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On Narratology: Criteria, Corpus, Context
Author(s): Gerald PrinceSource: Narrative, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), pp. 73-84Published by: Ohio State University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20107044.
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DIALOGUE
On
Narratology:
Criteria,
Corpus,
Context
GERALD
PRINCE
Over
a
dozen
years ago,
in
a
fine
book
called
The Narrative
Act
devoted
to
the
study
of
narration and
point
of
view,
Susan
Sniader
Lanser
noted
that
narra
tology
(by
which
she
meant
"formalist-structuralist
poetics
of
narrative"),
in
its
exploration
of
narrative,
paid
no
attention
to
sex
or
gender
(she
tended
to
use
the
terms
interchangeably):
"[N]owhere
in
modern
narrative
theory
is there
mention
of
the
author's
or
narrator's
gender
[this
vacillation
too
may
be
telling]
as
a
sig
nificant
variable
. . .
[yet]
surely
the
sex
of
a
narrator
is
at
least
as
significant
a
factor
in
literary
communication
as
the
narrator's
grammatical person,
the
pres
ence or
absence of
direct
address
to
a
reader,
or
narrative
temporality"
(46-47).
A
few
years later,
in
a
1986 article entitled "Toward
a
Feminist
Narratology,"
Lanser examined
some
of
the
reasons
why
the
feminist and
the formalist investi
gation
of
narrative had
ignored
each other.
For,
just
as
narratologists
paid
little
attention
to
questions explored by
feminist
theory
and
criticism,
the
latter
hardly
showed enthusiasm
for
narratology:
feminist
thinkers
may
have
produced
a
lot
of
suggestive
work
on
narrative
(or
linear
narrative,
or
"bad"
linear
narrative)
and?say?its
"inherent"
Oedipal configuration,
but without
much
recourse
to
narratological
claims, methods,
and
arguments.
I
will condense
Lanser's
account
while recasting it and underlining its implications: (a) "everyday" terminology
versus
technical
language,
the
attempt
of
(some)
feminists
to
speak
and
write
in
ways
understandable
to
everyone
and thus
implicitly
to
criticize
the
elitism,
au
thoritarianism,
and
protectionism
of "science"
including
the
attempt
of narratol
ogist
to
develop
a
special
(scientific)
vocabulary;
(b)
distrust of
binary
logic
and
of universals
(as
tools of
the
patriarchy,
it
hierarchies, exclusions,
and
repres
sions)
versus
confidence
in
and
reliance
of
them
(as
necessary
to
argumentation
and
basic
to
the
enterprise
of
specifying
the rules that
govern
all
and
only
narra
tives);
(c)
mimetic
orientation
versus
semiotic
approach,
the view that narrative
says
something
about and
influences
the
world
versus an
interest
in
narrative
as
a
meaning-producing
instrument,
with no consideration of how related or ade
Gerald Prince
is Lois and
Jerry Magnin
Term
Professor
of
Romance
Languages
and
Co
Director of
the
Center
for Cultural Studies
at
the
University
of
Pennsylvania.
He
is
the
author of
Narrative
as
Theme
(1992)
and
is
now
working
on a
guide
to
the
twentieth-century
novel
in French
(to
appear
in
2001).
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74
Gerald
Prince
quate to the world this meaning is; and (d) sensitivity to context and emphasis
on
the role
of
sex
or
gender
in the
production
and
processing
of
(narrative)
meaning
versus
bracketing
of
context
(since
narratologists aspire
to
grasp
and
analyze
narrative
qua
narrative).
Lanser's discussion
of these
incompatibilities
was
preliminary
to
a
call for
a
feminist
narratology
whereby,
she
hoped,
"feminist
criticism,
and
particularly
the
study
of
narratives
by
women,
might
benefit
from
the methods and
insights
of
narratology
and
.
. .
narratology,
in
turn,
might
be
altered
by
the
understand
ings
of
feminist criticism and the
experience
of
women's texts"
(342).
To
start the
movement
toward
such
a
revised
narratology,
to
pose
some
of
the
questions
and
focus on some of the (textual) aspects that a sex- or gender-conscious study of
narrative would
have
to
confront and
discuss,
Lanser
analyzed
a
short
letter,
al
legedly
written
by
an
unhappy
young
bride
to
an
intimate friend.
Lanser's choice
may
have
been
perplexing
(though willfully
so).
As
she herself
noted,
the
letter?
which
hardly
made
up
a
narrative in
the
usual
sense
of
the
term
(it
did
not
re
port
events;
it
did
not
tell
about
changes
in
states
of
affairs)?was
probably
apocryphal
and
no
definite conclusions
could
be
reached
about
its
real
author's
sex;
in
other
words,
no
definite
conclusions could be reached about
the
possible
influence
of that
sex
on
the nature
of the
text.
But Lanser's
analysis
was
interest
ing,
nonetheless,
especially
when
bearing
on
questions
of narrative
situation,
voice,
and
tone
(because
of
the
constraints
on
her
gender,
the
unhappy
letter
writer
had
to
resort
systematically
to
indirection).
