Download - Sosa - Judgment and Agency (Part III)
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T
Knowledge andAction
hat
foilows
r,vili draw
inspiration
fronl
Aristotie's
virtue
theory
for
an accrount of
how
human
knowledge
and action are
related.
A. Aristotle
r.
We
begin
r.vith
a
passage
that
illurninates Aristotle's
ethics,
frorn Book
ll,
Clrapter
4,
of the
lrlicomachean
[:thics;
It is possible
to
do sonrething that is
in
accorciance witir the
laws ofgrarnnrar,
cither
by
chance or at the
suggestion of another. A uran will
be a
gramnur*
ian,
then,
only
when
he has
both done
something
grammatical
and donc it
grammaticaliy;
and
this
means
doin;
it in accordance with the
gramuratical
krrowiedge in hirnself.
(ENII
a,
no5azz-(>)
'l'his
provides a key
to
Aristotle's view of hurnan flourishing as the fun-
tlrrnrental
ethical
value. Please
note that
the second
o'in
accordance with"
(.ilnnot
mean
simply
"coinciding
with the
content of."
After
all, what
orrc
cloes nright coincide with the content of
one's
knowledge entirely
by
,'llance.
But Aristotle
means
to
rule
out
such accidental coincidence,
as is
t lcar
in the
first
sentencre
of the passage.
There nlust be
a tighter
connection
tlrln
jr-rst
coinciclence letween one's knowledge that a certain
sentence is
rtlrulrnratic:al
ancl thc
bcing granrnlatical clf
one's utterance,
in
order
for the
uttcr;Il)c:c
to trc
"in
ccorcianc:cr with" the knowledge. The
sentence
may
lrc knowll to bc
gnrnrnltic'a1,
firr
onc thinil,
blrt
its
grarunratical
utterance
rrr;ry bc
clrrc
orrly to
tlrc
ussrrr:rrrt'c
of
rr
liar
(to
tlrc
"suggestion
ofanother"),
u,llilc tllc
klrowlctlu('rr.'nlrtins
irrrplicit
rlrrl
ill,rt
tivc.
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r34
KN()WLEDGIT
AND
ACl
l()N
The
view
is
fi,rrther
specified
in the
capsulc
statelllellt
foupd
in
Book
I,
Chapter
7,
accordillg
to
which
. . .
hura
good turns
out
to
be
activity
of
soul
in
accordance
r.vith
virtue,
antl
if there
are
more
than
one
virtue,
in
accordnce
lvith
the
best
and
most
cornplete.
(ENI
7,
ro98ar-r7)
Chapter
8
adds:
Yet evidetly,
as we
said,
it
leeds
the
cxternal
goods as
well;
for it
is ipos-
sible,
or
not
easy,
to
do
noble acts
without
the
proper
ecluipment.
Irr many
actions
lve
usc
friends
and
riches
and
political
power as
itrstruurcnts
.
.
'
(EN
I 8,
ro99a3r-bti)'
And
Chapter
9
explains
furtirer:
[Happiness]
. .
. has been
said
to
be a
virtuous
activity
of soul,
of
a
certain
kincl.
Of the
reraining
goojs,
sonte
ll1tlst
necessarily
pre-exist
as
condi-
tions
ofhappiness,
and
others
are
naturally
co-operative
and
useful
as
instru-
ments.
(ENI
9,
ro99bz-8)
One
last
important conlponent
appears
in Book IV, Chapter
r:
Now
virtuous
actions
are
noble and
done
for the
sake
of the
noble.
Therefore
the
liberal
ruan,
iike
other
virtuous
men,
will
give
for the sake
of the
noble,
and
rightly;
fbr he
r.vill
givc
to the
right
people,
the
riglrt anloullts'
ancl
at
the
right iinre,
with all
the other
quaiifications
that
accompany
right
giving; and
that
too
with
plcasurc or
without
pain;
for that
which
is
virtuous
is pleasant
orfree
frorn
pairr-least
of
all will
it
be
painful.
(ENIV r, rI20^4-7)
z.
Beyond
his
own
nlain
statenrents,
Aristotle's
vierv
stands
otlt
lnorc
clearly
by
contrast
with
the
Stoic
alternative,
which
seenls
diametrically
opposed.
Aristotelian
flourishing
involves
the
exercisc
of
one's
virtuc's'
ntoral
and
intellectual. However,
sonle
virtues require
external
aids
ftrr
their
exercise, as
when
liberality
reqrlires
itlollcy.
Ily
contfast,
all
that thc
Stoics
require
for
a
full
nteasure
ofhappiness
(f;rring wcll)
and
virtue
is that
one
properly
order
one's
preferenc:es
and
clhoose
raticltrally
()n
th:rt
basis.
r.
It
riht
be tgrrght
tht cxtcrnrl
qoorls
firrtlrcr
hrppirrcss
tltc_rv:ry
:t gootl
stotclr
tirrthcls
'r
pl..riirrblc
i,rt".ii.l
strc,
irs
r,rr"r.i,'',".,,,
to
rcrl hlprirrcss,
rvhith
is
irrtcrrrrlly
(-()lrstittltc(l'
ilrrt this clrrtr.rt
frc
riglrt,
givcn
tllrt
Iir Alistotlc
lrl'irrrr
rvcll is
r'rrrs/lllrlr'rl
by
tttllrlc
t
titlll.
sttt l
rs
thc
libcllrl
h;rn,lirrg
ovt'l
,r{'.1
lili.
.rrrrl
rrot
.irrst
tltc
situttl.tt
tllll
ilt
.t M.rtrix
sr't'rlritl.
Nol
ir
it plrLrsiIlc
t
lr,rt lr;rpprrrcss
,,rrsist.
ol vrr t rrorrr
t I
ivil
\'
tllrr
p,rsst'ssiott
of cx
tt'lll gotltls'
sillt
r'
Itttttt.ttt11,,,,,11(\'lll1l()ll\.l(tiVll\'..lltlcrltltt'tltl0tlt
ll(',llilIvllIll{rtl\'l(Il\lt\"l)lllll)\tltl
rrt'rtls
rsr',1 irl
solttt
rtlr lt .tr I tvtt
1'.
l.t5
True virtue resides tn
the
perfection
of
one's
rational nature, and it is tllc
exercse of such virtue and
only
this that makes
a
life
good.'
Thrs paints
a
stark
contrast.
'Who
is right?r
B.
Aristotle
and
the
Stoics
r.
Take
a culture
where
sheep
are sacred
and wolves evil. Shccp urc t() [)('
protected,
wolves to
be
killed. Suppose you shoot and kill
a
shccp in woll
's
clothing. Your
action
is
"in
accordance" with virtue. Nevertllclcss,
it
l,rlls
short.
We are focused on
your
doing
in killing
that shcep-that
vcry tloiui.
not
things done whereby
you
do that doing. This doing is clistint t
fiorrr
any action
ofyours, strictly
speaking.
An
action of
oing
nrust
illlplcurcr)l
,ur
irrtention
to o, as
such, and
you
do not
intend to kill a.s/lccp,
as
sur'lr. Yor
rl,'
intend
to kiil that animal
(clothed
as a wo10,
and that
aninral
i.r :r .r/rcr7r, lrrrt
you
do
not
intend to ki1l it under rlris description.
Suppose
next you
shoot
and
kill
a
wolf
in
wolf's clothing.
Nolv
you tlo
intend
to kill this arrinal, and this
alrinlal
is
a wolf, and
you tlo intcnrl
ro
kill
it
under
this
dcscription. Now your full endeavor
is in
act:ortlrurt
t' rvit
lr
your
virtue, as
is
its
succcss.
You do
intend to kill that anintal bcfirrc
v()u,
,rs
it
happens a wolf, and you do
intend
to
kill
it
as
a rvolf.
In
a
wrry
tlris srrt
t't'ss
i-s
"in
accordance with"
your
relevant conlpetences,
practical
rultl t ounitivr'.
You
endeavor
to
kill
that
rvoif
by shooting
it,
when you spot
it,
r
ntl
bclit'r,t'
it
correctly
to be
a
wolf.
You thr.rs
bring
to bcar
a colllplcx
c:ornlrint'tl r'onr
pe tencre. This
includes
your
ability to tell the look of a wolf
,
:rncl
it irrclrrtlt's
;rlso your shooting cornpetence.
So,
your lethal
shot at
tht
wolf-n,rrrilt'sls
rclevant
virtues
and
conlpetences
seated
in
you.
