Assessing the Role of Public Policy in Industrial Transitions:
How Distinct Regional Contexts Inform Comprehensive Planning
Nina Peluso, Michael Kearney, and Richard Lester
Working Paper SeriesThe Roosevelt Project Special Series
Roosevelt Project Report Sponsor
The Roosevelt Project participants thank the Emerson Collective for sponsoring this report and for their continued leadership on issues at the intersection of social justice and environmental stewardship.
AssessingtheRoleofPublicPolicyinIndustrialTransitions:HowDistinctRegionalContextsInformComprehensivePlanning
NinaPeluso1,MichaelKearney1,RichardLester1
1MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
September2020
Abstract
Major industrial transitions in the United States led to highly divergentcommunity outcomes. As the nation transitions to a deeply decarbonizedeconomy,understandingthedriversofcommunitysuccessinthefaceofthesehistorical transitions is crucial. We examine historical US transitions andcorrespondingpolicyviaaseriesofliteraturereviewsandcasestudies.First,we examine literature around four key domains governing communitydevelopment.Then,weusehistoricaltransitionsinPittsburghandthePacificNorthwest to interrogate markers for regional success and geographicaldisparities.Finally,we investigatetherecentcaseof theUStransition fromincandescenttoLEDlightingtoidentifyspecificpolicyrecommendations.Ourfindingssuggestthat,ataregionallevel,policymakersshouldidentifydriversof community well-being, nurture strong ties between core institutions,carefully utilize economic development corporation structures, and usecautionwhenconsideringprivate-leddevelopmentinitiatives.
2
1. IntroductionAsthethreatofclimatechangelooms,globalpolicymakersandtechnologistshaveturned
their attention to thevast arrayofmeasures to confront the challenge.Ashuman-driven
emissionsrise,alarge-scalerehauloftheglobalenergysystem,encompassingtheelectricity,
transportation,industrialandbuildingssectorsseemsimminent.
Withinthisglobalcontext,theUnitedStatesmustconsideramajorindustrialtransition
ona scaleandat apace that ithasneverexperienced.The transitionwill fundamentally
reshapecommunitiesandindividuallivelihoods.Theprosperityofthedomesticandglobal
communitiesalikereliesonthepoliciesadoptedbyfederal,state,andlocalgovernmentsin
thenearterm. Yet,policies thatbestspurpositiveenvironmentalchangecansitatcross
purposes with the goals of the industries that have long supported U.S. working
communities.
ConsidertheexperienceofAdamsCounty,Ohio.AdamsCounty,70milesfromCincinnati,
experiencedaneconomicboominthe1970sand1980sfollowingthecommissioningoftwo
coal-firedpowerplants.Atthetime,coal-firedpowerplantsdelivered80percentofOhio’s
electricpower.Alongwiththeplantscamejobs,fromhandlingheavymachineryintheyard,
tooperatingboilersandturbines,toensuringwaterqualityandregulatorycompliance.In
recentyearstheavailabilityofinexpensivenaturalgasandincreasedemissionsreduction
policieshavecombinedtomaketraditionalcoal-firedpowerplantslesseconomicallyviable.
In2017,AES,theowneroftheAdamsCountycoalplants,announcedthattheywouldshutter,
leaving the roughly 500 employees at the two plants jobless. In addition to worker
displacement, the plant closures created an acute budget crisis for Adams County – tax
revenuesfromtheplantsmadeup10percentofthecountybudget–alreadyundergreat
stressasthecriminaljusticesystemwasoverwhelmedbytheon-goingopioidepidemic.In
responsetobudgetarywoes, thecountywas forcedtocutspendingoneducation,among
otherpublicservices.(MacGillis2018).
Whiletheforthcomingenergytransitionisdaunting,itisbynomeansthefirstlarge-scale
industrial transition to occur with consequential distributive effects. Indeed, industrial
transitions are deeplywoven into the historical fabric of theUnited States. When these
transitions “succeed” they are held up as evidence of the American Dream, but not all
Americanshavesharedintheirbenefits.
3
Communitiesacrossthecountryhaveexperiencedwidelyvaryingoutcomesduringand
intheaftermathof industrial transitions.A frequently-citedexample, inboththepopular
mediaandacademicinquiry,isthetransitionofthecoalindustryinWestVirginia,which
beganexperiencingemploymentvolatilityanddeclinewiththeGreatDepressionandthe
subsequent emergence of continuous miningmachines and strip mining. The industrial
fallout persists – at the beginning of the decline, Appalachian povertywas a “paradox, a
disturbingcontradictionofAmericanprosperity”(Thomas2010).Employmentincoalisno
longeraparadox,butratherapredeterminedsentence.Ina2017TimeMagazinearticle,Ted
Boettner,executivedirectoroftheWestVirginiaCenteronBudgetandPolicy,saidofcoal
industry employment, “There’s almost zero reason to be completely optimistic. It’s a
disservice to coal-mining communities to tell them they will have a mighty comeback”
(Worland2017).Inpopularmedia,theAppalachianstorylacksnuanceandovershadowsthe
experiences of many other U.S. regions that have successfully weathered industrial
transitions(forexample,post-textileNewEngland).Asregionsacrossthecountryfacethe
unique challenge of transitioning toward a decarbonized economy these historical
experiencesandtheirattendantoutcomesshouldinformfuturepolicymaking.
Inthispaper,weconsiderwhatwecanlearnfromthesehistoricaltransitionsaboutthe
roleofpublicpolicy.Whatpolicieshaveledtosuccessfulcommunityevolutioninthepast,
andwhatlessonsdotheyteachfortheforthcomingtransitiontoadecarbonizedeconomy?
Of course, these historical transitions are not directly comparable to a projected
decarbonized future. Rather, they provide a useful comparative baseline.We review the
literatureon industrial transitions, focusing inparticularon case studiesof the steel and
timberindustries,andidentifykeypolicydecisionsaffectingcommunityoutcomes.Wealso
consider the case of the lighting industry and the shift from traditional lighting to LED
technology.Wediscusshowmajorpolicyconcernsinearliertransitionsapplytothelighting
sector,andhowthelightingsectorcasecaninturninformthetransitiontoadecarbonized
future.Weareprimarilyinterestedinidentifyingbroadbestpracticesforpolicymakingand
corporateengagementthatwillhaveapositiveimpactonprosperityinthosecommunities
thataremostatriskofeconomicdislocationinadecarbonizedworld.Whenitisapparent
thatthosemethodsvarywidelyindifferentjurisdictionsweprovideguidingquestionsfor
policydevelopment.
4
Section 2 summarizes the literature on industrial transitions, highlighting the broad
domainsstudiedinassociationwithsuccessfultransitions.Section3explorestwohistorical
cases toexamine the roleofpost-transitionpublicpolicy: thepost-steel reimaginationof
Pittsburgh,andtheimplementationoftheNorthwestForestPlaninthePacificNorthwest.
Section4presentsacasestudyofthetransitionfromtraditionallightingtoCFLstoLEDsand
four affected communities. Section 5 concludes with findings and recommendations for
policymakers.
5
2. LiteratureReviewThis section provides a broad overview of our literature review on previous industrial
transitions, theprocessesthatsurroundedthem,andresultingcommunityoutcomes.The
literaturehighlights fourkey factorsbearingonoutcomes following industrial transition:
socialfabric,businesslandscape,humancapital,andthepolicyenvironment.
2.1ANoteonSuccessfulTransitions
Akey challenge in reviewing this literature isdeterminingwhatexactly constitutesa
successful transition.When considering communities and regions that have experienced
majorindustrialtransitionsitiseasytofallintothetrapofrelyingonanecdotalevidenceof
failure or success. If success is not well-defined, policymakers risk designing policy
predicatedonpasteffortsthathaven’tledtosubstantivegains.Forourpurposeshere,we
relyonthevastliteraturehighlightingthecomplexityofdefiningsuccessandconsiderthe
following:
1. Whatrepresentssuccess?
2. Whodoweconsiderwhenwediscusssuccess?
3. Areappropriatemeasuresofsuccessquantitative,qualitative,orboth?
4. HavemisapplicationsofsuccessmetricsledtoworseoutcomesforU.S.communities?
Someclearfoundationalmetricsacrosspolicyandeconomicdevelopmentliteratureare
GDP, employment, and incomeper capita.Thedevelopment literature tends to centeron
rising incomeasametric that implies regional success.BeyondGDPand income,Malizia
(1994)notesthatthepurposeofeconomicdevelopment“istoparticipateintheprocessof
nationalwealth creation for the benefit of local consumers and producers by facilitating
either the expansion of job opportunities and tax base or the redeployment of local
resources.” Malizia’s frame of reference focuses on building societal wealth and income
expresslyforthepurposeofincreasingjobopportunitiesandlocalresources.
Carley et. al.’s review ofmetrics for evaluating energy-based economic development
programshighlightsgapsinevaluationandsuggestsusingnon-economicevaluativemetrics
includingqualitativemeasuresofhealth,educational,cultural,political,andenvironmental
outcomes (Carley 2014). Similarly, using internal migration and place-based social and
6
economic factors asmetrics can demonstrate divergent outcomes in small communities
facingtransition(Harrison2017).
