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THE NOTION OF INFINITUDE IN Ps.-DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA
Author(s): Salvatore R. C. LillaSource: The Journal of Theological Studies, NEW SERIES, Vol. 31, No. 1 (APRIL 1980), pp. 93-103Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23959150Accessed: 15-01-2016 15:27 UTC
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NOTES
AND
STUDIES
93
He
imitates the
spiritual beings by
his words while he is
making
supplication;
and
holily
he teaches
the
people
to
cry
1Holy'.
The utterance
of sanctification of the
heavenly beings
he recites to
men,
that
they may
be
crying: 'Holy, Holy, Holy,
Lord'.1
There is
good
reason for the
epiklesis
and the Sanctus to be the
only
parts
of the
anaphora
mentioned;
the reason is hinted
at
by
Edmund
Bishop
in the
Appendix
to
Connolly's
translation.
Bishop
carefully
noted that after the Sursum corda the canon seems to have been recited
silently except
for three
things:
the
concluding
words of the Preface
which
led into the
Sanctus;
at
the
signing
of
the
mysteries
when the
people
said
'Amen';
and after the
epiklesis,
when 'the
priest
makes
his
voice heard to all the
people,
and
signs
with his hand over the
mysteries,
as
before',
but now 'to
teach . . .
that
they
are
accomplished'.2
Since
Narsai
was concerned
to
describe
the
priest's theological
function
in
the
Eucharist,
he would
naturally
mention the
epiklesiseven though
it
appears
to have been recited
silentlysince
he
regarded
this as
the
moment
of consecration. This was at the centre of the
priest's
function.
But Narsai
might
be
expected
to turn back to
give
some
explanation
of
what for the
congregation
must
have been
the
most
significant
and
puzzling interruptions of the silent canon, namely the recitation of the
Sanctus.Sanctus.hat
explanation
could be
given
for this curious
interruption,
for the Sanctus
plays
no obvious
theological
role in the consecration?
What obvious
significance
could Narsai
give
for the Sanctus?
Simply
that
the
priest
raises his voice to
give
the
congregation
the cue for
reciting
it;
that
is,
'he teaches men to
cry "Holy"
with the
spiritual beings.
The
people
answer after his words:
Holy, Holy
Power,
hidden
from
all and
revealed to
all.'
The
explanation
of the so-called
anaphora
in
Homily
XXXII offered
here
is,
admittedly,
not
as
fascinating
as
that
suggested by
Ratcliff,
but
it gives some consistency to the Eucharistic material in the liturgical
homilies of
Narsai;
it also avoids the
unlikely
conclusion of drastic
liturgical
revolutions
at
Edessa and Nisibis
during
the latter
part
of
the fifth
century.
Bryan
D.
Spinks
1
Ibid.,
p. 57
2
Ibid.,
pp. 125-6;
the references in Narsai are
pp.
12, 13,
and
22.
THE
NOTION OF INFINITUDE IN
Ps.-DIONYSIUS
AREOPAGITA
The
problem
of the
relationship
between the
concept
of infinitude and
the first metaphysical
principle
does not
play
a
secondary
role in the
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94
NOTES AND STUDIES
history
of Greek
philosophy:
from the Presocratics1 to late
Neoplato
nism,
it never
ceased to draw the attention of
philosophical speculation,2
and
even some Greek and Latin
patristic
authors
paid
attention
to
it.3
In
Ps.-Dionysius' theology,
too,
the
concept
of
or )
has
some
relevance,
and it
may
therefore be worth while to
try
to
investigate
it.
In
his
longest
treatise,
the De divinis
Nominibus,
Dionysius
represents
God
sometimes as
being
above
and as its
source,
and
sometimes as
being
identical with
it; moreover,
in the latter
case,
he
uses
the terms
in different contexts and seems to
attach at least three different meanings to them. This short paper sets
itself the task
of
establishing
(a)
the
philosophical
sources on which
Dionysius
depends
when
he
places
God above
; (b)
the
three different
meanings
which
the
concept
of
assumes
when
it is
applied directly
to
God,
as well as their
philosophical
and
patristic
sources;
(c)
the real reason
why
Dionysius
sometimes dis
tinguishes
God from
,
nd sometimes identifies him
with
it.
