![Page 1: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords)
Xiaoming Huo
Georgia Institute of Technology
August 8, 2012
1 8/8/2012
![Page 2: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/2.jpg)
Outline
I. Problem Description
II. Game theoretical aspect of the bidding problem that we are considering
III. Statistical Implementation
IV. Conclusion
8/8/2012 2
![Page 3: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/3.jpg)
I. Introduction
• We consider the modeling issue in AdWords
• An equilibrium strategy is derived, which we argue will be the foundation of statistical modeling
• What is AdWords: A tool at Google that allow users to bid for advertising positions at google.com
3 8/8/2012
![Page 4: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/4.jpg)
8/8/2012 4
Organic search AdWords dehumidifier
![Page 5: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/5.jpg)
8/8/2012 5
Hotel raleigh NC
![Page 6: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/6.jpg)
A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding
• Sorted (descending) bids 𝑏𝑗, 𝑗 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑁, of
𝑁 potential advertisers: 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ > 𝑏𝑁
• Positions and Cost per Click by AdWords
• GSP: generalized second price
8/8/2012 6
Position Bid price Actual price (i.e., CPC)
1 𝑏1 𝑏2+ 1 cent
2 𝑏2 𝑏3+ 1 cent
3 𝑏3 𝑏4+ 1 cent
4 𝑏4 𝑏5+ 1 cent
5 𝑏5 Assume out of space
![Page 7: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/7.jpg)
Actual Scheme: Incorporate a Quality Score
• The quality score (aka, AdRank) that depends on relevance, past click through rate, landing page, etc.
• Purpose: integrating web page quality, user experience, user satisfaction
• Prevent: bad, irrelevant ads goes to top positions by paying more (customer satisfaction)
8/8/2012 7
![Page 8: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/8.jpg)
An Example • Bidding with quality scores (rank according to 𝑏𝑗𝑞𝑗)
• Assume: 𝑏1𝑞1 > 𝑏2𝑞2 > ⋯ > 𝑏𝑁𝑞𝑁 • Note: the order of advertisers may change from the
previous example
8/8/2012 8
Position
Bid price
Quaity score
Multiply Actual price (i.e., CPC)
1 𝑏1 𝑞1 𝑏1𝑞1 𝑏2𝑞2/𝑞1+ 1 cent
2 𝑏2 𝑞2 𝑏2𝑞2 𝑏3𝑞3/𝑞2+ 1 cent
3 𝑏3 𝑞3 𝑏3𝑞3 𝑏4𝑞4/𝑞3+ 1 cent
4 𝑏4 𝑞4 𝑏4𝑞4 𝑏5𝑞5/𝑞4+ 1 cent
5 𝑏5 𝑞5 𝑏5𝑞5 Assume out of space
![Page 9: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/9.jpg)
Advertiser 1
Advertiser 2
Advertiser 3
Advertiser 4
Advertiser 5
Advertiser 6
Web server 1.com
Web server 2.com
Web server 3.com
Broker Broker web site.com
Advertisers Brokers’ Clients Broker
9
Listings
Listings
Listings
Listings
Listings
Listings
Listings
Listings
Listings
Listings
Problem Description
8/8/2012
AdWords
![Page 10: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/10.jpg)
Bidding
Process
Ad Position
10
Search
Leads (User Info)
Compensation
Click (Cost)
Broker & Google AdWords
8/8/2012
![Page 11: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/11.jpg)
Review of a Few Terms
8/8/2012 11
Impression Click Conversion
A link showed up Link is clicked Some one filled in necessary information, so that the broker make $$
![Page 12: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/12.jpg)
Review of a Few Terms
8/8/2012 12
Impression Click Conversion
A link showed up Link is clicked Some one filled in necessary information, so that the broker make $$
CTR (Click thru rate)
![Page 13: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/13.jpg)
Review of a Few Terms
8/8/2012 13
Impression Click Conversion
A link showed up Link is clicked Some one filled in necessary information, so that the broker make $$
CTR (Click thru rate)
CR (Conversion rate)
![Page 14: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Simple Economics for Broker
• Profit = revenue – cost = leads x $ per lead – clicks x CPC = clicks x CR x $ per lead – clicks x CPC = clicks x (CR x $per lead – CPC) = clicks x (RPC – CPC)
– RPC = revenue per click (= CR x $per lead)
• Objective: maximize Profit • Control variable: maxCPC (maximum amount
willing to pay for CPC) • Assume no budget cap (simplification)
8/8/2012 14
![Page 15: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Other Queries Not Covered in This Talk
• Which keyword?
