Major Communications Cables - Points of Convergence -
ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile
New York New York New York New York Chicago Chicago Chicago Chicago Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Los Angeles Salt Lake City Salt Lake City Salt Lake City Denver Denver Denver Phoenix Phoenix Phoenix Kansas City Kansas City Kansas City Atlanta Atlanta Atlanta Miami Miami MiamiWashington DC Washington DC Washington DC Seattle Seattle SeattleSan Francisco San Francisco San Francisco Dallas Dallas Dallas
Major Cable Convergence Points (Cont.)
ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile
San Jose San Jose San Diego San Diego St Louis St Louis Orlando Orlando Boston Boston Newark Newark Houston Houston
Philadelphia Philadelphia Nashville Cleveland Portland San Diego Las Vegas Detroit Charlotte NC Richmond Sunnyvale Burbank Tucson Tampa Eckington
Major Cable Convergence Points (Cont.)
Amsterdam Amsterdam Amsterdam Frankfurt Frankfurt Frankfurt Paris Paris Paris London London London London Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Singapore Singapore Singapore Stockholm Stockholm Sydney Sydney Toronto Redditch Sophia Antipolis Bangolor Shanghai Buenos Aires Copenhagen Rio De Janeiro Marseille Santiago Hamburg Lima Hanover Mexico City Nuremberg Bogota Zurich Mumbai Vienna
ATT Verizon British Telecom T-Mobile
FISA Amendments Act Section 702 Operations
FAIRVIEW Sites
3
Global Public Service Telephone Network Switching System
The Phone System Knows What It’s Doing – Why Don’t U.S. Officials?
FOREIGN TO FOREIGN 00
FOREIGN TO UNITED STATES 00
UNITED STATES TO FOREIGN 01 or 011
UNITED STATES TO UNITED STATES 1
PHONE CALL (LANDLINE OR CELL) REQUIRED PREFIX
STELLAR WIND
Both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are generally assigned in a hierarchical manner. Users are assigned IP addresses by Internet service providers (ISPs). ISPs obtain allocations of IP addresses from a local Internet Registry (LIR) or national Internet Registry (NIR), or from their appropriate Regional Internet Registry (RIR):
Registry Area Covered AfriNIC Africa Region
APNIC Asia/Pacific Region
ARIN North America Region
LACNIC Latin America and some
RIPE NCC Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia
Target Development and Discovery
Zone of “Suspects”
2º of separation from“Knowns”
Known
Unknown
Suspect
Focus of Analysis: One Degree and Two Degrees of Separation
Known Bad Guy
Suspected Bad Guys
Encryption – The key to Protecting the Privacy of U.S. Citizens
Using encrypted identifiers of US individuals
Relationships can still be mapped
Communities can still be determined
Connections with known US or foreign targets can be traced
IC and/or LE analysts can look at any relationships without identifying protected persons
IC analysts cannot purposefully or accidentally access and analyze protected citizen data without probable cause
Identifying data can be decrypted for targeting, once criteria constituting probable cause are met
Civil liberties are protected while preserving the ability to detect terrorists and/or other activities
(#@&^:” ?<|{Hollywood, FLMohamed AttaHollywood, FL
Majed MoqedDaytona Beach, FL
Marwan AlshehhiHollywood, FL
Hani HanjourHollywood, FL
WANTED
U.S. WANTED
UNKNOWN
U.S. PROTECTED
Nawaf AlhazmiSan Diego, CA
Khalid AlmihdharSan Diego, CA
Mustafa AlhawsawiDubai, UAE
Ramzi BinalshibhHamburg, Germany
E
Mullah OmarKandahar,
Afghanistan
+^#* ?<“|{@$Hollywood, FL
<#(!}| ?%#*&”:>Hollywood, FL
){;?] %)/’|Daytona Beach, FL
Ramzi BinalshibhHamburg, Germany
Mustafa AlhawsawiDubai, UAE
Discovering and Protecting
- Guarding Privacy While Finding the Threat -
Community Transaction Timeline
Illegal Use of Private InformationU.S. Drug Enforcement Agency/Special Ops Division
http://rt.com/usa/dea-agents-nsa-evidence-067/
Illegal Use of Private Information- Masking the (Illegal) Source -
http://rt.com/usa/dea-agents-nsa-evidence-067/
