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Trade, Politics and the Navy in LatinAmerica: The British in the Parana,184546
David McLean
When military conflict and economic disruption in the river Plate region led to a British
naval occupation of the river Parana in 1845 46, traders from many nations followed the
warships upstream hoping to conduct business in the Argentine interior and with Para-
guay. Since the 1920s historians have uniformly disparaged this Parana expedition as a
commercial failure, insisting that the foreign intruders found neither trade nor
welcome among the local populations. In Argentine historiography, the episode is consist-
ently presented as a successful assertion of national identity in the face of European imper-
ial assault. Research here, however, demonstrates not only the expeditions economic
success but, again contrary to established opinion, its military and strategic achievements,before the British government abandoned its policy of armed intervention. The Parana
was eventually opened to foreign navigation by international treaties in 1853.
Fashionable or not, historical detail usually reasserts itself as a challenge to generalis-
ations about the past and in few areas do scholars try harder to reconcile such tensions
than when debating the relationship between economic benefit and political policy in
nineteenth-century European expansion. Imperialism of free trade entered the
lexicon of British historiography more than half a century ago; in that time a
copious literature has provided both theoretical analyses and specific studies of econ-omic and political interaction.1 For the first half of the nineteenth century Britains
expansion in the world has been linked to opportunities for trade: the need either
for materials to feed the growth of industry or, more frequently, for markets for its
manufacturers upon whose profits the prosperity of the nation increasingly depended.
Thus when recession loomed or when conditions for international trade deteriorated,
governments responded to effective lobbies or to the need to alleviate social distress
and avoid unrest by taking a more active role in breaking down such barriers to unim-
peded enterprise abroad as state monopolies or protective tariffs and in guarding
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2007, pp. 351370
Correspondence to: Professor David McLean, Department of History, Kings College London, Strand, London,
WC2R 2LS, UK. Email: [email protected]
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commercial freedoms already established. In the 1830s and 1840s in particular,
whether by treaty, diplomatic persuasion or by force, the merchants interest was
secured in regions as diverse as Turkey, China, West Africa, Texas, Egypt and Latin
America.
With respect to Latin America, British naval exploits, with the French, in the riverPlate in the mid-1840s have often been cited as the most blatant assertion of such
interests. Platt in 1968 suggested that this was the only case of active intervention
which fits the imperialism of free trade model.2 It came about, Rock in 1986 and
Cain and Hopkins in 1993 maintained, because Britain and France, in the throes of
severe economic depression, were conducting an aggressive drive for new foreign
markets.3 The Plate estuary was certainly perceived as a region of considerable poten-
tial. Through this great waterway the rivers Parana and Uruguay disgorged into the
Atlantic; being navigable for hundreds of miles, these river systems gave access to
vast tracts of the south American interior, rich in hides with which to pay for theinflow of European manufactures. The commerce of the Plate was conducted
largely through the competing entrepots of Montevideo and Buenos Aires. The
former served its Uruguayan hinterland, while the latter, by the 1840s, enforced its
authority over the fourteen states which comprised the Argentine Confederation by
requiring clearance for all shipping at the port of Buenos Aires. Admittedly, trade
with the Plate, as with the whole of Latin America, was but a small part of Britains
international commerce in the mid-nineteenth century. About a hundred British
trading houses operated at Buenos Aires and Montevideo by the 1840s, with
exports to the former amounting to roughly 700,000 annually between the 1820s
and 1850s, while to the latter they were worth about 250,000 a year. Britainsglobal export trade totalled 150 million in 1845. About 10 per cent went to Latin
America, of which at most one fifth found its way to the river Plate.4
Modest, in this context, as the value of British trade with the region was, James
Murrays Foreign Office memorandum in 1841 has often been cited as evidence of a
greater will to intervene in Latin American affairs.5 Murray urged a reappraisal of
policy towards the warring regimes which had emerged there since independence
and proposed a more interventionist role for diplomacy to safeguard British trade.
Furthermore, as the Spanish empire dissolved in the early nineteenth century, the
Royal Navy increasingly assumed the mantle of protecting Pacific and Atlantic sealanes and, after 1821, of transporting much of the bullion accrued by merchants,
legally and by contraband, away from western Mexico and Peru to Europe.6 Beyond
that, the usually prompt and occasionally energetic protection given to British mer-
chants who suffered loss or maltreatment at the hands of indigenous authorities
understandably gave rise to uncertainty about where, in the minds of British govern-
ments and their representatives, support for aggrieved individuals ended and that for
wider trading advantages began. The fact that naval vessels were rarely used in defence
of British interests did not mean that the threat was not perceived. When British dip-
lomats and consuls spoke of commercial rights and treaty obligations there could be
no surety in Latin America that they neither held, nor could readily acquire, instruc-tions to call upon a man-of-war to emphasise their arguments.
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Generally, however, the official mind in London did not seem to worry much
about Latin America beyond the need to keep its markets open and its politics inde-
pendent of undue influence from either France or the United States.7 Off the eastern
seaboard, the British did aspire to stop the Brazilian slave trade but otherwise wanted
little beyond a strategic maritime base in the south Atlantic, the latter achieved in 1833with the re-occupation of the Falkland Islands.8 Murrays wider vision of alliances with
Britain to help bring stability to the continent, though welcomed by some officials on
the spot, usually had little appeal to foreign secretaries preoccupied with European
affairs and wary of being drawn into the complexities of either national or inter-
national politics in the New World. Lord Palmerston, when foreign secretary,
claimed that Latin American politics changed both so rapidly and so frequently that
it was futile to try to regulate events and that any benefit from so doing would be
minimal in relation to the effort expended.9 Only when justice for its nationals was
denied did the British government appear willing to use the power at its disposal.In 1840 Palmerston reproached the charge daffaires in Peru for preventing the navy
from harassing Chilean shipping when a claim on behalf of a British subject
wounded by Chilean soldiers remained outstanding. In the same year he asked the
Admiralty to detain Peruvian vessels until another case for injury was settled.10 But
even here the record was patchy. Frederick Chatfield, vice-consul in central
America, complained in 1844 that the navy totally neglected British interests: only
fourteen warships had visited the coasts of central America in the last ten years.11 Con-
sidering the extent of Britains economic and military power, it may not be unreason-
able to conclude that governments in London in the nineteenth century exercised
considerable restraint in their dealings with Latin America.12
When the British had been more forceful prior to the 1840s the actions taken had
usually resulted from unauthorised initiatives on the part of local officials or naval offi-
cers rather than directions sent from London. The military occupations of Buenos
Aires in 1806 and Montevideo in 1807 were cases in point. Both were disowned. So
too was the seizure of Peruvian bullion by British warships off Callao in 1830:
despite claims outstanding against the Peruvian government, Palmerston reproached
the naval commander and recalled the two vice-consuls responsible for such high-
handed behaviour.13 There were, however, some precedents for official intervention
in Latin American politics. British diplomacy had brokered the peace betweenBrazil and the Argentine Confederation in 1828 which created an independent
Uruguay. In 1837 Britains consul-general in Peru, Belford Wilson, succeeded in
halting a Chilean invasion: three men-of-war with 500 crew lay offshore in case
anyone should think the British governments attempt to mediate, and thereby to
protect British property, insincere. Two years later, after the Peru-Bolivian Confedera-
tion was again invaded, Palmerston eventually overcame his reluctance to take a stand
and, albeit too late, sent a warning to the Chilean government that Britains effort to
promote peace might transcend diplomacy if troops were not withdrawn.14 With a war
between Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation also beginning in 1839, the
Foreign Office once more faced the dilemma of how best to secure British interestsamid international hostilities.