• When to bid?
• How to write the ad?
• How to take advantage of user’s profile?
• How to group keyword?
8/8/2012 15
![Page 16: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/16.jpg)
Maximize Profit
• Large maxCPC (higher bid) – Higher position (always)
– More clicks (assumed)
– Higher CPC (always)
• An example – Same keyword
– Same web site
– RPC = 9 (assumed fixed)
• Optimal maxCPC ∈ [5,7)
• Relates to ICC (incremental CPC) 8/8/2012 16
Position Current bids Clicks Profit
1 $10 100 (9-9)100=0
2 $9 90 (9-7)90=180
3 $7 70 (9-5)70=280
4 $5 50 (9-3)50= 300
5 $3 30 (9-2)30=210
![Page 17: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/17.jpg)
Outline
I. Problem Description
II. Game theoretical aspect of the bidding problem that we will consider
III. Statistical Implementation
IV. Conclusion
8/8/2012 17
![Page 18: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/18.jpg)
II. Gaming Aspect in AdWords
• Advertisers (bidders): 1,⋯ ,𝑁
• Slots in AdWords: 1,⋯ , 𝐾, 𝐾 < 𝑁
• 𝑖-th bidder, with RPC (aka expected return) 𝑣𝑖
• Descending current bids: 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ > 𝑏𝐾
– 𝑏𝑖 = bid amount by bidder at position (slot) 𝑖
• Clicks for the 𝑖th bidder: WLOG, 𝑐1
𝑖 ≥ 𝑐2𝑖 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑐𝐾
𝑖
See justification next page.
8/8/2012 18
![Page 19: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Continue with Games
• Utility of bidder 𝑖: if bidder 𝑖 bids 𝑏𝑘(i.e., he/she is the 𝑘th highest bid), then his/her utility (i.e., profit) is
𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑘+1 𝑐𝑘𝑖
• Bidders want to maximize utilities
• Justification of non-increasing 𝑐𝑘𝑖
– If ∃𝛼, 𝑐𝛼𝑖 < 𝑐𝛼+1
𝑖,
– then 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝛼+1 𝑐𝛼𝑖 < 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝛼+2 𝑐𝛼+1
𝑖.
– Having 𝑐𝛼𝑖 = 𝑐𝛼+1
𝑖 preserves the above inequality, won’t change the outcome of the maximization problem.
8/8/2012 19
![Page 20: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/20.jpg)
Illustration: utility versus maxCPC
8/8/2012 20
𝑏2 𝑏1 𝑏3 𝑏4
Clicks
𝑐1𝑖
𝑐2𝑖
𝑐3𝑖
𝑐4𝑖
max (𝑐1𝑖 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏1 , 0)
𝑐2𝑖(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏2)
𝑐3𝑖(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏3)
𝑐4𝑖(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏4)
Bid amount (i.e., maxCPC) by the 𝑖th advertiser
Profit
𝑣𝑖 0
Piecewise constant utility/click function
![Page 21: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/21.jpg)
Recap of the Game
• Every bidder knows
– current bids: 𝑏1 > 𝑏2 > ⋯ > 𝑏𝐾
– clicks for all: 𝑐1𝑖 ≥ 𝑐2
𝑖 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑐𝐾𝑖
• Every bidder choose maxCPC (given 𝑣𝑖), so that she can achieves 𝑘∗ that maximizes utility
𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑘+1 𝑐𝑘𝑖 as a function of 𝑘
• Q: does equilibrium achievable?
