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PAGE 4 (Number 12 – 16)
SECOND PART
PEOPLE VS. TEOFILO TANEO (284 SCRA 251 [1998])
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 117683. January 16, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TEOFILO
TANEO, accused appellant .
E ! I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Teofilo Taneo was charged[1] and convicted of the crime rape and
accordingly sentenced by the Regional Trial Cort! Branch " of the Ceb City [#] to sffer
the penalty of death and to indemnify the offended woman! $encina Taneo! the amont
of % "&!&&&'&& as moral damages and the amont of % #"!&&&'&& as e(emplary
damages! as a deterrent to other fathers from se(ally molesting his own daghters)
and to pay the costs'[*] +n atomatic review! appellant assigns as errors the following,
I
T-E TR.A/ C+0RT RA2E/3 ERRE4 .N .2.N 50// CRE4ENCE T+ T-E
TE6T.$+N3 +5 T-E %R+6EC0T.+N 7.TNE66 $ENC.NA TANE+ 7-.C- .6
-.-/3 .NCRE4.B/E AN4 C+NTRA4.CT+R3'
II
T-E TR.A/ C+0RT RA2E/3 ERRE4 .N N+T A%%REC.AT.N .N E2.4ENCE T-
$E4.CA/ 5.N4.N6 +5 4RA' E$$A $ACAC-+R A6 C+N40CTE4 +N T-E
%ER6+N +N -ER %R.2ATE C+$%/A.NANT $ENC.NA TANE+ AN4 .N
.NC+RRECT/3 A4+%T.N .T6 +7N B.A6E4 .NTER%RETAT.+N +5 T-E
%-36.CA/ E2.4ENCE +N REC+R4 7-.C- C/EAR/3 .6 BE3+N4 .T6 A4804.CAT.2E %+7ER T+ 4+ 6+'
III
T-E TR.A/ C+0RT RA2E/3 ERRE4 .N N+T .2.N CRE4ENCE T+ T-E
4E5EN6E .NTER%+6E4 B3 T-E ACC06E49A%%E//ANT AN4 .N
0N5A2+RAB/3 %RE60$.N AA.N6T T-E ACC06E4 -.6 5A./0RE T+
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%RE6ENT A6 4E5EN6E97.TNE66 +NE /ET.C.A $AN0BAT T-06 6-.5T.N
T-E B0R4EN +5 %R++5 +N-T4E5EN6E 7-.C- .6 C+NTRAR3 T+ T-E
R0/E6 +5 %R+CE40RE'
I"
T-E TR.A/ C+0RT RA2E/3 ERRE4 .N C+N2.CT.N T-E ACC06E49
A%%E//ANT 4E6%.TE 5A./0RE +5 T-E %R+6EC0T.+N T+ %R+2E -.6
0./T BE3+N4 REA6+NAB/E 4+0BT'[:]
Aptly stated by the trial cort are the following fact with corresponding page
reference to the stenographic notes and e(hibits spplied by the +ffice of the 6olicitor
eneral which we have verified to be dly spported by the records,
+n $ay #*! 1;;:! $encina Taneo! a barrio lass! with physical virginity! was
with her parents and three
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$encina watched her sister and pt her to sleep on a hammoc' 7hen her
baby sister was already asleep! she also went to sleep as her wont after lnch
! supra='
6he noticed her cycling pants
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revealed to her ant! %aciencia Taneo who resides also in 6itio Bihang!
Borbon! Ceb! abot half a ilometer from the hose of Teofilo Taneo
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father becase the medical certificate issed after her e(amination did not
show that she was raped' That her father will be freed becase the doctor in
4anao eneral -ospital was paid by Engracio 0rot! brother9in9law of her
father
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Appellants argment is not persasive' -is assertion is a dismal attempt to distort
private complainants narration' 5or clarity! we Dote herender the material testimony of
private complainant spplying the portions which appellant omitted in his brief! ths,
C+0RT,
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F 3o stated that yor father was inserting his finger into yor vagina! will yo please tell the
cort! is it left or right finger
A Right hand
F 7hy! what happened to the left hand of yor father! what was he doing dring that time'G
A -e pinned me down with his left hand'
5.6CA/ BERC./E6,
F 7hen yo stated yo were pinned down by yor father! what happened ne(t
A After he inserted his finger! my father inserted his penis into my vagina'
C+0RT,
F 7as there penetration
A 3es! 3or -onor'
5.6CA/ BARC./E6,
F 7hat happened ne(t
A . tried to free myself in order that he will not scceed in his evil desire bt . was
overpowered by him'
F And becase yo were overpowered by yor father! what was yor initial reaction
A . was helpess
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F 7hat what
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A The pains'
F %ains where
A .n my vagina'
F And what did yo do when yo fell
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%rivate complainants frail physiDe is obviosly no match to appellants strong and
sperior physical bilt' Appellants pretension then that the prosection is dty bond to
show that he was sch an adroit prveyor of his sills at se(al intimidations to btress
his conviction loses force in the face of the physical ineDality between the concerned
parties'
$oreover! the force or violence necessary in rape is natrally a relative term!
depending not only on the age! sie and strength of the parties bt also on their relation
to each other '[;] And considering that the assailant is no less than private complainants
own father who wields parental inflence over her person! the crime ndobtedly was
consmmated with facility'[1&]The reason is that in a rape committed by a father against
his own daghter! the formers moral ascendancy over the latter sbstittes for violence
or intimidation'[11] Evidently! a woman of yong age lie the private complaint in the case
at bench! can only cower in fear and yield into sbmission' Appellants imptation of
implasibility! therefore! is more imagined than real'
Appellant stresses in his second assignment of error that 4ra' $acachor! the
attending physician who e(amined private complainant a day after the se(al assalt!
fond no fresh hemenal lacerations! contsion or trama on the other parts of [the
victims] organ'[1#] -e adds that the victims vaginal orifice still admits the forefinger which
is a normal state for women who have had no se(al e(perience' This is! therefore!
[appellant emphasies]! the e(act implication of the whole testimony of 4ra'
$acachor, N+ ABRA6.+N! N+ RA%E'[1*] At best the crime to which he shold have
been held liable! appellant sggests! is for certain acts of lasciviosness' [1:]
The contention lacs merit' The medical certificate issed by 4ra' $acachor reads
as follows,
6.R,
. have the honor to inform yo that $encina Taneo a medico9legal case has
been attended to in this hospital on $ay #:! 1;;: H #,:& %'$'
%ertinent 5inding, Body, No sign of violence) no abrasions! contsions or
hematoma noted on the breast! anterior chest! perinem! pper I lower
e(tremities' (((((((
/abia $aora, No laceration)
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/abia $inora, 6light redness noted in the posterior part of the labia minora)
(((((
5orchette, 6lightly distended) ((((((
-ymen, .ntact! no laceration or abrasion noted) (((((
2aginal +rifice admits forefinger) ((((((
2aginal smear, Negative (((((
((( ((( (((
2ery respectflly yors!
Chief of -ospital
By,
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the vaginal rgosities! to determine whether there was previos se(al
contact' The medical e(aminer did not even care to as for the clothings worn
by $encina Taneo at the time of the incident for laboratory e(amination! or at
least for visal e(amination for signs of strggle' [1?]
