Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Peter R. Wilshusen Environmental Studies Program Bucknell University Lewisburg, PA 17837 Email: [email protected] Abstract Social capital has been discussed widely as networks based in trust and reciprocity that can facilitate economic development, democratic governance, and sustainable natural resource management. The concept has not been examined thoroughly as an analytical lens for understanding power relations. Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory of practice, I develop a relational and contextual view of social capital in order to explore the everyday political exchanges tied to a long-standing community forestry association in Quintana Roo, Mexico. I present a case study that recounts the emergence and decline of a timber marketing fund to illustrate how elite actors from member communities (ejidos) maintain relative dominance within social networks over time. This process of elite persistence exemplifies the downside of social capital but also suggests why institutional design (rules in use) may be insufficient for encouraging rule enforcement and accountability in community-based conservation and development initiatives. Keywords: social capital, Bourdieu, power, domination, community-based conservation, development, Mexico, political ecology, eco-regional planning Word count: 7,982 Paper presented at the Maxwell Workshop on Organizations and the Natural Environment, Syracuse University, May 24, 2007
Please do not distribute or cite without author’s permission
0
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Introduction
A lot has been written about social capital. Even a brief scan of the literature reveals several
general reviews alongside abundant applied studies focused on diverse policy arenas
including education, social work, and health among others (Halpern, 2005; Field, 2003; Lin,
2002; Baron et al, 2000; Woolcock, 1998; Portes, 1998). Following trends in other areas,
those working in international conservation and development have emphasized the role
social capital might play in enhancing development outcomes at various scales, particularly as
they relate to questions of economic growth and democratic governance (e.g., Adger, 2003;
Krishna, 2002; Pretty and Ward, 2000; Dasgupta and Serageldin, 2000; Woolcock and
Narayan, 2000). At the same time, critiques of social capital are numerous (e.g., Fine, 2001;
Harriss 2002), producing a black and white terrain in which the term is either embraced or
rejected.
Amid this polarized spectrum, I chart a middle course that attends to the critiques levied
against social capital by situating the term within the broader theoretical framework of one
its originators—Pierre Bourdieu. Whereas the majority of work on social capital emphasizes
social structural traits—networks that can enhance collective cooperative capacity—
Bourdieu’s theory of practice stresses social interactions within broader institutional and
cultural “fields.” As such, the focus of attention turns to the production and reproduction
of power relationships over time. In this light, analysis concentrates on dynamic social
processes mediated by specific social structural contexts. Discussions of complex divisions
and conflict within agrarian communities appear in the literature (e.g., Agrawal and Gibson,
2001; Brosius et al, 2005), however, the everyday interactions and negotiations that, in the
aggregate, shape power dynamics over time have yet to receive a thorough interrogation.
How do certain elite actors persist in dominating community affairs over the long term?
How does elite persistence impact conservation and development activities?
This article explores the emergence and decline of a timber marketing fund linked to a long-
standing community forestry association in Quintana Roo, Mexico in order to uncover the
1
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico complex power dynamics connected with community-based conservation and development.
The first part summarizes on-going debates about social capital, arguing that the concept is
most useful as a means for analyzing everyday power relationships. The second part of the
article employs this view of social capital to analyze the everyday politics evident in the case
of the timber marketing fund. The case reveals how elite actors from member communities
(ejidos) helped to undermine the fund by encouraging and partaking in unregulated lending.
In terms of understanding the everyday politics of agrarian communities in rural Mexico, the
case illustrates how community elites persist or maintain positions of relative dominance
over time. In terms of explaining outcomes associated with community-based conservation
and development initiatives, the timber marketing fund example suggests why institutional
design (rules in use) may be insufficient for encouraging rule enforcement and
accountability.
Shades of Gray—Social Capital and Power Dynamics
Within the literature on conservation and development, social capital refers to social
networks based in trust and reciprocity. However, behind this apparently straightforward
definition considerable debate lingers regarding both the term’s meaning and utility. On one
end of the spectrum are those who view social capital mainly as a means of enhancing
collective empowerment. On the other end of the spectrum are those who claim that the
concept hides more than it reveals, given a lack of attention to broader political economic
factors. In the first instance, the developmentalist approach to social capital tends to
uncritically promote the term as a “public good,” while in the second case critical responses
often reject the concept outright as a manifestation of neoliberal hegemony. In this section,
I briefly examine these lines of debate in order to uncover a third way of looking at social
capital that returns to Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice. An explicitly Bourdieusian
perspective on social capital captures everyday politics situated within broader “fields of
play.”
Those works that fall within what I have generically called the “developmentalist” camp
equate social capital with an accumulation of collective cooperative capacity (Pretty and
Ward, 2000; Adger, 2003; Krishna, 2002; Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002a; 2002b;
2
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Building on the widely cited work of Putnam (1993; 2000),
these authors posit that social capital manifests itself as collectivities like networks and
organizations (structural social capital) or as individual attitudes and values such as trust
(cognitive social capital). They assume that building up “stocks” of social capital will
empower collective action in such a way as to encourage positive outcomes like democratic
governance, economic development, or sustainable natural resource management. In this
way, analysts can estimate the aggregate sum of social capital not just for individuals and
organizations but also for communities, regions, and countries. According to this logic,
those communities (or regions or countries) with higher accumulated stocks of social capital
are more likely to achieve positive development objectives than those with lower holdings.
Krishna’s (2002) study of 69 villages in two Indian states (Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh)
illustrates this approach, concluding that communities with higher social capital were more
successful in achieving three “societal objectives”: economic development, ethnic peace, and
democratic governance.
In contrast, Bebbington and Perreault’s (1999) conceptual framework looks beyond
Putnam’s presentation to consider access to different forms of capital (financial, human,
natural, and social) as well as social capital formation at different geographic scales.
However, their core questions fall on the developmentalist end of the spectrum in that they
focus on the extent to which social capital—“in the form of community, federated, and
national indigenous peoples’ organizations and their institutional networks” (395)—has
facilitated rural economic development. In this sense, social capital enhances community
access to other forms of capital thus presenting people and groups with greater development
options.
