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War
Crimes,
Genocide,
&
Crimes
against
Humanity
Volume2(2006): 133
MilitiasandGenocide*AlexAlvarezNorthernArizonaUniversity
Abstract
* Alex Alvarez is an associate professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at
Northern Arizona University. He is the founding director of the Martin-Springer
Institute for Teaching the Holocaust, Tolerance and Humanitarian Values. His
main areas of study have been in the areas of minorities, crime, and criminal
justice, and the areas of collective and interpersonal violence. His first book,Government, Citizens, and Genocide, was published by Indiana Press in 2001
and was a nominee for the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences book of the
year award in 2002 as well as a Raphael Lemkin book award nominee from the
International Association of Genocide Scholars Book in 2003.
Thispapercomprisesadiscussionoftheroleof
paramilitary groups, such as militias, in
perpetrating genocide. The reliance of many
statesuponparamilitarystyleunitsposessome
potentially important questions about the
nature of genocide and other human rights
violations as well as the governments that
createandunleashthem.Afterbrieflydefining
thesegroups,Ispecificallyexplorethereasons
why genocidal states rely so heavily on
paramilitarymilitiagroupswhentheyalready
havemilitaryandpoliceforcesavailable.Using
ArkansTigersandtheRwandanInterahamwe
militia groups as examples, I explore the
natureandfunctioningofthesegroupsaswell
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2 Alvarez
asthespecificadvantagestousingthesekinds
of units.Also included is a discussion about
thetypesofindividualswhojointhesegroups
andwhattheygainfromparticipation.
Examining different examples of genocide, one finds that
governmentsengaged
in
perpetrating
this
crime
frequently
rely on paramilitary organizations to actually carry out
much of the violence. This is true for the Armenian
genocide,theRwandangenocide,theBosniangenocide,and
inamore limitedsense theHolocaust.Paramilitarygroups
have alsobeen involved inmanyother typesofpolitically
motivated violence such as has occurred in East Timor in
1999 (Parry, 2002; Robinson, 2002; Trowbridge, 2002),
Guatemala in the1980s (Sanford,2003),Brazil in the1980s
(Huggins,HaritosFatouros,andZimbardo,2002),aswellas
inotherlocationssuchasElSalvador,Guatemala,Uruguay,and Haiti (Blum, 1995). Most recently, militias known
collectively as the Janjaweed have been implicated in
genocidal violence in the Darfur region of the Sudan
(Human Rights Watch, 2004). These paramilitary
organizations,often referred toasmilitiasor sometimesas
death squads, are frequently implicated in the worst
excesses of the regimeswhich they serve, includingmass
murder, genocide, rape, torture, and various other human
rightsviolations.
Trained
in
violence,
yet
not
bound
by
formal codes of conduct, these groups are a particularly
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MilitiasandGenocide 3
deadly form of social organization. The reliance ofmany
statesuponparamilitary styleunitsposes somepotentially
importantquestionsaboutthenatureofgenocideandother
human rights violations as well as the governments that
create and unleash them.Why do genocidal states rely so
heavily on paramilitary militia groups when they have
militaryandpolice forcesalreadyavailable?Whygo to the
effortof
creating
these
paramilitary
organizations?
What
are
thebenefitsofusing thesekindsoforganizations?It isalso
importanttolookatthetypesofindividualswhojointhese
groupsandwhattheygainfromparticipation.Thesearethe
particularissueswhichthispresentpaperaddresses.
MilitaryandPoliceForcesTheobviousperpetratorsofgenocidearethemilitary
forcesandthelawenforcementagenciesthatalreadyexistin
asociety.Theyare largeandcapableorganizations thataretrainedandequippedforviolence.Membersofthemilitary,
andtoalesserextentpoliceofficers,allgothroughaperiod
of indoctrination and training inwhich they are taught to
obeyorders,todeferpersonalattitudesandvaluestothatof
thegroup,todeveloployaltytotheorganization,tofosteran
espritde corpswith comrades, and tobe aggressive.They
arealsoconditionedtofallbackontheirtraininginstressful
and violent situations which can result in an almost
mechanicalapplication
of
force
and
violence
(Dyer,
1985;
Grossman, 1995;Keegan andHolmes, 1985).Additionally,
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4 Alvarez
these organizations also have the necessary plans,
equipment, tools, and resources already inplace formany
types of violent activities. These organizations, therefore,
provide a readymade tool for genocide. In point of fact,
however, we should recognize that military and law
enforcement organizations are often the primary
instrumentsofgenocideandduringtheArmeniangenocide,
theHolocaust,
as
well
as
the
Cambodian,
Bosnian,
and
Rwandan genocides, itwas the police andmilitary forces
that, tovaryingdegrees,perpetratedmuch, ifnotmost,of
thekilling.Even for thesewellknown examples,however,
paramilitary forces aided and abetted the killing and in
some cases were the prime agents of the genocides.
