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Educational impacts onacademic businesspractitioner’s moral reasoningand behaviour: effects of shortcourses in ethics or philosophy
EinarMarnburg
Introduction
In our society it is considered an obvious fact that
a long academic education has behavioural effects
on a graduate. But is this true of ethical behaviour
in general and of business ethics practice in
particular? The importance and effects of courses
in ethics in academic business education as well as
courses in morality and philosophy has been a
central issue in business ethics discussion
among scholars. The increased number of courses
in business ethics offered by business schools
can be seen to be a result of the great interest
in business ethics over the last 10–20 years.
Several researchers in business ethics have pointed
out the importance of teaching the subject in
business schools (e.g. DeGeorge 1987). The fact
that these courses have attained a central place in
the business schools’ curriculum can be consid-
ered a contribution from academia to ethics in
business.
This article addresses the issue of what kind of
effects, if any, courses in philosophy or morality
have on the future practitioner’s moral behaviour.
If effects can be seen – effects such as improved
abilities of reasoning, changes in recognition,
awareness or attitudes or actual behaviour – are
they possible to identify?
The effect of ethics courses
The study of the specific effects business ethics
courses may have on students is extremely
difficult. This is due to the fact that other subjects
in the curriculum may also have effects on
morality. In addition, the work environment after
graduating may have considerable influence
(McDonald and Donleavy 1995). The complexity
of this issue has given rise to discussions about
how business ethics teaching should be organised
in the business studies curriculum – i.e. as separate
or integrated (Rynning 1992, Herndon 1996).
There have also been a number of suggestions put
forward as to the ‘best’ teaching models, – e.g. the
use of case discussions (Beauchamp and Bowie
1988), the use of decision making models (Kahn
1990, Trevino 1992), the use of moral philosophic
theories and methods (Hosmer 1985, Green 1994,
Jensen, Pruzan and Thyssen 1990), or the use of
more action-based teaching (Bies 1996, Mercer
1996).
When accounting or marketing are taught, the
graduate is required not only to master the
technology of the trade, but also needs to be able
to cope with new problems and situations that the
future will bring. The same thing must also be the
case when business ethics is taught. The expected
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Business Ethics: A European Review
effects of business ethics courses should be, in my
opinion, to honour the specific learning objectives
of a course. It seems to be common to make a
distinction between courses that seek to have
effects on awareness or attitudes on the one hand,
and reasoning abilities on the other (Weber
1990b, McDonald and Donleavy 1995, Kavathat-
zopoulos 1993). Weber (1990b) uses a distinction
between philosophically oriented courses that
train the students in reasoning, and courses that
seek to strengthen the student’s ability to recog-
nise and focus on ethical issues (attitudes/aware-
ness). The latter type of courses often seems to
have an empiricist epistemology. A third category
seeks to integrate the two objectives of higher
awareness and better reasoning.
The type of course that aims to bring about better
awareness tries to build up strong positive attitudes
towards business ethics, as well as providing
the student with analytical and decision-making
techniques. In other words, these courses have an
emotional component, in addition to a cognitive
and behavioural component. Several authors have
reported effects on attitudes (Weber 1990b, McDo-
nald and Donleavy 1995, Herndon 1996). The
general picture is that the courses have effects on
the students’ ethical attitudes immediately after the
course has ended, although these effects are not
always reported as statistically significant.
The second type of course stresses reasoning
ability and has been subjected to thorough
research in the general context as well as to some
research in business contexts. These courses have
their basis in cognitive moral stage theory, or
moral development theory (Kohlberg 1981, Rest
1979, 1986). This kind of research makes mea-
surements of the students’ increasing use of what
is called ‘principle moral reasoning’ – i.e. reason-
ing that has its basis in the rational and universal
arguments of modern moral philosophies (e.g.
Utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, Rawl’s ethics of
justice). The teaching model of such courses is
mainly based on the discussion of so-called
dilemma histories. The large number of studies
and the methodological accuracy are convincing:
these kind of courses do change the students’
ability to reason, and research into different age
groups has reported the increasing effects ex-
plained by rising age (Rest and Thoma 1986).