The main critique of the developmentalist approach centers on core paradigmatic biases.
Fine (2001) argues that social capital is but one manifestation of a wider contemporary
pattern of colonization of social theory by neo-classical economics. In this sense, the
language, and thus conceptual framing, of economics assumes dominance (capital, stocks,
assets, investments, rational choice, social capitalists) in explaining social problems, eclipsing
alternative understandings such as those rooted in critical political economy. Analysis of
“underdevelopment” from the developmentalist perspective focuses attention on a
2
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico community’s lack of social capital rather than long-standing structural inequalities. As a
result, responses emphasize “building endowments” of social capital rather than addressing
fundamental inequities (see also Harriss, 2002; Fine, 1999; Harriss and De Renzio, 1997).1
While critical political economists like Fine (2001) and Harriss (2002) largely reject social
capital on conceptual grounds (see also Somers, 2004), their views converge in significant
ways with analyses that bring to the fore issues related to class and gender differentiation
(Mayoux, 2001; Rankin, 2001; Molyneux, 2002; Mayer and Rankin, 2002), the role of the
state and global institutions (Radcliffe, 2004), contextualization (Perreault,2003; Mohan and
Mohan, 2002; DeFilippis, 2001; Foley and Edwards, 1999), and access (Bebbington and
Perreault, 1999). In sum, whether supportive or dismissive in their characterization, these
writings signal that the conceptual utility of social capital depends on the extent to which
analysts tie its deployment to questions of power relationships.2
Interestingly, although Bourdieu (1986) provided one of the first conceptualizations of social
capital, his contribution has been eclipsed by presentations derived from Putnam’s work. It
is significant, therefore, that a growing number of authors point to Bourdieu as a way to
overcome the theoretical lapses apparent in dominant views of social capital (Fine, 2001;
Rankin, 2001; Harriss, 2002; Perreault, 2003; Cleaver, 2005; Svendsen, 2006; Bebbington,
forthcoming). What makes Bourdieu’s rendering compelling and how does it aid in
understanding key conceptual issues mentioned above such as social differentiation and
contextualization? In what follows I respond to this question by showing how Bourdieu’s
social theoretical concepts generate a grounded view of social capital that reflects power
dynamics in specific times and places.
Bourdieu Redux—Social Capital as Everyday Politics
To build on the work of others aimed at refining understandings of social capital, I argue
that Pierre Bourdieu’s work—including his piece on the forms of capital but also his wider
theoretical writings—offers the most complete set of ideas for developing a contextual and
relational view of power relationships. In contrast to Putnam, who understands social
capital as a means of empowerment, Bourdieu’s rendering ties the concept explicitly to
3
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico power dynamics. In this sense, social capital is not an individual or collective attribute but
rather an intangible set of relationships; a sphere of formal and informal exchanges in which
differentially empowered actors pursue other forms of capital (cultural and economic).
In Bourdieu’s view, the interactions associated with social capital tend to reproduce
dominant relationships of inequality linked to social differentiation (e.g., class or ethnicity).
However, since Bourdieu’s explicit treatments of social capital are brief, it is important to
situate his use of the term with respect to his wider work. In this section, I explore how
three of Bourdieu’s core theoretical concepts—habitus, capital, and field—address the
conceptual problems discussed above. Such an understanding considers actors operating
(exchanging resources) in formal and informal networks embedded in specific historical,
institutional, and cultural contexts. While Bourdieu’s work has been summarized and
interpreted widely (e.g., Wacquant, forthcoming; Robbins, 2000; Swartz, 1997; Bourdieu and
Wacquant, 1992; Calhoun et al. 1993), examining debates on social capital in the context of
his wider body of work informs a more grounded definition compared to dominant
understandings of the term.
Bourdieu’s use of the term habitus is important to his presentation of social capital because
it suggests how human action shapes and is shaped by the broader structural and cultural
bounds of particular contexts (see Bebbington, forthcoming). Habitus also engenders
everyday routines and informal practices that tend to parallel the strategic, rational choices
emphasized in Putnam’s writing. Bourdieu sees action resulting largely from deeply
inscribed dispositions informing a “practical sense” (le sens pratique). From this perspective,
strategies do not derive from rationally calculated or even conscious choices but rather stem
from pre-reflective tendencies. Actors respond dispositionally but also improvise or adapt at
this pre-reflective level given constantly changing configurations of opportunities and
constraints. As a result, habitus structures possible practical strategies but does not fully
determine them (Bourdieu, 1977; 1990; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Swartz, 1997;
Wacquant, 2005; forthcoming).3
On one level, such a practice-based understanding of human action recenters the actor
within analyses of social capital and thus overcomes the structural bias evident in most
4
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico dominant treatments. In other words, attention to social relationships within networks— as
opposed to just characterization of the types of bonds inherent in network structure—
highlights the everyday enactment of social capital. On another level, however, habitus
connotes individuals’ and groups’ lived cultural and institutional experiences such that
inequities and differences related to class, gender, and ethnicity (among other “structuring
structures”) shape actors’ dispositions.
For Bourdieu, the term capital simultaneously represented both a power relationship and a
power resource. In this sense, peoples’ lived experiences (habitus) derive from relative
endowments of different forms of capital, which, in turn, define their historically evolving
“positions” within social settings. Actors exchange and accumulate capital (material and
virtual) in the course of everyday social interaction. Bourdieu (1986) described three forms
of capital including economic, cultural, and social.4 Economic capital constitutes material
and financial assets while cultural capital encompasses symbolic goods, skills, and titles such
as educational credentials (Wacquant, forthcoming). When juxtaposed with the first two
forms, social capital represents a slightly different species given its intangible character. It is
best distinguished as a means (set of relationships) by which actors accrue economic and
cultural capital as a result of participation in culturally embedded networks. 5
Bourdieu’s (1986) discussion of the forms of capital offers two observations that inform
analyses of everyday politics. First, given unequal distributions of capital in any given
context, social interactions tend to reproduce existing power relationships even as
incremental change occurs. Second, the forms of capital are convertible such that
educational credentials (cultural capital) might produce increased income (economic capital).
