![Page 1: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Ariel Fiszbein
Chief EconomistHuman Development
World Bank
![Page 2: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Motivation
Many developing countries around the world have conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in place
CCTs have shown positive results through credible impact evaluation studies –source of their popularity
Focus on household behavior: relevant for social policies in developed countries as well
Policy Research Report summarizes lessons of experience
![Page 3: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
Outline
1. Present findings of report
2. Discuss implications for social policy
![Page 4: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
The CCT revolution
![Page 5: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
The CCT Revolution
![Page 6: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
Motivation
Programs vary, but all share some basic characteristics:
1. They transfer cash
2. They ask that households comply with a series of conditions—generally, school enrollment and attendance, often also attendance at health centers for young children
3. They are targeted to the poor
“Twin objective” promise of programs:1. Reduce current consumption poverty
2. Promote accumulation of human capital
![Page 7: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
A family of program approaches
Conditions Education and Health Education Only
Bolsa Familia (Brazil)
Oportunidades (Mexico)
Bono de Desarrollo Humano (Ecuador) Bolsa Escola (Brazil)
Familias en Acción (Colombia) Nationwide
Program of Advancement through Health and Education (Jamaica)
Jaring Pengamanan Sosial (Indonesia)
Female Secondary School Assistance Program (Bangladesh)
Chile Solidario Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction Girls Scholarship
Program (Cambodia)
Education Sector Support Project (Cambodia)
Niche (regional or
narrow target population) Social Risk Management Project (Turkey)
Basic Education Development Project (Yemen)
Programa de Asignación Familiar (Honduras) Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children
(Kenya)
Subsidio Condicionado a la Asistencia Escolar - Bogota (Colombia) Tayssir (Morocco)
Atención a Crisis (Nicaragua)
Prog
ram
size
/targ
et
Small scale/pilot
Red de Protección Social (Nicaragua)
Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (Pakistan)
![Page 8: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
CCT impacts on poverty
Message 1: CCTs have generally led to substantial reductions in consumption poverty—in particular, when transfers are large In Nicaragua, the Red de Protección Social, a
pilot program, reduced the poverty gap among beneficiaries by 18 percent
In Mexico, PROGRESA (now Oportunidades), a program with national coverage, reduced the poverty gap in rural areas by 19 percent
![Page 9: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Impacts on consumption and poverty
Mexico(1999)
Nicaragua(2002)
Colombia(2006)
Honduras(2002)
Average transfer (% of per capita consumption)
20% 30% 13% 11%
Impact on per capita consumption (%)
8.3%** 20.6%** 10%** 7%*
Impact: headcount index (% points)
1.3** 5.3** 2.9* --
Impact: poverty gap (% points)
3.0** 9.0** 7.0** 2.0*
Impact: sqd. poverty gap (% points)
3.4** 8.6** 2.2** 2.0*
![Page 10: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
CCT impacts on poverty
Why have CCTs reduced consumption poverty? They are well-targeted They have made transfers of (in some cases) substantial
magnitude They have not reduced adult labor market participation They have not generally crowded out other transfers, and
have not had substantial (local) general equilibrium effects
Transfers (which are generally made to women) have also changed the composition of consumption More expenditures on food, and on higher-quality
sources of calories
![Page 11: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
CCT impacts on food consumption
![Page 12: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Impacts on health and education outcomes
Message 2: CCTs have resulted in substantial increases in the utilization of education and health services – especially among poor households
Examples — education: In Mexico, Oportunidades decreased dropout between 6th and 7th
grade by 9% points In Pakistan, the Punjab Education RSP increased the school
enrollment of 10-14 year-old girls by 11% points In Cambodia, two pilot programs reduced the dropout between 6th
and 7th grade by 20-30% points Examples — health:
In Colombia, Familias en Acción increased the proportion of children who had growth monitoring by 20-30% points
In Honduras, PRAF increased the proportion of children who had at least one preventive health visit by 20% points
![Page 13: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Impacts on school enrollment
Age range Baseline enrollment
Impact (% points)
Size of transfer
Colombia 8-1314-17
91.7%63.2%
2.1**5.6***
17%
Chile 6-15 60.7% 7.5*** 3-7%
Ecuador 6-17 75.2% 10.3*** 10%
Mexico Grade 0-5Grade 6
Grade 7-9
94.0%45.0%42.5%
1.98.7***
0.620%
Nicaragua 7-13 72.0% 12.8*** 30%
Cambodia Grade 7-9 65.0% 31.3*** 2%
Pakistan 10-14 29.0% 11.1*** 3%
![Page 14: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Impacts on health service utilization
Age range
Baseline level
Impact
(% points)
Size of transfer
Colombia <24 months
24-48 months
n.a.
n.a.