(a)
The
passages
in which
Ps.-Dionysius places
his first
principle
above
and
and
considers
it as their
cause are
the
following:
I.I.
De
div. Notn.
IV,
X,
705
C
...
.
. .
,
.
2. De
div.
Nom.
IX, ,
909
c
.
*
I wish to thank here Father P.
Grech, O.S.A.,
rector of the
Institutum
Patristicum
Augustinianum,
Rome,
for
revising my
English.
1
To the
evidence about Anaximander
collected
by
H.
Diels,
Die
Fragm.
der
Vorsokr.Vorsokr.
(Berlin, 1951), pp.
81-90,
it is
possible
to add Clement of
Alex.,
Protr.Protr.6, I (I 50, 1416) , .
6
(Diels quotes
the imme
diately
following
lines of
this
passage
of
Clement
as
fragment
11 of
Archelaus,
op.
cit.
II
47, 15).
On
Anaximander,
the
philosopher
to whom the
identification
of
with God
ultimately goes
back, see,
for
instance,
W.
Jaeger,
Die
TheologieTheologieerfriihen griechischen
Denker
(Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 35-49
and
229-42,
and
G. S.
Kirk-J.
E.
Raven,
The
Presocratic
Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957),
pp. 99-142
1
Three
inquiries
on the
significance
of this
concept
in Greek
philosophy
can
be found in R.
Mondolfo,
L'infinite
nel
pensiero
dei
Greci
(Firenze,
1934),
in
C.
J.
De
Vogel,
'La thiorie
de
1'
chez Platon et la tradition
platonicienne',
Revueevue
philos.
de
la France et
de
I'etranger,
149 (1959), pp. 21-39,
and in the
important
book
by
E.
Muhlenberg,
Die Unendlichkeit
Gottes bei
Gregor
von
NyssaNyssaForsch. zur Kirchen und Dogmengesch. 16, Gottingen, 1966).
3
Besides
Gregory
of
Nyssa, Muhlenberg, op.
cit.,
draws attention
to
Irenaeus
(p. 69), Tertullian,
Minucius
Felix,
Hilary
of Poitiers
(pp. 70-2),
and the
Alexandrine
theologians,
viz.
Clement
and
Origen (pp.
73-82).
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NOTES
AND
STUDIES
95
3De div. Norn. XIII, I, 977 .
4
De div. Nom.
XIII, III,
980
C
,
.
. .
.
The
view
according
to
which
and
,
though
being
the two constitutive
principles
of all
things,
are nevertheless
subordinated
to the
first,
divine
principle,
goes ultimately
back
to
Presocratic
philosophy,
and
is
adopted
and
developed especially
by
Neopythagoreanism
and
Neoplatonism.
As
Clement of
Alexandria,
Protr.Protr.
6,
1
(I 50,
16-17
=
Archelaus,
fr.
11
Diels,
II
47, 15)
tells
us,
both
Anaxagoras
and his
pupil
Archelaus
placed
divine
intelligence
above
infinitude,
.
In the Platonic
Philebus
Socrates,
after
maintaining
that all
things
are
composed
of limit
and
infinitude
(16 c),
makes
it
clear
that there is
a
cause above
these two
principles
(30
C
. . .
,,
,
'
. . .
,
cf.
23
D
.
.
.
). According
to
Syrianus,
In
Metaphys. 165,
35-166,
2,
Philolaus
(under
whose name is
probably
adumbrated
a
Neopythagorean
philosopher,
just
as in the
case of
Archaenetus
and
Brotinus,
mentioned a few lines
below, p.
166,
4-5)1
considered
and
as
the
two
supreme
realities deriv
ing
directly
from the first
principle,
.