In this sense, Bourdieu considered social capital a means of access to other types of capital.6
A broader understanding of capital to simultaneously encompass power relationships and
power resources extends analysis of social process beyond purely economistic approaches,
which emphasize rational actors who take calculated risks in order to maximize personal or
group benefits vis-à-vis stated objectives.7 As such, analysis can track the flow of different
types and quantities of capital, permitting some measure of outcomes—both positive and
negative—linked to social capital.
5
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico
To capture the structural constraints acting upon networks, Bourdieu linked habitus and
capital to the concept of “field.” Fields are arenas of struggle in which actors attempt to
accrue or control economic and cultural capital. It captures formally institutionalized
relationships based on explicit codes or rules as well as non-formalized, customary
relationships structured by cultural norms or practices. The dominant or subordinate
positions that individual and group actors hold within a field are determined by their relative
endowments of economic and cultural capital. As a result, the character and configuration
of fields constantly shift as power relationships change. In addition, as structural forms,
fields present certain “logics” and thus define the domain of struggle. In other words, even
though both dominant and subordinate actors may challenge one another for resource
control, they all tacitly accept that the “rules of the game” and that certain forms of
contestation are legitimate while others are not (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Swartz
1997).
To the extent that the concept of field represents institutional and cultural contexts, it
addresses the concern that dominant presentations of social capital detach networks from
wider political economies, class structures, and ideologies (Perreault, 2003). Bourdieu’s
theory of practice ties all three core concepts together such that actors’ dispositions (habitus)
reflect their lived experiences (e.g., class) but also depend on changing capital endowments
and the boundaries of fields, including overarching logics.
In summary, a grounded definition of social capital encompasses social interaction based in
formal and informal exchanges, culturally and institutionally embedded networks, and
positive and negative social outcomes. Social interaction occurs when actors seek to accrue
cultural and economic capital. On one level actors may pursue rational strategies in an effort
to enhance their power resources. On another level, actors’ moves are shaped by durable,
pre-reflective, culturally-defined practices (habitus). Formal and informal exchanges within
fields (the flow of resources) constitute the enactment of social capital. Social structures
(e.g., networks)—representing formal or informal relationships among individuals and
groups—enable social interaction. Importantly, networks are embedded within
cultural/institutional fields and thus situated in specific times and places. The sources of
6
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico social capital, such as norms of enforceable trust, thus emerge as broader cultural constructs
(rules, norms, practices, logics) linked to fields of play rather than attributes of individuals
(cognitive social capital). While accrued cultural and economic capital may empower groups
in ways that are considered socially beneficial, it may also reinforce persistent inequalities or
detract from collective efforts in a manner perceived to be socially negative. The case of the
timber marketing fund and community forestry in Quintana Roo reveals social processes and
outcomes that fall into the latter category.
Case Study—The Timber Marketing Fund
Community forestry activities in Quintana Roo, Mexico date from 1983 with the initiation of
a joint Mexican Forest Service/German development assistance (GTZ) program known as
the Plan Piloto Forestal (Pilot Forestry Program). The initiative shifted forest management
from a state-run enterprise, Maderas Industrializadas de Quintana Roo (MIQRO), to agrarian
reform land grant communities (ejidos) following the expiration of a 25-year forestry
concession. The Plan Piloto program joined ten ejidos, building on existing community level
organizations and common pool resource management arrangements (Table 1). It was
instrumental in helping communities establish local forestry enterprises supported by twenty-
five year management plans. By 1989, state and federal agencies extended the model to
cover much of central and southern Quintana Roo by creating three new associations joining
some 35 ejidos.
The close of the Plan Piloto Forestal in 1986 inspired the creation of a second-tier producer
association as a means of ensuring continued economic and political collaboration among
the ten communities. The Sociedad de Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo or
“Sociedad Sur” provides technical support in forest management as well as political
representation for member communities. The association finances its operations through a
combination of community payments (fees for technical services) and federal government
grants. From 1989-1997, it received international project support from the German and
British aid agencies (GTZ and DFID respectively) as well as the MacArthur Foundation.
7
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Over the course of its twenty year history, the Sociedad Sur has sought to diversify its
activities with projects in individual communities focused on wildlife management,
ecotourism, and woodworking among others. The organization also has played a lead role in
establishing a national-level community forestry organization intended to scale-up the
sector’s political and economic impact. Despite considerable success in reshaping the
region’s institutional landscape around community forestry, the Sociedad Sur continues to
face perennial organizational and economic development challenges stemming from physical
differences among member communities, the structure of timber markets, shifts in national
agrarian policy, and internal divisions within communities.
Figure 1 about here.
With respect to marketing timber, forestry communities in Quintana Roo have numerous
buyers for mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) but no secure outlets for lesser known tropical
hard and softwood species. By 1996, ejidos with smaller annual volumes of mahogany but
significant amounts of lesser-known timber species sought a collective marketing
mechanism, spawning the creation of the timber marketing fund. Four member ejidos of
the Sociedad Sur established the fund in June of that year with federal development funds.
The timber marketing fund (fondo de acopio maderero) functioned as a type of holding facility
that allowed ejidos to secure higher sale prices and find national and international outlets for
marketing lesser-known wood species.
By assuming the role of a central financing agency and holding facility, the fund’s
administrators sought to increase supply side efficiency, leverage higher prices on behalf of
communities, and expand both domestic and international markets for the communities’
wood. In practice, the fund did temporarily increase sales of lesser-known, tropical hard and
softwoods but did not succeed in garnering higher sale prices, enhancing supply efficiency,
or expanding markets. Under the new marketing arrangements, the fund used the federal
seed money to pre-finance timber extraction and processing based on firm orders from
wholesalers. It then collected a small fee from member ejidos (approximately US$
0.01/board foot) for performing this service.
8
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Insert Table 1 about here.
On paper, the fund was legally incorporated as a for-profit, civil association with an
administrative staff and an elected assembly of delegates from each member community.
Promotional documents emphasized that the fund was a commercial link between buyers
and sellers and that communities maintained full control over production. For federal
agencies with programs aimed at supporting ejidos, the timber marketing fund fit well with
approaches focused on community enterprise development. One federal ministry provided
all of the fund’s financial capital, a total of almost $250,000 over five years (Table 2).