.t is nfortnate that cosel for appellant has made hasty accsation against the
trial cort for the above prononcement as taing a partial and biased position [1@] and
having adopted its own biased interpretation of the physical evidence' [1>] 7e do not find
any cogent and valid grond in the records of this case which cold stify sch a grave
imptation pon a member of the bench who merely performed his fnction and
e(pressed his observation on the condct of the e(amination' Consel shold be
reminded of his dty to observe and maintain the respect de the corts of stice and
dicial officers'[1;] Argments! written or oral! shold be gracios to both the cort and
opposing consel and be of sch words as may be properly addressed by one
gentleman to another'[#&]
Another serios reason why the medical e(amination yielded negative reslt is the
nrebtted testimony of the private complainant' Ths,
F, 7hom did yo see in yor residence
A, $y mother Elisa Taneo and my yonger sisters'
F, 7hat! if any! did Elisa tell yo at that precise moment when yo visited yor mother
A, $y mother reDested me to st pardon my father becase he cannot be imprisoned
becase in the medical certificate there is no showing that . was raped'
F, 7hat else did yor mother tell yo after she informed yo that there is nothing in the
medical certificate regarding the
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A, /eonila 0rot'[#1]
7ith the trial corts formidable observation and the victims nrebtted testimony!
appellants reliance with the medical certificate! as well as the testimony of the doctor!
assmes no significance'
.n any event! appellants argment proceeds from a misconception that a medical
certificate is an indespensible element in the prosection for rape and rns roghshod
over the well9settled rle that the absence of medical findings by a medico9legal officer
does no disprove the occrrence of rape' [##] The fact that the medical certificate show no
e(ternal signs of physical inries and spermatooa on the victim does not negate the
commission of rape[#*] for the slightness penetration of the labia consmmates the
offense'[#:] The medical e(amination of the victim! as well as the medical certificate! is
merely corroborative in character' 7hat is important is that the testimony of private
complainant abot the incident is clear! neDivocal and credible' 7hen a woman
testifie that she has been raped! she says all that is needed to signify that the crime has
been committed'[#"] +n this score! the trial cort declared,
The Cort sbected the testimony of the offended girl with painstaing
scrtiny! which was given in a straight9forward manner! and fond it
nimpaired by material discrepancies and contradictions and consistent with
ordinary hman e(perience' -er testimony ndobtedly bears the imprint of
trth and! therefore! mst be accepted'[#?]
5rthermore! private complainants firm resolve! Dicness and spontaneity in
devising a way to flee immediately after the day she was violated from the appellants
cltches and in tearflly confiding her harrowing ordeal to her ant spea well of the
natral reaction of a virtos and an aggrieved woman' /iewise! when she was given a
choice whether to e(clde the pblic dring her trial! private complainant
appeared resolte in testifying before an open cort' -er condct simply shows the
fervent drive to place before the bar of stice her rthless assailant' +r risprdential
annals! in this connection! reveal that no woman! especially of tender age! as in this
case! wold concoct a story of defloration! allow an e(amination of her private parts!
and thereafter pervert herself by being sbected to a pblic trial if she was notmotivated solely by the desire to have the clprit apprehended and pnished' [#@] 2erily!
lie the trial cort we find no valid reason to dobt private complainants testimony which
bears the earmars of trth' Besides! this Cort accords de deference to the trial
corts views on who shold be given credence! since the latter is in a better position to
assess the credibility of witnesses considering its opportnity to observe their
demeanor! as well as their deportment and manner of testifying dring trial' [#>] To be
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sre! this rle is sbect to some well definced e(ceptions [#;] none of which! however! is
attendant in this case'
Appellant claims in his third assessment of error that the trial cort erred in not
giving credence to his defenses of alibi and denial' Apart from this general averment!
however! appellant did not elaborate why his defense shold be accepted' Appellant
thereafter trails his attac on the alleged erroneos shifting of the brden of proof from
the prosection to the defense'Ths,
/astly! it is beyond cavil that the prosection has the onus probandi in
establishing the gilt of the accsed and the weaness of the defense does
not relieve it of this responsibility'
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$encina categorically candidly! and withot hesitation! positively identified his
father as the perpetrator of the crime'
The assertion of the accsed that $encian falsely charged him of the crime
becase he disallowed his daghter to wor as hosehelper! is! to say theleast! absrd'
.t is nthinable and nbelievable for $encina to e(pose herself to
embarrassment by telling very intimate matters dring a pblic trial and to
destroy the ftre of the whole family! st to spite and get even with her father
for a trivial reason' Besides! only a daghter who may have lost her senses
wold dare charge falsely her own father of committing a heinos crime of
rape' %erhaps against a stranger'
A woman does not go arond flanting her having been raped' There is no
evidence presented to show that $encina is so desperate and base that she
wold sacrifice her honor and that of her father st to satisfy a personal rge
for a petty vengeance'
((( ((( (((
The denial of the accsed cannot prevail over the positive straight forward and
candid testimony of the offended daghter' The categorical declarations of$encina on the details of the crime are more credible than the denial
interposed by the accsed'
6imilarly! appellants alibi that he was at the store one ilometer away from their
hose when the incident transpired cannot be taen seriosly' The short distance and
brief travel time between the store and appellants hose did not foreclose the
commission of the felony' .t is a cardinal rle that for alibi to prosper! the accsed mst
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime' [*#] 6o too! alibi cannot prevail
over positive identification of the accsed by the prosection witness' [**] .n this regard!
we Dote with approval the conclsions reached by the trial cort in reecting appellants
alibi' Ths,
The alibi of the accsed has to be reected' Accsed was positively identified
by his victim' .t has been repeatedly held! to the point of being trite! that alibi
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cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accsed' Besides! the alibi
appears dbios having been corroborated only by his wife! who testified that
her hsband! accsed herein! accompanied her to the store to get the sac of
corn grits bt who contradicted herself when on cross9e(amination! she
admitted that her hsband did not accompany her bt st followed her later tothe store) ths! corroborating instead the testimony of her daghter that
accsed followed her mother to the store after raping her'[*:]
The residal contention that the trial cort sbstantially dedced an nfavorable
presmption against the accsed9appellant for his spposed failre to present $s'
$angbat as a defense witness [*"] thereby shifting the brden of proof on the
defense[*?] is nworthy of serios consideration' Apparently! appellant based his
observation from the following passage in the trial corts decision,
No reason is given by the accsed that /etecia $angbat! the owner of the
store! is not available as witness to prove his alibi' 6aid spposed
ninterested witness had not been presented to testify for the accsed' As
nfavorable presmption may be dedced from the accseds failre to
present her'[*@]
6aid paragraph is neither obectionable nor contrary to the rles on criminal
procedre and evidence'[*>] The non9prodction of a corroborative witness! withot any
e(planation given why he was not so prodced! weaens the testimony of the witness
who named that corroborating witness in his testimony' [*;] Ths! appellants notion that
the brden of proof has been shifted on the defense is misplaced' 7hat the trial cort
did is to merely e(press a valid observation why appellants alibi! a wea defense!
became manifestly inferior vis99vis the evidence for the prosection' At any rate! the
basis of conviction is not the non9prodction of $rs' $angbat bt private complainants
credible and categorical testimony'
5inally! e(tant in the records is the testimony of appellants wife to the effect that,
F, .n fact on $ay #*! 1;;: st one word from yor hsband to go to the store made yo
afraid of yor hsband! is that correct
A, 7hen . proceeded to the store . was accompanied by my hsband'
F, 4oes it mean yo went ahead to the store
A, 3es! . went ahead with my hsband and after my arrival my hsband arrived also'
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F, 7hen for the first time did yo now that yo are going to testify
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forgive means to absolve! to pardon! to cease! to feel resentment against on
accont of wrong committed) give p claim to reDital from or retribtion pon
#! 11? 6CRA
1;*='[:1]
7e see no plasible reason why the foregoing principle may not be applied in the
case at bench'
%rescinding from the foregoing discssion! appellants last assignment of error has
to be brshed aside as it has no leg to stand on'
7e now come to the imposable penalty for the crime committed' 0nder Article **"of the Revised %enal Code! as amended by Repblic Act No' @?";! death penalty shall
be imposed if the crime of rape is committed where the victim is nder eighteen =
years of age and the offender is a parent! ascendant! step9parent! gardian! relative by
consanginity or affinity within the third civil degree! or the common law spose of the
parent of the victim'[:#] The imposition of the death penalty in sch instance is mandatory'[:*] .n the case at bench! the victim at the commission of the offense on $ay #*! 1;;:!
was e(actly seventeen
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DIGEST:
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URBINA VS. MACERAN (5 SCRA 4!" [194])
Repblic of the %hilippines
S$PRE%E !O$RT$anila
EN BANC
A.!. No. &88'J 8ne 1;! 1;@:
GA$EN!IO S. $R(INA an) "EASTO (. GES%$NO! omplainants!
