1
THE IMPACT OF IRAQ ON HUMANITARIANISM
Gianni Rufini
PRDU – York University 2005
In the last twenty years, humanitarianism has gone through a dramatic evolution of its role, technical
profile and ethic framework. Changes have normally been triggered by the most politically sensitive
crises, whereas the relationship of the humanitarian community with the political establishment has
swung between sympathy and idiosyncrasy. Such dynamics has largely undermined all the efforts to
establish a virtuous interaction of the two dimensions, based on respect of roles and commitment to
humanitarian law, at the same time as it has stimulated and fuelled the diversification of visions among
the concerned institutions and organisations.
This is the case for the war in Iraq, which has highlighted the increasing vulnerability of the
humanitarian system vis à vis the uncertainty of the political environment, the growing role of state
actors and the increasing security threats, like the events in the fall of the second year of occupation.
On 7 September 2004 the NGO community was shaken by news of the kidnapping, in Baghdad, of
two Italian aid workers, Simona Pari and Simona Torretta, soon become familiar as "le due Simone"
(the two Simonas). The two young women were employed by a solidarity organisation called "Un
ponte per…", active in Iraq since the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991. After a secret negotiation and
the likely payment of a ransom by the Italian Government, the two Simonas were eventually released.
On 19 October, Care International's Margaret Hassan - 20 years in the country, married to an Iraqi -
was also kidnapped. Care, which had maintained assistance programs in Iraq throughout the 1990s
including the run-up to war, announced the closure of all activities in the country. After one month
Hassan was killed. Between the two events, almost all NGO expatriates had been withdrawn from
Iraq.
Getting prepared for the war
2
The crisis in Iraq had begun under a very negative star for humanitarians. The build up to the conflict
took place throughout 2002. By the last quarter of that year the probability that there would be a major
conflict had become apparent to most in the aid community. The UN started contingency planning for
a possible conflict in October with the first of the so-called 'Versoix meetings'1. Due to the political
constraints at the Security Council, preparation had to be done in secrecy and participants were bound
to confidentiality.
Nonetheless, information leaked and the predicted scenario was scaring: “the collapse of essential
services in Iraq could lead to a humanitarian emergency of proportions well beyond the capacity of
U.N. agencies and other aid organizations.”, “as many as 500,000 could require treatment to a greater
or lesser degree as a result of direct or indirect injuries”, “the outbreak of diseases in epidemic if not
pandemic proportions is very likely” , “the nutritional status of some 3 million persons countrywide will
be dire and that they will require therapeutic feeding”, “It is estimated that there will eventually be
some 900,000 Iraqi refugees requiring assistance” plus 500.000 IDPs2 . Although another meeting, at
ODI in London, drew a less pessimistic picture: “Overall, conditions are certainly poor, but people have
saved up an average of about five weeks of food in addition to rations; people are preparing for a
siege. The government in Baghdad has been locating shallow wells to provide water in case of siege.
If a military administration wanted to provide essential humanitarian goods rapidly once the area is
stabilised, that potential for humanitarian protection now exists in a way that it hasn't in recent years”3
1 Versoix is a suburb of Geneva, where numerous humanitarian and UN organisations have their meeting and training facilities 2 Likely Humanitarian Scenarios - "strictly confidential" UN draft. Geneva, 10 December 2002 This "strictly confidential" UN document examines "Likely Humanitarian Scenarios" in the event of a war in Iraq. It was written to assist with UN contingency planning for safeguarding the wellbeing of a population most of whom the document acknowledges are "highly dependent" upon a Government ration for their basic needs. The existence of this document was first reported in The Times (London) on 23 December 2002, in an article entitled "UN chief issues secret orders for war in Iraq". It is published at http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/war021210notes.html 3 ODI - Transcripts from the meeting ‘Iraq: war, law and humanitarian protection’. Held at the Overseas Development Institute. London, 22 January 2003
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and recommended humanitarian organisations to rather play an active role in seeing that international
humanitarian law was applied.
Whatever the forecast, the big issue was whether and under what conditions humanitarians could
work in a conflict where belligerents are "our belligerents" and whether financing for relief should be
accepted from those same governments who fought the war. From Kosovo to Afghanistan, this
dilemma has repeatedly animated the humanitarian debate. Agencies' reactions to such dynamics are
diversified: some have withdrawn into their ethical fortress, others have accepted mingling with
politics. All have suffered from the contradictions inherent in the choice between following the funding,
for ensuring continuity and development for their action, and remaining consistent with principles, thus
preserving their credibility. This has brought a polarization between "interventionists" and "neutralists",
which underlies all classifications of the humanitarian world.