2.2KeyDomainsandCapacitiesforTransition
Abroadliteratureinvestigateshowcommunitiesexperienceindustrialtransitions.This
literaturerevealsfourgeneralareas(ordomains)thatencompassmarkersofcommunity
health: human capital, business landscape, policy environment, and social fabric. Each
domainincludesmultiplesocietalattributesthataffectcommunityoutcomesandeachmay
drivesuccessinawaythatisdistinctfromtheothers.Ofcourse,thesedomainsoverlap,and
entailmanycomplementarities.
HumanCapitalmeasuresspecificlevelsofknowledgeorcapabilitywithinapopulation
andreflectshowthatknowledgeenablesactionorthelackofit.Theeconomicdevelopment
literatureemphasizeshumancapitalasafoundationalindicatorofdevelopmentoutcomes.
SimonandNardinelli’s2000paperonhumancapitalandurbangrowthshowsthatcities
thatbeginwithamoreknowledgeablepopulationtendtoperformbettereconomicallyin
the long run. Notably, such “knowledge spillovers” are generally limited to a specific
metropolitanarea-knowledgeismostproductiveintheregionwhereitisacquired.Lester
(2005)findsthatlocaltechnicalknowledgeisoftenenhancedbyuniversities,whosemost
importantcontribution,amonganarrayofroles,iseducation.
SimonandNardinellipointoutthattheimportanceofaknowledgeablepopulationbase
ismutableintheshortterm–theyusethe1920sautomobileindustrialboomasanexample
whereexplosiveindustrygrowthoverwhelmedanyregionalbenefitsfromaknowledgeable
populationbase–butconfirmthathumancapitaldriveseconomicgrowthinthelongrun.
Theyalso find thathumancapital is economicallymore consequential inmanufacturing-
basedeconomiesthannon-manufacturingones,thoughtheremaybereasontobelievethat
this relationship may have evolved more recently, particularly when considering newer
growth hubs such as SiliconValley orKendall Square,where technology and innovation
serveasthebackboneofthelocaleconomies.WhileSimonandNardinellidealprimarilywith
knowledgeattainmentasametric,awidevarietyofotherindicatorsalsomeasurehuman
7
capital, including social insurance programs, union strength, apprenticeship training
programs,anduniversitypresence.
BusinessLandscapemeasuresthestrengthofprivateactors,theirtiestootherregional
players,andregionalsupportforbuildingandsustainingbusiness.Amongotherelements,
this domain includes public-private and private-private partnerships, industrial
diversification, industry location, state and regional business incentives, union-private
relationships,andthepresenceofforeignfirms.
Oneexampleofakeyfactordrivingindustriallocationislowcostenergy.Thereismuch
evidencetosuggestthat lowregionalenergycosts influencenewindustrialdevelopment.
Carlton(1983)foundthatenergycostsmotivatebusinesslocation.Morerecently,Kahnand
Mansur(2013) foundthatenergy-intensive industries(thebackboneofamanufacturing-
basedeconomy)locateincountieswithlowenergyprices.Thistrendcontinues,aslargedata
centersroutinelylocateincountieswithlowelectricityprices.Thepresenceofnewfirms
motivatedbylowenergycostscanhavesubstantialeffectonlocaleconomicdevelopment,
jobopportunities,andtheresultingbusinessatmosphereforpotentialnewentrants.
PolicyEnvironment.Thisdomainencompassespast,present, and futuregovernment
andindustryinitiativesatall levels:local,state,federal,andinternational.Importantly,in
addition to covering the policy environment, concerned with tangible structures for
policymaking, this category often overlaps with and informs the discussion of regional
politicalenvironment.
Neumann(2018)describestheimpactofurbanbrandingcampaignsonacity’spublic
image, citing 1970s New York and 1980s Pittsburgh as two citieswhere public officials
piloted programs to reimagine post-transition spaces. Neumann (2018) writes that
“Pittsburgh’spost-industrialrebrandingwasatriumph”,andherstoryservesasanexample
ofapolicyenvironmentthatenabledsuccessfulpost-industrialgrowth.Urbanbrandingof
this type represents one policy lever that leaders might use to target areas in need of
revitalization.
Business tax incentives are another commonly-used policy tool for economic
development,thoughevidenceoftheirvalueremainsambiguousintheacademicliterature.
Somestudiesshowthatstate-leveleconomicoutcomesarenotwell-correlatedwithstate
businessincentives(Bartik2017).Whileperceivedaswell-targeted,taxincentiveshaveseen
8
mixed results in terms of encouraging business relocation or incentivizing economic
development(Button2019).Moreover,Buss(2001)highlightsalackofconsensusaround
themosteffectiveimplementationandincentivestructuresforsuchpolicies.
SocialFabric.Finally,understandingthesocialfabricofaregioniscriticaltostructuring
policywithrespecttosocialandculturalcontext(Armstrong2019).Thisdomainincludes
the nature of actor networks, the magnitude of public-private partnerships, key
demographicmarkers(racial,economic,religious,etc.),andhistoricalunioninvolvement.
Socialfabricindicatorsareusefulwhenstudyingtheinteractionsbetweendiverseactor
groups, as evidenced in the literature on public-private partnerships. In the context of
Pittsburgh steel, Giarratani and Houston (1989) wrote that while public-private
partnershipscanbeausefultoolforspurringeconomicgrowth,theydivertattentionfrom
effortstoshapetargetedgovernment-leddevelopmentpolicy.InPittsburgh,public-private
partnershipsdrovegrowthwhenmeasuredbytraditionalquantitativeindicators,butitis
uncleariftheyimprovedlivelihoodsonamorequalitativescale(e.g.,happiness,perception
ofmobility),andwhetherthosemixedoutcomeswerearesultofalackofattentiontothe
existingsocialfabric.
Armstrong(2019)reinforcestheimportanceofgovernmentattentiontosocialfabric–
assertingthatindustrialpolicyismostsuccessfulwhenstategovernmentsworktoconvene
andmonitorlocalactorcoalitions.Todevelopthisargument,hecomparesthetrajectoriesof
Pittsburgh,PAandCleveland,OHfollowingindustrialdecline.Armstrong(2019)arguesthat
PittsburghflourishedduetoanintentionaleffortbythePennsylvaniastategovernmentto
conveneandmonitoracoalitionofempoweredresearchuniversities todesignadetailed
localeconomicdevelopmentstrategy.Incontrast,theOhiostategovernmentputpoliciesin
place thatwere ripe for capture.Agroupofstrongprivate incumbent firms inCleveland
exploitedstateattemptsatdevelopmentpolicyandobstructedmulti-tieredchange.
Whenconsideringtheenergytransition,itiscrucialtorememberthatthenuancedsetof
communityfeaturesdoesnotlenditselftoaclearmappingofinputsandoutputs.The2005
reportfromtheMITIndustrialPerformanceCenteronuniversitiesandinnovationargues
that‘one-size-fits-all’approachestoeconomicdevelopmentfailtorecognizethediversityof
needsinindustrialcommunities(Lester2005).Indeed,inthiscontext,wheretheassetson
thegroundinanygivencommunityarehighlyspecific,thereisnoone-size-fits-allsolution,
9
evenwithinthesamesector.Wemightexpect thatasuccessfulenergytransition inNew
MexicowilllookverydifferentfromenergytransitionsinMichigan,WyomingorLouisiana.
Forthisreason,aregionalapproachisessentialtomanagingfuturetransitions.
10
3. IndustrialDecline&EconomicRecovery:TwoHistoricalCasesInthissection,weassessindustrialtransitionsinPittsburghandthePacificNorthwestand
the policy responses aimed at reshaping affected communities. Both cases reinforce key
pointsfromtheliteraturereviewandsimultaneouslyhighlightcomplexregionaldynamics
outsideofbroadunderstanding.
3.1TheRoleofStateandLocalPolicyinPittsburgh’sSteelTransition
OurfirstcaseofindustrialtransitionoutlinesthedownfalloftheU.S.steelindustry,its
impactonthePittsburghmetropolitanareainthe1970sand80s,andthearea’ssubsequent
policyefforts.U.S. steelproductionhit itspeak in1973,producinga totalof137million
metrictonsannually.Lessthanadecadelater,globalizationandadvancementsinproduction
technologyledtoanindustry-widerestructuringandproductiondroppedtoalowof67.7
millionmetrictons(Haller2005).ThecollapseofthesteelindustryintheMonValleywas
occasionedbyabroadsetofintersectingindustryinterests,laborclashes,and,ultimately,
full-scaleindustrialcollapse(Hoerr1988).1
Between1980and1986,regionalmanufacturingemploymentdroppedby42.6percent,
withnearlyhalfofthedropattributedtosteelproduction.Broaderregionalemployment,on
theotherhand,onlydeclinedbysevenpercent,buoyedbyexistingeconomicdevelopment
efforts tomotivate growth in the service and financial sectors (Detrick 1999). This shift
happenedacrossAlleghenyCounty,assteelproducersdisinvestedandlaidoffvastswaths
of theirworkforces (Giarratani 1989). The state of Pennsylvania and the Pittsburgh city
governmentfacedacrisisthatwasbothsocialandeconomic.Beforethedecline,Pittsburgh
relied heavily on a traditional model of public-private partnerships to drive economic
development.Inthefaceofindustrialcollapse,cityandstateleadersleveragedandadapted
thisstructuretobetterincorporatenewstakeholders,primarilyresearchuniversities,and
werehailedforleadingthecitythroughthestorm(Detrick1999).Fortyyearsaftertheinitial
1Similarly,SherryLeeLinkonandJohnRusso’s2002bookSteeltown,U.S.A.paintsapictureofthedevastationYoungstown,Ohiofacedinthefalloutofthesteelindustry(Linkon2002).