Regardlessofwhetherparamilitariesonlyaugmentthework
of the regularmilitary andpolice forces or if they are the
major instruments of killing, paramilitary groups are a
pervasive facet of genocide and of much of the political
violence of the 20th century aswell. Before proceeding, itshould be useful to briefly discuss the nature and
organizationofthesegroups.
ParamilitaryGroupsWhat are paramilitary groups?Often referred to as
militias,theseorganizationsarecreatedinordertoengagein
actsofcollectiveviolence.Theycanvary insizefromjusta
fewmembers
to
several
thousand
and
are
primarily
organized along quasimilitary lines. Typically provided
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6 Alvarez
the connectionbetweenparamilitaries and thegovernment
tends to be much more obscured. Fourth and last,
paramilitarygroups often act forpersonalgain andprofit,
whilemembersof themilitaryandpolicedonotgenerally
profit personally from their activities. In fact, historically,
military and police forces have often been punished and
even executed for plundering and looting, while militia
groupshave
often
emphasized
these
activities.
One
journalistdescribedtheSerbparamilitarythisway,many
Bosnian Serb militiamen who volunteered to fight their
Muslimneighborssawtheirwarserviceasawaytoenrich
themselves (Gjelten, 1995, p. 137). Paramilitaries were
notoriousforrobbingrefugeesandlootinganythingofvalue
during theviolence inBosnia andCroatia (Malcolm, 1994;
Vulliamy 1994). This is not to suggest that soldiers and
armieshaveneverpillagedand looted,but rather that it is
nottypicallyconsideredthenorm.
In many ways, militias can be seen as a type ofmercenary organization. Historically, mercenary groups
havebeenperceivedasmilitaryforcesthatoperatesolelyfor
pay rather than out of loyalty or affiliation to a specific
cause. Paramilitary groups seem to operate in a nebulous
areabetween the two extremes of puremilitary and pure
mercenary.Membersofmilitiagroups oftenbelieve in the
cause inwhich they serve,be it thatofagreaterSerbiaor
Hutu dominated Rwanda, but also feel no compunction
aboutexploiting
the
situation
for
personal
gain.
James
Davis
writes about private armies and classifies them into the
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MilitiasandGenocide 7
following five categories. First are Regular Foreign Units
which are long term organizations such as the French
Foreign Legion. These are typically composed of foreign
volunteerswho serve as a specialized part of a countrys
military. Second are Auxiliary Foreign Units which are
similar in structure to the first category but are more
temporary in nature. The Flying Tigers are an obvious
example.Third
are
Private
Military
Companies
which
fit
the
mold of a classic mercenary organization. These groups,
oftencomposedprimarilyofformermilitarymen,sell their
militaryskillstogovernmentsandorganizations.Fourthare
Foreign Volunteerswho are individualswho serve in the
military of other nations. Fifth, and last, are Freebooters.
Thesegroupsservenotonlygovernments,butdrugcartels,
terroristgroups,andanyoneelsewillingtofinancethem.It
is into this latter category thatmilitia groupsmost closely
belong(Davis,2000).
A closer look at a few specific examples ofmilitiagroups may offer a better understanding of these
organizations. Two of the most notorious paramilitary
groupsof recentyears,ArkansTigerswhichwasactive in
Croatia and Bosnia and the Interahamwe of Rwanda,
illustrate many of the mechanics and methods of the
paramilitaries.
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8 Alvarez
ArkansTigersFormallyknownas theSerbianVolunteerGuard,this
groupwasbetterknownasArkansTigers(Arkanovci)and
itsleaderwasamannamedZelkoRanatovi whowentby
the nom de guerre Arkan. Born in 1950, Arkan was
involvedincrimefromanearlyageandwasoftenintrouble
forsnatching
purses
and
similar
kinds
of
delinquent
behavior (Judah, 1997; Sudetic, 1998). At some point his
father, a military officer, asked the Yugoslav Federal
Secretariat for InternalAffairs (SSUP), the secretpolice, to
helpget theyoungZelkooutof troublewith the law.The
SSUPdid come toArkans aidbecause they evidently felt
that his criminal career had compromised him andmade
him vulnerable to their advances. The SSUPwere able to
successfullyrunArkanasahiredassassinanditisbelieved
thatthisorganizationalsohelpedhimescapefromanumber
of European prisons (Judah, 1997). Never shy about hiscrimes,Arkansometimesboastedabouthisassassinationsof
nationalist Albanian and Croat leaders, including a past
executiveofCroatiasoil company (Sudetic,1998).Healso
engagedinbankrobberiesandinfacthadbeenconvictedof
armed robbery inBelgium,Holland,andGermany.Atone
pointhewasactuallyontrialinSweden,butmembersofhis
gang pulledweapons in court and allowed him to escape
(Sudetic,1998).Hewasalsowanted inItalyfor themurder
ofarestaurant
worker
but
the
SSUP
ignored
all
international
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warrants for his arrests and continued to protect him
becauseofhisservicestothem.In 1986 Arkan became a pastryshop owner in
Belgrade while he continued to work for the SSUP. His
involvement in theparamilitary scenebegan inOctoberof
1990 when he became head of the official fan club of
BelgradesRedStarfootballteam.Hehadbeenaregularat
thegames
of
the
team
and
his
shop
was
located
directly
across thestreet from theRedStarsoccerstadium.The fan
clubwasknownasDelijeandhis involvementas leaderof
the fan clubwas encouragedby theMiloevi government
which wanted to harness the energy, nationalism, and
violence of the young men who made up the club. This
interestonthepartofthegovernmentwasalsomotivated,in
part,byadesiretocounteracttheinfluenceofVojislavSeselj,
a prominent dissident who was later to become a rabid
nationalist and leader of a rival Serbian militia group.
