t has
been
underthe
mpetus
f the recent
mphasis
f
the Indian governmentn treeplantation hat the Civil & Soyamand the Soil
Conservation
ings
of
the
Forest
Department
ave undertaken ome
plantation
n
forest ouncil
and.
Except
for ome
very
recent
ases,
n
most nstances
he
Forest
Departmenthas planted exotic species
on
community
orestlandshathave little
subsistence
alue for
villagers. urther, efore
he
councilcan sell any of ts timber
or
resin,
t
must eek
pproval
rom
he
relevant uthoritiesn
theForest epartment.
Like the interactions ith the RevenueDepartment fficials,hesecan take
a
long
time
owing
to other utiesthatreceive
reater riority.
request o cut even a few
trees rom hecouncilforestantakeup to twoyears efore
t
is finally rocessed y
Forest nd Revenue
Department fficials.
This descriptionf the nstitutionalrrangementsituates he forest ouncils s
locallyfixed artners
n
the managementfforests,ubordinateo the employees f
the
Forest nd
RevenueDepartments.
heir
asymmetric
elationswith government
officials
ast
the
officials
n the role of arbiters
n
cases of
disputes
between
illagers
and forest ouncil fficeholders.heir bility o exercise ontrol ver
he
use
of
forests,
in the
absence
of
authority o impose sanctions
n
rule-breakers,
epends n large
measure
n the
willingness
f
villagers
o accord
uthority
o councils.But forest sers
can
also
question
and
undermine he
capacity
of
the councils.
They
can do so
by
showing
n
unwillingness
o
limit
theirharvests
f
forest esources.
hey
also
do so
more
explicitly y contesting
he fines
mposed by
the councils.
n
each
of
these
situations, he councils need to invoke the cooperation f government fficials,
simultaneously emonstrating
heir inks
to
the
state
and
theirweakerposition
n
thispolitico-managerialelationship.
Forest Protectionby CommunityManagers
In most of the forest ouncils, the basic rules for managing the forest nd
restrictingillagers rom singforest roducts re drafted ithin he first ear r two
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STATE FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES? 21
oftheformationnd election fthecouncil.After hat, hekey ctivity fthecouncil
is the enforcementf rulesto restrict he evelsof forest roducts hat re harvested.
Many villagers greethatprotection s necessary.n Dhanachuli, village on the
border
f Almora nd
Nainital district, villager
used the
heavy
monsoons o make
the point: "Do you see this rain? Do you see the crops n the fields? he rain can
destroy
he
standing rop.
But
even
f
the weatherweregood, the crop
can
still get
destroyed y thieves
f
there re no guards.
t
is the same with the forest. ou plant
a shrub,you give it water,you take care of t. But if you don't protect t, cattle an
eat it. The forests for s, butwe have to takecareof t,
f
wewant
t
tobe there or
us."'19Another
illager,
rom
Guniyalekh located near Dhanachuli),pointed
to
the
difficultiesf enforcement
n a
meeting f the council: Until we get the maps, egal
recognition,marked boundaries
of
the local forest},
thel
council cannot work
properly. he people from har
[a
neighboring
illagel
tell us that heforests theirs.
We should
not
enter
t. So
we
can
guardpart
of
the
forest,
nd
we
don't know
which
part
to
guard}. Since 1984 whenthepanchayat as formed, e have been requesting
the papers hat howtheproper imits o we can manageproperly, rotect ur forest.
But what an one do ifthegovernmentoes notevenprovide hepapers?"20 second
villager
n
the same
meetingadded, "Mister,
his is
Kaljug.21 No
one listens
to
authority.
o
we mustget support
rom
he government
o make sure that
villagers
don't
ust chop
down whatever
hey
want."
Other
villagers
ad differenttories
o
tell. When asked how councilrules ould
be enforcedmoreeffectively,ne said, "Whyshould councilsmake rulesto stopus
from sing grasses nd wood from he forest? he forests necessary or griculture,
for
ivestock,
or
home,
formanure.
