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EMOTIONALJUSTIFICATION

SantiagoEcheverri

UniversityofGeneva

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under whichemotionsareepistemicallyjustifiedorunjustified.Imakethreecontributionsto this researchprogram. First, I show thatwe can generalize some familiarepistemologicalconceptsanddistinctionstoemotionalexperiences.Second,Iusetheseconceptsanddistinctionstodisplaythelimitsofthe‘simpleview’ofemotional justification.On this approach, the justification of emotions stemsonlyfromthecontentsofthementalstatestheyarebasedon,alsoknownastheir cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitivebasesandemotions(re)presenttheirobjectsandpropertiesindifferentways,thencognitivebasesarenotsufficienttojustifyemotions.Third,Iofferanovelsolutiontothegapproblembasedonemotionaldispositions.Thissolution(1)draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2)preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a formof valueskepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and(4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluativeproperties.Keywords: Epistemology of emotions; epistemology of value; epistemicjustification;evaluativeexperience

IfPat’sfearthatterroristswillattackNewYorkCityisbasedonCIA

intelligencereports,herfearisjustified.IfPeterisjealousofhiswifeonthebasis

ofamerehunch,hisjealousyisunjustified.IfYounahasheardfromareliable

witnessthatherfatherisinbetterhealth,sheisjustifiedinbeingelated(e.g.,

DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;Greenspan1988;Huemer2001;Mulligan

1998;Pelser2014;Salmela2006).Emotionscanbeepistemicallyjustifiedor

unjustified.Atheoryofemotionaljustificationseekstospellouttheconditions

underwhichemotionsareepistemicallyjustifiedorunjustified.

Mostrecentworkontheepistemologyofemotionshasratherfocusedon

theircontributiontothejustificationofevaluativejudgments(e.g.,Brady2013;

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BrogaardandChudnoff2016;Brunetal.2008;Döring2003).Thisisunfortunate,

however,becauseemotionaljustificationraisesotherissuesofbroader

significancetoepistemology.Asanillustration,supposethatemotionscanbe

immediatelyjustifiedbymentalstatesdevoidofevaluativecontent.Ifthisviewis

correct,weshouldrevisethecommonideathatimmediatejustificationrequires

thattherepresentationalcontentofthejustifiermentalstatebeidenticaltothe

contentofthejustifiedmentalstate.Thispaperwillcastdoubtonthisassumption.1

Ishallmakethreecontributionstothetheoryofemotionaljustification.

1.Thereissomelackofclarityonwhatemotiontheoristsmeanby

epistemicjustification.Iwillarguethatwecanfruitfullyextendsomefamiliar

epistemologicalnotionstotheemotions:theconceptofjustificationasepistemic

permissibility,thecontrastbetweenpropositionalanddoxasticjustification,and

thedistinctionbetweenimmediateandmediatejustification.

2.The‘simpleview’ofemotionaljustificationholdsthatthejustificationof

emotionssupervenesonthecontentofthementalstatestheyarebasedon,also

knownastheir‘cognitivebases’(e.g.,DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;

Mulligan1998).Ishallusetheepistemologicaldistinctionsintroducedaboveto

displaysomelimitationsofthesimpleviewandformulatethe‘gapproblem’.The

gapproblemisroughlythis:Ifthereisadifferenceinthewayscognitivebasesand

emotions(re)presentobjectsandproperties,thencognitivebasesarenot

sufficienttojustifyemotionalresponses.2

1This‘samenessofcontentassumption’ispervasiveintworecentdebates:thedebatebetween‘liberal’and‘austere’theoriesofperceptualexperienceandthedebateonphenomenalconservatism.SeetheessaysinHawleyandMacpherson(2011)andTucker(2013).Millar(2000)andSilins(2013)havecriticizedthisassumption.2Iwillpresupposearepresentationaltheoryofcognitivebases.Thisiscontroversial,though.Asweshallsee,emotionscanbebasedonperceptualexperiences,whichsomephilosophersanalyzeasdevoidofrepresentationalcontent(e.g.,Brewer2011;Campbell2002).Still,myargumentscanbeeasilygeneralizedtonon-representationalconceptionsofcognitivebases.

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3.Iwillproposeasolutiontothegapproblemintermsofemotional

dispositions(alsocalled‘sentiments’).Iwilldefendthisviewintwosteps.First,

emotionaldispositionsenableustomakeroomforimmediateemotional

justificationwhilestickingtoabroadlycognitivistviewofemotions.Second,the

resultingviewshedsnewlightonthestructureofourepistemicaccessto

evaluativeproperties.

Thepaperhassixsections.Istartwithsomeremarksontheroleof

emotionsinourmentaleconomy(Section1)andthenclarifytheconceptof

epistemicjustification(Section2).InSection3,Iintroducethe‘simpleview’of

emotionaljustificationandformulatethegapproblem.Subsequently,Iexamine

somepossiblesolutionstothegapproblemandfindthemwanting(Section4).In

Section5,Ishowhowemotionaldispositionsenableustosolvethegapproblem

andshednewlightonthestructureofourepistemicaccesstoevaluative

properties.Iconcludewithobjectionsandreplies(Section6).

1. EmotionsinOurMentalLife

Itisdifficulttoprovideuncontroversialcriteriatodeterminewhethera

mentalepisodeisanemotion.Ishallcircumventthisproblembyrelyingon

paradigmaticexamplesofemotions.Theseincludeadmiration,amusement,anger,

disgust,embarrassment,envy,fear,jealousy,joy,pride,andshame.Thediscussion

willfocusonconscioustokensoftheseemotions.

Therearedifferenttheoriesofemotions.Iwillpresupposeabroadly

cognitivistconception.Thisinfluentialviewconceivesofemotionsasintentional

psychologicalepisodesthatprovideepistemicaccesstotheevaluativepropertiesof

theirintentionalobjects.Thisconceptionistheconjunctionoftwoclaims:

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Intentionality:Emotionsareaboutobjects,situations,eventsorstatesof

affairs.Forsimplicity’ssake,wecanrefertotheseentitiesasthe‘intentional

objects’ofemotions.3

Toillustrate,ifPeterisangrywithPat,theintentionalobjectofPeter’s

angerisPat.Ifaratisafraidoftheimminentelectroshock,theintentionalobjectof

therat’sfearistheelectroshock.

EpistemicAccess:Emotionsprovideepistemicaccesstotheevaluative

propertiesoftheirintentionalobjects.Followingalongtradition,wemay

termtheseevaluativeproperties‘formalobjects’(e.g.,DeSousa1987;

Kenny1963;Teroni2007).4

Asanillustration,theformalobjectofangeristheoffensive,theformal

objectofamusementisthefunny,theformalobjectoffearisthedangerous,the

formalobjectofgriefisloss,theformalobjectofprideisachievementbyoneselfor

someoneinasuitablerelationtooneself,andsoon.5

Aconsequenceoftheintentionalityandepistemicaccessclaimsisthat

emotionscanbeassessedascorrectorincorrect.AnemotionEiscorrectifanonly

ifitsintentionalobject,o,exemplifiestheformalobjectthatE(re)presentsoas

having.Itisincorrectotherwise.

3Myuseof‘intentionalobject’isintendedtobeontologicallyneutral.Thus,itdoesnotrequireanycommitmenttonon-existentobjects.4Sometheoristsrefertoformalobjectsas‘corerelationalthemes’(Prinz2004)or‘emotion-properproperties’(Goldie2004).5Thislistofformalobjectsisnotentirelyuncontroversial.Forinstance,onemightholdthattheformalobjectoffearisnotthedangerousbutthefearsome(e.g.,DeSousa1987;Salmela2006).Iwilltakenosidesinthisdisputebecausemyargumentsdonotrequireaspecificaccountofformalobjects.

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Therearedifferentwaysofdevelopingthecognitivistview.Onemayhold

thatemotionsarementalepisodesanalogoustojudgments(e.g.,Nussbaum2001;

Solomon1988).Alternatively,onemaycompareemotionstoperceptual

experiencesthatrepresentobjectsunderevaluativemodesofpresentation(e.g.,

BrogaardandChudnoff2016;DeSousa2004;Goldie2000,2004;Döring2003,

2007;McDowell1985;Roberts2003;Tappolet2011;Zagzebski2003).6More

recently,DeonnaandTeroni(2012,2014,2015)havedefendedtheclaimthat

emotionsaresuigenerismentalattitudesthathavecorrectnessconditionsbutdo

notexplicitlyrepresenttheirformalobjects.Sincemyargumentsapplytoanyof

theseviews,Iwillnotcommitmyselftoanyspecificcognitivisttheory.7

Mostcognitivistsrecognizethatemotionscanstandintwodifferent

dependencyrelationswithothermentalstatesorepisodes.

First,emotionsinherittheirintentionalobjectsfromothermentalstatesor

episodes,alsoknownas‘cognitivebases’.IfPeterisafraidatthesightofthedog,

hisfearofthedoginheritsitsintentionalobjectfromhisvisualexperienceofthe

dog.Emotionscanalsoinherittheirintentionalobjectsfromthoughtsorbeliefs.

Thus,Marycanbeexcitedatthethoughtofrunningforoffice(e.g.,Brogaardand

Chudnoff2016;DeonnaandTeroni2012,2014;Mulligan1998;Oliver-Skuse2016;

Wedgwood2001).Insum,emotionsrequirecognitivebases.Cognitivebasesare

thesubject-mattergiversofemotions.

6Johnston’s(2001)viewisoftenlistedasaperceptualtheory(e.g.,Brady2010,2013).Nevertheless,Johnston(2001:182n1)makesitclearthatheisinterestedinaprimitiveformofaffectiverelationtotheworldthatispriortotheemotions.Prinz(2004)isalsoclassifiedasaperceptualtheorist(e.g.,BrogaardandChudnoff2016).Inmyview,hisaccountisbestunderstoodasanelaborationofJames/Lange’sfeelingtheory.Theemotionisafeelingofbodilychangesthathavethefunctionofcarryinginformationoftheinstantiationofacorerelationaltheme.Ishallnotdiscussanyofthesetheorieshere.Butseefootnote29forabriefcomparisonofmyviewwithPrinz’s.7Emotiontheoristsoftenuse‘cognitivism’torefertojudgmentaccountsofemotions.Mylabelisclosertothefamiliarviewinmeta-ethicsaccordingtowhichevaluativestatementsexpresstruth-aptpropositions.

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Second,emotionsarepsychologicalepisodesforwhichwecanhaveorlack

reasons(e.g.,Brady2013;DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;Greenspan1988;

Mulligan1998;Salmela2006).Indeed,itisoftenmeaningfultoask‘why’-questions

inrelationtotheemotions.Theanswerstothosequestionsdonotalwaysconvey

merelycausalexplanations(DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;Mulligan

1998).Ifasked:‘Whyareyouafraid?’,asubjectcouldnaturallyrespond:‘Because

thatdoghasbigteethandismovingerratically’.Thisanswerconveysanepistemic

reasonforfear.