11
decline, the question remains whether this reshaped public-private partnership model
adequately supported both human and industrial interests in Pittsburgh’s subsequent
growth.
Prior to thecollapseof thesteel industry,Pittsburgh longreliedonasetofeconomic
development policies spearheaded by the Allegheny Conference on Community
Developmentstartedinthe1940s,aprogrameventuallytermedRenaissanceI.Thisbusiness
growthcoalitionfocusedprimarilyonrealestatedevelopmentprojectsandenvironmental
improvementsindowntownPittsburgh(Detrick1999).Asthedeclineofthesteelindustry
becameapparent in1977, leadersreorganizedthatsamegroupforRenaissanceII,anew
effort involving local nonprofit organizations in continued downtown development and
communityrenewal.RenaissanceIIsoughttoempowercommunityorganizationsasliaisons
andcollaborators,butultimatelyfailedtochangetheunderlyingpowerstructuresinthecity
anditsoutlyingregions(Detrick).Still,redevelopmentinthecitycoreflourished.
In 1982, Pennsylvania’s Governor Richard Thornburgh introduced the Ben Franklin
Partnership, a state initiative designed to create links between universities and private
institutions.Itprovidedfundingforadvancedtechnologyprograms,includinganAdvanced
Technology Center led jointly by theUniversity of Pittsburgh (Pitt) and CarnegieMellon
University (CMU). Armstrong (2019) argues that the Ben Franklin Partnership and its
relatedstateprogramsassistedPittandCMUinovercomingdeepinstitutionaldifferences
which allowed them to form a partnership for broad expansion of university research
infrastructure.
TheleadersofPittandCMUwerecentraltoa1985coalitionthatincludedthemayorand
threecountycommissionersanddraftedStrategy21,along-termstrategicplancomprised
of eighteen infrastructure and real estate development projects across the region. The
strategyrequiredmorethan$400millioninstatefundingtosupplementbillionsinprivate
investment.Strategy21projectsencompassedairportrenovationandtechnologyparks,and
capitalized on Governor Thornburgh’s goal to spur statewide investment in advanced
technologies.Theeffortfurtherempoweredthecity’suniversitiesaslocalleadersdrivenby
areimaginingofthecity’sfutureasatechnologycenter.
Intheensuingyears,economicdevelopmenteffortswerecontinuallyaimedtowardthis
reimagined future. The Working Together Consortium charged the city with creating
12
100,000 new jobs by 2000 via infrastructure grants (Detrick 1999). Pittsburgh public
schoolssawsubstantialinvestmentandbecameaparagonofpublicelementaryeducation
(Treadwell 1990). The guiding principle across the history of these programs was that
Pittsburgh sought to reimagine itself as a center for advanced technology and research
(Neumann2018).Ratherthanshoreupfuturesforthelegacysteelmillsandworkers,state
leaderspromotedanewsetofcommunityleaders–theresearchuniversities.
While this strategy saw success in image and by some metrics, the social support
resourcesforformersteelworkersandthoseinrelatedindustrieswerenotoftenbundled
intothosegrandeconomicplans(Neumann2018).Graham(2002)writesthat,inthewake
of job losses,unemployment insuranceandsocialbenefitswereprovided solelybygrass
rootsand religiousorganizations inPittsburgh.The communitywas forced tostepup to
provideservicesthatwerenotembodiedinPittsburgh’splanforfuturegrowth.Stateand
city efforts focused on impacted industries rather than blanket economic incentives,
identifiedbyTreado(2008)asfundamentaltothePittsburghstory.Asthecity’sserviceand
technologyeconomygrewandstate-wideproductivityflourished,medianincomestagnated
andpovertyratesoutsidethecitylimitsrose,particularlyforBlackAmericans(Neumann
2016). Pittsburgh went through a grand reimagining following the collapse of the steel
industry,butitremainsunclearwhetherstateandlocalleadersweresuccessfulinenriching
thelivesoftheexistingpopulation,orwhetherthatwasevenacentralmotivation.
3.2TheRoleofFederalandRegionalPolicyintheNorthwestTimberTransition
ThesecondexamplewehighlightisthetransitionofthePacificNorthwesteconomyaway
from timber harvest. The Northwest Forest Plan (NWFP) encompassed a set of federal
policiesadoptedin1994toregulateresourcemanagementfor24.5millionacresofforestin
Oregon,Washington,andnorthernCalifornia(“NorthwestForestPlan”2019)andaimedto
bothstaunchtheflowoftimberjoblossesandprotecttheendangeredNorthernSpottedOwl.
This example is particularly appropriate for comparative analysis in the context of deep
decarbonization, because both this historical transition and the impending clean energy
futurewillbesimultaneouslydrivenandaffectedbylarge-scalepolicy.
13
From the1950s through the1980s, timberwas seenas the foundational industry for
rural communities in the Pacific Northwest – in some regions (such as southwestern
Oregon), timber jobs represented as much as 30 percent of total employment. Timber
employmentbegantodeclinethroughoutthe1980s,dueinparttomechanization,reduced
capitalinvestment,legacymillclosure,regionalrecessions,andlesseningdemandforwood
products. In 1990, to further jolt the industry, the Northern Spotted Owl received a
threatenedcharacterizationundertheU.S.EndangeredSpeciesActwhichledtoaslewof
court injunctions on timber harvest within the owl’s habitat. In 1994, the Clinton
AdministrationdevelopedtheNWFP,atwo-prongedpolicypackagetominimizeimpactson
owlhabitat and stabilize the flowofregional timber sales.Whether causedby the initial
threatenedcharacterizationoftheNorthernSpottedOwlorthelaterimplementationofthe
NWFPtheregioncontinuedtoseesteadydeclines in timberemploymentthroughoutthe
1990s,endangeringacoresourceofregionalprosperity.
Inconsideringthistransition,Carrollet.al(2000)emphasizethecomplexsocialcontext
thatsurroundedtimberworkers in thePacificNorthwest,andnotethat the“dynamicsof
attachmenttoplace,torurality,andtooccupation”intheregionweredifficulttodisentangle.
The timber industrywasonly one of several factors tying people to the region. Further,
Goodstein(1999)discussestheimportanceofadiversemarketeconomyoutsideoftimber,
its own type of safety net – as timber employment declined, regional employment
opportunitiesgrew.ThisfindingismirroredinCharnley’swork,whichshowsthatthemost
severeeffectsofthetransitionwerefeltbycommunitieslocatedwithinfivemilesoffederal
forest(i.e.,inrural,lessdiverselabormarkets).Incontrast,manycommunitiesintheregion
saw increased prosperity based on their proximity to major metropolitan areas,
transportation routes, or natural amenities that spurred tourism (Charnley 2008). The
regionasawholewasbuoyedbynewemploymentopportunitieswhileasmallportionof
timber-dependentcommunitieswereleftbehind.
SimultaneousinterventionsbytheU.S.BureauofLandManagement(BLM)andtheU.S.
Forest Service (USFS) offer a convenient comparison of divergent outcomes based on
regional context. Both landmanagement agencieswere required to oversee the planned
transitionfromatimber-basedeconomytoanewecosystemmanagementparadigm.USFS
budgetallocationsweredeterminedinlargepartbytimbersales,andasharvestscontinued
14
todeclinetheagencysawanunexpecteddeepcutinfunding.Thisbudgetreductionseverely
limited the ability of USFS to provide goods and services to the communities it serves
(Charnley2008).From1993to2002,USFSlost36percentofitsworkforce(3,006positions)
andclosedordownsized23percentofitsregionaloffices.Astimberjobsdisappeared,sotoo
didagencyjobswithinUSFS.Pairedwiththedecliningworkforcewasdecliningfundingfor
procurementcontractspending,akeypathwayforemployinglocalworkers.In1991USFS
spent$103millionannuallyoncontractwork.By2002,only$33million.WhatUSFSdid
spendwasnottargetedtowardimpactedcommunities(Charnley2006).TheBureauofLand
Managementsawlossesaswell,butthebulkoftheirfundingwasnottiedtotimberreceipts,
and theagency startedwitha smallermandate.BLM lostonly13percentof its regional
workforce in the same timeperiod (166positions)andagency contract spending stayed
constant at $20million annually. Agency offices remained open, and BLM increased the
fundingallocatedtotheplanareawhichallowedlocalandstatemanagerstoappropriately
distributefundstoaffectedcommunities(Charnley2008).
