Evidence on Conditional Cash Transfers in Education
Laura Poswell, J-PAL Africa
IGC WorkshopMaputo 6 July 2015
Successful partnerships for evidence-based policy-making: Lessons from J-PAL
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Overview
Who is J-PAL Measuring impact: Why randomise Evidence from randomized evaluations
on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi
Lessons and nuances
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Overview
Who is J-PAL Measuring impact: Why randomise Evidence from randomized evaluations
on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi
Lessons and nuances
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J-PAL: Over 110 affiliated researchers and 600 projects in 64 countries
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J-PAL’s Work in Education
165 completed and ongoing evaluations in 36 countries
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Overview
Who is J-PAL Measuring impact: Why randomise Evidence from randomized evaluations
on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi
Lessons and nuances
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How should we increase secondary school participation?
Address health issues (malnutrition, intestinal parasites?)
Lower the costs of schooling to families?
Inform parents of the returns to secondary schooling?
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Intervention
Time
Att
en
dan
ce
Counterfactual
Impact
How to measure impact
Time
Att
en
dan
ce
Counterfactual
ImpactIntervention
How to measure impact
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Counterfactual
Counterfactual: Would have happened in the absence of the policy?
Problem: Will never observe what would have happened
How to measure the causal impact of a policy?
1. B
ase
line
3. Intervention
3. Comparison
4. E
ndlin
e
2. Randomassignment
Randomised Evaluations in practice
Members of the groups are statistically identical
thus any change can be attributed to the program itself.
Key advantage of randomised evaluations
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Partnerships for randomised evaluations
Implementing Partner (Government, NGOs, Business)
Research team (Academics, fieldwork team)
Question – Intervention + Evaluation – Results – Scale up
Start early together
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Overview
Who is J-PAL Measuring impact: Why randomise Evidence from randomized evaluations
on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi
Lessons and nuances
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Conditional Cash Transfers
Cash transfers to poor families conditional on children’s health and educational investments School attendance Regular medical check ups
Can address short term liquidity constraints longer term savings constraints
Aim Break the intergenerational cycle of poverty through
encouraging investments in children’s education & health
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Evidence from randomised evaluations on CCTs in education
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs widely tested, consistently effective at increasing participation Over 30 countries have some form of CCT Program
Impacts on learning less clear
Differential impacts? More or less effective for the most marginal?
Other impacts beyond education?
Can careful design improve effectiveness?
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PROGRESA : landmark program and evaluation
Context of Program: Beginning of Mexico’s Economic Crisis in 1994 Poor and marginalised populations lagged
behind in terms of education, health, and nutrition.
Group of cabinet officials with presidential support want to introduce conditional cash transfers for the poorest. Faced some objections Pilot and then a
rigorous evaluation
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PROGRESA
PROGRESA program details Included education, nutrition, and health conditions. Two-stage targeting mechanism (geographic,
household) Ave. transfer amount = 22% of the monthly income of
beneficiary families.