Accordingly,Arkantookoverasheadoftheclubandatthesame time began to surreptitiously set up the Serbian
volunteer guard. The primary members of what were to
become theTigerswere,notsurprisingly,derived from the
most aggressive of themembers of Delije (Sell, 2002). As
Arkandescribesthisgroup:
Wefans...trainedwithoutweapons.Iinsisted
upondisciplinefromthebeginning.Youknow
ourfans,
they
are
noisy,
they
like
to
drink,
to
jokeabout.Istoppedallthatinonego,Imade
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10 Alvarez
themcuttheirhair,shaveregularly,notdrink
andsoitbeganthewayitshouldbe(quotedin
Judah,1997,p.187).
Instilling thebeginnings of amilitary style discipline and
appearancewas the first step in transforming these soccer
fansintoamilitarystyleorganization.
Evenat
this
early
stage
Miloevi
was
planning
for
thefutureandrecognizing theneedtoviolentlycontestthe
comingbreakupofYugoslavia.Theparamilitarieswere an
importantpartofthatstrategy.Arkanwasactuallyarrested
by Croatian police in November 1990 after being caught
withacarloadedwithfirearmsandammunition.Hewasin
theKrajinaregionofCroatiahelpingtocoordinateandarm
Serbs who were interested in fighting against Croatias
independence.Afterbeingconvicted inaCroatiancourthe
wasreleasedpendingalegalappealwhereuponhefledback
toBelgradeandtauntedthatYouwillnevercatchmealive(Judah,1997).
On June 2, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared
independenceandprecipitated theviolence thatmanyhad
foreseen. One day after the declarations the Yugoslavian
NationalArmy(JNA)movedinandbeganhostilities.While
Slovenia escaped relatively unscathed, the fighting lasting
onlyacoupleofdays,theconflictinCroatiawasmuchmore
prolongedandbrutalandinvolvednotonlyelementsofthe
JNA,but
Serb
militias
as
well,
including
Arkans
Tigers
(Silber and Sell, 1996). During the fighting in Croatia the
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MilitiasandGenocide 11
paramilitaries were implicated inwidespread looting and
pillaging. InhomesabandonedbyCroats, for example, the
commandersof theSerbparamilitarieswouldscribble their
names over the door to signify that they had taken over
possession (Silber andSell, 1996).Similarly,whenviolence
broke out in Bosnia after that countrys declaration of
independence, theTigersplayedamajor role in the ethnic
cleansing.Almost
immediately
after
the
Bosnian
declaration
ofindependence,BosnianSerbsdeclaredtheRepublikaSrbska
and began cleansing the territory they controlled of
Muslims.Arkans Tigers entered the town of Bijeljina, for
example,onApril 2, 1992 inwhatwas tobecome the first
case of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.Dressed in camouflage
uniforms with ski masks and armed with automatic
weapons, this paramilitary group rampaged through the
town in a preview of subsequent cleansing actions
throughoutBosnia(BurgandShoup,1999;SilberandLittle,
1995). Bijeljinawas a north easternborder town and hadalreadyseenitsshareofviolence.Therehadbeenanumber
oflethalbarroombrawlsandtheleaderoftheMuslimparty
had alreadybeen assassinated. This, however, was but a
prelude to theviolence thatdescendedupon the town that
AprilmorningwhentheTigersarrived.Rushingfromhome
to home, theybooted in the doors ofmany of Bijeljinas
Muslimpopulation.Theytargetedtheeducated, influential,
wealthy,andprominentMuslimsanddraggedthemoutinto
thestreet
where
they
were
summarily
beaten
and
shot.
Over
twodozenmenandwomenweremurderedinthisfashion.
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12 Alvarez
After installing a Bosnian Serb government, the Tigers
movedsouthtoZvornikwheretheyrepeatedthissignature
violence that would come to be known by the name of
ethniccleansing.ThroughoutthefightingduringBosnias
ordeal,ArkansTigerscontinuedtoplayanimportantrolein
Bosnia.