vs'
J$GE %A*I%O A. %A!EREN! respondent '
R E S O L $ T I O N
!""#$NK"", J%
After the CortJs resoltion of 5ebrary ?! 1;@: dismissing the complaint Kfor failre to mae
ot a prima facie case withot predice to respondentJs filing a separate administrativecomplaint for nwarranted harassment against complainant Atty' 2edasto B' esmndo as
soght in respondentJs comment!L there were belatedly reported to the Cort
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fiscal correctly rled that K
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to give any inherent credence to the complaint for it wold have been e(tremely foolhardy
and pointless for respondent to have ased Atty' Esgerra to mae the alleged threats
against complainant' The Cort finds respondentJs comment to be satisfactory and will not
sbect respondent to frther needless harassment and distraction if it were to give de
corse to the complaint9motion! as insisted by complainant in his reply to comment'
.t is appropriate to enoin complainants and members of the bar who file administrative
complaints against dges of inferior corts that they shold do so after proper
circmspection and withot the se of disrespectfl langage and offensive personalities!
so as not to ndly brden the Cort in the discharge of its fnction of administrative
spervision over inferior cort dges and cort personnel' The Cort has meted the
corresponding disciplinary measres against erring dges! inclding dismissal and
sspension where warranted! and welcomes the honest efforts of the bar to assist it in the
tas' Bt lawyers shold also bear in mind that they owe fidelity to the corts as well as to
their clients and that the filing on behalf of disgrntled litigants of nfonded or frivolos
charges against inferior cort dges and the se of offensive and intemperate langage as
a means of harassing dges whose decisions have not been to their liing
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DIGEST
*+ CR$ -/ 0 1egal "t2is 0 1a34er o3es 5idelit4 to t2e ourts
Atty' 0rbina and one Atty' 2edasto esmndo lost a case filed in the sala of 8dge
$aceren' The two lawyers then filed a criminal case against $aceren for nowingly
rendering an nst dgment' The fiscal dismissed the case as he deemed the action to be
inappropriate considering that the dgment issed by $aceren at that time was pending
appeal' Allegedly however! prior to dismissal by the fiscal! 0rbina received a phone call from
another lawyer
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CASTANEDA VS. AGO (#5 SCRA 5!5 [195])
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-28546. July 30, 1975.
V!N"N#IO #"ST"$!D" %&' NI#!T"S (!NSON, Petitioners, ). *"STOR D. "GO, LO+RD!S + "GO%&' T(! #O+RT OF "**!"LS, Respondents.
u/%&o "oyo, o Petitioners.
Jo . Luo& o Respondents.
SNO*SIS
In a decision of the Supreme Court affirming a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in a replevincase, Pastor Ago was ordered to deliver personal properties or pay sums of money to the plaintiffs therein.he case was conse!uently remanded to the trial court for e"ecution, levy was made on Ago#s house and
lots, and auction was scheduled. Ago moved to stop the sale, failing in which he filed a petitionfor certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed it. his dismissal was affirmed $y the Supreme
Court. %fforts to o$tain a writ of preliminary injunction having failed, the sheriff sold the house and lots and
awarded them to herein petitioners as highest $idders. As Ago failed to redeem, a final deed of sale wase"ecuted in favor of the vendee in whose favor the Court of First Instance of Manila issued writ of possession
to the properties.
Su$se!uently, Ago, joined $y his wife, filed with the Court of First Instance of &ue'on City, an action toannul the sheriff#s sale on the ground that the o$ligation upon which judgment had $een rendered against
Ago was his personal o$ligation that could not legally affect his wife#s half(share in their conjugal house andlots levied upon and sold for the satisfaction of the judgment. he &ue'on City court issued an e" parte writ
of preliminary injunction restraining the registration of the final deeds of sale and the carrying out of anywrit of possession. For a couple of times this was lifted and then restored, $efore the said court finally liftedthe restraining order. )hile these processes were $eing pursued, Ago filed with the Supreme Court a petitionfor certiorari and prohi$ition praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff from enforcingthe writ of possession. he same was dismissed for lac* of merit and so with a similar petition in the Courtof Appeals. he dismissal $y the Court of Appeals was the su$ject of another petition in the Supreme Court
which was li*ewise dismissed.
Finally, the spouses succeeded in having another petition of the same nature given due course $y the Courtof Appeals which granted, and later made permanent, the preliminary injunction from enforcement of the
writ of possession on and ejectment from the one(half share in the properties involved $elonging to the wife.his decision of the Court of Appeals is the su$ject of the instant petition.
he Supreme Court ruled that an injunction cannot $e availed of to protect a wife#s half(share in theconjugal properties for her share is merely an inchoate interest, not a right in esse. It li*ewise condemned
respondents and their counsel#s misuse of legal remedies and maneuver of tactics for fourteen years toresist satisfaction of judgment. It motu proprio e"amined the records of Civil Case &(+- /the mother case
of the present action0 and found that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemented andamended, are all untena$le.
1udgment of the Court of Appeals reversed2 the civil case, in which Ago was joined $y his wife ordereddismissed without prejudice to the re(filing of petitioner#s counterclaim in a new and independent action2
tre$le costs against respondents to $e paid $y their lawyer.
SLL"+S
3. C456S2 467%6S2 I8%6F%6%8C% )I9 467%6S 4F A C4(%&5A: C456 84 A::4)%72 74C6I8%I8APP:ICA;:% I8 CAS% A ;A6. < he CFI of Manila, in Civil Case 8o. =+=>3, issued a writ of possession to
the properties sold to enforce a writ of e"ecution. he CFI of &ue'on City, in Civil Case &(+-,countermanded this order $y issuing an e" parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the registration of
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the final deeds of sale and carrying out of any writ of possession. Su$se!uently, the latter court lifted thepreliminary injunction it had previously issued. he Court of Appeals, in another petition for certiorari and
prohi$ition with preliminary injunction /CA ?6(@@-(60 granted preliminary injunction against theenforcement of the writ of possession on and ejectment from the one(half share in the properties involved.9%:7B he doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co(e!ual court cannot apply in the
case at $ar. he CFI of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimately was not interfered with $y itsco(e!ual court, the CFI of &ue'on City, as the latter lifted the restraining order it had previously issued
against the enforcement of the Manila court#s writ of possession. It is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, inpart, the enforcement of the writ.
=. 157?M%8S2 %%C5I482 ISS5A8C% 4F )6I 4F P4SS%SSI482 6I?9S 4F 9I67 PA6I%S, %FF%C265:I8? I8 9% CAS% 4F 4M8AS v. 6ID%6A. < he ruling in the case of 4mnas v. 6ivera, + Phil. 3, isnot that a writ of possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, $ut
that the writ of possession $eing a complement of the writ of e"ecution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue thelatter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval $etween the judicial sale and the
issuance of a writ of possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. his rulingis inapplica$le to the present case for here, there has $een no change in the ownership of the properties or
any interest therein from the time the writ of e"ecution was issued up to the time the writ of possession wasissued, and even up to the present.
@. I7.2 I7.2 :%DE 48 P64P%6E 4F 157?M%8 7%;462 C:AIM F46 %C:5SI48 F64M :%DE 4F SP45S%#SC4815?A: S9A6% ;A66%7 ;E :AC9%S. < It is much too late in the day for the respondents to raise the
!uestion that part of the property is unlevia$le $ecause it $elongs to the wife who was not a party to herhus$and#s $usiness venture which failed and resulted in the replevin suit and which did not $enefit the
conjugal partnership, considering that /30 a wife is normally privy to her hus$and#s activities2 /=0 the levywas made and the properties advertised for auction sale in 332 /@0 she lives in the very properties in
!uestion2 /0 her hus$and had moved to stop the auction sale2 />0 the properties were sold at auction in3@2 /0 her hus$and had thrice attempted to o$tain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from
enforcing the writ of e"ecution2 /+0 the sheriff e"ecuted the deed of final sale on April 3+, 3, when PastorAgo failed to redeem2 /-0 the hus$and had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could $e leviedupon $y his pleas to save his family house and lot in his efforts to prevent e"ecution and2 /0 it was onlyon May =, 3 when he and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff#s sale upon the issuethat the wife#s share in the properties cannot $e levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the
logging $usiness and not a party to the replevin suit. he spouses had every opportunity to raise the issue inthe various proceedings $ut did not2 laches now effectively $ars them from raising it.