8/8/2012 21
![Page 22: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/22.jpg)
Nash Equilibriums
• Notations – 𝒃 = 𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑁 ; note the difference betwn 𝑏𝑖
and 𝑏𝑖
– 𝒃−𝑖 = 𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑖−1, 𝑏𝑖+1, … , 𝑏𝑁 ; exclude 𝑏𝑖
• Best response of bidder 𝑖:
–𝑀𝑖 𝒃−𝑖 = given 𝒃−𝑖, the set of values of 𝑏𝑖 such that the utility of bidder 𝑖 is maximized
• Nash equilibrium: a strategy profile 𝒃 such that ∀𝑖, 𝑏𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝑖 𝒃−𝑖 .
8/8/2012 22
![Page 23: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/23.jpg)
Property of Equilibriums
• Does it exist?
– Yes. Can give examples…
• Is it reasonable?
– Need to define reasonableness
8/8/2012 23
![Page 24: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/24.jpg)
Vulnerability of Nash Equilibriums
• 𝑂𝑖(𝒃) bidder 𝑖's position in the descending bid queue
• Output truthful (OT) property of a position auction:
– ∀ equilibrium set 𝒆, and ∀𝑖, 𝑂𝑖 𝒆 = 𝑂𝑖(𝑣1, … , 𝑣𝑁), the auction is output truthful
• Counterexample in Bu, Deng, and Qi (2008)
8/8/2012 24
![Page 25: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/25.jpg)
Designing Objective of a Bidding Strategy
• A strategy that is available to all bidders
• Those who follow maximize their utilities
• Those who don’t will not negatively affect others
• Violators don’t maximize their utilities
• Equilibrium exists and unique
8/8/2012 25
![Page 26: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/26.jpg)
“Forward Looking” Strategy
• The higher bidder 𝑖 bids, the higher a slot she can get in the next step
• Bid as high as possible in the set 𝑀𝑖 𝒃−𝑖 --
best response
• Control the risks of decreasing their own payoffs by the affected bidders’ next optimal moves (kind of technical)
8/8/2012 26
![Page 27: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/27.jpg)
A Derived “Forward Looking” Strategy
• [Bu et al, 2008] for bidder 𝑖, given 𝒃−𝑖, suppose 𝑘 is the optimal position that maximizes her utility, this bidder’s next bid is
𝐹𝑖 𝒃−𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 −
𝑐𝑘𝑐𝑘−1
𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑘+1 , 2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝐾,
𝑣𝑖 , 𝑘 = 1 or 𝑘 > 𝐾.
• Here 𝑐𝑘 and 𝑐𝑘−1are the clicks of the bidder who occupies slot 𝑘 − 1
8/8/2012 27
![Page 28: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/28.jpg)
Forward Looking Equilibrium
• A forward looking response function based equilibrium is a strategy profile 𝒃 such that ∀𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, 𝑏𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖 𝒃−𝑖
• That is, every bidder follows the forward looking scheme
• The equilibriums exist • The position auction is output truthful under the
forward looking best response scheme; i.e., the corresponding equilibrium is always output truthful
8/8/2012 28
![Page 29: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/29.jpg)
Proof of the “output truthfulness”
• Using contradiction, if OT does not hold, (in an equilibrium,) there must exist a pair of adjacent slots 𝑘, 𝑘 + 1 and the bidder 𝑖 on slot 𝑘 and the bidder 𝑗 on slot 𝑘 + 1 such that 𝑣𝑗 > 𝑣𝑖
• Let 𝑢𝑘𝑖 denote the utility of bidder 𝑖 at slot 𝑘,
and 𝑢𝑘+1𝑖 the utility at slot 𝑘 + 1, the
inequalities on the next page establishes a contradiction: bidder would prefer slot 𝑘 + 1
8/8/2012 29
![Page 30: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/30.jpg)
Inequality of the OTness
• 𝑢𝑘𝑖 = (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑘+1)𝑐𝑘
= 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣𝑗 −𝑐𝑘+1
𝑐𝑘𝑣𝑗 − 𝑏𝑘+2 𝑐𝑘
= 𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑘+2 𝑐𝑘+1 + (𝑐𝑘 − 𝑐𝑘+1)(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑣𝑗)
< (𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑘+2)𝑐𝑘+1
= 𝑢𝑘+1𝑖
• The above contradicts to the equilibrium
8/8/2012 30
![Page 31: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/31.jpg)
Uniqueness of FL Equilibrium
• The position auction has a unique forward looking Nash equilibrium
• Sketch of the proof:
– Output Truthfulness
– The Forward Looking best response formula
8/8/2012 31
![Page 32: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/32.jpg)
Convergence of Forward Looking Strategy
• Does it converge? Yes, hopefully…
• If at every time, one bidder bids, and this bidder is randomly chosen, then the forward looking strategy will eventually converge to its equilibrium.