Why
shouldwe not
be able
to use it?"22 One of
the women fromDhanachuli complained bout the guards that the forest ouncils
hire: The wretched
uard
s
always
fter s. He is worse
han
heforest
departmentl
guard.
At
leasttheforest uarddoesn't top us
from
etting uelwood, ven
from
he
Reserved orest.'
23
The members
f
the forest ouncils re more
uniformly
n favor
of
protection
han
the
ordinary illagers.
This is
not
surprising. ot only
do the
council
members
nd eaders
rganize rotection,
ut
they
re
chiefly
enand
belong
to the
upper
castes.24
The expressionsfconcern ysomevillagers nd mostoftheofficialsftheforest
councils are reflected
n the different eans councilshave devised
to
protect
heir
forests.
n
some of the
villages,
he
duty
f
guarding
he
panchayat
orest otates rom
one household
to another.
Ghurkuna, village
with
only
lower-caste
esidents,
followed his
strategy
f
protection.
ecause
t
is
a
small
village
with
relatively oor
households,
he
council could not raise the
necessary
ontributions
rom
village
households
to hire
a
guard.
But
many
of
the
villagers expressed
n interest
n
protecting he forest
rom esidents f other
nearby illages.
The duration
f
guard
duty
for
ach household
an
vary
rom
day
to
a
week overthe course f
a
year
nd
19Interviewno. 2 with ShankarRam, Tape 1, translatedy
Kiran
Asher.
20Interviewo. 13 with Bachi Singh,Tape 5, translated y Kiran Asher.
2'In Indian mythology, aljug is the fourth nd the final ra before ime resumes gain
to proceed hrough he same sequenceof eras: Satjug,Ttreta,Dwapar, and thenKaljug. It is
the timewhendharma ives way to adharma nd established
uthority ails.
22Interviewo.
14
with GauriShankar, ape 5, translated y
Kiran
Asher.
23lnterviewo. 3 with Gauri Devi, Tape 1, translated
y Kiran Asher.
240f
the twenty-eightases
I
studied,only one council
had a woman as a member. n
multicaste illages,brahmansnd
rajputs
onstituted he
majority f the membership: 2 per-
cent.
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22 ARUN AGRAWAL
depends
n
largepart on the size of the forest nd the number
f
households
n
the
village. Villages whose forests re large n relation o theirhouseholdsmay allocate
guard dutyfor nlypartof the year. n general,maintaining uard duty t least for
the four wintermonths s essential. The frequency f rule infractionsncreases
significantly
n
winterbecause the forest s often he
most convenient r the
only
source f fodder nd fuelwood n this eason.
Although some councils rotate protection responsibilities mong village
households, his s not the most commonoption. Some households re chronically
deficient
n
undertakinghe patrolsnecessary o protect
he
forest,
nd it
is easy
for
more nfrequentree iders ot to contribute heir abortoward rotectionnd notto
be
detected. here re
two
lternativeptions.Both nvolve iring
ne or
more uards.
As thefirst ption, he ouncil an hire guard, ndvillagehouseholds hen ontribute
a monthly r annual sum to defray he guard's salary.Direct payment rom he
households oward he guard's salary s customary hen
the council
does not have
independent ources f income or when ts cash income s relativelyow. Councils
that
earn ncomefrom he sale of forest roducts fodder, piphytes, razingpasses,
or fuelwood
undles),25
rom
membership
eesfrom
illagers,
r
through
share
of
the sale of commercial roducts
hat
the ForestDepartment
harvests rom
illage
forests,
ftenhire
guards directly.When
a
council deploys
his second
option,
the
guard's alary
s
paid
from
he general
unds f
the
council.
The
sentiments
n favor
f forest rotection
hat
some villagers xpressed,
nd
the means of protection hat manyof the councilshave devised,
n
one sense only
indicate he ubiquity f the actions hatmake forest rotection necessity s far s
councils re concerned.
he recordsmaintained y the councils
ndicate hat
villagers
break
rules,
ften
n
large
numbers. onversations
n
the
villages
ell
a
similar
tory,
even
permitting
he nferencehat ctual
evels fviolations
frules
rescribing
orest
use must
be
far
higher
han thosedetected
by
the council
guards.