From the outside looking in, the fund appeared to be operating successfully. Between 1997
and 1999, the fund reported gross annual sales averaging US$270,000. Data from 2000 and
2001 suggested significant increases in commercial activity (Table 2). Approximately 60
percent of sales corresponded to lesser known tropical hard and softwoods, pointing to
growth in what had been a marginalized secondary timber market. As a result of these
developments, in 2000, the federal ministry that supported the fund received national
recognition for what was lauded as a model project.
Insert Table 2 about here.
The view of the fund from the inside was quite different. What appeared to be a successful
development project with regional impact was, in practice, an unregulated lending operation.
While the fund was designed to serve as a marketing conduit for communities, a significant
portion of its financial capital was doled out to individuals and work groups for uses
unrelated to timber harvesting, processing, and marketing. Some of the individuals who
received money were not affiliated with either the fund or the Sociedad Sur.
To a large extent, the administrators were able to disperse money in this way because the
fund had no formal set of procedures governing its operations. Moreover, the fund lacked
clear lines of accountability. The fund’s assembly of delegates met once in 1997 when it first
started doing business but not thereafter. As a result, the fund’s administrators carried out
their daily transactions but never reported back to the member communities. Similarly, the
9
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico fund’s full name suggested that it was part of the Sociedad Sur, however, the creation of
another assembly of delegates indicated a separate governance structure. Because of these
ambiguities, the Sociedad Sur’s executive committee and technical staff did not formally
intervene in the affairs of the fund until mid 2000 when it became clear that much of the
money that had been dispersed was non-recoverable. Ultimately, the absence of clear
procedures and lines of accountability allowed community and non-community members to
access cash loans that were never repaid. In combination with unsuccessful business
transactions in which buyers did not fully settle accounts, unregulated lending left the fund
in the red by mid 2000 with few prospects for achieving solvency. By late 2000, as evidence
of widespread unregulated lending came to light, the federal ministry that supported the fund
decided against providing any further grants.
Go With the Flow—Patterns of Giving and Taking
Of the fund’s $265,000 in total capital, the vast majority (92 percent) circulated as
unregulated loans to individuals, advances to work groups, and open accounts with timber
wholesalers. Significantly, conservative estimates suggested that only 29 percent of
circulating funds was recoverable. The administrator’s report indicated that the majority of
funds (63 percent) could not be recovered, which meant that without further injections of
federal money, the operation would not be able to cover its own costs or settle accounts
with some of its member communities.
An internal audit performed in mid 2000 showed that the fund had distributed money to a
range of actors, producing four types of debt—preexisting, client, ejido, and individual
(figures 2, 3). First, the fund’s administrator reported $11,500 in previous debt, none of
which was recoverable, passed on from the fund’s first administrator. Much of this sum
likely was tied to individual loans; however, no data exist to link money to specific
individuals or groups. Second, another $71,300 represented client debt, where timber
wholesalers had not paid off balances for sawn lumber received from the fund. The
administrator estimated that 83.5 percent of this amount was non-recoverable. Third, over
half of the fund’s circulating capital corresponded to ejido debt, which was to help cover
production costs associated with timber harvesting and milling. The administrator indicated
10
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico that 58 percent of the $137,800 in ejido debt was most likely non-recoverable. In effect,
numerous disbursals to ejidos were unregulated loans to work group leaders. Finally,
$24,100 represented unregulated loans to individuals, both members and non-members of
the fund. Of the four types, individual and ejido debt present important patterns for
analysis.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
(a) Individual Debts
Three points emerge with respect to the money that went to non-members. First, past and
present leaders in Quintana Roo’s community forestry movement made use of their personal
contacts to gain access to cash loans from the fund. These types of transactions represented
20 percent of loans to non-members. Two high profile actors—a leader of another
community forestry association and one of the founders of the Plan Piloto Forestal—fell
into this group. Second, the fund fed the Sociedad Sur’s accounts and supported past and
present staff members for a total of $12,095 (55 percent of non-member debts). Some of
these loans corresponded to salary advances during a period when the Sociedad Sur did not
have enough cash to pay its employees. The organization borrowed almost $10,000 to cover
operational expenses during 2000 and it is unclear whether it later repaid the fund when its
financial situation improved. Third, the timber marketing fund’s staff—including two of its
administrators—received money ($5,100 or 23 percent of non-member loans). The fund’s
first administrator carried $2,800 in debt and, at the time of the audit, had repaid less than a
fifth of that amount.
Regarding loans to individuals from member ejidos, direct ties to the fund’s administrator
dictated access to money in most cases. First, the ejido where individuals received the most
loans (21)—four times the number of the next closest ejido—was the administrator’s home
community. Loan recipients from this community were in most cases family members (wife,
uncle) or close friends of one of the fund’s administrators. The ejido where individuals held
the second highest number of loans (5) and outstanding debt also featured numerous
examples where close friendship ties played an important role. In these two cases, close
11
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico friendships were often built on “compadre” relationships, which comprise a stated
commitment to mutual support between two individuals. Interviews conducted in 2000,
2001, and 2003 suggested that the community members used the loan money to help cover
household needs, not the least of which were medical expenses. Numerous observers both
from and external to the communities in question suggested that some of the money was
spent on consuming alcohol.
(b) Ejido Debt
In theory, debt associated with ejidos and work groups represented advance payments to
cover production costs (figure 3). In practice, most participating ejidos adhered to this
approach but groups from one community in particular applied the capital in ways that both
bypassed and depleted the fund. Of the seven ejidos that owed a total of $138,000 in mid
2000, fund administrators expected five to repay in full because all or most of their wood
was being sold via the timber marketing fund and thus served as collateral. However,
estimates calculated that only 54 percent of the total amount was recoverable since work
groups in the largest debtor ejido were unlikely to return more than 10 percent of their
$78,000 deficit. Figure 4, which schematically illustrates flows of money and timber within
the timber marketing fund, shows the differences between ejidos that worked through the
fund and the one that received advances (or loans) but diverted monies. The second type
suggests complex interchanges that altered power dynamics within and among communities.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
The first type of community, represented by ejido 1 in Figure 4, primarily maintained a
formal commercial exchange relationship with the fund in line with the financial
mechanism’s original intent. Representatives of work groups received cash advances to
cover timber harvesting, milling, and transportation costs. The fund arranged for sales of
both mahogany and lesser-known species. Timber wholesalers placed down payments with
the fund to guarantee timber contracts. Once milled, work group leaders delivered sawn
lumber to the wholesalers via the fund. The fund completed the set of transactions by
paying the work group the balance of net profits after deducting the advance and a small fee.