Besides,
more
obviously
perti
nent
examples
could,
no
doubt,
have been
provided.
In her
1986
PMLA
article
on
the
engaging
narrator
and
then
in her
Gendered
Interventions
(an
excellent
study
of
narrative
discourse
and
gender
in
the
Victorian
novel),
Robyn
Warhol
showed
that,
contrary
to
what
often obtains
in
male-authored
or
with male
narrated
fiction,
an
engaging
rather than
distancing
attitude
toward the
reader
or
the narratee
tends
to
prevail
in female-authored novels
or
with female
narrators.
Lanser's call
for what
she
depicted
as
an
"expansive narratology"
("Toward
A
Feminist
Narratology" 358)
was
criticized
by
Nilli
Diengott,
who
argued
in
"Narratology
and
Feminism" that
gender
is
not
a
differentia specifica
of
narra
tive
and that "there
is
no
need, indeed,
no
possibility
of
reconciling
feminism
with
narratology"
(49),
given
that the former
constitutes
an
interpretive,
critical
enterprise
while the latter is
a
theoretical
activity.
In
her
response
("Shifting
the
Paradigm:
Feminism and
Narratology"),
Lanser
renewed
her
call
for
dialogue
among "feminists,
narratologists,
and
feminist
narratologists"
(59)
and
maintained
that
gender-inspired
questions
about the
nature,
scope,
methodology,
and
goals
of
narrative
poetics
could
lead
to
its
positive
transformation.
In
what
follows,
I
do
not
consider?any
more
than
Lanser did?what
narra
tology might bring to feminist- and gender-oriented narrative theory or criticism,
though
I
will mention
that,
according
to
her,
the
"comprehensiveness
and
care
with which
narratology
makes distinctions
can
prove
valuable
methods
for
tex
tual
analysis"
("Toward
A
Feminist
Narratology" 346).
Nor
do
I
intend
to
ex
plore
the
reasons
for
feminist
"resistance"
to
narratology?advanced
by
Lanser
and
others,
like
Josephine
Donovan
who,
in
"Toward
a
Women's
Poetics,"
in
veighs against
the
formalist "dissection
of
literature
as
if
it
were an
aesthetic
ma
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Narratology
and Context 75
chine
made
up
of
...
so
many
nuts
and bolts
easily disintegrated
from
the
whole"
(108;
quoted
in
"Toward
a
Feminist
Narratology" 342)?though
I
will
say
that
at
least
some
of
those
reasons
strike
me
as
nostalgic (the
longing
for
a
transparent
language,
the
stance
against
"deathly science"),
not
particularly
com
pelling
(the
preference
for
strategies
of "'both
.
.
.
and' but
nevertheless
'nei
ther
. .
.
nor'"),
and
even
misguided.
Thus,
arguments
for
the
existence
of
universals need
not
be
regressive (in
fact,
they
sometimes
have
been
and
can
be
progressive)
and beliefs
in
certain universals
need
not
entail
beliefs
in others
(I
believe that
all
human
beings
die;
I
do
not
believe
that
all
human
beings
enjoy
Mozart);
similarly,
though they
often
constitute
a
symptom
of
or
basis for
preju
dice, distortion, and repression, binary distinctions?on which I think we all de
pend?do
not
necessarily
lead
to
the
creation
of
hegemonies
and
exclusions;
besides,
it
may
be relevant
to
point
out
that
narratology
does
not
always
proceed
in terms
of
simple
binary
differentiations?think
of
its
account
of
narrative
speed
(and
the/?ve
canonical
tempos
which
it
isolates),
or
of
narrative
frequency (and
its three
basic
modes),
or
of the
tripartite
investigation
of
links
between
narra
tive,
narrating,
and narrated?and
it
may
be
relevant
to
point
out
also
that
nar
ratology
does
not
always
exclude the middle
(think
of
free
indirect
discourse).
What
I
want to
discuss,
rather
(not
for
the
first
time and
mindful
of the
argu
ments
advanced
by
Lanser,
Diengott,
and
others),
is
why
some
of the
challenges
posed
to
narratology by
a
category
like
"gender"
should
be
addressed
by
narra
tologists
and how
they
might
be assessed.1
It is
important
to
note
at
the
outset,
I
think,
that the
very
domain
of
narra
tology
is
(and
has
been)
in
flux
and
that the
discipline
keeps
on
changing
as
its
boundaries
are
(re)drawn. Though
narratology
may
already
be
old,
it
is
still
quite
immature.
As
Michael
Mathieu-Colas
has
argued,
given
that
narratology
is
a
theory
of
narrative,
its
scope
depends,
first
of
all,
on
the
definition
of
narrative.
When
the
latter
is viewed
primarily
as
a
verbal mode of
event
representation (the
linguistic
telling
of
events
by
a
narrator
as
opposed
to,
say,
the
enacting
of
them
on
stage),
the
narratologist pays
little
or no
attention
to
the
story
as
such,
the
narrated,
the
what
that
is
represented,
and
concentrates
instead
on
the
discourse,
the
narrating,
the
way
in
which
the "what"
is
represented.
