The prosecution has a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to disclose evidence to a criminal defendant when the evidence is both favorable to the defendant and material on either guilt or punishment.
Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83
1. Evidence must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or it is impeaching;
2. That evidence was suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently;
3. The evidence was material to the issue of guilt or punishment.
Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263
Evidence is favorable if it hurts the
prosecution or helps the defense. It can be
exculpatory or impeach a prosecution
witness. Impeachment evidence is
favorable Brady material when the reliability
of the witness may be determinative of a
criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence.
Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263
Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150
The suppression of evidence that is materially favorable to the accused violates due process regardless of whether it was intentional, negligent or inadvertent.
The prosecutor’s duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence exists regardless of whether there has been a request by the accused.
Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419, 433
Prosecution must disclose evidence
that is actually or constructively in its
possession or accessible to it. The
individual prosecutor has a duty to
learn of any favorable evidence
known to others acting on the
government’s behalf or assisting in
the case. Prosecution team includes police officers
and lab personnel.
Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419
United States v. Blanco (2004) 392 F.3d 382
Garden Grove police officers were pursuing Brown as he was leaving a bar. Brown fired 8 shots, killing Officer Donald Reed and wounding 4 other people. Brown claimed a diminished capacity defense saying he was under the influence of methamphetamine. At trial the DA refuted this claim with evidence that his blood sample was negative for any drugs. Brown was sentenced to death.
Unknown to the DA, Brown’s blood was initially tested using radioactive immunoassay (RIA) and was positive for PCP. A gas chromatography mass spectrometry was negative for drugs.
Case was overturned for prosecution’s failure to turn over the RIA report.
“Responsibility for Brady compliance lies exclusively with the prosecution, including the duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf. What ever the reason for failing to discharge that obligation, the prosecution team remains accountable for the consequences.”
The individual prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of ALL information gathered in connection with the government’s investigations and extends beyond the contents of the prosecution’s case file.
Prosecutor has the obligation to determine if the lab’s files contained any exculpatory evidence, such as the results of the RIA test and disclose it to defendant. Prosecutor remained ultimately responsible when the defense did not receive a copy.
In re Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873
The duty of disclosure does not end when
the trial is over. After a conviction the
prosecutor is also bound by the ethics of his
office to inform the appropriate authority of
after acquired or other information that
casts doubts upon the correctness of the
conviction.
People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169
Whitlock v. Brueggeman (2012) 682 F.3d 567
Evidence is material if there is a reasonable
probability that had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense the result of the proceeding would
have been different. In general impeachment evidence has been found to be
material where the witness at issue supplied the only
evidence linking the defendant to the crime. In contrast,
a new trial is generally not required when the testimony of
the witness is corroborated by other testimony.
• United States v. Petrillo (1987) 821 F.2d 85,90
Garcia case: Victim and friend were pushing a disabled vehicle on a road when defendant hit victim causing his leg to be amputated. Defendant’s BAC was .32. CHP Officer Mason formed expert opinion defendant was driving 56 mph and at an unsafe speed. Defendant was convicted of 23153 VC. Later the prosecutor discovered Officer Mason’s speed calculations were not consistent with current standards in the field and he had made a significant number of errors with regard to his speed calculations. CHP ordered him not to testify as an accident reconstruction specialist until he received more training.
Court found this information clearly constitutes evidence relating to Mason’s credibility as the prosecutor’s expert witness and was exculpatory and should have been turned over to the defense. Defendant was denied due process by the withholding of the evidence on the credibility of Mason, and was convicted on the basis of evidence that has now been demonstrated to be incorrect.
People v. Garcia (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1169
1. Are the new reports favorable to the accused?• Could it help the defense or impeach the expert?
2. Was it disclosed by the state?• Before trial-Was new interpretation done and disclosed
to defense?
• Post-trial- Was new mixture interpretation done and
sent to defense?
3. Is the new report material to the issue of guilt or
punishment?• Depends on the facts of the case
• Penal Code section 1111 evidence (corroboration of
accomplice testimony)
Lab reviews mixture interpretation report
and applies new guidelines. If there is a
different conclusion, the report is sent to
the DA office for review.
Confirm if criminal case was filed and where it is in court system. If case is still pending, report is sent to assigned DA for discovery.
If case has been resolved through trial or plea, lab reports and case facts must be reviewed to determine materiality. Is there a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
If report is material, a letter and the crime lab reports are sent to the defense attorney.
Many cases involve multiple
defendants and multiple pieces
of DNA evidence.
• Piece of DNA evidence against
one suspect can be Brady material
on co-defendant.
• One piece of DNA evidence could
be highly probative while another
piece of evidence does not have
probative value.
Cases not filed: 34• 10 cases rejected
• 24 cases not submitted for filing
Cases dismissed before new report issued: 2
Cases pending when new report was issued: 9• Reports sent to trial DA to discover to defense.
Cases determined not to be Brady material: 30• Reports not favorable to defendant: 19
• Cases include defendant was initially excluded from mixture and new report found the mixture not suitable for comparison.
• 1 Case where frequency estimate increased. Formerly more rare than 1 in 1 million, new report had frequency estimate more rare than 1 in 20 million.
• Not material because other evidence of guilt: 11
• 288 case, in original report defendant was present in victim’s neck and breast swab, 1 in 1 trillion and on victim’s hand swab. New report mixture from hand is no longer suitable for comparison. Defendant admitted touching victim with his hand.
Car burglary, in original report 3 person mixture on Maglite, defendant was contributor, 1 in 90,000. New report, 1 in 320. Two witnesses identify defendant as person breaking in to the car and defendant admits he “may” have broken the window and taken the property. Defendant pled guilty.
Cases determined to be potential Brady material and discovered to defense: 25
• One case where the ONLY evidence of identity was the DNA evidence. Reports changed from 1 in 1 trillion to 1 in 1000. Defendant pled guilty and was out of custody when case was reviewed.
• Examples of frequency change: 1 in 500,000 - 1 in 2000 3 defendants are minor contributors, 1 in 3000 - not suitable for
comparison 1 in 1 trillion - 1 in 130,000 1 in 1 billion - not suitable for comparison 1 in 1 million – not suitable for comparison 1 in 25,000-not suitable for comparison 1 in 100-not suitable for comparison
If materiality was a close factual call, erred on side of disclosure.
• In re Miranda: Death penalty case where prosecutor did not turn over evidence that showed their witness was incredibly biased and being forced to testify by the prosecutor.
• When case was reversed the Court stated, “To the extent the prosecutors are uncertain about the materiality of a piece of evidence, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.”
In re Miranda (2008) 43 Cal.4th 541