Anaturalassumptionisthatsubjectsapprehendtheepistemicreasonsfor

theiremotionsviathecognitivebasesofthoseemotions.IfIamafraidatthesight

ofthedog,myvisualexperienceofthedogcandelivertheepistemicreasonfor

fear:Ivisuallyrepresentthedogashavingbigteethandmovingerratically.Itis

thereforeplausibletoholdthatcognitivebasesplaytworolesatonce:theyare

bothsubject-mattergiversandreasongivers.

Somephilosophershavebeenattractedbyamoreradicalclaim.Ontheir

view,theepistemicjustificationofemotionssupervenesonthecontentsoftheir

cognitivebasesalone(e.g.,DeonnaandTeroni2012;Goldie2004;Mulligan1998).

Letustermthisthe‘simpleview’ofemotionaljustification.Ishallsuggestthat

emotionaljustificationhasamorecomplexjustificatorystructure.BeforeIdefend

thisclaim,weneedtogetabetterunderstandingoftheconceptofepistemic

justification.

2. CorrectnessandJustification

SupposethatPeterhasmadeasexistjokeinJulia’spresence.Unfortunately,

youcouldnothelplaughingatthejoke.Wasyouramusementappropriate?The

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answertothisquestionwilldependonwhatismeantby‘appropriate’.Youmight

thinkthatitwasmorallybadtobeamusedbythejokebecauseitisplainlywrong

tolaughatsexistjokes.Additionally,youmightthinkthatitwasprudentiallybadto

beamusedbythejokebecauseJuliaisyourbossandshemightretaliate.Allthese

considerationsnotwithstanding,youmightstillthinkthatthejokewasreally

funny.Barringextremeformsofsubjectivismaboutvalues,wecoulddistinguish

twodifferentkindsofassessment.Itisonethingtoaskwhetherfeelinganemotion

ismorallyorprudentiallyappropriate;itisquiteanotherthingtoaskwhetherthe

emotionitselffitsitsintentionalobject(e.g.,D’ArmsandJacobson2000;McDowell

1987;Salmela2006;Tappolet2011;Wedgwood2001).Inwhatfollows,whenI

speakofcorrectness,Iwillhaveinmindthequestionwhethertheemotionfitsits

intentionalobject.

Mostdiscussionsofemotionaljustificationhavefocusedontheir

correctness,whichisroughlyanalogoustotruthoraccuracy.Thereishowever

anotherassessmentdimensionthatdeservestobefurtherscrutinized:epistemic

justification.Thisdimensionbecomesapparentwhenwetakeseriouslytheidea

thatemotionsarebasedonothermentalstatesorepisodes(Section1).Onthis

view,anemotioncanbecorrectbutbasedonbadreasonsorincorrectbutbased

ongoodreasons.Inthisrespect,emotionsbearsomesimilaritiestobeliefs.This

parallelismsuggeststhatthetheoryofemotionaljustificationcanbenefitfrom

generalepistemology.Inwhatfollows,Ishowhowwecangeneralizesome

familiarepistemologicalconceptsanddistinctionstotheemotions.

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2.1. JustificationasEpistemicPermissibility

Thereisnosingleuseoftheword‘justification’ingeneralepistemology.

Moreover,thereisalivelydebatebetweeninternalistandexternalistaccountsof

epistemicjustification.Thus,itisdifficulttotalkaboutemotionaljustification

withouttakingoncontroversialcommitments.Idonothaveanantidoteforthis

problem.Nevertheless,wecanmakeheadwayifweprovideanapproximate

paraphraseofthetechnicaladjective‘justified’.Thedominantviewholdsthata

beliefBisjustifiedforanagent,S,ifandonlyifformingBispermittedfroman

epistemicpointofview(e.g.,Goldman1986:59;Littlejohn2012:8;Pollockand

Cruz1999:123;Silva2017;Wedgwood2012:274).Wecandropthequalification

‘fromanepistemicpointofview’foreaseofexposition.Thus,wehavea

characterizationofepistemicjustificationaspermissibility:

EpistemicJustificationasPermissibility

Anagent,S,isjustifiedtobelievethatpifandonlyifSispermittedto

believethatp(=Sisnotrequirednottobelievethatp).

Anagent,S,isjustifiedtohaveanemotionEifandonlyifSispermittedto

haveE(=SisnotrequirednottohaveE).

Thischaracterizationaccommodatestheintuitionthat‘justified’denotesa

propertyotherthancorrectness,truthoraccuracy.Considertheinternalist

intuitionthatoneispermittedtotakethecontentofone’sperceptualexperiences

atfacevalueifoneisnotawareofanydefeater.Thus,onecanbeepistemically

justifiedinbelievingthatpeventhoughone’sexperienceasofpisillusoryor

hallucinatory(e.g.,Huemer2001;PollockandCruz1999;Pryor2000,2005).

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Crucially,wecandefendthesameconclusionwithoutpresupposinganinternalist

picture.Supposethatyouthinkthatonlytruepropositionscanbereasons.Still,

havingaveridicalexperienceasofpmaybeinsufficientforanagenttobejustified

inbelievingp.Imaginethatouragenthasaveridicalvisualexperienceasofpbut

alsothinksthattheilluminationconditionsareabnormal.Inthiscase,ouragent

oughttocheckbeforesheformsthecorrespondingbelief.Beforesheperformsthe

relevantcheck,sheisnotpermittedtobelievethatp.

Letusgeneralizetheseremarkstotheemotions.SupposethatYounahas

heardfromareliablewitnessthatherfatherisinbetterhealth.Inthiscase,Youna

ispermittedtobeelated.Crucially,somemightwanttoholdthatYounaisstill

justifiedinbeingelatedevenifthewitnesshappenstobewrong.Afterall,one

mightreasonablyholdthatYounaispermittedtotrusttestimonyintheabsenceof

defeaters.SupposenowthatCarlosisafraidofasmallspiderinthebathroom.Yet,

histherapisthastoldhimthatmostspidersinNewYorkCityareinoffensive.

Rememberingthispieceofadvice,Carlostellshimself:‘Ishouldnotbeafraidof

thatspider’.Yet,themantradoesnotworkandhekeepsshaking.Unbeknownstto

Carlos,however,thespiderisvenomous.Inthiscase,Carlos’fearofthesmall

spideriscorrectbutunjustified.

Recallthatatheoryofemotionaljustificationshouldspelloutthe

conditionsunderwhichanemotionisjustified.Ourcharacterizationprovidesa

usefultooltoevaluateaccountsofemotionaljustification.Foranycandidate

condition,C,wecanask:IsCnecessaryforanagenttobepermittedtohavean

emotionE?IsCsufficientforanagenttobepermittedtohaveanemotionE?These

questionswillproveusefulwhenweexaminethesimpleviewofemotional

justification(Section3).

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2.2. Propositionalvs.AttitudinalJustification

Theanalogybetweentheepistemicrolesofbeliefsandemotionssuggests

thatemotiontheoristsshouldexploitthedistinctionbetweenpropositionaland

doxasticjustification.Inthecaseofbelief,onecanaskwhetherthepropositional

contentofapotentialbeliefisjustifiedforanagent(propositionaljustification)or

whetheranagent’sbeliefiswellfounded(doxasticjustification).Propositional

justificationconcernswhatone’sevidenceorreasonssupport;one’sbeliefis

doxasticallyjustifiedifitisbasedonthatevidenceorreasonsintherightway.This

distinctionisimportantbecauseapropositionpcanbejustifiedforanagent,S,

eventhoughSformednobeliefthatp.Additionally,pcanbejustifiedforanagent,

S,eventhoughSformedthecorrespondingbeliefviaadeviantcausalchainoron

badreasons(e.g.,Firth1978;PollockandCruz1999;Turri2010).8

Supposethatemotionsrepresenttheirintentionalobjectsashavingsome

evaluativeproperties.Inthisframework,atheoryofpropositionaljustification

shouldelucidatetheconditionsunderwhichapotentialemotionalresponsewith

suchandsuchcontentwouldbejustified.Crucially,thisaccountwillbeneutralon

whetherthesubjectrespondsemotionallytotheintentionalobject.Supposethat

MaryhasoffendedPeter.However,Peterhasjustbeennotifiedthathislottery

ticketisthewinner.Beingoverwhelmedwithjoy,Petercannotbeangrywith

Mary.Still,angeratMaryispropositionallyjustifiedforPeter.

Letusintroducethephrase‘attitudinaljustification’asagenericterm

coveringdoxasticjustificationanditscounterpartformentalstatesorepisodes

8Itisanopenquestionwhetherpropositionaljustificationismorefundamentalthandoxasticjustification,orviceversa.Iaminclinedtofavortheclaimthatdoxasticjustificationisthemorefundamentalconcept.Icannotdefendthisclaimhere.Nevertheless,Iwillexploitaparallelviewforemotionaljustificationinmysolutiontothe‘gapproblem’.SeeSection5andfootnote26.

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otherthanbelief.Atheoryofdoxasticjustificationseekstoelucidatetheconditions

thatthefixationofbeliefshouldsatisfyfortheresultingbelieftobewellfounded.A

theoryofdoxasticjustificationshouldexcludesuchthingsasdeviantcauses.

Similarly,atheoryofattitudinaljustificationfortheemotionsshouldelucidatethe

conditionsthattheappraisalsinvolvedinemotionsshouldsatisfytoproducewell-

foundedemotionalresponses.9

2.3. Immediatevs.MediateJustification

Supposethatyouareattractedbyamoderatelyfoundationalist

epistemology.Onthisview,thereisadifferencebetweenbasicandnon-basic

beliefs(inthecaseofdoxasticjustification)andbasicandnon-basicpropositions

(inthecaseofpropositionaljustification).Acentraltaskforamoderately

foundationalistepistemologististodrawthesedistinctionsinaprincipledway.

Letusfocusonpropositionaljustification.Thejustificationofsome

propositionsrequiresantecedentjustificationtobelieveotherpropositions.Ifyou

lookatthegasgaugeofyourcar,youmayhavejustificationtobelievethatyour

carisoutofgas.Yet,thisjustificationdependsonyourhavingantecedent

justificationtobelieveanotherproposition:thatthegasgaugeofyourcarreads

‘empty’(Pryor2005:182).Wecanthereforesaythatthepropositionthatthecaris

outofgasismediatelyjustifiedforyou.Ifthejustificationofthispropositiondid

notdependonyourjustificationtobelieveotherpropositions,itwouldbe9Ifoneholdsthatemotionsdonotexplicitlyrepresenttheirformalobjects,oneshouldformulatepropositionaljustificationinaslightlydifferentway.Anaccountofthepropositionaljustificationofemotionsshouldspellouttheconditionsunderwhichawould-beemotionwithsuchandsuchcorrectnessconditionsispermitted.Inthiscase,thepropositioninthephrase‘propositionaljustification’shouldbetakenasdescribingthosecorrectnessconditionsfromanexternalperspectivethatdoesnotcapturehowthosecorrectnessconditionsfigureinthewould-beemotion.SeeRoberts(2003),forthis‘external’useofpropositionsintheorizingontheemotions.