This
view
is
certainly
favored
by
some
important
dictionaries
(e.g.,
the
Grand
Larousse de la
langue
fran?aise)
and it
may
well
have
custom
on
its
side:
the
latin
term
narrare
desig
nated
a
linguistic
act
and?in
the
Western
tradition?the
opposition
between
diegesis
and
mimesis,
recounting
and
representing,
epic
and
drama,
narrative
and
theater
goes
back
to
Plato
and is still
very
common.
Furthermore,
this view
may
well
capture
the
specificity
of
a
purely
verbal
rendition of
events
by
a
narra
tor
and,
in
particular,
account
for
the
many
ways
in
which
the
same
set
of
re
lated events can be told?compare "Mary ate before she slept." and "Mary slept
after
she
ate."
or
consider
"John
mounted his
horse before
riding
off
into
the
sunset."
as
against
"John
rode
off
into the
sunset
after
mounting
his
horse."
But
this
view
neglects
the fact
that
nonverbal
or
mixed
modes
of
event
depiction
(e.g.,
movies
or
comic
strips)
are
frequently
taken
to
tell
stories,
to recount
them,
or
are
frequently
referred
to
as
narratives; besides,
it
tends
to
forget
that
the
story
too
makes
narrative whatever
it
is
(after
all,
without
story,
without
events,
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Gerald
Prince
without
changes
in
states of
affairs,
no
narrative).
When,
on
the
contrary,
narra
tive is defined not so much in terms of mode
(a
narrator
narrating)
or substance
(linguistic
as
opposed
to
nonlinguistic)
but
rather
by
its
object (events),
the
nar
ratologist
focuses
on
the
structure
of
represented
events
and
their
possible
com
binations.
But he
or
she
might
then
neglect
to
account
for
the
various
forms
a
given
story
can
take.
There
is?as
usual?a
third direction.
If
both
story
and
dis
course,
narrated
and
narrating
make
up
narrative,
narratologists
who
define
the
latter
as
the
representation (verbal
or
nonverbal,
with
or
without
a
narrator)
of
one or more
events
can
try
to
integrate
and
give
equal
importance
to
the
study
of the
"what" and
the
"way."
Of
course,
even
if
all
narratologists
agreed
on a
definition of
narrative,
they
would
still
have
to
determine
what
in narrative
is
specific
or
relevant
to
narra
tive.
There
is
a
lot
more
than
narrative
in
narrative
(comic
power,
psychological
insight, tragic
force)
and
narratology aspires
to
be
a
theory
of
narrative
qua
nar
rative: it
attempts
to
characterize
all
and
only
possible
narrative
tests
to the
ex
tent
that
they
are
narrative
(that
they
exhibit features
distinctive
of
or
particularly
associated with
narrative).
Now,
if
narrative is
the
representation
of
events
or
changes
in states
of
affairs,
some
temporal
relations, say,
are
narrative-specific
whereas comic
power
or
psychological
insight
are
not
(since
there
are
many?
perhaps
too
many?narratives
that
exhibit
neither
and
many
non-narratives
that
exhibit both). But if comic power or psychological insight does not constitute a
differentia
specifica
of
narrative,
the
same
can
be
said
of
character,
of
descrip
tion,
or even
of
focalization.
Yet these three
categories?especially
the
last
one?
have
attracted
a
great
deal
of attention from
narratologists.
In
other
words,
the
argument
against
making
room
for
an
ingredient
such
as
gender
in
narratological
models
on
the
grounds
that
this
ingredient
is
not
specific
to?distinctive
of?
narrative
hardly
seems
compelling.
If
the
distinctiveness
criterion is
not
determinative,
what about
the
integral
ity
criterion?
Narratologists
pay
(infinitely)
more
attention
to
a
narrator's
diegetic
situation
or
degree
of
covertness
than,
for
instance,
to
a
narrator's
sex or
gender
presumably because every narrator can be described as extra- or intra-, homo- or
heterodiegietic
and
every
narrator
can
be
described
as more
or
less
overt
or co
vert
but
not
every
narrator
can
be characterized
in
sexual
or
gender
terms
(what
is the narrator's
sex
in
"Mary
ate
before
she
slept"
or
in "John
rode
off into the
sunset
after
mounting
his
horse"?
more
generally,
if
narrative features
and
narra
tological
accounts constitute
and
designate
a
narrating
agency,
must
this
agency
be
gendered?)
However,
narratologists
pay
considerable
attention
to
narrative
space,
say,
though
it is
quite
possible
to
narrate
without
referring
to
the
space
of
the
story,
the
space
of
the
narrating
instance,
or
the
relations between them?
consider
"Jane
spoke
to
Irma
before she
spoke
to
Sally."
They
pay
even more
at
tention
to
characters
though
it is
not
difficult
to
find
(minimal)
narratives without
characters,
whether
or
not
the latter
are
taken
to
be
anthropomorphic
con
structs?consider
"First
it
rained and then
it
snowed."
In other
words,
the
argu
ment
against
making
room
for
a
feature like
"gender"
because it
is
not
integral
to
narrative
also
proves
unpersuasive.