12
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Among those groups that worked through the fund, some leaders (L1, group 1 in figure 4)
received unregulated loans that were never repaid (as discussed above).
The second type of community, represented by ejido 2 in Figure 4, presents a much more
complicated set of interactions based in both formal and informal relationships. First, only
one work group had a formal commercial relationship with the fund (group 3). This group
sold part of its timber volume via the fund and another part independently to a wholesaler.
Second, work group leaders (L4, L5) and local buyers (B1, B2) received unregulated loans
masked as formal transactions (the buyers were nominally considered group leaders although
they did not function as such). In some cases, group leaders (L4, L5) used cash advances for
non-timber related activities and did not repay them. In other cases, local timber buyers (B1,
B2) received high payouts from the fund—one individual received $26,000—and used the
financial capital to purchase timber volume (unprocessed roundwood measured in cubic
meters) from other community members (see below). Thus, in ejido 2, local buyers
accumulated significant stocks of timber from other individuals and groups, while selling
sawn wood independently to wholesalers. In each case, informal exchanges were one-way,
enhancing the financial power of certain individuals but depleting the fund.
Elite Persistence and the Accretion of Power
The timber marketing fund played a significant role in shifting power dynamics within ejido
2 as well as between ejido 2 and other member ejidos (represented by ejido 1). First, the
total flow of financial capital to ejido 2 was almost two and half times greater than the
community receiving the next highest amount. Since ejido 2 did not sell its wood through
the fund for the most part, other communities resented what appeared to be preferential
treatment for groups that least needed marketing support. In comparative terms, ejido 1
carried five percent of total ejido debt compared to ejido 2, which accounted for 57 percent.
Second, the internal movement of money within ejido 2 differed greatly compared to other
member ejidos. For those ejidos that sold timber through the fund, work group leaders used
the financial capital mainly to finance timber extraction and milling. By contrast, in ejido 2,
disbursals from the fund circulated internally within an active local timber market in which
13
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico many community members sold all or part of their annual timber volumes to others to gain
access to cash. As a result, advances from the fund allowed certain individuals, who
otherwise would not have had sufficient investment capital, to operate as brokers and
accumulate the highest relative volumes (B1). Additionally, unregulated loans to established
elites within ejido 2 (B2) reinforced their economic positions relative to others by allowing
them to purchase wood from other community members at a significant discount. Further
discussion of flows of economic capital in ejido 2 shows how unregulated lending supported
elite persistence.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
The flow of economic capital from the timber marketing fund intersected with an emerging
timber exchange in ejido 2 over the course of the 2000 and 2001 harvest seasons. Beginning
in 1996, the three largest forestry ejidos associated with the Sociedad Sur formed largely
independent “work groups” (grupos de trabajo) that continued to follow the community’s
forestry management plan but otherwise controlled all decisions regarding their timber
volume including harvesting, milling, marketing, and reinvestment. Ejidos divide annual
timber volumes—particularly mahogany—on a per capita basis. Therefore, each registered
community member controlled anywhere from one to seven cubic meters of mahogany in
2001 depending on the total allowable volume for the ejido in question. One cubic meter of
mahogany was worth approximately $200, based on an average internal exchange rate for
that season. The community’s total mahogany volume carried a gross value of just under
$300,000. Ejido 2 presented both high per capita timber volumes and high complexity in
terms of subdivision: in 2001 the community featured eleven groups, many of which
subdivided again—often along family lines—into another eighteen “sections” (table 3).
Insert Table 3 about here.
Internal exchange dynamics, where local buyers purchased timber volume from other
community members (ejidatarios), in part enabled long-standing elite actors to maintain
positions of dominance within the ejido at a time when the emergence of work groups
tended to mitigate concentrations of power resources. Table 3 suggests how two local
timber buyers, in particular, accumulated stocks of timber well in excess of the benchmark
14
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico average. For the 2001 harvest year, each ejidatario had rights to 7.3 m3 of mahogany worth
approximately $1,460 (about two months salary of a mid-level professional working in the
state capital, Chetumal). Numerous community members sold portions of their allotted
volume to others in order to cover different types of debt, ultimately creating a futures
market in which individuals bought and sold timber up to three years in advance. Most
ejidatarios did not have sufficient investment capital to purchase large amounts of timber as
evidenced by the per capita volumes listed in table 3. Two brothers, who had historically
dominated ejido affairs, were able to accumulate stocks much higher than the benchmark
average (77.2 m3 and 90.0 m3 respectively) given access to financial capital including the
timber marketing fund. Had the ejido assembly disallowed timber trading, these two
individuals would have been limited to the per capita distribution of 7.3 m3 and thus forced
to join with other groups in order to aggregate timber volume. Instead, these individuals
maintained standing and influence in decisions regarding forest management, timber
harvesting, and processing by virtue of their accrued volumes even though they did not
represent a work group.
The informal lending that occurred in relation to the timber marketing fund was one set of
micro processes or interactions that produced a certain continuity of historical power
relationships in ejido 2. Thus the exchanges linked to social capital represented more than
elite capture since they illustrate discernible instances that, in the aggregate, suggest long-
standing practices (“durable dispositions” in Bourdieu’s definition of “habitus”) that are
culturally defined even as individuals act upon them in everyday practice (Bourdieu and
Wacquant, 1992:120-22). While ejidatarios intentionally sought loans as a means of
“capturing” resources, they also participated in performances—“propensities” or
“inclinations” discernable in what people do and say— tied to the social history of a place
(Bourdieu, 1977:214, n1; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:124). In this sense, the gestures,
physical postures, talk, and routines associated with lending are one expression of everyday
life within agrarian communities—a set of practices that resonates strongly with people’s
lived histories. These everyday performances produced slow accretions of power over time.
