Infrastructure for Development
Meeting the Challenge in Africa
November 14th 2012
Dr Mattia Romani
Senior Visiting Fellow Grantham Research Institute London School of Economics and Political Science
and
Director, Green Growth Planning and ImplementationGlobal Green Growth Institute
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Contents
▪ Why infrastructure for Africa? The needs
▪ The gap
▪ The risk profile
▪ Potential solutions
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Contents
▪ Why infrastructure for Africa? The needs
▪ The gap
▪ The risk profile
▪ Potential solutions
1. Infrastructure contributed over half of Africa’s improved growth performance (1999-2005). IT contributed significantly more than any other structural policy in the continent.
2. Africa’s infrastructure lags well behind that of other developing countries, particularly in terms of pave roads and power generation. On the latter, it started from similar levels to South Asia in the 1960s, and is significantly behind now.
3. Africa’s infrastructure services are twice as expensive as elsewhere. This is true across tariffs for different types of infrastructure. This is particularly severe for power and water, where average tariffs are a multiple of tariffs in South Asia.
4. Today Africa faces a resource gap of approx $35bn/year. This includes taking into account the potential for efficiency improvements (as much as $20bn). This gap could double in the coming decade due to growth, as well as limited public funding and lack of private capital.
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Why infrastructure for Africa?
Source OECD (2012) Romani, Bhattacharya and Stern (2012)
▪ the incremental investment spending across emerging markets and developing countries is estimated at around $1 trillion a year more than what is currently spent.
▪ This excludes investment in maintenance and upkeep.
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Global scale and nature of needs
Estimated current annual
spending,2008
Estimated annual infrastructure spending need,
2020
1.8–2.3
0.8 - 0.9
0.2–0.3
1.6–2.0
Additional investments for climate mitigation and adaptation
NOTES: $ trillion per year, (2008 real prices), capital investments only (excl. operation and maintenance costs)SOURCE: Current spending from Fay et al. (2010), “Infrastructure and Sustainable Development”; Estimated annual infrastructure
spending need for 2020 calculated by taking the Fay et al (2010) estimate and assuming a 4% annual growth rate from 2013-20
Annual Infrastructure Spending in the Developing World ($tr, 2008)
▪ East Asia will require up to 50% of the total – in the region of $2tn a year
▪ More than half is required for the power sector, across generation, transmission and distribution; water and land transportation also are very prominent sectors
▪ If maintenance was included, then the transport sector requirements would be much larger
Split by sector
Split by phase
Split by region
Transport
Water
Electricity
Telecomms
1.8–2.3
15-30%
45-60%
10-15%
15-25%
Preparation
Construction
1.8–2.3
5-10%
90-95%5-15%
SSA
SA
MENA
LAC
ECA
EAP
1.8–2.3
5-15%
20-25%
5-10%
10-15%
35-50%
Global scale and nature of needs
NOTES: $ trillion per year, (2008 real prices), capital investments only (excl. operation and maintenance costs)
SOURCE: the by region, sector, and phase are authors’ own calculations taking ranges from Yepes (2008), MDB G20 working group on infrastructure (2011), and Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010); note the $200-300 billion annual requirement for sustainability is assumed split in the same ratio as the other investments across regions, sectors and phases
Annual infrastructure spending requirements in the developing world ($tr, 2008)
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Contents
▪ Why infrastructure for Africa? The needs
▪ The gap
▪ The risk profile
▪ Potential solutions
▪ Currently, an estimated $0.8-0.9 trillion is invested annually, mostly financed by public sector budgets, with lesser shares provided by the private sector and foreign countries through development finance
▪ Private sector investment heavily concentrated in the ICT sector
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The gap: existing institutions and financial architecture are not adequate to meet the needs
NOTE: Split by sources of finance are approximate ranges only and don’t add to exactly to the totals given for that reasonSOURCE: Split of current sources of finance is a G-24 own assessment based on various estimates including Estache (2010); MDB working group paper on infrastructure (2011); Macquarie (2009).
Private sector
Future annual investment needs,2020
Concessional ODA
Other developingcountries’ financing
1,800–2,300
Governmentbudgets
MDB financing
Estimated split of current annual investment,
2008
800–900
500-600
20-30 20-30 <20150-250
1,000-1,400
▪ 95% of all private finance is concentrated in middle-income countries (Estache 2010)
▪ Public-Private Investments concentrated in ICT, other sectors investments dried up during the crisis
Today’s need for capital expenditure in SSA is in the region of $60bn, likely to increase substantially over the next decade.