In January 2003, the Pentagon informed NGOs that the U.S. military's plans did not include policing or
protection and that not much could be done in terms of humanitarian assistance by the occupying
force, at the beginning of the conflict, thus falling well short of the threshold required for the U.S. to
meet its obligations under International Humanitarian Law. “With the UN planning to evacuate in the
event of hostilities and NGO capacity in Iraq and the wider region extremely limited, there will be a
humanitarian vacuum that the U.S. will have a responsibility to fill. The prospect of a quick hand over
to the UN and NGOs to take care of the Iraqi population is illusory”.4
Also, the decision was made to concentrate coordination and planning concerning humanitarian aid in
the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), under the Department of
Defence. This included the authority to release permits for access to International NGOs. The Office's
CEO was Jay Garner, a retired general with an experience of Iraq who was, until just a few weeks
earlier “an executive at a leading defence contractor working on missile systems that would be used to
4 ibidem
4
bomb Baghdad. Although a Pentagon official said Jay Garner's new role does not constitute a conflict
of interest, ethics experts say the appointment raises troubling questions”.5
Across the aid community there was confusion about why the coordination of a post-conflict Iraq
should be headquartered at the Pentagon. InterAction6, in a letter to President Bush, advocated for the
coordination to be placed under civilian authorities: “The relief professionals at the U.S. Agency for
International Development and at the Department of State, not members of the military establishment
at the Pentagon, know best how to conduct emergency assistance operations (...) U.S. AID and State
are familiar with the principles of independence and impartiality under which we must operate.” The
letter also stressed that to “force nongovernmental organizations to operate under DoD jurisdiction
complicates our ability to help the Iraqi people and multiplies the dangers faced by relief workers in the
field”. 7
The concern about military-civilian relations was very high. The Versoix meeting report warned: “For
years, as part of the debate over the role of the post-modern armed forces the military have attempted
to carve a niche for themselves in the direct delivery of assistance instead of the previous stance of
providing logistics and engineering support to humanitarian organisations. This is very much an
uncharted field that has, a priori, more "cons" than "pros". US/DOD is the most proactive military
establishment in the prosecution of such a role—see the extensive utilization of military/civil affairs
staff in Afghanistan”8.
5 USA: General/Defense Contractor to Rebuild Iraq. Conflict of Interest? - By David Lazarus - San Francisco Chronicle. 26 February 2003 6 The largest US alliance of nongovernmental organizations conducting overseas relief and development, based in Washington DC 7 Letter of Feb. 5, 2003. Reported by Mary E. McClymont, CEO InterAction, 7 April 2003 8 Likely Humanitarian Scenarios, op. cit.
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The second "Versoix" meeting, on 12 and 13 January 2003, "turned out to be quite a large event with
attendance from all major UN humanitarian and development agencies, UN staff from different
agencies based in Iraq and eight surrounding countries, IOM, the Red Cross Movement, and the three
NGO networks that are members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)"9. On 15 January,
the French daily "Le Monde" published a report on the "Versoix II", and a confidential UN document,
revealing different scenarios for humanitarian operations, appeared on the Internet.
In a meeting in February, American NGOs complained that the dialogue between aid organizations
and the military had been handled poorly, which had undermined previous progress. “This has
resulted in bringing levels of trust to an all-time low." Aid agencies hoped to find new channels of
communication. There was considerable scepticism, however, that the military would share its plans or
be willing to adjust them. As one participant expressed it, the USG administration was in the process
of "militarizing the entire aid process and they have been reluctant to be forthcoming in any detail
because they don't want to be second guessed or criticized. They plan to call in NGOs only if and
when they need them. In the military's eye, partnership means control.” 10
Some commentators invited NGOs to negotiate their involvement on a firm stand: “Despite financial
incentives to join the fray, humanitarian organisations have ample reason to fear that an aid effort
which is simply an extension of a political-military agenda will cut them off from reaching many of
those in urgent need. Perhaps it is time for a radical approach. Humanitarian agencies that resist
being taken for granted should stipulate the conditions under which they are prepared to become
involved in aid activities during or after an eventual war. Rather than politicising humanitarian action,
their initiative would underscore the importance of maintaining their neutrality and independence. In
the meantime, the United States and other military forces that prosecute an eventual war would 9 Meeting on Contingency Planning and Preparedness for Iraq “Versoix II”. Geneva, 12 and 13 January 2003, ICVA Note for the File. 10 Summary: Roundtable on Humanitarian Action in Iraq. From a meeting held on 3 February, 2003 hosted by the Institute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM) - Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
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themselves be obliged to accept the responsibilities of belligerents under international humanitarian
law to stanch the wounds they inflict”. 11
The broad understanding in the community was that the space for NGOs was seriously shrinking, at
the same time as many corporate contractors were pre-assigned contracts concerning rehabilitation
and logistic activities. These seemed interfering with the domain of humanitarian organisations,
suggesting an attempt to "corporatize" aid.
The humanitarian response timeline
In the advent of the war, some agencies had hundreds of local staff and the UN had over 1,000
international staff in country, including monitors of the Oil-for-Food program and 60 staff for the UN
country team. In addition, over 3,000 national staff were working in Iraq under the UN Oil for Food
program. The ICRC, at its peak, maintained 130 foreign aid workers in Iraq. On Day-1 of the war, the
ICRC and MSF were the only international humanitarian organisations that could claim having some
presence, albeit merely symbolic (8 ICRC and 5 MSF staff), in the country.
More than 150 NGOs had based their operations in Jordan, Syria, Iran and Kuwait: they were well
equipped and prepared to intervene with supplies and personnel, but forbidden to cross the border.
The military authority envisaged keeping NGOs out of the country until the end of hostilities. Later,
agencies would be allowed to carry out trans-border operations to assist IDPs, while keeping their
project headquarters abroad. Given the existing constraints, the best efforts made in terms of
preparedness had consisted of setting up camps and stocking food, blankets and other items for the
predicted 1.4 million refugees and IDPs.
11 Larry Minear - Agencies should resist being taken for granted in Iraq. AlertNet, 17 Jaunary 2003
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In a statement of 20 March, Save the Children UK firmly urged "the warring parties to uphold their
obligations with regard to the protection of civilian populations (Article 48 and 50 of Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions)12 and to refrain from using military ordnance that harms civilians" and to
"guarantee full and secure access to affected populations for adequate humanitarian supplies" with a
"clear separation between impartial humanitarian action and the role of the military”. 13
On the same day, the Coalition forces launched early morning air strikes at sites near Baghdad.
