Mapping Debris Fields of Lost US Ships from the 1944 Battle of Leyte GulfMidshipman 1/C Buinauskas, USN, Class of 2020; Advisor: Professor Peter L. Guth
IntroductionIn the aftermath of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Allied Forces lost one
light carrier, two escort carriers, two destroyers, and one destroyer-escort.
Some of these ships’ wrecks were more intact, which made the ship
whose wreck it was easily identifiable. An example of this is the
Casablanca-class Escort Carrier USS St. Lo, which was identifiable by a
clear “63” painted on the hull. The other wrecks, however, consisted
merely of scrap metal and ship parts, none of which alone were enough
to lead to identification. In these circumstances, the location, size, and
parts of the wreck were all considered in identifying the ship it belonged
to. This was the case for a pile of scrap metal off the coast of Samar,
which was recently identified as the Fletcher-class Destroyer USS
Johnston (Werner, 2019). Another destroyer, the USS Hoel, was sunk in
the same general location as the USS Johnston, which made identifying
the wreck difficult. However, the location of the wreck being in the
southern part of the area where the battle took place was what led the
wreck to be claimed as that of the USS Johnston (Werner, 2019). Using
videos I obtained of the wrecks, I was able to locate the final resting
places of the two ships and determine the orientations in which they hit
bottom, in order to present how the wreck looks today – after spending
the last 75 years on the sea floor, more than 4000 meters beneath the
ocean’s surface.
BackgroundThe Battle of Leyte Gulf took place from 23-26 October, 1944. Preceding
the battle, the Japanese Imperial Navy’s First Mobile Fleet launched
Operation Shō in order to counter the impending Allied landings in the
Philippines (NHHC, 2019a). This operation consisted of sending the
majority of Japan’s remaining ships in a desperate attempt to inflict
damage upon the US forces. The ploy successfully drew Admiral William
F. Halsey’s Third Fleet away from the Leyte Gulf area, which exposed
the northern flank of Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kincaid’s Seventh Fleet
(NHHC, 2019a). This left the most northwesterly task unit, Rear Admiral
Clifton A. F. Sprague’s TG 77.4.3, call sign “Taffy 3,” to battle four
Japanese battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and 11
destroyers – a battle later deemed the Battle off Samar, the largest naval
battle of World War II (NHHC, 2019b). Taffy 3 was comprised of six
escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts, of which
were no match for the Japanese. Of these, the destroyers USS Johnston
and USS Hoel, and carriers USS Gambier Bay and USS St. Lo were sunk.
MethodologyWe used the MICRODEM GIS program (Guth, 2009) for most of the
analysis, supplemented with Google Earth (Google, 2015). Professor
Guth obtained videos of the two shipwrecks taken by the Research Vessel
Petrel from the Naval History and Heritage Command. I went through
the videos, and screenshotted significant images of the ships and their
debris. I then created a database with each video the image was
screenshotted from, the time in the video of the screenshot, the latitude,
longitude, altitude, and heading of each screenshot, and a description of
what I thought the image might be. The database allowed me to create a
map of the debris fields with points at the locations of each image. Then,
I created icons for each image, and exported both debris field maps to
Google Earth. After that, I found plans for the 1944 Casablanca-class
carrier and Fletcher-class destroyer, and overlaid the plans on top of the
debris fields in Google Earth. I sized the plans to-scale, and rotated them
in the orientation of the wrecks based on my identification of key
features. Finally, I created a layer in Google Earth to overlay the icons, to
create a complete image of both debris fields (Figures 3&4).
ConclusionThe Battle off Samar was not a victory for the 113 of those who lost
their lives fighting for the USS Johnston, or the 186 of those doing the
same for the USS St. Lo (Werner, 2019). However, being able to
identify our lost ships and honor those lives lost in the pursuit of our
country’s liberty might be enough to take a small step towards
lessening the defeat. Due to our generation’s ability to utilize
technology such as the RV Petrel’s imaging systems, we were able to
dive over 4000 meters deep in the Leyte Gulf to identify two lost
World War II ships, the carrier USS St. Lo and what is likely to be the
destroyer USS. Johnston. We were then able to pinpoint the locations
of the wrecks and their respective debris, and create a database
detailing each debris piece. Using the GIS program, we were able to
map the debris fields and showcase the exact locations of the pieces.
We now know exactly where our lost ships are, the orientation in
which they sank, and have pictures of what the debris looks like to
date, over 75 years after the conclusion of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In
order to protect and respect the wreck sites as war graves, the exact
locations have not yet been released to the public, as to prevent grave
plundering of any magnitude.
Acknowledgements: We used the freeware GIS MICRODEM (Guth, 2009) for the majority of this study.
The Naval History and Heritage Command provided the videos of the shipwreck, which were video-
graphed by the Research Vessel Petrel.
ResultsAfter creating the debris fields, I determined that the USS St. Lo sunk
facing southwestward, since the ship stayed relatively intact and the
bow of the wreck faced southwest at approximately 225° (Figure 1).
The two furthest pieces of debris had a distance of 273.9 meters
between them, with the furthest piece hitting the sea floor at 98.07
meters away from the ship. According to the general plans, the St. Lo
was about 19 meters wide, so the debris field spread a significant
distance from the ship itself (U.S. Naval Repair Base San Diego,
2019a). I then determined that the USS Johnston sunk facing
northwestward at about 300°, since the bow of the ship sank relatively
northwestward of the rest of the debris, while other debris correlating
with further-astern-related parts of the ship sank southeast relative to
the bow (Figure 2). Unlike the St. Lo, the debris field was scattered,
since the destroyer was demolished into many pieces, making the ship
difficult to identify. The two furthest pieces of debris had a distance of
401.2 meters between them; which, from a ship whose original beam
was about 11.5 meters wide, makes for a much larger range than the
debris field of the St. Lo (U.S. Naval Repair Base San Diego, 2019b).
DiscussionGiven that the USS St. Lo was sunk by a kamikaze pilot, it makes sense
that the majority of the ship remained together. Taking a hit from a
Japanese plane would sink a carrier, but would not create enough force
to tear the ship into a multitude of pieces. Because of the manner in
which the St. Lo was sunk, there were larger pieces of debris scattered
around the wreck, but not in the same quantity that a ship sunk by
hundreds of 5 and 14-inch rounds would incur, like what happened to
the USS Johnston (New World Encyclopedia, 2019). Since the USS
Johnston was sunk by enemy fire, the ship was torn into pieces. While
sinking, the pieces would have floated away from the wreck, and
landed on the seafloor further distances away. Since the debris pieces
were smaller, they were more susceptible to ocean currents, which
could have moved the debris even further from their initial landing
sites, creating a larger debris field.
Figure 2. Aerial view of the general plans for the U.S. Fletcher-class destroyer, overlaid
onto its debris field.
Figure 1. Aerial view of the general plans for the U.S. Casablanca-class carrier, overlaid
onto its debris field.
Figure 3. Debris field of the USS St. Lo.
Figure 4. Debris field of the USS Johnston.