ThomasMichaelPower(2006)arguesthatthePacificNorthwestcommunitiesmostin
need,thosethatwerestrongly“timberdependent”,wereseeingemploymentdeclineswell
beforetheimplementationoftheNWFP,andthatthePlanactually“erodedtheeffectiveness”
of the regional services (e.g.USFS) that couldhelp themmostbymaintainingwhat little
forest was left available to harvest. The responsibility of forest management and
revitalizationwasincreasinglyplacedinthehandsofnonprofitorindustrialactors,whohad
relativelylessexperienceinthedomain.WhilethecoreeconomicassumptionsoftheNWFP
were flawed, and federal efforts to stabilize regional communities failed to materialize,
entrepreneurial residents took the helm, and created their own economic opportunities
within the region (Power 2006). Communities most negatively impacted by the Plan,
particularly those in close proximity to forests, already experienced larger barriers to
upwardeconomicmobility.Charnley(2008)foundthatthemostresilientcommunitieswere
15
those with close proximity to metropolitan or tourism areas or those with substantial
alternativeagriculturalindustry.2
Intheir2006review,Charnleyet.alcompileconclusionsaboutthesuccessoftheNWFP
across four goals related to socioeconomic success: (1) to produce a predictable levelof
timbersales,(2)tomaintainthestabilityoflocalandregionaleconomies,(3)toassistwith
long-termeconomicdevelopmentanddiversification,and(4)topromoteagencyandcitizen
collaborationinforestmanagement.
Thefirstgoal,regardingpredictabletimbersales,wasnotfullymetbyCharnley’s2006
paper,norbythepublishingofa25-yearmulti-authorreportoutliningtheplan’ssuccess
(Spies2019).Thesecondgoal,tomaintaineconomicstability,wasmorenebulousandalso
notexplicitlymet.In2006,Charnleyfoundthatanagency’sabilitytoprovidelocalstability
wasonlyasvaluableasthatagency’sfunding.Inessence,USFSprogramslackedthefunding
toprovidecommunitysupport,whileBLSmanagedtoachievepreliminarysuccess.By2019,
theNWFPareasawdiversificationinforest-relatedjobsstemmingfromtourismandrelated
ecosystemmanagement(Spies2019).
TheNorthwestEconomicAdjustmentInitiative(NEAI),alsodiscussedinGallagherand
Glasmeier(2020),wasdesignedtomeetthethirdgoaloflong-termeconomicdevelopment.
Unfortunately,NEAIwasbroadly considered ‘too little, too late’ tohelpdisplaced timber
workers.Similarly,jobretrainingprogramswerelimitedtosuchsmallpopulationsthatthe
mutedpositiveeffectsdidnotproducebroadimpacts(Daniels1998).
The Northwest Forest Plan did achieve its fourth goal to some extent, to promote
collaboration in forest management. Public support for forest management and strong
relationships between local community members and agencies have been valuable, if
community-dependent.Going forward,moreattentionwillbepaidtoagrowingminority
populationintheregionandaligningtribalintereststoecologicalgoals(Spies2019).
Oneofthekeyfindingsofthe25-yearassessmentreportisthatthelarge-scaleNWFP
monitoring program has been vital to the success of the program, in meeting both its
2 Charnley notes that, while the nontimber forest products industry remained stable, employment wasdominated by immigrant andmobile labor and didn’t provide comparable family-wage jobs for displacedtimberworkersorformeragencyemployees.
16
ecologicalandsocioeconomicgoals(Spies2019).Somemonitoringprogramshavebeenleft
aside, and uncertainty persists, but the commitment to monitoring has allowed
policymakers, community leaders, and researchers to understand the complex regional
dynamicsaffectingsuchabroad-scaleprogram.
3.3CentralQuestionsRaisedbytheTransitionCases
Generally,policyinitiativesinthecontextofindustrialtransitionsarenotembodiedbyone
governmental or community effort, but rather by patchwork approaches to addressing
major economic change. Resulting divergent outcomes are clear in both the cases of
Pittsburgh’spost-steel transformationandtheNorthwestForestPlan.Eachpoint towell-
knownpolicymakingtacticsasleadingto“success”butmayalsoconflictwithsomeguiding
principles. Inmost cases, these conflicts arisebasedondiffering regional characteristics.
Below,weraiseseveralquestionsbroughtforwardbytheabovecases.
In both Pennsylvania and the Pacific Northwest, the largest policy programs were
centeredaroundtheexistingbusinesslandscape.InPittsburgh,theAlleghenyConferenceon
CommunityDevelopmentconvenedmajorresearchuniversitiestoleadthechargeonpublic-
private partnerships and strategic regional plans. These plans stimulated specific
infrastructuredevelopmenttoenablethegrowthofthefinanceandservicesectorswithin
thecity,leadingtoamorediversifiedeconomy.InthePacificNorthwest,ratherthanattempt
to transition the region away from timber harvest, the ClintonAdministration sought to
stabilize the flow of timber products produced and sold in the region. However, by the
implementationdate,timbersaleshadalreadydeclinedsubstantially.ThePacificNorthwest
later reimagined the role of its forests as the center of a local economy dominated by
ecosystemservicesandtourism.
Bothtransitionsmightbeconsideredsuccessfulbasedontheeconomicdiversification
thatresulted,butitisunclearwhethereitherslateofpoliciesachievedthegoalofmitigating
pooroutcomes for impactedworkers. InPittsburgh, integrating steelworkers intoa city
activelyreimaginedasanadvancedresearcheconomyinherentlyconflicted.Thecityrelied
heavilyonpublic-privatepartnershipsthatdidlittletoassistdisplacedsteelworkers.Inthe
NorthwestForestPlan,timberworkerswerenotvisiblyreskilledorputbacktoworkwithin
17
theircommunities.Rather,theregionsawupliftfromotherexternalindustries.Howthen
doesthis informthinkingaround industrial transitions in theenergyspace?Theregional
vision for the future seemsparamount,whether in advanced technologies or ecosystem
services. As the United States transitions away from traditional fossil fuels, how must
regionalleadersenvisiontheirfutureindustry?Economicdiversificationappearsimportant
forregionalstabilityinthesetwocases,alongwithaneventualunderstandingthatlegacy
workforcesmayfadeentirely.Howcanpolicymakersstructurecleanenergylegislationand
regulationwithrespectbothtotheexistingbusinesslandscapeandalsotheimaginedfuture?
Anotherkeythemeunderlyingthesetwocasesistheexistenceoflong-termconvening
and monitoring programs as a precedent to success. As Armstrong (2019) outlines,
convening local actors to collaborate with state government agencies, monitoring the
outcomes of any implemented policies, and adapting based on observation is vital to
ensuringstrongpolicyoutcomes.InthecaseofPittsburgh,thestategovernmentsuccessfully
convened and nurtured relationships between local actors. Further, they monitored the
progress of university-led development issues over a series of decades, allowing the
institutions to act as effective network liaisons. The Northwest Forest Plan initially saw
unintendedoutcomes,astheinitialpremisethattimberharvestwastheonlyimportantlink
betweenruralcommunitiesandlocalforestsprovedfalse.Thisoverlookedthesignificance
ofnaturalresourcesininfluencingbothtourismandlocaleconomicwell-being.However,
theNWFPwasdevelopedwithlong-termmonitoringinmindand,25yearshence,localand
regionalleaderscontinuetoadjustforestmanagementpolicieswithrespecttoanevolving
socialfabric.
Adecarbonizedenergyfuture,asenvisioned,issuretoinvolvebroadanddiffusepolicy
programs. These two cases point to the deep importance of effectively convening and
monitoringlocalactorsandpromptlyadaptingpolicytoreflectcurrentstatus.Howmight
Pittsburgh look if theStateofPennsylvaniahadfundedPittsburgh’sresearchuniversities
without oversight? Would the Pacific Northwest have weathered the decline of timber
withoutcarefulandpersistentattentiontoPlanoutcomes?
Withthesequestionsinmind,weturntothecaseoftheU.S.lightingindustryoverthe
pastseveraldecades–toinvestigatehowoneportionoftheenergyindustryhasresponded
todecliningdomesticdemandandsubsequentproductivity.
18
4. TheU.S.LightingIndustry:ACaseStudyIndustrial transitions occur within a wide array of geographic, political, and temporal
settings that are deeply influenced by macroeconomic and microeconomic activity and
technologicaldevelopments.Thesevariationscomplicatethetaskofevaluatingtheeffectsof
publicpoliciesontheoutcomesoftransitions.Forthisreason,studyingthetransitionofthe
lightingindustryfromincandescentbulbstoLEDsisparticularlyinformative.Thelighting
transitionoccurrednationallywithinarelativelyshorttimeframe(startingaround2012),
across disparate geographies, and involvingmany different firms.We are able to select
specificcasesthatisolatetheseexogenousfactors(time,geography,andpolitics),allowing
us to isolate the relevant regional policy activity that we want to study. The case is
particularlyrelevanttoastudyoffuturedecarbonizationbecauseitwasspurredbypublic
policy, specifically the development of U.S. national lighting standards. It also occurred
within a globalizing economic context, with intense pressures on the domestic lighting
industrycoming fromabroad.Thetransitionthereforerequiredmulti-leveredresponsive
policyaction,aswillthetransitiontoadecarbonizedfuture.