Plotinus,
Enn.
II,
IV,
15 (II
69,
19-20
Brehier),
regards
infinitude
as
being produced by
the
one,
(i.e.
in the
one)
,2
and
brings
it
into
connection
with the
inexhaustible
power
of
intelligible being
(which
for him
is one and
the same
thing
with the
,
the
first
product
of the
one):3
(i.e.
the
intelligible)
act
,,
,
. . .
Enn.
VI, V,
II
(VI1 211, 23-5);
. .
.
,
1
.
R. Dodds
also,
Proclus,
The Elements
of Theology (Oxford, 1933), p.
247,
regards
this
passage
of
Syrianus
as
reflecting Neopythagorean
tradition.
2
To
this
passage
of Plotinus
attention
has been drawn
by
E. R.
Dodds,
op.
cit.
245
n.
3,
and
by
L.
Sweeney,
Gregorianum, 38 (1957), p. 718
n.
85.
The
words
immediately
preceding,
eV
rijs
eVos
del,
point
to the
doctrine
of the infinite
generative
power
of the
'one', which,
in
Plotinus'
opinion,
represents
the
only possible interpretation
of the infinitude
of the
'one':
see
p.
100 below.
For further
details on the
doctrine of infinitude
in
Plotinus
see
Dodds,
op.
cit.
245
and
246-7,
C.
J.
De
Vogel,
art. cit.
33-4,
and
especially
L.
Sweeney,
'Infinity
in
Plotinus',
Gregorianum, 38 (1957). 515
35
and
713-32
Cf. for
instance
Enn.
V, III, 5 (V 54, 26-7)
lv
.
8822C78
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96
NOTES AND
STUDIES
,
.
VI, V,
12
(VI1
211,
5~9) Porphyry
takes
up
the view of his
teacher.1
In Proclus the
doctrine
of
an, together
with
that
of
,
assumes a
very precise
connotation
and
becomes a
fundamental element
of
his
strongly
hierarchical
system.
In
keeping
with
Neopythagoreism,
he maintains
that,
according
to
the
view set
forth
by
Socrates
in the
Philebus,Philebus,
he first
principle begets
both
and
:
iviv
,
Theol.Theol.lat.
Ill,
8
(III
30,
19-20
Saffrey-Westerink);
the
and the are for him the two supreme principles of beings,
subordinated
only
to the first 'one'
{El.
Theol.
90-2,
p.
82
Dodds).
More
exactly,
whereas the
must be
regarded
as the second
'one' which
originates being,
the
represents
the
infinite
generative power
of
this second
'one',
and is situated between
being
and the first
'one':
Theol.Theol.lat.
Ill,
8
(III
31, 18-20)
'
(i.e.
the second
'one',
the
)
,
.
Theol.Theol.
lat.
Ill,
8
(III 32, 2-5)
i.e.
the
first
one')
,,
,.
El.El.
heol.
92 (82, 34)
(
,
)
,
'
),
.
Although
the
generative
power {)
is
represented,
in the
passages
of the
Theologia
Platonica
quoted
above,
as
belonging
to the
and
as
originating
after
t
(
),
it
goes
nevertheless
ultimately
back,
in Proclus'
thought,
to the first one': in El. Theol.
56
(54, 8-11)
Proclus
clearly
maintains
that the
generative power
charac
teristic of the
inferior
beings
derives
from
the
beings
of the
upper
rank,
. .
.
.
In
identifying
with the
infinite
generative
power
belonging
to the second
'one' and
originating
from
the first
'one',
Proclus
does not seem to be
far
removed from
the Plotinian
conception,
as
it
appears
in the
passages
of the Enneads
quoted
above.
Damascius,
in Dub.
et
Sol.
45 (I 91,
1
Ruelle), places
the first 'one'
1
The first
part
of
Sent.
40 depends
on
Plotinus,
Enn.
VI,
v,
12: see the
apparatuspparatus
fontium
in E.