Because councils
seek
to
restrict he
use of
the same productswhose use
the Forest
Department
was
trying
o
regulateearlier
n the
century,
ule infractionsre inevitable.Table
2
presents nformationn eight villages,based on the written
ecordsmaintained
y
the
village
forest ouncils.The information
n
the table
can be used to make several
points,
ut
want o draw
ttention
o two.
First,
here s
a
close
relationship
etween
a forest ouncil'sexpendituren hiring guardand the number frule nfractions
listed n councilrecords. econd, he evel of ruleviolations
eemsto
be veryhigh.
The
figures
n
the table make
it
obvious
that
village
residents
outinely
reak
rules reated
y
the forest ouncils.The
above
nformation
s from subset f
all
the
forest ouncils
that
maintainedrecordsfrom
mong
the
twenty-eight illages
I
studied.Several
about ten)
councilsdid not maintain
egular
ecords.
Nor
did
they
hold
meetings ften.
ut
where ecords erekept,
nd where
ouncils ried o enforce
their
rules, rule-breaking
s endemic. Minor infractions
ccurred lmost
daily.
Villagers
ntered
he
forest
when
t
was
closed
to
them,
ut
grasses
nd
leaffodder
in
excess f whatwas
permitted, athered uelwood, razed nimals,
ollected tones
and slate forhouseconstruction,nd sometimes elled rees.26 he seemingparadox
25ln
almost ll the cases,forest ouncils ell forest roducts nlyto village residents. he
practice s formalized ven n the termused to describe hosewho can buy forest roducts:
haqdar,
n
Urdu word meaning rightholder."
26Again, hese offences re very imilarto those
Guha
(1989)
describes orthe
period
1917-33. The main differences in the extent o which villagers sed fire o protest
gainst
the regulationsmposedby the colonial state. n present-day umaon, fewvillagers esort o
this means of regulating odder roduction r protesting gainstthe regulationsmposedby
the forest ouncils.
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STATE FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES? 23
Table 2. Detection f
Rule Infractionsy ForestCouncilGuards n
Kumaon: 1977-19921
Averagennual Averagennual
Number f
meetings
amount
pent
n numberfdetected
Name
of
village
held
peryear
protection
in Rs.)
rule nfractions
Airadi 3
790 32
Banua 6
2835 156
Bhagartola 10
3100 192
Ladfoda 3 2840 121
Miraini 8
832 62
Lohathal
4
1850 109
Nagilagaon 5 2500 89
Tangnua
4
175
8
Source: orest
ouncil ecords
t the
village evel;
ata
ollected
uring ieldwork,990-
1993
'The
figures
refor
even ears
electedt random rom he
ecords aintained
y
theforest
councils.
of "the
higher
he
protectionffort,
he
higher
herule
violations"
s
easily xplained.
Villagers
lso
break
rules
n
the
villages
where here
re
no
guards,
r where
guards
do not
report
ule violations
and
as
a
result,
he council
records
o not contain
informationboutruleviolations). ut either heforestouncilsnsuchvillagesmake
little efforto protect he forest r enforce he
rules,
or
theyhave few resources
t
theirdisposalto enforce ules.
Thus,
t
is not
surprising
hat
the councils
hat
pend
the higher mountson protection eem also to have higher nstances f villagers
illegallyusingproducts rom he forest.
In
the eightvillages
forwhich studied ocal
records, he veragenumber frule
violations s
nearlyninety er
year.
This is
almost
certainly gross
underestimate.
None
of the
village
forest ouncils
perfectly
etects
esidents'
ctions n the forests.
Whether he councils
ttempt
o
deploy
mutual
monitoring
r
hire
guards,
most of
theactions fvillagers
n
the forest emain idden
from
heviewof the council even
if
many
re
visible
to
villagers).
n
Bhagartola,
he
teashop wner,
who himself elies
on firewood rom he forest o
keep
his stove
going,
aid as muchwhenhe described
how theworldworks: To
what xtent an
you keep
watch ver heforest?
owadays
even one's own
property
s not safe
f
your yes
re not
on
it
twenty-four
ours.