Concerning more specific courses in business
ethics, Weber (1990b) concludes that reasoning
courses do have at least a short-term effect,
although Glenn (1992) refers to studies where no
effects were reported. Long-term effects are, as far
as I know, not reported.
The concept of moral reasoning in
relation to ethical attitudes and decision
behaviour
Jean Piaget originally constructed moral develop-
ment theory and its methodology as a result of
studying children’s morality. In the mid 1950s
Lawrence Kohlberg expanded Piaget’s stage
model from three to six stages in order to also
draw inferences about adults. Kohlberg con-
structed, and has periodically refined, a qualita-
tive interview method. Using Kohlberg’s theory as
a basis, James Rest (1979) developed a slightly
different and more flexible theory and measure-
ment instrument (the Defining Issue Test (DIT)
questionnaire), directed at the study of children
and adults.
The theory of moral development represents a
logical and systematised approach to morality,
where the most common moral philosophies are
represented in the six stages (Kohlberg 1981). The
theory has a large and convincing empirical
reference base, also longitudinal, going back to
the mid 1950s. The six moral development stages
describe how justice is balanced in society and
how to maintain this balance (Rest 1979). The
stages are as follows:
Stage 1: Punishment and obedience;
Stage 2: Instrumentation;
Stage 3: Interpersonal relations;
Stage 4: Law and order orientation;
Stage 5: Social contract;
Stage 6: Universal principles.
Reasoning according to Stages 5 and 6 is called
principled reasoning. Research into moral devel-
opment has reported an interesting correlation
with age (younger people), with IQ-testing and
with length of education (Rest 1990). Besides the
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404 r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
significance of length of education, the type of
education may also heighten the level of moral
reasoning. It has been reported that students with
a major in philosophy have significantly better
moral reasoning abilities than other students
(Rest 1979, 1986).
From a business ethics point of view this stage
theory has, undoubtedly, great intuitive explana-
tory value. Many important contributions to
business ethics have implemented this approach
in their modelling of, and research into, business
decision making and behaviour (Ferrell and
Gresham 1985, Hunt and Vitell 1986, Trevino
1986, Bommer, Glatto, Gravander and Tuttle
1987, Ponemon 1990, 1992, Jones 1991, Lampe
and Finn 1992). The assumption of the impor-
tance of moral reasoning ability has also resulted
in several empirical studies and reported group
differences in business environments (Goolsby
and Hunt 1992, Elm and Nichols 1993,
Jeffrey 1993, Shaub 1994, Weber 1990a). Such
comparisons are proper and relevant if research-
ers do not imply that the differences in moral
reasoning have any behavioural significance (see
discussion in Robin, Gordon, Jordan and Re-
idenbach 1996). Problems occur when reasoning
ability is used to explain behavioural variables
such as awareness, attitudes and actual behaviour
(Fraedrich, Thorne and Ferrell 1992, Robin et al.
1996, Marnburg 2001). This is due to the fact that
the relationship between moral reasoning and
other behavioural variables is not obvious. Cogni-
tive psychology tries to explain the structures by
which people think, structures that the individual
subjectively experiences as logical. This raises the
question that has haunted Western academic
history, namely ‘do people act according to their
best judgement?’ According to Plato’s Dialogues
(Plato, undated/1992) Socrates said they did.
Aristotle later pointed out that knowledge is not
enough to bridle passion and lust. The Bible also
adopts this position when it refers to the weak-
nesses of the flesh (Matt. 24:41, Romans 7:15–22).
Research in moral reasoning has not focused on
actual behaviour. However, Lawrence Kohlberg
is of the opinion that moral maturity predisposes
a person towards better moral behaviour (Colby
and Kohlberg 1984). The process behind this
maturity is the pressure and opportunity to adopt
role taking (Kohlberg 1984: 198 ff.). James Rest
(1979 and 1984) seems to be more sceptical of
assumptions like this, and specifically warns
against testing hypotheses that claim the existence
of a linear relationship between moral reasoning
and behaviour. He gives convincing theoretical
and empirical arguments for his point of view.