Lamberz, Porphyrii
sententiae ad
intellegibilia
ducentes
(Leipzig, 1975), p.
47.
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NOTES
AND STUDIES
97
above
limit and
infinitude,
;
and
in his
commentary
on
the Philebus
(62,
3
Westerink)
he
repeats
the
same
view
referring
to
Proclus,
Se
,
(i.e.
Proclus).1
Dionysius'
doctrine of the subordination
of
to God
and of
its
origin
from him shows
therefore a
complete
agreement
with
the
previous Neopythagorean
and
Neoplatonic
tradition,
and
particularly
with Proclus
and Damascius:
passage
1 must be
compared
with
Syri
anus,
In
Metaphys. 165, 35-166,
2,
with
Plotinus,
Enn.
II,
iv,
15 (II
69, 19-20), and with Proclus, Theol. Plat. Ill, 8 (III 30, 19-20);
passage
2,
stressing
God's transcendence
with
respect
to
,
must
be understood in the
light
of
El.
Theol.
92 (82,
31-4); passage 3,
in
which God is
represented
in the act of
imparting
a limit
upon
,
finds also its
counterpart
in El. Theol.
92,
,
;
and
passage
4,
in which
the first one' is
repre
sented
as
being
prior
to
any
limit and
infinitude,
agrees
almost verbatim
with
Damascius,
Dub.
et Sol.
45 (I 91, 1).
(b)
It could not
escape Dionysius
that
Parmenides,
in
the first
hypo
thesis of
the
homonymous
Platonic
dialogue
which so much
influenced
the
theology
of
Neoplatonism,2
calls
the
'one'
also
(Parm.
137 d);
and
that,
in the second
hypothesis,
he
brings
the
'one' into
close
connection
with
the
infinite multitude of
beings
{Parm.
144 a-b).
And
since
Dionysius, adapting
the
Neoplatonic
interpretation
of
the
Parme
nidesnideso his own
theology,
identifies
his first
principle
with
the
'one' of
the
first two
hypotheses
of this
dialogue,3
he is inclined
to call
God
himself
and
.4
1
Another
passage
of the
commentary
on the Philebus
(98, 1-6)
is
also worth
noticing:
rives
al
;
. . .
. . .
2
On the
theological
interpretation
of
the
Parmenides in
Neopythagoreism
and
Neoplatonism
see
particularly
E. R.
Dodds,
'The Parmenides of
Plato and
the
Origin
of the
Neoplatonic
"One"',
Class.
Quarterly,
22
(1928),
pp.
129-42;
E.
Corsini,
II trattato De
divinis
nominibus dello
pseudo-Dionigi
e i
commenti
neoplatonicineoplatonici
l Parmenide
(Torino, 1962),
pp.
115-20;
H. D.
Saffrey-L.
G.
Westerink, Proclus, Theologie platonicienne,
i
(Paris, 1968), pp.
lxxxv-lxxxix.
3
This has been
rightly
seen
by
E.
von
Ivanka,
'Der
Aufbau der
Schrift
"De divinis nominibus"
des Ps.
Dionysios',
Scholastik,
15
(1940), pp.
392-3
(=lato(=lato(=
lato
Christianus, Einsiedeln,
1964, pp. 234-5)
and
by
E.
Corsini,
op.
cit.,
pp.
43
and 120-1. On
the
dependence
of the De
divinis
nominibus on
the
Parmenidesarmenides
see
particularly chapter
III
of Corsini's
book,
II De divinis
nominibus
ee l
Parmenide,
pp.
77-111.
4 It may be worth noticing that Clement of Alexandria also calls his God
-,,
n
Strom.
V
81,
5-82,
(II 380,20-5)
he is
no
doubt under the influence
of
a
Neopythagorean
speculation
on
the first
hypothesis
of the Parmenides .
(
.
.
.
,
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NOTES AND
STUDIES
The identification of God with
and
gives origin,
in
Dionysius' thought,
to
three different
ideas. God is
infinitude
or infi
nite since
(1)
he
comprehends
all
things
in
himself;
(2)
he is endowed
with a
generative
power
which knows no
end;
(3)
he is
completely
in
comprehensible
to the
human
mind.