Ground war began in the afternoon near Kuwaiti border. On 28 March, with the port of Umm Qasr
partially cleared of mines, a British ship made the first sizable humanitarian delivery. On 9 April,
American commanders declared that Saddam's regime no longer ruled Baghdad. Crowds went on
looting rampages. Looters ransacked government offices, embassies, hospitals, businesses and the
Iraq National Museum. Unexpectedly, there was a very limited movement of displaced people, who
numbered a few thousands.
Under International Humanitarian Law, the occupying power has certain responsibilities. It has to
ensure that the needs of the inhabitants of a territory are met in terms of assistance, food, water,
hygiene. The occupying power has a duty to cooperate with humanitarian agencies and others, or it
may devolve this responsibility to the humanitarian agencies. But after the first weeks of combat, it
became evident that the Coalition forces had no capacity for ensuring basic assistance to the
population, whose situation was becoming critical, especially because of the lack of drinkable water,
the disruption of sanitation and the risk of epidemics. Unfortunately, the occupiers were also
neglecting public order and security in the streets, allowing looting and widespread violence.
12 The UK is a party to Protocol I. Iraq and the United States are not a party to Protocol I, although key provisions of Protocol I are reflected in the US military code. However, the fundamental provisions of Protocol I, including all the rules on the conduct of hostilities, are considered part of customary international law and are therefore binding on all states. 13 Save the Children Statement on the War in Iraq – Brussels, 20 March 2003
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Eventually, in the 4th week of war, the blockade for NGOs was gradually released. It was only as late
as 20 April that they were allowed to begin assessment in the field. On 1 May, U.N. international staff
returned to the capital for the first time since the war, and began to assess emergency humanitarian
needs. But the situation remained unclear as far as the "humanitarian space" was concerned: were
there neutrality of humanitarian operations, autonomy from the military, clear separation from the
political level, acceptance of local communities and leaders, safety for aid workers, and actual needs?
At the end of May, agencies complained that "levels of criminal activity are not reducing in Baghdad.
Many NGOs are recommending to their staff essential movements only and are enforcing a curfew a
lot more restrictive than that imposed city-wide by the Occupying Forces. Elements of the former
regime (including military and intelligence structures) are turning to organized crime. Violent crime is
on the increase. On average there are five attacks involving small arms or grenades against US
Forces in Baghdad daily. Hostage taking of wealthy Iraqi citizens is on the increase. There is concern
is that this may spread to the humanitarian community”14.
In June, as NGO operations began to flow more regularly, tension rose between American agencies
and the US Administration. InterAction denounced that "The Bush administration is wielding its
financial clout to make charitable relief organizations that receive U.S. government money serve the
interests of U.S. foreign policy”. The US Government claimed that "aid agencies in the field should
identify themselves as recipients of U.S. funding to show a stronger link to American foreign policy”15.
Some NGOs agreed to undergo USAID clearing before releasing statements to the press.
The season of massive attacks against humanitarian agencies began with the blasts of the UN (19
August 2003) and ICRC (2 October) headquarters, causing the death of a large number of
14 United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOHCI) - Talking Points UN Inter-Agency Daily Briefing, Larnaka, Cyprus, 23 May 2003 15 U.S. NGOs feel the squeeze from Bush administration - Reuters. Washington, 24 June 2004
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humanitarian officials, including the much beloved Sergio Vieira de Mello. In several phases of the
conflict, agencies repeatedly pulled out from and returned to Iraq, with their troops of expatriate aid
workers.
In the fall of 2003, the situation on the ground became more difficult as resistance to occupation
developed. In a Mission report by Mary Kaldor and Yahia Said it was noted that "Many people,
especially men, hate Saddam Hussein and the Americans in equal measure. They are angry at the
ever-growing list of Iraqi casualties both civilian and military. They feel humiliated by the rapid
American victory, their failure to liberate themselves, and by the patronising and sometimes insensitive
behaviour of the occupiers. A similar ambiguity characterises the dominant view of the 'resistance'.
They feel it is wrong and they hate the violence but nevertheless few Iraqis stand up publicly and
oppose the attacks. Sometimes, they even express satisfaction when Americans are killed”.16
Understanding the difficulty of operating in a very unsafe environment, and an ambiguous political
framework, International NGOs decided to minimize their visibility on the ground, while supporting
local clergy and mosque committees for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and protection. It is
true that “these arrangements allow their own organisations to keep a low profile, while minimising the
need for outsider-led humanitarian action and encouraging local responsibility and solutions”17 but
they probably had negative effects on the perceived neutrality of agencies, and legitimized non-
controllable local actors.
In the Spring 2004, the alert for aid workers' security reached a peak. “Insecurity and armed conflict of
note persisted last week in Falluja and Baghdad, and threatens to spread to the holy city of Najaf.
16 Regime Change in Iraq. Mission report by Mary Kaldor and Yahia Said - Centre for the Study of Global of Governance at the London School of Economics. November 2003 17 Greg Hansen - Humanitarian Action in Iraq. Emerging Constraints and Challenges - Humanitarianism and War Project, 27 April 2004
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Mounting civilian casualties and deaths, many reportedly women and children, have caused alarm
amongst the international community. The prevailing insecurity has given rise to a growth in the
targeting of foreigners as political targets, and is now severely restricting the ability of non-government
organisations (NGOs) to work in all parts of Iraq. The United Nations (UN) and its NGO partners
continue to operate, in large part due the tireless efforts of Iraqis, though under extremely difficult
circumstances”18.