In spite of warnings from cognitive psycholo-
gists against using the moral development concept
as a behavioural predictor, several researchers in
business ethics have tried to do this. But the
empirical efforts of most researchers in explaining
behaviour by moral reasoning abilities have failed
(Trevino and Youngblood 1990, Goolsby and
Hunt 1992, Shaub 1994, Robin et al. 1996).
According to studies into moral reasoning there
is a problematic relationship between ethical
attitudes and moral reasoning (Marnburg 2001).
It seems that strong ethical attitudes have a
restraining effect on reasoning. For example, in
studies of moral reasoning a correlation of up to
� .60 between moral reasoning and a test of ‘Law
and Order’ has been reported. These studies tested
opinions about how much power society should
be given in order to maintain order and stability
(Rest 1979: 161 ff). Another study was reported
by Lawrence (1979) in which a group of orthodox
theology students adjusted their moral reasoning
answers in accordance with their religious rules.
Marnburg and Jenssen (2001) point out the
educational problems this may lead to. Graduates
with well developed moral reasoning abilities will
first of all have competence in producing ‘talks’
(Brunsson 1989) – i.e. ‘nice’ oral and written
statements which are only made to please the
public or other stakeholders – they have no
intention of changing in practice. On the other
hand, graduates with strong ethical attitudes will,
perhaps, behave in a naive manner, without
carrying out the proper reasoning necessary in a
given situation.
Research question and hypothesis
The research population consisted of academics
(business economists and engineers) working in
Business Ethics: A European Review
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003 405
private companies in Norway. Compulsory
courses such as ‘business ethics’ and ‘business
and society’ are relatively new in Norway, and the
empirical basis for studying the effects of such
courses was unsatisfactory in 1997 when my
research was executed. However, a special educa-
tional rule in Norway made it possible to carry
out the empirical research. Traditional university
studies in Norway demand that students have a
half-year introduction course in philosophy, logic
and psychology (called ‘Examen Philosophicum’)
in order to enter the universities’ regular pro-
grammes. Students attending universities of tech-
nology and business schools have not been
required to take this course: nevertheless, it has
been common for many young people to take this
course while making up their minds about what
kind of major they ought to take. This unique
situation in Norway enables researchers to study a
highly educated group of academics in the work-
place where some have a philosophical educational
background and others do not. Besides this type of
course other kinds of short university level courses
in philosophy or ethics are also offered in Norway.
This led to the following research question: do
theoretical courses in philosophy and/or ethics
have any effects on an academic practitioner’s
knowledge, reasoning and/or behaviour related
variables? People who have taken a course in
philosophy and/or ethics will of course have some
knowledge of these subjects after completing the
course (which is the basis for passing the
examination). The population studied here in-
clude both newly qualified graduates and all other
age groups up to retirement age. Therefore, it is
reasonable to expect, when studying the whole
group, that much of the knowledge of philosophy
and ethics will have been forgotten. It is therefore
important to investigate whether the knowledge
effects of these courses exist for the whole group,
compared to academics who have not taken a course.
H1: Academics who have taken a course in ethics
or philosophy will have more knowledge in the field
than those who have not taken such a course.
Rest (1979, 1986) reports that masters students
with a major in philosophy have significantly
better reasoning abilities than others. This can
probably be explained by the fact that their
courses included advanced theories in moral
philosophy. To expect the same knowledge level
from people who have taken a minor course is
perhaps asking too much, nevertheless the follow-
ing question is asked:
H2: Academics who have knowledge of philoso-
phy or have taken a course in ethics or philosophy
will have better moral reasoning ability than
academics with a poor knowledge of philosophy or
have not taken such a course.