. I7.2 I7.2 I7.2 )IF%#S 9A:F(S9A6% I8 9% P64P%6E :%DI%7 A M%6% %P%CA8CE2 I8158CI48 84
ADAI:A;:% 4 P64%C A 6I?9 84 I8 %SS%. < he Court of Appeals decision enjoined the enforcementof the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one(half share in the properties involved $elonging tothe wife of the judgment de$tor. 9%:7B hat half(share is not in esse, $ut is merely an inchoate interest, amere e"pectancy, constituting neither legal nor e!uita$le estate, and will ripen into title only when uponli!uidation and settlement there appears to $e assets of the community. he decision sets at naught thewell(settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may never arise.
>. I7.2 I7.2 I7.2 MIS5S% 4F :%?A: 6%M%7I%S 4 9)A6 SAISFACI48 4F 157?M%8, C487%M8A;:%.< he attitude of respondents and their counsel of maneuvering for fourteen years to doggedly resiste"ecution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one court to another is to $e condemned
$ecause far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who see* justice, they tried to use them to su$vertthe very ends of justice.
. A468%ES2 C4875C2 :A)E%6#S I8SIS%8C% 7%SPI% PA%8 F5I:IE 4F 9IS C:I%8#S P4SII48,A 7IS6%?A67 4F 9IS MISSI48 AS A8 4FFIC%6 4F 9% C456. < )here counsel has allowed himself to
$ecome an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and aconciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true e"ponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, he has forgotten his sacred mission as a sworn pu$lic servant and his
e"alted position as an officer of the court.
D ! # I S I O N
#"STRO, J.
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he parties in this case, e"cept :ourdes Eu Ago, have $een commuting to this Court for more than a decade.
In 3>> the petitioners Denancio CastaGeda and 8icetas 9enson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago inthe Court of First Instance of Manila to recover certain machineries /civil case =+=>30. In 3>+ judgmentwas rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering Ago to return the machineries or pay definite sums of
money. Ago appealed, and on 1une @H, 33 this Court, in Ago v. CastaGeda, :(3H, affirmed the judgment. After remand, the trial court issued on August =>, 33 a writ of e"ecution for the sum ofP3+=,[email protected]+. Ago moved for a stay of e"ecution $ut his motion was denied, and levy was made on Ago#shouse and lots located in &ue'on City. he sheriff then advertised them for auction sale on 4cto$er =>,33. Ago moved to stop the auction sale, failing in which he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court ofAppeals. he appellate court dismissed the petition and Ago appealed. 4n 1anuary @3, 3 this Court, inAgo v. Court of Appeals, %t Al., :(3+3-, affirmed the dismissal. Ago thrice attempted to o$tain a writ ofpreliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcing the writ of e"ecution to save his family houseand lot2 his motions were denied, and the sheriff sold the house and lots on March , 3@ to the highest$idders, the petitioners CastaGeda and 9enson. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 3+, 3 the sheriffe"ecuted the final deed of sale in favor of the vendees CastaGeda and 9enson. 5pon their petition, the Courtof First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession to the properties.
9owever, on May =, 3 Pastor Ago, now joined $y his wife, :ourdes Eu Ago, as his co(plaintiff, filed acomplaint in the Court of First Instance of &ue'on City /civil case &(+-0 to annul the sheriff#s sale on the
ground that the o$ligation of Pastor Ago upon which judgment was rendered against him in the replevin suitwas his personal o$ligation, and that :ourdes Eu Ago#s one(half share in their conjugal residential house andlots which were levied upon and sold $y the sheriff could not legally $e reached for the satisfaction of the judgment. hey alleged in their complaint that wife :ourdes was not a party in the replevin suit, that the judgment was rendered and the writ of e"ecution was issued only against hus$and Pastor, and that wife:ourdes was not a party to her hus$and#s venture in the logging $usiness which failed and resulted in thereplevin suit and which did not $enefit the conjugal partnership.
he Court of First Instance of &ue'on City issued an e" parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining thepetitioners, the 6egister of 7eeds and the sheriff of &ue'on City, from registering the latter#s final deed ofsale, from cancelling the respondents# certificates of title and issuing new ones to the petitioners are fromcarrying out any writ of possession. A situation thus arose where what the Manila court had ordered to $edone, the &ue'on City court countermanded. 4n 8ovem$er 3, 3>, however, the latter court lifted thepreliminary injunction it had previously issued, and the 6egister of 7eeds of &ue'on City cancelled therespondents# certificates of title and issued new ones in favor of the petitioners. ;ut enforcement of the writof possession was again thwarted as the &ue'on City court again issued a temporary restraining order whichit later lifted $ut then re(restored. 4n May @, 3+ the court finally, and for the third time, lifted therestraining order.
)hile the $attle on the matter of the lifting and restoring of the restraining order was $eing fought in the&ue'on City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohi$ition with this Court under date of May=, 3, doc*eted as :(=33, praying for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the sheriff fromenforcing the writ of possession. his Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it in a minuteresolution on 1une @, 32 reconsideration was denied on 1uly 3-, 3. he respondents then filed onAugust =, 3 a similar petition for certiorari and prohi$ition with the Court of Appeals /CA(?.6. @+-@H(60,praying for the same preliminary injunction. he Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. herespondents then appealed to this Court /:(=+3H0. )e dismissed the petition in a minute resolution onFe$ruary -, 3+.
he Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals where they filed another petitionforcertiorari and prohi$ition with preliminary injunction /CA(?.6. @@-(60. he said court gave due courseto the petition and granted preliminary injunction. After hearing, it rendered decision, the dispositive portionof which readsB jgcBchanro$les.com.ph
)9%6%F46%, writ of preliminary injunction from enforcement of the writ of possession and ejectment fromthe one(half share in the properties involved $elonging to :ourdes Eu Ago dated 1une 3>, 3+ is madepermanent pending decision on the merits in Civil Case 8o. &(+- and ordering respondent Court toproceed with the trial of Civil Case 8o. &(+- on the merits without unnecessary delay. 8o pronouncementas to costs.cralawvirtua3awli$rary
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Failing to o$tain reconsideration, the petitioners CastaGeda and 9enson filed the present petition for reviewof the aforesaid decision.
3. )e do not see how the doctrine that a court may not interfere with the orders of a co(e!ual court canapply in the case at $ar. he Court of First Instance of Manila, which issued the writ of possession, ultimatelywas not interfered with $y its co(e!ual court, the Court of First Instance of &ue'on City as the latter liftedthe restraining order it had previously issued against the enforcement of the Manila court#s writ of
possession2 it is the Court of Appeals that enjoined, in part, the enforcement of the writ.
=. Invo*ing Comilang v. ;uendia, %t Al., 3 where the wife was a party in one case and the hus$and was aparty in another case and a levy on their conjugal properties was upheld, the petitioners would have :ourdesEu Ago similarly $ound $y the replevin judgment against her hus$and for which their conjugal propertieswould $e answera$le. he case invo*ed is not at par with the present case. In Comilang the actions wereadmittedly instituted for the protection of the common interest of the spouses2 in the present case, the Agosdeny that their conjugal partnership $enefited from the hus$and#s $usiness venture.
@. 6elying upon 4mnas v. 6ivera, + Phil. 3, the Court of Appeals held that a writ of possession may notissue until the claim of a third person to half(interest in the property is adversely determined, the saidappellate court assuming that :ourdes Eu Ago was a stranger or a third(party to her hus$and. heassumption is of course o$viously wrong, for, $esides living with her hus$and Pastor, she does not claimignorance of his $usiness that failed, of the relevant cases in which he got em$roiled, and of the auction salemade $y. the sheriff of their conjugal properties. %ven then, the ruling in 4mnas is not that a writ of
possession may not issue until the claim of a third person is adversely determined, $ut that the writ ofpossession $eing a complement of the writ of e"ecution, a judge with jurisdiction to issue the latter also has jurisdiction to issue the former, unless in the interval $etween the judicial sale and the issuance of the writof possession, the rights of third parties to the property sold have supervened. he ruling in 4mnas is clearlyinapplica$le in the present case, for, here, there has $een no change in the ownership of the properties or of any interest therein from the time the writ of e"ecution was issued up to the time writ of possession wasissued, and even up to the present.