The exchanges between ejido 2 and the timber marketing fund represented a single snapshot
of a much longer trajectory of similar power plays.
15
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Spinning Wheels—The Insufficiency of Institutional Design
In addition to illustrating patterns of elite persistence, the timber marketing fund case
suggests how everyday politics can undermine formal governance systems underlying
community-based natural resource management enterprises. Much of the literature on
natural resource governance emphasizes “institutional design,” where community members
and their supporters develop “rules in use” as a means for mediating access and use of
“common pool resources.” Comparative analysis concludes that successful common pool
resource management institutions incorporate key design principles such as membership
criteria, enforceable rules, and enforced compliance, among others (Ostrom, 1990; McKean,
2000; Ostrom et al., 1994).
In the case of the timber marketing fund, informal exchanges based mainly in familial and
compadre relationships, exacerbated power differences within and among communities and
undermined collective timber marketing efforts. The absence of clear lines of authority,
formal operational rules, and effective oversight within the fund allowed unregulated
exchanges to persist over the life of the project even when administrative irregularities
became glaringly apparent. In addition to institutional design weaknesses, lack of oversight
and accountability stemmed from the wide distribution of money among individuals and
groups as well as the Sociedad Sur. Moreover, the federal agency that provided the financial
capital had little to gain by holding the funds managers to account since it had already
received accolades for the project nationally. Thus, all of the main parties linked to the fund
had little or no incentive to provide oversight with respect to its operations.
However, the weakness of institutional design and implementation does not entirely explain
the negative outcomes presented in this case study. In addition, the timber marketing fund
case exemplifies how informal lending networks weaken formal common pool resource
regimes. This institutional “drag” represents a positive feedback loop in which non-existent
and/or unenforced formal rules enabled unregulated lending as lending, in turn, depleted the
fund’s economic capital but also overrode existing rules (however weak) and undermined
discussions about rule adaptations. Thus, even as the leaders of the Sociedad Sur created a
special task force in 2000 to reform the fund, carrying out formal conversations regarding a
16
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico strict regulatory framework to govern transactions, unregulated lending continued behind
the scenes.
The distinction between overlapping but different “fields of play” offers a way to see the
friction created by the collision of incompatible logics of action—the field of lending based
in informal networks versus the technocratic management field based in the formal
organization of the fund and the Sociedad Sur. Historically, the everyday political and social
practices linked to informal networks—such as lending—have consistently eaten away at
attempts to institutionalize technocratic management tenets, including community
enterprises. While it is true that many of the same actors populated both networks and fields
of interaction overlapped, it was also the case that lending practices intruded upon the fund’s
formal but tenuous tenets. In the aggregate, the combination of unregulated lending and
unpaid debts forced the timber marketing fund to cease operations in 2003. As of mid 2007,
community forestry enterprises in Quintana Roo, Mexico face the same problems of
marketing lesser known timber species as they did in the mid 1990s when the fund was
conceived.
Don’t Think of an Elephant!
Social capital as the term is most commonly understood—networks based in trust and
reciprocity—points to important human organizational factors that shape conservation and
development outcomes. However, just as importantly, social capital’s application as an
explanatory variable (e.g., where greater social capital enhances economic development) has
produced a situation where the term has outrun the concept. As Smith and Kulynych (2002)
note, social capital, as deployed in popular usage, more accurately connotes “social capacity”
rather than a form of capital. In contrast, Bourdieu’s presentation of social capital
emphasizes power relationships within institutional and cultural fields. In large measure,
confusion over the meaning of social capital resides within the term itself: capital. Lakoff’s
(2004) discussion of political speech in the U.S. suggests how key words evoke broad
cognitive frames and associations underlying understandings and emotional responses. He
thus instructs political progressives to frame ideas in terms that reflect their core values
rather than language that rejects, but still affirms, conservative values (“Don’t think of an
17
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico elephant!”). Similarly, the term “capital” conjures images of tangible resources that can be
accumulated, attributed a specific value, and exchanged. However, social capital is
intangible; it is a set of relationships that provide access to economic and other forms of
capital. While Bourdieu contributed to the problem by employing numerous economic
metaphors in his writing, his collective work explicitly seeks to overcome static perspectives
on social life.
The case of the timber marketing fund in Quintana Roo, Mexico represents more than an
example of the down side of social capital in the form of unregulated lending and petty
corruption. A Bourdieusian perspective on community-based natural resource governance
reveals the everyday interactions and negotiations—both formal and informal—that create a
dynamic web of power relationships. When used in this manner, social capital offers insights
on the micro-politics of conservation and development by providing an actor-centered
schematic that is dynamic but also situated within institutional and cultural contexts. As
such, Bourdieu’s contributions to social theory complement other strands in political ecology
and development studies such as those that emphasize Foucauldian discourse analysis (e.g.,
Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990; Peet and Watts, 1996). Thus, despite lingering skepticism
and critique, social capital remains an important concept that warrants continued use and
interrogation, especially when specifically tied to power dynamics as opposed to broadband
views that cast the term as collective cooperative capacity.
References Adger W, 2003, “Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation to Climate Change”
Economic Geography 79(4):387-404. Agrawal A, Gibson C, 2001 Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the State in
Community-Based Conservation (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ). Baron S, Field J, Schuller T, 2000 Social Capital: Critical Perspectives (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, UK and New York). Bebbington A, 2002, “Sharp Knives and Blunt Instruments: Social Capital in Development
Studies” Antipode 34(4): 800-803. Bebbington A, 2004, “Social Capital and Development Studies 1: Critique, Debate,
Progress?” Progress in Development Studies 4(4):343-349. Bebbington A, forthcoming, “Social Capital and Development Studies II: Concepts and
Contexts” Progress in Development Studies. Bebbington A, Guggenheim S, Olson E, Woolcock M, 2004, “Exploring Social Capital
Debates at the World Bank” The Journal of Development Studies 40(5):33-64.