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immediatelyjustifiedforyou.Hereisaplausibleexampleofimmediate

justification:Ifyouhaveanexperienceasofalightinfrontofyou,theproposition

thatthereisalightinfrontofyouisjustifiedindependentlyofwhetherother

beliefsorpropositionsarealsojustifiedforyou(Pryor2000:537).

Somephilosophershaverejectedtheideaofimmediatejustification(e.g.,

Wright2007).Itisnotmyaimtorespondtothoseargumentsbutrathertousethe

conceptofimmediatejustificationtoassesssomeexistingtheoriesofemotional

justification.

Amoment’sreflectionsuggeststhatmostemotionscannotbeimmediately

justified.Considerpride,jealousy,guilt,andshame.Theseemotionsrelyonmoral

andculturalpresuppositions.Moreover,theyinvolvearathersophisticatedself-

concept.Thus,wehaveprimafaciereasonstobelievethattheirjustification

alwaysismediate.SupposethatIamproudoftheLamborghinithatisparkedin

frontofmyhouse.Ifmyprideisjustified,thentheproposition<theLamborghini

thatisparkedinfrontofmyhouseenablesmetobeseeninagoodlightbypeople

Icareabout>isjustifiedforme(cf.Roberts2003:275).Now,thejustificationof

thispropositionrequiresantecedentjustificationtobelieveatleastfourother

propositions:(1)<thereisaLamborghiniparkedinfrontofmyhouse>,(2)<Iown

theLamborghinithatisparkedinfrontofmyhouse>,(3)<OwningaLamborghini

isanachievement>,and(4)<Achievementsenabletheiragentstobeseeningood

lightbypeopletheycareabout>.Thus,itisreasonabletocountthisexampleasa

caseofmediatejustification.Theanalysiseasilygeneralizestoothersophisticated

emotionslikejealousy,guilt,andshame.

Isthereimmediateemotionaljustification?Themostplausiblecandidates

forimmediateemotionaljustificationarepsychologists’basicemotions.Theseare

evolutionarilyancientemotionsthatpromotephysicalsurvival.Theyarefast,

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short-term,andinvolvestereotypicalresponses.Theyarealsoprocessedin

subcorticalareasthatareinformationallyencapsulated.Examplesinclude(basic

formsof)fear,anger,disgust,joy,andsadness(e.g.,Ekman1992;LeDoux1996;

Griffiths1997).10

Ifwefollowthemodelofperception,itistemptingtothinkthateventhese

emotionscannotbeimmediatelyjustified.ConsideravariationofCarlos’fearof

thespiderinthebathroom.Inthiscase,heignoresthefactthatmostspidersin

NewYorkCityareinoffensive.IfCarlos’fearisjustified,theproposition<the

spiderthatisinthebathroomisdangerous>isjustifiedforhim.Now,the

justificationofthispropositionrequiresantecedentjustificationtobelieveatleast

threeotherpropositions:(1)<TheanimalIamlookingatisaspider>,(2)<That

spiderisvenomous>,and(3)<Venomousanimalsaredangerous>.Thestructure

ofthisexampleisanalogoustothestructureofthegasgaugeexampleabove.Thus,

ifyouhavetheintuitionthatthelatterisacaseofmediatejustification,youshould

alsoagreethatfearisacaseofmediatejustification.

Thiscursoryanalysissuggeststhatthejustificationofanyemotionwillbea

rathercomplexmatter.Nevertheless,thereisawayofdrawingadistinction

betweenmediateandimmediateemotionaljustification.Onthisapproach,the

distinctioniscomparative.Intuitively,somepropositionsaremoremediately

justifiedthantheothers.MyprideintheLamborghinithatisparkedinfrontofmy

houseismoremediatelyjustifiedthanCarlos’fearofthespiderinthebathroom.

Thereasonisstraightforward.ThejustificationofmyprideintheLamborghini

drawsonmoreepistemicsourcesthanCarlos’fearofthespider.Mypridedraws

onperceptualrecognition,severalculturalpresuppositionstransmittedby10Somepsychologistshavetriedtoexplainallemotionsintermsofbasicemotions.Myprojectismoremodest.Iwishtoaskwhetherthesebasicemotionsareplausiblecandidatesforimmediatejustification.Asweshallsee,thisisthemostpromisingstancefordefendersofthesimpleviewofemotionaljustification.

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testimony,andaself-ascription.Bycontrast,onemightplausiblyholdthatCarlos’

fearonlydrawsonperceptualrecognition.Andthisisindirectlysupportedbythe

claimthatbasicemotionsareprocessedinsubcorticalareasandare

informationallyencapsulated.

Inwhatfollows,Iwillexploretheclaimwhetherbasicemotionscanbe

immediatelyjustifiedintherelativesense.11Ourquestioniswhetherbasic

emotionscanborrowtheirjustificationfromasingleepistemicsource,asthe

spiderexamplesuggests.Asweshallsee,thisisthemostpromisinginterpretation

ofthesimpleviewofemotionaljustification.12

3. TheSimpleView

Wehaveseenthatemotionsbeartwokindsofrelationstoothermental

statesorepisodes:theyhavesubject-mattergiversandreasongivers(Section1).

Thissuggestsasimpleviewofemotionaljustification.Cognitivebasesprovidethe

subjectmatterofemotions.Whentheydoso,theyalsoprovidereasonsthatconfer

justificationonthoseemotions.Thus,emotionsborrowtheirjustificationfromthe

contentsoftheircognitivebasesalone.Letusdubthis‘thesimpleview’of

emotionaljustification.

PeterGoldieendorsesthesimpleview:11Hereafter,Idroptheadjective‘relative’.12Itmightbeobjectedthattheepistemologicalparallelismbetweenemotionsandbeliefsbreaksdownwhenweconsidertheroleofproportionalityinemotions.ConsideranexamplefromRoberts(2003:317):“AlisangryatBudforputtingafingerprintonthehoodofhis1924RollsRoyce.Theintensityofhisangerisincommensuratewiththeimportanceoftheoffense.(Heseestheoffenseasmoreimportantthanitis)”.Onthisview,emotionscanbeassessedforproportionality,whilebeliefscannot.

Idonotneedtoholdthattheanalogybetweentheepistemicrolesofemotionsandbeliefsisperfectinordertovindicatethepresentapproach.Nevertheless,itisnotclearthatproportionalityplaysnoroleinthejustificationofbeliefs.Indeed,onemightrequirethatone’sdegreeofbeliefinpbeproportionaltoone’sevidenceinfavorofp(WedgwoodMs.).

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[A]nemotionalexperiencetypicallyseemstoonetobereasonableorjustified.But

whatmakesit,infact,justified?[A]nemotion,ifitis,infact,justified,willbe

justifiedbysomethingelseexternaltotheemotionitselfandtheperception:itwill

bejustifiedbyreasons[…].Thusthefactthatthemeatismaggotinfestedisa

reasonthatjustifies[…]yourfeelingofdisgust(Goldie2004:97–8).

Inthesametext,Goldieexcludesotherelementsfromthefactorsthat

contributetothejustificationofdisgust.Thus,onGoldie’sview,thejustificationof

disgustatthemeatsupervenesonthesubject’s(awarenessof)thefactthatthe

meatismaggotinfested.

Inmorerecentwork,JulienDeonnaandFabriceTeroni(D&T)have

defendedasimilarclaim.Theywrite:

Anemotionisjustifiedif,andonlyif,inthesituationinwhichthesubjectfinds

herself,thepropertiessheis(orseemstobe)awareofandonwhichheremotion

isbasedconstitute(orwouldconstitute)anexemplificationoftheevaluative

propertythatfeaturesinthecorrectnessconditionsoftheemotionsheundergoes

(DeonnaandTeroni2012:97).

D&Tillustratetheirviewwithaconcreteexample:

Supposethatadogwithbigteeththatisbehavinginanimpulsivewayconstitutes,

giventhecircumstancesinwhichthesubjectfindsherself,adanger.Theideais

thatherfearisjustifiedifitisbasedonherawarenessofthisdog,itsbigteethand

impulsivebehavior(DeonnaandTeroni2012:97).

ThereisadifferencebetweenGoldie’sandD&T’saccounts.WhereasGoldie

spellsoutemotionaljustificationintermsoffacts,D&Taddthequalifications

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‘seemstobeaware’and‘wouldconstitute’,whichmakeroomforjustified

emotionsbasedonfalseorinaccuratecognitivebases.Giventhatmyarguments

areneutralonthesetwooptions,IproposetodropD&T’squalifications.The

readerisinvitedtoadjustmyargumentstotheirpreferredaccount.13

Letususethedistinctionsfromtheprevioussectiontointerpretthesimple

view.

First,neitherGoldienorD&Tmakeanyclaimaboutthewayemotionsare

formedonthebasisoftheircognitivebases.Thus,theiraccountsaremost

plausiblyinterpretedascontributionstoatheoryofpropositionaljustification.

Second,bothGoldieandD&Tformulatetheirviewsinrelationtoany

emotion.Thisisproblematic.Itseemsnaturaltoholdthatonlyafewemotionscan

bejustifiedonthesolebasisofthecontentsoftheircognitivebases.Thisis

indirectlyconfirmedbytheexampleofpridefromSection2.3andtheexamples

theygive,whichconcernbasicemotions.Goldiethinksthatone’sdisgustatthe

meatdependsonone’sjustificationforthepropositionthatthemeatismaggot

infestedandnothingelse.14Thus,hisviewisbestcashedoutasanaccountof

immediateemotionaljustification.D&Tsubmitthatone’sfearofthedogdepends

onone’sjustificationforthepropositionthatthedoghasbigteethandimpulsive

behaviorandnothingelse.15Thus,theirviewisbestcashedoutasanaccountof

immediateemotionaljustification.Othercasesarelikelytodisplayamorecomplex

13Someemotionsarefactive.Examplesincluderegrettingthatp,beinggladthatp,andbeinghappythatp.Somehavearguedthattheseemotionsentailknowledgethatp(Gordon1987:26),whileothershavesuggestedthattheyonlyrequirethatthesubjectbelievesthatsheknowsthatp(Roberts2003:94).Dependingonone’sviewsonthematter,oneshouldamendthesimpleviewaccordingly.Ishallbracketfactiveemotions.14ForGoldie,thepropositionthatthemeatismaggotinfestedisjustifiedformebecauseitisafactthatthemeatismaggotinfested.15D&Tdonotspellouttheconditionsunderwhichthepropositionthatthedoghasbigteethandimpulsivebehaviorisjustifiedforme.Presumably,theywanttheirviewtobecompatiblewithmanyepistemologicalaccounts.

