Download - Shipping Container Security
Prior to being captured in 2003, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed the mastermind
behind the 9/11 attacks, offered to invest $200,000 in an export firm in exchange
for access to the intermodal containers used by the firm to ship garments to Port
Newark in the New York-New Jersey harbor complex. This deal did not go through
but the intent behind it was clear. America’s ports were targets for a terrorist attack.
If an attack on an American port were to occur it could potentially cause tens of
thousands of deaths and injuries while crippling global trade. According to the Rand
Corporation and the losses would range from $45 billion to more than $1 trillion.
(Rand Paraphrase Rpp1220) Lawmakers took this threat seriously and decided that
the best way to stop such an attack like that from happening would be to use
preventative tactics to keep dangerous intermodal containers away from U.S. ports
to begin with. This led to congress to “Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, unilaterally introducing a 100% scanning requirement for
US-bound maritime cargo at export, to be implemented by 1 July 2012,”
(sec_2010_131_EN). However while seemingly 100% scanning might make sense to
American politicians. Many Individuals representing the private business sector
think that while security needs to be improved, 100% scanning is not the answer.
They argue that while they can see why proponents might think 100% scanning is
wise based on the scanning of similar transportation methods. The complexity of
shipping makes 100% scanning unfeasible from an implementation standpoint.
While the current trend by government official is to look at how to achieve a
greater number of shipping containers can be scanned. Our research shows
evidence that the superior approach to mitigating the risk of another should rather
be how to improve methods to identify a suspect container before it reaches a U.S.
port. While at the same time limiting any disruption to international trade. This
question then leads to further questions that need to be solved such as the
following. What are the indicators that make for a container at risk of being used as
a weapon? Can technology be used to find patterns that can be observed to find out
which a containers were sent to the U.S. with the intent to cause it harm? In addition
to this can technology be used to better manage the security risk of a containers
being tampered with between when it loaded at its port of origination to when it is
unloaded at its port of destination in the United States? It is our belief that I.T. is
capable now of answering these questions by establishing a better system for
identifying these shipping containers as being a threat and monitoring them
effectively until they are fully discharged in America.
Proponents of the 100 percent mandate have pointed to the supposed success of the air cargo mandate, which mandated 100 percent screening of air cargo. Besides the fact that 100 percent screening was implemented only for domestic cargo—screening of U.S.-bound international cargo proved much more difficult—and that a significantly greater volume of cargo transits through the maritime supply chain, another critical difference is that the air cargo security mandate called for the 100 percent screening of all cargo, whereas the maritime cargo mandate calls for 100 percent scanning….. While screening calls for cargo to be assessed for risk on the basis of contents, origin, and other attributes, scanning means that each of the approximately 11.6 million maritime cargo security containers entering U.S. ports each year must be physically scanned. With many maritime cargo increasingly containerized in recent decades, typical maritime cargo containers often measure some 40 feet in length. One key issue regarding maritime cargo screening is, therefore, one of scale. While the basic technology exists to effectively screen cargo containers, the expanded technology necessary to perform this function on large containerized cargo largely does not. (Heritage 2/2012)
Current Issue
About 90 percent of the cargo that is transported to the United States comes
in the form of shipping containers. There are literally thousands of containers that
enter each the over 300 ports in the United States daily. The revenue earned from
the shipping and handling of these containers not only contributes to the local
economy of the ports they enter. They also contribute significantly to the national
economy as well. (Rand source for paraphrase) This fact adds to the paradox of the
lack of an effective national security plan that could be the difference between
having effective security for containers that would allow for normal trade levels to
continue. This in turn indicates one of the larger, more significant issues in shipping.
Are their any cost effective options to improve the security systems used by
America’s ports from the threat of a shipping container based terrorist attack that
will not disrupt international trade. (Rand source for paraphrase)
This issue of trying to mitigate the risk to America’s ports while maintaining
their current level of economic viability is far from new. Before 9/11 very little
emphasis was placed on the threat of a container being used to smuggle a WMD into
America because of the fear that over regulating shipping might affect negatively
affect the international trade. The reason’s giving that over securing would lead to a
loss of business and could negatively affect international commerce worldwide.