8/8/2012 32
![Page 33: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/33.jpg)
More on Forward Looking Equilibrium
• FL schemes maximizes bidders who follow it;
• Follower won't be punished by actions from those non-followers;
• non-followers will not maximize their utilities.
8/8/2012 33
![Page 34: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/34.jpg)
Outline
I. Problem Description
II. Game theoretical aspect of the bidding problem that we will consider
III. Statistical Implementation
IV. Conclusion
8/8/2012 34
![Page 35: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/35.jpg)
III. Implementation Issues
• Recall the forward looking strategy – Find the best response slot 𝑘, then do the following
𝐹𝑖 𝒃−𝑖 = 𝑣𝑖 −
𝑐𝑘𝑐𝑘−1
𝑣𝑖 − 𝑏𝑘+1 , 2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝐾,
𝑣𝑖 , 𝑘 = 1 or 𝑘 > 𝐾.
• Need to know: – 𝑐𝑘 and 𝑐𝑘−1are the clicks of the bidder 𝑗 who
occupies slot 𝑘 − 1 – 𝑏𝑘+1, the immediate lower bid; This is the current
CPC!
• Possible solution: use AdWords traffic estimator
8/8/2012 35
![Page 36: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/36.jpg)
AdWords: Traffic Estimator • Given a key word, Traffic Estimator tells how it
could perform
8/8/2012 36
![Page 37: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/37.jpg)
8/8/2012 37
![Page 38: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/38.jpg)
Use Adwords Traffic Estimator for Inference
• Estimating 𝑐𝑘 and 𝑐𝑘−1: – ATE gives average positions and a range of clicks – Need statistical model to estimate 𝑐𝑘’s
• Getting 𝑏𝑘+1: – Current CPC paid by this bidder – Time varying
• Big question: can we really trust ATE to perform the above tasks? (do not know…)
• If there is a statistically consistent way to estimate 𝑐𝑘, forward looking converge to equilibrium with high probability
8/8/2012 38
![Page 39: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/39.jpg)
Other Considerations
• We assumed known RPC; however in reality, the conversion rate (CR) is highly stochastic
• One may infer 𝑐𝑘 through knowledge of the bidders (their web sites are observable) and its own experience; for example, similar web sites likely have similar 𝑐𝑘’s
• In fact, many online testimonies say that you can learn by trying AdWords – see @ youtube
8/8/2012 39
![Page 40: Considerations of Modeling in Keyword Bidding (Google:AdWords) · A Simplified Version of AdWords Bidding •Sorted (descending) bids , =1,2,⋯, , of potential advertisers: 1> 2>](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022070111/6050707a1223ff336b6bc687/html5/thumbnails/40.jpg)
IV. Conclusion
• We study the keyword bidding problem at AdWords
• A strategy named “forward looking best response” is a promising way to bid: – It can be made available publicly
– Maximize utility
– Immune to adversary bids
• There remain some statistical estimation problems unsolved
• Haven’t been tested in reality
• Stochasticity can be another issue
8/8/2012 40