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The war which developed in the river Plate from 1839 was, at times, hard to
distinguish from the civil conflict also raging within the Argentine Confederation,
in consequence of which the dictator general Juan Manuel de Rosas came to assert
his control of the territory from his capital at Buenos Aires. With death squads on
the streets, his enemies defeated, and his hold over the inland states tightened byclosing the river Parana to trade in 1841, Rosas turned his attention to Uruguay
where his surviving opponents had fled and where he hoped to avenge a military
defeat suffered in 1839. For this purpose, and to cripple its capital as a rival trading
emporium, he supported the claims of the exiled Uruguayan general Manuel Oribe
to the countrys presidency by blockading the port at Montevideo, invading with
8,000 of his best troops, destroying a Uruguayan government army in December
1842 and laying siege to Montevideo by land after February 1843. Widely regarded
as an illiberal danger to all foreign commerce, Rosas now threatened not only to dom-
inate the Argentine states but, if Montevideo fell to Oribe, to control both sides of theriver Plate by virtue of the puppet regime he would install in Uruguay. As the siege of
Montevideo dragged on throughout 1843 and 1844 there was a growing clamour from
British commercial houses doing business in the region, and in the London press, to
stop him.
By the end of 1841 the British legation at Buenos Aires had twice offered its govern-
ments good offices to Rosas to help resolve the dispute with Uruguay. Neither offer
had been accepted. With trade now disrupted in the river Plate, the British and
French governments co-ordinated their diplomacy and proposed a joint mediation
in August 1842. Rosas, however, refused to withdraw his soldiers from outside
Montevideo; his Argentine naval squadron was effectively strangling Montevideoscommerce and his army was on the point of overrunning the citys dwindling defences.
Convinced, nevertheless, that they could restore peace to the region, by force if necess-
ary, an Anglo-French fleet was sent to the south Atlantic in 1845 in support of a fresh
political initiative. The diplomats chosen for this mission, whereby Argentine
regiments were to be required to leave Uruguay as a precondition for peace nego-
tiations, were William Gore Ouseley and Baron Anton Deffaudis. Before they could
reach Buenos Aires, though, Rosas delivered what appeared to be the final blow by
routing the last Uruguayan army in the field. With Montevideo apparently at his
mercy, and believing that Britain and France would soon fall out over what to donext, Rosas was less inclined than ever to compromise.15
Ouseleys instructions, in the event of a diplomatic rebuff, were not specific; his pri-
orities, however, were to maintain the independence of Uruguay and to work closely
with his French colleague.16 Naval measures had been considered in London; these
Ouseley and Deffaudis initiated once it became obvious that their negotiations with
Rosas had failed. In August 1845 their combined fleet closed Oribes supply ports,
took possession of the island of Martn Garca at the confluence of the rivers
Parana and Uruguay, impounded the Argentine navy and assisted Uruguayan forces
to recapture the town of Colonia. In September an Anglo-French blockade was
thrown onto the port and coastline of Buenos Aires and in October more than 600British soldiers were deployed to help the 250 British and French marines already
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on the defensive lines in Montevideo. With the Uruguayan capital thereby secured,
Ouseley could claim, with some justification, that he was doing no more than his
instructions required. But forcing the Argentine army out of Uruguay, which he
insisted was essential for protecting the latters sovereignty, required something
more. Ouseley and Deffaudis therefore devised a grand strategy for carrying the warto Rosas by sending the Royal Navy to destroy Argentine fortifications in the
Parana and to open the river.
The Parana flowed up between the Argentine states of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre
Rios and Corrientes, and then on to the land-locked territory of Paraguay: to force the
river by a display of naval power, followed by the continued cruising there of British
and French warships, would not only foster an economic revival at Montevideo and
permit merchant craft of all nations to reach markets in the Argentine interior, but,
most importantly from a military and political perspective, would cut off Rosass
army in Uruguay and allow contact with regimes in the states up river which wereunhappy with the isolation imposed upon them from Buenos Aires. It was an auda-
cious plan whereby not only did Ouseley interpret his instructions, drawn up nine
months earlier, in the widest sense, but which, at every turn, risked embarrassing
reversals. If all went well an expedition into the Parana could be commercially profit-
able and might decide the war and quickly restore peace. Given that the objectives were
clear enough, gauging success or failure for the naval squadron and the flotilla of
trading vessels which accompanied it into the Parana might seem straightforward.
Unfortunately, however, the judgements of both contemporaries and historians have
long indicated otherwise. The problem is rooted in the politics and historiography
which surround events in the river between October 1845 and July 1846.
I
Misunderstanding is inevitably compounded when errors are passed from one scholar
to the next and earlier verdicts conveniently accepted. What is incontrovertible is that
Captain Charles Hotham, commanding the Anglo-French squadron, destroyed Argen-
tine batteries at Vuelta del Obligado in the Parana on 20 November 1845 thereby ush-
ering merchant vessels up river. It is also unquestioned that, when British warships left
the Parana, engaging newly constructed Argentine batteries at San Lorenzo on 4 June1846, 110 merchantmen were conveyed down the river, into the Plate and towards
Montevideo. With regard to the fortunes of those traders, every history of the
expedition considers it to have been an economic failure. Kirkpatrick in 1931
judged it disappointing as to commercial results and Pivel-Devoto said the same
in 1945.17 In 1960 Ferns wrote that commercially the venture was a fiasco. Sales
were poor, he continued, an appraisal echoed by Morgan in 1975.18 In 1981 Lynch
stated that the expedition found no promising inland markets in Entre Rios and Cor-
rientes: as for the sales drive, the market was poor and many merchants returned with
their cargoes unsold. Lynch conceded that some trade may have occurred, though in
1985 he reiterated his view that sales had been sluggish and that this attempt to inau-gurate direct trade with the Argentine interior had not been well received.19 Weighty
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authorities on Latin American history have thereby all painted a remarkably consistent
picture. References lead back, one to another, but ultimately are traceable to research
by Cady in 1929 who first designated the expedition a dismal failure from a commer-
cial standpoint and decided that many of the merchant vessels returned from the
Parana with their entire cargoes untouched.20
It was pioneering work, but did Cadychoose his sources wisely?