Academics who started their educational ca-
reers by studying moral philosophy or ethics
probably have had, and have, a better basis for
role-taking (Kohlberg 1984: 198 ff); this should
lead to moral maturity (Colby and Kohlberg,
1984). To use Kohlberg’s references as a basis for
a hypothesis assumes that H2 is accepted (that
education in ethics or philosophy improves moral
reasoning), and that there is a correlation between
moral reasoning and moral behaviour. However,
Rest (1979, 1984) gives quite convincing theore-
tical and empirical reasons for not formulating
hypotheses that predict a linear relationship
between reasoning and behaviour. If attending a
course in philosophy or ethics and passing an
examination has any significance for behavioural
variables, this has to be explained by the fact
that the courses, in addition to teaching knowl-
edge, also awaken the participant’s recognition,
awareness or emotional involvement in current
moral issues. If so, this effect will occur as an
effect in addition to, or instead of, improved
moral reasoning ability. This implies that the
courses have trained the students not only in
philosophic reasoning but also in recognition
and awareness of moral issues (Weber 1990b).
An alternative or complementary line of argument
stresses the importance of biased recruitment.
Perhaps some people take a course in philo-
sophy or ethics because they are emotionally
involved in ethical issues and hope that the course
will give them some answers. A genuine interest
in moral philosophy may also be held by
those who have a great deal of knowledge
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406 r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
about philosophy, but have not attended any
course.
If the occurrence of moral recognition, aware-
ness and engagement exists, this may be shown by
the expression of attitudes towards ethics. In
order to approach the study of ethical attitudes in
a systematic way, it is essential that one is able to
differentiate between issues. Claes Gustafsson
(1988) suggests in his work that four structures
cover the most important issues of business ethics
as shown in Table 1.
The following hypothesis was proposed:
H3: Academics who have a good knowledge of
philosophy or have taken a course in ethics or
philosophy will have, due to moral recognition
abilities, awareness and emotional engagement,
stronger ethical attitudes and make more moral
correct decisions than academics with a poor
knowledge of philosophy or who have not taken a
course.
Method
The population of the study consisted of aca-
demics, business economists and engineers (with
an education corresponding to a masters degree)
working in private Norwegian companies. For
practical reasons, a sample of 1010 people was
randomly drawn from Norway’s two professional
associations of engineers and business economists.
At this educational level (masters degree) these
two groups represented the largest and dominant
group of academics in the private sector in
Norway. The reported findings in this article are
part of a larger study executed during the period
1994–97 (Marnburg 1998).
A postal questionnaire of 10 pages containing
demographic data, company data, educational
data, an attitude survey, a moral reasoning test,
an ethical decision-making test and a philosophi-
cal knowledge test was designed. The survey was
executed in the spring of 1997, the questionnaire
being sent out in February, with two follow-up
reminders. Completion of the survey was on a
totally anonymous basis and did not use any form
of explicit incentives. This resulted in 4491
completed questionnaires; a response rate of
44.5%. All age groups were represented in the
sample. The control routines revealed that the
sample was biased in some respects. Only 14% of
those sampled were women, which reflected the
proportion of female academics in the private
sector in Norway. Female professionals were
younger than their male colleagues. Besides this,
the whole group was biased towards younger age
groups – explained by the ever-increasing number
of younger people taking a higher education in
these subjects.
Moral reasoning was measured by using a
translated 3-dilemma case version of the DIT
(Defining Issue Test) according to the DIT
manual (Rest 1990). The test was pre-tested and
prepared for postal use. The statistical testing was
done by measuring differences in ‘principle
reasoning’, called P-score – which includes prin-
ciple reasoning. This took place in stages 5 and 6.
The statistical properties of the test were generally
found to be in accordance with the manual’s
reliability data. However, the mean P-score for
the group was only 30.4, which is very low for a
group of academics compared to American
studies (Rest 1990). Due to the absence of any
other explanation, the results might be explained
by the translation of the test into Norwegian.
A small test of philosophic knowledge was
drawn up, including six items with a multiple
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 1. The four ethical structures (from Gustafsson
(1988), my translation from Swedish)
Credibility ethics cover behaviour in relation to promises
and expectations – e.g. to tell the truth, to keep your
promises, etc.