Ncvcrthclcss, y()ur
killrrri
r.
'I'hc
atticle
on Stoicisnr, by Dirk Blltzll', in the
.\r,lrlirrrl
I:ucytloptlit
rtl l'ltlosoplty
(
onl.un\
.r
llrief'accottnt.AlsorelevantistheostensiblecontrrstrviththcsrrlposcdlySotr.rtir
lrcu'rlr.r(
wisdorn is
sullicient
for happiness
(for
flourishing). llrrt scc l{trsscll.l,rrrcs olr
"Wstlorrr
.rrrtl
Hrtrpirressirtllutltl,duutts:7tl-:ll:,"Pltil()soplt(rs'lrryrrtt,rj(tq)("tol):
r:r,lir.(()nrl)('llrrf'
cr-itiqtrr: of':tddutirr
tllll(
pssiluc
in
suppor-t
ot'thc thcsis tl)rt
So.r'.rtcs
(rr
l'l.rt,,''
Sot
r.rttr)
rc1ly
hcld tlrc
vicrv tlrirt rt,istlonr rs
rr1/ir'i'lt,
urrtl
rrot-jtrst
l(l('rr,//)/, lirr lr.rprrrt'ss
.
Iltrvctticdtotitcortlvs,rnt(('nlr.rll).rs\;r{csinlp()ttiurt
lirrlllt'ttounl ol Aislrrttlr.trcllrrrs
tlrtisslrlrl;trtl,.tllc.tsltttlltrtsicler
thcn hcr.jtrclnrent
that
it
is
sunny outside
at
a
nroment
when
tlrc scrccrr
r/o's ltntpcttto
r'pcrfe'c:tly
tratrsparent, errabling her
to see that
it
rs inclcccl
sur)uv:rt tll:rt
v('r'y n)()nrcnt.
Tllc nlcrc qlJinnatior in
the endeavor
II.
Wt'(,ul
.r\slrtttt' lll.rt,
.rt lll,
nr()ru( nl
rltt'
tn.rtlr'ltt't
tt,lgtnt'nt.
llt't sitt,rtiott
totrltl sw,itt'lr
nl\l.illl,ll('()tt\l\'.trl
rr,l/l//rr,/)'lt,'ntlr.rn\l),u('nl
\(t('('nl()\(t('('lt
rr.tllt lnovrr'.
KNOWT-EDGE
AND ACTION
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KN()W
LIlD(;E AND A(lTI()N
KN()W Ltlt)(;li AND ACTI()N
I5I
to aflirm
correctly
is then
plausibly
colllpetent
on the
first
order.
It
is
basecl
inrnrediately
on the apt visual
experience
and the
apt
visuai
seerning
that
p.
In aflirming accordingly, she thereby
functions appropriately. The aflir-
nratioll then cloes get
it
right, and in
so doing
manifests
a
first-order
conr-
petence
to
nrake
such
correct
visual
affirmations.
So, the
afftrmation
is
not
only conlpeterlt
but
also apt.
Flowever,
the aflirnration might
too
easily
have been
inapt,
since
the
screen
nright
so
casily havc bcen opaque
(whilc
seanrlessly segueing
into
sonlething
now quite
clivergent
fronr
the
reality
yonder).
Something is
thus
seriously
amiss
in the
relevantjudgnrent, which
falls
short
in
the
fbllowing
respect.
To
judge
is to
affirm
in
the
encleavor
to affirm aptly.
But when
she takes
it
tlrat
in aflirming
as
she
does she
would
then
affirm
aptly,
our
subject
is
incorrect.
Given the
randonr
behavior of the
screen,
given
that it is
just
as
likely
that it would be
transparent as
opaque, she is wrong to think
that shc:
utctuld
then af{irnr
aptly,
if
she
affirnred at
all
on the
nlatter
at
hand.
Only by
luck
can she at that nroment
get
it
right
with
her relevant
first-order
percep-
tual
affirmations
airned
at truth. True,
her
alJtrnrafttn
tltat
p
is
correct
at that
ttronrent, when
the screen happens
to
Lre
transparellt
(at
least
for
a
llronlent).
Her aflirmation
is
correct,
and even apt, as
rpt
rs
would
be
her
aflirmations
based on her
perceptions
through an
open window sorne sunny
morning.
Why
are
they apt that
way? Iiecause
she
happens
to
satisfy
the interest-
ing
Shape and Situation requirenrents whosc conrbination with her visual
sorting skill
gives her
the
conrpetence to
sort
the
things she
sees
clearly dis-
piayed
under
the
sun before
her.
Nevertheless,
Sinrone's
perceptual
judgments
through
the randomly
transparent screen
are not
apt, since her
affirmations are
not guided
to
apt-
ness
through
an
apt
appreciation
of
the
conditions. Therefore,
when
shc
happens
to view
the
scene hefore her through the trensparent
screen,
ancl
affirms about that
scene
in
the endeavor
to aflirnr
aptly,
she will
affirnr
aptly.
but
her
attainment of
this ainr will
not be
apt. This is
becatrse
the ranclonr-
ness
of
the screen precludes
her
believing
aptly that
her afftrnlatic>ns about
the
scene
beyoncl
l,trltl
thcn bc apt,
that
if shc thcn affinlrccl ebout thrt
scene,
her affirnlation u,ottltlbc
apt.
T'his
is nrclc fhlsc
by tlrc
firct
thrt tlrt'
screen rnight:rs
casily
bc trattspurcnt lls
n()t
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r52
KNOWLEDGE AND AC]'ION
with the perceptual conlpetences made possible
by the transparency of
the
screen.
But
she
lacks
the second-order
com.pctence required
forjudg-
nrental
knowledge. She
lacks the
required conrpetence
to
judge,
not
just
to
afiirm,
aptly. This required competence
rvould
enable her
to
succeed
aptly
in
the endeavor notjust
to
get
it right,
but to get
t right
aptly.
4.
That
is
then what
we nray be
tracking
commonsensically when we deny
that she
really
knows even
when the
screen is
perfectly transparent so
that
on the first
order
she fcrrrns
apt perceptual aflirmations
(ancl
representa-
tions). Those afiirrnations
(representations)
fail to be guided
to
aptness by
the subject's
awareness
that
they uottld
be apt.
Even
though they
are
apt
when the screen
happens
to be
trarlsparent,
their attainment
of
ayttness is not
itself
apt; it is spoiled by credit-iimiting luck.
J.
There
is
however a difference between our
two
Simone
cases.
Simone:
in her plane
up aloft does have
credal anirnal
knowledge of the scene before
her
on the ground,
despite
how
easily
she nright
have
been in
the simula-
tion
cockpit instead.
By contrasto when she faces
the transparent screen,
Simone lacks any credal
knowledge
of the scene before her.
That
contrast
between
our
two
Sinrones
derives
from
the follow-
ing
corresponding contrast.
When
up
aloft, Sirnone's
perceptual
afiir-
rnations
are unsafe in one
way:
as she makes
her
perceptual
afhrmations,
she
might
easly hat,e
been ili
piaced
to
make
thenr,
since she might so
eas*
ily have been
in the simuiation cockpit.
Clall
this
backwards-unsafcry,
l)espitc
the backwards-r.rsafety of
her
perceptual
affirnrations as she
nrakes
thenr,
Simone's affirnrations r,vhen
aloft
still seem
safe
in
another
wayr
if
she
werc
to
ask herself whether her
affirmation
u,ould
thtnbe apt, as
she
contemplatcs
a perceptual
affirmation,
she
can lnswer correctly in
the
afiirrnative.
So,
hcr
afti
rmation
then
is
-forutard
s -
safe.
If
Simone aloft lacks creclal anirnal knowledge, then,
it
is
not for the
rcr-
son
that the screen-dependent Sinrone
lacks
it.
It is
not
because
it
is-llsc th:rt
she would afiirm aptly on the scenc before her.
If
Sinrone ak>ft
lacks
crccl:rl
animal knowledge
it is rather because, cvcn if it happcns t()
bc
true:
thlt
il'
she affirrrr.ed
perceptually, shc r,,rrulr/ afflnlt
aptly, rhis is
n()t sonlc)thing
sllc
is
in
a
position
to
know,
4ivcn
hr>w
casily
shc tt,qltt
tltut
ltaw ''l rurclcr sinlrr-
lation,
itrdisc:cnt
ibly so.
(lonsiclcr'
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INTENTIONAT.