22.8**
33.2***
17%
Chile 0-6 years 17.6% 2.4 7%
Ecuador 3-7 years n.a. 2.7 10%
Honduras 0-3 years 44.0% 20.2*** 9%
Mexico 0-3 years 69.8% 8.4 20%
Nicaragua 0-3 55.4% 13.1* 27%
![Page 15: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Impacts are concentrated on the poorest households
Example: Nicaragua
![Page 16: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Impacts on education and health outcomes
Message 3: Despite increase in service utilization, CCTs have had only mixed success in terms of improving final outcomes in education and health:
Education Increases in school enrollment and years of completed
schooling have not come hand-in-hand with improved learning outcomes
Health Some programs, but my no means all, have improved child
nutrition (as measured by height-for-age, hemoglobin status)
![Page 17: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
CCT impact on child nutrition
Age range
Baseline level
Impact (% points)
Size of transfer
Colombia <24 months
24-48 months
n.a. 0.16**
0.01
17%
Ecuador <24 months
24-48 months
-1.07
-1.12
-0.03
-0.06
10%
Mexico 12-36 months
n.a. 0.96 cm** 20%
Nicaragua <60 months -1.79 0.17** 27%
Honduras <72 months -2.05 -0.02 9%
![Page 18: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
Impacts on child development (children age 3-6)
Nicaragua Ecuador (poorest 40%)
Ecuador (poorest 10%)
Receptive language 0.223***(0.078)
0.011(0.108)
0.177(0.148)
Memory 0.092(0.072)
0.192*(0.105)
0.228**(0.109)
Socio-emotional 0.067(0.065)
0.150(0.103)
0.389**(0.159)
Fine motor 0.150(0.110)
0.160**(0.076)
0.288**(0.117)
Note: all program impacts are in standard deviations.
![Page 19: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Outline
1. Present findings of report
2. Discuss implications for social policy
![Page 20: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Designing transfers to maximize impact on human development outcomes
Which behaviors should be targeted? Quality of services: what kind of services are
beneficiaries of welfare programs actually receiving?
Incentives to service providers Intermediation services
Conditioning on outcomes? If under control of beneficiaries (e.g. STDs) If combined with incentives to providers (e.g. learning
outcomes) Bonuses
![Page 21: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Designing transfers to maximize impact on human development outcomes
Change behaviors within households that prevent the accumulation of human capital.
Programs to improve parenting and early stimulation (as in the “pláticas” of Oportunidades or social-worker support as in Chile Solidario)
Targeting the right age group Life-cycle skill formation as dynamic process
(Heckman et al.) Early stimulation and pre-school programs
![Page 22: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Why condition?
Economic justifications Persistently misguided beliefs “Incomplete altruism” Externalities
Political economy justifications Greater support for a program that appears to ask
beneficiaries to do “something to help themselves” CCTs as new “contract” between the state and
beneficiaries. Emphasis on “co-responsibilities” not “conditions
Research on social perceptions (e.g. Brazilian press, Argentina opinion polls)
![Page 23: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Do conditions work?
Conditions do play a role in increasing service use beyond income effect (at least in education)
Mexico: Children in households w/o monitoring 5.4% points less likely to enroll in school
Ecuador: Program effects are only significant for households that believed transfer are ‘conditional’
Cambodia: Program has no effect on enrollment for siblings at other levels
![Page 24: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Avoiding negative effects of transfers
Why didn’t CCTs have negative effects on labor supply?
Leisure effect: low b/c of fine targeting Avoided high marginal tax rates by use of proxy-
means and infrequent update
Design options Time limits (Chile) Graduated benefits (Brazil) Combining with other programs (e.g. workfare)
![Page 25: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Institutional Issues
CCTs have had important institutional legacies CCTs have led the way in the design of well-
run administrative structures for beneficiary selection, payments, transparency
CCTs have been groundbreaking in terms of the importance they have paid to impact evaluation with credible counterfactuals
![Page 26: Ariel Fiszbein Chief Economist Human Development World Bank](https://reader030.vdocuments.net/reader030/viewer/2022032802/56649dff5503460f94ae6c7b/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
END