Besides,
it
could be
argued
that
narrators
and
narratees
must,
like
actors
or
characters,
be
gendered
or
not
gendered
and
that
this
aspect
of their
nature
can
remain
unspecified.
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Narratology
and
Context
11
Other criteria prove just
as
problematic. Simplicity,
for
example, is
not
only
a
function
of
the
measures
selected
(number
of
elements used
in the
model,
number
of
rules
for
combining
these
elements,
diversity
of
the elements
or
the
rules)
but
also
a
function
of the results
yielded
(what
if
these
are
inconclusive
or
uninteresting?);
and
elegance?another
frequently
invoked criterion?should
be
left
to
the
tailor.
In
the
end,
perhaps
the
most
consistently
applied
and
applicable
criterion is
that
of
productivity.
The inclusion
(after
some
reluctance)
of such
categories
as
character
or
description
in
narratological
models
was
motivated
and
vindicated
by
their
traditional
and
continued
importance
in
"adequate"
accounts
of
narra
tive possibilities as well as by their capacity to be linked with or to raise narra
tively pertinent problems
(about
plot
structure,
say,
about narrative
domains
and
energetics,
about narrative
speed
and
frequency).
Now,
sex
or
gender
(and
race,
class,
religion,
age,
ethnicity,
sexual
preference,
or?and
here
I
am
resorting
on
purpose
to
seemingly
trivializing
features?height
or
weight)
may
prove
to
be
just
as
productive
(even
if
they
do
not
have
"tradition" behind
them).
In
any
case,
it
would
be
easy
(or,
at
least,
not
difficult)
to
start
incorporating
them
ex
plicitly
in
a
narratological
model,
for
instance
by
subsuming
them
under
the
ru
bric
"distance"
(the
space obtaining
between
narrators,
characters,
events
narrated,
and
narratees,
a
space
that
can
be
temporal,
intellectual, emotional,
etc.)
or
even?more
radically?by
subsuming
that
rubric
under
them
(given
the element
gender,
for
example,
such
and
such
a
set of
distances
may
obtain).
Just
as
arguments
inspired
by
the
wish
to
include
elements
like
gender
in
narratological
accounts
can
challenge
the
criterial
basis
of
certain
narratological
decisions,
they
can
put
into
question
the actual
nature
of
the
narratological
cor
pus.
Narratology
tries
to
formulate
rules
pertinent
to
all
and
only
possible
narra
tives.
Ideally,
its methods
and
reasonings
do
not
depend
on a
particular
set
of
narratives
(great
ones,
literary
ones,
fictional
ones,
or
even
extant
ones)
and
nar
ratologists
have
been known
to
invent narratives
in
order
to
bolster
their demon
strations
and
prove
their
points. Still,
there is
a
narratological canon,
a
set
of
texts
repeatedly
used
as
illustrations
(La
Modification
for
second-person
narra
tive,
"Hills
like
White
Elephants"
for
external
focalization,
"A
Rose
for
Emily"
for
the
homodiegetic
narrator-observer,
Ulysses
for
stream
of
consciousness).
And
this
canon
is
undeniably
androcentric:
Robyn
Warhol
points
out,
for
instance,
that
in
my
"Introduction
to
the
Study
of the
Narratee,"
there
are
as
many
as
eighty
examples
"and
only
two
of
them
[I
could have
sworn
it
was
three ]
are
from
female-authored
works"
(Gendered
Interventions
7).
Now,
narratology
is indeed
a
theoretical
activity
but?since
it constitutes
an
instance
of
"theory
transitive"
rather than "intratransitive"?it
is far
from
indif
ferent to critical enterprises (just as feminist critical practice is not detached from
theories
in
general
and feminist theories
in
particular).
On
the
one
hand,
narra
tology provides
tools and
ideas
for
investigations
of
specific
texts
and
leads
to
so
called
narratological
criticism,
of
which
I
think
there
are
two
main
variants.
First,
narratological
description
can
not
only
help
to
characterize
the
specificity
of
any
given
narrative,
to
compare
any
two
(sets
of)
narratives,
and
to
institute
narrative
classes
according
to
narratively pertinent
features,
but
it
can
also
help
to
illuminate
certain reactions
to texts
and
it
can
hein
to
found
or
suDDort
certain
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78
Gerald
Prince
interpretive conclusions. Indeed,
as
G?rard Genette's outstanding Narrative Dis
course
and
a
long
tradition
of
(para-narratological)
Anglo-American
and Ger
manic
criticism centered
on
narrative
technique
demonstrate, any
narratologically
descriptive
statement
can
become
a
springboard
for
a
reading,
any
technical
fea
ture
can
lead
to
the
construction
of
meaning,
any
how
can
give
rise
to
a
why.
Second,
by
insisting
that there
is,
in
any
narrative
text,
an
autonomous
layer
constituting
that
which
in the
text
is
"properly"
narrative,
a
configuration
insti
tuting
events
as
such,
fixing
their
beginning
and their
end,
and
presiding
over
the
itinerary linking
them,
narratology
facilitates
the
choice of narrative
as
defining
pattern
or
as
thematic frame.