AC
rr()N AND
^IUDGMENT
2. Evetr that
rnuch
is made
cloubtful by
actions still
to
sonle extent
apt
and creditable without
anything
properly called knowiedge to
serve as the
nleans-end
connection. Not even
subcredal
knowledge
seenrs
required.
Take
a
case
in which
we
need
to choose
arbitrarily by
just
supposing
that
a
certain nleans-end proposition
is
true.
'We
may need to act
on
that
assunrption
just
as an
arbitrary choice among
3o
equal options, one
of
which
nrust
be
chosen.
We might
just
barely
guess
by opting for
straight
swimrning
in
one of
3o
clirec:tions, and we
nright
reach
land that way,
and
our cloing
so
nlay be
apt to
some
extent. Our
guess is
rnininrally
competent.
At least we
do not swinr in
circles
So
that seenls a
way to
get
it right
on
the
direction
of reac:hable
land, in
a way
that
manifests
some
degree ofaptness.l
C)n
the
other
hand,
we need not
even
positively guess.
We
need not
posi-
tively think that the choice we have made is right,
and that
our
choic e
will
be
a successful
means
to our
end.
'We
can insteacl
lust
supprrse and hope that
the
chosen
option
will
yield success, while acting on that
assurnption. Here
one's
action nright be succ:essful and even
apt to some
extent,
despite the
element of luck owed to the arbitrariness
of our supposition. Here again,
what
may
enable
the action
to
attain
sonre
degree
of
aptness
is
that
it
suc-
ceed
(one
reaches land) in
a
way
that
nlanifests
(suflicient)
competence,
so
as
to
be a
success
sonrewhat creditable to
the agellt.
3,
That
conclucles
our
inquiry into r,vhether
apt action requires
knowledge
of
at least
the
anirnal
level. Arbitrary
suppositiorl carlnot
constitute
knowl-
ecige of
any sort.'
Apt
action connects with epistemology
rnore tenuously
than
by
requiring
knowledge
of the
nreans
to one's
end. Nothing nrore
is
necessarily
required than
arbitrary
supposition
on
which one
is
willing
to
risk
action.
Such
supposition will sonretinres enable
apt
attainnrent of one's
end by
connecting
it
to soille
nleans,
helping
thus
to constitute
a
much
fuller
c:onlpetence nranifest
in
suc-cessful
attrinnrent
of that
end.
A
value
ofaninral
krrowledge
hence
resides not in
its being
neccssary
for apt
intentional
action,
but rather in its
often being
a constitutive
part
ofwhat is
r.
Oourpare
the
pitcher
who ltrckily
hits
a
honre
nrn withont
nranifbsting
competence
(period)
as
a
hotuc rtrn
hirter
(trnhkc
the
uniclrre
llabe
l{uth). It
still seenls possible
to
say that
his
suc-
cess nrirnifbsts
s()lrc
(sliglrt)
tlcqrcc
of'corrrpctcnce
,
rntl instrrntiatcs
sourc
(corresponclinely
sliulrt) tlcqrcc of-lptrrcss.
:. Hct'c wc
slrorltl irrtclrlct
tllc
";r'bitrrincss"
of'tllc supl)()siti()ll
til prct'lutlc tllc
solt
of'sub-
lintin:rl rcli,rlrllitVtll.rt t'n.llrl('\()urcyc
t'x:rrrrsrrlrjt't't'suucsst'st()(.()llstitutc.rsortof'sulrt'rcrl:rl
k rror','lctlHr..
r55
-#**ir
'{'
"d
,$
Intentional
Action
andJtdgment
A.
Taking Stock
r.
We have explored
a connectiou
between
knowledge
and
apt .tctiot.t,
action
whose success
ntanifests
pertinent
colllpeteltce.
'We
have
focusecl
on
action that
takes a
nleans-end fornr,
a
forrn
huttratt
action
so
often
does
take.
Clonsider
the complete
conrpetence recluired
fbr
slrch
actiou
to
bc:
conlpetent
and fur
its
sLlccess
(in
attaining
its
airn) to
nranifest
conlpetellce.
Such conrpetence seerned
initially
to require
the agent to
beleve
knou,ledgt''
ably
the
relevant nreans-end
proposrtion.
On
further
rcllection,
that
rlow
appears
too
rcstric:tivc
a
view of
apt
action,
which ntay
after all
require
rlothini
nlore
tharl a
good guess,
especially
if
one
rtrust act
whetr nothing
epistenrically
better
is
avail-
able.
In
response we nray
recluce the
level of
klowleclc
requirecl ttr
that of
sinryly thnkng
that the
nreans-end
proposition
is
trueo
so
long
as
this thought
is colnpetently
enough
sustairred,
c:ven
with
coltrpetellcc
'nvhose
reliability
lies
well
below
Jo
perc:t:nt.
We
rteec{
not
evett
insist
that this
is
literally
knowleclge.
We
can
allow
that
we
speak
rtretaphori-
cally
in calling such
guess-like
thoughts
"ktrowled4e." This
neecl
tror
concern
us
if
our
interest
is
not so
tnttch senlantic
as
rttctatrllrysic:al analy-
sis.
But
we
have seen how
proper it
see
ttrs
to
rcc'optrizc
in Errglisll
r
killtl
of
subcredal
aninlal
knowle
clge,
as
in the c:ase of
thc, fllwle ss cyc-cxaltl
subject.
If crcdll
lnilnl krrowlcrlgc
is not rcrlttirctl
for u t'oltlpctctl('c
t() stt('('cctl,
pcrlrirps
subr'rctlul
:llliltr;rl kllowlcclsc
(';ut
sufllr'c?
Arrtl
pcrlrlrs
kllowlctluc'
trf';rt
lc';rst
tlris
low lcvcl
is
n'rttin'l?
-
7/24/2019 Sosa - Judgment and Agency (Part III)
13/41
r5
TNTENTIONAL ACl'ION
AND
.IUDGMENT
sufficient.
This
status it
often attains
by
constituting
the subject's
grasp
of rel-
evarlt means-end
infornration,
however tenuous
that
grasp nray
be,
whether
through
a
reliable*enough
though
subcredal
thought
that
the
means
will
yielcl
the
desired
end,
or
through
a rnore substantiai
judgment
to that
effect.
Moreover,
such
"knowledgeable"
success
ts
more
fully
creditable
to the agent
than
is
the
success due to
suppositional
luck. And
the
relevant
crednl
anirnal
knowledge
would bring
creclit
beyond that
ofits
subcredal
correlate.
4.
Cornpatibly with that,
we can
nevertheless
uphold the Aristotelian
view
of
human
flourishing as a life
of acconrplishnlent, while activity of soul
rel-
evantly avoids
luck to
the
extent
that it is in accordance
with
virtue, and
at
the
limit in
accordance
".
. . with
the
best ancl
nrost
conrplete."
B.
What
Is an
Intentional Action?
A
Preliminary Account
I.
Have
we now
stumbled
on
a
problem
for
our
analysis
of
intentional
action in Chapter
r? An
h.entional
actittn was said to be
constituted by
the
apt
success
of an
intenticln of
the doer's, one that manifests
the
doer's
com-
petence
to succeed with such intcntions.
What now
shall
we say about
the swimnreruvho nlanages
to
reach shore?
Does he reach shore
intentionally?
It
would
seerl
so.
At
least, he
does
aim
to
do
so. And
he
does attain
that ainr. But
does
he
do
so
aptly? Does the
attain-
ment
ofthe aim nranifest a colllpetence to do so
reliably
enough?
Very
plausibly
it does
not.
At
first the
swinrrnerjust
guesses
at
randonl
one
of
3o
directions in
which he
uright
swirn,
and
the
guess,
as we
saw, need
not
even
rise
to the level
of
a thinking, however tentative, that land
lies
in
that
direction. It
nray
be
nothing
nlore
than
an
arbitrary
supposition for the
sake
of trying sonrething
as
likely
to succeed as any
of the
other
directions.
Shail we conclude that the swinrnrer reaches shore intentionally
without
nraniftsting
any conlpetence to do
so?
The success
does seeul
a
nrrtter
of
pure
luck,
which
ostensibly
refutes the
account
of intentional action as apt
intention.
Br-rt
it is ftr
fronl
cle r that
the
swinlrucr's sLlcccss cloe s nrrf nlanifbst
a
spc-
ciflc:
cclrupc)tcncc to rcrc'lr sllorc.