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justificatorystructure.Culturallydependentemotionsandemotionsthatemerge

fromcomplexpatternsofreasoningwillintroduceothersourcesofjustification

(Section2.3).Hence,weshouldthinkofthesimpleviewasanaccountof

immediateemotionaljustification.

Third,neitherGoldienorD&Texplainwhattheymeanbyepistemic

justification.Giventhatjustificationhasbeenwidelycashedoutintermsof

permissibility,Iproposetoassesstheirviewsinthoseterms.Doesthesimpleview

providenecessaryandsufficientconditionsforpropositional-immediateemotional

justificationunderstoodasepistemicpermissibility?16

IfweuseD&T’saccountasatemplate,wecanrephrasethesimpleviewas

theconjunctionofanecessityandasufficiencyclaim:

NecessityClaim

Ifasubject’semotionisimmediatelyjustified,thesubjectisawareofthe

propertiesthatconstituteanexemplificationoftheformalobjectofthe

emotion.

SufficiencyClaim

Ifasubjectisawareofthepropertiesthatconstituteanexemplificationof

theformalobjectoftheemotion,thesubject’semotionisimmediately

justified.

Letusstartwiththenecessityclaim.ItisunclearwhetherGoldieandD&T

haveprovidedanexhaustivecharacterizationofthepropertiesthatconstitutethe

formalobjectsofdisgustandfearrespectively.Supposethatbasicformsofdisgust

trackpoisonousandinfectedfood.Thus,thepropertyofbeingmaggotinfestedis16Hereafter,whenIspeakaboutanemotionbeingjustified,Irefertopropositional-immediatejustification.

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notsufficienttoconstitutethepropertyofbeingdisgusting.Afterall,themeatis

disgustingrelativetohumanbeingsbutnottovultures.Therefore,thereissome

pressuretoincludesomepropertiesofhumanbeingsintothepropertiesthat

constitutethedisgustingcharacterofamaggot-infestedpieceofmeat.D&Tare

morecarefulthanGoldie.Theysuggestthatthedangerousnessofadogina

situationisalsoconstitutedbythefactthat“thesubjectismadeoffleshandblood

aswellassomespatialandotherrelationsbetweenherandtheanimal”(Deonna

andTeroni2012:95).17Butthisraisesaproblem.Ifweincluderelational

propertiesintothepropertiesthatconstituteformalobjects,thesimpleview

seemstopredictthatdisgustandfeararealmostneverjustified.Afterall,weare

nottypicallyawareoftheserelationalpropertieswhenweexperiencedisgustor

fear.18

Therearesomewaysofcircumventingthisproblem.Onemightfollow

Setiya(2012:40ff.)andstipulatethattheagentonlyneedstohavesomeevidence

oftheinstantiationofthepropertiesthatconstitutethecorrespondingformal

object.Anotheroptionwouldbetohypothesizethatweareunconsciouslyaware

ofthingsasstandinginrelevantrelationstousandthatthisunconscious

awarenessisallweneedforimmediateemotionaljustification.Alternatively,one

mightclaimthatasubjectdoesnotneedtobeawareofallthepropertiesthat

constitutedangerforherfeartobejustified.Thissolutionseemstobeimplicitin

D&T’sformulation.Theycouldreplythatsomeoftheseconstitutivepropertiesare

bestunderstoodasimplicitparametersofthesubject’ssituation.

17“[W]edonotsuggestthatthesuperveniencebaseforevaluativepropertiesonlycomprisesmonadicpropertiesoftherelevantobject.Thesuperveniencebasewilltypicallycompriserelationalpropertiesofthisobjectaswellassomepropertiesofthesubjectundergoingtheemotion”(DeonnaandTeroni2012:103n4).18SeealsoMcGrath(forthcoming)foradditionalworries.ShepresentsherobjectionstoSetiya’s(2012)inferentialtheoryofmoralknowledge.

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Letusassumethatoneofthesesolutionscouldbeworkedout.Hence,we

canratherfocusonthesufficiencyclaim:Isittruethatasubject’sawarenessofthe

propertiesthatconstituteanexemplificationoftheformalobjectofheremotionis

sufficientforimmediatejustificationofthatemotion?Myanswerisno.The

sufficiencyclaimleadstothe‘gapproblem’.Ontheplausibleassumptionthatthere

isadifferenceinthewayscognitivebasesrepresentobjectsandtheirproperties

andthewaysemotions(re)presentevaluativeproperties,itfollowsthatthe

cognitivebasesofemotionsarenotsufficienttojustifyemotionalresponses.To

understandthisproblem,weneedaworkingcharacterizationoftherelation

betweennon-evaluativeandevaluativepropertiesandnon-evaluativeand

evaluativerepresentationalcontents.

Therearereductiveandnon-reductiveconceptionsoftherelationbetween

non-evaluativeproperties(N-properties)andevaluativeproperties(E-properties):

Non-ReductiveConceptions.Ontheseviews,N-propertiesaredifferentfrom

E-properties.AnaturalwayofdevelopingthisideaistoholdthatE-propertiesare

higher-orderpropertiesofN-properties(e.g.,Oddie2005).

ReductiveConceptions.Ontheseviews,E-propertiesareidenticaltoN-

properties.

Goldieisnotexplicitonwhichontologicalconceptionheendorses.D&Tare

attractedbyareductiveview:

[I]fdangerisconstitutedbytheinstantiationofsomenon-evaluativeproperties,

thereisnofurtherfactofthematter,nothingmoretoaspecificdangerthanthe

instantiationofwhatmakesitadanger[…].Aspecificinstanceofdanger,loss,or

offensivenessisnotafurtherpropertyalongsidethosepropertiesthatconstituteit

(Dancy1993:75)(DeonnaandTeroni2012:97;emphasismine).

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Theargumentstofollowgeneralizetobothreductiveandnon-reductive

views.Moreover,theycanbeappliedtovariousconceptionsoftherelation

betweenN-propertiesandE-properties.Yet,wewillgaininclarityifwefocusona

singletypeofview.Iproposetofocusonreductiveaccountsthatexploitthe

constitutionrelation.

Anyonewhoendorsesareductiveaccountofevaluativepropertiesshould

accommodateaplatitude.EvenifanE-propertyisidenticaltoanN-property,one

canrunaMooreanOpenQuestionargumentforEandN:IsittruethatEisN?

(Moore1903).Itisunclearwhetherthisargumentenablesustodrawany

metaphysicalconclusionsabouttherelationbetweenE-propertiesandN-

properties.Yet,thisargumenthasanepistemicconsequence:Ifitmakessenseto

runaMooreanOpenQuestionargumentforEandN,itfollowsthatthesentence‘E

isN’isinformative.IntheFregeantradition(Frege1892),ifaninformative

identityisflankedbytwoco-extensionalexpressions,theextensionsofthese

expressionsarepresentedunderdifferentmodesofpresentation(MOPs).

TheMoore-Fregeinsightstronglysuggeststhatone’sawarenessofthe

instantiationoftheN-propertiesthatconstituteanexemplificationoftheformal

objectofagivenemotionEisnotsufficienttoconferimmediatepropositional

justificationonE.

Letusstartwithanexamplefromadifferentdomain.Intuitively,wateris

constitutedbyHydrogenandOxygen.Still,beingawarethatthisstuffisH2Oisnot

sufficientforanagenttobepermittedtoconcludethatthisstuffiswater.Ifour

agentweretodrawthatconclusion,shewouldbejumpingtoconclusions.

AlthoughwaterisinfactH2O,itisunreasonableforanagenttoconcludethatthis

stuffiswateronthesolebasisofherawarenessthatthisstuffisH2O.Ifanagentis

awarethatthisstuffisH2ObutignoresthatH2Oiswater,therationalthingforher

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todoistosuspendjudgmentwhensheispresentedwiththecontentexpressedby

‘ThisisH2O’(Frege1892).

Thesimpleviewofemotionaljustificationhasasimilarstructure.Goldie

andD&Tholdthatcognitivebasesenablesubjectstobeawareofobjectsashaving

someN-properties.IfcomplexesofN-propertiesarepresentedunderamodeof

presentationthatisdifferentfromthewayformalobjectsarepresentedin

emotionalexperiences,thentherationalthingtodowhenoneisawareofthese

complexesofN-propertiesistostaycoolandwithholdone’semotions.

Letusdevelopthispointinsomedetail.Wehavetwooptions:eitherthe

subjectisawareofN-propertiesasN-properties(i.e.,underanon-evaluativemode

ofpresentation–MOPn)orasE-properties(i.e.,underanevaluativemodeof

presentation–MOPe).Unfortunately,thetwooptionsleadtothesameresult.19

Non-EvaluativeModesofPresentation.IfthesubjectisawareoftheN-

propertiesunderanon-evaluativemodeofpresentation,sheshouldfindthe

followingquestionreasonable:‘Isittruethatthis(MOPn)isthesameas

that(MOPe)?Tobepermittedtorespondwithanemotion,oursubjectshouldknow

thattheanswertothisquestionis‘yes’.Still,itisunclearhowthesoleawarenessof

someN-propertiesunderanon-evaluativemodeofpresentationcoulddeliverthat

affirmativeanswer.Indeed,answering‘yes’tothisquestionbasedonlyonone’s

awarenessofsomeN-propertiesunderanon-evaluativemodeofpresentation

wouldleadouragenttojumptoconclusions.

Imagineanagentwhoseesadogwithbigteethandmovingerratically.Even

ifthesefeaturesdoinfactconstitutethedangerousnessofthedoginthecurrent

circumstances,theagent’ssoleawarenessofthedogashavingbigteethand19Oliver-Skuse(2016:Chapter2)reachedasimilarconclusionondifferentgrounds.McGrath(forthcoming)hasalsodevelopedasimilarargumentagainstSetiya’sinferentialaccountofmoralknowledge.Inthenextsection,Iarguethatherconsiderationsdonotlendsupporttoaperceptualtheoryofevaluativeexperience.