. )e agree with the trial court /then presided $y 1udge :ourdes P. San 7iego0 that it is much too late in theday for the respondents Agos to raise the !uestion that part of the property is unlevia$le $ecause it $elongsto :ourdes Eu Ago, considering that /30 a wife is normally privy to her hus$and#s activities2 /=0 the levy wasmade and the properties advertised for auction sale in 332 /@0 she lives in the very properties in !uestion2/0 her hus$and had moved to stop the auction sale2 />0 the properties were sold at auction in 3@2 /0her hus$and had thrice attempted to o$tain a preliminary injunction to restrain the sheriff from enforcingthe writ of e"ecution2 /+0 the sheriff e"ecuted the deed of final sale on April 3+, 3 when Pastor failed to
redeem2 /-0 Pastor had impliedly admitted that the conjugal properties could $e levied upon $y his pleas tosave his family house and lot in his efforts to prevent e"ecution2 and /0 it was only on May =, 3 whenhe and his wife filed the complaint for annulment of the sheriff#s sale upon the issue that the wife#s share inthe properties cannot $e levied upon on the ground that she was not a party to the logging $usiness and nota party to the replevin suit. he spouses Ago had every opportunity to raise the issue in the variousproceedings herein$efore discussed $ut did not2 laches now effectively $ars them from raising it.
:aches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasona$le and une"plained length of time, to dothat which, $y e"ercising due diligence, could or should have $een done earlier2 it is negligence or omissionto assert a right within a reasona$le time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it eitherhas a$andoned it or declined to assert it. =
>. he decision of the appellate court under review suffers from two fatal infirmities.
/a0 It enjoined the enforcement of the writ of possession to and ejectment from the one(half share in theproperties involved $elonging to :ourdes Eu Ago. his half(share is not in esse, $ut is merely an inchoateinterest, a mere e"pectancy, constituting neither legal nor e!uita$le estate, and will ripen into title whenonly upon li!uidation and settlement there appears to $e assets of the community. @ he decision sets atnaught the well(settled rule that injunction does not issue to protect a right not in esse and which may neverarise.
/$0 he decision did not foresee the a$surdity, or even the impossi$ility, of its enforcement. he Ago spousesadmittedly live together in the same house > which is conjugal property. ;y the Manila court#s writ ofpossession Pastor could $e ousted from the house, $ut the decision under review would prevent theejectment of :ourdes. 8ow, which part of the house would $e vacated $y Pastor and which part would
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:ourdes continue to stay in he a$surdity does not stop here2 the decision would actually separate hus$andand wife, prevent them from living together, and in effect divide their conjugal properties during covertureand $efore the dissolution of the conjugal union.
. 7espite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the sheriff#s sale /civil case&(+-0, elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in thereplevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the respondents Agos, a$etted $y their lawyer 1ose M. :uison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to thee"tended prejudice of the petitioners. he respondents, with the assistance of counsel, maneuvered forfourteen /30 years to doggedly resist e"ecution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and from one courtto another /> times in the Supreme Court0.
)e condemn the attitude of the respondents and their counsel who,
far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who see* justice, have tried to use them to su$vert thevery ends of justice.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn pu$lic servant and his e"alted position as an officer of the court,Atty. :uison has allowed himself to $ecome an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead ofa mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigationinstead of a true e"ponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice.
A counsel#s assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client#s cause must $e encouraged andis to $e commended2 what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer#s insistence despite the patentfutility of his client#s position, as in the case at $ar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law,on the merit or lac* of merit of his case. If he finds that his client#s cause is defenseless, then it is his$ounden duty to advise the latter to ac!uiesce and su$mit, rather than traverse the incontroverti$le. Alawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and temper his client#s propensity to litigate. Alawyer#s oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client2 its primacy is indisputa$le.+
+. In view of the private respondents# propensity to use the courts for purposes other than to see* justice,and in order to o$viate further delay in the disposition of the case $elow which might again come up to theappellate courts $ut only to fail in the end, we have motu proprio e"amined the record of civil case &(+-/the mother case of the present case0. )e find that
/a0 the complaint was filed on May =, 3 /more than 33 years ago0 $ut trial on the merits has not evenstarted2
/$0 after the defendants Castanedas had filed their answer with a counterclaim, the plaintiffs Agos filed asupplemental complaint where they impleaded new parties(defendants2
/c0 after the admission of the supplemental complaint, the Agos filed a motion to admit an amendedsupplemental complaint, which impleads an additional new party(defendant /no action has yet $een ta*enon this motion02
/d0 the defendants have not filed an answer to the admitted supplemental complaint2 and
/e0 the last order of the Court of First Instance, dated April =H, 3+, grants an e"tension to the suspensionof time to file answer.
/%"pediente, p. -3>0
)e also find that the alleged causes of action in the complaint, supplemental complaint and amendedsupplemental complaint are all untena$le, for the reasons hereunder stated.
he Complaint
5pon the first cause of action, it is alleged that the sheriff levied upon conjugal properties of the spousesAgo despite the fact that the judgment to $e satisfied was personal only to Pastor Ago, and the $usiness
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venture that he entered into, which resulted in the replevin suit, did not redound to the $enefit of theconjugal partnership. he issue here, which is whether or not the wife#s inchoate share in the conjugalproperty is levia$le, is the same issue that we have already resolved, as $arred $y laches, in stri*ing downthe decision of the Court of Appeals granting preliminary injunction, the dispositive portion of which washerein($efore !uoted. his ruling applies as well to the first cause of action of the complaint.
5pon the second cause of action, the Agos allege that on 1anuary >, 3> the CastaGedas and the sheriff,
pursuant to an alias writ of sei'ure, sei'ed and too* possession of certain machineries, depriving the Agos of the use thereof, to their damage in the sum of P=>,HHH up to May >, 3. his second cause of action failsto state a valid cause of action for it fails to allege that the order of sei'ure is invalid or illegal.
It is averred as a third cause of action that the sheriff#s sale of the conjugal properties was irregular, illegaland unlawful $ecause the sheriff did not re!uire the CastaGeda spouses to pay or li!uidate the sum ofP33,+>H /the amount for which they $ought the properties at the auction sale0 despite the fact that therewas annotated at the $ac* of the certificates of title a mortgage of P+>,HHH in favor of the Philippine8ational ;an*2 moreover, the sheriff sold the properties for P33,+>H despite the pendency of :(3+3-where Pastor Ago contested the amount of P,-++.H- out of the judgment value of P3+=,=@.@+ in civilcase =+=>32 and $ecause of said acts, the Agos suffered P3+,-++.H- in damages.
Anent this third cause of action, the sheriff was under no o$ligation to re!uire payment of the purchase pricein the auction sale $ecause when the purchaser is the judgment creditor, and no third(party claim has $eenfiled, he need not pay the amount of the $id if it does not e"ceed the amount of his judgment. /Sec. =@,
6ule @, 6ules of Court0
he annotated mortgage in favor of the P8; is the concern of the vendees CastaGedas $ut did not affect thesheriff#s sale2 the cancellation of the annotation is of no moment to the Agos.
Case :(3+3- where Pastor Ago contested the sum of P,-++.H- out of the amount of the judgment wasdismissed $y this Court on 1anuary @3, 3.
his third cause of action, therefore, actually states no valid cause of action and is moreover $arred $y prior judgment.
he fourth cause of action pertains to moral damages allegedly suffered $y the Agos on account of the actscomplained of in the preceding causes of action. As the fourth cause of action derives its life from thepreceding causes of action, which, as shown, are $aseless, the said fourth cause of action must necessarilyfail.
he Counterclaim
As a counterclaim against the Agos, the CastaGedas aver that the action was unfounded and as aconse!uence of its filing they were compelled to retain the services of counsel for not less than P+,>HH2 that$ecause the Agos o$tained a preliminary injunction enjoining the transfer of titles and possession of theproperties to the CastaGedas, they were unlawfully deprived of the use of the properties from April 3+,3, the value of such deprived use $eing =HJ annually of their actual value2 and that the filing of theunfounded action $esmirched their feelings, the pecuniary worth of which is for the court to assess.
he Supplemental Complaint
5pon the first cause of action, it is alleged that after the filing of the complaint, the defendants, ta*ingadvantage of the dissolution of the preliminary injunction, in conspiracy and with gross $ad faith and evidentintent to cause damage to the plaintiffs, caused the registration of the sheriff#s final deed of sale2 that, tocause more damage, the defendants sold to their lawyer and his wife two of the parcels of land in !uestion2that the purchasers ac!uired the properties in $ad faith2 that the defendants mortgaged the two otherparcels to the 6i'al Commercial ;an*ing Corporation while the defendants# lawyer and his wife alsomortgaged the parcels $ought $y them to the 6i'al Commercial ;an*2 and that the $an* also acted in $adfaith.
