The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism
Dr. Charles D. FergusonScience and Technology Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations
September 29, 2004Georgetown University
Financial support: John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, and Nuclear Threat Initiative
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism
• Acquisition of an intact nuclear weapon
• Crude nuclear weapon or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND)
• Attack against or sabotage of a nuclear power plant or other nuclear facility
• Radiological dispersal device (RDD) or “dirty bomb”
Assessing RiskRisk = Probability X Consequence
Large uncertaintiesLack of data
Alternatively:
Risk = Motivation X Intention X Capability X Consequence
Terrorist Motivations• Why haven’t there been any RDD or crude
nuclear weapon terrorist attacks?
• Those who study terrorist motivations are “underwhelmed by the probability of such an event for most – but not all – terrorist groups.” – Jerrold Post (IAEA presentation, Nov. 2001)
• Psychological and political constraints are great for most groups
Terrorist Motivations (continued)• Traditional thinking: “Terrorists want a lot of people
watching, not a lot of people dead.”
-- Brian Jenkins, RAND
• New Breed of Terrorist Group: Al Qaeda – politico-religiousAum Shinrikyo – Apocalyptic
Want to kill many and have even more watching in dread
But Can They Get the Means?• Nuclear weapons and fissile material are difficult
to obtain
• Radioactive materials are much more accessible
• Variety of nuclear facilities to target: Security also varies
Acquisition of Intact Nuclear Weapon
• Theft
• Purchase
• Gift (a little help from their friends)?
• Coup
Estimated Nuclear ArsenalsNation Total Active
WeaponsRelatively Portable Weapons
United States 7,650 3,000
Russia 8,200 8,000-10,000
France 348 60?
Britain 200 Unknown
China 380 Unknown
Israel 75-200 Unknown
India 30-35 Unknown
Pakistan 24-48 Unknown
North Korea 0-8? Unknown
Greatest Risks of Terrorist Acquisition• Russia –
Large numbers of portable, forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons
• Pakistan – Presence of al QaedaUnstable political systemParts of government (ISI) sympathetic to
terrorist causesNascent nuclear command & control system
Highest Priority Efforts: Intact Nuclear Weapons
U.S. should:• press Russia to fully implement 1991-1992
Presidential Nuclear Initiative pledges.
• revamp policy prohibiting security assistance to operational Russian nuclear weapons.
• declare its intention to remove its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
• provide security assistance to Pakistan contingent on constraints of NPT
Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb?
• Gun-type: – Simplest
designCannot use
plutonium; must use HEU
Can Terrorists Build Their Own Nuclear Bomb? (continued)
• Implosion-type: – More sophisticated,
but still first generation weapon
Can use either plutonium or HEU
Major Hurdle: Acquisition of Fissile Material
Material Type Global Inventory (metric tons)
Military plutonium (Pu) 250
Civil Pu (separated) 205
Military HEU 1,670
Civil HEU 20
Highest Priority: Put HEU at the Head of the Queue
• Accelerate down-blending of Russian HEU
• Speed up repatriation of Soviet/Russian- and U.S.-origin HEU and accelerate conversion of research reactors
• Use Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility to secure HEU
• Subordinate Plutonium Disposition Program to HEU First Strategy
Attacks on Nuclear Facilities
• Commercial nuclear power plants
• Research reactors
• Spent fuel storage pools
• Reprocessing facilities
Nuclear Facilities: Highest Priority Efforts
• Design basis threat should reflect 9/11 magnitude of attack
• Rapidly identify and implement urgent upgrades to vulnerable plant systems
• Need performance-based (not-compliance based) security system
• Need formal government assessment of potential vulnerabilities at research reactors
Dirty Bombs – Myth versus Reality • RDDs (Dirty Bombs) are NOT Weapons of
Mass Destruction
– Few, if any, people would die immediately or shortly after exposure to ionizing radiation from typical RDD
• RDDs can be Weapons of Mass Disruption
Major effects:
• Panic (psychological and social effects)• Economic costs (decontamination and rebuilding)
High-Risk Radioactive Sources• Finding: Only a small
fraction of commercial radioactive sources pose inherently high security risks
• But still large number
• High-risk sources are:
• Portable• Dispersible• More radioactive
Dirty Bombs: Highest Priority Tasks
• Improve security of high-risk radioactive sources
Preparation and Response:
• Develop and stockpile effective decontamination technologies
• Involve public in development of decon standards• Provide better training of emergency first
responders• Educate public about real versus perceived risks
of radiation: psychological immunization