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movingerraticallywouldnotsufficetomakeitreasonableforhertofeelfearofthe

dog.Afterall,someinoffensivedogshavebigteeth,whileothersmoveerratically

outofjoy.Moregenerally:Ifjustificationiscashedoutintermsofepistemic

permissibility,anagent’sawarenessofsomeevaluativepropertiesundernon-

evaluativemodesofpresentationisnotsufficientforhertobepermittedto

respondwithanemotionwhoseformalobjectisconstitutedbythoseproperties.20

Somemightwonderwhetherthisargumentpresupposessomeformof

internalism(Oliver-Skuse2016:Chapter2).Iagreethatthislineofargumentwill

bemoreappealingtoaninternalistaboutepistemicjustification.Nevertheless,I

haveformulateditinsuchawaythatevenanexternalistshouldrecognizeitasa

problem.Indeed,externalistsshouldgrantthattherearecasesinwhichwearenot

permittedtojumptoconclusions.Thus,iftheexternalistseesnoproblemhere,she

owesusanexplanationofwhywearepermittedtojumptoconclusionsinthecase

ofemotionsbutnotinother,structurallysimilarcases.Beforethisexplanationis

provided,thegapproblemisstillwithus.21

D&Thaveinsistedthatemotionsdonotexplicitlyrepresentevaluative

properties(DeonnaandTeroni2012,2014,2015).Thus,onemightthinkthatthe

argumentdoesnotgeneralizetotheirview.IcannotevaluateD&T’sviewhere.

Still,thepreviousargumentdoesapplytoD&T’sview.D&Tendorsethecognitivist

claimthatemotionsprovideepistemicaccesstotheevaluativepropertiesoftheir20Thegapproblemalsoarisesforthestrongerconceptofjustificationintermsofobligation.Ifsomeinoffensivedogshavebigteeth,whileothersmoveerraticallyoutofjoy,itisunclearwhyanagentoughttofeelfearofthatdog.

Thegapproblemalsogeneralizestonon-reductiveviewsofevaluativeproperties.Supposethatthepropertiesofhavingbigteethandmovingerraticallyareonlycorrelatedwiththepropertyofbeingdangerous.IftwopropertiesFandGaremerelycorrelated,asubjectisnotpermittedtoconcludethatGisinstantiatedjustbecauseshewasawareofF.Somethingismissing.21Indeed,theviewIwillrecommendiscompatiblewithexternalismunderstoodastheclaimthatsomeofthefactorsthatdeterminejustificationareexternal(inasuitablesenseof‘external’).SeeSection5.

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intentionalobjects(Section1).Inaddition,theyholdthatemotionshavea

phenomenalcharacterthatdistinguishesthemfromperception,memory,and

beliefs,whichinturnplaytheroleofcognitivebases.Hence,thereisabroadsense

inwhichcognitivebasesandemotionsprovidedifferentmodesofaccesstoformal

objects.Thus,evenifemotionsdonotexplicitlyrepresentformalobjectsunder

evaluativemodesofpresentation,D&T’sviewstillfacesthegapproblem.

EvaluativeModesofPresentation.Onthisview,thesubjectisawareoftheN-

propertiesthatconstitutetheformalobjectofheremotionEunderanevaluative

modeofpresentationMOPeandthisawarenessconfersjustificationonE.Iamnot

awareofanywell-workedoutconceptionalongtheselines.Yet,MichaelBrady’s

(2010,2013)recentworkcomesclosetothisview.AccordingtoBrady,emotions

motivateustosearchforconsiderationsthatbearontheaccuracyofour

emotionalappraisals.Emotionsperformthisfeatbydirectingourattentiontoward

significantfeaturesofthesituation.Supposethatyouaretryingtogettosleepand

hearanoisedownstairs.Youfeelfearandaremotivatedtoseekout

“considerationsthathaveabearingonwhetheryourinitialemotional‘take’onthe

situation,namelythatweareindanger,isaccurate.[You]strain[y]ourearstohear

otheranomalousnoises,orrack[yourbrain]tryingtothinkofpossiblenon-

threateningcausesforthenoise”.Bradysuggeststhat“itistheseconsiderations

thatprovideuswithinformationabouttheevaluativerealm”(Brady2010:124).

Subsequently,hepositstheexistenceofnon-emotionalcapacitiestorecognizethe

instantiationofevaluativepropertiesandclaimsthatthosecapacitiesarethe

sourcesofjustificationofemotions.

Brady’sanalysisisinsightfulinmanyways.Heisrighttostressthat

emotionsoftenmotivateustolookforreasons.Nevertheless,Brady’sapproach

doesnotprovideasatisfactorysolutiontothegapproblem.

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First,itisacentralcommitmentofcognitivisttheoriesthatemotions

provideepistemicaccesstotheevaluativepropertiesoftheirintentionalobjects

(Section1).IfweuseBrady’sviewtosolvethegapproblem,wemustrejectthe

cognitivistview.Ifwerejectit,however,wewillneedtoprovideadifferentstory

abouttheepistemicroleoftheemotions.

OnemightbetemptedbyBrady’scontentionthattheepistemicroleof

emotionsispreciselytodirectourattentiontosignificantfeaturesofthesituation.

Unfortunately,Brady’sargumentsforthisviewarenotconclusive.Aninitialworry

isthat‘significantfeatures’seemstobesynonymouswith‘evaluativeproperties’.

So,emotionscannotdirectourattentiontosignificantfeaturesunlesstheyare

somehowsensitivetoevaluativeproperties.Andbeingsensitivetoevaluative

propertiescomesveryclosetogivingaccesstoevaluativeproperties.Moreover,it

isperfectlyconsistenttoholdthatemotionsoftenmotivateustosearchfor

reasonswithoutendorsingthestrongerclaimthattheyalwaysdoso.Thisseems

particularlyclearinthecaseofbasicemotions.WhenIamafraidofthedogand

runaway,Ihavenotimetosearchforreasonsthatbearonthedangerousnessof

thedog.Still,itisreasonabletoholdthatfearprovidedmewithepistemicaccessto

thedangerousnessofthedogandthatthisaccessmotivatedmetoactinthewayI

did.Crucially,weareinterestedintheepistemicjustificationofbasicemotions.

Thus,anyalternativeaccountoftheepistemicroleofemotionsshouldgeneralize

tobasicemotions.

Third,evenifBradyisrighttopointoutthatemotionsarejustifiedbynon-

emotionalcapacitiestorecognizetheinstantiationofevaluativeproperties,this

wouldnotsolvethegapproblem.Toseewhy,itisimportanttorecallthe

H2O/waterexample.Thatexampleshowsthatonecangenerateanepistemicgap

outsidetheevaluativedomain.Intuitively,thereasonwhy‘H2O’and‘water’refer

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towaterunderdifferentmodesofpresentationisthatarationalsubjectwho

ignoresthat‘H2O’and‘water’areco-extensionalshouldsuspendjudgmentwhen

sheispresentedwiththeidentitysentence‘H2Oiswater’.Inotherwords,

suspendingjudgmentonthatidentitysentenceisthereasonablethingtodofor

thatsubject.ConsidernowBrady’sproposal.WemightthinkofBrady’sviewas

positingtwodifferentmodesofpresentation:non-emotionalmodesof

presentationofevaluativepropertiesandemotionalmodesofpresentationof

thoseevaluativeproperties.Giventhatthesemodesofpresentationaredifferent,a

subjectisnotpermittedtomovebackandforthfromonetotheotherunlessshe

hassomebackgroundinformationthatthesemodesofpresentationareinfactco-

extensional.Unfortunately,Bradyhasprovidednostoryaboutthesourcesofthis

backgroundinformation.

Tosumup,thesimpleviewholdsthatthecontentsofcognitivebasesare

sufficienttoconferimmediatepropositionaljustificationonbasicemotions.Ihave

exploredtwowaysinwhichcognitivebasescouldrepresentthepropertiesthat

constitutetheformalobjectsofemotions.Non-evaluativemodesofpresentation

introduceMoorean-Fregeaninformativeidentities.Thus,theypredictthatan

agentwhoisawaresolelyofthepropertiesthatconstitutetheformalobjectofher

would-beemotionisnotpermittedtorespondwiththatemotion.Evaluativemodes

ofpresentationfacethreeproblems:theyleadustorejectcognitivismabout

emotions;theydonotseemtoprovideageneralaccountofouraccessto

evaluativeproperties;andtheydonotsolvethegapproblem.22

22Otherphilosophershavepositednon-emotionalmodesofaccesstoevaluativeproperties.See,e.g.,Mulligan(2009)andthereferencestherein.Ihavetwoworriesinrelationtotheseproposals.First,Idonotfindthesenon-emotionalmodesofaccesstoevaluativepropertiesintelligible.Second,Iaminclinedtothinkthattheseviewsshouldbeintroducedonlyifwehavecompellingreasonstothinkthatthecognitivistviewcannotbepreserved.Oneofmyaimsistoshowthatthecognitivistviewcanbepreserved.

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4. Inferentialism,ValueSkepticism,andPerceptualism

Anobviousstrategytosolvethegapproblemistointroduceadditional

reasons.Considerananalogy.Intuitively,theproposition<John’sbestfriendis

comingtotheparty>isnotareasontobelievetheproposition<Patiscomingto

theparty>.IfItellyouthatJohn’sbestfriendiscomingtotheparty,youarenot

permittedtoconcludethatPatiscomingtotheparty.Ifyouweretodoso,you

wouldbejumpingtoconclusions.Still,theproposition<John’sbestfriendis

comingtotheparty>canbecomeyourreasontobelievetheproposition<Patis

comingtotheparty>ifyouaregivenanotherreasonthatbridgesthegap:<John’s

bestfriendisPat>.Thus,wemightwanttointroduceabridgepropositionthat

linksournon-emotionalaccesstoevaluativepropertiesviacognitivebasesandthe

formalobjectsastheyfigureinouremotionalresponses.Hence,wecouldsolvethe

gapproblemasfollows:

Premise1:Iamawareofanobject,o,ashavingN-propertiesF,G,H…

Premise2:N-propertiesF,G,H…constitutetheformalobjectofemotionEin

thecurrentcircumstances.

Conclusion:Therefore,emotionEispermittedformeinthecurrent

circumstances.

Thissolutionfacesamajorproblem:itleadstovalueskepticism.Suppose

thatinordertobepermittedtorespondwithemotionEtoanobject,o,anagent

needstohaveantecedentjustificationforpremise2.Thus,ouragentneedstohave

justificationforthepropositionthatN-propertiesF,G,H…constitutetheformal

objectofemotionEinthecurrentcircumstances.Butwheredoesthisjustification

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comefrom?Ifwedonotcomeupwithaplausibleexplanation,valueskepticism

follows.ThisjustificationcannotcomefromemotionE,forEonlyprovides

epistemicaccesstoitsownformalobject.Ifthisjustificationcomesfroma

differentsource,itseemsthatthereisawayofhavingepistemicaccesstothe

formalobjectofEthatdoesnotrequireE.Thus,itisatbestunclearwhyweshould

stillholdthecognitivistviewofemotions.