The kidnappings of aid workers in September 2004 showed how little effective such a strategy was, as
far as safety was concerned. In November, Médecins Sans Frontières decided to pull out from Iraq
because of escalating violence in the country and the danger to its staff. "It has become impossible for
us, as an international humanitarian organisation, to guarantee an acceptable level of security for our
staff, whether they are expatriates or Iraqis," said Gorik Ooms, director-general of MSF-Belgium19.
The rationale of a presence
Iraq is not a major humanitarian crisis. On 3 October 2003, Oxfam reported that "While there is no
humanitarian crisis as such, many Iraqis live in poor conditions with insufficient access to basic
services such as food and water, electricity, fuel, and healthcare”20. There is widespread poverty and
unemployment, criminality and diffused violence, and disruption of a large part of public services.
Nonetheless, there is no lack of food, the number of refugees and IDPs is declining at a reasonable
rate, water is scarce but still sufficient. Sanitation is in a critical state but no risk of major epidemic is
envisaged, and health services are working, although in a very difficult condition. "Iraq is a classic
18 Week in Review – Iraq Situation Report - United Nations, 12-18 April 2004 19 Al-Jazeera.net - 5 November 2004 20 ReliefWeb - 3 October 2003
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rehabilitation and development operation, there is no humanitarian emergency here. The situation I
found in Bosnia is much worse than this one”21.
What are evident are the cumulative effects of sanctions and the current general disregard for human
life by combating parties of all types, which keep the number of casualties very high. A survey recently
released by the Lancet, a British medical journal, based on a study carried out by American
researchers, calculated that the death rate since the invasion had increased from 5 percent annually
to 7.9 percent. That works out to an excess of about 100,000 deaths since the war22. The figures
remind us of those of the 1991 Gulf War aftermath, when the victims were 150.000 to 250.000. In the
following 12 years, the excess mortality reached the brutal level of 500.000 to one million deaths
caused by the war. After 1991, Iraq dropped from 96º to 127º place in the Human Development rank,
an unprecedented case.23
The sieges of Fallujah and other insurgent cities have created acute humanitarian needs for a limited
time, and serious concerns for both the non-combatants and the combatants. In an appeal in
November 200424, Amnesty International demanded: "Unequivocal orders for the proper treatment of
unarmed and wounded insurgents must be issued or reinforced to all US and Iraqi military and civilian
personnel. US and Iraqi forces should be clear that under international law they have an obligation to
protect and provide necessary medical attention to wounded insurgents who are no longer posing a
threat, as well as to civilians". There was also evidence of war crimes, disclosed by the US television
21 Testimony of Ugo Bernieri. Italian Red Cross official 22 The Lancet medical journal - "Mortality Before & After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Cluster Sample Survey." www.thelancet.com/journal/vol364/iss9445/contents. The project was designed by Les Roberts and Gilbert M. Burnham of the Center for International Emergency, Disaster and Refugee Studies at the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health in Baltimore; Richard Garfield of Columbia University in New York; and Riyadh Lafta and Jamal Kudhairi of Baghdad's Al-Mustansiriya University College of Medicine. 23 Figures from “The Human Costs of War in Iraq” - Center for Economic and Social Rights. New York, 2003 24 Amnesty International - Urgent action needed to prevent war crimes. ReliefWeb, 16 November 2004
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network NBC, like the deliberate shooting of unarmed and wounded fighters “who pose no immediate
threat is a war crime under international law and there is therefore an obligation on the US authorities
to investigate all such reports and to hold perpetrators of such crimes accountable before the law.
Such investigations should be open and transparent and the findings should be made public. Any
potential witnesses should be protected." In these cases, response should be provided by the ICRC,
with the Iraqi Red Crescent, and a few specialised organisations, should the Coalition forces allow
them into the cities.
In fact, most organisations are engaged in rehabilitation activities, distribution of drugs and supplies for
hospitals, limited demining, school and education. Activities in the area of development rather than
humanitarian assistance, and whose level could be easily handled by Iraqi counterparts. In principle,
local resources can provide almost all the required skills. Still before the war, a common sentiment
heard within Iraq was expressed by the manager of an international NGO to the researchers of the
Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR): ““This isn't Afghanistan - there is a functioning
government system that, politics aside, makes, for example, the food distribution system the best in
the world. The [US Government] should support and reinforce the existing system instead of
developing a parallel system of international NGOs who will take forever to mount a parallel
infrastructure.”25
Most observers comment that there is no evident need for a large number of expatriates in Iraq, and
the presence of most foreign workers is not justified by actual operational necessities. Many
International NGOs have concluded that the extent of needs does not justify facing the difficulties and
political constrains of the situation. Particularly considering, the security threats.
25 see note 23
13
However, some NGOs have been working for years in the country and do not see why they should
leave now, when the needs have become more acute and the Iraqi communities lack a point of
reference to streamline the reconstruction process.
Given the high level of politicization of this crisis, there is a number of organisations who are affirming
their right to be there, in a somewhat symbolic political confrontation with the Coalition's Governments,
as an expression of their opposition to war. This is the case for a group of Italian NGOs gathered
under the umbrella of the so-called "Iraqi table”26 Some of these organisations have a strong political
profile and cannot be defined as “humanitarian”, though they deliver humanitarian assistance and
participate in the sectoral meetings. Other, more pragmatic, NGOs have decided that as long as there
is work to do, they will do it, as a means of keeping the agency going in an age of scarcity of
resources to work anywhere else. Amongst agencies in the field, the big divide is between those who
receive financing from the belligerent governments and those who don't.
