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WHENTHEMIDDLECOMESEARLY:PUZZLESANDPERPLEXITIESINPLATO’SDIALOGUES
MIRIAMBYRD
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SeepublishedversioninProceedingsoftheBostonAreaColloquiuminAncientPhilosophy(2013)XXVIII:187-209
https://brill.com/abstract/journals/bapj/28/1/article-p187_17.xml
Plato’searlydialoguesappeartobemuchdifferentfromhismiddlebecause
oftheiraporeticnature.1WhereasSocratesofthemiddleperiodputsforth
philosophicalpositionsandarguesinsupportoftheses,Socratesoftheearly
dialoguesprofessesignorance,useselenchusonothersratherthanarguingfor
conclusions,andendsdiscussionsinaporia.2Thehypothesisof
developmentalismisoftenusedtoexplainthesedifferences.Thebasic
developmentalistposition,arisinginthe19thcenturywithKarlFriedrich
Hermanin1839andreachingdominancebytheearly1860’s,dividesthe
dialoguesintothreechronologicalperiodsandassociatestheseperiodswith
threestagesofdevelopmentinPlato’sthought,oftenidentifyingthephilosophy
oftheearlydialogueswiththatofthehistoricSocrates.3GregoryVlastos,
1 I would like to take this opportunity to thank the University of Texas at Arlington for awarding me a
Research Enhancement Program grant (summer 2008) for beginning research on Plato’s early
dialogues.
2 For examples of such differences found between the early and middle dialogues, see Gregory
Vlastos’ ten Theses in Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (1991, 47-49) and Terrence Penner’s
twelve points of contrast in “Socrates and the Early Dialogues” (1992, 125-130).
3 For a history of developmentalism, see C.C.W. Taylor (2002).
2
perhapsthemostinfluentialproponentofdevelopmentalisminthe20thcentury,
distinguishedthethoughtofSocratesintheearlydialoguesandSocratesinthe
middleastworadicallyseparatephilosophies.AccordingtoVlastos,Socrates,in
thesetwoperiods,
pursuesphilosophiessodifferentthattheycouldnothavebeendepictedas
cohabitingthesamebrainthroughoutunlessithadbeenthebrainofa
schizophrenic.Theyaresodiverseincontentandmethodthattheycontrast
assharplywithoneanotheraswithanythirdphilosophyyoucareto
mention….(Vlastos1991,46)
Manyotherscholarsagreethatthereisauniquephilosophicalpositioninthe
earlydialogues,eitherbelongingtothehistoricSocratesorinfluencedbyhim,
andtheirworkhasgivenrisetothefieldofSocraticstudies.4
Inthispaper,Ichallengethepositionthatthereisaradicalshiftbetween
Socrates’philosophyintheearlydialoguesandthatinthemiddlebyofferinga
competingexplanationofthedifferencesinthetwoperiods.5Iproposethat
thesedistinguishingcharacteristicsoftheearlydialoguesdisplaySocrates’use
ofthe“summoners”(parakaloËnta)describedinRepublic7andarethus
4 See, for example, Terrence Irwin (1977), Gerosimos Santas (1979), Terrence Penner (1992), Hugh
Benson (1992), and Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith (1994).
5 Other scholars who argue against a sharp distinction between Socrates’ philosophy in the early and
middle dialogues include Julia Annas (1999, 12), Charles Kahn (1996, 39), and Christopher Rowe
(2007, 4-5).
3
explainedbyPlato’smiddleperiodepistemology.6Asaconsequence,myposition
isconsistentwithunitarianism,theviewthatthereisafundamentalunityin
Plato’scorpusandcontinuitybetweenperiods.7Myargumentisinfoursections.
Inthefirst,IestablishtheimportanceofsummonersinPlato’smiddleperiod
epistemology.Inthesecond,IarguethatPlatois,intheearlydialogues,awareof
theimportantfunctionplayedbysummonersanddepictsSocrates’attemptsto
summoninterlocutors.IarguethatSocratesembarksonhisdivinemissionasa
resultofthesummoningprocessandthat,inperformanceofhisdivinemission,
Socratesuseselenchusinanattempttosummonothers.Afterestablishingthese
points,Iargueinsection3thatPlatousesSocrates’failedsummoningattempts
toestablishaframeworkforsummoningreaders.Isupportthisclaimwitha
closereadingoftheLaches.Inthefinalsection,Iarguethatthefeaturesunique
totheearlydialoguesmaybeexplainedintermsofSocrates’andPlato’s
attemptstoinitiatethesummoningprocess,andItraceouttheimplicationsmy
hypothesisforthedebatebetweenunitariansanddevelopmentalists.
6 For more on summoners, see Miriam Byrd (2007, 365-381) and Nicholas Smith (2000, 126-40).
7 Charles Kahn defines unitarianism as follows: “The unitarian tradition tends to assume that the
various dialogues are composed from a single point of view, and that their diversity is to be explained
on literary and pedagogical grounds, rather than as a change in the author’s philosophy. Different
dialogues are seen as exploring the same problem from different directions, or as leading the reader to
deeper levels of reflection” (1996, 38).
4
I.SummonersintheMiddleDialogues
IntheRepublicandthePhaedo,bothconsideredtobemiddledialogues,
Socratesassignssummonersanimportantroleinepistemologicaldevelopment.
InRepublic7,afterdescribinghiseducationalphilosophy,Socratesexplicitly
describessummonersandsituatesthemwithinhispedagogicaltheory.
FollowinghisfamousallegoryofthecaveatRepublic514a-517b,Socratesstates
hisviewofeducation.At518b9-10heexplains:“Educationisn’twhatsome
peopledeclareittobe,namely,puttingknowledgeintosoulsthatlackit,like
puttingsightintoblindeyes.”8Rather,hecontinues:
Ourpresentdiscussion,ontheotherhand,showsthatthepowertolearnis
presentineveryone’ssoulandthattheinstrumentwithwhicheachlearnsis
likeaneyethatcannotbeturnedaroundfromdarknesstolightwithout
turningthewholebody.Thisinstrumentcannotbeturnedaroundfromthat
whichiscomingintobeingwithoutturningthewholesouluntilitisableto
studythatwhichisandthebrightestthingthatis,namely,theonewecallthe
good.(518c3-d1)
Theallegoryofthecaverepresentsthisturningoftheeyeofthesoulasa
forcibleturningofthebody.Inthecontextofdiscussingeducationinthegood
city,Socratesappointssummonersasignificantroleinthisprocess.At521a-d,in
theprocessofinvestigatinghowphilosopherswilldevelopwithinhiscity,
Socratesraisesthequestionofwhatwillleadthemfromdarknesstolightand
turnthesoulfrombecomingtobeing.Answeringhisownquestionat522a,
8 All translations of the Republic are from Grube and Reeve (1992).
5
Socratessaysthatnumberandcalculation,or“[t]hatinconsequentialmatterof
distinguishingtheone,thetwo,andthethree”(522c5-6),willfulfilltheroleof
thepersonphysicallyturningtheprisoner’sbodyintheallegory.
However,accordingtoSocrates,nooneusescalculationcorrectly,thatis,asa
summoningprocess.Heassertsthat“somesenseperceptionsdon’tsummonthe
understandingtolookintothem,becausethejudgmentofsenseperceptionis
itselfadequate,whileothersencourageitineverywaytolookintothem,
becausesenseperceptionseemstoproducenosoundresult”(523a9-b5).
Socratesdistinguishesthelatterassummoners.