he second cause of action consists of an allegation of additional damages caused $y the defendants# $adfaith in entering into the aforesaid agreements and transactions.
he Amended Supplemental Complaint
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4n May =@, 3@, Atty. Mariano C. Sicat, a former assistant or
associate of respondent 1udge when the latter was still in the
practice of law $efore his appointment to the $ench, entered his
appearance as the new counsel for defendant Pedro ;ravo, vice
Attorney Antonio 6esngit. 4n 1une 3, 3@, the defendant, throughAtty. Sicat, filed a supersedeas $ond to stay the e"ecution of the
judgment, and on 1une =H, 3@ respondent 1udge granted the stay
of e"ecution, over the o$jection of plaintiffs, and ordered the sheriff
to restore the possession of the lands in San Carlos to the
defendant. he petitioner li*ewise had as*ed for the appointment of
a receiver over the parcel of land located at ;ayam$ang, which
prayer was granted $y respondent 1udge on 1uly -, 3@2 $ut upon
the filing of a $ond $y the defendant for the non(appointment of areceiver, the order receivership was set aside. 4n August =, 3@,
pending the approval of the defendantLs amended record on appeal,
Atty. Sicat filed a motion for new trial and to set aside the judgment
and, over the vigorous o$jection of plaintiffs, the respondent 1udge
granted the said motion on 8ovem$er +, 3@. he hearing on the
retrial was finally set for Fe$ruary 3H, 3.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
;efore the opening of the courtLs session in the morning of Fe$ruary3H, 3, Atty. 7aniel Macaraeg, counsel for petitioner and his co(
plaintiffs, saw respondent 1udge in his cham$er and ver$ally
transmitted to him the re!uest of petitioner that he /the 1udge0
inhi$it himself from further hearing the case upon the ground that
the new counsel for the defendant, Atty. Mariano C. Si*at, was his
former associate. he respondent 1udge, however, rejected the
re!uest $ecause, according to him, the reason for the re!uest of his
inhi$ition is not one of the grounds for dis!ualification of a judgeprovided for in the 6ules of Court. hereafter, when the case was
called for hearing in open court, the following transpired, as shown
$y the transcript of the stenographic notes ta*en during said
hearingB2
APP%A6A8C%B chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
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AE. 7A8I%: C. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
appeared in $ehalf of plaintiffs. /After the case was called0 chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Eour client is here chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
AE. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Ees, Eour 9onor.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
)here is hechanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
AE. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
9e is here, Eour 9onor.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
)hat is your name chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
P:AI8IFFB chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
7omingo Austria, sir.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Eou are one of the plaintiffs in this casechanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
74MI8?4 A5S6IABchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Ees, sir.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
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Atty. Macaraeg approached me in cham$ers re!uesting me to
dis!ualify myself in hearing this case. 7id you authori'e Atty.
Macaraeg to approach me ver$ally to dis!ualify myself from hearing
this case $ecause the lawyer of the other party was my former
assistantchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
74MI8?4 A5S6IAB chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Ees, sir.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Is that your reason why you re!uested Atty. Macaraeg to approach
me, re!uesting me to dis!ualify myself simply $ecause the lawyer of the other party was my assistant chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
74MI8?4 A5S6IAB chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Ees, sir.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
All right. 7o you dou$t the integrity of the presiding 1udge to decidethis case fairly and impartially $ecause the lawyer of the other party
was my former assistant 7o you dou$t 1ust answer the !uestion chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
74MI8?4 A5S6IAB chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Ees, sir.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
he Court here$y finds you guilty of contempt of Court and you are
here$y ordered to pay a fine of P>H.HH. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
AE. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
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)ith due indulgence of this 9onora$le Court ( I have learned, after I
have conferred with you in cham$ers, another ground of the
plaintiffs for their re!uesting me to as* for the dis!ualification of
Eour 9onor in this case, and this ground consists of the rampant
rumor coming from the defendant Pedro ;ravo himself that he is$oasting in San Carlos that $ecause he has a new lawyer, that
surely he is going to win this case. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
)hy did you not wait until the case is finally decided and find out if
that is true or not chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
AE. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
And may$e, that is why the plaintiffs re!uested me to approach
Eour 9onor $ecause of that rampant rumor that Pedro ;ravo is
spreading.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Eou mean to say $ecause of that rumor, you are going to dou$t my
integritychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
AE. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
As for me, I entertain no dou$t, Eour 9onor.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Eour client e"pressed openly in Court his dou$ts on the integrity of
the Court simply $ased on rumors and that is a ground for contempt
of court, if only to maintain the faith of the people in the courts. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
AE. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
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a*ing into consideration that these plaintiffs are laymen and we
cannot e"pect from them the thin*ing of a lawyer, I am most
respectfully praying that the 4rder of this Court $e reconsidered.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
C456Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
7enied. Eour client should pay a fine of P>H.HH. )e will hear this
case this afternoon. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
AE. MACA6A%?Bchanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Ees, Eour 9onor.
he respondent 1udge forthwith dictated the following orderB3
;efore this Court opened its sessions this morning, Atty. 7aniel C.
Macaraeg, counsel for the plaintiffs, approached the presiding 1udge
of this Court in his cham$ers and manifested the desire of his
clients for the 1udge to dis!ualify himself from trying the a$ove(
entitled case for the reason that counsel for the defendant, Atty.
Marciano C. Sicat was formerly an associate of the 1udge of this
Court while he was still engaged in the practice of law. o this
manifestation of Atty. Macaraeg, the Presiding 1udge informed the
latter that such fact alone does not in itself constitute a legal ground
to dis!ualify the Presiding 1udge of this Court, from trying this
case.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
)hen the a$ove(entitled case was called for hearing, the Presiding
1udge called on one of the plaintiffs who was present, namely,
7omingo Austria, and in!uired from the latter if it was true that he
as*ed his lawyer Atty. Macaraeg to approach the 1udge in cham$ersand to as* him to dis!ualify himself from trying this case $ecause
defendantLs lawyer, Atty. Sicat was formerly associated with the said
1udge. o this !uery 7omingo Austria answered in the affirmative.
)hen he was also as*ed as to whether the said 7omingo Austria
has lost faith in the sense of fairness and justice of the Presiding
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?iven in open Court this 3Hth day of Fe$ruary, 3, at :ingayen,
Pangasinan.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Petitioner 7omingo Austria, accordingly, paid the fine of P>H.HH
under protest. 9aving $een punished summarily for direct contemptof court, and the remedy of appeal not $eing availa$le to him,
petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari $efore this Court. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
It is the position of the petitioner that under the facts and
circumstances attendant to the hearing of the Civil Case 8o. 3@=>H
on Fe$ruary 3H, 3H@, he had not committed an act of contempt
against the court and the respondent 1udge had acted in e"cess of
his jurisdiction with grave a$use of discretion when he declared
petitioner in direct contempt of court and imposed on him the fine
of P>H.HH as a penalty.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
After a careful study of the record, )e find merit in this petition. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
he respondent 1udge declared the petitioner in direct contempt of
court. 4ur tas*, therefore, is to determine whether or not the
petitioner was guilty of mis$ehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge, as to o$struct or interrupt the proceedings $eforethe same, or had committed an act of disrespect toward the court or
judge.4chanro$les virtual lawli$rary
he respondent 1udge considered the actuation of the petitioner, in
the premises, as offensive, insulting, and a reflection on his integrity
and honesty and a showing of lac* of respect to the court. he
respondent 1udge considered that the petitioner was not justified
and had no reason to entertain dou$ts in his fairness and integrity
simply $ecause the defendantLs counsel was his former associate. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
)e do not agree with the respondent 1udge. It is our considered
view that when the petitioner re!uested respondent 1udge to inhi$it
himself from further trying the case upon the ground that the
counsel for the opposite party was the former associate of the
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respondent 1udge, petitioner did so $ecause he was impelled $y a
justifia$le apprehension which can occur in the mind of a litigant
who sees what seems to $e an advantage on the part of his
adversary2 and that the petitioner made his re!uest in a manner
that was not disrespectful, much less insulting or offensive to therespondent 1udge or to the court. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
)e are in accord with the statement of respondent 1udge in his
memorandum that the circumstance invo*ed $y petitioner in as*ing
him to inhi$it himself from further trying the case ( that Atty. Sicat
was his former associate in his practice of law ( is not one of the
grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 3, 6ule 3@+ of
the new 6ules of Court for dis!ualifying a judge. )hile it is true thatrespondent 1udge may not $e compelled to dis!ualify himself, the
fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel
for a party in the case $eing tried $y him, may constitute a just or
valid reason for him to voluntarily inhi$it himself from hearing the
case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the
second paragraph of Section 3 of the said 6ule 3@+.5chanro$les virtual lawli$rary
he apprehension of petitioner regarding the pro$a$le $ias of
respondent 1udge does not appear to $e groundless or entirely
devoid of reason. he respondent 1udge had decided the case in
favor of petitioner and his co(plaintiffs, and that upon plaintiffsL
timely motion and filing of $ond they were already placed in
possession of the lands in !uestion pending appeal. It was when
Atty. Sicat too* over as new counsel for defendant that the latter
was given $ac* the properties, upon a motion to stay the e"ecution
of the judgment which was filed $y said counsel and was granted $y
respondent 1udge over the opposition of petitionerLs counsel. Again,
when the same counsel for defendant filed a motion for a new trial,
said motion was granted $y respondent 1udge in spite of the
vigorous o$jection of counsel for the petitioner and his co(plaintiffs.