Evaluation integrated into programme design Evaluation at scale planned from the outset Budget and administration constraints Randomised phase-in design (320 localities receive
program in first 2 years, remaining 186 in year 3)
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PROGRESA evaluation outcomes
Education outcomes Increased enrolment rates especially for children transitioning to junior
secondary school (11.1 percentage points) And especially for girls (14.8 percentage points)
Lower dropout rates Reduced child labour
No significant impacts on learning outcomes
References: Shultz (2001), Behrman et al 2001)
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PROGRESA-OPORTUNIDADES
Implications of Rigorous Evaluation Credibility
People believed the results – international recognition Made it politically robust – new government in 2000
continues and expands the program 2.6 million families by 2000
Precedence Set a new high standard for the design and
conduct of social policy - early involvement of government & researchers
Evaluation recommendations lead to new questions for further program improvements
CCTs introduced in more and more countries and many rigorous evaluations done
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Columbia StudyTiming and size of payout
Structure of most CCT programs is surprisingly similar: Families receive money (often every 2 months) when their
children meet specified monthly attendance targets Usually +- 80%
In 2005 the Secretary of Education of the City of Bogota decided to pilot a new CCT programme to: Prevent drop out from secondary school Encourage matric graduation & tertiary enrollment
Pilot in 2 of 12 localities in the city for 1 year Results to inform the design for city-wide program
References: Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011)
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Columbia study: 3 programs tested
Intervention Regular Transfers
Conditions Additional Transfers
1 Standard CCT 30,000 pesos (US$15)/month
80 % attendance /month
2 Savings CCT 20,000 pesos (US$10)/month
80 % attendance /month
100,000 pesos (US$50) at enrollment time of next school year
3 Graduation CCT
20,000 pesos (US$10)/month
80 % attendance /month
Graduated from secondary school
600,000 pesos (US$300) immediate payment with proof of enrolment in higher education;
otherwise, payment delayed by one year
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Colombia study: Attendance
Despite reducing the amount for regular payments, the saving and graduation CCTs attendance >= standard CCT
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Colombia study: Re-enrollment Savings & graduation CCTs on re-enrolment >
standard CCT
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Colombia study: Tertiary enrollment
Savings & graduation CCTs tertiary enrollment but standard CCT does not (not statistically significant)
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Columbia study: Other effects? Savings CCT
Especially effective at improving re-enrollment of the poorest students & those most at risk of dropping out
+- 12 percentage point
Eligibility rules & Unintended consequences: Families on average did not enrol all eligible
children And if they were registered, but not selected,
they attended school less than a sibling who was selected
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Transfer size?
In Colombia – the savings CCT reduced the monthly transfer by 30% from the standard CCT. Did not result in lower monthly attendance than the standard CCT
CCT study in Malawi Randomly varied CCT amounts in Malawi:
$1/month to girls as effective as $2-5, similar results for transfers to parents
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Conditional vs Unconditional? Malawi study – first study to test CCT vs
UCT Considers effects on education and
sexual behaviour of adolescent girls Zomba district, 2007 - 2009 Sample size – nearly 3,000 schoolgirls
aged 13 – 22 CCT - 80 % attendance /month UCT – no conditions
References: Baird et al (2011)
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Malawi study – Education Results
Enrollment UCTs - 5% higher than control CCTs – 11% higher
Attendance UCTs – no significant impact CCTs - 8% points higher than control
Learning (English, Maths, Cognitive tests) UCTs – no significant difference CCTs – significant improvements in all
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Malawi study – Other Results Marriage/ Pregnancy
Married after 2 years Control: 18% married UCT: 10% CCT: no significant difference
Pregnant during the program Control: 25% UCT: 18% CCT: no significant difference
UCT effect appears to be driven by cash to school drop outs as opposed to CCT where no cash if drop out
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In rural Burkina Faso CCT vs UCT study for children 7 – 15 , Very low enrollment - +- 50% UCTS = CCTs in erollment for non-marginal children
(boys, older & higher ability children)
CCTS > enrollment for marginal children (girls, younger children, lower ability children)
“Labeled” cash transfers as effective as CCTs in Morocco
Mixed Results on Importance of Conditionality
References: Akresh et al (2013), Benhassine et al (2014)
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Overview
Measuring impact: Why randomise Who is J-PAL Evidence from randomized evaluations
on conditional cash transfers for education Mexico (PROGRESA) Colombia Malawi
Lessons and nuances
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Lots of lessons, many nuances Many are supportive Some conflict When thinking through your own design:
Try to understand the evidence And what might be most applicable to your
context Ask new questions important to you based
on work already done Work with partners from early on
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J-PAL’s Post Primary Education Initiative
To promote policy-relevant research on secondary, tertiary, and vocational education in developing countries
Step 1: Review paper Highlighted gaps in the literature Identified policies that that should be given the
highest priority for future research
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J-PAL’s Post Primary Education Initiative
Research questions Pedagogy The role of information communication
technology The design of teacher incentives Strategies to include and support
disadvantaged students The role of private schools Mechanisms to increase the demand for
schooling among students and their parents (CCTs, information interventions)