It shouldbenoted that theTigerswerenot theonly
paramilitarygroup
engaged
in
this
violence.
In
1994
a
UnitedNations report listed 83paramilitarygroups in the
former Yugoslavia. Fiftysix were Serb, 13 Croat, and 14
BosnianMuslim(Judah,1997).Eventhoughhewasindicted
by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia,Arkanwasneverputontrialfortheatrocitieshe
helped commit. Often giving interviews to journalists,
especially during the later violence inKosovo,Arkanwas
himself killed when he was shot in the Belgrade Inter
Continental Hotel in January 2000 (Scharf and Schabas,
2002). While the killers remain unknown, some havesuggested that he, along with other paramilitary leaders,
mayhavebeenkilledbymembersof theMiloevi regime
intentuponremovingpotentiallyembarrassingwitnesses.
InterahamweMuchofthekillingduringtheRwandangenocideof
1994was perpetratedby paramilitary groups such as the
interahamwe
(those
who
stand
together
or
those
who
fight
together) and the impuzamugambi (those with a single
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MilitiasandGenocide 13
purpose)(Taylor,1998;Melvern,2000).Thereasonfor their
creationrelatestothepoliticalchangessweepingRwandain
the early 1990s. In 1990 Rwanda was invaded by 2500
members of theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)whowere
Rwandanexiles.Althoughsmallinnumber,theRPFfighters
werewelltrained,welldisciplinedandprovedaformidable
fighting force.Although theysufferedsomemajorsetbacks
initially,they
began
having
some
success
under
the
leadership of Paul Kagame,whowould laterbecome the
postgenocide leader of Rwanda (Melvern, 2004). In 1991,
President Juvenal Habyarimana, whose National
Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) held
complete power, conceded to mounting pressure on his
regime and allowed the creation of opposition political
parties,manyofwhichalsocreatedyouthwingsinorderto
defend their partys interests and coerce support. This
development was not to the liking of Hutu extremists
including the inner circle of thePresidentsgovernment, ashadowy group known as theAkazu (LittleHouse)whose
members included his wife and various political and
military leaders who used their influence and power for
personalgainandcorruption(Scherrer,2002).Theextremists
opposed any power sharing agreements and
accommodationwiththeTutsi.
As theRPFbegan gaining some success after initial
setbacks, the Akazu increasingly mounted propaganda
attacksagainst
the
Tutsi
led
RPF
and
the
countrys
Tutsi
population (Edgerton, 2002). Violence, assassinations, and
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14 Alvarez
localizedmassacresalsobegancroppingup throughout the
country.The trainingof themilitiagroupsalso intensified,
the most important of which was formed in 1992 by
President Habyarimana who began providing military
training to young members of his party. This was the
beginningoftheInterahamwe(DesForges,1999).Manyofthe
Interahamwememberswere recruited from soccer fan clubs
andin
this
way
their
genesis
mirrors
that
of
Arkans
Tigers.
Thousands of young Rwandanmen hadbeen leftjobless,
alienated,andangryby theeconomicproblems inRwanda
in the late1980sandearly1990sand they congregated to
thegovernmentandAkazusponsoredfanclubs(Gourevitch,
1998).Membership in themilitiawas appealing formany
youngmenasPhilipGourevitchdescribes,
Hutu power youth leaders,jetting around on
motorbikes and sporting pop hairstyles, dark
glasses,andflamboyantlycoloredpajamasuitsandrobes,preachedethnicsolidarityandcivil
defense to increasingly packed rallies,where
alcohol usually flowed freely, giant banners
splashed with hagiographic portraits of
Habyarimana flapped in the breeze, and
paramilitary drills were conducted like the
latesthotdancemoves.ThePresidentandhis
wife often turned out tobe cheered at these
spectacles,while
in
private
the
members
of
the
Interahamwe were organized into small
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MilitiasandGenocide 15
neighborhoodbands, drew up lists of Tutsis,
and went on retreats to practice burning
houses, tossing grenades, and hacking
dummiesupwithmachetes(Gourevitch,1998,
pp.9394).
Eventscontinued toescalateas themilitarysituation
worsenedfor
the
Rwandan
government.
In
January
of
1994,
theheadoftheU.N.missionwarnedthatassassinationlists
werebeingdrawnupofprominentTutsis and thatmilitia
weapons caches had been discovered (Klinghoffer, 1998;
Melvern,2004).Even in the faceof thismountingevidence
ofplannedgenocideandevenwith the increasingvitriolof
the radio propaganda very littlewas done. Conceding to
increasing international pressure and military setbacks,
president Habyarimana was finally forced to go to the
negotiating table in Arusha, Tanzania after which peace
accordswere drawn up and power sharing arrangementsinstituted. On April 6, 1994 as Habyarimana and other
dignitaries,includingthepresidentofneighboringBurundi,
were approaching the Kigali airport, two surfacetoair
missiles hit the plane, causing it to crash and killing
everybodyonboard.Whilenofirmevidenceexistsastothe
identity of the perpetrators, most believe that it was the
Akazu thatwasbehind the assassination, unhappy as they
werewiththeconcessionsHabyarimanahadagreedto.