The
forests
big,
and
there
s
just
one
guard.
How
far
an he
makerounds
ftheforest?'
27
Although
here s
no
way
to know for
ure,
conversations
ith the
villagers
eft
general mpression
hat the
councils
detect no more than
20
percent
f
all
rule-
violating
ehavior.
The
eightvillages
n
the
table
vary
n
size,
n
the
amount f forest
heymanage,
in proximityo markets,nd in levels ofout-migration. s a group, they re not
visibly
ifferent
rom ther
illages
n the hills.
f
the
figures
or hese
ightvillages
resemble
what
happens
in
villages
in
Kumaon
in
general,
the total number
of
27Suchentimentstand
n
sharp ontrast,
f
ourse,
o
other
xpressed
dioms
n
which
villagers
ndicate
hat
veryone
nows hat
appens
n
a
village.
he
point
s
that t
s almost
impossible
o catch omeone
n
the ct s
they
re
aking
ut
fodderr
firewood,
ven
f here
is a
general
warenessfhow
pecific
ndividualsct.
n
other
tudies f
village
ife r ife
n
small groups, t is a commonplace hat members now a greatdeal about thosewith whom
they nteract requentlyAgrawal1997a).
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24 ARUN AGRAWAL
infractionsn a year s striking. or the twelve housand r so
villages n the three
districts fKumaon, even the
detectedrule violationswill add up to more than a
million nstances f rulebreaking nnually.And this may be only 10 to 20 percent
of all ruleviolations
Compare his figure
with
the performancef the ForestDepartment hat Guha
reports rom he earlier art
of the century. he ForestDepartment etected round
twenty-fiveundred uleviolations nd convicted bout ten thousand
ersons ach
year
t
the
peak
of
protests gainst ts
attempts
o
take
overKumaon forests. ven
f
one takes ntoaccount he
fourfold opulation ncrease hathasoccurredn Kumaon
since the earlypart of this
century, nforcementy the ForestDepartmentwas
far
more mperfect. o achieve
ven this mperfect egulation
f
village ife, he Forest
Department
ad
to increase ts size and expenses ignificantly.his drastic
ncrease
in department ffortso protect nd police forests esulted n widespread rotests
throughout he region. The
policy of indirectpolicing, even internalpolicing,
emerged
rom hat
failed xperience f
trying
o
extend
direct ontrol.
By dividing
its forest
oldings
ntotwo
differentroups Class
I
and
ClassII
forests)
nd
allowing
villagers o takeover hemanagementfthe more catteredorests
hat
re also more
critical or
aily
ubsistence elated o
cooking,
ivestock
aising,
nd
agriculture,
he
ForestDepartment nabled
the emergence f
a
new form
f
systematic
egulation.
The costsof controllingnd
managing hesenearly hree housand cattered atches
of
vegetationwere, are,
and will
be prohibitive
or the Forest
Department.
The
attenuation f whatproperty ights heoristswould call ownership as, however,
reduced the cost of policing vegetationby displacing them onto the
villagers
themselves.
In
conjoiningpolicywith policing, refer xplicitly o Foucault's
suggestive
observations
hat
eepolicy s "the set of means
necessary
o
make the state ncrease
from
within." Political economy tselfdevelops when
it
becomes clear that the
resources-populationroblem an no
longerbe fullymanagedthrough
coercive
regulatory ystem . .
"
(Foucault
[19941
1997, 69-70).
It
was
precisely
his
realization hat
ed
to
the appointment
f
the Kumaon
ForestGrievances ommittee
in
1921
and the
passing
f
theForest ouncil Rules
n
1931.
In
contrast o theearlier
efforts f the state to excludevillagersfromforests-deemedstatepropertynd
monopoly-the
new
regulations
mark somewhat ifferent
trategy
o
deploypower
to
manage resources. heydependon the emergence
nd cultivation f the sense
among village
elite that
the
local
forests re theirs.