Infinitude
becomes
thus
practically
identical
(1)
with God's
property
of
enclosing everything
in
himself;
(2)
with his infinite
generative
power; (3)
with his total
unknowability.
(1)
That for
Dionysius
God is infinitude because he
comprehends
everything
in
himself is
clearly
shown
by
the
following
evidence:
5.
De div. Norn.
Ill,
I 680
.
6. De div. Notn.
V, ,
825
.
..
e
div.
Nom.
V, X,
825
>
[]
..
. .
.
.1
8.
De div. N0ttl.
IX,
III,
912
.
.
.
. .
.
.
It is one of
the
main features
of the
theology
both
of
Dionysius
and of
Neoplatonism
to
consider
all
beings
as
proceeding
from
the 'one'
by
means
of a
process
of
emanation:
the
'one'
is the source of all
beings
in
so far
as
they
pre-exist
already
in some
wayi.e.
without
being
distinct
from one
anotherin
the
'one',
which contains
all of them and
brings
them
forth.2
This
is the
underlying
idea of a
passage
of
Plotinus,
Enn.
,
Sc
,
oil
,
,
.
All
these
concepts
go
back
to the first
hypothesis
of
the
Parmenides.
On this
passage
see also
Muhlenberg, op.
cit., pp. 75-6;
I
very
much
regret
not to
have drawn atten
tion
to
this
important
point
in
my
book on Clement
(see particularly p.
219).
1
is
my
own
restoration;
I
also
thought
it
proper
to
cut out
the
which
immediately
follows. E.
R.
Dodds,
Proclus.
The Elements
of
Theology,
p.
248,
in
quoting
this
passage,
puts
after
in,
without
making
it clear
that the
word
represents
a
restoration,
since it occurs
neither
in
the
Migne
edition nor
in
the
manuscripts.
I,
however,
prefer
to
write
,
which
I
regard
as
dependent
on
.
*
It
must be
remembered
that
in
passages
58
of
Dionysius,
as well as in
analogous
passages
of
Plotinus,
Proclus,
and
Damascius,
the 'one'
comprehends
all
things
in itself
potentially,
i.e. before
bringing
them forth
by
means of its
emanation.
This
concept
must not
be
confused
with the
other
idea
according
to
which
the divine
principle,
thanks
to its
power,
embraces
()
and holds
together () the whole sensible universe. This idea, which goes ultimately
back
to
Presocratic
philosophy,
occurs
in Plato's
conception
of the
world-soul,
becomes
fundamental
in the
Porch,
and
is inherited
by
Philo,
Clement of
Alex.,
Gregory
of
Nyssa,
Middle
Platonism,
Neoplatonism,
and
Dionysius
himself:
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NOTES
AND STUDIES
99
V,
III,
15 (V 70, 29-3 )
7
.
. . '
.
In his
commentary
on
the Parmenides
Proclus,
prob
ably
having
Aristotle in
mind,
brings
the
infinitude
of
the first 'one'
into
close
connection
with
its
property
of
possessing
everything
in advance:
Inn
Farm. VI
(73,
11-12
Cousin)
...
el
,
7
,
.1
Inn
Parm.
VI
(7316-17)
.
Damascius also
maintains that the 'one'
comprehends
everything:
Dub.Dub.t Sol. I
(I 3, 1-2)
'
.
Dub.Dub.
t
Sol. 2
(I 5, 2-3)
.
. .
'
. . .
.
Dub.Dub.
t
Sol.
25 (I
42, 27)
.
Ps.-Dionysius'
dependence
on
Neoplatonism
even
in
terminology
is
therefore
evident:
the
of
passages
5
and 8
is
already
used
by
Proclus and
Damascius;
and the
of
passage
7
must be com
pared
with the
expression
which occurs
in
Plotinus,
Enn.