Cady was influenced by Argentine historiography and a selective use of north Amer-
ican material, attached to both of which were political agendas. Argentine scholarship
traditionally permits criticism of Rosas as an oppressor of his people yet adheres to a
nationalist ideal whereby he inspired the normally quarrelsome states of the Confed-
eration to resist an imperialist onslaught. It is likewise axiomatic that, faced with exter-
nal challenge, the inland population resented the invader, fought valiantly wherever
possible to defend their freedom and spurned any economic advantage to be gained
by trading with an enemy. Saldas in 1911 and Caillet-Bois in 1944 saw such resistanceas instrumental in bringing home to Britain and France that they could never force
open internal Argentine waterways for the benefit of their traders, and Irazusta
took the same line in 1961.21 Levene insisted that the foreigners found no business
among a loyal population up river and even Pivel-Devoto, writing from Montevideo,
conceded that, while a rebellious regime in Corrientes, serving at best the interests of a
collaborating elite, may have been sympathetic to aggressors in conflict with Rosass
government at Buenos Aires, nonetheless the people were hostile to them.22
Popular antipathy to the intruder demonstrated a bed-rock for Argentine national
identity. To suggest otherwise called into question the instinctive patriotism of a
proud people and reopened old divisions about federal authority versus provincialautonomy over which so much blood had been shed since independence from Spain.
Although Cady both drew from and subsequently contributed to this historiogra-
phical strand, the sources on which he principally relied were not Argentine but
north American. First, Cady placed reliance on reports from the river Plate appearing
in the National Intelligencer in Washington. These were of questionable accuracy
because the informants themselves were either merely guessing or else derived their
data from notoriously pro-Rosas English-language publications in Buenos Aires. On
23 June 1846 the National Intelligencer indeed declared that the traders in the
Parana
had found no profits, but it asserted this amid fallacious accounts of howthe whole expedition was breaking up since the warships had sustained heavy casual-
ties and were set to abandon the river.23 Cadys other source were despatches from the
United States charge daffaires at Buenos Aires, William Brent, again used selectively
and with little regard for Brents credibility.
Brent was an obsessive Anglophobe who saw the whole intervention as but a cover
for expanding British control in south America. Without the authority of his govern-
ment he had offered Rosas United States mediation in the latters dispute with the
European powers and had so undermined diplomatic efforts to induce Rosas to with-
draw his troops from Uruguay that the British government made an official protest in
Washington. But it was not only in London that Brents behaviour was questioned.Edward Hopkins, American special envoy to Paraguay in 1845, was totally
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disillusioned with his colleague. Brent was constantly being humiliated by Rosas.
Certain it is that Mr. Brent is a mere child in his hands, Hopkins reported, and
that with him he is utterly unfitted to assert or support the dignity of his position
or his country.24 American citizens in Buenos Aires were demeaned by Brents
fawning to the Argentine dictator. Under pressure from London and so advised byits own agent, the United States government finally faced up to Brents partisan inept-
ness and recalled him in June 1846.
Partiality alone might have discredited Brents accounts of the Parana expedition.
More damaging still to his credibility was the fact that, while the British and French
diplomats and naval commanders were in Montevideo and all the shipping was orche-
strated there, Brent himself was in Buenos Aires with no access to uncensored infor-
mation. As late as April 1846 he confided that he still had no real knowledge as to the
effectiveness of the Anglo-French blockade of the port and coast of Buenos Aires.25
Similarly, days after the warships actually entered the Parana
in November 1845Brent had still been speculating on their number and how many merchantmen had
assembled at the rendezvous.26 It was only on 16 January 1846 that he felt able to
report that the batteries at Obligado had been engaged even though the outcome
was known in Montevideo in mid December 1845.27 Details of the expeditions pro-
gress thereafter became more sketchy still and at the end of January 1846 the steamer
HMS Alecto was sent up river because nothing had been heard of the convoy, even in
Montevideo, since it left Obligado to move on to Corrientes six weeks earlier. Isolated
more than ever in Buenos Aires, therefore, Brent was certainly in no position to
announce in mid-January that as far as the mercantile speculations have been con-
cerned, there has been a total failure. Upon going up to Corrientes they found no-one to purchase.28 Given his ignorance of events and that the convoy remained
trading in the Parana for at least a further four months, Brents assessment was
wishful thinking and, as an historical record, worthless.
Even worse, Brents despatches to Washington had to disguise a further embarrass-
ment; he was at loggerheads with many of his compatriots and with the American
consul at Montevideo, Robert Hamilton. While Brent, Hopkins and Henry Wise,
United States minister to Brazil, all tried to present their nation as supporting a
sister republic in the New World against bullying European imperialists and took
stands broadly consistent with the Monroe doctrine, Hamilton and other Americancitizens in the region were more than happy to throw in their lot with Ouseley and
Deffaudis and to make money both out of the blockade at Buenos Aires and of
opening the Parana. This should have come as no surprise to Brent. North American
shippers had been involved in smuggling in the river Plate since the 1780s and had
expanded their activities spectacularly in the early nineteenth century. The American
merchant community in Buenos Aires had supported the British occupation in 1806,
seeing it as an opportunity to increase business, and in 1843 one prominent American
merchant, Silas Burrows, had profited, under his neutral flag, by allegedly ferrying
Uruguayan soldiers and certainly smuggling fresh meat and contraband goods into
Montevideo in defiance of the Argentine blockade. Indeed, Brent had argued withAmerican naval captains about the protection which, in practice, they afforded for
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such illicit trade.29 Hamilton, his consular duties aside, was a partner in the Montevideo
trading house, Southgate & Co., and willingly authorised merchant craft to join the
Parana expedition. Much to the chagrin of all three American diplomats, six such
vessels, three named as Creole, Hannah and Cumberland, went up river with
Hotham. The English know that we are from nature and principle hostile to her inter-vention in American affairs, Hopkins complained to Washington, but they see with
joy that there is a want of unanimity amongst our officials.30 Hamilton should have
followed the example of his Brazilian counterpart who refused to allow any Brazilian
vessels to leave Montevideo for the Parana. Instead, Hamilton had sent his son,
Thomas, into the river as a passenger aboard one of the British warships.