Humanistic ethics include the values of humanity, integrity
and equality among people.
Efficiency ethics is perhaps the most central type of ethics
in business, requiring an organisation and its individual
employees to produce as much as possible of value
(utility), while imposing on them industrious and
economically sound behaviour. The theoretical parallel to
this form of ethics comes from both utilitarian ethical
theory and Max Weber’s ‘ethics of Protestantism’.
Environmental ethics include all the worries and concerns
for the environment and the welfare of future generations.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Business Ethics: A European Review
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003 407
choice of three-answer alternatives. The items
addressed well-known concepts of moral philoso-
phy such as the definition of ‘altruism’, which
philosopher described the ‘categorical impera-
tives’, what is meant by Utilitarianism, and
others. Pre-testing of this test work was very
promising. The respondents were asked not to use
any form of reference in order to get the answers
correct. However, it should be kept in mind that
in a self-reporting postal test like this, help from a
spouse or friends may occur.
An attitude questionnaire was drawn up con-
sisting of 16 items, four of which related to each of
the four ethical structures (see Table 1), resulting
in one index for each of the four ethical structures
and an overall index. The respondents were asked
to consider how important it was that their
business company related actively to the issues,
for example Item 1: the reliability of advertising
and public relations, and to mark their answers on
a scale from 1 (not important) to 5 (very
important)). The test was pre-tested and a test-
retest (with a small student sample over a period
of two months) gave Pearson’s r5 0.69. Cron-
bach’s alpha was measured at 0.89. A correlation
matrix confirmed that the four ethical structures
possessed statistical properties besides the theore-
tical basis.
The decision-making behaviour test consisted
of eight short vignettes, each describing a situa-
tion and a specific ‘ethical decision’. The respon-
dent was asked how likely it was that he or she
would have taken that ethical position on a scale
from 1 (not likely) to 5 (very likely). The
construction of the test was based on inspiration
from Cavanagh and Fritzche (1985). The test was
pre-tested, and a test-retest (with a small student
sample, a period of two months) gave Pearson’s
r5 0.83. When constructing the items a high
differentiation was emphasised which was con-
firmed by a low Cronbach’s alpha at 0.44. The
test-retest measure is therefore of most interest
(Anastasi 1988: 119). Tests like this will always
have great validity weaknesses because the test
defines what decisions are morally right and
wrong. However, using one’s own supposition
for what is morally right has long traditions in
business ethics research (Robertson and Anderson
1993, Baumhart 1961, Brenner and Molander
1977, Weber 1990a, Merritt 1991, Jones 1991).
The SPSS, version 7.5, was used, where
Student’s t-test, ANOVA and MANOVA were
employed.
Results
Table 2 shows the descriptive results concerning
level of knowledge of philosophy. It was hypothe-
sised (in H1) that academics who had taken a
course in ethics or philosophy should have a
better knowledge of philosophy. An ANOVA test
gave F(2, 347)5 4.5, po.00 and Z25 .04, with an
explained variance equal to a correlation coeffi-
cient at .20. The H0 was rejected.
It was also hypothesised (in H2) that academics
who had a good knowledge of philosophy or had
taken a course in ethics or philosophy would have
better moral reasoning ability. The mean P-score
for the whole sample was P5 30.4. Using an
ANOVA for testing the relation philosophy
knowledge and P-scores, gave F(2, 253)5 5.40,
p5 .01 and Z25 .06. The explained variance is
moderate and corresponds to a correlation
coefficient of .25. H0 was rejected.
In H2 it was also hypothesised that academics
who had taken a course in philosophy or ethics
would have a better reasoning ability. Testing of
this relationship, with a student’s t-test, gave
t5 1.44, p5 .15. H0 was not rejected.
As displayed in Table 2, P-scores rise by length
of education. Length of education explains P-
scores significantly (F(3, 301)5 2.7, po.05 and
Z25 .03), with a weak explained variance corre-
sponding to a correlation coefficient at .18.