V, III,
15 (V
70,
29-30).
(2)
God's infinitude
is
also connected with his
generative
power,
which is infinite in so
far
as it never ceases to
produce
an infinite
number of
powers
and never
runs short.
This idea occurs in
the
two
following
passages:
9.
De div. Nom.
VIII,
11,
889
D
. .
.
157j57,
2
.
see,
for
instance,
Anaximenes 2
(Diels I,
95)
and W.
Jaeger's
important
remarks
on the use of the term
on the
part
of some
Presocratic
philo
sophers, op.
cit.
42
and n.
39,
pp.
232-3;
Plato,
Tim.
36 e;
SVF
I
530,
II
439,
440, 441, 447;
Philo, De
Fuga
et Inv. 112, De
Conf. Ling.
137,
De Post. C.
7,
DeDe
Migr.
Abr.
182,
De Sobr.
63,
De
Somn.
I
63
and
185;
Clement of Alex.
Strom.Strom.
I, 5, 4,
II, 6, 2, V,
73, 3,
V, 81,
3; Gregory
of
Nyssa,
De
Profess.
Christ.
139,39, 3-4
Jaeger;
Plutarch,
De An. Procr. in Tim.
1023 a;
Atticus,
fr. VIII
Baudry;
Alcinous,
Did.
170,
3-5
(on
the
right spelling
of the name of
the author
of the
Didaskalikos,
who must
be
distinguished
from
Albinus,
the
pupil
of
Gaius,
see now
J.
Whittaker, Phoenix,
28
(1974), pp. 450-6);
Plotinus,
Enn.
IV,
3, 9
(IV 76,
36-7)
and
V, 1,
2
(V 17,
29-30); Ps.-Dionysius,
De div. Nom.
IV,
iv
697
c, 700
a-b,
VIII,
11
892 a,
XI,
949 a, XI,
11
949
c.
1
Proclus' words
eVo's
may
have
been influenced
by
Aristotle's
definition
of
,
ot 8e
17780
,
Phys.
Ill
207a8-9-
As to
the
idea
according
to which infinitude
comprehends
everything
in
itself,
cf.
Aristotle,
Phys.
Ill
207a1821, ye 1, nepicgfiv
1,
'
.
2
The
expression ?
is Procline: see for instance
El.
Theol.
(2,
10-11),
Theol. Plat.
II,
1
(II
4,
22-3),
In Parm. VI
(75,
16 and
19).
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100
NOTES AND
STUDIES
10. De
div. Norn.
VIII, 11,
889
D-892
A
in'
.
Plotinus also had
interpreted
the
infinitude of the
'one'
in
this
way:
the
'one' is unlimited
(Enn.
IV
ill, 8,
pp. 74, 38
6
,,
f.
Enn.
V, V, II,
p. 103, 34
"'
^
and
Enn.
VI, V,
4>
202,
13-14
,
),
but its
infinitude must be
under
stood as
referring
not to its
physical
dimensions
(from
this
point
of
view the 'one' is neither limited nor unlimited, Enn. V, v, 10,
p. 103,
18-20 '
. . .
'
'
)
but
only
to its
inexhaustible
power:1
Enn.Enn.Enn.
I,
4,
15
(II
69,
19)
Enn.Enn.
V,
III,
8
(IV 74> 3^~7) V
TV
,
..
Enn.Enn.
, V,
(V 103,
212)
'
..
Enn.Enn.
I, V,
\ (VI1
202,
1314)
"
,
'
,
;
Enn.Enn.
I, ,
6
(VI2
11210
)
eivai
)
and
is
severely
condemned
by
Justinian
for this
reason: cf. the references
produced
by
P. Koetschau in the
apparatus
fontium, p.
164.
For
a
discussion
of
this
passage
cf.
Muhlenberg,
op.
cit.,
pp. 78-82,
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NOTES AND STUDIES
101
The same view is shared
by
Damacius,
who
in
Dub. et Sol.