Asummoner,accordingtoSocrates,isaperceptionthatappearstobe
contradictory,suchasthesameobjectappearingtobebothtallandshortor
hardandsoft.Heusestheexampleofsomeoneholdingoutathumb,index
finger,andmiddlefinger.Whenoneobservestheindexfinger,perception
presentsoppositequalities.Theindexfingerisbigincomparisontothethumb,
butitissmallincomparisontothemiddlefinger.Perceptionpresentstheone
fingerasbeingsimultaneouslylargeandsmall,whichcausesthesoultobeat
loss(épore›n).9Puzzled,thesoulissummonedtousecalculation.Thoughprior
toencounteringasummonerthesoulbelievedthedataofitssensestobetrue
9 Socrates uses the term “épore›n” at 524a6 and e5. The verb “épor°v” means to be at loss, in
difficulty, puzzled, or at an impasse. Note that Socrates’ description of how summoners bring the soul
to aporia parallels Diotima’s description in the Symposium of the conception of Eros, who is a
personification of the philosopher. Penia, scheming to get beyond her lack of resources (épor€an),
managestobecomepregnantbyPoros(203b8-9). Eros is her offspring.
6
andtooksensationtobereality,thesummonerbringsittoaporia.Thesoul
realizesthatonethingcannotsimultaneouslyhaveoppositequalitiesinthe
samerespect,anditinvokescalculationtoresolvethecontradiction.Calculation
separatestheintelligibleobjects,bignessandsmallness,fromtheperception.
Platowrites:
Thenit’slikelythatinsuchcasesthesoul,summoningcalculationand
understanding,firsttriestodeterminewhethereachofthethingsannounced
toitisoneortwo.
Ofcourse.
Ifit’sevidentlytwo,won’teachbeevidentlydistinctandone?
Yes.
Then,ifeachisone,andbothtwo,thesoulwillunderstandthatthetwoare
separate,foritwouldn’tunderstandtheinseparabletobetwo,butrather
one.(524b3-6)
Whereasthesoulbeganbygraspingonesenseperception,itnowdistinguishes
theintelligibleentitiesfromtheperceptioninwhichtheyappearandattemptsto
grasptheforms.Platowrites:
Andisn’titfromthesecasesthatitfirstoccurstoustoaskwhatthebigis
andwhatthesmallis?
Absolutely.
And,becauseofthis,wecalledtheonetheintelligibleandtheotherthe
visible.(524c7-10)
7
Havingbegunpracticingcalculation,thesoulisreadytostudythemathematical
sciencesrecommendedbySocratesfortheeducationoffuturerulers.
ThoughSocratesdoesnotrefertosummonersbynameinthePhaedo,wesee
analogousintellectualpuzzleswhichplayasimilarepistemologicalrole.
Recollection,theprocesswherebysensiblethingsbringtomindourprior
knowledgeoftheforms,consistsofbeingsummoned,asisshowninthe
followingexcerptfromSocrates’descriptionofrecollectiontoSimmias:
Donotequalstonesandstickssometimes,whileremainingthesame,appear
toonetobeequalandtoanothertobeunequal–Certainlytheydo.
Butwhatoftheequalsthemselves?Havetheyeverappearedunequaltoyou,
orequalitytobeinequality?
Never,Socrates.
Theseequalthingsandtheequalitselfarethereforenotthesame?
Idonotthinktheyarethesameatall,Socrates.
Butitisdefinitelyfromtheequalthings,thoughtheyaredifferentfromthat
equal,thatyouhavederivedandgraspedtheknowledgeofequality?10(74b-
7-c6)
Whensomeonesees,forexample,apairofsticksthatappearequal,onenotices
thatinsomeaspectthesesticksalsoappearunequal.Thesticks,appearingto
haveoppositecharacteristics,provokethesoultothought.Intryingtoresolve
thecontradiction,thesoulseparatesouttheequalfromtheunequal,andrealizes
10 All translations of the Phaedo are from Grube (1981).
8
thattheequalitself,unliketheequalsticks,canneverappeartobeunequal.
Sensibleobjects,thetwosticks,havepromptedthesoultorecollectaform.
WhenSocratesrecountshisowneducationaljourneyinlines96a-101e,he
saysthatapparentcontradictionscausedhimtoabandonhispursuitofnatural
scienceanditsemphasisonthesensesandappealinsteadtotheformsascausal
explanations.Forexample,sightsuggestedtoSocratesthatalargemanwas
tallerthanasmallonebyahead.Thisexplanationofwhyonemanwastaller
thananotherprovedinadequate,however,forSocratesrealizedthatitledto
contradiction,“first,becausethebiggerisbiggerandthesmallersmallerbythe
same,thenbecausethebiggerisbiggerbyaheadwhichissmall….”(101a9-10).
ResolutionofthehypothesisinvolvesSocrates’separatingoutbignessand
smallnessfromtheperceptionofthetwomen.Socrates’newexplanationis
“thatitisthroughbignessthatbigthingsarebigandthebiggerarebigger,and
thatsmallerthingsaremadesmallbysmallness”(100e4-6).11
II.Socrates’DivineMissionandSummonersintheEarlyDialogues
ThesummoningprocessisevidentinSocrates’accountofhowheembarked
onhisdivinemission.HerelatesthathisfriendChaerephontraveledtoDelphi
andaskedtheoracleifanymanwaswiserthanSocrates.Theoracleanswered
thatnomanwaswiser.Socrates,uponbeinginformedofthis,wasperplexed
andasked:
11 Socrates uses similar puzzles in the Theaetetus. See 154c and 155b. At 155d he expresses approval
of Theaetetus’ puzzlement and describes it as the beginning of philosophy.
9
Whateverdoesthegodmean?Whatishisriddle(ka‹�t€�poteafin€ttetai)?I
amveryconsciousthatIamnotwiseatall;whatthendoeshemeanby
sayingthatIamthewisest?Forsurelyhedoesnotlie;itisnotlegitimatefor
himtodoso.12(21b4-8)
Socratesisherepresentedwithanapparentcontradictionverysimilartothe
summonersmentionedinRepublic7.WhenSocrateshearstheoracle’sanswer
toChaerephon’squestion,heisfacedwithaninconsistencythatprovokeshis
thought.Socratesperceiveshimselfaslackinginwisdom,andhebelievesthat
thisperceptionistrue.However,thegod,whomherespectsandtrusts,hassaid
thatnomaniswiserthanSocrates,whichSocratesinterpretsasthegodsaying
thatSocratesisthewisestofmen.Socratesbelievesthatthegodspeaksonly
truth.Whentheoracle’sanswerisaddedtoSocrates’beliefsthatheisnotwise
andthatthegoddoesnotlie,Socratesrecognizesthatheisfacedwith
contradiction.Socratesexperiencesaporiawhenconfrontedwiththegod’s
riddle.InApology21b7herecounts:“ForalongtimeIwasatloss(ÆpÒroun) as
tohismeaning….”Socrateshasbeenbroughttothefirststageofthesummoning
process:perplexityandadesiretoresolvetheapparentcontradiction.
Findinghimselfinaporia,Socratessetsouttosolvethepuzzlebysearchingfor
amanwiserthanhimselfsothathecanrefutetheoracle.Uponquestioning
“wise”men,Socratesdiscoversthat,thougheachbelievedhimselftobewise,
nonewas.Socratesevendiscoversthathe,inaway,waswiserthantheybecause
heisawareofhisownignorancewhereastheyarenot(21d).Socratessaysthat,12 All translations of the Apology are from Grube (1981).
10
becauseoftheimportanceheattachedtotheoracle,hecontinuedtoquestion
prominentmeninorderto“provetheoracleirrefutable”(22a8),andtheresults
haveconvincedhimthatthegod’smessageissomethingtothiseffect:“This
manamongyou,mortals,iswisestwho,likeSocrates,understandsthathis
wisdomisworthless”(23b2-4).Socrateshasnowfoundasolutiontothepuzzle.