4.1 HistoryoftheLEDtransition
Lightbulbproduction intheUnitedStateshasdeclinedsteadilyover thepastseveral
decades (See Figure 1). The last U.S factory producing incandescent light bulbs, in
Winchester,Virginia,closed in2010.The fewfactories thathavetransitionedtospecialty
lightingorLEDbulbproductionarestruggling,andSylvania’sLEDVANCEfacility,northof
Pittsburgh,announced its impendingclosure inApril2019(Brady2019).Twokey forces
havedriventhedeclineofU.S.lightbulbmanufacturing:increasedinternationalproduction
andlightingefficiencyregulations.
19
Figure1.U.S.LampBulbProductionEmployment,1966-2006
Source:U.S.BureauofLaborStatistics
Lightingstandardswerefirstimplementedatthestatelevelintheearly2000s.Following
patchwork state-level enactment, bulbmanufacturers and advocatesworked together to
drive federal action on lighting standards. In 2007, Congress passed the Energy
Independence and Security Act (EISA), which required increased bulb efficiency of 25
percentby2014,effectivelyshutteringremainingincandescentbulbmanufacturers(Ungar
2015). This spurred a rapid transition away from incandescent bulbs, first to compact
fluorescents (CFLs), then to halogen bulbs and, beginning in 2015, to LEDs (NMRGroup
2018).
Figure2.A-lineBulbShipmentU.S.MarketShare,2011-2017
Source:NMRGroup,Inc.2018,NEMALampIndices
20
Theselightingstandardsshooktheinternationalbulbmanufacturingstatusquo.When
the standards came into effect, China was the only producer of CFL bulbs. While U.S.
manufacturers eventually began to produce LED bulbs, they remain costlier to produce
domestically(Whoriskey2010).Thetraditionallightingandbulbmanufacturingindustryis
projectedtodecline“atanannualizedrateof9.8percent”overfiveyearsandinternational
imports, ledbyChinesemanufacturers,satisfyapproximately63percentofdomesticU.S.
demand.Ontheotherhand,theLEDindustryisprojectedtosee4.2percentgrowthin2019
alone (Holcomb2019).Halogenbulbs continue tobe shipped in regions thathave lower
efficiencystandardsasamarginallycheaperandmoreefficientreplacementtoincandescent
bulbs(NMRGroup2018).
WhilejobsinenergyefficiencysoaracrosstheUnitedStates,andintheefficientlighting
sector as a whole (2020 U.S. Energy), futures for communities with existing lighting
manufacturersareuncertain.JenniferDolan,theheadofgovernmentaffairsforLEDVANCE
spoketoindustryambiguityinthecontextofthePittsburghplantclosure,saying“There’sa
lotofuncertaintyinpolicy.There’salotofuncertaintyinthemarketplace.Everythingisjust
converging tomake it verydifficult in lighting.” (Brady2019) In the followingpages,we
examine the impact of policy, from the federal down to the community level, on groups
affected by the decline of traditional lighting manufacturing and the ascent of efficient
lighting.
4.2CaseStudies
WeselectedfourU.S.lightingmanufacturingsitesthatrepresentdifferentoutcomesin
thefaceofthebulbtransition.Thefirst,GE’sOhioLampPlant,inWarren,Ohio,wasoneof
theoldest lighting factories in theU.S. andwas shuttered in2014aftera longhistoryof
declining demand and a controversial union vote. The second, GE’s Circleville Plant, in
Circleville,Ohio,wasretrofittedtoproducehalogenbulbsinresponsetoincreasingnational
efficiencystandards,butultimatelyclosedin2016.Theclosureofeachoftheseplantstellsa
distinctstoryaboutworkerandunionparticipation,aswellaslocalandregionalresponse
todecliningmanufacturing.OurthirdcasestudyconsidersCree’sLEDlightingplantbased
inSturtevant,Wisconsin.Basedinthesmallestcommunitywestudied,theSturtevantplant
21
representsthecontinuedbuttenuoussuccessofMade-in-USALEDlighting.Cree’sotherkey
plant,inDurham,NorthCarolinaiscoveredbyourfourthcasestudy.Thisplant,whichhas
alreadytransitionedawayfromlightingtosemiconductors,sitsinadifferentgeographical
andbusinesslandscapethantheotherthreefactories,andbenefitsfromitscloseproximity
toastrongresearchinfrastructure.
Asoutlinedabove,thesecasesserveasatoolforisolatingsomeoftheexogenousfactors
thatmakestudyingindustrialtransitionssochallenging.Weexaminetwoplantsownedby
bothGEandCree,whichallowsustocompareoutcomesseparatefromandinfluencedby
firmownership.ThetwoGEplantsalsoallowustoexaminedivergentoutcomeswithinthe
samegeographicalregion(Ohio).Finally,amongthemanylightingplantsthatwestudied,
these four caseshappenwithin the same timeframe.We are thus able to investigate the
specificdrivingfactorsatbothfederalandregionallevelsacrossthisperiod.Ourcarefulcase
selection strengthens the comparativenatureofouranalysisbyaiming to isolate similar
cases.
GE’sOhioLampPlant,Warren,OH
Oneoftheoldesttraditionallightingfactories,theOhioLampPlantwasfoundedin1880
bythePackardBrothersandacquiredbyGeneralElectric(GE)in1903.Initshey-dayinthe
1970s,theplantemployed1200workers,andmaintainedastrongworkforcethroughthe
nationaldeclineoflighting,stillemploying600workersin2000.However,by2010,withan
acceleratingdeclineindemand,theplantemployedonly240workers(21WFMJ2013).
In2013,asdemandfor traditional lightingdroppedacrosstheU.S.,due inpartto the
EISA standards, GE threatened to shut down the plant (Tribune 2013). Threatenedwith
losingtheirjobs,someplantoperatorsdevelopedaplantoconverttheexistingproduction
linestomanufacturehalogenlamps.Inoneofthefewsucheventsrecorded,GEapproved
theirproposalandagreedtoreverseplanstoclosetheplant.Thelocalunion(IUE-CWALocal
722) negotiated an offer that included 15 percent wage concessions, wage freezes, and
personnelreductions,butultimatelykepttheplantopeninlinewiththeworkerproposal.
Inasurprisingturnofevents,thefactoryworkersultimatelyvotedtheproposaldownby
a narrowmargin of six votes. Older workers had the opportunity to cash in on strong
22
retirementbenefits,andtheynarrowlyoutweighedtheyounger,moreenthusiasticworkers.
The union and younger workers expressed disappointment, but legacy plant workers
ultimatelysawtheGEdealasaband-aid–onlypushingoutplantclosurebyacoupleofyears.
CarolHoffman, a longtimeLampPlantmechanicobserved, "Youaregoing tohaveyoung
peoplelosingtheirjobs.Theythinktheyaresavingtheirjobs,buttheywillbelaidoff.People
inthemiddlewillgodowntolowerpaygrade.It'snotaboutseniorityanymore."(Tribune
2013)
Bulb production at theOhio LampPlant ended in January 2014, and the factorywas
demolishedseveralmonthslater.ItwasthelastofsixGEplantsintheareatoclose(WFMJ
2014).Theplantclosureattractedbothlocalandstateattention,andCongressmanTimRyan
shared his support of the initial plan to keep the plant operational and subsequent
disappointmentatitsclosure.Warren,Ohiocityofficialsestimatedthattheclosurewould
result in an estimated loss of $280,000 in income taxes (WKBN27 2014). The largest
remainingemployersinWarrenaretheTrumbullCountyGovernment,ValleyCareHealth,
AVIFoodSystems(foodservice),OhioSecuritySystems,andWarrenCitySchools(Regional
2019).Accordingly, thecity turnedtoeconomicdevelopmentoptionsaimedatattracting
newbusinessviataxabatementincentives(WKBN272014).
In2017,itseemedthatsomeofthosedreamshadcometofruitionwhenChrisAllen,a
Warren native and the CEO of AutoParkIt, an automated parking solutions company,
announced an expansion in the city. Allen bought both theOhio LampPlant plot and an
adjacent shuttered auto parts factory. His plan for the facilitywasmulti-use, with some
manufacturingfunctions(Nelson2017).AsofSeptember2019,AutoParkIthadinvestedfour
milliondollars into facility improvements,hadundergonea full locational environmental
study,hired40-60employees,andhadareportedmonthlypayrollof$250,000.Allentook
advantage of the tax incentives offered by the city, and was reimbursed for the
environmentalstudybyJobsOhio,astate-runpublic-privateeconomicdevelopmentagency
(21WFMJ2019).
TheresponsetotheclosureofOhioLampPlantinWarren,Ohiowasaone-dimensional
push to incentivize new manufacturing in the same location. Warren’s economic
developmentmaterials trumpet the city as sitting at the “crossroadsof America”,within
reasonabledistanceoftenmajorU.S.metropolitanmarkets.Whilethecityhasn’tseenmajor
23
successinthemanufacturingarena,ithasn’tseenunprecedenteddeclineeither.Population
has been declining from its 2010 level of around 41,500, but slowly. Warren’s median
householdincomesitsat$29,241,substantiallylowerthanthenationalaverageof$63,179,
and the poverty rate is 34.6 percent (American FactFinder). The city’s identity revolves
around its manufacturing workforce and has suffered from the decades-long decline in
industry,driveninitiallybythefallofsteel.TheclosureoftheOhioLampPlantfollowsthat
pattern,thoughitdidn’tdramaticallyworsencommunitylivelihoods.