()orrrpctcnr:cs
ncccl
nt
trc
infhlliblc,
aftcr
:rll.'l'lrcy t';ur
bc.jtrst
rcli:tblc'to s()nrc'tlcgrcc,'uvllir'll t':ur bc
cxtrcntcly
krw.
A
lron('r'un
lrittt'r rrrirr,lrt,rnr
firt'tlrc
r.fit'r's,
t'xt'r-t'sing;t
t:ifi
ttrun:rtt'llctl
itt
INT'ENTIONAL
ACTION
AND
^IUDC;MHNT
r57
the
history
of
the
sport.
Here
reliability
is
still
quite
low,
while
artainmer
is nonetheless
intentional
and
creditable
to
say the
least.l
If
our
switnmer's
shore
is
distant
and
the
crossing
clifticult,
success
may
manifest
conlpetence
that
is
outstanding.
And
he
does
certainly
aim
to
reach
safe shore.
This
is
the
airn
that
keeps
him
swimming
for
hours.
Outstanding
cornpetence
is
then
rnaniGst,
yes.
Competence
to
reach
shore
given the swimmer's
capabiliti
es
and
knout-how?
This
is
not
so
clear.
According
to
our
accotlrlt,
however,
it
is this
sort
ofqper
fic con-ryetence
that
a
success
must
manifest
in
order
to
be intentional.
But
why
deny
to
our
swim-
mer
the
specific
competence
to
succeed
upon
trying
in those
conditions?
Conrpare
the
tennis
novice
who swings
wilclly
as he receives
a thunder-
bolt
serve.
There
are
matry
ways
he
might
have
swung,
rnany
arcs
that
his
racket
might
have
traced
at rnany
different
angles.
Ancl
there
is
of course
one such
way
of swingine
vigorously
that
will
vield
a
winning
rerurn.
Suppose
he happens
to
swing
that
way,
and
does
score
a
rvinning
return.
Is
he
then
competent
to
hit
a winning
return?
V/hy
not
say
that he
does have
a
competence
to
do
so,
though not
a
very
high
conlpetence?
After
all,
he
does
ainr to
hit
a
winning
return,
alcJ
he
does
secure
various
elenrents
of conrpetence
in
his
performance.
His
eyes
are
open.
He
is
alert
and
focused.
He
faces
and
swings
in
the right
direc-
tion'
Et
cetera'
His
overall
competence
to return
that serve
is
of course
extremely
low;
nonetheless
he
has
sorue
degree
of
it.
And
this
degree
is
then
exercised
in pursuit
of his
firm
and
present
aim
to
nrake
the
return.
He
does
succeed
in
doing
so,
nloreover,
and
his
effort
with
that degree
of
aptness
is
crucial
to the
success
of his
attempt.
Here
again
it
seenrs
rather
plausible
that
the
aim is
attained
intentionally,
as was
the
aim
of the swimmer.
2.
Competence
cloes conle
in
degrees,
within
a
dinrension
reflecting
ole's
probability of
success,
itr
reievatrt
conditions
of
shape
and
situation.
One
has
a
degree of
such "cotttpetence"
proportionally
to how likely
one
would
be
to
succeed
if
one
tried
when
so shaped
and
situated.
Conrpare
the
"length"
of
a
piece
of writing.
A novel
can
attain
sonle
clegree
of length
without
counting
as
a longnovel.
Similarly,
an
aIenr
can
attairl
sollle
deree
of
(relevant)
conrpetence
without
counting
as
a
(rele-
varrtly)
comltcfcttf
agent.
So,
we
lrlust
clistinguish
(a)
attainrlret
of success
.
llrrt
rlt'rrsc
r't',,rll
tlr.rr
rrrl
"rrt('llli'rr,rl"
is t.nlr;ulr()unr
t.
"lr\,,lcsrrgrr,".ul,l
is tlrrrs
stiPlrl,1i1,1.1"
l'('\lt
t(
l('(l
li.tln
ttr
ryl,lr.l.rlrlrrrlt'r,,litr.
).\lr(.(.(
ll
-
7/24/2019 Sosa - Judgment and Agency (Part III)
14/41
r58 INTEN'II()NAL
ACTt()N AND
.TUDGMENT
that
nranifests
sonle degree of
(relevant)
cornpetence
in a
given
dotnain,
frorn
(b)
attainnrent of success that nranifests cttmpetuzcc
(period)
in that
domain. Attainrnents
of
sort
(a)
rnay qualify as
intentional actiorts, and
for this
they
need
only attain sollre degree
of aptness,
corresponding to
the degree of pertinent cornpetence
then exercised by the
agent.
Only
with
attainrnents of sort
(b)
do we reach
success
that
is
apt
(period)
in
that
dornain.
In
this
sense
a
donrain
will
nornrally
allow
a
distinction
between
(c)
attainnlents to sonre
clegree apt, rnaniftsting sonre degree
of
relevant
conlpetence,
ancl
(d)
attainments that
are
apt
(period),
ancl
nranifest
conlpetence
(period),
in that
clonrain.
3.
The
foregoing
account acconlrlrodates
orlr
swimrrter
who
reaches
safe
shore,
the golfer who
scores
a hole-itr-one,
ancl also
the
fbllowing
conrpelling
case.
A prisoner
is
told
by
hisjailer
that
throughout the conring
night hisjaii
cell r,r,'ill
be
unlocked, but the
jailer's
testimony
is
only
a
cruel
joke.
The prisoner does
form
the belief,
though,
and by acting
on it that
night,
he escapes,
since
c:onl-
pletely by
accident
the
door
ras
unlocked.
Is
his
escape
intentional?
Is
it
apt?
It is hard to deny
that the
prisorrer esc:apes
intentionally
(by
design).
Moreover,
his
escape
does
seern
plausibly
enough to manifbst a
degree of
conlpetence
alreacly
seatecl in
hinr as he lay irr
bed
preparecl
to
nrake his
n1ove.
And that degree of conrpetence
seellls
also to lre
r-nanifest
in his
successful escape,
even
despite the
irrrportant
elenrent of luck involved.
A conrpetence need not be
infallible, after
all.
Note in
any case
the
sharp
contrast
lretween
the prisoner
and
l)avidson's
waiter.
The
waiter does
intend
to Llpset
his boss, to
c1o so
by
knocking
over
a
stack ofdishes.
So
he arranges the
tall
stack
in the kitchen in preparation for
the
execution of
his plan.
Br-rt before he
can
exc'cute, his nervy
interntiotr
nrakes
hinr
nervous,
which rnakes hinr sturttblc onto
the
stack,
thus
knocking it over
and upsetting
the
boss.
Here
there
is
a clear
and
powcrfirl
intuition that thcr
waiter
upsets
the
boss rruintentionally,
even
though
he
cloes
so
bcc:ause
of his
intention
to
do
so.
'What
then rnakcs the
cliflcrrcncc bctwecn
this casc artcl otrr
earlier
cases?
Is it
not true
in
all
ofthcrn thlt
thc
ascnt
suc:ccccls
in tkrin what hc
intends,
and succeecis accorcling to
plarr? It is by
krrockirrg ovcr
tllc
clisllcs
thar
thc waite-r upscts tllc: boss. Anrl
it is
by
s'uvirruirrg irr
ccrtuin
wirys
thr
tllc tcnnis
rtovit'c
ntl
tlrc
g()lfi'r-ltt;rin
su('('r'ss,;rrrtl
by
slvinlrrrirrg
in :r t'crt;rin clircr'ri
-
7/24/2019 Sosa - Judgment and Agency (Part III)
15/41
IO
INTENTIONAL
ACTION AND
JUDC;MENT
is a basketball
player's shot
reliable
enough
to count as apt? What
about a
baseball hitter's
swing?
A chess
rrtaster's
gambit? A cornedian's
risky
joke?
A
detective's
following
of a
lead? A
scientist's
line
of
inquiry?
In each
case
sonle
judgment
of
appropriate
risk
must be nrade,
one
that
takes
into
account the
relevant skills,
shape,
and
situation of
the perfornrer.
C.
Two
Further Problems
r.
Take
again a
golfer's
hole-in-one. Cornpetence to
hit a
hole-in-one
spe-
cifically
(or
at least reliability
at
cloing
so),
in
his
conditions
nllrst
of
course be
very low. But that ostensible
problenr
we
have aiready surpassed. The
golfer
nonetheless does hit the hole-in-one
intentionally. Ifin so
doing
he does not
manifest competence,
nroreover, it is not necessarily because
the competence
manifest
is too low.