Hamilton, however, did not stop there. He arranged the chartering of American
merchant vessels to the British, flag and all, Hopkins discovered, whereby the
owners received the value of the vessel in return for a term of four or five years oper-
ating in the Parana
or elsewhere as Ouseley required. He worked with an accomplice,his compatriot consul Pendrick in the Brazilian port of Rio Grande, who used his own
and other ships to conduct a cattle-smuggling business supplying the beleaguered city
of Montevideo where Hamilton was his consignee. Pendricks captains were known as
violent men who abused their crews, but they enjoyed the implicit protection of
American consular staff. His whole conduct whilst filling the office of consul of the
U.S. was a gross outrage upon the rights of American citizens, Hopkins wrote of
Pendrick. I have been told by many Americans and others, the State Department
learned, that the most outrageous system of running blockades and prostituting the
American flag has been carried on.31 On 29 October 1845 Rosas protested to Brent
about vessels flying the stars and stripes assembling with the convoy at Mart n Garcaand informed him that such participation would be interpreted as unfriendly. Brent
could only reply meekly that American craft joined Hotham at their peril and that
his government would make no claims for any loss or damage incurred.32
II
Accounts of the number of merchant vessels which joined the warships in the Parana
vary, most likely because they did not all enter the river at the same time and because
some traders were already trapped there from when Rosas had last allowed navigationbetween August 1844 and the early months of 1845. Saldas and Caillet-Bois mention
fifty merchantmen passing Obligado after the fortifications were dismantled whereas
another Argentine historian, Pomer, refers to ninety.33 Ouseley was quick to confirm
the cosmopolitan nature of the convoy as soon as it had assembled; it was, he mused, a
host of merchant vessels of all nations, and flying as wide a variety of national flags as
he could muster.34 Against the strong current in the Parana, however, progress for
sailing ships was slow. Aside from difficulties manoeuvring, by February 1846 some
of the convoy crews were also starving; indeed, so helpless had the craft become
that Alecto took a number of their boats in tow towards the town of Goya in Corrientes
where fresh beef and vegetables might be readily obtained. But there was no need totake the boats as far as Goya. On 17 February Alecto anchored still off the littoral of
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Entre Rios where a well-stocked estancia had been spotted. We were immediately
assured of its being a friendly place by boats coming off to us, Lieutenant Lauchlan
Mackinnon observed, and not only telling us all the latest news from the armies
but likewise bringing huge and fat quarters of beef. All the boats we had towed up
with us returned to their proper vessels loaded to the gunnel, he recorded.35
Thiswas not the hostile reception of the invader subsequently enshrined in Argentine
history.
Mackinnon was in the Parana almost continuously from February until Alecto
returned to Montevideo in June 1846 and his account has been used by several scho-
lars. But reference to his chronicle has not always done Mackinnon justice. Irazusta
cites Mackinnon as evidence that the populations of Entre Rios and Corrientes were
suspicious of foreigners but in doing so misquotes him. Mackinnon certainly expected
an unfriendly reception but, when put ashore, was pleasantly surprised. This revelation
ill-suited Cadys history; the latter, however, solved that problem by simply deemingMackinnon to be untrustworthy.36 In fact, there is much to suggest that Mackinnon
was a highly credible source: he was a discerning observer who appreciated the embar-
rassing position into which the Royal Navy had been thrust by Ouseleys policy. In per-
petrating the war in the river Plate Mackinnon acknowledged that Britain and France
were possibly acting contrary to the law of nations and were certainly sustaining a
regime in Uruguay which, backed financially by unscrupulous foreign speculators,
had little to commend it. Mackinnon also noted that the coastal blockade was of
limited effectiveness, with many commodities, even luxury goods, remaining
cheaper at Buenos Aires than they were in Montevideo so much so, he recalled,
that in procuring its stores in Montevideo the navy was paying through the nose.37
Unconvinced by what was being done in the name of his country, unenthusiastic
about the Parana expedition and grateful only when Alecto left the river, Mackinnon
had no inclination to exaggerate its success.
If the inland states of the Argentine Confederation were unwelcoming places that
was not necessarily because the people spontaneously identified a foreign enemy.
Hopkins, travelling overland in November 1845 in order to take Americas message
of friendship to Paraguay, confessed that it would have been insane for him to have
attempted the journey alone. For ten years past the whole area had witnessed war
and outrages of every description; even with a trusty companion he slept in hissaddle, so great was the need for vigilance.38 Mackinnon was suddenly confronted
with the same prospect three months later when Alecto ran aground and he was
ordered to ride over eighty miles with urgent despatches to Hothams headquarters
in the town of Corrientes. Terrified and alone, he was soon confronted by a bunch
of gauchos escorting the commandant of a nearby village. They were extremely
civil and obliging, Mackinnon recorded with relief: not only did the village provide
horses for Mackinnons journey but the commandants son and a burly friend
accompanied the young lieutenant to his destination. As for Alecto, still struggling
to get off a sandbank, the commandant asked to be allowed a courtesy visit and
offered to supply its crew with as much beef as they wished, refusing any payment.As they approached Corrientes, where news had clearly spread fast, the local soldiery
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and townsfolk turned out and mobbed us, Mackinnon noted with astonishment.39
Having delivered his despatches and met the governor, he then explored the back-
streets and market of the town in complete safety before returning downriver to
Alecto in one of Hothams boats.
Mackinnon was understandably anxious, but even a week before his sojourn overlandthere had been signs that British naval vessels in the Parana evoked no sense of hostility. On
12 February 1846, forced into a deep-water channel close to the Entre Rios shoreline,
Alecto encountered a party of armed horsemen all of whom had very clear shots and
the potential to do the ship some damage while it was so hopelessly exposed. Yet, as the
ships officers soon realised, they were not at all unfriendly. By 25 February Alecto had
made it up to Corrientes where the whole population turned out to cheer the novelty
of a modern steamer. Crowds lined the banks and in the town every rooftop and
window was crammed with spectators. As soon as the heat of the day had passed, the
people began to swarm on board and speedily the whole vessel was thronged, Mackinnonrejoiced; the gun room was opened to visitors and cherry brandy was served to all. Ashore
in the town again, he was frequently invited into houses and regaled with mate and cigars.