Itmightbethoughtthatthegapproblemandvalueskepticismonlyarisefor

thoseviewsthatconceiveoftheepistemicroleofemotionsonthemodelof

belief.23Thus,onemightwanttoavoidtheproblemssofarbyconceivingofthe

emotionsonthemodelofperceptualexperiences.Unfortunately,thegapproblem

stillarisesforthisfamilyofviewsinadifferentguise.

Herearetworepresentativeexamplesofperceptualtheories:

Iwillreserveexpressionsoftheform‘IseexasA,’whereAisathickaffective

concept,forthosecasesinwhichthethingIseeasAistheintentionalobjectofan

emotionalstate.SowhenIseesomethingasrudeIaminadistinctiveemotional

state.Anemotionisthereforeaunitarystatethathasbothacognitiveaspectand

anaffectiveaspectthatarenecessarilyconnected.Anemotionisastateoffeelinga

characteristicwayaboutsomethingseenasrude,aspitiful,ascontemptible,andso

on(Zagzebski2003:114).

Accordingtotheso-calledPerceptualAccount,emotionsareakindofperception:

theyrepresenttheirobjectsincertainways.Whatisspecificaboutemotionsisthat

theyrepresentthingsashavingcertainevaluativeproperties(Tappolet2011:120;

seealsoDöring2007;Goldie2000,2004).

Perceptualtheoriesofemotionsshareacoreperceptualclaim:

23ThisisakeyassumptionofMcGrath’s(forthcoming)defenseofmoralperception.Iftheargumentstofollowarecorrect,McGrath’sdiagnosisismistaken.

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CorePerceptualClaim

Emotionsareexperiencesthatrepresenttheirobjectsunderevaluative

modesofpresentation.Theseevaluativemodesofpresentation(partly)

explainthephenomenalcharacteroftheemotions,i.e.whatitisliketohave

them.

Onemightthinkthatnothingthatfallsshortofanemotional-evaluative

modeofpresentationcansufficetojustifybasicemotions.Inotherwords,weneed

topositanawarenessofformalobjectsunderevaluativemodesofpresentation

thatalsoexplainthephenomenalcharacterofemotions.Thismovesolvesour

problem,notbybridgingthegap,butbyeliminatingit.Italsoavoidsvalue

skepticismbypositingaperceptualmodeofaccesstoevaluativeproperties.

Oncloseinspection,however,perceptualtheoriesdonotsolvethegap

problem.Evenifweendorseaperceptualaccountofemotions,thereisstillasense

inwhichouremotionalexperiencesdonotprovideabasicmodeofaccesstothe

world.Evenperceptualtheoristshaverecognizedthispoint.Thus,McDowell

(1985)grantsthat,contrarytosensoryqualities,valuesdonotstandincausal

relationstous.Eveniftheydid,theircausalrelationtoouraffectivesystemsmust

beindirect.Thispointdovetailswiththeclaimthatemotionalresponsesare

groundedinournon-evaluativemodesofaccesstotheworld(Section1).Onthe

plausibleassumptionthatthisgroundingrelationisnotprimitive,weshould

elucidateit.24

Itisnaturaltothinkoftheemotionsonthemodelofhigh-levelperception.

Ifhigh-levelpropertiesareproperties“otherthancolor,shape,illumination,

motion,andtheirco-instantiationinobjects”(Siegel2006:481),evaluative

24Therearedifferentwaysofcashingouttheconceptofgrounding.Itwilldonoharmtoourdiscussionifweworkwithanintuitiveunderstandingofthisconcept.

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propertiesarehigh-levelproperties.Onthisapproach,emotionalexperiencesbear

structuralsimilaritiestotheexperiencesofexpertbirdwatcherswhenthey

visuallyrecognizebirds:theirvisualrecognitionofabirdasacanaryis

phenomenallyimmediate.Thetroublehereisthathigh-levelcontentssuchas

‘canary’arenotrepresentationallybasic.Indeed,whenweperceptuallyrepresent

ahigh-levelcontent,wedosoinvirtueofrepresentingmorebasiccontents(Pryor

2000:539).IfIvisuallyrepresentatomato,Idosoinvirtueofrepresentingits

shape,color,andtexture.Therefore,evenifthesubjectmaybeunabletotellwhich

low-levelpropertiesgroundherhigh-levelexperiences,perceptualtheoristsowe

usanaccountofhowhigh-levelemotionalmodesofpresentationcanbegrounded

inlow-levelcontentsandwhetherthistransitionfromlow-tohigh-levelcontents

canhaveadeleteriouseffectonepistemicjustification.

Anotherpopularideaistosaythatemotionalexperienceshaveastructure

analogoustowhatWittgenstein(1953)called‘seeingas’(Roberts2003;Zagzebski

2003).Considerthefamousduck-rabbitdiagram.Thisdiagramillustratesthe

claimthatonecanexperiencethesameentityindifferentways:asaduckorasa

rabbit.Similarly,onemightholdthat,whenIfeelangryatJohn’ssexistjoke,I‘see’

John’sjokeasoffensive.Yet,itwouldbeunsatisfactorytoleavethingsthere.We

stillneedanaccountofhowthisaspectualseeingisgroundedinamorebasic

representation.Ifweseeadiagramasarabbit,wemustexplainhowthiswayof

seeingthediagramisgroundedinourexperienceofitsgeometricalproperties.An

explanationmightgoasfollows:theelongatedshapesareliketheearsofrabbits,

itscommissureislikearabbit’smouth,thedotislikearabbit’seyeseenfromone

side,andsoon.Thesegeometricalconfigurationsimposelimitsonthepermissible

interpretations.Youseethefigureasarabbitbecauseyouarealreadyfamiliar

withtherelevantpropertiesofrabbitsandcanexploitthosesimilaritiestoseethe

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diagramasarabbit.IfemotionshavethesamestructureasWittgenstein’s‘seeing

as’,weshouldprovideanaccountofhowone’sawarenessofthelow-level

propertiesofthesituationconstrainthepermissibleemotionalresponses.Inour

exampleofbasicfear,weshouldexplainhowanagent’sawarenessoftheteethand

erraticbehaviorofthedogconstrainsthepermissibleemotionstowardthedog,so

thatfearisjustifiedwhilejoyisnot.

Insum,inferentialsolutionsleadeithertovalueskepticismortherejection

ofcognitivism,fortheyrelyonabridgepremisethatcannotbejustifiedby

cognitivistlights.Perceptualtheoriesofemotionscouldonlyavoidthisproblemif

theymanagedtoexplainhowourevaluativeperceptualexperiencesaregrounded

inrepresentationswithlow-levelcontents.25Inthenextsection,Iproposea

solutiontothegapproblemthatdoesnotfallpreytovalueskepticismand

dischargessomeoftheexplanatoryrequirementsofperceptualtheories.My

solutioncanbeintegratedwithinanybroadlycognitivisttheoryofemotions.

5. SolvingtheGapProblem

Thegapproblemhasthreeroots:

1) Theclaimthatemotionsprovideepistemicaccesstotheevaluative

propertiesoftheirintentionalobjects.

2) Theclaimthatemotionsaregroundedinothermentalstatesorepisodes

thatrepresenttheintentionalobjectsofemotionsinanon-emotional

way.25Mypointisnotthattheaccountofhowemotionsaregroundedinrepresentationswithlow-levelcontentscannotbegiven;itisratherthatithasnotbeengiven.Itisonlyafterhavingprovidedtheaccountthatperceptualtheoristsmayclaimtohavesolvedthegapproblem.

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3) Theclaimthatsomeemotionsareimmediatelyjustifiedintheweak

senseofborrowingtheirjustificationfromtheircognitivebasesalone.

Onemightwanttorejectoneoftheseassumptions.Iwanttopreserve

cognitivismbecauseIamnotawareofanyalternativecharacterizationofthe

epistemicroleofemotionsthatisbothplausibleandwellworkedout.Ialsofindit

uncontroversialthatemotionsaregroundedinothermentalstatesorepisodes

thatrepresenttheintentionalobjectsofemotionsinanon-emotionalway.Thus,I

willmodifyassumption3:itistruethatsomeemotionsaremoreimmediately

justifiedthanothers.Thisclaimisparticularlyplausibleinthecaseofbasic

emotions,whichareprocessedinsubcorticalareasthatareinformationally

encapsulated.Nevertheless,itisamistaketoholdthatthoseemotionsborrow

theirjustificationfromtheircognitivebasesalone.Mysuggestionistorethinkthe

wayinwhichemotionsaregrounded.Roughly,emotionsaremanifestationsof

emotionaldispositions.Theseemotionaldispositionsarekeyedtosomenon-

evaluativepropertiesthataregiventousviathecognitivebasesofemotions.

Otherthingsbeingequal,iftheagentisawareoftheinstantiationofthesenon-

evaluativeproperties,shewillrespondemotionallytotheintentionalobject.Thus,

ourepistemicaccesstoevaluativepropertiesresultsfromtheinterplayof

cognitivebasesandemotionaldispositions.Emotionalresponsesarethesynthesis

ofthesetwosources.Myproposalisthatwecanexploitthispsychological

structuretocapturethedistinctionbetweenthejustificationofbasicemotionsand

thejustificationofmoresophisticatedemotions.26Crucially,theappealto

emotionaldispositionsdispelssomeofthemysterythatsurroundsourepistemic26Iwilltrytosolvetheproblemofpropositionalemotionaljustificationbyreflectingonthepsychologicalstructureofemotionalresponses.Thisviewisavailabletoanyonewhoholdsthatattitudinaljustificationismorefundamentalthanpropositionaljustification.Seefootnote8.

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accesstoevaluativeproperties.Thus,evenifoneisattractedbyaperceptual

account,oneoughttointroduceemotionaldispositionsintothestructureof

emotionaljustification.Iproposetodevelopthesetwopointsbyreflectingona

concreteexample.27

Considerthreedifferentsituations:

Situation1:Youareseeingagorillainthezoo.Believingthatitissafely

behindthebars,youformthejudgment:‘Thatgorillaisdangerous’.

Situation2:Yousuddenlyrealizethatthedoortothecagehasbeenleft

open.Thishasanimmediateimpactonyourevaluation.Youmovefromthe

initiallycoldevaluativejudgmenttofeelingfearofthegorilla.

Situation3:YourfriendPeterhasworkedinthezooformanyyears.Hefed

thegorillawhenitsmotherabandoneditandhasbeenfeedingitsincethen.