On the other hand, financing is widely available. Even refusing to consider the US official aid, which
most NGOs find ethically incompatible with their mandate, the European Community alone pledged
€200 million from its budget for 2003 and 2004. €40 million was released in December 2003 and €160
million in May 2004. The allocation has largely been channelled through UN thematic funds and NGOs
to support work on emergency rehabilitation of water and sanitation, health and education (€90
million), employment generating schemes (€60 million) as well as promotion of the political process,
transitional justice and human rights (€10 million)27. ECHO channelled almost €100 million to Iraq
during 2003, responding to needs arising before, during and after the war28.
26 “Tavolo di solidarietà con le popolazioni dell' Iraq" – www.tavoloiraq.org 27 European Commission - UN forum: Fifth Committee (Administrative and Budgetary Affairs) - EC04-112EN. Brussels, 3 May 2004 28 ECHO - Assisting the Iraqi population - http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/field/iraq/index_en.htm
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In a broad sense, Humanitarian organisations in Iraq have focussed on "keeping the control of the
territory": being there, affirming their independence, representing the West's sense of guilt, getting
funding, reacting to the corporate invasion, contending the field with the military, in a dramatic
asymmetrical confrontation, in which their best asset, the acceptance by the local communities, is
hampered by the attacks of militias and criminals.
This is shown to be a shortsighted strategy that has neither improved the situation of the Iraqis nor
allowed a positive influence by NGOs on the political processes, which should have been the main
priority.
"The primary humanitarian aim is not to occupy as much of humanitarian territory as possible. Even if
you can occupy it, it is unlikely you will be able to hold it, or do all you want on it, if you have not first
overcome those who do not want you to have it. Instead, the strategic aim is rather to protect and
assist the civilians on this territory and to defeat your opponents who are causing their suffering or
preventing their protection. To achieve this may not involve taking humanitarian space or discussing
humanitarian access at all."29
Humanitarianism and politics
There is a broadly agreed view, in the community, that the war in Iraq represents a very negative
event for humanitarianism. In fact, it paradigmizes a critical state of relations between humanitarians
and politics, following l'age d'or of the 1990s, when humanitarian concerns seemed to draw the
political agenda. Although, some wonder whether such a golden age has ever existed.
A large part of the contentious issues concerns the interpretation of the founding principles of
humanitarianism: the obligation to assist, which stresses the independence of aid from any
29 Hugo Slim - A Call to Alms. Humanitarian Action and the Art of War. HD Opinion – Geneva, 2004
15
consideration of interest or opportunity; neutrality, the moral stance or position of third parties in other
people’s wars; and independence of aid, from any (political) influence. Neutrality aims to ensure
respect and immunity for non combatants in a conflict, and allow them to operate unmolested by the
warring parties. These concepts have been internalised in international law through the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the four Geneva Conventions (1949) and the Additional
Protocols of 1977, and repeatedly reviewed in a process whereby grim experience, reflective practice
and juridical precedent over more than a century have developed the ensemble of doctrine, ethics and
practice that is now termed ‘humanitarianism’.
The principle of neutrality has been the core of a large discussion since the World War II, and an
engine of diversity in the humanitarian community, with three main historical strands or traditions that
have been important in the evolution of modern humanitarianism: the religious, the ‘Dunantist’ and the
‘Wilsonian’.
Organisations in the oldest of the three, the religious tradition, see their humanitarian programmes as
combining social and religious goals. Their views of neutrality can be very varied, but normally they do
not proselytise in any direct way.
Dunantist humanitarianism is named for Red Cross founder Henry Dunant. Dunantist organisations
seek to position themselves outside of state interests and are strictly neutral, maintaining the solely
purpose of saving all human lives as central to their action.
‘Wilsonian’ humanitarianism is named for President Woodrow Wilson, who hoped to project US values
and influence as a force for good in the world. Wilsonians have a practical, operational bent and see a
basic compatibility with humanitarian aims and foreign policy objectives. 30
Dunantists and Wilsonians represent the extremes of a spectrum which encompasses all humanitarian
organisations, where the balance between the rigid adherence to neutral principles and the adoption
of political goals diversifies the identities in the humanitarian arena.
30 Abby Stoddard, “Humanitarian NGOs: challenges and trends” - HPG Briefing Number 12, July 2003
16
In the multiplication of crises and relief actors that marked the years between 1985 and 1999, the
concern for neutrality tended to decline among relief agencies:
1. Factional warfare, emerged after the end of the Cold War, challenges the definitions of
impartiality and neutrality that are critical to the concept of “humanitarian space”. The scale and
fluidity of conflicts forces agencies to make choices as to where they operate. But when aid is
insufficient or differentially distributed among needy groups, humanitarian organisations are
inevitably seen as culpable actors in a discourse of perceived discrimination and vulnerability.31
2. There is a perception that unconditional humanitarian assistance is not effective. Certain
minimum conditions have to be put in place if aid were to be effective in aiding and protecting
victims of conflict. These include: consent of warring parties; security; independent access for
assessment; and monitoring of needs and distributions. 32
3. The so-called “New Humanitarianism”, supported by large part of the political spectrum,
proposes a model which pursues crisis management, stabilisation and democratisation, and
whereas humanitarian aid is no longer a substitute for political action but the primary form of
political engagement responsible for delivering a liberal peace33. This implies a view of the
traditional humanitarian principle of neutrality “as on the one hand morally repugnant and on
the other hand unachievable in the complex political emergencies of the post Cold war
world”34.