We
have already seen low reliability
to
be
no insuperable
obstacle to intentional success.
More
problematically, however,
golfers
nornrally do
not
airn at
hittng
a
hole-in-orue specifically.
It need
not
be through
so
ainring that the
golfer
attains
his
success, though
the success
is
attained
intentionally
nonetheless.
'We
must
hence relax
the condition
that in order
to
attain
X
intentionally
one nrust
have
aimed to attain
X specificaily. One
nlust
have
ainred to attain
Y, for
sonle
Y
related
appropriately
to X. In the golfer's case,
here
is a likely
Y com.ing as
close
as
possible
to the
hole
(with
sinking the
shot
being
the
limiting case).
Of
course,
that does
not provide
a
general solution to how Y
rnust
be
related to X
in
general.
One
suggestion is
this:
X
rnust
be a
deterrni-
nate
ofY.
Better
yet,
X
nrust
be a deterrninate ofY
such that
the
alent
favors
Y&X over
Y&-X
in such a
way
that
he aims
to
attain
rnore specifically the
following
[Y, preferably
4.In
this
way,
an
airn
can
be
a
conrplex,
hierarchi-
cally
orclered aim.a
+.
Recall
in any case the shot
in the clark whereby Strperstitious
Huntcr harpens
to
kill
a
ratr-
bit. I now see
no good way
to cleny
that
htrnter s nltrch crerlit as
is
cltrc: orrr
ittcky golfcr anti
orrr lucky
swimnrer.
lt
seenrs [rest to grrrnt
thrrt Hrultcr tlocs
"intcntiorr.rlly"
kill tht rabbit.
as
cloes our
swinlllrcr rerrch
slr
-
7/24/2019 Sosa - Judgment and Agency (Part III)
16/41
r6z
INTENTIONAL
ACTION
AND
JUDGMENT
the
relevant
phenonlena
is now in
plain
view,
and
it retnains
oniy
to
apply
labels. True
enough,
that
is not
to say
that
labels
catrnot be
nrisapplied,
by
the
standard of
the natural
language.
But nor is
it
given
a
priori
that
the
language
will
always
stancl
ready to
deliver
already
dedicated
labels that
appropriately
distinguish
what is
there
to be
distinguished.
C)urs,
I
sense,
is
a
case
ofthe
lat-
ter sort.
Is it
really a deterlrrinate
issue
whether
I win
"intentionally"
when
my
rnaster
intention
was
to
lose,
rny
intention
to
win
only
clerivative?
In the
appendix
to this
chapter,
we
take up
what
it is
to intend,
which
deserves
our attention
through
its central
involvenrent
in our
account
of
intentional
action.
Ilut
fbr
now we
continue
to
develop
that account.
D.
Intentional
Action:
A
Further
Development
r. Let
us
next
explore
firore
fully the
metaphysics
ofintcntional
actiotr,
via
a nretaphysical
"by"
relation.
When
sonteone
has
ten
cents
in
their
pocket this
coulcl be
by having ten
pennies,
or by
having
two
nickels,
or by haviug
a
dinre.
These
are all
ways
of having
that amount
of
nroney
in
one's
pocket.
When
sonreone
makes
the
light
go on, this
could
be by
ac'"ivating
a
sensor'
or
by
flipping
a
switch.
These
are alternative
ways
of nraking
the light
go
ot1. [f
one
activates
the
sensor, this
could
be
as
passive a
doing
as
when,
pushed ofl a
cliff,
cne does
fall
to
the
ground
below.
Alternatively,
it could
be a deecl,
a doing
of
one's
own,
and
perhaps
even
something
one
does
intentionally.
This
could
in
turn
be dorre by
the
raising
of one's
right lcg.
Of
collrse,
one
nright
raise
one's
leg as a
ntere
cloing,
under
the
doctor's
nrallet.
One's
raising of
that
leg
is
not
just
the
rising
of
the
leg,
rn'hic:h
could
be
forced
up by
sonreone
who
seizes
it,
or
could
rise
in
a
sLlrgeott's
hands once
anlputated.
There
seenls
a diflerence
between
those
ways
in which
oneos
leg
nright
have risen,
and
one's
raising
that
leg.
The
latter
ts
tcrhap,s
sonle-
thing
that
one
r/oes,
even though
one
crallnot
help
cloing
it
otlc:c
the ntallet
strikes.
If a
purse
is in
the
way, olle
does
kick that
nurse; that
is sorlrething
one
surely
cloes.
If
ollc:
r/ocs
roll clowrthill
whctl
ptrshccl
frttrtl
tltc: top,
thett
in a
sinlilar
way
onc
riocs
raisc'
onc's lcg
whc,rl tllc
rlrllct
strikcs.
T'llcsc are:
tlritrgs
tlr:rt
onc
tlocs cvcn
if'rlonc
is
llropcrly
tlwttccl
s
"()l)c's
tlwll tloiltg'"
lly t'ontt';tst,
tltr'l'ising
of'tlrc
lcg
tllrrt
is rtllll)tlt:ttctl,
or firrc'ctl trp
plrysi-
,,rllv lry
st,nt(.()lt('t'ls.',.rr
l,y,r
tlu\t
ol'rvilttl,
r't)l'l't'slr(tlltls
l() l)()tlrirrg
tll:tt
tlllc
INTENTI()NAL
ACTION
AND
JUDGM
tjN"r
r63
r/oes,
not
even
to anything
that one does
passively.
Still,
one does
perhaps
raise
one's leg passively
under
the
rrrallet,
and
uery plausibly
otte
nright raise
it thus
passively
in one's
sleep, In
this
last
case
a
doing
is
one's
own
doing-
is
thus
a
"deed,"
let's
cail it
that-even
though
it
is not
ntcntionally
done.
There are thus
things done
by one's
bod
or its
parts-as
when the
leg
is forced
to
move
up-without
being
things done
by oneself. The
Ieg
does
lllovc
up,
even
if it
is made
to
do
so
by
the force
appliect.
And
there
are
things one does
passively,
deeds
done
without
being
done intentionally,
as
when
one nloves
one's leg
whiie
asieep.
2.
Cornpetence
aligns
with none
of that,
since it recluires
intention,
which is
absent in
those cases.
A
competence
is
a
disposition
to suc-
ceed
in
attaining
certain
aims
that
one might
have in
a
certain
dornain.
A cornpetence
is a
disposition
to attain
those
ains if
one tried
to
attain
thern.
Trivially, I
would
say, it is
a
disposition
to
attain thenr
ilrtention-
aliy,
everr if
this
does not entail
that the
attainnlent
nlust
be consciously
intentional.
'We
are
proceeding
on
the
assumption
that
in
order
to
do
sonrething
intentionally
one
nlust clo
it
in
accordance
with one's
nrost
deternrinate
relevant
plan,
one that
begins
with
a set
of
basic
actions
and
eventuates
in
the
aimed-for
outcome.
Holv
the
outconre
conles
about
nrust not
clash
with that plan,
as it
does
when
a golf
ball
ricochets
offa rree
for
a hole-in-
one.
Moreover,
the
execution
of the plan
must
consist
in the performance
of
a spatiotemporal
array
of basic
actions
whereby
one
nreans
to
attain the
objective
via the
plan.
The plan
might
gain
specificity
as
the
time for
action
approaches,
if one
thinks that
one
can still
affect
the
outconre.
That
is why
tlre
basic
actions can
be spatiotemporally
arrayed.
3.
-We
are
thus relyini
on
the
notion of
an action
that
is basc.
This
I
under-
starrd
as
sirnply a deed
D
that
one does
intentionally,
there
being no
other
cleed
f)'
Ity tloing
which
one intentionally
ainrs
to do D
(alternatively:
there
bcing
no
such D'
that
one
does
intention
ally in
the
endcaurrr
to
do D).
One inrportant
uotion
to
be used
below
is that
of
an aim
A's
being
.rttairrccl
pnrtly-by
onc's
cloirtsciecd
I)'. The
ainr nright
be a
deed
of
one's
owrr,
clcccl l),
as
abovc.
lltrt
othcr
ainrs
nright
also be attainecl
portly-lty
clcccls tlf-onc's
()w
n.
Wllcn
()r)c
rinrs
to tkr l),
tlrcrc
is;r
clcccl l)'lt,
wlliclr olrc
intcrrtionally
.tillts
to
tlo l),
wlrt'l-t' l)
l)'
in
tltt. lillitilrrr
t';rsc.