18
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Bebbington A, Perreault T, 1999, “Social Capital, Development, and Access to Resources in
Highland Ecuador” Economic Geography 75(4):395-418. Bourdieu P, 1977 Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK). Bourdieu P, 1980, “Le Capital Social: Notes Provisoires” [Social Capital: Provisional Notes]
Actes de la Récherche en Science Sociales 31:2-3. Bourdieu P, 1986, “The Forms of Capital” in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of
Education ed JG Richardson (Greenwood Press, New York). Pp. 231-258. Bourdieu P, 1990 The Logic of Practice (Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA). Bourdieu P, Wacquant L, 1992 An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, IL). Brosius P, Tsing A, Zerner C, eds, 2005 Communities and Conservation: Histories and Politics of
Community-Based Natural Resource Management (Altamira Press, Lanham, MD). Calhoun C, LiPuma E, Postone M, eds, 1993 Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives (University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL). Dasgupta P, Serageldin I, eds, 2000 Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective (The World Bank,
Washington, DC). DeFilippis J, 2001, “The Myth of Social Capital in Community Development” Housing Policy
Debate 12(4):781-806. Field J, 2003, Social Capital (Routledge, London and New York). Fine B, 2001, Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social Science at the Turn of the
Millennium (Routledge, London and New York). Fine B, 1999, “The Developmental State is Dead—Long Live Social Capital?” Development
and Change 30: 1-19. Grootaert C, van Bastelaer T, eds, 2002a The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical
Assessment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK). Grootaert C, van Bastelaer T, 2002b Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A
Multidisciplinary Tool for Practitioners (The World Bank, Washington, DC). Halpern D, 2005 Social Capital (Polity Press, Cambridge, UK). Harriss J, 2002 Depoliticizing Development: The World Bank and Social Capital (Anthem Press,
London). Harriss J, De Renzio P, 1997, “‘Missing Link’ or Analytically Missing? The Concept of Social
Capital” Journal of International Development 9(7): 919-37. Krishna A, 2002 Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy (Columbia
University Press, New York). Lakoff G, 2004 Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (Chelsea
Green, White River Junction, VT). Lin N, 2001 Social Capital: A Theory of Structure and Action (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK). Mayer M, Rankin K, 2002, “Social Capital and (Community) Development: A North/South
Perspective” Antipode 34(4):804-08. Mayoux L, 2001, “Tackling the Down Side: Social Capital, Women’s Empowerment and
Micro-Finance in Cameroon” Development and Change 32(3):435-64. McKean M, 2000, "Common property: What is it, what is it good for, and what makes it
work?" in People and Forests: Communities, Institutions, and Governance. Eds, C Gibson, M McKean, E Ostrom (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) pp. 27-56.
Molyneux M, 2002, “Gender and the Silences of Social Capital: Lessons from Latin America” Development and Change 33(2):167-88.
19
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Mota J, 2002, Estudio de Caso de Integración Horizontal: Sociedad de Productores
Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo, S.C. [Horizontal Integration Case Study: Forestry Producers Association of Quintana Roo], Interamerican Development Bank Report ATN-NP-7444-RS. (IADB, Washington, DC). http://www.iadb.org/en2/estudios/estudiomexico2.html (Accessed 3-4-06).
Ostrom E, 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).
Ostrom E, Gardner R, Walker J, 1994 Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor).
Perreault T, 2003, “Social Capital, Development, and Indigenous Politics in Ecuadorian Amazonia” Geographical Review 93(3): 328-349.
Portes A, 1998, “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Contemporary Sociology” Annual Review of Sociology 24: 1-24.
Pretty J, Ward H, 2001, “Social Capital and the Environment” World Development 29(2): 209-227.
Putnam R, 1993 Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).
Putnam R, 2000 Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon and Schuster: New York).
Radcliffe S, 2004, “Geography of Development: Development, Civil Society and Inequality—Social Capital is (Almost) Dead?” Progress in Human Geography 28(4):517-27.
Rankin K, 2002, “Social Capital, Microfinance, and the Politics of Development” Feminist Economics 8(1):1-24.
Robbins D, 2000 Bourdieu and Culture (Sage, London). Smith S, Kulynych J, 2002, “It May Be Social, but Why Is It Capital? The Social
Construction of Social Capital and the Politics of Language” Politics and Society 30(1):149-186.
Somers M, 2004, “Let Them Eat Social Capital: Socializing the Market versus Marketizing the Social” Thesis Eleven 81: 5-19.
Svendsen G, 2006, “Studying Social Capital in situ: A Qualitative Approach” Theory and Society 35: 39-70.Swartz D, 1997 Power and Culture: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago). Wacquant L, Forthcoming, “Pierre Bourdieu,” in Key Sociological Thinkers, 2nd ed., Stones, ed.,
(Palgrave Macmillan, New York and London). Wacquant L, 2005, “Habitus,” in International Encyclopedia of Economic Sociology, Beckert,
Zafirovski, eds, (Routledge, London and New York) pp. 315-19. Woolcock M, 1998, “Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical
Synthesis and Policy Framework.” Theory and Society 27(2): 151-208. Woolcock M, Narayan D, 2000, “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory,
Research, and Policy.” The World Bank Research Observer 15(2):225-49.
20
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Table 1: Member Ejidos of the Sociedad de Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana
Roo (Sociedad Sur)
Community Area (Ha.)