Themilitias
quickly
moved
into
action
in
Kigali,
rounding up and killing all thosewho hadbeen on their
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16 Alvarez
death lists. Soon the massacres spread throughout the
country as armed groups of paramilitary militias, police
officers,and localpoliticianshuntedout theTutsiand then
killedthem.Roadblockswerealsosetupbythemilitiaswho
wouldcheckgovernmentissuedidentitycardsandthenkill
anyonewhowas listed as aTutsi, aswell as anyone they
deemedsuspicious,orwho,intheireyes,lookedlikeaTutsi
(Gourevitch1998,
Des
Forges,
1999).
At
other
times
they
woulddescenduponcommunitiesorplacesofrefugewhere
Tutsi had gathered and orchestrate massacres, often
encouraging and/or forcing local Hutus to assist in the
killing.They also oftenworked in concertwithpolice and
military groups in perpetrating the mass murder of the
Tutsi. The killings of these paramilitary groups were
particularlygruesomeastheyfrequentlyreliedonmachetes
andclubs,theshaftsofwhichweresometimesstuddedwith
nails (Taylor, 1999). Alcohol and mass rape often
accompaniedthekillingasthebloodsplatteredgenocidairesoftheInterahamweandothermilitiaswentabouttheirbrutal
business.Thekillingsonly ended inJulyof1994when the
governmentfellandtheRPFtookpower.
RelianceonParamilitariesThe twogroupsdiscussedabove, theTigersand the
Interahamwe,aresimplytwoofthemostnotoriousexamples
ofthis
kind
of
genocidal
organization.
They
are
representative ofmany other groups as well and as was
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pointedout earlier, these typesofgroups areaubiquitous
feature of genocidal violence.Governments that use these
groupsdosoforsomeverypowerfulreasons.
Deniability
The first obviousbenefit to relying on paramilitary
groupsis
deniability.
The
military
and
police
forces
of
a
nationarealwaysovertlyanofficialandrecognizablebranch
of the state. There is no concealing the fact that they are
representativesofthegovernmentandtheir involvement in
genocide makes clear the role of the government in the
murderof the targetedpopulationwhich thoseregimesare
often atpains to conceal especially given the international
legal developments of recent years. Increasingly,
governmentofficialsrecognizethattheymay,atsomefuture
time, endup in frontofa tribunalbecauseof theiractions
while in power.Onewriter summarizes the situation thisway:
Today states find themselves under scrutiny
from foreign governments, both allied and
enemy; semigovernmental agencies such as
the World Bank; and a multitude of
nongovernmental organizationsFailure to
meetinternationalnormsofbehaviorcanhave
allsorts
of
serious
repercussions
today,
includinglossofforeignloansandinvestment,
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18 Alvarez
diminutionorlossofforeignaid,lossoftourist
revenue, tradeboycotts, etc.Stateswishing to
use extreme forms of extralegalviolence thus
have every reason to appear uninvolved.
(Campbell,2002,p.13)
Genocidesdontjusthappen.Rathertheyareplanned
attemptsto
remove
apopulation
and
as
such
display
intent,
forethought, and purpose. Genocidally inclined
governments,therefore,areusuallyatpainstodisguisetheir
involvement and paramilitary groups provide them with
what is sometimes termed plausible deniability.
Paramilitary groups are usually affiliated with political
power structures and tend to be funded, trained, and
equipped by that political party even though their
relationshipisoftenintentionallyobscuredanddenied.
Eventhoughtheevidence isclearthatMiloevi had
adirecthandinequippingandtrainingtheTigers,hedidnthesitatetodenyknowingArkanwhenconfrontedaboutthe
actionsof themilitia (DoderandBranson,1999),especially
after1992when internationalpressuremade itprudent for
Miloevi to distance himself from theparamilitaries (Sell,
2002). SlododanMiloevis style as a politician hasbeen
describedinthisway:
Milosevic liked to compartmentalize his
activities,never
giving
any
one
subordinate
too much control or understanding of the
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MilitiasandGenocide 19
bigger picture.He took extra care to keep a
formaldistance, tomake it seem as if others,
outsidehis control,were responsible.Hewas
thetypeofpoliticianwholeavesnotraces. ...
His style was conspiratorial. Everything was
movedbyword ofmouth without a paper
trail.(DoderandBranson,1999,pp.102103)
While the linkages are obvious in hindsight,many
accepted thedisconnect.RichardHolbrooke,forexample,a
topAmerican diplomatwho helpedbroker an end to the
fighting in Bosnia, described Arkan as a freelance
murderer and the Tigers as a private army, the
implicationbeingthatArkanandhismilitiawereactingon
theirown(Holbrooke,1999,p.189).