GE’sCirclevillePlant,Circleville,OH
TheCirclevillePlantwasfoundedin1948,andbyits50thanniversaryemployedmore
than 600 line workers. The Circleville Plant, owned by GE, manufactured primarily
fluorescent lamps, and specialized in producing a wide variety of sizes and shapes that
couldn’t be manufactured elsewhere in the United States (GE Circleville 1998). The
CirclevillePlantexperienceddeclinesthatmirroredthoseacrossthecountry in theearly
2010s. In 2013, following the failed conversion proposal at the Ohio Lamp Plant, GE
committedtoa$30millioninvestmentinincreasingproductionofsoftwhitehalogenlight
bulbs.Halogenbulbshadtheadvantageofbeingmarginallymoreenergyefficient,andGE
planned increasedproductionat theirCircleville,BucyrusandMattoonplants.Acrossthe
threeplants,GEprojectedanadditional150jobs,100ofwhichwouldbelocatedatCircleville
(GEtoInvest2013).
Thehalogenupgradewasmotivatedbyincreasedlightingefficiencystandardsandalso
byanewagreementbetweenGEandWalmart.Undertheagreement,GEwouldprovidesoft
whitehalogenbulbs tobe sold in3,400Walmart storesacross the country (GE to Invest
2013).In2013and2014,thecountyalsosawaresurgenceofonshoremanufacturing.Scott
Paul,thepresidentoftheAllianceforAmericanManufacturing,saidthatmanufacturingin
theU.S.justseemedto“makeeconomicsense”.JobsattheCirclevillePlantclimbedbackup
that year, and some lineworkerswere even featured in aMade-in-USA ad campaign by
Walmart(Gearino2014).
AslightingstandardspushedCFLandLEDsaleshigherandinternationalbulbproduction
proliferatedaround2014,thepriceofhalogenbulbsdroppedandGE’sCirclevilleoperations
24
became uneconomic. By 2016, the Circleville Plant was operating at 90 percent below
capacity,andGEannounceditsclosure.Workerswereofferedseverance,abenefitspackage,
and preferential treatment for employment at other GE plants. Approximately half of
Circleville’sworkerswereeligibletocollectretirementbenefits(Gearino2017).
The City of Circleville had a relatively new, but strong economic development
corporation, the Pickaway Progress Partnership, or P3, which covers Pickaway Country,
stretchingfromAppalachiatotheColumbusMetroArea.InCircleville,P3partneredwiththe
city government to provide income and net profit tax incentives through the City of
CirclevilleEconomicGrowthInitiative.Theirtaxincentivepackageappearstomirrorthose
inotherOhiocities(BusinessPrograms).By2017,P3crediteditselfwithcreating1,700jobs
andspurringonebilliondollarsincapitalinvestmentandhadreceivedover$49millionin
grantfunding(Collins2017).
TheCityofCircleville’s SafetyCommitteewasactively looking foranewuser for the
Circleville Plant site, but in the meantime focused on other avenues for attracting new
manufacturingjobs(Collins2019).InOctober2018,Sofidel,aleadingItaliansanitarytissue
manufacturer announced a $400 million investment in a new manufacturing plant in
Circleville. The new plant comprises both a papermill and a tissue conversion process.
Sofidelemployed300jobsattheplant’sinitiationandprojectedaneventual700positions.
Sofidel tookadvantageof the local tax incentivesandalsobenefitted from theSelectUSA
project, designed to promote foreign investments in the United States (Sofidel 2018).
Additionally,inMarch2019,DuPontannounceda$200millioninvestmenttoexpandtheir
existingCirclevilleoperationandadd50morepositionsontopoftheexisting500,allaying
communityconcernsaroundthefutureoftheplantinthefaceoftheDowChemical/DuPont
merger(Williams2019).
Circlevillefollowedasimilarstrategyofeconomicdevelopmentandbusinessincentive
structuresasWarren,butsawmoresuccess,likelyduetotheexistinggrowthofregional
actor networks. Circleville’s population rose 3.4 percent from 2010 to 2019, to 13,965.
Educational attainment is similar in both cities, but the median household income in
Circleville is substantially higher at $41,660, and its poverty rate ismuch lower at 23.1
percent(AmericanFactFinder).
25
CreeWisconsin,Sturtevant,WI
InAugust2011,Cree,anAmericanLEDmanufacturer,acquiredRuudLightingand its
manufacturing facility in Sturtevant,Wisconsin. Cree paid $525million to acquireRuud,
which manufactured LEDs and had a strong niche in the outdoor lighting market. In
Sturtevant,CreeplannedtoexpandRuud’smanufacturingfacilityby280,000squarefeet,
costingapproximately$24.5millionandprojectedtobring469newjobstothetownover
fouryears.Forthisproposedexpansion,Creereceivedincentivestotaling$8millionfrom
the Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation, Racine County, the Racine County
EconomicDevelopmentcorporation,andtheVillageofSturtevant(LEDsMagazine2011).
Further,theUSDepartmentofEnergyprovidedashowofsupporttoCreein2013,whenit
designated a $30 million grant to expand the firm’s manufacturing footprint in both
WisconsinandNorthCarolina(JournalTimes2013).
Onthesurface,itappearsthatCree’sinvestmentpaidoffforthevillageofSturtevant.As
of 2019, they employed approximately one thousand workers (JournalTimes 2019) and
wereoneofthethreelargestemployersinthevillage,allofwhicharemanufacturingfirms
(includingBRPUS,apowersportscompany,andAndisCompany,anelectricclippersand
trimmersmanufacturer)(LeadingEmployers).
However,Creehasbeenvolatileinrecentyears,anditisunclearwhetherstressonthe
companywilltranslatetolostjobsinSturtevant.In2016,Creesawcorporate-widelayoffs,
thoughtheywerelimitedintheSturtevantarea(Patch).In2018,theTrumpAdministration
announcedtariffsonLEDsthatthreatenedCree’sinternationalsupplychain,inthefaceof
alreadydeclininggrossmargins–downto26.4percentin2018from34.7percentin2016
(WSJ).Finally,in2019,Creeannouncedthatitwouldselloffitsentirelightingbusinessfor
$310million to Ideal Industries andwould transition its focus to semiconductors. As of
March 2019, there was no announcement regarding the impact on employees at the
Sturtevantlocation(JournalTimes2019).
Sturtevantisstablerightnowwithapopulationaround6,600,educationalattainment
andmedian incomehigh ($67,212), and the poverty rate around8.9 percent (American
FactFinder). Yet, its future remainsunclear, as theLEDlightingplant facesanuncertain
future.
26
CreeNorthCarolina,Durham,NC
Meanwhile,Cree’sothercentralfactory,locatedinDurham,NorthCarolina,amuchlarger
city, though touched by the rapid shift away from lighting, may not see negative
consequences for workers or the community. In 2015, Cree announced that it would
consolidateitstwoDurhamfactoriesintoone.MuchofCree’slightingbusinesswasalready
centeredinWisconsin,butDurhamcontinuedtobethecentralhubofCree’smanufacturing
operations,internationallyanddomestically(Ohnesoge2015).
Following the sale of its lighting business, Cree doubleddownon chip fabrication. In
2019, Cree announced a $1 billion investment in expanding its silicon carbide wafer
manufacturing capacity in Durham (Area Development 2019). This plan included a
partnershipstructurewithstateandlocalcommunityandfour-yearcollegestoimplement
trainingprogramsaimedatpreparingaworkforceforlong-term,highqualityemployment.
Further,CreeisinvestinginUtica,NewYorkviaapublic-privatepartnershipwiththestate
thatwillcomprisea$1billioninvestmentandcreate600localfull-timepositionsatanew
siliconcarbidewaferfactory(BusinessFacilities2019).SimilartoCree’seffortsinDurham,
theUticafacilitywillimplementatalentdevelopmentprograminpartnershipwiththeState
UniversityofNewYork(SUNY)system.
Durhamisamajorcitywithapopulationofapproximately274,000,withanextremely
high educational attainment rate (around 49 percent of the population has a bachelor’s
degree)andamedianhouseholdincomeof$55,851(AmericanFactFinder).Cree’sindividual
successasafirmlikelywillnotimpacttheoverallhealthofthecity,butthecityofDurham
does provide Cree with a strong set of resources and a fertile testing ground for the
expansionofitssemiconductormanufacturing.
4.3CentralFindingsfromtheLightingCases
Based on our examination of these four case studies,we have identified four central
conclusionsregardingpost-transitionstability.