However, the lack of overall planning prior to 9/11 has led to this current political
environment post 9/11 of overcompensation where politicians are recommending
overly restrictive regulations. The idea that 100% scanning will deter terrorist
attack more than a well thought system to that approaches and mitigates the risk of
an attack is a extremely costly error waiting to happen. Historically, one of the
reasons that 100% scanning was not required was that the perceived greatest
threat to the security of goods in containers had only been an issue due to problems
such as smuggling and/or theft. Legislators understood that simply stopping
containers with illegal goods would not stop smugglers from brings drugs into the
country (http://www.rand.org/commentary/2012/07/06/RAND.html).
However, after the attacks in America on September 11 many countries
around the world began to realize how at risk they were by lacking the security of
their ports truly was. This realization led to millions of dollars being invested into
developing technology to assisting the protection and security of our ports. Yet, this
planning has not extended itself to improving the approach to risk management that
ports had to take to shipping containers. So the approach the government took was
to ask for 100% scanning in spite of the fact that the technology to do it did not
exist, nor that when the idea of 100% scanning had been found lacking when it came
as a smuggling deterrent already. The main hindrance to container security is the
reality that it is simply not possible to screen every single container entering the
United States. Currently only 5% of cargo sent to the U.S. is actually screened. An
example of how inefficient that is can be seen when this policy is applied to
American ports. A port such as Long Beach that sees 1.7 million containers a year
yet randomly scans less than a 100,000 is a year.
In addition to the scanning of 5% of containers, currently the container
security system that is most widespread through shipping is based upon following
federal protocols created in 2002 known as the Maritime Transportation Security
Act (MTSA 2002). The MTSA’s main goal was to protect the maritime infrastructure
of the U.S. (such as ports and waterways). However a byproduct of this act was the
creation of a chain of responsibility that helped deter terrorist attempting to attack
the U.S. port through a shipping container. The concept of the chain of responsibility
is that similar to the concept of incoterms While incoterms states at what part of
transport a person is responsible to pay for the cost of shipping. The security chain
of responsibility states at what part of shipping is someone responsible to document
what is in a shipping container and where has it gone. The chain consists of the
Company Security Officer (CSO), the Vessel Security Officer (VSO), and the Facility
Security Officer (FSO) who work together to better document and track shipping
containers. In 2006 the Safety And Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port act created
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) whose purpose was to identify or investigate
shipping containers that could pose a security threat to the U.S. However as stated
earlier, due to the sheer levels of shipping containers entering the U.S., even these
additional regulations allow many containers to come into the United States
unchecked. The CSI would be the system most likely to be directly affected by a
change in scanning rules since it current mode of operation is to scan a container at
the dock when it considered a risk. “CSI is a security program administered by the
US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency which falls within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The program, announced in January 2002,
uses rules-based software to identify containers bound for the US that are “at risk”
of being tampered with by terrorists. A key input to this system is the container’s
shipping manifest, which contains information about the container’s sender,
recipient, and contents” (WP20090501)
Another system for the detecting suspicious cargo is the cooperative
program started by homeland security in joint partnerships with individuals in the
shipping industry that formed a Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT). The C-TPAT is a voluntary program between the U.S. government and the
private shipping sector to maintain & improve the overall security of the global
supply chain of shipped goods. The overall focus of this system is based on
prevention of dangerous materials reaching American shores. A major aspect of this
security system is the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) defined by the United
States Coast Guard as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the
maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment”.
MDA Also acts as a key component for other maritime security measures for the
Container Security Initiative. In addition to this MDA is complimentary to the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) that relies on individuals in
the private sector to accept responsibility for following the security protocols of the
United States on any items placed into a container at different parts of the
containers transportation.
Currently the MDA is focused on the implementation of Maritime change
Detection. Maritime change detection focuses on ways to recognize “anomalies from
established trends and patterns." (Munson 2009) For example a ship will load 200
intermodal containers from ABC Company and its consigned to XYZ Company in the
U.S.A. The cargo will then be declared as textiles. What happens now is homeland
security will run a background check on the ship. Homeland security will look for
certain details about the ship. They will look for anything unusual or suspicious. For
example does the ship have an historic relationship with that American port? Does
this ship have a history of dealing with textiles? If not they may be considered
suspicious. If yes, then further questions might be asked. Does the company usually
move in this lot size? Is this the normal container size usually moved in? They will
analyze the MARSEC (Maritime Security) levels of the ports that the cargo came
from to see what level of risk the port of origination is. (Munson 2009) Homeland
security will then track all the statements and look for anomalies in the pattern for
that particular cargo to see if they can look for things that just stand out as not being
normal. These background checks are done on continuous basis. Of the several
layers of checking that are done to find a suspicious container, the most significant
is the 24-hour manifest rule that requires shippers to tell homeland security what
they are carrying in their intermodal containers at least 24 hours before it arrives.