It
provides
many
entrance
points
and reference
points to the study of texts in terms of that pattern or that frame; and its influ
ence
explains
in
part
the
great
popularity
enjoyed
by
the
theme of
narrative
in
the
past
twenty
years
(the
large
number
of critical
essays
arguing
that
such
and
such
a
novel
or
short
story
is,
among
other
things
or
above
all,
a
reflection
on
narrative)
just
as
it
explains
in
part
the so-called narrativist
turn
(the
reliance
on
the
notion "narrative"
to
discuss
a
multitude of
activities, fields,
and
texts,
from
political speeches
legal
briefs,
and
philosophical
arguments
to
scientific
proofs,
psychoanalytic
sessions,
and L.L.
Bean
catalogues).
On the
other
hand,
these
investigations
of
specific
texts
and
domains,
these
enterprises
in
narratological
criticism,
in
turn,
test
the
validity
and
rigor
of
narra
tological
categories,
distinctions,
and
reasonings, they identify (more
or
less
sig
nificant)
elements
that
narratologists (may)
have
overlooked, underestimated,
or
misunderstood;
and
they
(can)
lead
to
basic
reformulations of
models of
narra
tive.
Genette
himself
admitted
that,
in his
synthetic exploration
of
narrative dis
course,
he
paid
little
attention
to
certain
possibilities
because Proust
had
not
(very
much)
exploited
them in
A
la
recherche
du
temps
perdu
(Narrative
Dis
course
Revisited
12,
51).
Thus,
it
can
be
argued
that
a
modification of
the
narra
tological
corpus
in
favor of female-authored
narratives,
for
example,
may
significantly
affect
the
very
models
produced
by
narratology;
and,
should it
turn
out
that such
a
change
does
not
lead
to
an
alteration of
the
models,
the
latter
would be
all the
more
credible,
all the less
open
to
negative
criticism.
If
narrative
poetics ought
to
be
more
alert
to
the
implications
of
the
corpus
it
privileges,
it
also
ought
to
be
more
sensitive
to
the
role
of
context?and,
more
specifically,
say,
to
the
possible
role
of
sex
or
gender?in
the
production (or
pro
cessing)
of narrative.
This
is
probably
the
crux
of
Lanser's
argument,
the
critical
point
made
by
any
"expansive"
study
of
narrative.
The
allegiance
of
classical
narratology
(the
narratology
of
the
sixties
and
seventies)
to
strategies
inspired
by
structural
linguistics
or
generative-transformational
grammar (both
of
which
are
notoriously
indifferent
to
context),
the
concern
for
capturing
the
differentiae
spe
cificae of narrative, and the "scientific" ambitions of the discipline (its desire, in
particular,
to
isolate
narrative
universals,
which transcend
context)
resulted in
the
narratologists'
reluctance
to
make
pragmatics
part
of their
domain
of
inquiry
and
in their
neglect
of
the
contextual
dimensions of narrative
generation.
But,
by
the
end
of the
seventies,
perhaps
because
of
repeated
(sociolinguistic)
reminders
about
the
importance
of communicative
contexts
in
semiotic
production (or
be
cause
of
awareness
that
narrative
can
be viewed
not
only
as an
object
or
product
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Narratology
and
Context 79
but also
as
an
act
or
process) and certainly because of the very logic and devel
opment
of narrative
poetics,
a
number
of
narratologists (apart
from
Lanser)
be
gan
to
interrogate
certain
aspects
of
context
more
explicitly,
if
only
to
shed
more
light
on
narrative
qua
narrative.
In
Story
and
Discourse,
Seymour
Chatman
de
voted
several
pages
to
the
number
of
parties
one
had
to
posit
in
order
to
account
for the transmission
of
narrative
messages;
much
more
recently,
in
Narrative
as
Communication,
Didier Coste
developed
a
view of
narratology
as
"concerned
with
the
production,
transmission,
and
exchange
of information
on
change
and
simulacra of
change"
(5);
and,
on
several
occasions
(e.g.,
"Narrative
Pragmatics,
Message,
and
Point"),
I
have stressed that
narratological
models
ultimately
should
include?along with a syntactic, a semantic, and a discursive component?a
pragmatic
one.
At least
three context-related
areas
of
investigation
seem
to
me
worthy
of
some
discussion
here.
The
first
pertains
to
different
media
of
manifestation
and
their
expressive
possibilities
(as
recently explored
by
Chatman,
for
example,
in
his
Coming
to
Terms
and,
more
specifically,
in
his
discussion
of the
means
by
which verbal
texts
and
filmic
ones
actualize various
narrative
features
or
favor
certain
ways
of
presenting
them).
Neither
film
strictly
conceived
("moving pic
tures" without
linguistic
or
other
semiotic
accompaniments)
nor
written
language
finds
it
particularly
hard
to
use
diverse
narrative
speeds,
frequencies,
or
points
of
view.
But
they
differ
significantly
in their
ability
to
utilize
other
features
that
nar
ratologists
have
studied
at
length.
