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Behavior in blind environmental dilemmas -
An experimental study
Martin BeckenkampMax-Planck-Institute for the Research on Collective Goods
Bonn – [email protected]
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Overview
• Introduction: – Many environmental problems are
environmental dilemmas– Environmental dilemmas often are blind
dilemmas• My hypothesis: Blind dilemmas are the
most tragic dilemmas• Experimental setup and results• Discussion and policy implication
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Introduction: Most environmental dilemmas are blind dilemmas
Many environmental problems are environmental dilemmas:
Hardin (1968) “Tragedy of the commons”.
Ostrom et al. (2002) “Drama of the commons”.
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Introduction: Most environmental dilemmas are blind dilemmas
Above that: Stakeholders in an environmental dilemma often are not aware of their social interdependencies.
Minimal social situation Environmental dilemmas are blind
dilemmas
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Minimal social situations
• A game with incomplete information
• Players do only know their own strategy sets and payoffs.
• In its most extreme form, players are even oblivious of the fact that their decisions are choices in a game or strategy cf. Coleman, 2005, p. 217
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Minimal social situations
• Many argue that due to Pavlov-strategies or “win stay, lose shift” subjects learn cooperation in prisoners’ dilemmas with minimal information (Colman, 2005, p. 222).
• My general hypothesis is contrary to that: Minimal information leads to high defection-rates.
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Cooperation in minimal social situations?
• But how can Pavlov-strategy results be integrated with my hypothesis?
Other design: information about the payoff-matrix (i.e., not really blind).
Confounding of games: mutual fate game (Kelley, 1968).
Negative payoffs or even shocks.
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To summarize the main issue of the experiment:
Does it make a difference whether participants know that they are playing with another person?
In many environmental dilemmas, the agents are unaware of the interdependence of their actions. It would be expected that their decisions change once they know about the actual social interdependencies in the situation.
Method and Design
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The experiment consists of four treatment groups to clarify the issue:
The impact of reducing information about social interdependencies in a prisoners’ dilemma.
Method and Design
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Method and Design:
Entscheidungssituationder anderen Person
19 groups, 38 subjects
12, 0 4, 4
I choose A
I choose B
A B
8, 8 0,12
Control Group
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Method and Design:
Entscheidungssituationder anderen Person
19 groups, 38 subjects
Treatment group 3
12 4
I choose A
I choose B
A B
8 0
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either 12 or 4
I choose A
I choose B
either 8 or 0
Method and Design:
Entscheidungssituationder anderen Person
19 groups, 38 subjects
Treatment group 2
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Method and Design:
Entscheidungssituationder anderen Person
18 groups, 36 subjects
Treatment group 1
I choose A
I choose B
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Method and Design
controlgroup
treatmentgroup 2
40 periods with partner design in each treatment Ring-Measure of Social Values afterwards
Experiment programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 2007)Subjects recruited with ORSEE (Greiner 2003)
treatmentgroup 1
treatmentgroup 3
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Results
controlgroup
treatmentgroup 2
Cooperation rates33.0% 14.7% 48.8% 87.4%
N 1520 1440 1520 1440
treatmentgroup 1
treatmentgroup 3
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Typical progessionstreatment 1
0
1
2
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1 4 7 1013161922252831343740
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Treatment 2
0
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1 4 7 1013161922252831343740
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Treatment 3
0
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2
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1 4 7 1013161922252831343740
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Treatment 4
0
1
2
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1 4 7 1013161922252831343740
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
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Gruppe 1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 2
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 3
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 4
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 5
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 6
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 7
0
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 8
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 9
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 2
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 3
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 4
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 5
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 6
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 7
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 8
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 9
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 1
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 2
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 3
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 4
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 5
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 6
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 7
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 8
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 9
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
treatment 1 treatment 2 treatment 3 ControlGruppe 1
0
1
2
3
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 2
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 3
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 4
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 5
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 6
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 7
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 8
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 9
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 1
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 2
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 3
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 4
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 5
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 6
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 7
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 8
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DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 9
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 1
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 2
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 3
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 4
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 5
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 6
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 7
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 8
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 9
0
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 10
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 1
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 2
0
1
2
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 3
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 4
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 5
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 6
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 7
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 8
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 9
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 10
0
1
2
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3 DC - 2 CD - 1 CC - 0
Gruppe 1
0
1
2
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 2
0
1
2
3
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 3
0
1
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 4
0
1
2
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1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 5
0
1
2
3
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 6
0
1
2
3
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 8
0
1
2
3
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 7
0
1
2
3
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 9
0
1
2
3
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Gruppe 10
0
1
2
3
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
DD - 3, DC - 2, CD - 1, CC - 0
Results
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Results
Random-effects GLS regression Number of obs = 6000Number of groups = 150 (Std. Err. adjusted for 75 clusters in group_ID)------------------------------------------------------------------------------ decision | Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- treat_1 | .544481 .0728862 7.47 0.000 .4016267 .6873353 treat_3 | .7276316 .0756018 9.62 0.000 .5794548 .8758084 treat_2 | .3868421 .1008136 3.84 0.000 .1892511 .5844331 period | .0024853 .0009502 2.62 0.009 .000623 .0043476 _cons | .0747092 .0605195 1.23 0.217 -.0439069 .1933253-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------R-sq: within = 0.0076
between = 0.5197
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Discussion
• In social dilemmas (!):– Information matters! Information about
social interdependencies may lead to higher cooperation rates.
– Information about expected payoffs without knowledge about social interdependencies may reduce cooperation.
– Political implications: Get people out of their veil of ignorance.