WhenPetersuddenlyrealizesthatthedoortothecagehasbeenleftopen,

hestayscalmbutrushestocloseit.‘Thegorillaisdangerous…someone

mightbeinjured’,hethinks.28

Goldiehasusedsimilarexamplestodefendtheclaimthatemotions

representobjectsunderdesemodesofpresentation.Wecanuseourexamplesto

defendadifferentclaim.Inthethreesituations,thecognitivebasis(visual

perception)providesthesubjectmatterofalltheevaluations.Alltheseevaluations

areaboutthegorilla.Nevertheless,therearecrucialdifferences.Whereasyouare

27Dispositionshavealsofiguredintheworkofsomeperceptualtheorists,includingD’ArmsandJacobson(2010),Goldie(2007),Jacobson(2005),McDowell(1985,1987),andRoberts(2003).Theyeitherinvokethemasexistenceconditionsofemotionsoraspartsofatheoryofevaluativejudgment.Mycontributionistheintroductionofdispositionstosolvethegapproblem,whicharisesforemotionaljustification.28ThecasesareinspiredfromGoldie(2000:61),whodevelopedthemonthebasisofsimilarexamplesfromPerry(1979).SeealsoDöring(2007:373).

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disposedtofeelfearofthegorilla(Situation2),yourfriendisnotdisposedtofeel

fearofthegorilla(Situation3).Situations1and2aredifferenttoo.Your

dispositiontofeelfearofthegorillaiskeyedtosomefeaturesofthesituation.In

thiscase,yournoticingthatthedoortothecagehasbeenleftopentriggersthe

fearexperience.

Iproposetothinkofourepistemicaccesstoevaluativepropertiesonthe

modelofSituation2.Situation2lendscredibilitytotheclaimthattheemotional

responseisgroundedinitscognitivebasisandanemotionaldisposition.The

emotionaldispositionexplainswhyyoudonotfeelfearinSituation1.Inthatcase,

youdidnotrepresentatriggeringconditionofyourdispositiontofeelfearof

gorillas.ThisalsoexplainsthedifferencebetweenyouandPeter.Peterhasa

slightlydifferentemotionaldisposition;thatiswhyhecanissueacoldevaluation.

Crucially,theproposedviewdispelssomeofthemysterylurkinginouraccessto

evaluativeproperties.Youremotionaldispositionisnotdirectlytriggeredbythe

perceptionofdanger,asifyouhadanarcanesensethatisputintooperationbythe

detectionofinstancesofdanger.Youremotionaldispositionisrathertriggeredby

anon-evaluativepropertyofthedoor(beingleftopen).Thereisnoinherent

difficultyinunderstandinghowwecouldhaveepistemicaccesstothatproperty.

Thus,theproposedapproachalsoindicateshowwecanimproveuponperceptual

accountsofemotions.Theproperty<Thedoortothecagebeingleftopen>signals

thedangerousnessofthegorillainthatsituation.Thus,emotionsstandinatleast

twosortsofgroundingrelationswiththeircognitivebases.First,cognitivebases

providetheemotionswiththeirintentionalobjects.Second,theydeliver

representationsofpropertiesthatsignaltheinstantiationoftheevaluative

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propertiesthatfigureinthecorrectnessconditionsofthecorresponding

emotions.29

Considernowtheconceptofjustificationaspermissibility.Thegapproblem

reliesontheintuitionthatwearenotpermittedtojumptoconclusions.Thisgapis

absentfromdeductivetransitions.Whyisthetransitionfromp,<ifp,thenq>toq

permitted?Partoftheansweristhatqseemsfollowfrompand<ifp,thenq>.In

otherwords,qseemstobecontainedinpand<ifp,thenq>.Wecannotavail

ourselvesoftheconceptoflogicalconsequenceinthecontextofampliative

transitions,i.e.transitionswherethecontentoftheendstategoesbeyondthe

contentoftheinitialstate.Nevertheless,wehavesomethingsimilaratour

disposal.Considerthecaseofperceptualrecognition.Intuitively,expertiseisaway

ofachievingphenomenologicallyseamlesstransitions,i.e.transitionsthatstrikeus

as‘obvious’fromthefirst-personperspective.Theperceptualjudgment‘thisisa

canary’isreasonablebytheornithologist’slightsbecauseshecanseamlesslymove

fromthedetectionofthelow-levelpropertiesofsomebirdstotherecognitionof

thosebirdsascanaries.Fortheornithologist,abirdwithsuchandsuchlow-level

propertiesisacanary.Theverysametransitiondoesnotseemobvioustome.

SinceIcannottellafinchfromacanary,Iamawareofagapbetweenmy

perceptionofthosesamelow-levelpropertiesanddifferentpossible

categorizationsofthebird.Thus,Iwouldhavetomakeaguessorinferenceto

categorizethebird.Thesuggestionisthatthesephenomenologicalconsiderations

29TheproposedviewdiffersfromPrinz’s(2004),whothinksofemotionsasbodilyfeelingsthathavethefunctionofindicatingtheinstantiationofcorerelationalthemes.Inmyview,itisnotbodilyfeelingsbutratherpropertiesofthesituationthatsignaltheinstantiationofformalobjects.Thesepropertiesshouldbearsomesalientrelationtotheintentionalobject.Inthecaseathand,Iamafraidofthegorilla.MyfearisdirectedatthegorillabecauseIdetectedapropertythatbearsacloserelationtoit:thedoortoitscagebeingleftopen.Iamthereforecompelledtoascribeadifferentroletobodilyfeelings.Myhypothesisisthatbodilyfeelingsenableustoregulateouremotionsandself-ascribethem.

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arenotaccidental.Expertbirdwatchershaveachievedhighreliabilityinbird

recognition.Thishighreliabilityisreflectedinthephenomenologyofperceptual

recognition,i.e.inhowexpertbirdwatchersexperiencethetransitionfromthe

representationoflow-levelpropertiestotherepresentationofhigh-level

properties.30

Somethingsimilaroccursinourmostbasicemotionalresponses.

Presumably,ourbasicemotionaldispositionshavebeendevelopedthroughlong

evolutionaryprocessesinrelativelystableenvironments.Someoftheseemotional

dispositionscanalsobeshapedandmodifiedthroughlearning,therapyorhabit

(asinSituation3).Onceweareendowedwiththerelevantdispositions,the

emotionalresponsestheygroundarepermittedfromthefirst-personperspective.

Ifyouhavetheemotionaldispositionthatgroundsyourfear,youcannotevenraise

theMooreanquestion:‘Butisittruethatthegorillaisdangerous?’Thereisno

phenomenalgapbetweenyourawarenessofthegorillainanon-emotionalway

andyourawarenessofthegorillainanemotionalway.Youseamlesslymovefrom

yourperceptualrepresentationofthegorillatoanemotionalexperienceoffearof

thegorilla.Youseamlesslymovefromperceptiontotheactiontendenciesthat

characterizefear.DeonnaandTeroni(2012:80)capturethispointinaninsightful

way:“[you]feeltheway[your]bodyispoisedtoactinawaythatwillcontributeto

theneutralizationofwhatprovokesthefear”.Similarly,whenyoufindthejoke

funny,youcannothelplaughingatit.Yourrepresentationofthesituation

describedbythejokeseamlesslyleadstoamusementatthejoke.Ifyoucouldstop30Thereisalivelydebateonhowexactlytoaccountforthephenomenologyofexpertperceptualrecognition.Althoughallpartiesagreethatexpertiseleadstoachangeintheoverallphenomenalcharacterofone’svisualexperience,itisnotentirelyclearhowbesttoexplainthisoverallphenomenalchange(Siegel2010).Mytalkabout‘seamlesstransitions’isintendedtocapturetheuncontroversialclaimthatthewaywemovefromperceptiontorecognitionchangeswithexpertise.Expertsexperiencethosetransitionsasphenomenallyseamless;thosesamemovesstrikethenon-expertsashavinggapsthatmustbesewntogetherbybridgeprinciples.

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somewhereinbetween,youdidnotgetthejokeorwerenotepistemically

permittedtolaughatit.

Theseremarkssuggestanewpictureofthewayemotionsprovideuswith

epistemicaccesstoevaluativeproperties.Itisamistaketotrytoassignthe

responsibilityforthisaccesstoasingleentity,eitherthecognitivebasisorthe

emotion.Instead,thatepistemicaccessisajointendeavor.Itisachievedwhenthe

agentmovesfromthedetectionofthetriggeroftheemotionaldispositiontosome

actiontendencies.Thus,accessinganevaluativepropertyisnotpassively

recognizingapropertyoftheintentionalobject.Itisratheratransitionfroma

cognitivebasistoanactualizationofanemotionaldisposition.

Ihavedevelopedthesesuggestionsbyreflectingontheprocessesthatlead

tospecificemotionalresponses.Thismightseemtocontradicttheoriginalaimof

dealingwithpropositionaljustification.Yet,theproblemisjustapparent.Indeed,

somephilosophersholdthatattitudinaljustificationismorefundamentalthan

propositionaljustification(seeGoldman1986,forthepriorityofdoxastic

justificationoverpropositionaljustification).Wecanthereforegeneralizethese

lessonstopropositionaljustificationbyformulatingacounterfactualanalysis.We

cansolvethegapproblemasfollows:

BasicEmotionalJustification

IfasubjectS’sbasicemotionEaboutanobject,o,isjustified,then:

-Sis(orseemstobe)awareofoashavingsomeN-propertiesF,G,H…

-Shasasetofemotionaldispositionsthat,otherthingsbeingequal,would

leadhertomovefromthedetectionofF,G,H…tothecorresponding

emotionE.

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-Iftheemotionalresponseweretooccur,Swouldexperiencethetransition

fromthecognitivebasistotheemotionasaphenomenologicallyseamless

transition.

Itisworthmakingtworemarksonthisanalysis.First,Ihavenotoffered

sufficientconditionsforemotionaljustification.Thereasonisthatacomplete

accountofemotionaljustificationshouldbesupplementedwithatheoryof

emotionaldispositions.Thistheoryshouldbefurthertestedbyitscapacitytodeal

withdefeaters,‘barn’cases,andsimilarscenariosthathavebeendiscussedinthe

epistemologicalliterature.Iwillsaysomethingaboutthisprograminthenext

section.Second,DeonnaandTeroni(2012:104–17)haveofferedabatteryof

argumentstotheeffectthatdispositionssuchasmoods,sentiments,andcharacter

traitsdonotpositivelycontributetothejustificationofemotions.Thesearguments

deservetobeexamined.Unfortunately,Idonothavesufficientspacetodiscuss

themhere.Iwillratherspendsometimerespondingtosomespecificobjectionsto

thecurrentapproach.

6. ObjectionsandReplies

Objection1:Itcouldbeobjectedthatthedispositionalviewisnotan

alternativetoinferentialismbutratheraversionofit.Indeed,onemightclaimthat,

evenifanemotionalresponseisgroundedinacorrespondingemotional

disposition,thesubjectstillneedsantecedentjustificationtobelieveabridge

propositionoftheform:N-propertiesF,G,H…constitutetheformalobjectof

emotionEinthecurrentcircumstances.