Heisnotwiseinrespecttothefactthathedoesnotknowanythingworthwhile,
butheiswiseinrespecttothefactthatheisawareofthelimitationsonhisown
wisdom.
BothintheApologyandinthePhaedo,Socrates’storyofhisownintellectual
developmentincludesadescriptionofbeingsummoned,andtheactofbeing
summonedisplacedatsomeimportantjunctureinhislife.InthePhaedo,after
beingsummonedSocratesgivesupnaturalisticexplanationsandinsteadappeals
tothehypothesisoftheforms,whichservesasthephilosophicalfoundationof
themiddledialogues.IntheApology,Socrates’experienceofsolvingtheoracle’s
riddlehasanequallymomentousimpact.Socrates,speakingofthegod,says:
“whenhesaysthisman,Socrates,heisusingmynameasanexample
(parãdeigµa)”(23b1).Socratesissayingthatthegodwishestousehimasa
rolemodelforothers,andhethinksthatwhatthegodwishestoillustrateisthat
mortalswouldbewisetounderstandthattheirwisdomisworthless.He
continues:
SoevennowIcontinuethisinvestigationasthegodbademe–andIgo
aroundseekingoutanyone,citizenorstranger,whomIthinkwise.ThenifI
11
donotthinkheis,Icometotheassistanceofthegodandshowhimthatheis
notwise.(23b5-9)
IarguethatnotjustSocrates’humanwisdom,butalsohissuccessfully
undergoingthesummoningprocess,makeshimexemplary.Accordingto
Socrates’accountofChaerephon’svisittotheoracle,Socratesdoesnotmerely
acknowledgethatheisfacedwithariddleandgiveup,declaringhisignorance,
butheissummonedtoanswertheriddle,takesgreatpainsinhisinvestigation,
andisabletomovebeyondhisformeropinionsandfindasolution.Socratesisa
worthymodelforothersnotonlybecauseofhisabilitytorecognizethathehas
beenbroughttoaporia,butalsoduetohisabilitytoprogressbeyondthatpoint.
Socrates’activityofexaminingandcross-examiningothers(29e)representshis
ongoingfightagainstcomplacencybycontinuingtheinvestigationofhis
assumptions.Asexplanationofwhyhepersistsinquestioningpeopleeven
thoughhehascollectedareasonableamountofsamples,Socratessaysthathe
keepsonsothattheoraclewillremainunrefuted.Socratesmovesbeyondhisold
assumptionsinhissolutiontotheriddle,butratherthanallowhisnew
assumptionstosolidifyintothebeliefthathehas“knowledge”,Socrates,by
continuingtheinvestigation,admitsthehypotheticalnatureofhisinterpretation
andhiswillingnesstore-examinebeliefs.
Socrates’professionofignorancecontributestohisactingasarolemodelfor
fellowAthenians.13Heoftenexemplifiesthesummoningprocessbybecoming
13 Whether or not Socrates is genuinely perplexed by an impasse to which he has led an interlocutor, I
believe that his actions present us with a positive role model since we should recognize puzzling
12
puzzledalongwithhisinterlocutorsintheearlydialogues.Hemodelsonewhois
challengedbyriddlesandisattemptingtoworkoutinconsistenciesinbelief.At
theendoftheLaches,forexample,Socratesdeclareshimselftobeinthesame
stateofperplexityashisinterlocutors,declaring:“asthematterstands,weare
allinthesamedifficulty”(200e6).14InCharmides165b,Socrates,speakingto
Critias,asserts:
youaretalkingtomeasthoughIprofessedtoknowtheanswerstomyown
questionsandasthoughIcouldagreewithyouifIreallywished.Thisisnot
thecase—rather,becauseofmyownignorance,Iamcontinually
investigatinginyourcompanywhateverisputforward.15(165b5-c2)
Critias,unconvinced,accusesSocratesofjusttryingtorefutehim,andSocrates
replies:
Oh,come,Isaid,howcouldyoupossiblythinkthatevenifIweretorefute
everythingyousay,IwouldbedoingitforanyotherreasonthantheoneI
wouldgiveforathoroughinvestigationofmyownstatements—thefearof
unconsciouslythinkingIknowsomethingwhenIdonot.AndthisiswhatI
claimtobedoingnow,examiningtheargumentformyownsakeprimarily,
butperhapsalsoforthesakeofmyfriends.(166c6-d6)
problems for what they are and have the appropriate reaction of being humbled and perplexed. See
Gareth Mathews (1997) for the position that Socrates’ declarations of ignorance reveal a genuine and
appropriate perplexity.
14 All translations of the Laches are from Sprague (1992).
15 All translations of the Charmides are from Sprague (1992).
13
AsimilarproblemisfoundintheMeno.There,MenoaccusesSocratesof
puttinghimunderaspellsothatheisperplexedandcompareshimtothe
torpedofishthatmakesanyoneittouchesnumb.Socratesretorts:“Nowifthe
torpedofishisitselfnumbandsomakesothersnumb,thenIresembleit,butnot
otherwise,forImyselfdonothavetheanswerwhenIperplexothers,butIam
moreperplexedthananyonewhenIcauseperplexityinothers”(80c7-d1).16
Socratesdoesnotjustprovideanexampleofthesummoningprocess,buthe
triestosummonothersashehimselfwassummoned.Whenperplexedbythe
oracle’sanswertoChaerephon,Socratesidentifiesthepronouncementasa
riddle.Hisreferencetoriddles,inthecontextofquestioningothers,indicates
thatheistryingtobringthem,also,toaporia.Forexample,inRepublic1,when
Polemarchusbaseshisdefinitionofjusticeasbenefitingfriendsandharming
enemiesonSimonides’statementthat“itisjusttogivetoeachwhatisowedto
him”(331e,332a-b).Socratescastsdoubtonthedefinition,saying:“Itseems
thenthatSimonideswasspeakinginriddles(±in€jato)—justlikeapoet!”
(332b9-10).Socratesthenimmediatelylaunchesaseriesofargumentsthat
convincePolemarchus,too,thatthisstatementispuzzling.Polemarchusloses
hisconceitofknowledge,rejectshisformerdefinition,andiswillingtojoin
Socratesininquiry.WeseeasimilarexampleintheCharmides.Charmidessays
thatherememberssomeonesayingthattemperanceismindingone’sown
business.Socratescallsthedefinitionariddle,saying:“ifwesucceedinfinding
outwhatitmeans,Ishouldbesurprised,becauseitseemstobeasortofriddle16 All translations of the Meno are from Grube (1981).
14
(afin€gµati)”(161c7-9).Immediatelyafterward,SocratesquestionsCharmides
untilheispuzzled.AftershowingCharmidesthatthedefinition,asheand
Socratesinterpretedit,leadstoabsurdity,Socratescasthisnetforabiggerfish,
thetrueauthorofthestatement,Critias.At162a-bSocratestwicerepeatsthe
claimthatthepersongivingthisdefinitionmusthavebeenriddling.OnceCritias
enterstheargument,Socratesleadshimthroughagruelingquestioningprocess
duringwhichCritiasbecomesperplexed,thoughheunsuccessfullyattemptsto
concealthisfact(169c-d).SocratesalludestoriddlesonceagainintheApology,
butmockinghisaccuser,heplacesMeletusinthepositionofriddler.Protesting
theimpietycharge,SocratessaysofMeletus:
Heislikeonewhocomposedariddle(a‡nigµa)andistryingitout:‘Willthe
wiseSocratesrealizethatIamjestingandcontradictingmyself,orshallI
deceivehimandothers?”Ithinkhecontradictshimselfintheaffidavit,asif
hesaid:‘Socratesisguiltyofnotbelievingingodsbutbelievingingods….
