Harry S. Truman was a realistic, pragmatic President who skillfully led the American people against the menace posed by the Soviet Union. Assess the validity of this generalization for President Truman’s foreign policy. (84)
Analyze the influence of TWO of the following on American-Soviet relations in the decade following the Second World War.: Yalta Conference; Communist Revolution in China; Korean War; McCarthysim (96)
I. Commanding Heights Conflict competing econ. systems Redevelopment 1st, development 3rd World
US took seriously econ. development poorer nations: World Bank, International Monetary Fund
USSR refused to join: US control “The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery
and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.”
Harry Truman, March 12, 1947
II. Decolonization Collapse British, French, German,
Japanese empires Nationalism communism
Opp. colonizers (West) “communism” Capitalism as means of oppression Ho Chi Minh, Mao Zedong
Non-alignment: Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt)
III. Lessons from Munich No appeasement: “Red fascism”
Stalin’s “orgy of terror”: purges, gulags, starvation, mass murder communists pathologically murderous
USSR really was “evil empire” BUT post-WWII USSR unclear goals (satellite nations for
buffer; spread communism?), regional not global power: threat was limit to US expansion, not direct attack; Cold War mentality led US to undermine democracy at home + abroad (“Cold War consensus”)
No depressions political extremism, war
IV. Irony of the Boom US econ depended trade (10% GDP,
import resources) Europe: “dollar gap” (insufficient currency to
buy US goods) Communists/nationalists closed trade
(autarky: econ independence)
V. Small World After All Long-range bombers + ICBMS far-flung
defenses needed Sec’y Navy James Forrestal: ships
“Wherever there is a sea.”
VI. PersonalitiesA. FDR’s Two Foreign Policies
FDR’s public vs. private policies Universalist: Wilsonian
“universal” values that US supports and will promote throughout world (Four Freedoms: speech, religion, from fear, from want)
Sphere of influence: divide up world between great powers
Public: Atlantic Charter Private: Four Policemen (US, GB, USSR, China) Spheres only practical solution: Red Army in
Eastern Europe—is US willing to go to war in Poland?
Soviets did not want repeat Napoleon, WWI, WWII Precedent in Italy: GB+US liberate Italy
determine interim gov’t w/o consulting USSR or Italian communists: whoever wins, rules (Germany vs. Japan) Stalin followed same pattern in Romania
Yalta Summit, April 1945: 2 policies conflict over Poland
Red Army in Poland, but Poles don’t want USSR
US commitment to “free” elections in Poland (never happened)
USSR claimed Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria
Some believe FDR would continue policy after war (set up United Nations for this purpose), but died
B. Scaring the Hell out of the American People
“Get-Tough” HT met with FDR twice during vice-
presidency: FDR thought him corrupt and stupid
HT little foreign policy experience blunt, undiplomatic
HT hard core universalist: No empire; didn’t always distinguish Fascist and Communist Stalin global domination; only US had strength + moral resolve But Vietnam and French
Potsdam: Atomic bomb HT harder line USSR out of E. Europe
Stalin didn’t react: 1) working on own bomb, 2) calculated US public would not support use in Poland
Late ‘45/46 HT demanding withdrawal
Mid-1946 negotiation impossible rearmament
Stalin 1st declared Cold War Feb. ’46: capitalism + communism incompatible
March ‘46: Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech Exaggerated as monolithic, aggressive
archenemy
VII. Containment Feb. 1946: George Kennan,
Ambassador to USSR: 8,000 word telegram (Long Telegram): argued Stalin not stop till western democracies destroyed
Anonymous article in Foreign Affairs (“X Article”): argued containment USSRUS superior economy to tie countries to capitalist democracies
Greece and the Truman Doctrine March 1947: HT declares in response to British
request for aid in Greece (GB couldn’t afford to prop up king against several thousand “Communist” guerillas; not actually backed by Soviets)
Tough sell: history of activity in Latin America, but needed to make a break to support through the world
Dean Acheson (Sec’y State): public won’t accept unless “scare the hell” out of them
March 12, 1947: Truman Doctrine
Greece 1st domino in chain that leads to Mid East oil
What was WWII for anyway?
Won’t accept change in status quo (anticommunists freedom fighters, even if brutal dictators)
$250 mil to Greece; $150 mil to Turkey
Shattered isolationism Scared Americans so much began asking
“why not doing more?”
“why a Cold war if they’re so bad?”
HT found that Republicans could play Red Card better than Dems (Nixon, McCarthy)
VIII. Marshall Plan: Catalyst of Cold War Sec’y State Gen. George C. Marshall Don’t repeat WWI: rebuild and reintegrate
our enemies (Germany, Western Europe) Strengthen ties between US and Europe
(economic and political) Keep Europe open to US products (no
repeat GD) $13 billion in 4 years (Europe already
rebuilding: catalyst, gave confidence) Fueled division of Europe: West vs. East;
those with us and those against us
Germany: deindustrialization policy at end of war
1946: James Byrnes’ “Speech of hope” repudiate Morgenthau Plan (fear push to communism)