178
(II 55,
22)
uses
the term
which occurs in
passage 9
of Ps.
Dionysius:
.1
(3)
In two
passages
Dionysius brings
nto close
connection
with the total
unknowability
of the first
principle.
God is
and,
is therefore too
superior
to
the limited
faculties
of
the human
mind,
which is not
capable
of
comprehending
him:
II.II. De div. Norn.
I,
I
588
. . .
2
. . .
.
12. De div. Nom.
I, 11,
588
C
.3
The doctrine of
the
absolute
unknowability
of
the first
principle
is
fundamental in
Neoplatonism:
as E.
R. Dodds has
shown,
it derives
from
the
theological
interpretation
of the 'one' of the
first
hypothesis
of
Plato's Parmenides.4
And since Parmenides calls this
'one'
(Parm.(Parm.37 d)
and
comes
to
the
conclusion that it
cannot be the
object
of any speech, scientific knowledge, or opinion (Parm. 142 a), it must
not have been difficult
for
Dionysius
to
bring
these two
negative
properties
of
the
first
one'
(that
of
being
infinite and
that of
being
completely unknown)
into connection
with
each other and
to define
consequently
his God
as an
which lies
far
beyond
the reach
of
the human mind.
But
Dionysius
did not find
this close
connection
between
and
God's
unknowability
in
the Parmenides itself or in
Neoplatonism:
the
'one'
of
the first
hypothesis
of
the Parmenides
is
represented
as
being
completely
unknown not because
it
is
,
but because
it
partakes
in no way of being (Parm. 141 e ), and
1
In
the
Elements
of Theology
Proclus
applies
the
term
not to
the first
principle,
but to
the
intelligible beings
deriving
from
and
:
see El. Theol.
84 (78, 5),
86
(80, 12), 89 (82, 2), 92 (82,
31).
In the
Commentary
onn the
Timaeus
also
(see
Diehl, Index,
vol.
iii,
397)
the
term
is not
applied
to the first
principle.
The
expression
en'
in
passage
10 of
Dionysius
should be
compared
with
Damascius,
Dub. et Sol.
178
(II 55,
18)
en'
.
22
In
my opinion,
the
varia
lectio
,
which occurs in some
manuscripts,
is better than
, accepted
in the
Migne
edition.
3
The term
which occurs in De cael. Hier.
II,
iii,
140
D
is also con
nected with
God's
incomprehensibility:
..
4
Cf. Class.
Quarterly,
22
(1928).
133i
and
especially
the
Appendix
I,
'The
unknown God in
Neoplatonism',
in his
Proclus,
The
Elements
of Theology
(Oxford
1933), 310-13.
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7/25/2019 LILLA, Salvatore R. C., The Notion of Infinitude in Ps.-dionysius Areopagita
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102 NOTES
AND
STUDIES
in
spite
of the
strong emphasis
laid on
the
doctrine of
the
unknowability
of
the first
'one',
Neoplatonism
does not seem to
regard
this
unknow
ability
as
a
result
of
.
As we
have
seen
(pp. 95-7
above),
for
Plotinus, Proclus,
and
Damascius
is the
product
of the first
,one',
but
not identical
with
it;
and when
they
call this 'one'
infinite,
they
think either of its
property
of
containing
all
beings
in itself
potentially,
or
of
its
generative
power
which
knows no
end.1
The
con
ception
of
God's
unknowability
as
a
direct result of
has come
to
Dionysius
not
from
Neoplatonism
but from a Patristic
source,
namely
Gregoiy of Nyssa, and goes ultimately back to the Aristotelian doctrine
of
71/)>.
.
Muhlenberg
has
devoted
a
detailed
inquiry
to the notion of
both
in
Gregory
of
Nyssa
and in
previous
Greek
thought,2
and has
also hinted
at the
way
in which
Dionysius interprets
this doctrine of the
Cappadocian
father.3
We shall here limit
ourselves to
drawing
attention
to some
passages
of
Gregory
and of
Aristotle which
may
be of
some
importance
for our
point.