On 27 FebruaryAlecto held another open day, attended first by the governor, dignitaries
and their families, but then, as before, by hoards of local people. The vessel was literally
crammed; engine room, cabins, paddle-boxes, and in fact every place capable of holding a
human being, Mackinnon wrote. But such times could not last: Alecto was soon ordered
back down to Goya and beyond. Goya, he knew, was the last place where we could expect
to land with safety. Fifty miles below lay the territories of Santa Fe and Buenos Aires boast-
ing newly fortified positions. Well stocked with food and supplies, on 6 March the little
warship was on its way again leaving the friendly country behind us.40
Favourable receptions among the populations of the interior were not restricted to
the warships. The expedition also brought much welcomed opportunities to trade and
the merchantmen, having struggled so far up the Parana, in the end were not to be
disappointed. The reason for that was not hard to find even in the sources and his-
tories which have sought to disparage the expeditions commercial results. Hopkinss
assessment of Paraguay in November 1845 applied equally to the states of Corrientes
and Entre Rios: the energy of the country is festering to death and her productions
rotting in the warehouses.41 In return for American and European manufactures,
the upper reaches of the Parana
could supply the world with precious metals,leather, horn, tallow, tobacco, rice, sugar, molasses, cocoa, India rubber, wax, dye-
stuffs as well as medicinal ingredients such as Peruvian bark, sarsaparilla and a
range of herbs. There were 700,000 hides awaiting shipment in Corrientes alone,
one correspondent of the Morning Herald wrote from Buenos Aires in April 1846.
Caillet-Bois confirmed that large stocks of hides had accumulated in Corrientes
since Rosas closed the Parana.42 Hamilton eagerly anticipated any opportunity to
trade there as early as August 1845: if the British forced the river, he advised Wise,
then Entre Rios and Corrientes will be enabled to find a market for their produce
at Montevideo.43 By the spring of 1846 trade was easy for American merchants, as
for others who had followed Hotham the more so after the capture of the armedArgentine whaleboats which Rosas had licensed as privateers to harass unprotected
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merchant craft. Seeing a chance to swell its coffers, the government of Corrientes
quickly doubled its import tariff and raised the duty imposed on exported hides.
This was unfair, the supercargoes complained. Hotham was petitioned to make it
plain to the Corrientes authorities that if the duties were not returned to their original
levels then the convoy would pass on to Paraguay and do business there.44
Hundreds of miles inland, communication with Montevideo was sporadic and the
exploits of the expedition thereby remained largely a matter of rumour. As late as
April 1846 there was no certainty of any commercial success and even at the beginning
of June the correspondent of a Philadelphia newspaper wrote from Montevideo that the
convoy have made a losing concern of it.45 Up river, however, another naval drama was
slowly unfolding. A motley collection of merchantmen wishing to leave the Parana was
given a place for rendezvous in May four miles north of Argentine batteries command-
ing the river at San Lorenzo. They were of all nations and all sizes, Hotham observed;
more to the point, they were lumbered with enormous deck-cargoes.
46
Trade,indeed, had been brisk in the Parana in the early months of 1846. Some of it arose
from distress sales as British and American ranchers liquidated their stock and saw
the convoy with its armed escort as a last chance to get out what they could. But in
Goya again at the end of April, Mackinnon also noted how, as elsewhere in Corrientes,
merchants were frantically exchanging the European and American goods brought up
river for local produce and were loading their vessels. On 6 May he watched anxiously
as several of the tail of the convoy were left at Goya, some of them on shore, which ren-
dered it doubtful whether they would all make their appearance at the appointed ren-
dezvous.47 On 4 June the 110 merchantmen present were finally marshalled into line
as the men-of-war began bombarding the Argentine guns. Distracted by this and byrockets shot from an island mid-stream, the Argentine fire became scattered and in
the melee and without casualties Hotham whisked the convoy past on a rushing
current. Strange to say, it was at this moment of greatest danger that the commercial
outcome of the expedition became apparent.
So heavily laden were the trading craft that their crews often could not control them.
A French vessel, hopelessly entwined in a mat of weed and debris, was salvaged only
when sailors from two British steamers ejected its piles of hides, thereby lightening
the vessel sufficiently to tow it clear. When the barque Caledonia, out of Hull, ran
aground with one Paraguayan and two Uruguayan schooners on sandbanks underArgentine fire desperate efforts to offload their heavy hides, mate, wool, amber, yerba
and tobacco failed and the vessels were eventually burnt. A further Paraguayan ship
was disabled and drifted until Alecto boarded her and forced a panic-stricken crew to
drop anchor, thereby saving both the vessel and its valuable hides. So many bales of Para-
guayan tea were dumped in the river to reduce ships weight that the officers of Alecto
helped themselves as they floated past and Argentine gunners on the cliffs above mistook
them for the bodies of sailors killed and reported the supposed accuracy of their fire
accordingly. Hoping to remain as inconspicuous as possible, most craft hoisted their
flags only after they were out of range but not so the Americans, one merchant
boasted.48
That almost proved a disaster. When Creole limped into Philadelphia inAugust 1846 she carried a 13-pound cannon ball cushioned in a stack of hides.
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Creole was indicative not only of the convoys luck but also of its commercial for-
tunes and, when enthusiastically describing its cargo of hides, yerba and tobacco,
the Philadelphia press reproduced a letter from a correspondent in Montevideo
who had watched some of the vessels enter port prior to 14 June 1846. There is
not such a large quantity of hides come down as was expected, he reflected, butthere is a large quantity of yerba, tobacco, and wool. Salt hides none. Small quantity
of tallow, packed beef, one cargo horse hair, a great deal of timber and etc.49 Hamilton
was also waiting in Montevideo for Creole and the other vessels to return. Creole, he
wrote to Wise, brought down from Corrientes 17,000 hides costing only six and a
half cents per pound which ought to leave a profit in the U.S. of at least $20,000;
the cargo she carried up netted out cost and charges.50 But this was only half the
story. Only the larger vessels from the convoy had returned to Montevideo by 14
June; the rest had to shelter from bad weather at Martn Garca and, as the bulk of
the convoy came in, trade began to revive spectacularly in Montevideo. Theimmense arrival of produce from Corrientes and elsewhere was just beginning to
produce most beneficial results in business generally, The Times reported by way of
correspondence leaving the port in mid-July.51 For the time being, Montevideo no
longer had the air of a city under siege.
Although he had never doubted it, Hamilton wrote elatedly that the Parana
expedition has, contrary to expectation, turned out a lucrative business.52 Deffaudis
reported to Paris in similar vein. He had estimated that 350,000 hides might be
traded for in the Parana; in fact, by mid-July 1846 the total was nearer 450,000 and
his assumptions regarding other commodities required adjustment in proportion.
So worthwhile had the Parana venture proved to be that a group of traders was con-sidering another expedition, at their own risk and without escort, relying for security
only on the fact that British and French warships would still be cruising in the river.