In addition to this, there are spot checks that involve physically opening the
container in a foreign country before they are shipped to the United States along
with suspicious containers being scanned for radiation prior to them reaching the
United States Shores.
However the flaw to all of the systems discussed so far is of course what
would happen if a container was shipped with a possible WMD and it didn’t stand
out due to it being transported in an intermodal container that the MDA did not
consider as being a suspicious intermodal container. If anyone in the responsibility
chain notice anything odd about the container the results could be a WMD entering
America undetected. The common denominator to all the systems discussed so far
is that they are all too susceptible to human error. If one or two people involved in
the maintaining the sanctity of this system fails in their security duties, a dangerous
container can easily reach American shores. When you consider how vulnerable of
ports are to shipping containers containing smuggled contraband or drugs the odds
of these system being successful long term to stopping a dangerous container from
reaching an American port seem bleak.
It might be due to this fear of human error that the scanning of intermodal
containers for is exceedingly becoming a hot topic when it comes to the security of
the U.S. ports. Many lawmakers conceptually believe that it would make sense to
scan all intermodal containers coming into the United States to verify if it contained
any dangerous materials (such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) shipped to
America with the purpose to cause us damage. Then from their point of view this
decision to implement 100% scanning would make sense due to it fulfilling the
requirements contained in the SAFE Port Act signed into law in Oct. 2006. In
addition, the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 recommended the implementation of
100% scanning, which was signed into law in August 2007. The new 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 went further by amending the SAFE Port Act to say: “A
container that was loaded on a vessel in a foreign port shall not enter the United
States (either directly or via a foreign port) unless the container was scanned by
nonintrusive imaging equipment and radiation detection equipment at a foreign
port before it was loaded on a vessel also mandate scanning.”
(http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-109hr4954enr/pdf/BILLS-109hr4954enr.pdf)
The new system in place would operate thusly.
(wp-2009 page 28)
So while the 100% scanning of an intermodal container on paper might seem
like an effective security measure when it was put together by congress and signed
into law, there are however several significant issues that would hinder the
implementation. The most important one would be in box number 2 in the graph
above. Primary inspection at the Gate/Quay would add significantly to the overall
cost of time and money prior to the cargo even being put into transit. After that
would be the fact that reliable technology to fulfill this goal doesn’t exist. Lastly the
often not mentioned fact that foreign countries might consider this scanning a
barrier to trade with America because the proposal would have containers be
scanned prior to being placed on a vessel at port of origination heading for the
United States. As Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano described 100% as,
“A Significant and negative impact on trade capacity and the flow of cargo…. Systems
to scan contanors cannot be purchased, deployed or operated at ports overseas
because ports do not have the physical characteristics to install such a system”.
(
https://www.bimco.org/en/News/2012/06/27_100_pct_container_scanning_deferred_unti
l_2014.aspx) Nor would it likely be possible to install such a system on American
shores either. As has been discussed earlier CSI is the current process in which
containers thought to be at risk of containing unknown dangerous materials is
scanned. “Current CSI protocol, which relies on more sensitive equipment to scan
high- risk containers in a centrally-located government operated inspection facility,
would face significant hurdles were it to be scaled up to scan more than a small
fraction of US-bound container traffic….it is possible to support passive radiation
detection and NII of no more than 5% of US-bound traffic at the smaller port and no
more than 1.5% of US-bound traffic” (page 7 Wp20090501)
As of June 7, 2012, the Homeland security committee amendments bill
known as “Ensuring Scanned Containers Arrive in Ports Efficiently Act of 2012”
(http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/maritime-cargo-port-security-and-
the-100-percent-screening-mandate) only pushed the goal from 100% scanning to
implemented from 2012 to 2014 however the base flaws with a 100% scanning
prerogative still exist. The initiative still requires the United States to buy and install
scanners after reaching agreements with host nations on the terms for placing the
scanning equipment but did not specify who would pay the full cost for the
procedure. Charterer would still pay for their cargo to be scanned or would the
United States pay the cost. Also, if the time needed to scan all the cargos affected the
schedule for the shipment of goods going to other countries would the United States
be liable for time (and money) lost? Or even who would be liable for the cost of
late/expired cargo if the scanning equipment at a port ceased to function? According
to European Commission staff report, it would cost at least 10% more to ship goods
to the U.S.A. from Europe if the mandate were instituted and everything ran
smoothly. When all the cost associated with instituting a security strategy of
scanning of 100% of all inbound intermodal containers is aggregated, it becomes
clear that the cost of instituting it would far exceed the mere price of the scanners
themselves. In addition to this while the current generation of PVT scanner that are
very good at detecting radiation from materials such as ceramic tile. They are not
very good at sensing highly enriched uranium or shielded uranium. Meaning the
technology needed to make 100% scanning a truly effective deterrent to illegally
transporting dangerous radioactive materials doesn’t even exist yet. This in turn
would make it even more expensive to try to implement this plan the way it is
currently designed.