The paramilitaries allowed Miloevi to conduct a
campaignofethniccleansingandostensiblykeephishands
clean.When facing criticism for theviolencehappening inBosnia,Miloevi wasabletoassertthattheseatrocitieswere
the responsibility of paramilitary groups and therefore
beyondhis control.On occasion,he evenpointed out that
paramilitary groups were banned in Serbia. In fact, later
Miloevi was able toportrayhimself as apeacemaker for
beingable tobring themilitias toheelandatonepointhe
even placed amember of a paramilitary group on trial in
order todeflect internationalcriticismandpressure (Doder
andBranson,
1999).
The
truth
is
far
different.
Miloevi
was
clearly responsible for forming, recruiting, housing,
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20 Alvarez
transporting,arming,training,anddirectinggroupssuchas
the Tigers and time has shown that the actions of the
paramilitarieswerecoordinatedwith theJugoslavNational
Armythroughofficialsattheinteriorministryandthestate
securityforces.(DoderandBranson,1999;Sell,2002;Sudetic,
1998).
Not all genocidal states are so concerned about
disavowingthe
linkages
with
paramilitary
organizations.
TheextremistsinRwandamadealmostnoefforttodisguise
their supportof theparamilitarygroupsalthough amemo
from the Belgian military intelligence reveals that
Habyarimana and others denied anymilitarybehavior on
the part of the militia (Des Forges, 1999). President
Habyarimanasdenial aside, theRwandanmilitary openly
trained, armed, and supplied the militias as well as
coordinatedattackswiththeparamilitarygroupsinorderto
maximize their genocidal reach (Melvern, 2004). Clearly,
groups like the Interahamwewere actingonbehalfofHutupower as overt agents of a nationwide campaign of
exterminationagainsttheTutsi.
On the other hand, the situation in Darfur, Sudan,
revealshowgovernmentsoftenrefutetheirrelationshipwith
themilitias. In theDarfur region of the Sudan, one of the
most remote and impoverished regions on earth,
government sponsoredmilitiashave led theway inkilling
andbrutalizingmembersofseveraltribesinappearstohave
allthe
qualities
of
agenocide
(Human
Rights
Watch,
2004).
Beginning in 2003, members of three ethnic groups (Fur,
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MilitiasandGenocide 21
Masalit, andZaghawa) formed two organizationswith the
goalofimprovingtheireconomic,political,andsocialstatus
withintheSudan.TheSudanesegovernment,largelyArabic
Muslims,havelongdiscriminatedagainsttheAfricansofthe
Darfurregionandtheyrespondedtothisnewdevelopment
withbrutalityandviolence.Governmentsponsoredmilitias
inconjunctionwithregularmilitaryforceshaveengaged in
wholesalemassacres,
systematic
rape,
and
widespread
looting(HumanRightsWatch,2004).TheseArabmilitiasare
known collectively as Janjaweed. Government
representativeshave responded to internationaloutrageby
asserting that the Janjaweed are outlaws and that the
Sudanese government is working to suppress these
lawless groups or as one report asserts, The more
internationalcriticismthewarinDarfurincurs,themorethe
governmentdeniesany involvementwithorconnections to
theJanjaweed(HumanRightsWatch,2004,p.43).
ForceMultiplier
Another reason why genocidal states often rely on
militias isthattheyprovideaquickandeasyaugmentation
totheregularmilitaryforces.AtthetimeoftheRPFinvasion
ofRwanda in1990, theRwandanmilitarynumbered9,335,
not a large number by any stretch of the imagination
(Melvern,1994).Whileitistruethatthearmyhadgrownto
27,913by
1991,
itis
also
true
that
most
of
these
new
recruits
werepoorly trainedand illeducatedyoungmen. It takesa
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22 Alvarez
great deal of time and resources to create a competent
military force. Paramilitary groups on the other hand, are
muchquickerandeasier to create,especially sincemostof
their activities pit them against unarmed civilian
populations,rather thanagainstanarmedenemy.Thisalso
frees up regularmilitary forces for other duties.Wemust
rememberthatgenocidestypicallyoccurduringcivilwarsor
othertypes
of
conflict
when
most
of
anations
military
forcesneed tobedeployed against the enemy.During the
fighting in Bosnia, theJugoslavNational Army faced the
problemofyoungmenemigratingtoavoidbeingmobilized
intothemilitary.Manyothersrefusedtobecalledupandas
the conflict continued, thearmybegan suffering fromhigh
desertion rates (Judah, 1997;Wilmer, 2002).The increasing
useofparamilitariesduring theconflicthelpedaddress the
personnel shortcomings suffered by the military. So,
paramilitary groups offer states the ability to quickly
generatemoreforcesneededtoaccomplishthegoalsofthatgovernment.While not necessarily up to the standards of
professional military forces, the training and abilities of
paramilitary groups are usually enough to allow them to
achievethegoalssetforthembygenocidallyinclinedstates.