SOURCE: WB and AFD (2010). Africa’s infrastructure: a time for transformation
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The gap in SSA: current capital expenditure is $25bn, gap is $35bn
SOURCE: Adapted from Briceño-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008, splitting ODA financing between 75% MDB financing and 25% concessional ODA based on Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010)
TransportPowerInformation & Communication
Technology
Water, Sanitation, Sewerage
8.5
4.5
0.5
4.7
2.4
0.2
7.0
1.3
4.6
1.1
0.3 0.2
1.4
0.5
0.90 0
Africa’s infrastructure capital investment, by source of finance (real $bn, 2006)
Concessional ODA
Governmentbudgets
Other developing countries ‘ financing
Private sector
MDB financing
▪ ICT receives more than 2/3 of total private sector investment in Africa (7 out of 9bn)
▪ The financial crisis reduced substantially the already small amounts going to other sectors
▪ ODA and MDB financing are relatively small (3.8bn), other developing is not insignificant (2.4bn)
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In SSA, the unmet need to support infrastructure development is for both debt and equity
1 ‘Public sources’ includes government financing, ODA, and non-OECD financing (e.g., from China). Public-private split is assumed same as current spending and, as such, may understate the potential private sector contribution
2 Split of equity and debt is approximate, based on 30-40% equity (including c.5-10% of total for project development equity), 60-70% debt
SOURCE: Adapted from Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010)
Estimated current infrastructure financing need for Sub-Saharan Africa$ billion per year
Irrigation
WSS
Transport
Power
ICT
Estimated unmet need fordebt2
8-9
Estimated unmet need for other equity2
3-4
Estimated unmet need for project develop-ment equity2
~1
Unmet need that could be met by private sources1
Unmet need that could be met by public sources1
Unmet needCurrent spend
25
05
Annualneed
60
3
15
Unmet capital need
Total of $ 4-5 billion needed in equity for unmet infrastructure demand
3
10
0
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▪ To meet needs, approximate payment of 0.40 dollars per day in Sub-Saharan Africa
▪ Equal to 35-50% of individual income where a significant proportion of the population lives off less than $1-2 per day
▪ If we add the additional cost of finance on this, the figures look even more worrying
12Source Climate Policy Initiative (2011). The Landscape of Climate Finance.
▪ Concessionality, intergenerational transfers of financial burden, cash transfers to enable people to pay fees, ODA to cover fees from donor countries are all potential mechanisms to alleviate this issue
▪ This adds a layer of political uncertainty on the sustainability of user fees which discourages investment: will subsidies be removed or reduced? Will the government have enough liquidity to pay out cash transfers for the foreseeable future?
Can SSA afford its infrastructure?
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In 2011 private investment in developing country infrastructure fell by more than half due to the financial crisis
-51%
20102005200019951990
DAC I & II
Others
SOURCE: World Bank PPI database
PPI in infrastructure, all developing countries, $ billion per year
NOTE: 2011 data has been estimated by doubling H1 data for 2011 in PPI database.
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Contents
▪ Why infrastructure for Africa? The needs
▪ The gap
▪ The risk profile
▪ Potential solutions
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Financing and governance
issues
Financing and governance
issues
Budget overrun of over 80%
Budget overrun of over 80%
Unforeseen disasters
Unforeseen disasters
6 month delay on delivery
6 month delay on delivery
Under-estimate of;▪ Environmental and safety
concerns ▪ Construction costs ▪ Capital costs for
development 140% higher
Demand forecasts 200%
off
Demand forecasts 200%
off
Experience shows that complex infrastructure projects are plagued by risks
SOURCE: CIA Factbook, EIB, UN, National Resources Defense Council, Gates Foundation, WEF, McKinsey
Economic loss > €10 billion
Economic loss > €10 billion
▪ Caused partly by design SPV (MTL) separate from operating SPV (Eurotunnel)
▪ 18 months of unreliable service after opening
▪ Passenger volume forecast at >15 mln in 1st year, yet 10 mln mark not reached today
▪ Partly underestimated competition from ferries and airlines
▪ Several major issues;– Train stuck in tunnel– Major Fire in 2008– Asylum seekers leading
to loss of capacity▪ Litigation with insurers still
in process (> €250 mln)
▪ Re-financing delayed and costly due to;– Governance structure leading
to delay in turnaround plans– Debt holders did not want to
take on more risk
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Infrastructure finance underwrites risks along the life of the project
▪ Fluctuation in interest and/or exchange rates▪ Increase in input (e.g. fuel, commodities, labour) costs and availability▪ High inflation
Market
▪ Inaccurate revenue forecasts▪ Change in environment e.g.