(26e10-27a7)
Continuing,Socratessays:“Youmusthavemadethisdeposition,Meletus,either
totestusorbecauseyouwereatalosstofindanytruewrongdoingofwhichto
accuseme”(27e3).Socratesgoesoninlines27b-28atobringoutthe
inconsistencyinMeletus’impietycharges.Inallthreeoftheseexamples,
Socratesdeclareshisintentiontoshowthataknowledgeclaimisinconsistent
withtheinterlocutors’otherbeliefsbydrawingattentiontoitasaperplexing
riddle.Then,Socratesusesquestionandanswertobringtheinterlocutorto
15
perplexityonthematter,revealingtohimthathedoesnotknowallhebelieved
himselftoknow.17
Socrates’attemptstosummoninterlocutorsarenotlimitedtoinstancesin
whichheexplicitlyreferstoriddles.Theaboveexamplesareallinstancesof
Socrates’uniquestyleofquestioningothersinthecourseofhisdivinemission.
IthasbecomecommonpracticetorefertoSocrates’patternofquestioninginthe
earlydialoguesbythisterm.18Lately,however,scholarshavechallengedboth
theassumptionthatSocrateshasamethodandtheassumptionthatthismethod
iselenchus.19Socrates’useofelenchususuallyfollowsacertainpattern.
Socrates’interlocutormakesaknowledgeclaim,oftenintheformofamoral
definition.Socratesnextaskstheinterlocutoraseriesofquestions,eliciting
otherbeliefsfromhim.Socratesthenshowsthattheinterlocutor’sanswers
implythenegationoftheoriginalknowledgeclaim.Fromthis,Socrates
concludesthatthereisaninconsistencyinthebeliefset.Atthispointthe
17Michael C. Stokes notes Socrates’ use of riddling in these three dialogues and argues for a similarity
between passages, but he uses this information as support for the claim that Socrates is treating the
oracle as he does his human interlocutors (1992, 39-41).
18 For an early and influential discussion of elenchus, see Robinson (1953).
19 For scholars who deny that elenchus is a method, see Brickhouse and Smith (2002, 147, 154-156)
and David Wolfsdorf (2003, 301-2). For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that elenchus is a
philosophical practice whereby Socrates refutes or cross-examines stated knowledge claims.
16
interlocutorisshownthathemustrejecteitherhisinitialclaimoroneofhis
otherbeliefs.20
Elenchushasgreatpotentialtosummon.First,itdisturbstheinterlocutor’s
complacencybypresentinghimwithacontradictionwithinhisaccount.Ideally,
thisawarenessthatone’saccountisnotsufficient,combinedwiththeunsolved
puzzlecreatedbythecontradiction,motivatestheinterlocutortoinitiate
thought.Finally,throughstrugglingtoresolvethecontradiction,theinterlocutor
makesepistemologicalprogress.TheslaveboydemonstrationintheMeno
presentsuswithanincomplete,butmoderatelysuccessful,exampleofSocrates’
summoningthroughelenchus.ThoughSocratesreferstotheprocessas20Accordingtotheso-calledconstructivistinterpretation,Socratesthinksthat
hehasestablishedthattheinterlocutors’thesisisfalse.Forexample,in“The
SocraticElenchus,”Vlastosdefinesthepatternof‘StandardElenchus’asfollows:
“(1)TheinterlocutorassertsathesiswhichSocratesconsidersfalseandtargets
forrefutation.(2)Socratessecuresagreementtofurtherpremises,sayqandr
(eachofwhichmaystandforaconjunctofpropositions).Theargumentisad
hoc:Socratesarguesfromqandrbutnottothem.(3)Socratesthenargues,and
theinterlocutoragrees,thatqandrentailnot-p.(4)ThereuponSocratesclaims
thatnot-phasbeenprovedtrue,pfalse”(1983,39).Non-constructivistsdeny
thatSocratesisusingelenchustosupportpositiveknowledgeclaims.For
examplesoftheirarguments,seeBenson(1995),Stokes(1986),andGrote
(1888,449-50,and457).IbelievethatBensonmakesaconvincingcaseand
sharehisposition.
17
recollection,hispatternofquestioningisthesameasthatusedearlierinthe
dialogueinhiselencticexaminationofMeno.Inthisdemonstration,Socrates
beginsquestioningaslaveboy,askinghimtosolveageometricalproblem.At
first,theboythinksthatheknowstheanswer.AsSocratescontinuestoquestion
him,however,andshowhimtheproblemswithhismathematicalreasoning,the
slaveboyrealizesthathedoesnotknowtheanswerandbecomespuzzled.
Describingthebenefitsofelenchus,Socratessaysthat,priortotheexamination,
theboy“thoughtheknew,andansweredconfidentlyasifhedidknow,andhe
didnotthinkhimselfataloss,butnowhedoesthinkhimselfataloss,andashe
doesnotknow,neitherdoeshethinkheknows”(84a7-10).Accordingto
Socrates,findinghimselfinaporiamotivatestheboytoseekanswers.Socrates
asks:“Doyouthinkthatbeforehewouldhavetriedtofindoutthatwhichhe
thoughtheknewthoughhedidnot,beforehefellintoperplexityandrealizedhe
didnotknowandlongedtoknow?”(84c4-6).21Theboy’scuriosityand
willingnesstocontinuesubmittinghimselftoSocrates’questioningresultsinhis
eventuallylookingintherightdirectionandseeingthecorrectanswer.Though
elenchusleadstoapositiveresultfortheslaveboy,thesummoningprocessis
leftincomplete.Theboy,atthisstage,onlyhastrueopinion–heseesthatthe
answeriscorrect,buthecannotprovideanaccount.However,Socratesclaims
that“ifhewererepeatedlyaskedthesesamequestionsinvariousways,you
21 In Sophist 230b-d, the Eleatic visitor presents a similar view of beneficial effects of a process that
appears to be elenchus.
18
knowthatintheendhisknowledgeaboutthesethingswouldbeasaccurateas
anyone’s”(85c8-d1).
ThesuccessofSocrates’summoningprocessdependsupontheinterlocutor.
Elenchuspresentstheinterlocutorwithcontradictionswithinhisownthought.
But,onceSocratesrevealsthoseinconsistencies,theinterlocutoristheonewho
chooseseithertoacknowledgeordenythatheisinaporia.Likewise,the
interlocutorchooseswhethertobecomeeagerforinquiryor,alternatively,sink
backintocomplacencyandignoretheproblem.22Socratescanusequestionsin
anattempttoturnaninterlocutor’sattentioninahelpfuldirection,buthe
cannotforcesomeoneblindedbyfalsebeliefstofocusonwhatisbeforehim.At
most,Socratescansetupasummoningopportunity;hecannotforcetheprocess.
Understandably,elencticdialoguestendtohaveinconclusiveendingsinwhich
problemsremainunresolved.
III.Plato’sAttempttoSummonReaders
WiththeexceptionofhisslaveboydemonstrationintheMeno,Socrates’
attemptstosummonproveunsuccessful—thoughinterlocutorsarebroughtto
contradiction,theydonotacknowledgebeinginastateofaporiaandgiveupon
attemptstoresolveinconsistencieswithintheiraccounts.23WhywouldPlato
22 As an anonymous referee has pointed out, Socrates’ description of his role as midwife in Theaetetus
150d-151b supports this point.
23 Socrates’ failure is underscored by Plato’s choice, as interlocutors, of historical figures such as
Alcibiades, Charmides, Critias, and Meno, who had already become notorious for their lack of virtue.