ViolencewithoutLimits
The use of paramilitary militias also allows
genocidallyinclined
states
the
best
and
the
worst
of
military
organizations. Military organizations have as their main
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MilitiasandGenocide 23
purpose the application of organized violence against a
varietyofopponentsorasChrisHedgesputsit,Organized
killing is best done by a disciplined, professional army
(Hedges, 2002, p. 9). Their hierarchical structure, their
training,theirethoshavedevelopedovercenturieswiththe
soleaimofmaking themeffective inusing force toachieve
victory over enemies. For a genocidally inclined state, the
militaryin
the
ideal
is
perhaps
the
best
weapon
they
have
to
achieve their destructive goals, but the military is also
sometimeshandicapped in that ability.First, asmentioned
above, they are directly linkedwith the statewhichmay
pose a problem for a government intent upon hiding its
complicity. Second, themilitarymaybe needed for other
tasks,suchasengaging incombatagainstanenemy.Third,
themilitary,whiletrainedtokill,isalsooftenimbuedwitha
code of honor and discipline that may hinder their
willingnesstoparticipateingenocide.
A central theme of much of the training in manymilitary systems involves inculcating recruits with the
proper attitudes, values, and ethos of themilitary culture.
Notionsofindividualandgrouphonorareoftenaparticular
emphasis of this type of instruction and a common theme
withinthesevaluesystemsprohibitsthekillingofunarmed
noncombatants such as women and children. Sometimes
these values are even codified into a military code of
conductwithpotentiallegalconsequencesforviolators.But
noncombatantvictims
are
precisely
the
main
targets
of
genocidalviolenceandmilitary leadersmaybe resistant to
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24 Alvarez
participation in genocide. This is not to say that these
perceptionsofhonorcannotbesubverted.OmerBartov,for
example, illustratedhow thediscipline and training of the
Germanarmybecamehighlypoliticizedduringtheyearsof
theThirdReichandthisallowedthearmytobecomeactive
and willing perpetrators. The ideology of race war and
genocidepreempted traditionalGermanmilitarynotionsof
honorand
chivalry
(Bartov,
1992).
This
is
not
the
only
example as history is replete with examples of military
perpetratedatrocitiesfrommanydifferentnationsincluding
theUnitedStates.Wecannotforgetthatwar is inherentlya
brutalizing process.Nonetheless, as tenuous as it often is,
mostmilitaries are at least nominallyboundby a code of
conduct thatmayactasa curbonexcessesagainst civilian
forceswhilemilitias suffer no such hindrance. It isworth
taking a closer look at the training process and how it
facilitatesviolence.
Paramilitary groups offer governments thebenefitsthat military training brings to an organization without
some of the ideological baggage against attacking the
defenseless.Not only are they taught touseweapons and
explosives,but they are taught the habits and patterns of
obedience,atleastinrudimentaryform,whichisthebasisof
military organization. This is done so thatmembers obey
orders reflexively,without thinking about themeaning of
the behavior. The training that paramilitaries receive,
typicallyfrom
military
instructors,
reinforces
and
strengthens the inherent tendency for conformity to the
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MilitiasandGenocide 25
behaviors and ideals of the group. The training also
submergesthevaluesoftheindividualintothevaluesofthe
group,inthiscontext,ahighlyviolentandaggressivegroup.
There is freedom in this: the freedom todo things thatare
otherwiseprohibited.
Everymilitaryorganizationhasan initiationprocess
known asboot camp orbasic training. The experience is
intentionallyintended
to
be
hard,
brutal,
and
degrading
becauseitisintendedtoturnciviliansintosoldierswhoare
able to engage inviolenceon command.After recruits are
brokendownbothpsychologicallyandphysically, theyare
builtbackupintosoldiers,aprocessthatinvolvesinstillinga
senseofloyalty,pride,andobedience.Insum,basictraining
is designed to provide new soldiers with themechanical
skillsofviolenceand to socialize them intoavalue system
that supports fierceness, aggression, and solidarity with
their comrades. For the same reasons, informal military
organizations such as militias employ the same kinds oftraining patterns.While not as lengthy or involved as the
militaryversion,militiasalso receiveasimilarkindofboot
camp.SeveralSerbmilitias,forexample,trainedatamilitary
campnearMountTara,ontheSerbborderwithBosniaand
many,suchasArkansTigers,weretrainedbyregulararmy
officers.InRwanda,theInterahamwemilitiaengagedinmass
rallies with alcohol, speeches, marching, and drill
maneuverstotrainand instilltheappropriateattitudesand
behaviors.This
militia
also
utilized
three
week
indoctrinationsessionsata trainingcamp inMutarawhere
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26 Alvarez
recruitsweretaughthowtousemachetesonhumanshaped
dummies,throwgrenadesandburnhomes.Italsoshouldbe
notedthatthetypeofindividualsrecruitedintomilitiasare
particularlysusceptibletothiskindoftraining.