(Rand 2005)
Mandating 100% would likely lead companies to have to adjust for the new
cost of exporting and importing goods globally. They would likely be forced to
change which countries they import goods from and which ports they use to ship
the goods to America. This could lead to unintended changes in the global supply
chain overall and even then due to the lack of technology required it could not
guarantee improved global security. However it would likely cause a decrease the
global supply chain’s overall efficacy.
These questions of who will pay for 100% scanning of containers and how
much it will eventually cost the cargo owner to implement that plan is why it is
opposed by the Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA). The RILA whose
members include some of the largest retail companies in the world such as Apple
(AAPL), Costco Wholesale (COST), Home Depot (HD), Nike (NKE), Target and Wal-
Mart stores (WMT) have been vocal critics of the 100% scanning of containers
policy. The group’s vice-president for supply chain policy, Kelly Kolb say’s “It’s not
effective or feasible to scan every container that meets [American] shores. RILA
does however support the current programs requiring shippers to send cargo
manifest to Homeland Security 24 hours before a container leaves a foreign port.
However simply maintaining the current security system is not the answer
for securing America’s ports either. The current situation still does have security
problems associated with it. The major one being that Homeland security is really
not as secure as they think. The Navy and the MDA focus primarily on vessel
tracking and intelligence. As stated before, with the MDA focusing solely on the
ports and containers alone. The MDA takes the risk of being ineffective if a
dangerous container does not stand out as being abnormal. Also the current system
does not focus on the ship’s crew or passengers at specific times and places. The
MDA belief is that automated systems can recognize pirates or terrorists. The
current system if focused on tracking ships, not so much investigating what the ship
is doing actually doing at sea. Relying on suspicious behavior or anomalies might
not be the ideal technique. Anomalies at sea are never necessarily important and
most of the time does have a reasonable excuse. It is possible terrorists recognize
the fact that homeland search for anomalies, and make a special effort for their
container not to be identified as an anomaly or unusual the whole system will not
function properly and dangerous materials might reach a U.S. port. All recent
maritime terrorist activity involved no anomalies in the ships position. As was
stated at the beginning of this paper a known terrorist was trying to buy into an
established export firm because they had already established a normal shipping
route that ended in Newark, New Jersey. On the other hand anomalies that do show
up could be normal occurrences such as a ship going to a new port for the first time
that could be caused due to new owners, new management, or the ship handling a
different type of cargo. New Security rules are needed for the importation of goods
transported by sea in intermodal container, however they have to be made not to
impose any unneeded difficulties in the shipping of goods on while being effective
on a global scale since America cannot force the whole world’s supply chain to slow
down in an attempt to keep itself safe.
FUTURE
As has been stated earlier, the SAFE Port Act is calling for the replacement of United
States current system of deterrence for terrorist attacks by the shipping container
with one that relies on the 100% scanning of containers. Since 2006 several
business associations nationally (including the National Retail Federation) that rely
of transportation of goods for their business operations have been against the
implementation of this new 100% of all containers. They argue that 100% scanning
before entering the country is impracticable and costly. These opponents to 100%
scanning also point to the facts that it would likely trigger foreign government to
look upon the SAFE port act as being an unofficial barrier to trade. “The Study on the
Impact of Security Measures on the EU Economy and Trade Relations focused on
estimating the investment and operational costs required to implement 100%
scanning in European ports. The study has shown that the great majority of EU ports
are not prepared to implement 100% container scanning. Neither the terminal
operators nor the customs authorities would be ready to bear the additional costs.”
(Sec 2010) In addition to business leaders, some United States politicians don’t
support 100% scanning either.