Unioninvolvement.Aswithmanytraditionalmanufacturingoperations,unionsplaya
central role in the livelihoodsofworkersemployedat lightingplants. In these scenarios,
union involvement appears to consistently improveworker outcomes, evenwhenplants
27
close. In the Warren and Circleville cases, the unions were central to managing the
relationship with GE. InWarren, GE allowed a 60-day period following the initial plant
closureannouncementforunionsandemployeestosubmitideastomaketheplantmore
competitive.Theworkersdevelopedaplan soattractive thatGE reversed itsdecision to
close,anunprecedentedmove.InparalleltheIUE-CWALocal722inWarrenhadsuccessfully
negotiated strongwages – GE’s CEO had once calledworkers the highest-paid lightbulb
workers in theworld, and they earned $27 per hour (Ohio Lamp Plant). However, high
historicalwagesandstrongbenefits,negotiatedbythesameunionthatsupportedtheplant
conversionproject,ultimatelycontributedtotheplant’sclosure.
TheWarrenandCirclevilleplantsarebothbasedinOhio,bothownedbyGE,andwere
both faced with the same federal lighting policies. While workers at both plants were
representedbyaunion, theWarrenplant sawstrongeractionby local leaderswhile the
Circlevilleworkerswereleftwithbaselevelsupport.Ultimately,theWarrenworkerswere
abletoexercisemoreagencyandbenefitedfromastrongersetofnegotiatedprotections,
whiletheCirclevillecommunityfacedaslowanduncertaindecline.
Regionaleconomicdevelopmentcorporations&businessincentives.Inallfourof
thecaseswestudied,economicdevelopmentcorporationswereheavilyinvolvedinspurring
local investment. These organizations serve primarily to incentivize the development of
income and profit tax incentives, and in some cases partnerwithmanufacturers to find
sources of initial capital. At the local level, both the City of Circleville EconomicGrowth
Initiative and the Village of Sturtevant provided tax incentives for local manufacturing
development.Regionaleconomicdevelopmentcorporations,suchasthePickawayProgress
PartnershipinCirclevilleandtheRacineCountyEconomicDevelopmentCorporation,credit
themselves with effectively marketing their respective regions and creating beneficial
connections between industry and local government to fund expanded manufacturing.
Further, firms pursuing newmanufacturing in the place of traditional lighting leveraged
state-levelprograms(e.g.,theJobsOhiofundingofsiteenvironmentalstudiesinWarrenOhio
andtheStateofNewYorkpartnershipwithCreetofundthenewUticafacility).Ineachof
these communities, regardless of ownership, geography, or population, economic
developmentcorporationsservedasamechanismtodrivepoliciesthatpromotedbusiness
incentivesandsoughttocreateabusiness-friendlyenvironment.
28
Detrimentaleffectsofprivate-privatepartnerships.Circleville’sstoryisareminder
that private-private partnerships, while beneficial for the participating firms, may also
discount community longevity. The initial Made-in-USA partnership between GE and
Walmart led to a brief increase in employment, but ultimately failed to recognize the
impendingdeclineofdomesticlightingmanufacturing.Sturtevant,Wisconsinisasmalltown
thatishighlyreliantonafewkeymanufacturers.ThroughoutRuud’s,Cree’s,andnowIdeal
Industries’tenures,thefutureoftheSturtevantplanthasbeenopaqueandprovideslittle
long-term assurance to workers. Both communities, previously reliant on these private
actorsforsupport,anticipatefuturerelianceonsimilarindustrypartnerships.
Theeffectivenessofretrainingorcareersupportprograms.Ineverycase,inevery
geographyandeverycommunitysize,retrainingandcareersupportisplacedinthehands
ofthecorporations,whichmakestheprocessopaqueatbest.Thereisverylittleevidence
concerningwhat,ifanything,theseprogramshaveaddedfordisplacedworkers.Facilities
withproximity tostrong researchhubs can lessencorporate reliancebypartneringwith
universities to develop a more highly-skilled manufacturing line. For example, as Cree
transitioneditsDurhamfacilitytosemiconductorsitutilizedthenearbynetworkofcolleges
anduniversitiesandlookstobepursuingthesameapproachforitsnewfacilityinUtica.
29
5. ConclusionsandPolicyRecommendationsThetransitionfromincandescenttoLEDlightingmayseematfirstlikeyetanotherstory
of traditional industrial demise in the United States. Yet our four case studies suggest a
somewhatrosierpicture.Intheleastfruitfultransition,approximatelyhalfoftheemployees
attheOhioLampPlantenteredretirementuponplantclosure,whiletherestfoundother
manufacturingjobswithinacloseradius.Inamorepositivetransition,Creeleveragedits
earlysuccessinLEDlightingintosemiconductormanufacturingwithintheU.S.,leadingto
thegrowthofmoreaccessibleandmorehighly-skilled jobs.Thepresenceof strong local
unionsandregional economicdevelopment corporationshave shepherded thegrowthof
new business, though private-private partnerships demonstrated little recognition of
communitydevelopmentand the impactofretrainingprograms remainshidden.Beyond
thesepolicy considerations, lighting communitieshave consistentlybenefitted from their
geographicproximitytoothermanufacturingjobsormetropolitancenters.
5.1 Recommendations
Between our literature review and industrial transition and lighting case studieswe
concludethatpolicypackagesarestrongestwhentheyacknowledgedistinctregionalsocial
fabric and human capital, carefully structure policy to encourage cross-community
collaboration, and design policy with the particular business landscape in mind, while
avoidingoverrelianceonprivatefirms.Accordingly,wehavedevelopedasetofthreehigh-
levelrecommendationsforpolicymakerstokeepinmindwhenrespondingtotheimpending
energytransition.
Understand local competitive advantage. Knowledge of a community’s specific
skillsets and an understanding of the importance of geography is paramount to
managing a transition. Each community has its own characteristics, and policymakers
shouldbefullyawareofthese.Inourresearch,wefoundthatknowledgeofacommunity’s
specific skillsets and an understanding of driving geographical factors is paramount. For
example,lineworkersincommunitiesdominatedbylightingmanufacturinghavebeenable
tostepfromtraditionalbulbmanufacturingtoemploymentinadvancedbulborotherforms
ofproductionandmanufacturing.Incontrast,selectruraltimbercommunitiesinthePacific
30
Northwestfacedseverechallengesinchangingoccupationsandsawlittleassistancefrom
theregionalmarket-basedpolicyeffort.
Additionally,whilegeographicproximitytomajormetropolitanareashasbeenaboonto
displacedlightingandsteelworkers,lessobviousplace-basedsocialandeconomicfactors
drove success in some transitions. Take, for example, the many moderately remote
communitiesinthePacificNorthwestwhowereabletoleveragethenaturalbeautyoftheir
locationstoadvancetourism.Geography,existingskillsets,andotherunderlyingindicators
ofregionalsocialfabricshouldbeconsideredandinterrogatedaheadofpolicycreation.
Build ties between core institutions.Nearly every example of industrial transitionwe
investigatedbenefittedfromarobuststructureofcommunicationandtrustbetweenlocal
actors.Theabsenceof anyparticulargroupordominanceofone strong firmcan lead to
policycaptureandemergeintounintendedconsequences.TakethecaseofCleveland,Ohio,
where an existing network of private actors monopolized on attempts at economic
development and failed to include community organizations (Safford 2009) versus
Pittsburghwhichsuccessfullyleveragedanetworkofprivateactors,researchuniversities
andcommunityorganizationstoreimaginethecity.
Similarly, inSturtevant, the relianceona fewmajorprivate firmsand relative lackof
socialoreducationalassetsmakesthecommunity’sfutureuncertainwhereasinDurhamand
Utica,Cree ispartneringwithstategovernmentand localuniversities toprovideamulti-
organizational robust safety net. Policymakers should prioritize the creation and
maintenanceofstakeholdernetworksahead,during,andfollowingtheimplementationof
economicdevelopmentefforts.
Leverageeconomicdevelopmentcorporationsandpublic-privatepartnershipswith
caution.Bewarethecreationofprivate-privatepartnershipsorprivateinitiativesthat
do not consider long-term community benefits. Economic development corporations
featureheavilyinthecurrentsteadyorpositiveprogressduringthelightingtransition.They
canprovideusefulhubsforfacilitatingstrongnetworksandmaintainingtheprominenceof
regional knowledge.However, thework of economic development corporationsmust be
31
monitored, as the business tax incentives they promote are highly susceptible to policy
captureandmisuse.
The story of the Circleville lamp plant, and its overreliance on a private-private
partnershipbetweenGEandWalmartservesasawarningagainsttrustingsiloedfirm-led
policies. While often well-intentioned, private deals can be blind to community futures.
Across our literature review and case studies, public involvement was key to building
beneficialoutcomes.Whileprivateinitiativesmayplayacentralroleinsomepost-industrial
transitions,itisimportantthatpolicymakersstructureplansthatdonotrelytooheavilyon
them.
32
References
“2020U.S.EnergyandEmploymentReport.”2020.EnergyFuturesInitiative.https://www.usenergyjobs.org/fiveyears.
21WFMJ.2013.“GEOhioLampPlantClosingMayBeAverted,”April3,2013.https://www.wfmj.com/story/21818177/ohio-lamp-plant-closing-may-be-averted.
21WFMJ.2014.“LightsOutatWarrenGEPlant,”January24,2014.https://www.wfmj.com/story/24542436/lights-out-at-warren-ge-plant.
*21WFMJ.2019.“AUTOParkitOwnerStillCommittedtoBringingJobstoWarren,”September1,2019.https://www.wfmj.com/story/40998492/autoparkit-owner-still-committed-to-bringing-jobs-to-warren.