Forest Reserve
% Total Population
(2000) Men WomenEjidatarios
(2000) Botes 18,900 8,000 42.3 1,771 929 842 298 Caoba 68,553 32,500 47.4 1,535 749 786 311 Chacchoben 18,450 6,000 32.5 1,140 575 565 294 Divorciados 12,000 1,500 12.5 961 476 485 187 Manuel Avila Camacho 12,000 1,500 12.5 829 426 403 189 Nuevo Guadalajara 28,500 6,000 21.1 1,390 720 670 276 Petcacab 46,000 32,500 70.7 947 484 463 206 Plan de la Noria 9,450 5,000 52.9 228 132 96 52 Tres Garantías 43,678 28,000 64.1 820 445 375 105 Total 257,531 121,000 avg. 39.6 9,621 4,936 4,685 1,918 Sources: SPFEQR. 2000. Informe Final. Anualidad 17. Chetumal, QR.; INEGI. 2000. XII Censo General de Población y Vivienda,
Principales Resultados por Localidad. Aguascalientes (www.inegi.gob.mx). Table 2: Timber Marketing Fund Activity (1996-2001)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001(*) Total
Federal grants (US$) $59,000 $55,000 $50,000 $40,000 $45,000 $0 $249,000Gross sales (US$) inactive $309,208 $205,168 $294,520 $473,347 $363,651 $1,645,894Volume (Bft.) inactive 360,433 243,795 294,417 518,294 395,060 1,811,999
Sources: Timber Marketing Fund 2001, 2003, Mota 2002. *data through July 2001.
21
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Table 3: Timber Exchange among Work Groups and Individuals in Ejido 2 (2001)
Group Section # Members
Volume (m3)a
Volume (m3)
per capita Gross per Capita ($)
Machiche, S.P.R.b --- 17 131.692 7.747 $1,549 Tankasché --- 7 127.916 18.274 $3,655 Poot Medina
Family 5 18.104 3.621 $724
Francisco Poot M.c 0 77.208 77.208 $14,842 Emilio Poot M.c 0 90.000 90.000 $18,000 Uc Chan Family 6 9.552 1.592 $318 Sinanché 4 35.104 8.776 $1,755 Secc. Tankasché 3 14.828 4.942 $988 Canul Family 8 0.000 0.000 $0 Yaití --- 3 18.828 6.276 $1,255 Sección Yaití 4 17.828 4.457 $891 Zapote Negro --- 22 135.796 6.173 $1,235 Gongora 1 5 20.828 4.166 $833 Sufricaya, S.P.R. --- 31 234.556 7.566 $1,513 Rodríguez Family 10 69.088 6.909 $1,382 Pech Family --- 4 35.380 8.845 $1,769 Reyes Poot Family 4 29.104 7.276 $1,455 Selva Tropical --- 10 77.036 7.704 $1,541 Verdes 8 42.932 5.367 $1,073 Dzul Family 6 43.036 7.173 $1,435 Botan --- 3 46.380 15.460 $3,092 Botanes 7 37.380 5.340 $1,068 Cruzché --- 4 26.104 6.526 $1,305 Tzalam 2 46.932 23.466 $4,693 Quebrahacha --- 3 9.552 3.184 $637 Quebrahacha 2 3 16.828 5.609 $1,122 Gongora 2 4 32.104 8.026 $1,605 Nicolas 1 24.552 24.552 $4,910 Caracolillo --- 5 29.104 5.821 $1,164 “Desvalagados”d 17 0.552 0.032 $6 Individual and family names are pseudonyms. a harvest volume for mahogany and cedar (high-value species); b The denomination “S.P.R.” or “Sociedad de Producción Rural” indicates that the group is formally registered with the National Agrarian Registry (RAN); c indicates an individual timber buyer whose membership and individual volume are counted under the family section; d “Desvalagados” translates as “disengaged” or “unaffiliated.” It does not represent a group per se but rather a grouping of individuals not affiliated with other groups.
22
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico
Figure 1: Member Ejidos of the Sociedad Sur
23
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico
Figure 2: Timber Marketing Fund: Summary of Accounts
Ejido debts52%
Bank Balance 0%
Operational expenses
8%
Individual debts9%
Previous debts4%
Client debts27%
Federal MinistryFederal grants$250,000 over 5 years
Fund
Figure 3: Flow of Economic Capital Associated with the Timber Marketing Fund (1997-2001)
Timber WholesalersClient debt$71,297 (83.5%)
Associated IndividualsIndividual debt$24,110 (90.0%)
Total debt(US$)
Non-recoverableamount (%)
Ejido debt$137,797 (54.8%)
Member Communities
24
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico Figure 4: Flow of Economic Capital at the Community Level (1997-2001)
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5
Ejido 1
Ejido 2
L1L1
L2L2
L3L3
L4L4
L5L5
B1B1
B2B2
Fund
$$
T
$$$$
$$
T
T
$$
$$
T
T
T
T
T
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
$$
T
L1
B1
T
$$
Local timber buyer
Work group leader
Intermediary timber buyer
Timber
Money
Exchange of timber for money
Unregulated loan
KEY
L1L1
B1B1
T
$$
Local timber buyer
Work group leader
Intermediary timber buyer
Timber
Money
Exchange of timber for money
Unregulated loan
KEY
25
Shades of Social Capital: Elite Persistence and the Everyday Politics of Community Forestry in Southeastern Mexico
Notes
1 For responses to this line of critique see Bebbington, 2002; 2004 and Bebbington et al., 2004. 2 For example, Bebbington (2002:801) finds that “…social capital is a ‘mesolevel’ concept that can be usefully
linked to other bodies of theory in order to ground them better by focusing our attention on actors and their networks, the ways in which networks structure patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and the ways in which the mobilization of these networks helps explain change in access to resources and relations of power.” See also Perreault, 2003 and Mohan and Mohan, 2002.
3 Bourdieu (1990:53) defines habitus in the following terms: “A system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them.” 4 Bourdieu’s writing also contemplates a fourth category—symbolic capital—which connotes power through
symbolic legitimation (Bourdieu, 1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 5 Fine (2001: 53-64) provides an in depth discussion of Bourdieu’s forms of capital as they relate to power
dynamics. 6 Highlighting this notion of access Bourdieu (1980:2) writes, “…different individuals obtain a very unequal
return on a more or less equivalent capital (economic or cultural) according to the extent to which they are able to mobilize by proxy the capital of a group (family, old pupils of elite schools, select club, nobility, etc.).” (quoted in Field, 2003:16).
7 Although Bourdieu positions his theory of practice in opposition to economistic approaches, his use of terms like capital, endowments, and investment have generated critiques that his concepts are overly rigid and utilitarian (see Swartz, 1997:73 and Fine 2001:64; for a response, see Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992:118).
26