Ironically enough even with all this opposition to the SAFE Port act, it wasn’t
these complaints that eventually led to the congress to decide to replace the SMART
Port Act with a newer law. This law contained several key provisions that altered
the SAFE Port Act that became effective immediately after passing. While the SMART
Port Act overturned one of the more controversial provision in “The SAFE Port Act”
that would require background checks of foreign investments into American port
infrastructure it continued to call for 100% scanning.
“The Act, among other things, changed the Exon–Florio Amendment 50 U.S.C. app 2170 to require the executive branch to perform a 45-day investigation of each foreign investment deal unless the Secretary of Transportation and the head of the lead agency on the transaction jointly agree that there is no threat to national security. Other important provisions require stricter review of container security and foreign port assessments. (http://nationalsecuritylawbrief.com)
The SMART port security Act of 2012 reorganized key parts of the SAFE port act,
which became law in 2007 however it did not take into account once again of the
infeasibility of 100% scanning. This in turn set in motion that the implementation of
the SAFE port act 100% scanning that 9/11 commissions recommended, which
included that contentious provision that all US-bound containers will be scanned at
the port of origin (regardless of affect on international trade) starting in July 2012.
While there is within the SAFE Port Act, a clause that allows for the Homeland
Security Secretary to grant waivers to shipments coming from specific ports. Under
the conditions that to this day are somewhat vague. Homeland Security passed a
version that allows DHS to recognize other countries trusted scanning and security
programs and allows the United States Coast Guard to recognize other governments
threat assessments included.
On July 23, 2012 Lloyds List released an article claiming that illicit arms
traders step up use of containers, arms traffickers are turning to global maritime
containers as the means to transport deadly cargo across the high seas and into
busy active ports. This ultimately can very well persuade the DHS to highly consider
passing the bill in 2014 for 100% scanning of all containers coming into US ports.
The key components that comes with the shipping of containers including speed and
efficiency, not to mention the added plus of anonymity granted by the millions of
containers that come in and out of ports on a daily basis, are the same reasons that
this form of supply trade is becoming increasingly popular and attractive with illicit
gun traffic traders.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found through an
earlier report in the year that arms proliferation networks are increasingly adopting
the same techniques that have been pioneered by some drug trafficking
organizations that have come to understand the logistics operations within the
global supply chain and has completely utilized the use of sealed shipping
containers. The containers are being carried on board vessels owned by major
mainstream shipping companies engaged in day-to-day, innocent, legal trade, so
providing an extra layer of respectability for traffickers to camouflage their
activities and remain off the radar of the proper authorities. A very important piece
to this situational awareness is the effect that the most cost effective method of
dealing with these traffickers is that when they are confronted by well-resourced
and coordinated surveillance operations supported by international agreements
such as the United Nations Arms Embargoes and counter-narcotics conventions, the
traffickers ultimately begin to lose the opportunities and confidence to continue to
move their wares across the ocean and into major ports.
We propose that companies combine this tracking technology to the chain of
responsibility enacted by the Maritime Transportation Act (MTSA 2002). By better
equipping the Vessel Security Officer with this mobile scanning technology a VSO
can go about the ship scanning for containers for any of the aforementioned threats.
This could allow for a greater number of scanning and in lieu of potentially slowing
down international trade allow for the current levels of speed for the transportation
of goods. In addition to this we believe that shipping companies and charterers
should begin to use Container Security Devices (CSD) on their shipping containers.
CSD Now while this system would still be a certain level of risk for the crews of ships
and all containers would not. What we propose is that instead
Recently the private market has produced some solutions that could
potentially be proactive in protecting containers while not hindering international
commerce if instituted. In 2006, Powers International Inc. located in Belmont, North
Carolina announced today that was testing a joint international project to
demonstrate its SeaCure Satellite System (SCSS) container security solution in an
international shipping trial. RFID usage for global container transportation is not
conducive but satellite communication is good for the following reasons; A satellite
system using either low earth orbit (LEO) constellations or a high-altitude
geosynchronous satellite transmits data differently, but the vendors' systems will
work anywhere in the world that they have coverage.