19
writedialogueafterdialogueshowingSocratesfailinhismission?Ipositthatat
leastonereasonPlatoallowsSocratestofailtimeaftertimeisthatheisusing
Socrates’attemptstosummontheinterlocutortosummonus.WereSocrates’
interlocutorscarefullytoexaminetheirbeliefs,identifyquestionable
assumptions,andsucceedinresolvingcontradictions,readerswouldbeleftwith
theopinionsofothersratherthanwithpuzzlesdesignedtoprovokethought.
SincePlatodoesnotspeakinhisownvoiceinthedialogues,anythesis
concerninghisintentisdifficulttosupport.Manyscholarsassumethatthemain
speakerofadialogue,usuallySocrates,isthemouthpieceforPlato.Onthebasis
ofthisassumption,theyusethewordsofthemouthpiecetosupporttheirclaims
concerningPlato’sbeliefsandintent.Thisapproachisnotopentome,however.
SincePlatomakesaconsciouschoicetoavoidspeakinginhisownvoice,I
believethatacceptingthemouthpieceassumptionispresumptuous.24Ihave
freelyquotedfromSocratesinthemiddledialoguestosupportmyclaimthat
Socrates,intheearlydialogues,employsapedagogicaltechniquehecontinuesto
endorseinthemiddleperiod.However,inthatcase,IuseSocrates’wordsin
ordertosupportaclaimaboutthebeliefandactionofthedramaticcharacter.I
wouldbeonmuchweakergroundifIweretousethatapproachtosupporta
claimaboutPlato’sintent.25
24 The mouthpiece assumption, prominent though it is, has been challenged in recent years. See, for
example, Press (2000).
25 Another option is appealing to Plato’s letters. Letter VII does not mention summoners, but the views
expressed at 341c-e do express a pedagogical philosophy consistent with use of aporetic dialogues to
20
TheveryfactthatPlatowrotehisdialoguesforanaudience,however,offers
someinsightintohisintent;itisreasonabletosupposethathehopedtoaffect
readersinsomebeneficialway.26Plato’srepeatedrepresentationsofSocrates’
elencticencountersindicatethathetooktheprocessofbringinginterlocutorsto
aporiaseriously.Thisdoesnotprovethatheendorsedit,sincehemighthave
hadsomeothergoalinemphasizingit.However,ifPlatodidbelievethatbeing
summonedwasimportanttoengaginginphilosophicalinquiry,andheintended
hisdialoguestohaveabeneficialinfluenceonhisaudience,itislikelythat
aporeticdialogueswerecraftedtosummonreaders.
MyargumentusesaclosereadingoftheLachestoshowthat,ifonelooksatthe
dialogueasawhole,Platohascreatedadditionalpuzzlesforthereader.The
reasonIhavechosentofocusonjustonedialogueratherthanpresentrelevant
passagesfrommanyisthatmyclaimrequirescontextualevidencethatcanonly
beprovidedbyexaminingthedialogueasaunifiedwhole.27Ihavechosenthe
Lachesbecauseitiswidelyrecognizedtobeoneoftheearlierdialoguesandit
summon readers. Because this letter has not been definitively identified as Plato’s, however, it offers
weak support for my position.
26 See Rowe’s argument for the persuasive function of the dialogues (2007, 9-12).
27 I recommend Edward Halper’s discussion of “evidentiary literalism,” the assumption that, because
the mouthpiece gives Plato’s philosophy, the only acceptable evidence for an interpretation of Plato’s
dialogues is what is explicitly asserted. Halper (1993), appealing to the differences between a
philosophic treatise and a Platonic dialogue, proposes that both structural and contextual evidence are
important for understanding Socrates’ arguments, and he correctly points out that evidentiary literalism
is hardly neutral since it rejects any interpretation appealing to implicit arguments in the text.
21
representsSocratesconductinghisdivinemissionasdescribedintheApology.I
showthatSocratesisattemptingtoleadinterlocutorstocompletethe
summoningprocess,butflawsintheircharacterpreventhimfromsucceeding.I
thendemonstratethatPlatoisusingSocrates’failedattemptsinorderto
summonreaders.
Thedialoguebeginswithaconversationbetweentwooldergentlemen,
LysimachusandMelesias,whohaveinvitedthegenerals,LachesandNicias,to
attendwiththemStesilaus’demonstrationoftheartoffightinginarmor.
Lysimachusexplainsthat,sincethegeneralstooarefathers,theyseektheir
counselinthematterofhowtoraisetheirsonsThucydidesandAristides,also
present,tobegoodmen.Theywishtoknowiflessonsinfightinginarmorwill
improvetheirsons,andtheyaskadviceaboutotherpursuitsthatwouldbenefit
theboys.Socrateshappenstobepresentattheeventand,throughthe
promptingofLachesandNicias,isinvitedtojointheconversation.Thoughthe
subsequentconversationoriginatesindebateoverthebenefitoflearning
Stesilaus’art,withthetwogeneralsarguingopposingpositions,Socratesre-
framestheirdiscussionbyleadinghisinterlocutorstoseethattherealconcern
ismakingtheboysvirtuous.Socratesexpressesconcernoverwhetheranyofthe
menpresenthavethisknowledge(186a-c).LysimachusandMelesiasareaware
thattheylackit,butthegeneralsseemconfidentthattheyarequalifiedtogive
counselonthesubject.Inordertopreventthemadvisingoutofignoranceand
harmingtheyoungmen,Socratessetsthestageforaseriesofelenctic
arguments.Hepointsoutthattheknowledgerelevanttocaringforyoungmen’s
22
soulsisknowledgeofvirtue(189d-190c).Sinceinvestigationofthewholeof
virtueappearstobetoodifficult,Socratesrecommendsinvestigatingonepart,
courage(190c-d).Hecontinuesontoaskthegeneralstotellhimwhatcourage
is.
Earlyinthedialogue,beforeelenchusbegins,Platorevealstheinterlocutors’
fundamentalbeliefs.Thegeneral’sspeechesconcerningfightinginarmor
provideanintroductionintotheirviews.Laches’laterdistinctionbetweenlogoi
(words)anderga(deeds),madeat188d,isanticipatedhere.Niciasappearsto
valuelogoiovererga.Hecallsfightinginarmora“branchofstudy”(181e1),and
assumesthat,assuch,itisbeneficial(Hoerber1968,99).Heextolsitsvalue,
claimingthatitinitiatesloveoflearning:
suchastudyarousesinusthedesireforanotherfineformofinstruction,
sinceeverymanwholearnstofightinarmorwillwanttolearnthesubject
thatcomesnext,thatis,thescienceoftactics;andwhenhehasmasteredthis
andtakenprideinit,hewillpressontothewholeartofthegeneral.Soithas
alreadybecomeclearthatwhatisconnectedwiththislatterart,allthe
studiesandpursuitswhicharefineandofgreatvalueforamantolearnand
topractice,havethisstudyasastarting-point.(182b4-c5)
Niciasassumesanassociationbetweencourageandknowledge,declaring:“this
knowledgewillmakeeverymanmuchbolderandbraverinwarthanhewas
before”(182c6-9).Nicias’emphasisonintellectualmattersisemphasizedbyhis
useofthewords“mathema”and“episteme”,ortheirderivatives,eleventimesin
thirty-fivelines(O’Brien1963,142).