Thus,
it
may
be
difficult
for
film
to
provide
certain
signs
of
extradiegetic
narratees
(what
is
the
filmic
equivalent
of
a
sentence
like
"He
bought
one
of
those
shirts
that
you,
dear
reader,
would
never
even look
at"?),
or
to
take
full
advantage
of
the
category
"person"
(how
are
differences
be
tween
first-, second-,
and
third-person
narration
conveyed
filmically?),
or
to
ex
ploit
something
akin
to
free indirect
discourse.
In
other
words,
perhaps
certain
features
can
be actualized
(more
or
less
easily)
by
all
the semiotic
media
whereas
other
can
be
actualized
only by
some
or,
even,
by
one.
Indeed,
there
might
be
strong
correlations
between the
mediatic
exploitability
of features and
their
"properly
narrative"
relevance
(as
experimental
studies
by
Hans-Werner
Ludwig
and Werner
Faulstich
suggest,
the
use
of first-
as
opposed
to
third-person
narra
tion
in verbal
narratives
hardly
affects
the
receiver's
response)
and
narratologists
should
investigate
the
possibility.
The
second
area
pertains
to
tellability,
to
the
qualities
that
make
events
worthy
of
being
told. On the
one
hand,
tellability
must be
tied
to
context.
"Great
topics"
and
"sure-fire
themes"
have,
of
course,
long
been
thought
or
claimed
to
awaken
narrative desire
and
have
long
drawn
the
attention
of
best-seller
seekers.
A
sexist
French
formula
for successful narratives valorizes
the
elements
of
mys
tery, religion, sex, and aristocracy: "My God, said the Duchess, I am pregnant.
Who done
it?"
(Ryan 154);2
and
an
old
Readers'
Digest
recipe
is
supposed
to
stress?along
with
sex
and
religion?personal
experience,
foreign
travel,
money,
and
the
animal
kingdom:
"How I
Made
Love
to a
Rich
Bear in
the
Alps
and
Found God."
But
money,
sex,
or even
religion
do
not
always
play
equally
well
in
Peoria
and
Landernau;
and
the
pointedness
or
pointlessness
of
any
narrative
varies with
the
circumstances
of its
reception.
On
the other
hand,
some
narratolo
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80
Gerald
Prince
gists,
in
exploring
what
in
a
semiotic
object foregrounds
its narrative
nature,
have
attempted
to
show that
tellability (or
narrativity
as
distinct from
mere nar
rativehood)
results
in
part
from
certain
aspects
of the
object
qua
object.
In
my
own
work,
for
instance,
I
have
argued
that the
narrativity
of
a
text
depends
on
the
extent
to
which that
text
constitutes
a
doubly-oriented
autonomous
whole
which
involves
some
kind
of
conflict
(consider
"The
cat sat
on
the mat"
versus
"The
cat
sat
on
the
dog's
mat.")
This
autonomous
whole, furthermore,
is
made
up
of
discrete,
particular,
positive,
and
temporally
distinct
actions
having logi
cally
unpredictable
antecedents
or
consequences,
and
which
avoids inordinate
amounts
of
commentary
about
them,
their
representation,
or
the
latter's
context
(Prince, Narratology: The Form and Functioning of Narrative). Similarly, in her
splendid
Possible
Worlds,
Artificial
Intelligence,
and Narrative
Theory,
Marie
Laure
Ryan
not
only
shows that
an
adequate
model
of
plot
must
represent
the
relational
changes
obtaining
among
the constituents of
the
actual narrative world
(what
is
true
in
the
story)
and
the
constituents of
the
characters'
private
worlds
(the
virtual embedded narratives fashioned
in
terms
of
their
knowledge,
wishes,
obligations,
simulations, intentions,
or
fantasies);
she
also
argues
that
"not
all
plots
are
created
equal"
(148)
and that
narrativity
is rooted
in the
configuration
of
these
changes
and
specifically,
in
"the
richness
and
variety
of
the
domain
of
the
virtual"
(156).
In
fact,
Ryan
even
distinguishes
between
a
"theory
of tellabil
ity,"
accounting
for
potential
narrative
interest,
and
a
"theory
of
performance,"
accounting
for
actual
narrative
appeal
(148-49).
But,
given
the
difficulty
of
the
question
of
such
interest
or
appeal,
much
more
testing
and
investigation
are
no
doubt
needed
to
determine
the
input
of
text
or
context
in
the
production
of
tell
able
narratives.
The
third
area?and
perhaps
the
most
relevant?is
that of narrative
seman
tics. As
Ryan's
work
emphasizes,
narrative
intelligibility
is
based
upon
the
links,
in the
narrative
universe,
between
a
world
designated
as
real and
a
set
of virtual
worlds
(more
or
less
adequate representations, perceptions,
and notions of
the
"real"
world).
To
explain
what
governs
narrative
meaning,
the
narratologist
must
therefore establish
a
map
of
the worlds
making
up
the
narrative
universe and de
scribe
the
conventions
or
devices
allowing
for
the
specification
of
their alethic
value,
their
truth
coefficient.