And then the petitioner $ecame aware of the fact that his adversary,
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with the other party or counsel ( feels that no matter how upright
the judge is there is peril of his $eing unconsciously swayed $y his
former connection and he may unwittingly render a $iased or unfair
decision. 9ence, while it may $e conceded that in re!uesting the
dis!ualification of a judge $y reason of his relation with a party orcounsel there is some implication of the pro$a$ility of his $eing
partial to one side, the re!uest can not constitute contempt of court
if done honestly and in a respectful manner, as was done $y
petitioner in the present case. Perhaps the fault of petitioner, if at
all, is his having as*ed his counsel to ma*e the re!uest to
respondent 1udge inside the latterLs cham$er.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
he following o$servation of this Court, spea*ing through Mr. 1ustice7i'on, is relevant to the !uestion $efore 5sB
Petitioner invo*ing the provisions of section 3, 6ule 3= of the 6ules
of Court, argues that the case of respondent judge does not fall
under any one of the grounds for the dis!ualification of judicial
officers stated therein. Assumingarguendo that a literal
interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies petitionerLs
contention to a certain degree, it should not $e forgotten that, in
construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its
true intention nor the real ground for the dis!ualification of a judge
or judicial officer, which is the impossi$ility of rendering an impartial
judgment upon the matter $efore him. It has $een said, in fact, that
due process of law re!uires a hearing $efore an impartial and
disinterested tri$unal, and that every litigant is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge /@H Am. 1ur. p.
++0. Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision,
is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion
as to its fairness and the integrity of the 1udge. Conse!uently, we
ta*e it to $e the true intention of the law ( stated in general terms (
that no judge shall preside in a case in whichhe is not wholl free,
disinterested, impartial and independent /@H Am.
1ur.supra0 . . . . 6 /%mphasis supplied0.
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paragraph. ;ut the petitioner was simply truthful and candid to the
court when he gave that answer. It would have $een unfair to
respondent 1udge had petitioner answered 8o, sir, $ecause then
he would not $e sincere with the court, and he would $e
inconsistent with the re!uest that he made through his counsel forrespondent 1udge to inhi$it himself from further hearing the case.
)hen respondent 1udge as*ed that !uestion, he necessarily
e"pected a truthful answer from petitioner, and indeed petitioner
gave him the truthful answer. )e are not persuaded that in so
answering petitioner meant to $e disrespectful, offensive or
insulting to respondent 1udge. 8or do )e consider that in so
answering petitioner meant to cast reflection on the integrity and
honesty of respondent 1udge. )e $elieve that in so answering thepetitioner was simply manifesting the misgiving of an ordinary
layman a$out the outcome of his case that is going to $e tried $y a
judge who has $een closely associated with the counsel for his
adversary. he petitioner would never have e"pressed that
misgiving of his had respondent 1udge not as*ed him in open court
a !uestion that evo*ed that answer. A judge can not prevent any
person ( even a litigant or counsel in a case $efore him ( to
entertain in his mind an opinion a$out him as a judge. Certainly,any person is entitled to his opinion a$out a judge, whether that
opinion is flattering to the judge, or not. It would $e different if a
person would deli$erately and maliciously e"press an adverse
opinion a$out a judge, without reason, $ut simply to malign and
discredit the judge. In the case now $efore 5s )e $elieve that
petitioner did not mean to malign or discredit respondent 1udge in
answering as he did. It can $e said that petitioner was simply
moved $y a desire to protect his interests in the case pending$efore the court, presided $y respondent 1udge. A citi'en of this
6epu$lic is entitled to e"pect that our courts of justice are presided
$y judges who are free from $ias and prejudice ( and it should not
$e made a count against the citi'en if he so e"presses himself
truthfully, sincerely, and respectfully. A judge, as a pu$lic servant,
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should not $e so thin(s*inned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended
if a citi'en e"presses an honest opinion a$out him which may not
altogether $e flattering to him. 10 After all, what matters is that a
judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his
conscience and the light that ?od has given him. A judge shouldnever allow himself to $e moved $y pride, prejudice, passion, or
pettiness in the performance of his duties. And a judge should
always $ear in mind that the power of the court to punish for
contempt should $e e"ercised for purposes that are impersonal,
$ecause that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
persons $ut for the functions that they e"ercise.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
It is worth mentioning here that numerous cases there have $eenwhere judges, and even mem$ers of this Court, were as*ed to
inhi$it themselves from trying, or from participating in the
consideration of, a case, $ut scarcely were the movants punished for
contempt even if the grounds upon which they $ased their motions
for dis!ualification are not among those provided in the rules. It is
only when there was direct imputation of $ias or prejudice, or a
stu$$orn insistence to dis!ualify the judge, done in a malicious,
arrogant, $elligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants wereheld in contempt of court. 11 And this li$eral attitude of the courts is
in *eeping with the doctrine that he power to punish for contempt
of court should $e e"ercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle. 4nly occasionally should the court invo*e its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the
administration of justice must falter or fail. 12 he power to punish
for contempt, $eing drastic and e"traordinary in its nature, should
not $e resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.
13chanro$les virtual lawli$rary
)herefore, the order of respondent 1udge dated Fe$ruary 3H, 3,
in Civil Case 8o. 3@=> of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
declaring petitioner in direct contempt of court and ordering him to
pay a fine of P>H.HH, is here$y annulled and set aside2 and it is
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ordered that the sum of P>H.HH, paid under protest $y petitioner as
a fine, $e refunded to him. 8o costs. It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Rees, J.!."., Di#on, Ma$alintal, !eng#on, J.P.,
%anche#, Castro, Angeles and &ernando, JJ., concur.
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MARTELINO VS. ALE%ANDRO ("2 SCRA 1!# [19!])
%8 ;A8C
G.R. No. L-30894 %;: 25, 1970
!D+"RDO L. "RT!LINO, #IRILO ORO*!S", T!ODOROF"#!LO, R+*!RTO "ISOTO, "L!RTO SOT!#O, SOLF!RINOTITONG, !T "L., Petitioners, vs. JOS! "L!J"NDRO, R+!N S.
ONTO", SI>TO R. "L("R", "V!LINO #. !N!=, !FR"INS. "#L"NG, !T "L., Respondents.
Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners.
Colonel Manuel '. Rees (Judge Advocate )eneral, )%C*, Major
%amuel M. %oriano (JA)%*, Major +iginio . Dacana, Jr. (JA)%, PC*
and %olicitor )eneral &eli- '. Ma$asiar, Assistant %olicitor )eneral
Crispin '. !autista, %olicitor Jaime M. "antin and )uillermo a$ar,
Jr. for respondents.