23
Laches,ontheotherhand,valuesergaoverlogoi.28Heisagainstthistypeof
trainingduetotheactionsofitspractitioners.Heobservesthatthoughthe
Lacedaemoniansareexpertsinwarcraft,theteachersoffightinginarmor
“regardLacedaemonasforbiddengroundandkeepfromsettingfootinit”
(183b4-6).Inaddition,theteachersofthisartfailtodistinguishthemselvesin
war,evenworse,“themenwhopracticethisartseemtobethosewhohavethe
worstluckatit”(183c7-8).Asanexample,Lachesrecountsaninstanceinwhich
Stesilaus,whohasjustgiventhedisplay,publiclymadeafoolofhimselfinbattle
(183d-e).
Thedistinctionbetweenwordsanddeedsisreflectedinthereasonsbothgive
forbringingSocratesintothediscussion.LachesissurprisedthatMelesiasand
LysimachushavesoughthisandNicias’advicebutnotSocrates’.Onereasonis
Socrates’actions:“heisalwaysspendinghistimeinplaceswheretheyoung
menengageinanystudyornoblepursuitofthesortyouarelookingfor”(180c5-
6).Also,LachespraisesSocratesforhisdeedsonthebattlefield.Lachessays:
Don’tunderanycircumstancesletthemangetaway,Lysimachus—becauseI
haveseenhimelsewherekeepingupnotonlyhisfather’sreputationbutthat
ofhiscountry.HemarchedwithmeintheretreatfromDelium,andIcantell
youthatiftheresthadbeenwillingtobehaveinthesamemanner,ourcity
wouldbesafeandwewouldnotthenhavesufferedadisasterofthatkind.
(181a-b)
28 See similar discussions in Robert Hoerber (1968, 99) and Henry Teloh (1986, 45).
24
Nicias,too,vouchesforSocrates,butherecommendsSocratesforareasonmore
closelyassociatedwithlogoi.NiciasvouchesforSocratesbecause,hesays,
SocratesrecentlyrecommendedthesophistDamon,amanwhoseintellectNicias
findsimpressive,asamusicteacherforhisson(179e-d).Later,immediately
beforeelenchusbegins,thegeneralsdisplaythesesamebasicvalueswhenthey
consenttobequestionedbySocrates.Niciasconsentstoitbecauseheenjoys
intellectualdiscussionwithSocratesandbelievesittobebeneficial.Niciassays:
Itakepleasureintheman’scompany,Lysimachus,anddon’tregarditasat
allabadthingtohaveitbroughttoourattentionthatwehavedoneorare
doingwrong.RatherIthinkthatamanwhodoesnotrunawayfromsuch
treatmentbutiswilling,accordingtothesayingofSolon,tovaluelearningas
longashelives,notsupposingthatoldagebringshimwisdomofitself,will
necessarilypaymoreattentiontotherestofhislife.(188a8-b6)
LachesconsentsbecausehebelievesthatSocrates’deedshaveentitledhimto
speakonthetopicofvirtue.Lachesexplainsthatheenjoyslisteningto
discussionsaboutvirtueandwisdomwhenthespeaker’swordsanddeedsarein
harmonybuthatestolistentoamanwhosedeedsarenotinharmonywithhis
words(188c-d).Here,Lachesshowsapreferencefordeedsoverwords–heis
onlywillingtolistentothewordsofthosewhosedeedsherespects.Concerning
Socrates,Lachessays:
NowIhavenoacquaintancewiththewordsofSocrates,butbeforenow,I
believe,Ihavehadexperienceofhisdeeds,andthereIfoundhimaperson
privilegedtospeakfairwordsandtoindulgeineverykindoffrankness.Soif
25
hepossessesthisabilitytoo,Iaminsympathywiththeman,andIwould
submittobeingexaminedbysuchapersonwiththegreatestpleasure,nor
wouldIfindlearningburdensome,becauseItooagreewithSolon,though
withonereservation–Iwishtogrowoldlearningmanythings,butfromgood
menonly.(188e-189a)
Theinterlocutors’definitionsfollowtheirpreviouslyexpressedbeliefs.When
SocratesasksLachestodefinecourage,Lachesanswersconfidently:“Good
heavens,Socrates,thereisnodifficultyaboutthat:ifamaniswillingtoremain
athispostandtodefendhimselfagainsttheenemywithoutrunningaway,then
youmayrestassuredthatheisamanofcourage”(190e4-7).Thisdefinitionof
courageemphasizesdeedsbutleavesoutpossiblestrategy(Hoerber1968,99).
Laches’definitionistoonarrow.Socratespresentstheexampleofamanwho
fightstheenemyinretreat(191a-c),theactionforwhichLacheshadearlier
praisedSocrates.Lachesnextattemptstodefinecourageas“asortofendurance
ofthesoul”(192c9-10).Thisdefinition,too,stressesaction.Socratespointsout
thatthisdefinitionistoobroad.SocratesguidesLaches’thirdattempt,
persuadinghimtoaddknowledgetothedefinition:wiseenduranceiscourage
(192d).SinceLacheshasattendeddeedstotheexclusionoflogoi,hehasnot
consideredwhatkindofwisdomisnecessaryforcourage.
WhenLachesdefinescourageaswiseendurance,Socratesbeginshiselenchus
bysuggestingthattheyinvestigateinwhatsenseitiswise.Hepresentsalistof
examplesbasedontheimplicitassumptionthattherelevantwisdomisskill
knowledge.Here,heseemstobefollowinguponapointLachesmadeinhis
26
earlierspeechagainstfightinginarmor.At184b,Lacheswarnsthatsomeone
whohasgainedfalseconfidenceduetolearningthisartwilllikelybetoobrash,
ratherthanbrave,inbattle.Thisimpliesthathavingtechnicalskillisnecessary
forbeingbrave.
Itturnsoutthat,inthecontextoftheseexamples,Lachesthinksthattheactsof
foolishendurancearethemorecourageousones.Forexample,Lachesbelieves
thatamanwhoenduresinbattlebecauseheknowsthatreinforcementsareon
theirwayandthathissidewillhavegreaterstrengthislesscourageousthanone
whoenduresinbattlewithoutthisknowledge(193A-B).Similarly,Laches
believesthatthosewhodiveintowellswithoutbeingskilledarebraverthan
thosewhodosowithtraining(193C).Laches’reactiontotheseexamplesshows
thatthenotionofcourageheusesinordertopickoutindividualcasesof
courageousbehaviorisdifferentfromthedefinitionhehasgiven.Also,his
reactionimpliesthathebelievesthatcourageisfoolishendurance,whichis
oppositetohisdefinition.Notonlyiscourageasfoolishendurancecontradictory
tohisstateddefinition;itcreatesinconsistencywhenaddedtohisbeliefsthat
courageisnoble(193D)andfoolishendurancedisgracefulandharmful(192D,
193D).
AfterperformingelenchusonLaches,Socratessuggeststhattheyalsosummon
Niciastothehunt(194B).Nicias’definition,too,followsfromthebeliefshehas
expressedearlier.Nicias,whovalueslogoiovererga,discardsthenotionthat
enduranceplaysaroleincourage,and,drawingonasayingheattributesto
Socrates,“thateveryoneofusisgoodwithrespecttothatinwhichheiswise
27
andbadinrespecttothatinwhichheisignorant”(194d1-2),infersthatcourage
isakindofwisdom:“theknowledgeofthefearfulandthehopefulinwarandin
everyothersituation”(194e10-195a2).Thisassociationofknowledgewith
couragewasearlierassumedat182cinhisspeechsupportingStesilaus’art.
SocratessetsthestageforelenchusbyconfirmingthatNiciasdoes,indeed,
believethatcourageisapartofvirtue(198a).Socratesasks:“Anddoyoualso
speakofthesamepartsthatIdo?Inadditiontocourage,Icalltemperanceand
justiceandeverythingelseofthiskindpartsofvirtue.Don’tyou?”(198a7-10).