H3 hypothesised that academics who had a
good knowledge of philosophy or had taken
a course in ethics or philosophy would have
a higher score in the attitude and decision-making
test. Table 3 gives a picture of the data concern-
ing ethical attitudes and shows small differ-
ences. Using a MANOVA test concerning the
relation ‘taken or not taken a course – ethical
attitudes’, this gave Hotelling’s T25 .002,
F(4, 346)5 0.562, p5 .93. The overall test did
not reject H0.
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408 r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
The test of ‘philosophic knowledge – ethical
attitudes’ gave Wilk’s lambda5 .987, F(8, 440)5
1.35, p5 .83 and Z25 .01. H0 was not rejected.
H3 also hypothesised that academics who had a
good knowledge of philosophy or had taken a
course in ethics or philosophy would make ‘more
ethical’ decisions. Mean score on the decision
making test for the whole sample was 3.79. Mean
score for academics who had taken a course
(N5 154) was 3.83 and for those without the
course (N5 290) 3.78. Testing of this difference
gave t5 1.04, p5 .30. The H0 was not rejected.
Testing the relation ‘philosophy knowledge –
decision making behaviour’ gave F(2, 341)5 0.8,
p5 .41. Also here H0 was not rejected.
Discussion
The result of the statistical testing implied that
those academics in private companies (business
economists and engineers) that have taken a
course in philosophy or ethics, have a significantly
higher score on the philosophy knowledge test
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 2. Knowledge of philosophy, education and P-scores
P-scores Stages
2 3 4 5 6
Variables N M SD M M M M M
Philosophy knowledge 255
0–2 correct 85 28.2 11.6 8.9 22.5 40.3 19.8 8.4
3–4 correct 113 31.1 13.6 9.3 21.0 38.7 20.7 10.3
5–6 correct 57 35.1 13.6 7.7 18.0 39.2 23.3 11.8
Taken a course in philosophy or ethics? 303
Yes 103 31.9 13.1 7.9 19.5 40.8 20.4 11.5
No 200 29.6 13.2 9.0 22.3 39.1 20.3 9.3
Length of university studies 302
Under 4 years 21 23.7 12.4 10.0 20.3 46.0 16.0 7.6
4–5 years 186 30.7 12.7 9.1 21.9 38.2 20.3 10.4
6–8 years 79 29.8 13.9 7.6 21.9 40.8 20.0 9.7
Over 8 years 16 38.5 12.7 6.3 14.4 40.8 29.0 9.6
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 3. Philosophical knowledge, education and ethical attitudes
All items Credibility Humanistic Efficiency Environmental
Variables N M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Philosophy knowledge 350
0–2 correct 120 3.15 .78 3.62 1.07 3.00 .88 2.85 .83 3.15 .99
3–4 correct 158 3.20 .68 3.64 1.06 3.12 .83 2.82 .69 3.21 .98
5–6 correct 72 3.11 .75 3.50 1.16 3.07 .80 2.74 .78 3.13 1.11
Taken a course in philosophy or ethics 449
Yes 157 3.19 .75 3.60 1.09 3.11 .82 2.83 .77 3.23 1.10
No 292 3.16 .73 3.60 1.06 3.07 .85 2.82 .78 3.17 1.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Business Ethics: A European Review
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003 409
with a correlation coefficient at .20. This is a
surprising result considering that the population
covers all age groups from 24 to 69, although
younger people were to some degree over-
represented. If this indication gives an accurate
picture of the population, it indicates that short
courses teach knowledge that ‘lasts a lifetime’, i.e.
an indication that the effects of the courses are
long-term.
It is important to remember that the courses
which produce these effects are dominated by
courses of less than 1/2 year in duration. No
doubt the teaching which has been done in these
courses has been very efficient.
Knowledge of philosophy significantly ex-
plained the score of principle scores (P-scores) of
moral reasoning. This, if true, is remarkable. I do
not like to repeat myself, but let me say again that
the population represented were (presumably)
laymen in the field of philosophy and ethics. It
is therefore remarkable that the little knowledge
they possessed implied these differences.