The jump in the customs receipts at Montevideo from a monthly average of about
10,000 Spanish dollars before June 1846 to about 115,000 afterwards was astonishing;
almost all of this, Ouseley insisted, was due to the great importation from the Parana
and Entre Rios. More than 500,000 worth of produce had been shipped out of the
Parana and many commercial men believed that there were still considerable quan-
tities detained in Paraguay, Corrientes and Entre Rios.53 When Hotham later recalled
his feat of bringing so many merchantmen safely out of the river in 1846 he confirmedthat his squadron left behind sufficient cargo for a second convoy.54
III
In a sense it was ironic that Ouseley and Deffaudis should have occasion to applaud the
commercial achievements of the expedition for, in planning it, the trade of the Parana
had never been their primary concern. For them, extending opportunities for com-
merce to all nations was a respectable cover for what they hoped would prove a deci-
sive military strategy. Having their warships in the Parana not only threatened the
supply line for Oribe and his allies surrounding Montevideo but also offered materialas well as political support for the regimes inland which were at war with or in revolt
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against Rosas. As with its commercial outcome, so once more the existing historiogra-
phy condemns the Parana expedition as an embarrassing failure. But even in its
strategic and military objectives did Hothams venture really accomplish so little?
Ouseley and Deffaudis calculated that the outcome of the war in Uruguay depended
on the actions of the governor of Entre Rios, Justo Jose de Urquiza. If he could be per-suaded to join with Corrientes and Paraguay, recently allied in war against Buenos
Aires, and to end his support for Oribe, then Rosas would face a tide of revolt
within the Argentine Confederation led by a general of great talent. Deeply resentful
of the way in which Rosas had closed off the riparian states from international trade
and aspiring to overthrow the tyrant at Buenos Aires when opportunity allowed,
Urquiza nonetheless faced accusations of treachery if he openly sided with foreigners
and Argentine historians ever since have sought to question or defend his nationalist
credentials within that framework. From Urquizas perspective, of course, the presence
of British and French men-of-war in the Parana
was a veiled threat of reprisal as well asa hint of support, and once the expedition sailed in November 1845 Urquiza broke
with Oribe and withdrew his remaining Entre Rean troops from Uruguay. Urquizas
neutrality was plain when he sent officials to Montevideo to meet with Ouseley and
Deffaudis in June 1846 and when, within weeks and to Rosass fury, he came to an
accommodation with the rebellious regime in Corrientes.55
Ouseley never disguised the political dimension to the Parana expedition. As early as
July 1845 he advised his government that we must not discourage the detachment of Cor-
rientes and Entre Rios from the Argentine Confederation.56 Not only that, but an integral
part of Hothams mission was to journey on to Paraguay and to enter into discussions, at
Ouseleys behest, with the nations president. Together, Corrientes and Paraguay couldraise more than 60,000 men, Hotham estimated; he even saw international realignment
in this part of south America whereby Corrientes and Entre Rios would eventually
sever ties with Buenos Aires and form, with Paraguay, a new republic. The moment is
remarkably opportune, he wrote assuringly from Corrientes on 31 January 1846: the
de facto independence of Paraguay is menaced; now she will gladly seek those European
alliances to which a year ago she was indifferent.57 In response to Hothams discussions
at Asuncion the president sent two political agents down river to meet with government
officials in Montevideo, both conveyed aboard Alecto in March 1846. Here, for Ouseley
and Deffaudis, was the ultimate prize: a regrouping of the Platine states which mightensure that the tributaries of the river Plate were kept open to international commerce
and, more immediately, would overthrow Rosas and secure the independence of
Uruguay. Meeting with Urquizas representatives, Ouseley confessed that I did not discou-
rage the idea of a final separation from the Argentine Confederation.58
Aboard the warships ascending the Parana it was clear that once alongside the
shoreline of Entre Rios there was little to fear. For some reason, not clearly explained
or publicly understood, Mackinnon recorded, the governor of this province, general
Urquiza, although a nominee of Rosas, did not take an active part to keep the convoy
back.59 In April 1846 Mackinnon was again struck by how vulnerable the ships were to
shots fired from cliff tops along the coast of Entre Rios, yet none was ever heard.Ouseley wrote to London in May that Urquiza had given a furlough to the greater
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part of his army and now encouraged merchantmen out of Montevideo to trade
directly with Entre Rios without prior clearance at Buenos Aires. Hotham, above
all, was acutely aware of the importance of Urquizas compliance: indeed, without it
he felt that the naval expedition would have been nigh impossible. Looking back on
Urquizas conduct, Hotham reminded the Admiralty that in 1845 he allowed thesquadron under my command to sail up and down the Parana unopposed by artillery
on his side of the river and although holding positions of strength sufficient to have
rendered our efforts abortive, limited his resistance to an interdiction of landing. I
might multiply instances of his good will to trade in general, Hotham concluded;60
in short, it suited the interests of both men to avoid a confrontation.
Ouseley highlighted the expeditions strategic success in April 1846. In short, it had
obliged Urquiza to abandon the war in Uruguay; specifically, the Parana expedition
caused the withdrawal of general Urquiza and thus diminished the Argentine army by
5 or 6,000 men.
61
Furthermore, Urquizas neutrality after November 1845 also encour-aged Ouseley and Deffaudis in their plan to send arms and military supplies to support
the armies of Paraguay and Corrientes. This topic soon arose at Asuncion in January
1846. My son communicated to me by letter from Corrientes a matter of some import-
ance being that you had offered to supply Paraguay with arms, the president told
Hotham. Can that be done? Hotham retreated from any promise of direct supplies.
However, he replied, if you require our help, no doubt we can assist you, and at Rio
they are to be purchased extremely reasonably.62 It was widely believed in Buenos
Aires that the British and French navies were gun-running to Rosass enemies and
what Mackinnon witnessed certainly gave grounds for suspicion. Alecto set off from
Montevideo at the end of March towing three heavily-laden schooners. Two carriedstores for the squadron in the Parana, but the third transported soldiers from Montevi-
deo sent to join the fight in Corrientes. Inevitably, Hotham was best placed to judge the
expeditions work and indeed its reception, not only by the political leadership but also
among the populace. In Paraguay we were almost borne on the shoulders of the people,
he revealed. There and in Corrientes, he continued, the cry was everywhere general
when will the convoy arrive and what do they bring. From the highest to the lowest I met
with but one feeling. The inhabitants of the province of Entre Rios also entertain the
strongest desire for free commercial relations, he concluded, and once the river had
been forced they began an extensive trade with Montevideo.
63
Hotham returned toMontevideo a hero in June 1846. He had, it seemed, turned the tide of the war.