WhenNiciasanswersintheaffirmative,Socratessays“Weareinagreementon
thesepoints….”(198b2).Socratesthenbeginsconstructinganargumenttoshow
thatNicias’definitionofcourage,combinedwithotherofhisbeliefs,resultsin
inconsistency.SocratesascertainsthatNiciasagreesthat
[W]eregardasfearfulthingsthosethatproducefear,andashopefulthings
thosethatdonotproducefear;andfearisproducednotbyevilswhichhave
happenedorarehappeningbutbythosewhichareanticipated.(198b5-9)
Thenheargues,andNiciasaccepts,thatknowledgeisnotjustofpast,present,or
futurebutofalltimes(198d-199a).Courageis,then,notknowledgeoffuture
goodandevilbutknowledgeofgoodandevil(199c-d).Amanwithknowledgeof
goodandevilhasallofthevirtues.Socratesasks:
Thendoesamanwiththiskindofknowledgeseemtodepartfromvirtuein
anyrespectifhereallyknows,inthecaseofallgoodswhatsoever,whatthey
areandwillbeandhavebeen,andsimilarlyinthecaseofevils?Anddoyou
regardthatmanaslackingintemperanceorjusticeandholinesstowhom
28
alonebelongstheabilitytodealcircumspectlywithbothgodsandmenwith
respecttoboththefearfulanditsopposite,andtoprovidehimselfwithgood
thingsthroughhisknowledgeofhowtoassociatewiththemcorrectly?
(199d4-e3)
Socratesconcludes:“Thenthethingyouarenowtalkingabout,Nicias,would
notbeapartofvirtuebutrathervirtueentire”(199e5-6).Niciasappearstobe
contradictinghimselfbymaintainingthatcourageisbothapartofvirtueandthe
wholeofvirtue.Nicias,too,hasreachedanimpasse.
ThoughSocrateshassuccessfullyperformedelenchusonthegenerals,hehas
notfullybroughtthemtoaporia.SocrateshasmadeprogresswithLaches.
Lachesisawareofinconsistencyinhisbeliefset,agreeingwithSocratesthat
theirdeedsarenotinharmonywiththeirwords(193e).Laches’admissionthat
heisnotinagoodstate(193e)impliesthathewishestoresolvethisproblem,
andSocratesrallieshimtocontinuesearchingforcourage:
letusholdourgroundinthesearchandletusendure,sothatcourageitself
won’tmakefunofusfornotsearchingforitcourageously–ifendurance
shouldperhapsbecourageafterall.(194a1-5)
Lachesexpressesenthusiasmforthesearch,saying“Iamreadynottogiveup,
Socrates,althoughIamnotreallyaccustomedtoargumentsofthiskind.Butan
absolutedesireforvictoryhasseizedmewithrespecttoourconversation….”
(194a6-b1).Atthispoint,Lachesisperplexedaboutamatteraboutwhichhe
wasformerlycomplacent.However,hehasnotfullyarrivedataporia.Hedenies
hisignorance,saying“IstillthinkIknowwhatcourageis,butIcan’tunderstand
29
howithasescapedmejustnowsothatIcan’tpinitdowninwordsandsaywhat
itis”(194b2-5).
ThoughLacheshasbeenstimulatedtoseekanswers,hisneglectoflogoihas
lefthimillequippedforphilosophicalinquiryandhefailstoendureinthesearch
forcourage(Teloh1986,51;Hoerber1968,99;O’Brien1963,141-142;and
Devereaux1977,134).AfterLachesfindshimselfatlossanddoesn’tknowhow
toproceed,SocratesinvitesNiciastodefinecourage,andatSocrates’request,
Lachestakesoverthejobasinterrogator.Nicias,however,ismoreexperienced
inargumentation,andLachessoonrelinquisheshisroleinfrustrationat196c.
EvenwithSocratesatthereigns,at197eLachesdisplaysunwillingnessto
continuetheconversation,eveninapassiverole.WhenSocratesattemptsto
keepLachesengaged,saying“Payattentionandjoinmeinexaminingwhatis
said”(197e7-8),Lachesunenthusiasticallyresponds“Verywell,ifthatseems
necessary”(197e9).ThoughLachesisstillpresent,heisnolongeractively
engagedinthesearch.
Niciasalsofailstoendureinthesearchforcourage.ThoughNiciaspresents
himselfasathinkerandclaimstofindSocraticelenchusbeneficial(188a-c),heis
deficientinlogoi.Afteradmittingthathehasnotsuccessfullydefinedcourage,
Niciasbreaksoffdiscussion(200b).Niciasendstheinvestigation:“AsfarasIam
concernedIthinkenoughhasbeensaidonthetopicforthepresent,andifany
pointhasnotbeencoveredsufficiently,thenlateronIthinkwecancorrectit
bothwiththehelpofDamon…andwiththatofothers”(200b6-7).Niciasoffersto
instructLachesaboutcourageafterDamon,thesophist,hasfoundaresolution
30
(200c).Clearly,Niciashasbeenneithertroublednorperplexedbythe
inconsistencyrevealedinhisthought.
SocratescannotachievehisdesiredresultwithNiciasbecauseNiciasiscontent
withusingthethoughtofothers.Nicias’definitionofcourageisnotreally
originaltohim,butisaninterpretationofoneofSocrates’points.Recallthat,in
introducinghisdefinitionofcourage,Niciassays“Ihaveoftenheardyousaythat
everyoneofusisgoodwithrespecttothatinwhichheiswiseandbadin
respecttothatinwhichheisignorant”(194d1-3).Fromthishereasonsthat
wisdomisanecessaryconditionofcourage(194d),andbuildshisdefinitionon
theideathatvirtueisasortofwisdom(194dff.).Later,whenNicias
distinguishesbetweencourageandboldnessinhisdiscussionwithLaches,
Socrates’attributesNicias’distinctionstosophists.Socratessays:
Nevermindhim,Laches.Idon’tthinkyourealizethathehasprocuredthis
wisdomfromourfriendDamon,andDamonspendsmostofhistimewith
Prodicus,whohasthereputationofbeingbestamongthesophistsatmaking
suchverbaldistinctions.(197d1-5)
WhenNiciasrealizesthathedoesn’tunderstandwhatcourageis,heiscontentto
usewhateversolutionDamonproduces(200b)ratherthantrytofigurethings
outforhimself.Thispatternofusingthethoughtsofothersasasubstitutefor
independentthoughtisreinforcedbythereader’sknowledgeofNicias’
notoriousfailureintheSicilianexpedition.Socrates’remarkat199athat“the
lawdecrees,notthattheseershouldcommandthegeneral,butthatthegeneral
shouldcommandtheseer”remindsthereaderofNicias’real-lifefailureto
31
exhibitcourage.Whenitwastimetowithdrawbysea,Niciaswassuperstitiously
frightenedbyaneclipseofthemoon.Ratherthandemonstratingcourage,he
listenedtoseersanddelayedretreatforamonth.Thislackofintellectualself-
relianceresultedinadevastatingdefeatforAthens(Devereaux1977,134-135;
Hoerber1968,145-6;andTeloh198654).
Thereaderisleftwithapuzzle:theperspectiveofergaalonehasproventobe
deficient.NotonlyhasLachesreachedimpasseduetoignoranceofthekindof
knowledgeassociatedwithcourage,buthislackoflogoihasmadehimfailin
ergaandthuspreventedhimfromresolvingthecontradictiontowhichelenchus
led.Ontheotherhand,Nicias’focusonlogoitotheexclusionofergahasproved
deficientaswell.Nicias’removalof“endurance”fromthedefinitionofcourage
leadstocouragebeingindistinguishablefromthewholeofvirtue.Also,hisown
lackofendurancemakeshimdeficientinlogoi.Failuretoendureinreasoning
thingsoutandlookingforanswershasledhimtobecontentwithusingthe
viewsofotherswithoutunderstandingthem.Thesefailuressuggestboth
wisdomandenduranceareessentialtothedefinitionofcourage(O’Brien1963,
139-140;Devereux1977,135;andHoerber1968,102).Canthetwobe
combined?