customer requirements▪ Unforeseen competition
▪ Inaccurate revenue forecasts▪ Change in environment e.g. customer requirements▪ Unforeseen competition
Demand / revenue
▪ Financing terms▪ Availability of financing▪ Liquidity challenges
Credit
▪ Suboptimal regulation▪ Change in regulation▪ Contractual conditions/interpretation of contract▪ Regulatory oversight & (stakeholder) conflict
Regulatory & legal
▪ Political unrest, war, terrorism, corruption▪ Natural disaster, outbreak of disease▪ Nationalisation▪ Embargoes, supply chain disruption
Political & external
Construction▪ Incomplete / optimistic budget▪ Lack of project / supplier control▪ EPC quality, technological or equipment
issues▪ Incomplete planning & permitting status
Risks
Operational▪ Project-related external (strike, sabotage,
theft)▪ Rise in wages, taxes or labour-related costs▪ Inefficiencies due to process or organisation▪ Other counterparty and procurement risks
(e.g., corruption)
Enabling environment
Project development
Financing ConstructionEarly operations
Mature operations
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The risk profile: the nature of risk for infrastructure makes it a complex proposition for investment
Source: AGF Report (2011)
Preparation Construction Operation
▪ Developer/government organizes feasibility studies; models cash flows, finances; organizes contracts with utilities, operators and construction firms
▪ Construction firms build the project to specifications
▪ Separate operating company takes over operation and maintenance of the project
▪ Macroeconomic & political risks▪ Technical risks to project viability▪ Environmental and planning
risks
▪ Macroeconomic & political risks▪ Construction risks (e.g., of
overrun, delay)
▪ Macroeconomic & political risks▪ Demand / traffic risks▪ Operating risks▪ Policy risks (e.g., tariff changes)
Description
Main risks
Cash flows (stylized)
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The risk profile: the nature of risk for infrastructure makes it a complex proposition for investment
Source: AGF Report (2011)
Preparation Construction Operation
▪ Developer/government organizes feasibility studies; models cash flows, finances; organizes contracts with utilities, operators and construction firms
▪ Construction firms build the project to specifications
▪ Separate operating company takes over operation and maintenance of the project
▪ Macroeconomic & political risks▪ Technical risks to project viability▪ Environmental and planning
risks
▪ Macroeconomic & political risks▪ Construction risks (e.g., of
overrun, delay)
▪ Macroeconomic & political risks▪ Demand / traffic risks▪ Operating risks▪ Policy risks (e.g., tariff changes)
Description
Main risks
Financing moments
Once project is ‘bankable’ the developer will seek equity investors and debt providers to finance the project
Once construction is complete and started to operate project can be refinanced to reflect the changing risk profile
Cash flows (stylized)
During project preparation and feasibility studies the developer seeks patient capital or, often, public funds
investors in the early phases (greenfield) need to consider all risks across the different stages of the project- since a return on their investment will only be possible if the return profile of the later stages of the project life are sufficiently attractive to make up for the early stage risks
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Base case + volatility
-3.000.000
-2.000.000
-1.000.000
-
1.000.000
2.000.000
3.000.000
4.000.000
5.000.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 11
Base Case + Volatility
SOURCE: McKinsey
The upfront investment often relies on a very uncertain future cash flow
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Most recent and future projects are greenfield
Already today, opportunities are mostly in greenfield…
And the pipeline is even more skewed towards new construction projects
Projects since 2010Projected number
Mature3Greenfield2
61%
SOURCE: Preqin, Infrastructure Journal, Public Works Financing, Infrastructure Investor
29%
Mature1Greenfield
Projects 2005-10 Average number p.a.
1 Includes Secondary stage and Brownfield 2 Includes Greenfield (112) and Expansion (12)3 Includes Asset Acquisition, M&A, Brownfield, Privatisation
▪ The prospective increase in the scale of ‘greenfield’ investments that are required in developing countries – which typically have higher risks than ‘brownfield’ expansions - means that the risks of a substantial bottleneck where financiers are not ready to invest are greater.
415
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The risk profile: constraints to matching demand of investment with supply of available financial instruments
▪ Infrastructure investment projects in developing countries have high risks across most of the above categories
▪ Macroeconomic and political risk in
developing countries compounds with high risks of early phases of investment
▪ This problem is further compounded by the fact that many potential financiers have few if any benchmark projects to serve as comparison for pricing these risks.