Archivalrecords
rom
he late
nineteenth nd
early
twentieth
enturies,
when the
colonial
government
as still
attempting
o take over he
bulk
of Kumaon
forests,
how
that
common
omplaint
of
Forest
epartment
fficials as
that t
was
nearly mpossible
o catch
villagers
who
broke ulesbecause
they
efused
o inform n
each other.
ven
villageheadmen,
who
were
upposed
o
prevent
orest-related
nfractions,
ere
unreliable
Shrivastava
996,
168-88).
In
contrast, illage
council
eaders
oday omplain
hat
government
fficials
do notprovide hem ufficientupportnapprehendinghosewhobreak ouncil ules.
The
handing
ver
of
ocal forests o
villagers
nd their
onversionnto
council-
managed
forests as
wrought remarkable ransformation
n
the character f local
rules.
The new
regulations enetrate
eeper
nto
existing
ocial relations n
villages
and
create
multiple
channels
of
engagement
between
state officials nd
village
residents. ut not
all
these
ngagementsre
conflictual.
nstead,
ome
villagers those
who are
officials
n
the forest
ouncils)
ome to redefine
heir nterestss consonant
with hose
ftheForest nd RevenueDepartments.venwhile hey nd their
amilies
remain orest sers, heybecomethe agentsof state-facilitatedrotection
ithin
he
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STATE FORMATION IN COMMUNITY SPACES? 25
village.
Another
group
of
villagers forest sers) continues
o
be defined s the
opponents
f
protection. speciallyprominent
n this
redefinition
f
protectorsnd
users,official onserversnd incorrigible arvesters,re women and lower-caste
villagers see
next
section).The locus
of
the conflict etweenmanagement nd use
shifts.
t
is no
longerbetween ormallymployed tateofficials
nd
villageresidents.
Instead,
t
resideswithin hevillage, ven f ts ife epends
ltimately n the anctions
available
from he tate.
ts characteristiceature ecomes
onsent, ven
f
his onsent
is
ultimately ounded n the threat f coercion. ts chief
nstrumentemains ower,
but
it
is
power
exercised
through
numerous ocalized
points
of
engagement.
Reshaping
f
ndividual ctions s still ts principal im, but
t
is tobe accomplished
by making
the
villagers esponsible
or
management
nd
thereby
wareof the need
for
protection. hus, the decentralizationf regulationsmakes
villagers ccomplices
in their wn control.
AllocationRegimes and Their Effects
State control
ver forests reates
ypical nequalities
n
the
allocationof forest
products nd asymmetriesn the definitionsfsubjectivities.
hese inequalities nd
asymmetries inge upon
how
particularpeoples and groups
connect
with
state
managers.Some groupsand peoples are better ble to traverse he lines of state
authority
hat
permit the conversion f public resources nto
private profits.
Asymmetricistribution
f
benefits
nder ouncil
managementccurs oth s
a
result
of the
type
of rules some
councils create
and fromthe
unequal
enforcement
f
seemingly qual
rules.
If
villagers
are
accomplices
n their own
control,
their
complicity
s
non-reciprocal
nd
unequal.
Over the
past seventy ears,
orest
ouncilshave created
n
enormous
ange
of
rules.These rules
definewho can take
whatfrom
where
t what imeforwhat
purpose.
The "who"
refers
o
"right
holders
n
the
forest,"
who
may
be defined
y gender,
residencytatus,
r
access to monetary ower.The
"what"
ncludes odder,ivestock
grazing, uelwood fdifferentizes, imber,medicinal lants, ndstones, mong ther
products. imilardiversity haracterizeshe referentsf "where," when,"and the
uses to which harvested
products
are
put.
This tremendous
ariation n
rules
notwithstanding,
e must lso
acknowledge
hat he
objective
ehind
ivingvillagers
the
power
o create ules
was
to
regulate
nd
give shape
to an
even
greater iversity
of
forest-use
atterns
nd
everyday ractices
hathad
existed.
The
processes hrough
which
village
councils
re
empowered
o
create
nd enforce ules
go
hand in hand
with other
processes
hat
make rule
design,
rule
enforcement,
nd rule infractions
visible
to
powerful
u