Wllt.n
ollt.
is
t.ornpctcrrt
t
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164
tNl'riN'tloNAt
ACl'lON
AND
IUDGMENT
by doing
I)',
for sonle
D';
rvhich
is cornpatible
with
the
possibility
that
one
do
D by
doing
D",
fbr soflle
I)"
distinct
from
l)''
Oue
may
be
competent
to
do
D
by
doing
l)', rnoreover,
bttt
nof
competent
to
do
D by
doing
D"'
In
that case,
if one
always
tried to
do
D
by
doing
D",
one
would
not
really
be
competent
to
succeed
when
one tried
to
do D,
In order
to
be
conlpeterlt
to
successfully
do
I)
when
one
tried,
there
ntust
rather
be
a
I)' such
that
one
would
succeed
reliably enough when
one triecl
to
clo
D
by
cloing D',
and
such
that
one
would try
reliabiy
enough
to
do
D
by
doing
D'.
(Or,
rather,
there
must
be
sonre set
of
actiolls
like
D'
such that,
in
trying
to
do
D,
the
agent
would
reliably
enotrgh
pick
one or
another
of
the
mernbers
of
that set
as
the
deed
by
doing
which
they
would
try
to
clo
D.)
For a
particular
exanrple
of
the
above,
let
D
=
putting
sonle
water
in a
certain
basin,
D'
=
twisting
open
the
right
faucet
with
one's
right
hancl,
and
D"
-
twisting
opell
the left
faucet
rvith
one's
left
hand'
Normally,
however,
one
tnust coordinate
one's
own
basic deeds
so
as
to
bring
about
one's objective.
One's
basic deeds
nrust forrtr
a
spatiotemporal
array
such that
olle
attailts
oue's aim
only
through
the
courbination
of
the
mebers
of
te
array,
where
the array
sufilces
for the
attainnre
nt
of the airn.
Here
the ainr
is
attained
suffrciently-by
the
combined
doing
of the
basic
deeds
in the
relevant
array.
So
we
have:
Attainment
A is
attained
sufficiently-by
set
(array)
X
iffX is
a
rnaximal
set
of
deeds
D
partly-by
each
ofwhich
is
A attained'i
Attainment
A
is
an
inditidual
attaintnent
by
indiuidual
I iff
A is
attained
sufiiciently-by
a
set X,
all deeds
in
which
are
deeds
of
I'
Thus,
one
rnay
filI
the
basin
quickly
by
first
opening
the
right
faucet
with
one's
right
hand, and
then
openine
the left
fattt-et
with
one's
left
hand.
If
no
other
basic
cleecl
is
requirecl
for
the actional
sufliciellcy of
that
set,
then
the
quick
filling
of that
basin
is an
individual
attaillnrertt
of
onc's own.
-5.
A is
a collcctittt,lttailuellt
ift X
is
ir
set
srch
that
A
is
attillecl
strfllciently-lty
sc't
X. ncl
therc
are at least
tw.
cleeils
in X clone
by clisparate
agents.
Attlinnlcnt
A
is
thcn
rt i'
-
7/24/2019 Sosa - Judgment and Agency (Part III)
18/41
lN
I llN
I l()NAt
A(,t
l()N
ANI).f
Ul)(jNil:N
I
Wc lrr:ry
tllus
t.ollc:lutlc
tlllt;r-jtrclgrrrcrrt
is
rn
illterllti
-
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19/41
So ctalRoots
ofFluman
Knowledge
Q
ocial
factors
affect epistemology in
at least two ways. They bear
on
an
l)irnportant
sort
of belief,
ancl
also
on a
corresponding sort
of
epistemic
competence. This concerrls
a kind
of value
possessed
by
knowledge,
and
concerns
also how
the
pragmatic can properly encroach on epistemology.
We begin
with
this
latter issue.
A.
Pragmatic
Encroachment
The Risk of Pragmatic Encroachment
What
sorts
of factors bear orl the huntins-relative evaluation of an
archer-hunter's shot? This involves
how
well that shot contributes to the
overall hunting-relevant objective:
say,
a
good
afternootr's hunt.
One way it
can
contribute is
by being successful, by aptly
hitting
a
target of
high
(hunt-
ing) value,
and
killing that
prey.
Such
aptness does
not require that the shot
be
also
meta-apt. A
shot
can
aptly
kill
its
pre , manifesting
the archer's
skill,
even
though
it
was
too risky
a shot, and betrayecl
poorjudgment.
An apt
shot can thus
fail
to
be nleta-apt.
On
a
nreta*level
we
ask whether the
risk
under4one is
appropriate.
What
might
this involve?
How
(:arl
we under-
stand
a way of
manaing and
assessing
risk while brac:kcting
suc:h
prac:tic:al
objectives as
how
rlruch
it
nratters
to that huntcr or
t()
his
tribc
that
hc not
rnisuse his
energy, titttc, ancl
rcsr>ttrcc:s?
Strppose
rt srrrccss/irl
ltttttt t
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20/41
T7I
knowiedge
i.s a norm
of assertion, that
one
falls
short
ifone afflrnrs,
whether
publicly
or privately,
what
one
does not
know.
Such
affirmation
can be
an
act either
of thought or
of speech.
Judgment
in particular
is
an aflirnra-
tive
act
of
thought.3 Knowledge
then is
a
nornl
ofjudgnrent.
And
this is
of
course conrpatible with knowledge being apt
belief,
or
belief
whose
cor-
rectness
nranifests
(sufficient)
conrpetence and not
(too
rnuch) luck. The
conclusion
to
draw
is
then that
aptncss is
a
norln
of
belief. And
this fits
our
picture
platitudinously.
A belief
cloes
surely
fall
short
ifit fails
to
get
it right
through conlpetence.
It falls
short
in the way
any
perfornrance
with
an airn
falls
short if it
faiis
to
secure its
ainr
through
conlpetence.
That
knowledge
is
a
nornr
of belief
is
then
a
special c:ase
of the fact tbat
aptnes.r,
success that
rrranifests
cttrnpctcncc,
is a
norln
of perJormancc.a
What,
however, does
such
conrpetence
require?
Core epistemic colnpe-
tence
is
a dispositional
ability
to
discern the
true fronr
the
false
in a certain
donr.ain. Infallibly
so?
Surely
not:
that
is
askine
too
rnuch.
Reliably? Well,
yes,
reiiably enougll,
What then
is the standard?
How
rnuch
reliability
is
required
for it to
be,
episternicaliy,
reliability enough?
Is
it
really appropriate,
hor,'ever,
to
reqriire
a
precise
specification
of
a
threshold? Is
this
not
as inappropriate as it
would
be
to insist
on
an exact
threshold for
justification
enough to
constitute
justification,
or an
exact
threshold fbr confidence enough to constitute
belief?
We are content to
assunre
that
tlrcre are such
thresholds
(or
twilight zones) for
justificatiorl
and
for
belief. Why
can't
we extend that
tolerant
attitucle to the supposecl
threshold
of
reliability for
epistenric
competence?
Can't
we
just
assunre that
there
is such
a
threshold, even if
we
callnot specify it
rrrore precisely?
Fair
enorigh.
But we nright
still
wonder
about the dimension
of epis-
ternic
justification
and
that
of
episternic
conlpetence
(whether
these are
clifTerent
or at
bottorn the
sarne),
and even
about the
dinrension
of con-
fidence.
All
three
are
nragnitudes,
each
plausibly
involving
a
threshold.
.t.
This is
a
tenrporary expedient for expository purposes; in
due course
rve
will
find reason to
clistinsuish
rrorc cl;rbot'atcly trctr'vceu
thc
state
ofbelieving
anri
the assertive act
ofjnclenrent.
.1.
Tlris
provirlcs rlrt urtlcrstlnrling
of'thc'kuorvlctlce
trornr
olassertion difibrent fi-om
that
firtnrcl in Tirrrotlry
Willirrrlrson's
Kr,rr,/r'r{qc
tutd Its Linits
(()xfirrd:
()xforcl
university Press,
:ooo). Scc cspcr'irrlly
ch. r t,
"Asscrtion,"
rvltcrc thc kllowlcdcc
rtrle
is unclerstoocl
as
qovern-
ing
rr.r'rr'r/irrr corrstitutivclv,
[r1'.rrr,rlt>ry lvitlr tllc w:rys irr rvlricll
tlrc
ltrlcs of'chcss
cr>trstitutivcly
a()vcrn
tlrc
Itic.t'..