#"STRO, J.
his case presents another aspect of the court(martial proceedingsagainst the petitioner, Major %duardo Martelino, alias A$dul :atif
Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the officers
and men under him, for violation of the th and +th Articles of
)ar, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 3-, 3- of some
Muslim recruits then undergoing commando training on the island of
Corregidor. 4nce $efore the !uestion was raised $efore this Court
whether the general court(martial, convened on April , 3- to try
the case against the petitioners, ac!uired jurisdiction over the casedespite the fact that earlier, on March =@, a complaint for frustrated
murder had $een filed in the fiscalLs office of Cavite City $y 1i$in
Arula /who claimed to have $een wounded in the incident0 against
some of the herein petitioners. he proceedings had to $e
suspended until the jurisdiction issue could $e decided. 4n 1une =@,
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3 this Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military
court.1chanro$les virtual lawli$rary
he jurisdiction !uestion thus settled, attention once again shifted
to the general court(martial, $ut no sooner had the proceedingsresumed than another hitch developed. his came a$out as the
petitioners, the accused in the court(martial proceedings, in turn
came to this Court, see*ing relief against certain orders of the
general court(martial.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
It appears that at the hearing on August 3=, 3 the petitioner
Martelino sought the dis!ualification of the President of the general
court(martial, following the latterLs admission that he read
newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. he petitioner
contended that the case had received such an amount of pu$licity in
the press and other news media and in fact was $eing e"ploited for
political purposes in connection with the presidential election on
8ovem$er 33, 3 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After
deli$erating, the military court denied the challenge. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
hereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col.
Alejandro, as president of the court(martial, and Col. 4lfindo, :t.Col. Camagay, :t. Col. Dalones, :t. Col. ;lanco and Col. Malig, as
mem$ers. )ith regard to peremptory challenges it was the
petitionersL position that for each specification each accused was
entitled to one such challenge. hey later changed their stand and
adopted that of the trial judge advocate that for each specification
jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only 3 peremptory
challenge2 and that with respect to the specifications tried
commonly, each one of the accused is entitled to one peremptorychallenge. hey there contended that they were entitled to a total
of eleven peremptory challenges. 4n the other hand the court(
martial ruled that the accused were entitled to only one peremptory
challenge as the specifications were $eing jointly tried.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
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he petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and
prohi$ition, to nullify the orders of the court(martial denying their
challenges, $oth peremptory and for cause. hey allege that the
adverse pu$licity given in the mass media to the Corregidor
incident, coupled with the fact that it $ecame an issue against theadministration in the 3 elections, was such as to unduly
influence the mem$ers of the court(martial. )ith respect to
peremptory challenges, they contend that they are entitled to
eleven such challenges, one for each specification. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
4n August =, 3 this Court gave due course to the petition,
re!uired the respondents as mem$ers of the general court(martial
to answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from proceedingwith the case. chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$les virtual lawli$rary
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the pu$licity
which the case had received, no proof has $een presented showing
that the court(martialLs presidentLs fairness and impartiality have
$een impaired. 4n the contrary, they claim, the petitionerLs own
counsel e"pressed confidence in the integrity, e"perience and
$ac*ground of the mem$ers of the court. As a preliminary
consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the
petition on the ground that it has no power to review the
proceedings of the court(martial, e"cept for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the
person and su$ject matter, and whether, though having such
jurisdiction, it had e"ceeded its powers in the sentence
pronounced, and that at any rate the petitioners failed to e"haust
remedies availa$le to them within the military justice system.chanro$lesvirtualawli$rarychanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
Ichanro$les virtual lawli$rary
It is true that civil courts as a rule e"ercise no supervision or
correcting power over the proceedings of courts(martial, and that
mere errors in their proceedings are not open to consideration. he
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single in!uiry, the test, is jurisdiction.2;ut it is e!ually true that in
the e"ercise of their undou$ted discretion, courts(martial may
commit such an a$use of discretion ( what in the language of 6ule
> is referred to as grave a$use of discretion ( as to give rise to a
defect in their jurisdiction.3his is precisely the point at issue in thisaction suggested $y its nature as one for certiorari and prohi$ition,
namely, whether in overruling the petitionersL challenges, the
general court(martial committed such an a$use of discretion as to
call for the e"ercise of the corrective powers of this Court. It is thus
o$vious that no other way is open to this Court $y which it may
avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrust upon it. 8or will
the fact that there may $e availa$le remedies within the system of
military justice $ar review considering that the !uestions raised are!uestions of law.4chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
And so the threshold !uestion is whether the pu$licity given to the
case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right to a
fair trial. As already stated, the petitioner Martelino challenged the
court(martial president on the ground that newspaper accounts of
what had come to $e referred to as the Corregidor massacre
might unduly influence the trial of their case. he petitionerLscounsel referred to a news item appearing in the 1uly =, 3 issue
of the Dail Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that
coffins are $eing prepared for the President /of the Philippines0 in
1olo, that according to Senator A!uino massacre victims were
given sea $urial, and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Dice
President candidate, had gone to Corregidor and found $ullet
shells. In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila
/imes editorial of August =, 3 which states that he 1a$idahcode name of the training operationsN issue was $ound to come up
in the course of the election campaign. he opposition could not
possi$ly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the
administration. he petitioners argue that under the circumstances
they could not e"pect a just and fair trial and that, in overruling
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their challenge for cause $ased on this ground, the general court(
martial committed a grave a$use of discretion. In support of their
contention they invo*e the rulings of the 5nited States Supreme
Court in 0rvin v. Dowd ,5Rideau vs. "ouisiana,6stes v.
/e-as,7and %hepard v. Ma-well .8chanro$lesvirtual lawli$rary
An e"amination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are
widely disparate from this case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin, for
instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after the petitionerLs
arrest in connection with si" murders committed in Dander$urgh
County, Indiana, the prosecutor and police officials issued press
releases stating that the petitioner had confessed to the si" murders
and that a $arrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons andpictures was unleashed against him during the si" or seven months
preceding his trial. In reversing his conviction, the Court saidB
9ere the pattern of deep and $itter prejudiceL shown to $e present
throughout the community, ... was clearly reflected in the sum total
of the voir diree"amination of a majority of the jurors finally placed
in the jury $o". %ight out of the 3= thought petitioner was guilty.
)ith such an opinion permeating their minds, it would $e difficult to
say that each could e"clude this preconception of guilt from his
deli$erations. he influence that lur*s in an opinion once formed is
so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the
processes of the average man. ... )here oneLs life is at sta*e ( and
accounting for the frailties of human nature ( we can only say that
in the light of the circumstances here the finding of impartiality does
not meet the constitutional standard.9
0rvin mar*s the first time a state conviction was struc* down solelyon the ground of prejudicial pu$licity. 10 In the earlier caseof %hepherd v. &lorida, 11 which involved elements of pu$licity, thereversal of the conviction was $ased solely on racial discrimination
in the selection of the jury, although to concurring 1ustice 1ac*son,
who was joined $y 1ustice Fran*furter, It is hard to imagine a more
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prejudicial influence than a press release $y the officer of the court
charged with defendantsL custody stating that they had confessed,
and here just such a statement unsworn to, unseen, uncross(
e"amined and uncontradicted, was conveyed $y the press to the
jury. 12
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the ro$$ery of a $an* in :a*e
Charles, :ouisiana and in the *idnapping of three of its employees,
and in the *illing of one of them, was similarly given trial $y
pu$licity. hus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was
ta*en of him in an interview with the sheriff. he interview,
which lasted appro"imately =H minutes, consisted of interrogation
$y the sheriff and admission $y 6ideau that he had perpetrated the$an* ro$$ery, *idnapping and murder. he interview was seen and
heard on television $y =,HHH people. wo wee*s later he was
arraigned. 9is lawyers promptly moved for a change of venue $ut
their motion was denied and 6ideau was convicted and sentenced to
death. 6ideauLs counsel had re!uested that jurors $e e"cused for
cause, having e"hausted all of their peremptory challenges, $ut
these challenges for cause had $een denied $y the trial judge. In
reversing his conviction, the Court saidB
)Ne hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the
re!uest for a change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish
had $een e"posed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of
6ideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he
was later to $e charged. For anyone who has ever watched
television the conclusion cannot $e avoided that this spectacle, to
the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real
sense was 6ideauLs trial ( at which he pleaded guilty to murder. A