31 Responding to conflict in Africa - Mark Bowden - February 2001 32 Mark Duffield and Joanna Macrae – in ‘The new humanitarianisms: a review of global humanitarian action’, HPG Report 11, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2002. 33 Eriksson, J. - The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience. Synthesis report. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Danida, Copenhagen, 1996
Macrae, J. - Aid and War: Reflections on current debates, Paper presented at a workshop for Oxfam Staff, Birmingham, February 1996, Oxfam, Oxford. 34 Fiona Fox - Draft Presentation -Seminar on Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension Commonwealth Institute, London -1 February 2001
17
While Dunantists reject this model, arguing that it allows partisan politics to dictate the nature and
scale of external assistance, thus transforming humanitarian action into ‘political action’35, the
Wilsonians are far more sympathetic with the emerging trends and accept to diverse extents the
“coherence” between humanitarian action and military-political operations, although experience shows
that the achievements of this approach are dubious if not counter-productive36.
At the turn of the century, the diversification within the humanitarian community is wide. Agencies
position themselves in relation to the balance between neutralism and interventionism, as well as
between charitable spirit and right-based approach (see below an arbitrary attempt of graphic
description of such diversity).
35De Waal, Alex and Rakiya, O. 1994. Humanitarianism Unbound, Africa Rights Discussion Paper, Number 5, specifically criticise (excluding ICRC) operating in Africa arguing that neutrality for them is an aspiration rather than a fact. Macrae, Joanna and Leader, Nicholas. 2000. The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, Humanitarian Policy Group Briefing Number 1, London: Overseas Development Institute. Ryfman, Philippe. La Question Humanitaire. Histoire, Problématique, Acteurs et Enjeux de l'Aide Humanitaire International, Paris: Ellipses. 1999 36 André Pasquier, Constructing Legitimacy - Seminar on Politics and Humanitarian Aid: Debates, Dilemmas and Dissension Commonwealth Institute, London -1 February 2001 Duffield, M. Aid policy and post-modern conflict:a critical review, Birmingham, University of Birmingham. 1998
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In an effort to reconcile major divergences on these themes, the inter-agency work to draft the
common Code of Conduct for the Red Cross family and NGOs, intentionally omitted to mention
neutrality in the text, though asserting the need for agencies not be used to further a particular political
or religious standpoint (Art. 3) and not to act as instruments of government foreign policy (Art. 4)37.
After ten years, the level of implementation of the Code of Conduct, in this sense, seems
unsatisfactory.
Humanitarian assistance has always been carried out under extreme political conditions, and thus it
has always influenced the political economy of conflict and has been influenced by political
considerations. What is new regards the development of a specific framework for relationship between
humanitarian relief and politics, which Macrae identifies as a “Third Way foreign policy that defined
37 Principles of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster response programmes. Geneva, 1994.
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national self-interest in terms of good international citizenship. An important implication of the rights-
based approach to foreign policy is that states that abuse human rights forego the right to be treated
as legitimate members of the international community, and become the object of international scrutiny,
censure and occasionally military intervention”38. This “Third Way” encompassing different political
traditions, provides the moral justification for some of the developments following the “September 11”
attack.
After the war in Afghanistan (2002), whose uncertain legitimacy has a negative influence on relief
operations and the security of aid workers, the occupation of Iraq has widened the divide between
those agencies who have accepted to collaborate with the occupying forces, those ones who refuse
collaboration and work in the country independently, and the organisations convinced that there is
simply no humanitarian space at all in Iraq.
The peculiar characteristic of the Iraqi crisis is that all the elements of contradiction and constraint that
humanitarianism has already experienced over the years, overlap in the same context: donors who
become belligerent, poor political analysis, sharp clashes with governments, competition with
corporate, tied aid, impotency of the UN, violations of humanitarian law, insecurity and bad relations
with the military; all due to the extent of the vested interests around the war and post-war. The impact
that this may cause on humanitarian ethics could be as violent as that of the Rwanda crisis. It is
throwing into relief the flaws in the system but hopefully will provoke an equal impulse for change.
The most significant aspects of the Iraqi process mirror the core issues of the crisis of
humanitarianism, as they emerge from the debate that has animated the humanitarian community in
the last decade:
38 Macrae, Joanna. 2001. Aiding Recovery? The Crisis of Aid in Chronic Political Emergencies, London: Zed Books.
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1. Iraq, along with Afghanistan, represents the most serious case of "humanitarian co-option into
war aims, posed by belligerent funding and military encroachment into humanitarian activity,
which is seen as causing a dangerous blurring of belligerent and humanitarian interests and
action"39. In recent years, "humanitarian action itself is increasingly subsumed or integrated
into other - essentially political - realms"40. On both shores of the Atlantic, there is a concern for
putting humanitarian assistance under the direct control of governments, integrated with other
foreign policy tools: military, diplomatic, financial, bilateral and multilateral. Humanitarian
organisations' ethical concerns about independence, neutrality, impartiality and International
law are little consistent with political priorities and goals. If some organisations have decided to
overcome such concerns and cooperate with these policies, most of them have declined.
Therefore, the American Government is looking at the corporate environment as a way to
provide humanitarian assistance through contractors, while the European Union is prepared to
use public Civil Protection services and, in part, the military41.