()ru';rtt'orrlt
is irr tt'r'rrs
-
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172
SOCIAL
ROOTS
OF
HUMAN KNOWLE.I_JGE
We
might still wonder
how
such
a threshold
is set.
'What
sorls
of
consiclera-
tions deternr.ine
it? In particular,
is
the
epistenric threshold
invariant across
the practical
situations
ofboth
subject and attributor?
How
reliable
is reliable
enough?
Will this vary
clepending
on
how
much
is
practically
at stake
for the subject?
For
the
attributor?
Take a fact that
p.
Earlier
we
distinguished
(a)
the
degree of
reiiability
required
for
arl
appro-
priate
public
assertion
of
that
fact
(or
for
the
clam
to know it) from
(b)
the
degree
required
for the subject
to
just
know
it, regardless
of
whether
he
claims to do
so, and
also
from
(c)
the
degree
required
even
just
to
believe
competently thatp,
to
tnanifest
in so believing
a
reliable
enough
conr.petence.
These
degrees nray well
coincide,
determined
as they
all
are
by
what
we
can appropriately
store
for
later
retrieval
even
when the
original
basis is
lone
from. memory.
If we
put aside pragmatic
concerns such
as whether
a check
will bourlce,
or
whether
one
will
be late
for a tneeting
in another
city,
what
then determines
whether
a conlpetence
is episten:tically
reliable
enough?
How
can we
assess
risk of
failure
(false
belief) once
practical concerns
are
set
aside?
The
concerns that remain
would
be
cognitive or theoretical.
Using
a catchall
label,
let's
call
thern
"(purely)
episternic."s
'What
is distinc-
tive of
these?
They
presunrably
involve
truth,
and
its reliable acquisition.
A
competence
is epistemic only
if it
is
an
ability,
a disposition,
to discern
the true
trom
the
false
in a certain
domain.
But infallibility
is
too rnuch
to
require, which
triggers
once
again our
persistent question:
How
reiiable
is reliable
"enough," and
is
this
som.ething
that
varies
from subject to sub-
ject,
or
from attributor to
attributor,
or
both?
When
we bring
in extra-epistenric
concerns
about
physical safety,
or
bouncing
checks,
or
irnportance
of
tinrely
arrival,
in
the epistemc
assessnlent
of
a
belief,
are
we
proceeding
as inappropriately
as
when
we
assess
the
ten-
nis appropriateness
of
a serve
by
how well it
inrpresses
a
friend entering
the
stancls?
There appear
to
be
domain-intertral
stanclards
that
deternrine
proper
risk in tennis.
And
the sanle seenrs
true
of huntitrg,
and
ofindefinitely nlany
other
domains
of
hunran
perforrnanc:e.
These
adrnittcclly
resist
precise for-
nr.uiation. They
presurnably
concern
ltow sucrct:
ss
is asscssccl
intcrnally
to thc
dornain.
f)onrain-internal
stattclarcls
of suc:h
suc(:erss
wotrlcl lrclp clctcrtltillc
5.
ltrlrfirllt.t';rtt'oultwcnriry,
lrt'r'rl
l.,rult'outo(ltt'l'tontct-ttsllc'srtlcstltcpl'tttlt'ttti;rl:rlrtl
ltlot:tl.
su, lr.slrcrlr.rlrslllt';t.sllrctr,.Ilt',rvt'lll.tt
()l)('nlot
rto\t'..1n,1 ,ssltllt'lirl'srrrrrlrritVtlt.tl
.ttlVtltllct
rrrrlrr,)n((.t
n\l.rllrlrtrtltllr.,r. l.rrrr,,,rtlr('rnrlltttlt'tllt'trtlt'ol
tlrt"'rt,trllt.rl()ll)t.tl'ltl,lli(-."
173
dornain-internal
standards
for
"reliability
enough." For
a
hunt
we
have
the
successful
hunt,
for
tennis the winning
match.
Whether
a particular perfor-
lance
is appropriate
within
either
dornain
depends
on how appropriately
that
perfornlance
is meant to
contribute-and
how
appropriately
it
does
contribute-to
a
pattern
of activities with enough
probability
of
attaining
domain-internal success,
such
as
that of the hunt or of the rnatch.t'
As hunians and
as
fellow
mernbers
of our
conrmunities
and
of our
spe-
cies,
we depend cnrcially and variously on
the
acquisition and sharing of
information.
The epistemically successful
liG
is a difiicult
thing to
define
in
general ternr"s,
as
is
the
epistemically successful history
of
a comnlunity
or
species.
It
seems a
rnatter
of collectively attaining and sustaining a picture
of the surrounding world
that
enables
a
level of prediction, control, and
understanding
within an acceptable
range,
liven
the possibilities and
trade-
offs
proper
to
the
constitution
and situation of
the subject
and/or
his group.T
Here non-epistemic
factors do
plausibly
bear.
What
determines the
accept-
able range
depends
on the
needs
of that
life and corrlrnunrty, and
on the
range ofpossible
success allowed by
participants'
constitution
and situation.
Epistemic
competences
are
analogous
to
tennis
and hunting
compe-
tences.
The
latter
abilities or dispositions attain their status as
conlpetences
by how they bear on the
proper
objectives of tennis and hunting
respec-
tively. Whether
a
tennis
or hunting ability is reliable enough depends on
whether its
exercise can
suffciently further the relevant
objectives over
the
span
of a rnatch
or
of a hunt. This is compatible with the failure
of
many
instances
of
that exercise.
And
assessment
of proper perforrnance must
also
take
into
account
h
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SOCIAL ROOIS
OtI
HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE
175
174
SOCIAL ROO'I'S
OF
HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE
such
an ability
can be
rnaniftst
in the
success
ofthe
hunter's kill
or the
chartr-
pion's winning ace, nraking
this an apt
perfornrance. But it seenrs
quite oth-
erwise in
the epistemic
donrain; or at
lelst so
it seems
initially.
A speculative
hypothesis that
a detective,
or
a lover,
or a
rneteoroloist
feels in his
bones to
be
correct,
can be
based on
a considerable.
ability
that
nevertheless
falls well short
of
being
io
percent
reliable. An aflirmation
on
such
a
basis
is thus analogous
to
the
long
shot
by
ther
hunter-archer or
the
biasting
serve
by
the tennis
charnpiotr.
These
latter seen
properly
ASSess-
able as apt,
so long as they
succeed
within the
hunt or
the
nratch. Sttppose
the long
shot does
kil1 the
prey
and the
blasting
low-percentage
serve does
win the
point,
and suppose
these
perfbrnrances
to
be part of a
pattern
reli-
ably
enough
predictive of succress
over
the course of
a hunt
or of
a
match.
That particular
hunting
shot,
and that
particular serve,
would then
each
be
assessed
as both
apt and
neta-apt,
as
one
rvhose sucrcess
manifests
a
domain-specific
conlpetence
of
the perfortner,
and one
that
runs
appropri-
ate risk
(perhaps
when viewed
as part
of
a
relevant
overall
pattern), even
if
the
risk of failure for
that
isolated
perfornrance
is
quite high.
It
seems
otherwise, however,
in
the
donrain
of
knowledge. Take
the
speculative
belief-in*one's-bones
based
on
an ability
to
discern
truth,
though with
low
reiiability. That
belief will not
be
considered
an
instance
of
knowledge, surelyi
nor will
it
be
rirought
to
hit
the ttrark
of
truth through
a reliable enough
cpistenric
cornpetence
exercised
by
the believer.
If that
ability
falls
very far short
of reliability,
if it falls
near the server's
t5 percent
rate of
slrccess, then it will
not
be
granted
the
status
of a
knorvledge-level
epistemic
competeltce. When
taken at
face value,
its
deliverarlces will
pro-
vide
neither
knowledge nor
reliably
enough
apt beliefl,
Why
is a batter's
15 percent
conrpetertce
deerned outstanding,
as is
a
basketball
player's
40
percerrt
three-point
percentage.,
u'hile an
epistenric
ability
at
those levels
is
disnrissed
as
subpar
and inadequate
to
provide
knorvledge?
True, those athletic
percentages top the
relevant clistributions
among
humans and
even anrong
players. Suppose
however that
the ability
to
speculate correctly
on the
part of thc
clctcctive or
the lovcr
or tltc
ttrete-
orologist
also
tops
its relevant
clistribution.