Difficult to match project needs and financial archetypes, making investment at scale unfeasible
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Contents
▪ Why infrastructure for Africa? The needs
▪ The gap
▪ The risk profile
▪ Potential solutions
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The shift in wealth has implications for asset allocations: Most emerging market investors have very low allocations to equities
Compound annual growth rate, 2000–10%
Asset allocation by investor, 2010%; $ trillion, 2010 exchange rates
Fixed income
Cash anddeposits
Other
Emerging market central banks
Equities
90
Emerging Asian private investors
11
13
Chinese private investors
125
Latin American private investors
14
24
0
MENAprivateinvestors
3.5
18
14
3
Sovereign wealth funds
6.5
52
29
6
Western Europe pensions and private investors
1.8
34
23
5
US pensions and private investors
5.9
45
29
6
2.74.328.343.6 3.6
13
Developed Asian private investors
32
100% =
Traditional investors
Emerging investors
4 15 239 16 16 14 223
1 Includes Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan. Excludes Japan, where private investors have 10% in equities
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The BRICS are now playing a larger role in infrastructure financing and are taking a new approach
China is now a larger contributor to infrastructure financing in Africa than the World Bank
Infrastructure financing in Africa$ billion
2004 20102007
World Bank Group China
▪ China and Gulf countries offer cheap capital and turn-key solutions conditional to geo political objectives rather economics
▪ Chinese commitments are 15% of total African infrastructure investment
▪ Chinese commitments including non-infrastructure sectors are even higher at $15.9bn in 2010
▪ Two-thirds of Chinese infra-structure financing is in energy and transport
SOURCE: Infrastructure Consortium for Africa 2010 annual report; ICA 2010 annual report; World Bank, “Building bridges: China’s growing role as infrastructure financier for sub-Saharan Africa” (2008); World Bank Group, Infrastructure Strategy Update paper (2011)
① Innovative public finance instruments (project preparation funds, political risk guarantees, etc)
② Complementing private finance instruments (both debt and equity)
③ Financial solutions that combine these public and private instruments effectively at low transactional cost
④ Large data-banks providing benchmark for assessing risk-return of projects
⑤ Governance of public money that allows a more efficient use of scarce public finance resources
⑥ Project preparation facilities that support countries in creating a healthy pipeline of investable projects
⑦ Mechanisms to guarantee revenues from user fees at the end of the investment cycle
⑧ Excellent data rooms on projects to facilitate assessments of risk and returns for private investors
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Potential solutions: reforming IFIs and need for new institutions
Current IFIs :•ensure that current money made available by members is leveraged more efficiently•Change governance to reflect both new geopolitics and current risk frameworks
New institution(s):•Institutions that reflect in their governance, capital and instruments the new economic and financial reality of the world and use resources from emerging and developing countries efficiently
PR
OJE
CT
SF
INA
NC
E
o Resolving the infrastructure challenge for the next 2 decades means laying the foundations for global growth.
o Most greenfield infrastructure projects in developing and emerging markets face upfront risks that current market players are unable to take on. A new institution could have the scale of capital, the portfolio of projects and the instruments required to take on this risk and unlock private investment.
o Public finances under pressure and domestic financial systems relatively young. New bank can help deepen domestic financial markets, channel savings to profitable investment and reduce exposure to currency risk, particularly with respect to $US/Euro
o BRICS keen to expand their commercial and strategic links with resource rich countries, mostly pursuing this through bilateral deals. A new bank could help achieve such objective with less financial and political exposure with a multi-lateral approach
o Existing IFIs not in a position to take on scale (due to institutional limits and governance) and nature (long term financing, large proportion of equity) although can be good partners
o Project preparation is not happening at the scale and quality required which results in a poor pipeline of bankable projects. A successful new institution needs to develop world-class, global project preparation facilities over time
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Rationale for a new a bank fit for purpose: modern in its mandate, instruments and ownership
Source Romani and Stern (2011)
1. Deepening the assessment of infrastructure investment needs – by region, country, sector
2. Risk analysis framework: assessing the risk return profiles of projects across regions, sectors, phases
3. Evaluating experience on existing financial instruments: what works and what doesn’t
4. Assessing the constraints on the development of a strong pipeline of investable projects across different sectors, countries, regions; explore experience on project preparation facilities and technical assistance
5. Assessing the existing financial architecture and its delivery:
1.Public finance (budgets)
2.MDBs and RDBs
3.National Development Banks
4.Private finance
6. Considerations and implications on developing new institutional arrangements: range of functions, instruments, membership, governance, capitalization, etc
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Proposed G24-GGGI work program in collaboration with other partners
Source Romani and Stern (2011)