Militiagroupsare typically recruited from segments
ofa society thatare extremelyvulnerable to indoctrination
into ideologies and practices of violence. Members of
ArkansTigers
were
recruited
from
members
of
asoccer
fan
club in Belgrade. These youngmenmadewilling recruits
into paramilitary violence. Similarly, members of the
RwandanInterahamweweredrawnfromtheranksofsoccer
playersand fan clubs.What is itabout theseorganizations
that made them such a productive source of militia
murderers?First, the individualswhoaredrawn into these
groupsareyoungmen.The literatureonviolentcrime tells
usthatmostviolenceisperpetratedbyyoungmalesintheir
lateteensandearlytwenties.Becauseofhormones,lifestyle,
inclination, and culture, young males are at their mostaggressiveandviolent(Barak,2003;RiedelandWelsh,2002).
This penchant for engaging in violent behavior drops
throughoutthelifecourse.Aspeopleage,theirparticipation
inviolentbehaviortendstolessendramatically.Themilitias
areusually composed ofmenwho are at an age atwhich
theyareparticularlyvulnerable to theattractionsofviolent
behavior.
Second,many of these youngmen also tend tobe
joblessand
poor,
uneducated,
and
unmarried.
In
short
they
fit theclassic imageofdisaffectedandalienatedyouth.The
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MilitiasandGenocide 27
militias give these young men a mission and a sense of
purpose that is easily harnessed to a politicalmovement.
Onereasonwhymanyyoungmenareattractedtosportsfan
clubs is that these organizations providemeaning, status,
and a sense of belonging and identity from membership
(Armstrong,1998;Buford,1990;Perryman,2001).Theseare
essentially the samekindsofattractions thatparamilitaries
provide.Eric
Hoffer
points
out
that,
When
people
are
ripe
foramassmovement,theyareusuallyripeforanyeffective
movement,andnotsolelyforonewithaparticulardoctrine
or program (Hoffer, 1951, p. 16). Mass movements are
interchangeable and the energies that youngmen channel
into sports clubs can easilybe transferred tomore violent
outlets,onesthatarepossiblypoliticaland/orgenocidal.Its
no accident thatboth the Interahamwe and theTigerswere
originally recruited from among these ranks. The use of
these kinds of young men in Rwanda and Bosnia is no
different from theways inwhich theNazimovementusedangry and aggressive youngmen in the SturmAbteilung
(SA)todomuchoftheirdirtyworkintheearlyyearsofthe
Nazimovement.Thepower theyderive frombelonging to
theseorganizationscanbe intoxicating,especiallyforangry
youngmenwhoformerlyfeltpowerless.
Third, these young men are a self selected group
attracted to the violence that often accompanies many
groups of sports fans. The phenomenon of sports
hooliganismin
Europe
has
been
especially
well
documented
(see forexampleArmstrong,1998;Buford,1990;Perryman,
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28 Alvarez
2001).Membershipinsoccerfanclubsoftenrevolvesaround
issuesofidentityandterritorythataresometimesdescribed
as a form of tribalism (Campbell andDawson, 2001). In
many ways, these groups are all about particular
conceptions ofmasculinity, competitiveness, and asserting
power or as Campbell and Dawson assert, Hooliganism
and violence are not effects of disordered psyches; on the
contrarythey
are
alogic
of
the
quest
for
personal
mastery
(Campbell andDawson, 2001,p. 72).Theyoungmenwho
are drawn to this kind of organization are those whose
affiliation tomainstream society ismarginalatbest.Chuck
Sudetic, in describing the soccer clubs fromwhomArkan
recruited the Tigers, asserted that they, had become a
magnet for hoodlums and disgruntled, unemployed, and,
veryoften,unemployableyoungmen.Fromtheworstofthis
rawmaterial,Ranatovi formedamilitiacalledtheTigers
(Sudetic,1998,p.98).
ConclusionsMilitias and other forms of paramilitary groups
remain a common feature formany typesofhuman rights
abuses, including genocide. They offer many advantages
and fewrisks tostatesengaged invarious formsofviolent
conflict.Wemust also remember thatwe live in an era in
which international security and military forces are
increasinglybecoming
privatized
(see
for
example
Davis,
2000; Singer, 2003) and conflict andwar are less and less
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MilitiasandGenocide 29
about armies fighting traditionalwars internationally, but
more and more about internal conflicts fought
nontraditionally. It isprecisely in thiskindofenvironment
that paramilitary groups thrive and prosper. Unless the
international community is able to act effectively and
decisively topreventstates fromutilizing thesegroups,we
willcontinuetoseegovernmentsrelyingonthem.
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