IV
With the possible exception of the unsanctioned occupations of Buenos Aires and
Montevideo in 180607 there was no precedent for British intervention in Latin
American affairs on the scale witnessed in the river Plate in the mid-1840s and
certainly no other case in the nineteenth century where diplomatic agents and naval
officers acted so forcefully in consequence of instructions. Back in London,
however, by late 1845 the view at the Foreign Office was that by landing troops in Mon-tevideo and by sending the Royal Navy to force open the river Parana Ouseley had far
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exceeded his authority. Sent to restore peace, Ouseley had instead extended the war in
a partisan fashion and thereby brought even more disruption to international trade in
the region than had existed prior to his mission. Even while the expedition was still
in the Parana the British government sent another diplomat to negotiate a compro-
mise with Rosas. Confronted by complaints from both British and foreign merchantswhose livelihoods depended on the trade of Buenos Aires and increasingly suspicious
of French duplicity and colonial ambitions in Uruguay, the Foreign Office recoiled
from its intervention policy and effectively left the defenders of Montevideo to their
fate.64 In 1847 Ouseley was recalled and the British blockade of Buenos Aires was
lifted. Nevertheless, aided by French subsidies, Uruguayan troops and foreign volun-
teers held out until 1851 when Urquiza at last felt confident of challenging for mastery
of the Argentine Confederation. Leading a military coalition from Entre Rios,
Corrientes and, crucially, Brazil, Urquiza relieved the siege at Montevideo and
forced the surrender of the Argentine army. In February 1852 the same coalitiondeposed Rosas at Buenos Aires. All this, of course, was without any contribution
from the British whose armed intervention, in hindsight, appeared to have been futile.
Ouseley was understandably indignant at his treatment in 1846 and 1847 and con-
sidered himself to have been made the scapegoat for an embarrassing volte-face in
British government policy. Whatever the overall judgement on Britains efforts to
restore peace to the region, Ouseley was always popular in Montevideo where his
actions in 1845 had been instrumental in averting disaster. Holding the city,
though, was never enough for Ouseley and Deffaudis. Believing it to be consistent
with their governments wishes, even if not specifically provided for in their instruc-
tions, they intended to deliver Uruguay from Rosass clutches by seizing the initiativeand taking the war into the Argentine interior. It was not their enterprise which had
failed, they argued: it was politicians in Europe, and especially in London, who had
lost their nerve and lacked a proper sense of urgency. Deffaudis, whose initial instruc-
tions from Paris in 1845 had been identical to those issued to Ouseley, rebuked the
French government in July 1846 for refusing to acknowledge that since the littoral
of the state of Buenos Aires extended along the lower reaches of the Parana then at
least that portion of the river had to be patrolled by allied warships in order to inter-
cept Oribes military supplies. Only by controlling the river, he implored, did the two
diplomats neutralise Urquiza and confine his troops to Entre Rios.
65
Indeed, Ouseleyconfirmed, as soon as it became known that the British government had disapproved
the Parana expedition Urquizas attitude began to change. Beyond these political con-
siderations, however, reopening trade with the inland states had revitalised the
economy of Montevideo and offered the prospect of prosperity to the populations
of Entre Rios, Corrientes and Paraguay. The only maritime operation that has been
effective and important in its results is the expedition up the Parana, Ouseley insisted
in April 1846.66 That his own government had thrown him over and reneged on the
armed intervention never dimmed the judgement of Ouseley and his supporters that
the Parana expedition was anything other than a triumph.
For many naval men, action in the river Plate was difficult to understand. Unaware, ofcourse, of whether Ouseley was in breach of his instructions or not, some saw it in any
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case as a distraction from the moral imperative of suppressing the Brazilian slave trade
while others sensed that Britain was degraded by fighting on behalf of a regime in Mon-
tevideo dominated by foreign speculators in the course of which Argentine territory was
unlawfully violated and its internal politics manipulated. Hearing of fresh diplomatic
proposals for peace in the region in July 1846, Mackinnon expressed quiet satisfaction:everyone concerned, he noted, is quite tired of warfare against the wretched people of
La Plata.67 A fellow naval officer evinced great relief when his ship was redeployed later
that year: Thank God! We are fairly out of the river Plate, its dirty waters, and no less
dirty and disgraceful work.68 But unpopular did not mean unsuccessful, as Hotham was
aware. With Rosass power waning in 1851 and the prospect of negotiations which might
lead to a permanent opening of the Parana to the trade of all nations, Hotham was quick
to reiterate his offer to serve as an official envoy. Writing to the Admiralty in 1851, he
reaffirmed the economic potential of the riparian states which five years earlier he
had seen with his own eyes. A trade, he urged, which gave full employment to 140or 150 merchant vessels during the few months of the English and French occupation
is not to be despised.69
Invariably willing to press opportunities for opening the worlds navigable rivers to
unrestricted commerce, the British government agreed. A year later Urquizas regime
in the Argentine Confederation recognised the major tributaries of the river Plate as
international waterways and by the end of 1852 Hotham was back in the Parana on
another mission to Paraguay. Old ties were not forgotten. Hotham took Ouseleys son
as his attache and, as if in recognition of American participation in his original
expedition, invited the American charge daffaires at Buenos Aires to accompany him
too. As for Ouseley, he was knighted in 1852 and soon afterwards it was acknowledged,at least privately, that much of the criticism heaped on him when recalled in 1847 had
been unjust. Hotham concluded an Anglo-Paraguayan agreement in March 1853, facil-
itating also treaties between Paraguay and France, the United States and Sardinia. Within
weeks he had signed a further convention with the Argentine authorities guaranteeing
access for British traders up the river Parana to Paraguay and to markets in the Argentine
interior.70 Had Ouseleys bold vision of 1845 been adhered to, his supporters responded,
those longer-term benefits for trade and to the region might have materialised earlier.71
Politically inspired though the expedition was, the commerce conducted in the Parana in
1846 had unquestionably revealed a widespread enthusiasm for trade and contact withthe British however unwelcome, for some, that message might be.
Notes
[1] Stemming largely from Gallagher and Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade. More recent
coverage is by Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism; Porter, The Oxford History of the British
Empire; Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire; and Owen and Sutcliffe, Studies in the Theory of
Imperialism. More succinct are Cain, Economic Foundations; Porter, European Imperialism;
and Louis, Imperialism.
[2] Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics, 323.
[3] Rock, Argentina, 111; Cain and Hopkins, Imperialism, 99n. An interpretation suggested earlier
also by Morgan, French Policy in Spanish America, 313.
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[4] British trade with Latin America has been evaluated differently over the years. The recent esti-
mates most cited are by Davis, The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade. These are
discussed in Miller, Britain and Latin America, 7178. See also Platt, Latin America and British
Trade, 2831.
[5] British commercial policy has been extensively investigated in Williams, British Commercial Policy.
For possible linkage betweenthe 1841 memorandum and British activity in Latin America, see also
discussion by Miller, Britain and Latin America, 51; Mathew, The Imperialism of Free Trade, 565;
Platt, Finance, Trade and Politics, 32122; and Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 253 55.