There are some flaws to this system. 1 being that there is an almost
guarantee that not all countries will agree to allowing RFID or satellite tracking of
their containers. Therefore it would be wise to maintain the current versions of
security systems such as MARSEC that makes designations between the threat levels
of Cargo depending on its point of origin. If anything the current system of
designating risk by point of origin might assist in this tracking technology becoming
more widespread quicker. If it becomes known to charters and freight forwarders
that using this technology on their container will lessen the odds of their cargo
being stopped for inspection in spite of the point of origin from shipping being
somewhere with a dubious MARSEC rating. Therefore, satellite applications are not
critically impaired by regional differences and are useful for global container
security.
The benefit of the use of a satellite system is that it could communicate in
real time or nearly real time depending on the satellite system used. Satellite-
equipped containers could then likewise utilize these sensors, but the benefit of it
being that a satellite system could be programmed to immediately warn its users of
changes to a cargo container giving them an opportunity to investigate the container
themselves or warn port authorities of the fact they might have a dangerous
container on their ship. Satellite applications even also allow for remote unlocking
of the doors because of the variety of data that can be sent. Finally, satellite offers
redundancies in notifying the user of problems encountered during the
international movement of the container. If instituted correctly containers could be
laden in sight of an MDA trained (so as to ensure the cargo was legal when placed in
the container) dockworker, secured and then placed under satellite supervision. If
anyone tried to tamper or open the containers prematurely, the satellite monitoring
it could warn An RFID user either on the ship or the port of destination and they
would know to scan the container using the already setup scanning assets for
dangerous material.
The more data that the RFID collects prior to the container reaching an
American port the more likely that a suspect container can be identified before it
could cause any damage. That information alongside the MARSEC and MDA will
allow for a much more thorough review of a containers contents prior to it reaching
a port. This in turn is why the RFID technology is in many ways the best option at
the moment. It could be incorporated into the system already in operation and in
turn adds another layer of container security.
Transition
The transition by the United States into incorporating better tracking
technology into their current maritime security systems such as MARSEC (Maritime
Security) and the MDA (Maritime Domain Awareness) as a way to improve it ability
to secure shipping containers has been slow. While these programs currently rely
on recognizing signs of suspicious behavior by a shipping containers route or point
of origin as a way to identify possible terrorist attacks, prior to them reaching an
American port. The United States historically has been slow to be more proactive in
the forms of security and risk management when it comes to creating a system of
protecting shipping containers. While many shipping experts will admit that
MARSEC and the MDA have been effective so far in stopping WMD from reaching
American port through shipping containers. Simply relying on a system of
procedures based on noticing suspicious signs on a container as an early warning
system has a very real potential of failure. All it would take is for a terrorist to ship a
WMD through the normal shipping protocols and it could bypass the system set up
due to not being inconspicuous enough. Detection of suspicious
containers cannot be based on only one maritime aspect, such as cargo’s
movement. Recent events of Maritime related terrorism show that unusual behavior
cannot be the only determining factor in threat assessment. No unusual or
suspicious behavior was found in the attacks on the USS Cole, or bombing of
the SuperFerry 14 bombing in the Philippines where terrorists killed 116 people by
hiding explosives in a Television set.
The alternative plan to relying on the MARSEC and the MDA that is often
touted by politicians, that the United States should adopt a container/shipping
security plan based upon scanning 100% is unrealistic. Unfortunately 100%
scanning has already been made into law by the 9/11 act that had a provision in it
that altered the SAFE Port Act to require that inspections happen at ports that
included scans for radioactive materials. There are several problems with this law
that make 100% scanning at docks not just pointless but unrealistic as well. The first
being that the law states that scan’s must take place on the dock. Even if dangerous
material was found at a dock and made inoperative before it could hurt someone or
destroy something. The disruption to the docks operation for a single day due to it
could potentially be in the 100’s of million. In addition to this the technology needed
to perform 100% scanning efficiently does not exist, and even if it had. The United
States would likely be unable to pay for it anyway. The reason being that Congress
did not propose a bill that would cover the cost of installing these hypothetical
scanners in the SAFE Port act. Finally the last reason that 100% is an unrealistic goal
is because it would require that docks across the world to carry the equipment
needed to scan containers 100%. For that to happen would mean that the United
States would have to impose its safety regulations on the world, which is politically
impossible to do.
It is for those reasons that the 100% scanning of containers mandate is
opposed by the Retail Industry Leaders Association (RILA), whose members include
Apple (AAPL), Costco Wholesale (COST), Home Depot (HD), Nike (NKE), Target and
Wal-Mart stores (WMT). The group’s vice-president for supply chain policy, Kelly
Kolb says, “It’s not effective or feasible to scan every container that meets our
shores”. Even in the face of all this extensive critique from business leaders and
politicians. The 100% scanning requirement has only had the 100% scanning
provision deadline pushed back to 2014.