That
Gregory
of
Nyssa regards
as a
negative
attribute
of God
and
as the
main cause of his
unknowability
appears
clearly
from the
following evidence:
Contraontra Eunom. II
(I 246,
16-22
Jaeger)
i.e.
)
. .
. .
,
'
,,
'
.*
Contraontra
Eunom.
Ill
(II 58,
268
Jaeger)
55
,
.
Quoduod
non sint tres dii
(52, 1520 Miiller)
,
.
,
.6
1
As to the
interpretation
given by
E.
Muhlenberg
of the
passage
of
Enn.
VI, IX,
6
quoted
above
(p. 100)
see the
footnote
p.
100 n.
3
above.
2
Cf.
p. 94
n. 2 above.
Op.
cit.
142-3:
'. .
. dad er
[Gregor
of
Nyssa]
nicht einfach
sagt,
das
MaB
Gottes
sei seine
Unbegreiflichkeit.
So haben die
mystischen
Theologen, ange
fangen
bei
Dionysius Areopagita, Gregor
von
Nyssa
verstanden.'
4
This
passage
is discussed at some
length
by
Muhlenberg, op.
cit.,
p. 142.
5
The same verb SioJ s used by Dionysius in passage 2 quoted above
(P- 94)
6
Another
passage
of
Gregory
of
Nyssa
about divine
infinitude,
De An. et
Res.
(P.G.
46. 97
a
3-8),
is also worth
noticing, although
there is no
mention in
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NOTES AND STUDIES 103
The last sentence
of this
passage,
which
traces the
unknowability
of
divine
nature
back to
the
impossibility
of
giving
any
definition
of
pov,pov,
s based
on the Aristotelian
doctrine
according
to
which
is
completely
unknown:
Phys.Phys.Phys.
187b 7
el
fj
.
Phys.Phys.
ll
207"
25-6
fj
.
Rhet.Rhet.ll I048b 27-8
(c)
It is now
necessary
to
point
out that there is
no real contradiction
between
Dionysius'
view
which
places
the
first
principle
above
and considers the latter
as a
product
of the former and his
tendency
to
identify
with God himself.
If we take into account
a funda
mental law
of
Dionysius' systemnamely
the
law
of
and
,
the two distinct
stages
of
God's
existenceand
are aware of
the
philo
sophical background
of both
views about
,
we
are able to
under
stand
what
Ps.-Dionysius really
meant and to
appreciate
the intimate
coherence of his
thought.
For
Dionysius
there can be no confusion between
the
which
is
produced by
God and is inferior to him and
the
which
is
identical
with
him:
whereas the former is the
expression
of divine
emanation or
,
and is
only
one of the
two
constitutive
prin
ciples
of
beings
which Plato
places
under the first
cause and which
both Plotinus
and
Proclus
regard
as an
emanation
of the first ,one'
(cf.
pp. 95-6
above),
the latter
must be referred to
God's
,
viz. to that
stage
of God's existence in which he has not
yet
come out of
himself,
and
becomes then one of his main
negative
attributes. As we
have seen
(pp. 97
and 101
above),
it was the
Neoplatonic interpretation
of
the
first
two
hypotheses
of Plato's Parmenides that led
Dionysius
to
identify
with
God;
and the three different
ways
in which he
interpreted
it were
suggested
to him
by
Neoplatonism
and
by Gregory
of
Nyssa.
Salvatore R. C. Lilla
it of God's
unknowability:
'
.
.
.
)
-
,
.
1
On
the notion of
in
Aristotle
see also
Muhlenberg, op.
cit.,
pp. 43
if.
who, however,
does not draw
enough
attention to the
unknowability
of the
Aristotelian
.
In the
passage
of Clement of
Alexandria,
Strom. V
81,
6
quoted above (footnote 4, p. 97 above) there also seems to be a closer connection
between
the
infinitude of the 'one' and its
unknowability:
. .
.
.