[6] The Royal Navys role off the west coast of central and south America has been explored in
detail by Mayo, Consuls and Silver Contraband; and Gough, Specie Conveyance. Admiralty
records, however, do not reveal comparable activity in the river Plate.
[7] A concept analysed in Mayo, The Impatient Lion.
[8] Britains strategic interest in the south Atlantic is considered extensively in Gough, Sea Power
and South America, The Falkland Islands and The British Reoccupation and Colonisation of
the Falkland Islands.
[9] Morgan, French Policy, 313.
[10] Wu, Generals and Diplomats, 91.[11] Gough, Specie Conveyance, 423.
[12] A conclusion reached by Bethell, Britain and Latin America, 12. Extensive analysis of the
British in Latin America is also to be found in Miller, Britain and Latin America; Bethell,
Spanish America after Independence; and Platt, Business Imperialism. More specific to the
river Plate are Winn, British Informal Empire in Uruguay; and Ferns, Britains Informal
Empire in Argentina.
[13] See Wu, Generals and Diplomats, 3652.
[14] British diplomacy with respect to the Peru-Bolivian Confederation is discussed in Mathew,
The Imperialism of Free Trade, 567; and more extensively in Wu, Generals and Diplomats,
7687. See also Miller, Britain and Latin America, 51.
[15] Events in the river Plate and the background to the warfare which engulfed the region in the mid-nineteenth century are most recently analysed in McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire
and Garibaldi in Uruguay. For the career of Juan Manuel de Rosas and the internal struggles of
the Argentine Confederation, see Lynch, Argentine Dictator and The River Plate Republics.
[16] French policy towards Latin America generally is explained in Morgan, French Policy. For
French activity in the river Plate see also Morgan, Orleanist Diplomacy. The more specific
theme of relations with the British is explored in Morgan, Anglo-French Confrontation.
[17] Kirkpatrick, A History of the Argentine Republic, 155; Pivel-Devoto, Historia, 145.
[18] Ferns, Britain and Argentina, 274; Morgan, Anglo-French Confrontation, 327.
[19] Lynch, Argentine Dictator, 283, and River Plate Republics, 346.
[20] Cady, Foreign Intervention, 158.
[21] Saldas, Historia, IV, 26162; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 43334; Irazusta, Vida Politica, V, 138. Seealso Munoz-Azpiri, Rosas frente al imperio ingles.
[22] Levene, Historia, II, 251; Pivel-Devoto, Historia, 145.
[23] National Intelligencer, 23 June 1846.
[24] Hopkins to Wise, 27 March 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 33235.
[25] Brent to Buchanan, 4 April 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 35058.
[26] Brent to Buchanan, 14 Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 30312.
[27] Brent to Buchanan, 16 Jan. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 31416.
[28] Brent to Buchanan, 16 Jan. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, I, 31718.
[29] The history and extent of smuggling by north American shippers and merchants in the river
Plate and Brents disagreements with American naval officers there is revealed in Cooney,
Doing Business in the Smuggling Way; and Randall, Captains and Diplomats.
[30] Hopkins to Buchanan, Feb. 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 8085.
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[31] Ibid.
[32] Arana to Brent, 29 Oct. 1845, and Brent to Arana, 27 Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic
Correspondence, I, 299300, 31214.
[33] Saldas, Historia, IV, 253; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 430; Pomer, Conflictos, 69.
[34] Ouseley to Canning, 13 Nov. 1845, FO 6/106; and Ouseley to Aberdeen, 31 Oct. 1845, FO 6/105, The National Archives, London.
[35] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 10102.
[36] Irazusta, Vida Politica, V, 137; Cady, Foreign Intervention, 157n.
[37] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 12; II, 47, 9597.
[38] Hopkins to Buchanan, 10 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 91 95.
[39] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 111, 146.
[40] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 76, 16869, 171, 182, 193.
[41] Hopkins to Buchanan, 31 [sic] Nov. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, X, 6376.
[42] Morning Herald, 27 June 1846; Caillet-Bois, Historia, 42930.
[43] Hamilton to Wise, 10 Aug. 1845. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 30405.
[44] Morning Herald, 27 June 1846.
[45] Morning Herald, 29 Aug. 1846, reproducing correspondence from the United States Gazette.[46] The Times, 23 Sept. 1846, reproducing Hotham to Inglefield, 7 June 1846.
[47] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 26869.
[48] National Intelligencer, 1 Sept. 1846.
[49] Morning Herald, 17 Aug. 1846, reproducing correspondence from the Philadelphia North
American.
[50] Hamilton to Wise, 9 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 347.
[51] The Times, 23 Sept. 1846.
[52] Hamilton to Wise, 9 June 1846. Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 347.
[53] Deffaudis to Guizot, 14 July 1846, and Ouseley to Aberdeen, 12 Aug. 1846, FO Confidential
Print, 260; Morning Herald, 11 Sept. 1846. Montevidean customs receipts are cited in
Acevedo, Anales Historicos, II, 20001. See also Braconnay, La Legion Francesa, 244.[54] Hotham to Malmesbury, 20 Feb. 1852, FO 59/2.[55] For the career and politics of Urquiza and his antagonism towards Rosas see Bosch, Urquiza
and Los Tratados.
[56] Ouseley memorandum, 5 July 1845, FO 6/104.[57] Hotham to Inglefield, 31 Jan. 1846, DD HO 10/7, Hotham Papers, University Library, Hull.[58] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 6 June 1846, FO 6/119.[59] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, I, 18 19.
[60] Hotham to Baring, 13 June 1851, NP5/1/3/6, Northbrook Papers, ING Baring, London.[61] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 16 April 1846, FO 6/117.[62] Hotham to Inglefield, 31 Jan. 1846, Hotham Papers, DD HO 10/7.
[63] Hotham to Auckland, 29 Sept. 1846, Hotham Papers, DD HO 10/8.[64] For analysis of the British governments changing attitude towards the intervention in the riverPlate see McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire, 78 81, 86 100.
[65] Deffaudis to Guizot, 25 July 1846, enclosed in Ouseley to Aberdeen, 12 Aug. 1846, FO Confi-
dential Print, 260.
[66] Ouseley to Aberdeen, 7 April 1846, FO 6/117.[67] Mackinnon, Steam Warfare, II, 56.
[68] Diary, 13 Nov. 1846, FIT/3, Fitzgerald Papers, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.[69] Hotham to Baring, 30 June 1851, Northbrook Papers, NP5/1/3/6.[70] For the opening of Paraguay to international trade see Tate, Britain and Latin America in the
Nineteenth Century; and Williams, The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic. See also
Kiernan, Britains First Contacts with Paraguay.
[71] See Hadfield, Brazil, the River Plate, and the Falkland Islands, 238, 343.
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