On the other hand, the difference in mean P-
scores for those who had and those who had not
taken a course in philosophy or ethics was not
significant. Various interpretations of these find-
ings can be carried out, but it is important to
point out two possible explanations. First, many
people have a personal interest in philosophy but
perhaps no interest in taking a formal course. If
this is the case, the lack of differences in P-scores
between those with and without a course can be
explained by the fact that some people in the ‘no-
course group’ also have a good knowledge of
philosophy and ethics. Another interpretation of
the result is that some people in the ‘taken a
course group’ have had no interest in philosophy
and ethics and have therefore forgotten the whole
thing. Of course, these speculations can only be
clarified by further empirical research.
It was also hypothesised that people with a
good knowledge of philosophy and ethics had, in
addition to their knowledge, a higher degree of
awareness, recognition and emotional involve-
ment in ethical issues. This was theoretically
explained by the possible fact that the courses
also stimulated emotional engagement in ethical
issues besides teaching theories. Another line of
argument was that people with philosophic
knowledge but no course (and perhaps some of
the group that have taken the course) had taken a
self-study course or attended the philosophical or
ethics course because of their genuine interest and
concern for moral issues. If this was true, one
should expect that people who have taken the
course and/or had a good knowledge of the
subject would produce a higher score on the
ethical attitude test and decision-making beha-
viour test. This hypothesis was completely re-
jected. This implies that knowledge of philosophy
and ethics has no correlation with ethical attitudes
or moral decision-making behaviour.
Overall, it is encouraging to observe that short
introductory university courses do have a sig-
nificant effect on knowledge and that this knowl-
edge has a significant effect on one of the most
vital elements of discourse in our society – the
morality. On the other hand, it is in a way a
problematic implication that well-developed mor-
al reasoning does not seem to have any beha-
vioural effect. This means that knowledge of
philosophy only gives the competence to produce
‘talks’ – i.e. ‘nice’ speeches and well written
statements in order to please stakeholders, but
with no intention of behavioural change. To paint
a dark picture, it can be asked ‘where are the
moral actions?’ In other words, is it acceptable for
the managers of our business community to
master the thoughts and words but not to be
concerned with moral actions?
One characteristic of both business and engineer-
ing schools is the focus and willingness to make the
right decisions and take the appropriate actions in
the different fields that are taught. For example,
students do not only learn about accounting,
marketing and technology, they learn how to
handle accounting, marketing and technology.
From my point of view this focus on actions has
to be a part of the result of teaching business ethics.
In contrast to moral reasoning abilities, strong
ethical attitudes, at least to some degree, should
correlate with behaviour. However, as pointed out
in the introduction, empirical studies seem to imply
that strong ethical attitudes may have a restraining
effect on free and open-minded reasoning. The
person with overly strong ethical attitudes might
Volume 12 Number 4 October 2003
410 r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
do naıve and perhaps even stupid things because he
or she does not reason before acting. Perhaps there
is a balance between sound moral reasoning and
the moral concern that is expressed through ethical
attitudes – I do not know.
Conclusion
The empirical findings reported in this article
imply that short introduction courses in philoso-
phy and/or ethics significantly explain higher
knowledge in philosophy and ethics among
Norwegian academics in private business (busi-
ness economists and engineers) of all ages. Good
knowledge of philosophy and ethics seem to
explain significantly higher moral reasoning abil-
ities. On the other hand, taking a course or having
a good knowledge of philosophy and ethics does
not have any effect on ethical attitudes or moral
decision-making behaviour. It has been pointed
out that business schools in their business ethics
teaching must also stress and focus on moral
actions – not only on producing talk. Exactly how
this should be done is not addressed in this article.
Note
1 The completion of the questionnaire’s different
parts was as follows: Ethical attitudes: N5 441;
Moral reasoning: N5 304; Decision behaviour:
N5 443; Philosophy knowledge test: N5 350.
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