All thrcc
ofltltertt
arc as
goocl
at such
risky, speculativc
thought s
is
artyor)c,
ancl [rr
bcttcr
thatl
ltt
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SOCiAL ROOT'S OF
HUMAN
KNOWLEDGE
that would
have
had
greater
chance
of success, as
there was no time to pass
to
a
teamrate.
The
teanr-involving
social dirnension of lrasketball
hence
does
not preclude
that a
perft>rnrance
rrright
attain
an
inr.pressive degree
of
aptness while
manifesting very unreliable
conrpetence.
Why
not allow
similarly
that
aptness ofbelief might be based on unreliable
competence?
The foregoing suggests a
distinction between:
srtmeuthat
apt thought,
whose
correctness nranifests sonle degree
of conrpetence
on the
part ofthe
believer, and on
the
nratter at
hand,
and
in the
circunlstances,
and
reliably
enough
thought
that
is apt
(lteriod),
above a
threshold ofreliable conlpetence
set
by
the
needs ofhuman flourisiring in infornration-sharing
conrnrunities.
Given
this
distinction,
we might
rvell
allow
that a
thought
can
attain
sonle degree of aptness rvithout alrrounting to
knowledge.
Thus, the
well-infornred hypotheses
of
a
self-conficlent Sherlock Holnres or
Albert
Einstein
can
anlount to
sonrewhat
apt
thoughts
(affirnrative
thoughts),
while falling short of knowledge. In
a way they
are: sonrewhat apt affirma-
tions,
whose
correctness does
nranifest conlpetence
far
above
the
aver-
age
for
the
sort
of
question
and
the circunlstarlces
involved.
Nevertheless,
they are
not
reliably
enough apt aflirmations. They
neecl
to
be
confirmed-
in
some cases
through
nlore
peclestrian,
reliable ways-before they
can
attain
the
status
of
outright
knorvledge.
Only through
such confirmation
could
they
finally
attain
the status
of
reliable
enough
apt
belief.
And only
thus
can
they be
really
apt
(pcriod).
Note
further
how
this
nright
help
explain
the
sta
nding of
rorm-requiring
conlpetence
(or
epistenric
justification)
for
assertion.
There is a nornr
of
assertion
that derives
fronr
a default reliability
requirenrent inrposed
on
mernbers
of
human cornnlunities.
'We
are
accordingly required
to
assert
only what
manifests
reliable enough
competence. What
is properly
asserted
is only
what is underwritten
thus reliably. The standing ofthis
norm derives
in turn
front the requirements
for
altproltratc sharing
of
infornration,
con-
ducive
to
human
flourishing through rnutual
reliancc.
So,
the cxplarration
of
the noril)'s stancling
will clcrivc
fronr
tlrc
rccltrircnrcnt of rcliability if
sharing
is
to
c
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r78
SOCIAL
ROOTS
OF
I-IUMAN
KNOWLI]DGE
an apt
intellectual
perfornlance,
a
perforrtrance
that
attains
its
aiur irl
a
way
that
manifests
the perforrner's
contpetence.
The kowledge
that
we
are
reluctant
to
attribute
here
requires full-fledged
jgdgntent,
notjust
a slless.
Compatibly
with
that,
we
can
allow
a
lower
grade
of
"knowledge,"
whether
metaphorically
or
literally,
olle that
requires only
apt
guessing,
and
not
apt
judging.
Aptjuclging,
nloreover,
requires
that
the
perforrner attain
his
airn,
and do
so
in
a
way that
rnanifests
"r'nough"
relevant
conlpetence.
Accordingly,
to
really know
fiuclgnrentally)
one
nlust aflirnr
in
the endeavor
to
get it
right
aptly
(and relial-rly enough),
ancl
or]e lnust
attain
that objective
in
a
wav
that
rnanifests
one's relevant
conlpetence.
Since
the
eye-exanr
glresser
cloes
not
evenjtrdge,
he cral)llot
knor.vjuclunrentally."
Encroachment
and
Invariantisnr:
.What
Is
Reliability
"Enough"?
Aptness
then
is success
through
conrpetence,
where
the cotnpetence
urust
be
reliable
enoup4h.
This enables
a
distinction
betweeu
the
things
we
knorn,
full
stop,
ancl
the
things
we
know well
enouh
to
act
on
thetn. One
might
knorv solnething,
after
all, even
though
in a
special
context,
e.l',
where
one's expert
opinion
is required,
otte
does
not
know
it well
enough
for action.
Just
think
of the
stakc'
involved
in the c:ontcxt
of
a
tluclear
reactor,
or a
law cottrt, or
a surgery
roonl.
How
nlore
specifically
do we
understand
this variation?
We
nrighr
try
saying
that
to
know
well
enough
in
a
high
stakes
situation
is
to
have a reliable
enough
apt belief.
If
we
applicd
our
earlier
fornlula,
then,
we
would
have
to say
that as
the stakes
rise, the
stttrject's
krtowledge
dwindies
or
even disappears,
providecl
his conrpetetrc:e
does
not
rise.
More
plausibly, however,
there
is
no sttch outright
loss
of
krlowledge;
what
chanses
is
only
whether the
subjc:ct
knows
weli
cnolrgh
irl
thc'
new
context,
with
its
higher stakes,
whether
he
knows
well
ettottgh
to ellable
proper
reliancc
on
that
belief as a
prenrise
in
practical
reas
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7/24/2019 Sosa - Judgment and Agency (Part III)
25/41
SOCIAL ROOTS OF
HUMAN
KNOWI-EDGE rBr
r8o
SOC]IAL
ROOTS
OF
IIUMAN
KN0WLEDGE,
(.()ur-s(.
tlrt.
.lr/.,t'l'.rr't
of-
nililit.s,t,irtq
lltttt
vrclt
uti
tlrt.
.\(.,l,r
ll.ttl',tl
l,rrrr,,rr,rtr,.'.
l'lrr,ttltllr
stt,'ll
a
saying
we can endeavor
to
attain
one
or
another of
a
vast
nunlber of airns,
inclucling
pragmatic
airlrs
divorced frorn
disinterested intention to inforrn.
Fortunately, there
rs very often the intention sinrply to infbrnr-to infornr
and not to nrisinforn-as
a
donrinant
aim
in hunran
conlnlunication. Given
our
capacity
for strategic
self-deception,
a
sinrilar distinction
seems in
order
forjudgment
and
beliefas
for
public
assertion.
Despite
how
susceptible
we
can
be
to
epistenrically
irrelevant pragmatic
factors, there
is
such
a
thing
as
disin-
terestecl beliefinfluenced purely
by
the ainr to
get it
right,
to beiieve correctly.
Consider the
irnportarlce of proper assertion for an
inforrnation-sharing
social
species. A
newscaster
or a
teacher
might assert
with testimonial pro-
priety even
when
they
do
not
voice
their
own
beliefs.'3
If the speaker plays
no role in
any such
epistenric
institution,
however, no such
role as
that of
newscaster or that of teacher, then their assertion is
epistemically
proper
only
when it
voices
their
own lrelief.
Otherwise
it
would
be irnproperly
insincere.
But
what sort
ofbeliefis
at
issue here?
Is it
beliefas
confident
enough credence
or is
it
rather
judgtnent,
an act
ofafiirrnation or
a disposition
to affirnr with
the
aim ofafiirnring correctly, rvith truth, reliably enough,
and
indeed
aptly?
Suppose such
judgnrent
to
be
r,vhat
nrost
directiy
determines
proper,
sincere public
aflirmation. A
speaker's
afiirnlatiorl of
what
he does
not
n
this
sense
judge
to be true
wouid
then involve
an episternically
improper
clash:
what
he
is willing
to
say publicly
then clashes with
what
he
says to
hinrself
nJitro interno.In
orcler to
avoid
such inrpropriety, what the speaker
affirnrs
publicly
must
conlport
with
what
he rvould
aflirnr
to hinrself in
the
privac:y
of
his
own
rnincl. Otherwise
there would be either some
speech
flaw,
or
sorne failure
of sincerity.
Fully
epistenrically proper aflirmation
reqr-rires
the
avoidance of
any
such flaw
or failure. It
nrust
express
in
unf-
lawed
speech
what the speaker
thinks
(in
act
or disposition).
The speaker
speaks
with epistenric propriety only if
he
speaks
as
he
thinks, with sincer-
ity
and
without linguistic
flaw.'a
Is
there
an account in ternrs
of
credential threshold that rivals our
account
in
terms ofjudgment?
Acc:ording to
such a
rival
account
what assertion
r.j.
As-fcnnitcr