Such challenges are part of a longer term trend, begun in the mid-1990s and made explicit in
the concept of “humanitarian war” adopted to define the Kosovo War, albeit one that has
accelerated in recent years both from a cumulative effect and from the political consequences
of 9/11. "That trend includes: the routine labelling of interventions as "humanitarian" that are
essentially political and military in nature; the undermining of the independence, neutrality, and
impartiality of assistance and protection efforts; the special burden placed on NGOs,
particularly American ones, given the high-stakes politics involved; the difficulties of functioning
in insecure settings and of developing rules of engagement and disengagement for the
39 ibidem 40 Antonio Donini, “The Forest and the Trees,” in OCHA, The Humanitarian Decade: Challenges for Humanitarian Assistance in the Last Decade and into the Future - New York, 2004, Volume 2, 127-140. 41 The European Union’s Rapid Reaction Force, has recently deployed for the first time 1,400 soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2004. It is conceived as a military device aimed at carrying out peacekeeping and stabilisation operations, as well as providing support to, or direct delivery of, humanitarian assistance.
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humanitarian community as a whole; and the predominantly Western character, culture, and
accountability of the humanitarian apparatus”42.
2. The second element is the decline of Humanitarian organisations' advocating capacity and
political influence. The polarization imposed by the “war on terror” in the political arena has
created a negative environment for concerns about neutrality, impartiality and independence.
When all enemies become “terrorists” it is difficult to hold the point that all life is intrinsically
valuable.
Humanitarian advocacy has also been sacrificed to pragmatism. In the first “classic”, inter-state
war in years, with the clear definition of a state of occupation, the International humanitarian
law should still be a valid tool for a strong action at a legal and political level. The 1907 Hague
Regulations and the 4th Geneva Convention (articles 55 to 61) lay down the duties and
responsibilities of an Occupying Power, from providing adequate food and medical supplies for
the population (art. 55); to maintaining hospitals, public health and hygiene (art. 56); to
ensuring that education facilities stay open and allowing religious freedoms.
After the Kosovo crisis in 1999, NGOs have spent considerable energy and time in fighting
(and, ultimately, losing) a rearguard battle to protect humanitarian action from politicization,
instead of trying to "humanitarianize politics", by putting International law obligations and
humanitarian considerations on the political table. Of course, this implies considering the
political costs of receiving official financing. “These need review as part of a thoughtful, long-
term strategy by and for NGOs. Such a review might help restore integrity to the non in non-
governmental”, which in “future will require NGOs to situate themselves more clearly in relation
to the political, military, democratization, and development aspects of international
interventions, a difficult task given their own commitments to human security, democratic
42 The Future of Humanitarian Action. Implications of Iraq and Other Recent Crises - Workshop Report - Feinstein International Famine Center. The Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy. Tufts University, 9 October 2003
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values, and participatory development” and this “may require review of current relationships
with the U.S. and other donor governments and stepped up efforts in the areas of advocacy
with governments and education among northern publics”.43
3. The third worry is about being there. The Iraqi case highlights what we have experienced in
several crises, from Somalia to Afghanistan: that humanitarian organisations should be more
careful when deciding whether to engage in such extreme political situations, where credibility,
safety and humanitarian coherence are at stake, while there is not an absolute and
unquestionable need for them to be there. If they decide to enter such a ground, they must
have a very high level of specialization and be able to fit into the operational environment. It is
obvious that NGOs based in a belligerent country and expatriate aid workers may face
enormous difficulties, and it would make sense to give in to these pressures. Although many
organisations take a principled stand about the “right to be there”, the blurring of roles between
civilian humanitarian agencies, commercial contractors, military forces, occupation authorities,
religious bodies and Iraqi authorities represents a very hazardous environment for any
coherent and independent humanitarian action.
Problems of the same kind exist in Afghanistan and could spread to other countries where
comparable situations exist, developing prejudice and ultimately hostility towards humanitarian
organisations. We have to surrender to the evidence that levels of acceptance of “westerners”
in some countries are very low, and the “predominantly Western character, culture, and
accountability of the humanitarian apparatus”44 is becoming a burden, hampering the capacity
to accomplish the mission. This is something Americans have faced for a long time, often
inducing USAID to finance non-american NGOs in order to deliver assistance in certain areas.
The problem in Iraq is now extended to all foreigners, sometimes including other Arabs.
43 Ambiguity and Change: Humanitarian NGOs Prepare for the Future - The Feinstein International Famine Center. Tufts University, August 2004 44 see note 33
23
Priority should be given by the aid community to strengthening the capacities and supporting
the action of genuinely humanitarian Arab NGOs, while International NGOs could better invest
their energy in sound advocacy and policy-making, to monitor and advocate for the respect of
International Law and humanitarian principles.
This has been on the NGO agenda for more than a decade now, translated into terms like
“capacity building”, “empowerment” and “de-centralization”, but pursued with scarce
coherence. “A key challenge for the future is not only how NGOs interact with other sectors but
what relationships might develop within the NGO sector itself. The larger North-South divides
that have impacts on other global processes also influence NGO relations. Already the trend is
for better endowed northern NGOs to “subcontract” with less well-resourced southern NGOs.
While the language of “partnerships” is often used, resource flows remain critical in defining
these relationships.” 45
4. In the field, an effort should be made to clarify the different identities and mandates of “real”
humanitarian NGOs, development organisations, solidarity movements, and others.
Despite the inevitable competition, International NGOs have always formed a solidary body of
organisations, structured in platforms, coordinations and umbrellas. In reality, the common
definition of “NGOs” (as well as “civil society” or “non profit”, or “voluntary”) covers a wide
diversity of roles, approaches, goals and capacities. Unity above differences is important for
promoting common interests and policies in the North, but may create a dangerous confusion
in the field, in the midst of a serious crisis, with a negative impact on the way in which the
neutrality, independence and impartiality of humanitarian work is perceived by the parties.