Now,
the
propositions composing
a
narrative
and
its
worlds
can
be
distinguished
on
the
basis
of their
origin
(as
signified
by
the
text).
There
are,
on
the
one
hand,
those
which
the
narrator
expresses:
they
pre
sent
or
report
certain
states
of affairs and
certain
series
of
events
in
a
certain
world
(the
diegesis);
they
comment
on
them;
or
they
comment
on
the
presenta
tion itself
and
its
context.
On
the
other
hand,
there
are
the
propositions
which
a
character
in the
diegesis
formulates
and
which
also
can
refer
to
that
diegesis:
clarify it, comment on it, or remark on its presentation. In terms of the narrative,
and
barring
any
textual
indication
to
the
contrary,
the world
described
by
the
narrator
constitutes
the
world
as
it
is,
whatever its
correspondence
to
our
own
world
(or
the
way
we
imagine it).
If,
for
example,
the
narrator
declares
that Van
couver
in
the
capital
of
France,
that
Napoleon
won
the
battle
of
Waterloo,
or
that
Ulysses
was
very
naive,
each
one
of
these
declarations
represents
a
fact in
the
narrative
universe,
if
not
in
our
own.
Note
that their truth
does
not
necessar
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Narratology
and
Context 81
ily depend
on
the homo-
or
heterodiegetic
status
of
the
narrator.
What
Philip
Marlowe and Mike
Hammer
say
of
the
environment in which
they
move
about
and
of their
adventures
in
that
environment is
no
less
true
(in
terms
of the
rele
vant
world)
than
the
statements
of the
heterodiegetic
narrator
of
Middlemarch
or
those of
a
CNN
announcer
on
the finals
at
Wimbledon.
Similarly,
incoherent
commentaries
by
the
narrating
voice,
as
well
as
deceptive
or
erroneous
explana
tions
and
illogical
conclusions
(according
to
the text
itself),
do
not
always
call
into
question
the
veracity
of
the
propositions
which
present
the
diegesis.
They
cast
doubt
on
the
interpretive
powers
of
the
narrator;
they
do
not
necessarily
de
prive
him
or
her
of other
powers.
In Jim
Thompson's
Killer
Inside
Me,
for in
stance, Lou Ford is a psychopath, but the geographical information he gives us
about
Central
City
is
no
less
correct.
On
the
contrary,
a
narrator's
(repeated)
hes
itations
concerning
what
is,
avowals
of
ignorance regarding
ontic
matters,
presen
tations of
existents
or
events
according
to
a
point
of
view
designated
as
(suspi
ciously)
subjective,
all weaken
his
or
her
authority,
his
or
her
ability
at
authenti
cation
(to
use
Lubomir
Dolezel's
term),
and call
into
question
the
truth of
the
propositions
composing
the
diegesis
(and
of
the comments
pertaining
to
them).
As for
the
propositions
formulated
by
the
characters,
their
truth
coefficient de
pends
above
all
on
their
conformity
to
what
this voice
says
explicitly
about
them,
or
on
the
reliability
of the characters themselves.
In
other
words,
however
accu
rate
these
propositions
may
be
in
our
world
("Paris
is the
capital
of
France,"
"Na
poleon
lost
the
battle
of
Waterloo,"
"Ulysses
was
very
cunning"),
they
are
true,
textually
speaking,
only
if
they
do
not
involve
any
contradiction
to
the
state
ments
of
the reliable
narrator,
if
they
are
not
designated by
him
or
her
as sus
pect,
untrue,
or
fictitious,
and if their
source
proves
generally trustworthy.
Obviously,
the
situation
can
often
be
quite complex.
One
frequently
finds
in
a
narrative
several
narrators and
many
characters.
Besides,
it is
not
just
a
matter
of
setting
up
distinctions
between
them in
terms
of
their
authority
or
reliability.
It
is
necessary
to
classify
all the
propositions
(and
their
relations)
according
to
their
degree
of
veracity
and
the
latter
depends
of
the
number and
importance
of
the
textually
true
propositions
or
relationships
which
are
contradicted
or con
firmed.
Let/?
and
q
be
two
propositions?formulated by
a
character?the first
of
which does
not
contradict
any
true
proposition
whereas
the
second
contradicts
a
single
one.
All
other
things
being
equal,
it
can
be
said
that
p
but
not
q
is in
con
formity
with the textual
truth.
The
same
would obtain
even
if/?
did
not
confirm
any
other
propositions
and
q
confirmed
a
dozen.
Suppose
now
that
p
contradicts
only
one
true
proposition,
but
one
entailing
numerous
consequences
in
the
narra
tive
universe,
and
that
q
contradicts
two
or
three
propositions
having
no conse
quences
at
all.
One
could
then
maintain,
perhaps,
that
p
is less close
to
an over
all textual truth than q. But there are thornier cases. Suppose, for example, that
p
and
q
contradict
only
each
other
and that
one
of
them
confirms
more
proposi
tions
that
the
other.