Recently the private market has produced some solutions that could
potentially create a solution that can be realistically proactive while not hindering
business if instituted. In 2006, Powers International Inc. located in Belmont, North
Carolina announced today that was testing a joint international project to
demonstrate its SeaCure Satellite System (SCSS) container security solution in an
international shipping trial.
RFID usage for global container transportation is not conducive but satellite
communication is good for the following reasons; A satellite system using either low
earth orbit (LEO) constellations or a high-altitude geosynchronous satellite
transmits data differently, but the vendors' systems will work anywhere in the
world that they have coverage. Therefore, satellite applications are not critically
impaired by regional differences and are useful for global container security. In
addition to this the Department of Defense has been testing this type of technology
for security reasons since 2008. “research will prove the feasibility of developing a secure,
satellite-enabled, radio frequency identification (RFID) system for verifying the location of and
tracking in-transit items without disclosing the location or nature of the communications to
unintended individuals.” (http://www.sbir.gov/sbirsearch/detail/303063)
The benefit of instituting of a satellite system/RFID into the current security
systems is that it could communicate in real time any potential risk to whoever is
responsible for security at whatever point it is in its transportation. If and when any
of these containers would set off an alarm due to it being tampered with, the
corresponding person on the chain of responsibility (the VSO, FSO, or the CSO)
would know that they would have to put that container through further testing. If
instituted correctly containers would be laden in sight of an MDA trained (so as to
ensure the cargo was legal when placed in the container) dockworker, secured and
then placed under satellite supervision. If anyone tried to tamper or open the
containers prematurely, the satellite monitoring it could warn An RFID user either
on the ship or the port of destination and they would know to scan the container
using the already setup scanning assets for dangerous material. Satellite
applications even also allow for remote unlocking of the doors because of the
variety of data that can be sent. Finally, satellite offers redundancies in notifying the
user of problems encountered during the international movement of the container
The more data that the RFID collects prior to the container reaching an American
port the more likely that a suspect container can be identified before it could cause
any damage. That information alongside the MARSEC and MDA will allow for a much
more thorough review of a containers contents prior to it reaching a port. This in
turn is why the RFID technology is in many ways the best option at the moment. It
could be incorporated into the system already in operation and in turn adds another
layer of container security. Instituting this program would take time. Containers
would have to outfitted with the technology needed, and the individuals who would
be in charge of maintaining this system would have to be trained in the proper
procedures for loading and unloading cargo as well as how to go about scanning
containers that might pose a risk of being a WMD. However the time and money
needed to achieve this would likely be far less and much more feasible than trying to
continue to implement 100% scanning of all containers that come to ports located in
the United States. What we have described here is improvement of a system that
while already being effective had the flaw of being to vulnerable to human error. By
following the suggestions made in this paper on adding more tracking technology to
that system in theory the need for scanning could be eliminated and the threat to
ports lessened significantly. “This strategy requires a combination of different
technologies with traditional control methods and risk management based on
reliable and adequate information. The improvement of cargo and container
integrity during the whole transport cycle is another key layer where modern
technology such as sealing, tracking and tracing, positioning or scanning technology
can help.” (Sec_2010 pg 14)
In addition to this another step that should be taken to ensure more security
of America’s shipping ports should be America transitioning its views on security as
being from a singular national point of view to being more collaborative global point
of view. International shipping is a global trade and shipping containers will travel
around the world due to this fact
National policies will, however, be ineffective unless they are supported by enhanced international cooperation to guarantee their coherence and compatibility. Terrorists will focus attention to 'the weakest links' in the international supply chain; it is a joint responsibility of the international community to strengthen all elements of the supply chain in order to diminish the chance of an attack.…. The idea is to address the security of the international supply chain as a global and complex challenge, and to offer a range of global security options which, if implemented together, form a more effective and flexible multi- layered risk management strategy.” (Sec 2010 pg 14)
By forming international partnerships and alliances, the United States along
with its international allies. Can work far more effectively together to lessen the risk
of global commerce being used as transportation route of terror than any singular
country can hope to work towards this goal alone. This goes along with the goal of
superior tracking of containers. Just because a container might be transported to
and from foreign ports doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t still be observed so as to keep
the risk of being tampered at a minimal.