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Reply:Thisobjectionwouldleadusbacktovalueskepticism(Section4).I

haveassumedthatvalueskepticismisnotadesirableposition.Still,mygoalwas

nottheambitiousoneofrefutingvalueskepticismbutratherthemodestoneof

sketchinganaccountofemotionaljustificationthatdoesnothaveskeptical

consequences.Andinferentialismhasskepticalconsequences.Thus,ourquestion

is:Aretherereasonablegroundstothinkthatthedispositionalaccountdoesnot

haveskepticalconsequences?Myansweris‘yes’.Indeed,ageneralizedformof

inferentialismwouldleadtoahighlyunstableposition.Tobeginwith,noticethat

thereareplentyofampliativetransitionsinourmentallifethatarenotplausibly

construedalonginferentiallines.Yet,wehavethestrongintuitionthatthose

ampliativetransitionsareepistemicallypermissible.Ifyouseearedsquareanda

bluecircle,yourvisualsystemmovedfromsensorystatesthatdetectredness,

squareness,blueness,andcircularitytoothersensorystatesthatrepresentared

squareandabluecircle.Thistransitionisampliativebecauseyourvisualsystem

hadtogobeyondthedeliverancesoffeaturedetectors.Afterall,thedetectionof

redness,squareness,blueness,andcircularitycouldcorrespondtoascene

containingabluesquareandaredcircleorascenecontainingfourscattered

properties.Still,thistransitionstrikesmostnon-skepticsasepistemically

permissible.Crucially,itisimplausibletoholdthattakingthebindingofthese

featuresatfacevalueisjustifiedbecausewehaveantecedentjustificationto

believeabackgroundproposition,astheinferentialmodelwouldpredict.Amore

plausiblehypothesisisthatweareendowedwithdispositionstobinddifferent

featuresintoobjectrepresentations.Ifwedonotpositthesedispositions,wewill

beledtothetroublingconclusionthatevenprimitiveperceptualpropositionssuch

as<Thisisaredsquare>cannotbeepistemicallyjustifiedbyperceptionalone.

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Afterall,itisunclearhowtheproposition<Thissquaregoestogetherwiththat

instanceofredness>couldbeepistemicallyjustified.

Mysuggestionisthatsomethingsimilarholdsforbasicemotions.Emotions

suchasfearhavecorrectnessconditionsthatfeatureformalobjects.Basic

emotionsarepartlyjustifiedbybasicdispositionstobindthoseformalobjectsto

theirintentionalobjects.Thesebasicdispositionsaretriggeredbynon-evaluative

propertiesthatbearsalientrelationstotheemotions’intentionalobject.31

Objection2:Somereadersmightprotestthatthedispositionalaccountfaces

acircularityproblem.Indeed,onemightcontendthatourunderstandingof

emotionaldispositionsisparasiticonourunderstandingofemotionalepisodes.To

illustrate,theemotionaldispositionthatgroundsfearistobeunderstoodasa

dispositiontofeelfearindangeroussituations.Thus,itisamistaketoholdthat

fearisgroundedinanemotionaldisposition.

Reply:Icangrantthatourunderstandingofemotionaldispositionsis

parasiticonourunderstandingofemotionalepisodes.Yet,thisdoesnotprevent

thedispositionalviewfromofferinganinformativeaccountofemotional

justification.Indeed,itispossibletocharacterizeemotionaldispositionsinways

thatgobeyondspecificemotionalepisodes,andthesecharacterizationsare

epistemicallysignificant.Thus,Mulligan(1998:163)suggeststhatsentiments“fix

therangeofvariationofasubject’s”emotionalresponses.32Similarly,Roberts

(2003:142)describesthebroadercategoryofaconcern“asaprincipleof

predilectionofarangeofwidelyvariousemotionalresponses”.Thus,onemight

thinkofemotionaldispositionsasprovidingtemplatesthatdeterminethewaysin

31Thisisaveryspecialkindofbinding.Inmyview,itisphenomenologicallyrealizedinourexperienceofactiontendencies.Ileavethisissueforanotheroccasion.32Mulligan(1998)doesnotconstruesentimentsasbasesofemotionsbutasbasesofintentionsandwantings.Thus,hisviewfacesthegapproblem.

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whichasubjectwouldreacttosometypesofeventsorsituations.An

epistemologicaltheoryofemotionaldispositionscouldthereforeexaminethe

conditionsunderwhichthesetemplatesareepistemicallygoodorbad.Itis

obviousthatsomeemotionaldispositionsareepistemicallybad.Loveoftenleads

tounwarrantedadmirationandbeingtimidoftenleadstofeelfearofinoffensive

objectsandsituations.Atheoryofemotionaljustificationcouldthereforeidentify

commonalitiesbetweenthesetemplatesandusethemtoidentifytheconditions

underwhichanemotionaldispositionisepistemicallygoodorbad.Itcouldalso

describesomegeneralfeaturesoftheacquisitionofemotionaldispositionsby

evolution,habitoreducation.Presumably,somemodesofacquisitionmay

negativelyorpositivelyaffectemotionaljustification.33

Objection3:Somereadersmightcomplainthatthedispositionalaccount

facesaproblemanalogoustoafamousproblemfacedbypsychological

behaviorism.Arguably,itisnotalwayspossibletospecifythetriggeringconditions

ofemotionaldispositionsinnon-evaluativeterms.

Reply:Idonotclaimthatthetriggeringconditionsofallemotional

dispositionscanbespecifiedinnon-evaluativeterms.Indeed,someofthemmay

bebasedonrepresentationswithevaluativecontents.Asanillustration,many

peoplehaveexperiencedindignationatDonaldTrump’selectionbecausethey

judgehimtobeunworthyofbeingtheUSpresident.Moregenerally,many

emotionscanbebasedonjudgmentsofvalue.Mypointisratherthatthetriggering

conditionsofseveralemotionaldispositionscanbespecifiedinnon-evaluative

terms.Thisisallweneedtoavoidvalueskepticismwhiledispellingsomeofthe

mysterythatsurroundsourepistemicaccesstoevaluativeproperties.Thecaseof

33Virtueepistemologywouldbeanaturalstartingpointtopursuetheseinquiries.Ithinkthatcurrentaccountsofepistemicandmoralvirtueswillbenefitfromacloserexaminationofemotionaljustification.

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thegorillaisarepresentativeexampleofthisidea.Oncewethinkaboutthe

structureofthiscase,itisnotdifficulttocomeupwithmanyotherexamples.A

rat’sfearofanimminentelectroshockcanbekeyedtoitshearingofabeep,which

isspecifiableinnon-evaluativeterms.Ananimal’sfearandavoidanceresponses

canbekeyedtothecolorsofpoisonoussubstances.Similarly,episodesofgriefand

longingcanbetriggeredbytheperceptualrecognitionofthebeloved’sbelongings,

whichdonotneedtobedescribedinevaluativeterms;theyarejusttightly

associatedwiththebelovedone.

7. ConcludingRemarks

Thesimpleviewofemotionaljustificationholdsthatthejustificationof

someemotionssupervenesonthecontentoftheircognitivebasesalone.I

introducedaseriesofepistemologicaldistinctionstoclarifythescopeofthesimple

view.Thesimpleviewismostplausiblyconstruedasanaccountofimmediate

propositionaljustificationunderstoodasepistemicpermissibility.Thisrestricted

thesisfacesthegapproblem:Ifthereisadifferenceinthewayscognitivebases

representobjectsandpropertiesandthewaystheemotions(re)presentthe

evaluativepropertiesofthoseobjects,thesimpleviewhasfailedtoprovide

sufficientconditionsforemotionaljustification.Iconsideredvariouswaysof

solvingthegapproblemandfoundthemwanting.Thepurportedsolutionseither

leadtovalueskepticism,orcontradictcognitivism,orarenotsufficiently

illuminating.

Onemightsolvethegapproblembyrejectingcognitivismortheclaimthat

emotionsaregroundedinothermentalstatesorepisodes.Iproposedamore

conservativeview.Ipreservedtheintuitionthatsomeemotionsaremore

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immediatelyjustifiedthanothersbyintroducingadispositionalmodelofour

accesstoevaluativeproperties.Onthisview,subjectshaveemotionaldispositions

that,inconjunctionwiththecontentsofemotions’cognitivebases,canconfer

immediateemotionaljustification.Emotionaldispositionsexplainhowonecan

haveepistemicaccesstoevaluativepropertieswithoutbeingabletoliterallydetect

thoseevaluativeproperties.Theyalsoexplainwhyemotionalresponsesseemto

bepermissiblefromthefirst-personperspective.

Itisanopenquestionhow,ontheproposedaccount,emotionscontributeto

thejustificationofevaluativejudgments.Thisisadifficultissuethatshouldbe

tackledbyanalyzingtherepresentationalstructureofemotions.Itisworth

stressing,however,thattheproposedaccountoffersacontributionofbroader

interesttoepistemology:itprovidesaseriesofcasesinwhichimmediate

justificationdoesnotrequirethattherepresentationalcontentofthejustifier

mentalstatebeidenticaltothecontentofthejustifiedmentalstateorepisode.

Thus,philosophersinterestedinthescopeofimmediatejustificationshouldpay

closerattentiontotheepistemologyofemotions.34

34IamextremelygratefultoJulienDeonnaandFabriceTeroniforhelpingmefindmywaythroughtheintricateliteratureonemotions.SpecialthanksareduetotheparticipantsattheworkshopExperience,Values,andJustification(Geneva,2-3June2016)fortheirprobingquestionsandremarks,especiallytoBeritBrogaard,ElijahChudnoff,DavidFaraci,KarenJones,FedericoLauria,MoritzMüller,andPeterRailton.IwouldalsoliketothankRichardDubforseveralstimulatingconversationsontheemotions,ArtursLoginsforadviceonepistemicmatters,andTristramOliver-Skuse,whokindlysentmehisexcellentdissertationandmadedetailedcommentsonanearlierdraft.IpresentedasubsequentversionofthisarticleattheInstitutJeanNicod(November9,2016).ManythankstoJöelleProust,PaulEgré,andtheirstudentsfortheirobjectionsandremarks.AnearlyfinalversionofthisarticlewasalsodiscussedatSusannaSchellenberg’sresearchseminaratRutgersUniversity.IamgratefultoSusannaandherstudentsfortheirsuggestionsofimprovement.Finally,IwouldliketothanktheSwissCenterforAffectiveSciences(NCCR)andThumos:TheGenevanResearchGrouponEmotions,Values,andNormsattheUniversityofGenevaforprovidinganidealresearchenvironmentwhileIwaspreparingthismanuscript.WorkonthisprojectwasfundedbyagenerousgrantfromtheSwissNationalScienceFoundation(FNS100012_150265/1).

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