Should
we
consider
(on
the
ground
that
the
narrative would
thereby gain
richness
and
coherence)
the
former
true
and the latter
false?
In
the
same
way,
suppose
we
find
two
or
three
unimportant
contradictions
in
the
narra
tor's
discourse. Should
we
then conclude
that
he
or
she
is
not
trustworthy
or
should
we
simply speak
of
absentmindedness
or
trivial
miscalculations?
What
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82
Gerald
Prince
ever
decisions
are
made, they will
no
doubt affect what the narrative
means
and,
though
narratologists
do
not
have
to
choose
(since
their
goal
is
not
to
determine
the
meaning
of
particular
texts),
they
must be
able nevertheless
to
indicate
in
their
models
that
narrative
meaning
sometimes
depends
on
such
decisions
(just
as
they
must
be able
to
indicate
that certain narrative
passages
can
function
as
iterative
or
singulative
narration,
as
free
indirect
or
narratized
discourse,
as
chro
nologically
or
causally governed).
In other
words,
they
must
be
able
to
make
room
for
(the
voice
of)
a
variable and
extratextual
determiner.3
As
my
quick
discussion
suggests,
narratology
can
and
must
be
cognizant
of
context. But
there remains
a
significant
distance
between the
exploration
of
con
textual features to understand what is "properly narrative" or to construct amodel
in which the
pragmatic
dimension
is
not
forgotten
and the
kind
of
"expansive"
narrative
poetics
that
Lanser,
for
instance,
calls
for.
In
"Toward
a
Feminist
Nar
ratology"
Lanser states that
narratology
ought
to
"study
narrative
in
relation
to
a
referential
context
that is
simultaneously linguistic,
literary,
historical,
biographi
cal,
social,
and
political"
(345). Similarly,
in
her
1992
book entitled
Fictions
of
Authority,
where
she
explores
how
women
writers
strive,
with
the
help
of
narra
tive
structures,
to create
fictions of
authority
while
exposing
them,
Lanser
states
that these
structures
should be
analyzed
in
terms
of
the
power
relations
"that
implicate
writer, reader,
and text"
(5).
Both
statements
are,
I
think,
more
relevant
to
(narratological)
criticism
than
to
narratology.
The latter
attempts
to
character
ize
the
ways
in
which all
and
only
narratives
are
configured
and make
sense
rather
than the
forms
or
meanings
of
specific
narratives in
specific
circumstances.
It
can
indicate
that narrative
configuration
or
signification
is
a
function
of
con
text.
It
cannot
specify
how
a
certain form
or
meaning
results
from
a
certain
context;
it
cannot
list
the
infinity
of
possible
contexts
or
exhaustively
describe
most
of
them;
it
cannot,
in
particular,
state
how
the
sex,
gender, height,
or
weight
of
a
producer
or
consumer,
a
writer
or
reader,
affects
the
production
or
processing
of narrative from
and
content.
Still,
statements
and
enterprises
like Lanser's
help
to
remind
us
that,
with
out
yielding
to
the
interpretive
temptation
(without
conflating
criticism
and
po
etics)
and without
renouncing
the
ideal
of
a
description
of narrative
and
its
pos
sibilities
that would
be
explicit,
systematic,
and
universal,
narratology
should
strive
for
more
self-awareness,
flexibility,
and attention
to
the
concrete.
It
is
on
this
condition
that
it will
perfect
the
fit between
its
models
and
the
texts
they
en
deavor
to
characterize
and that it will
find
a
place
in
a
generalized
semiotics.4
ENDNOTES
1. For
a
different version
of
this
discussion,
see
Gerald
Prince,
"Narratology,
Narrative
Criticism,
and
Gender."
2. This is
Margaret
Boden's
English
rendition
of "Mon
Dieu,
dit
la
Marquise, je
suis enceinte
et
ne
sais
pas
de
qui"
(299;
quoted
in
Ryan,
154).
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Narratology
and
Context
83
3.
A
more
developed argument
is
presented
in
Gerald
Prince, "Narratology, Narrative,
and
Meaning."
4.
This
paper
was
presented
at
the
1994 International
Conference
on
Narrative
Literature
in
Van
couver,
B.C. At the
same
conference,
a
good
panel
discussion moderated
by Kathy
Mezei
and
Melba
Cuddy-Keane
raised the
question
"Why
a
Feminist
Narratology"
anew,
through
short
presentations
by
the
panelists,
Janet
Giltrow,
Susan
Stanford
Friedman,
and
Robyn
Warhol. The
discussion
tended
to
characterize the
pair
"formalist
narratology/feminist
narratology"
as
a
mem
ber of
a
series
including:
sentence/discourse, text/context,
totalizing/specifying,
formalizing/politi
cizing,
similarity/
difference,
construction/deconstruction,
sedentariness/nomadism (one
might
add
grammar/rhetoric,
form/force,
and
so
on).
As
for
the
speakers, they suggested
shifting
back and
forth
between
positions,
trying
to
combine
them,
or
trying
not
to
occupy
any
of them.
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Boden,
Margaret. Artificial
Intelligence
and Natural
Man. New
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1990.
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http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
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