Thoughneitherofthegeneralsfightshiswaythroughthedifficultiesof
elenchus,theirconversationwithSocratesofferssomedirectionforthereader
whohasendurance.Forexample,Lachesreachesanimpassebecausehe
associatesthewrongkindofknowledgewithcourageousbehavior.Heappeared
tocontradicthisdefinitionofcourageaswiseendurancebecausehelabeledas
32
courageousexamplesofpeopleenduringthoughtheylackedrelevantskill
knowledge.Ironically,animplicitresolutiontohiscontradictionisprovidedin
thediscussionatlines195b-196b.Nicias,defendinghisownpositionagainstone
ofLaches’criticisms,distinguishesbetweenskillknowledgeandknowledgeof
goodandevil.OneofNicias’examplesinvolvesthecraft-knowledgeofmedicine.
Hepointsoutthatthedoctor’sknowledgeofhowtohealabodyisseparatefrom
theknowledgeofwhetheritisbetterforaparticularindividualtoliveortodie
(195C).Laches,however,refusestoacceptNicias’distinctionandaccuseshimof
being“unwillingtomakeagentlemanlyadmissionthatheistalkingnonsense….”
(196a10-b2).Laches,writingNicias’contributionoffas“emptywords”,doesnot
recognizeitspotentialtoremovehimselffromhisearlierdifficulty.Laches’
inconsistencyisproducedwhenheassociatesthewisdominvolvedincourage
withskillknowledge.IfLachesweretodiscardhisassumptionaboutthetypeof
wisdomrelevanttocourage,hecouldresolvehisproblem(O’Brien1963,139-
140andDevereaux1977,136).29Resurrectingthedefinitionofcourageaswise
enduranceprovidesapossiblesolutiontoNicias’problem.Nicias’definitionof
couragefailstodifferentiatecouragefromvirtueitself,but,ifcourageis
endurancebasedonknowledgeofgoodandevil,couragecanbedistinguished
fromvirtueingeneral.
IV.TheSummonerExplanationanditsImplicationsforDevelopmentalism
29 For a related interpretation, see Teloh (1986, 50 and 55).
33
Ihaveaccountedfortheaporeticfeaturesoftheearlydialogues—Socrates’
declarationsofignorance,useofelenchus,andthedialogues’inconclusive
endings—intermsofSocrates’attemptstosummon.Ihavealsoarguedthat
Platousesthesefeaturestosummonthereader.Thethesisthatdifferences
betweenearlyandmiddledialoguescanbeexplainedasPlato’sapplicationof
middleperiodepistemologyisnotlimitedtoaporeticfeatures,however.Italso
explainsanothermajordifferencebetweenthetwoperiods;whileSocrates
appealstothehypothesisoftheformsinthemiddledialogues,hedoesnot
mentionordiscusstheformsinhisearlierworks.Inresponse,onecanargue
thatlackofmentionoftheformsinearlydialoguesdoesnotentailthatPlatohad
notyetformedanopiniononthesubject.30Moreover,thethesisforwhichIhave
arguedprovidesagoodexplanationforhissilence.Withinthedramaticcontext
oftheearlydialogues,Socratesisdrawingoutandexaminingthethoughtof
interlocutorsinanattempttosummonthem,andsharinghisownviewswould
hinderthisprocess.31Similarly,explicitlypresentingthehypothesisoftheforms
intheearlydialogueswouldpreventthereaderfromgraspingtheformsthrough
herowninquiry.32
30 See, for example, Paul Shorey, (1933, 314); Rowe (2007, 39); and Kahn (1996, 40).
31 Julia Annas makes a good point on the subject. She writes: “Socrates’ lack of position must be
understood to be relative to the context of teaching: he has no doctrine when eliciting other peoples’
views, since if he did, this would interfere with the process of getting views out of them, but this does
not mean he has no positions of his own which can be discussed in a different context (1999, 21).”
32 Kahn also explains silence concerning the forms by appealing to Plato’s pedagogical motives. He
proposes that Plato was aware of how unusual his view was and expected it to be met with hostility,
34
Mythesishasinterestingimplicationsforthedebatebetween
developmentalistsandunitarians.Therearetwocommonapproachesto
attackingdevelopmentalism.Oneischallengingtheaccuracyofthestandard
chronologicalorderingofPlato’sdialogues.33Idonotusethistacticand
tentativelyacceptthedivisionofthedialoguesintothreechronological
periods.34Instead,Ihavetakenthesecondapproach,providinganalternative
explanationofdifferencesbetweenperiods.Byexplaininguniquefeaturesofthe
earlydialoguesasmanifestationsofSocrates’epistemologyinmiddleworks,my
argumentchallengestheinductivecaseforthedevelopmentalistclaimasan
inferencetothebestexplanationandalsobringstolightanimportantpointof
continuitybetweenthetwoperiods.
Myexplanationhasanadvantageoverdevelopmentalisminthatitdoesnot
dependonthecontroversialassumptionthatwehaveanaccuratelinear
chronologyofthedialogues.ThoughIhaveusedthechronologicallabelsof
“early”and“middle”inthispaper,thesummonerexplanationappliesequally
wellwhenwesetasidetheseterms.Thepurportedinconsistencywithwhich
thus the “rhetorical motivation for his use of indirect statement and the device of myth-making, his
holding back and then his gradual, ingressive exposition of the otherworldly metaphysics (1995, 32).”
Rowe, too, argues that Plato, aware of how strange his theories would sound to his contemporaries,
sought to prepare the readers of his early dialogues (2007, 23-25).
33 For scholars who raise serious challenges for the project of ordering the dialogues, see Nails (1995);
Thesleff (1989); and Young (1994).
34 Though developmentalism presupposes acceptance of the standard ordering of the dialogues,
acceptance of the established chronology does not imply developmentalism.
35
I’vebeenconcernedis,atitsmostfundamentallevel,aninconsistencybetween
thestyleandcontentofaporeticdialoguessuchastheLachesandEuthyphroand
so-calleddoctrinaldialoguessuchasthePhaedoandRepublic.35Mysummoner
explanationexplainsthesedifferencesbypositingthattheaporeticdialogues
presentanapplicationofapositionheldincertain“doctrinal”works.In
addition,itsindependencefromchronologyalsogivesitanedgeinaccounting
forinconsistencieswithinasingledialogueorbetweendialoguesassignedtothe
sameperiod.
Thecumulativeforceofattacksagainstdevelopmentalismhasleftusinneedof
abetterexplanationofinconsistencieswithinthedialogues.Iproposethatthe
hypothesisthatSocratesandPlatousesummonersinordertoprovoke
philosophicalthinkingprovidesanalternativeframeworkforinterpretingthe
significanceofcontradictionswithinthePlatoniccorpus.Thisframeworknot
onlypreservesconsistencyforanauthorwhoplacedmuchemphasison
harmonizingone’sbeliefset,itchallengesustotacklePlato’sprovocative
puzzlesandusethemasopportunitiestoengageactivelyinphilosophical
inquiry.36
UNIVERSITIYOFTEXASARLINGTON
35 I question this label because Socrates himself often refers to his main assumptions as hypotheses.
36 I have revised this conclusion in light of questions raised by Gerald Press in his commentary.
36
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