Troubled Waters:
Post 9/11 Challenges of Maritime Terrorism & Port
Security in New York City
Dawn O’Donnell, B.A. Criminal Justice, Graduate Student - Criminal JusticeApril 28, 2014
Agenda
Introduction – Purpose & Background Hypothesis/Methods Findings - Potential Targets, Modes of
Attack, Controversies - Interagency Challenges
Conclusion – Suggestions for Future Research, Lessons Learned & Research Limitations
Introduction
Maritime - Bordering or connected with the sea in relation to navigation, shipping, etc.
Introduction
PURPOSE - Why Study Port Security and the Maritime Terrorist Threat in NYC?
NYC - Prime Target (massive casualties, financial, basic infrastructure)
Population in NYC – 8.33 millionPort of NY & NJ - 1 of 3 centers for world economyNY NJ are Largest Ports on the East Coast
PURPOSE, cont..
60 known terrorist threats against the United States since 9/11 (NYC-16)
2003 - Brooklyn Bridge 2006 - Hudson River Tunnels – Bomb PATH train
2011 - USS Intrepid – Washington Heights “YouTube” Suspect 2013 - NYC & Atlantic City - Navy detonated a mine - 100 feet from the shoreline & 12 feet below
Introduction – PURPOSE OF STUDY
NYC CBRNE Budget– Kelly designated 1,000 “Anti-Terror Cops” with tanks, anti-aircraft capability (?)
Vessel - highly sensitive radiological detection equipment Bell 412 Chopper ($10 million, $4 million hi-tech equipment) detects radiation from altitude of 200 ft.
“Proactive Measures” since 9/112006 - Dubai Ports World proposal to control of 6 ports in the U.S. (including NY) - rejected2008 – Proposal to build a LNG Terminal in Long Island Sound - rejected
MARITIME FACTS/SCOPE
Background/Maritime FactsScope - includes Westchester County, Long Island2,073 “bridges” in New York City15M containers enter the U.S. each year2011 – CBP – Import/Export - $3.7 trillion
2002 Simulation - $58 Billion loss
MARITIME FACTS
Only 5% - 6% containers inspected – DHS & CBP
THINK INSIDE THE BOX – 40 ft.
“Targeting Strategy”- Intelligence/Risk Assessment
HISTORY OF MARITIME TERRORISM IN NY
WORLD WAR II ERA
Lucky Luciano – Alleged “deal” with OSS (Office of Strategic Services) German Saboteurs Invasion of U.S. - U-202 Submarine (50 miles off U.S. coastline) – used inflatable boats Planned Attacks - NY Central Rail Roads – Hell Gate Bridge, New York’s water supply
Hypothesis/Methods
Hypothesis – New York City is a prime target for maritime terrorism and inter-agency challenges complicate prevention and response
Methods – Qualitative study (content analysis) of public documents (peer reviewed journals, articles, books, speeches and interview transcripts) and videos
Results - Potential Maritime Targets in New York
Results/Findings
RisksNYC “Prime Location” – Devastating Consequences & Multitude of Potential Maritime TargetsCopycat syndrome – Oslo car bomb, Norway Youth Camp, “Mumbai-style” of attack (“wave of attacks”)
Results/Findings
Modes of Attack Attacking vessels, floating bombs, frogmen, transporting CBRNE’s, transporting saboteurs - “wave of attacks”
Results/Findings
Inter-Agency ChallengesNumber of agencies (Federal, state and local law enforcement, militia, etc.)Inter-agency rivalriesIntel Sharing - “Linkage Blindness”Jurisdiction - sharing credit and blame - Location of incident (Federal Property)
Federal Agencies
NIMS (National Incident Management System)&
NRF (National Response Framework)
NRF Provides
Structure & Mechanism
s for Incident
Management
NIMS National Approach to Incident Manageme
nt
NIMS – National Incident Management System
SYSTEMATIC & PROACTIVE APPROACH
GUIDE AGENCIES
AT ALL LEVELS OF
GOVERNMENT
NON-GOVERNME
NT
PRIVATE SECTOR
NRF – National Response Framework
PROVIDES STRUCTURE
& MECHANISM
S
• FOR NATIONAL LEVEL POLICY AND DIRECTION
INCIDENT MANAGEME
NT
• ENSURE TIMELY & EFFECTIVE
FEDERAL SUPPORT
• STATE, TRIBAL AND LOCAL RELATED ACTIVITIES
USED DURING INCIDENTS REQUIRING FEDERAL SUPPORT
Premise to provide the guidelines and procedures to integrate capabilities and resources into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for incident management
local jurisdictions retain command, control, and authority over response activities for their jurisdictional areas.
CIMS(Citywide Incident Management System)
Primary Agencies
Coordinating Agency
Supporting
Agencies
Primary AgenciesIncident Command Responsibilities
Incident Commander
Single Comma
nd Respons
e Multiple Incident Commanders
Single Incident Command PostMAY Designate Single Operations Section Chief
Unified Comma
nd Respons
e
Coordinating Agency: OEM
If Established
Unified Comman
d
Manages CIMS Protocol
Coordinate Resources
Relay messages to Mayor & Emergency Operations Center
Facilitate transition of command & RESULUTION OF INTERAGENCY DIFFERENCES
Multi-agency Incident
s
Supporting Agencies
Provides Personnel & Equipment
No loss of responsibility
for their resources or jurisdiction
May Join Unified Primary Agency
Depending upon
nature/location of incident
CIMS Matrix (Primary Agencies)Single Command
Boat in Distress – NYPD/FDNY*Explosive Device, Bomb Threat - NYPD
Fire - FDNY
Unified Command
CBRN/Haz-Mat Incident – NYPD/FDNYExplosion – FDNY/NYPD
Results/Limitations
New York City is an attractive target for maritime terrorism
Inter-agency challenges exist – Prevention & Response Over two dozen agencies can be on the water at
once Alleged inter-agency rivalries/jurisdiction
challenges Challenges with Intel sharing – nature of
intelligence Limitations of study
Public information
Conclusion
Introduction – Purpose & Background Hypothesis/Methods Results - Potential Targets, Modes of
Attack, Controversies - Interagency Challenges
Conclusion – Research Limitations
QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS?
Thank You!