Indeed, their perception of humanitarian action has a direct influence on the degree of
acceptance of humanitarian actors and therefore sometimes also on their actual safety. A clear
45 see note 42
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definition of roles must be consistent with the diversity of technical skills, mandates, behaviours
and relations.
Everybody has a duty to contribute to humanitarian response, there is no sovereignty for relief
and cooperation, but organisations with different mandates should not advertise themselves as
“humanitarian”. There is a need to clarify and underline the peculiarity of the humanitarian
approach.
5. Interaction with military and other security actors is as critical as in Afghanistan but further
complicated by the considerable presence of private security. “the private security business
thrived. Private contractors providing security in Iraq numbered an estimated 20,000 in early
June, making international private - security firms the second-largest contributor of “troops”
after the United States. Dozens of new security firms cropped up to meet the demand for
security needs. Some were hired by the U.S. government to protect U.S. civilians in Iraq or to
carry out military-related tasks; others were hired by private contractors to protect their
employees working on reconstruction projects”46.
In a paper in October 200447 the UN reminds us that “Humanitarian organisations that interact
and/or coordinate with the military and/or other security actors in Iraq need to be aware of the
constraints and limitations they may face. Their adherence to the key humanitarian principles
mentioned above is crucial for their credibility as a humanitarian actor.” And remarks that
“procedures adopted by one humanitarian agency/organisation might have implications for all
the others, i.e. if one agency is perceived as cooperating closely with the military, or if one
agency is seen to have armed personnel in their vehicles such might also be assumed of all
the others by the local population”. Military forces are prepared to engage in relief activity
46 Bathsheba Crocker - Reconstructing Iraq’s Economy – in The Washington Quarterly. Autumn 2004, vol. 4
47 Unami - Guidelines for Humanitarian Organisations on Interacting with Military and Other Security Actors in Iraq. 20 October 2004
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themselves or persuade humanitarian agencies and like-minded civilian agencies to distribute
assistance in areas under their control, in order to gain legitimacy with local communities. In
many ways, the strongest argument against this policy is sustainability; the security of staff
depends on their independence, and this will determine whether agencies are able to operate
in the long term.
6. The other side of the coin is the increased engagement of the military in force-protection and
psychological operations, which includes the distribution of assistance, “often seen as critical in
the process of gaining the trust of local communities, leading to a crucial 'stabilisation' effect.
(…) Political and military decision makers have evolved increasingly sophisticated doctrine on
how they should relate to civilians, or undertake tasks typically civilian in nature. In some
environments, this engagement will also be driven by a desire to extract information of military
value and to serve military objectives.”48 The Italian contingent is in Iraq with a parliamentary
mandate for protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance, nonetheless is repeatedly
engaged in protracted combat in Nassirya. There is no legal reason why military forces should
not be involved in the provision of relief. In law, it is the relief, not the body delivering it, that
needs to be impartial. Providing such assistance can very often be a duty of the military, and
certainly the duty of the state. Just as certainly, we might want to dispute the use of the word
'humanitarian', in such cases.49 This type of engagement began in Africa and the Balkans, in
peacekeeping contexts, and has often been endorsed by a large part of the NGO community.
But Iraq is a case where no such interpretation is possible. As MSF remarks in an article about
48 SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance. Final version. Geneva, 18 October 2004 (revision of the 2001 version) 49 In May last year, MSF complained to the United States and other coalition forces about the distribution of a leaflet in southern Afghanistan that included a picture of a young Afghan girl carrying a bag of wheat. The leaflet said that if humanitarian assistance was to continue, Afghans needed to pass information to the soldiers about all insurgent forces in the country, including remnants of the the former Taliban regime and members of the al-Qaeda terrorist group. (Afghanistan: US, UK Subverting Relief Aid - IPS, 3 August 2004)
26
the humanitarian language debate, we must “agree to talk about: humanitarian intervention
when referring to civilian action, military intervention when referring to military action, and to
forget the fallacious slogans of military humanitarianism, and military-humanitarian
interventions”50.
As Oxfam stated in a paper of March 2003, “Humanitarian aid is most effectively delivered by
civilian humanitarian agencies under UN leadership. Military involvement can compromise the
effective delivery of aid and lead to unintended consequences, potentially threatening the
security of civilian aid workers. Any war in Iraq, however, may prove to be exceptional.
Extreme insecurity may limit civilian agencies' ability to work. If there is an occupation,
international law obliges occupying forces to ensure the supply of food and other necessities.
Military forces must be prepared to provide aid if Iraq is too insecure for civilian agencies to
operate”51.
In Iraq, humanitarians have entered a very dangerous realm: an extreme political crisis but with low
humanitarian needs, and where all the players have a narrow view of issues like rights and protection.
In part, they were simply unaware of the inherent risk. In large part, they have considered moral issues
like showing the good face of the West, or matters of social and political identity involving taking side,
together with problems of visibility and resources. All this has pushed organisations into a political
game they cannot play without putting at stake their mission and mandate, their independence and
accountability; and shows that sometimes preserving the integrity and credibility of humanitarianism
may involve giving up the idea that you "have to be there" anyway.
50 Tanguy, Joelle, 'Intervention, Protection and Humanitarian Assistance at a Crossroads', Paper delivered by MSF at the World Affairs Council, San Francisco, 28 March 2000. 51 Iraq: Humanitarian-Military Relations, Oxfam Briefing Paper, March 2003.
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Eventually, the occupation will end, and Iraq will become peaceful and secure enough to allow the
reconstruction process. At that time, the contribution of International NGOs will be important to build a
fair and sovereign civil society, but they need to get prepared now for the political challenge that this
will imply.