AreaDevelopmentNewsDesk.2019.“CreePlans$1BillionExpansionatDurham,NorthCarolina,Campus.”AreaDevelopment,July29,2019.https://www.areadevelopment.com/newsItems/7-29-2019/cree-durham-materials-mega-factory-north-carolina.shtml.
Armstrong,Ben.2019.“BrassCities:InnovationPolicyandLocalEconomicTransformation.”PhDdiss.MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.
Bartik,TimothyJ.2017."ANewPanelDatabaseonBusinessIncentivesforEconomicDevelopmentOfferedbyStateandLocalGovernmentsintheUnitedStates."PreparedforthePewCharitableTrusts.https://research.upjohn.org/reports/225
Brady,Jeff.2019.“Cheaper,Longer-LastingLightbulbsPoseIndustryChallenge.”AllThingsConsidered.NationalPublicRadio.https://www.npr.org/2019/11/25/782087163/lighting-industrys-future-dims-as-efficient-led-bulbs-take-over.
Burke,Michael.2019.“CreeSellingoffEntireLightingBusinessfor$310Million.”JournalTimes,March1,2019.https://journaltimes.com/business/local/cree-selling-off-entire-lighting-business-for-million/article_6d684492-2713-53a9-8a05-b313acfb9419.html.
“BusinessPrograms.”n.d.PickawayProgressPartnership.AccessedDecember19,2019.https://www.pickawayprogress.com/Pickaway-County-Business-Programs-P3.html.
Buss,TerryF.“TheEffectofStateTaxIncentivesonEconomicGrowthandFirmLocationDecisions:AnOverviewoftheLiterature:ReviewEssay.”EconomicDevelopmentQuarterly15,no.1(February2001):90–105.
Carley,Sanya,TomP.Evans,MichelleGraff,andDavidM.Konisky.“AFrameworkforEvaluatingGeographicDisparitiesinEnergyTransitionVulnerability.”NatureEnergy3,no.8(August2018):621–27.
Carley,Sanya,andSaraLawrence.“Energy-BasedEconomicDevelopment.”InEnergy-BasedEconomicDevelopment:HowCleanEnergyCanDriveDevelopmentandStimulateEconomicGrowth,editedbySanyaCarleyandSaraLawrence,1–14.London:SpringerLondon,2014.
33
Carlton,DennisW."TheLocationandEmploymentChoicesofNewFirms:AnEconometricModelwithDiscreteandContinuousEndogenousVariables."TheReviewofEconomicsandStatistics65,no.3(1983):440-49.doi:10.2307/1924189.
Carroll,Matthew.2000.“EmploymentandDisplacementAmongNorthwesternForestProductsWorkers.”Society&NaturalResources13(2):151–56.
Charnley,Susan.2006.“TheNorthwestForestPlanasaModelforBroad-ScaleEcosystemManagement:ASocialPerspective.”ConservationBiology20(2):330–40.
Charnley,Susan,EllenM.Donoghue,andCassandraMoseley.“ForestManagementPolicyandCommunityWell-BeinginthePacificNorthwest.”JournalofForestry;Bethesda106,no.8(December2008):440–47.
Collins,Steven.2017.“P3Receives$10KAEPOhioGrantforEconomicDevelopment.”TheCirclevilleHerald,August26,2017.
Collins,Steven.2019.“FindingNewMoney.”TheCirclevilleHerald,March14,2019.https://www.circlevilleherald.com/news/finding-new-money/article_2e9a3859-1929-52da-88e1-0070e6acd803.html.
Daniels,Steven.2000.“ReemploymentProgramsforDislocatedTimberWorkers:LessonsfromOregon.”Society&NaturalResources13(2):135–50.
DeHaas,Hein."MigrationandDevelopment:ATheoreticalPerspective."TheInternationalMigrationReview44,no.1(2010):227-64.
DeepDecarbonizationPathwaysProject(2015).Pathwaystodeepdecarbonization2015report,SDSN-IDDRI.
Detrick,Sabina.“ThePostIndustrialRevitalizationofPittsburgh:MythsandEvidence.”CommunityDevelopmentJournal34,no.1(January1,1999):4–12.
EnergyFuturesInitiative.2019.“Optionality,Flexibility&Innovation:PathwaysforDeepDecarbonizationinCalifornia.”https://energyfuturesinitiative.org/efi-reports.
Fay,Marianne;Hallegatte,Stephane;Vogt-Schilb,Adrien;Rozenberg,Julie;Narloch,Ulf;Kerr,Tom.2015.DecarbonizingDevelopment:ThreeStepstoaZero-CarbonFuture.ClimateChangeandDevelopment;.Washington,DC:WorldBank.©WorldBank.
Foster,David.2019.(distinguishedassociate,EnergyFuturesInitiative),indiscussion.October.
GECirclevilleLampPlant50thAnniversary.1998.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDDw0OI44HE.
“GEtoInvest$30Million,Adding150Jobs;GE-WalmartAnnounceAgreementforU.S.ManufacturedProduct.”2013.GeneralElectric.https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20130822006040/en/GE-Invest-30-Million-Adding-150-Jobs.
Gearino,Dan.2014.“CirclevilleLight-BulbFactoryAdding,NotLosing,Jobs.”TheColumbusDispatch,November1,2014.https://www.dispatch.com/article/20141109/NEWS/311099849.
34
Gearino,Dan.2017.“GELightingtoCloseCirclevillePlant,Costing148Jobs.”TheColumbusDispatch,April1,2017.https://www.dispatch.com/news/20170412/ge-lighting-to-close-circleville-plant-costing-148-jobs.
Giarratani,F.,andD.Houston.“StructuralChangeandEconomicPolicyinaDecliningMetropolitanRegion:ImplicationsofthePittsburghExperience.”UrbanStudies(Routledge),12/1/19891989,549.
Goodstein,Eban.1999.TheTrade-OffMyth:FactAndFictionAboutJobsAndTheEnvironment.IslandPress,Washington,DC.
Graham,Laurie.1998.SingingTheCity :TheBondsOfHomeInAnIndustrialLandscape.UniversityofPittsburghPress.
Gustafson,Abel,ParrishBergquist,AnthonyLeiserowitz,andEdwardMaibach.2019.“AGrowingMajorityofAmericansThinkGlobalWarmingIsHappeningandAreWorried.”YaleProgramonClimateChangeCommunication(blog).February21,2019.
Haller,William.“IndustrialRestructuringandUrbanChangeinthePittsburghRegion:Developmental,Ecological,andSocioeconomicTrade-Offs.”EcologyandSociety,no.1(2005):13.
Harrison,JillAnn.“RustBeltBoomerang:ThePullofPlaceinMovingBacktoaLegacyCity.”City&Community16,no.3(2017):263–83.https://doi.org/10.1111/cico.12245.
Hausker,K.,K.Meek,R.Gasper,N.Aden,andM.Obeiter.2015.“DeliveringontheU.S.ClimateCommitment:A10-PointPlanTowardaLow-CarbonFuture.”WorkingPaper.Washington,DC:WorldResourcesInstitute.;
Heal,Geoffrey.“WhatWouldItTaketoReduceUSGreenhouseGasEmissions80%by2050?”WorkingPaper.WorkingPaperSeries.NationalBureauofEconomicResearch,August2016.https://doi.org/10.3386/w22525.
Hoerr,JohnP.Andthewolffinallycame:ThedeclineoftheAmericansteelindustry.UnivofPittsburghPr,1988.
Holcomb,Griffin.2019.“IBISWorldIndustryReport33511:Lighting&BulbManufacturingintheUS.”IBISWorld.
IPCC,2018:SummaryforPolicymakers.In:GlobalWarmingof1.5°C.AnIPCCSpecialReportontheimpactsofglobalwarmingof1.5°Cabovepre-industriallevelsandrelatedglobalgreenhousegasemissionpathways,inthecontextofstrengtheningtheglobalresponsetothethreatofclimatechange,sustainabledevelopment,andeffortstoeradicatepoverty[Masson-Delmotte,V.,P.Zhai,H.-O.Pörtner,D.Roberts,J.Skea,P.R.Shukla,A.Pirani,W.Moufouma-Okia,C.Péan,R.Pidcock,S.Connors,J.B.R.Matthews,Y.Chen,X.Zhou,M.I.Gomis,E.Lonnoy,T.Maycock,M.Tignor,andT.Waterfield(eds.)].WorldMeteorologicalOrganization,Geneva,Switzerland,32pp.
Jacobson,MarkZ.,MarkA.Delucchi,GuillaumeBazouin,ZackA.F.Bauer,ChristaC.Heavey,EmmaFisher,SeanB.Morris,DinianaJ.Y.Piekutowski,TaylorA.Vencill,andTimW.Yeskoo.“100%CleanandRenewableWind,Water,andSunlight(WWS)All-Sector
35
EnergyRoadmapsforthe50UnitedStates.”Energy&EnvironmentalScience8,no.7(July3,2015):2093–2117.
Jenkins,JesseD.,MaxLuke,andSamuelThernstrom.“GettingtoZeroCarbonEmissionsintheElectricPowerSector.”Joule2,no.12(December2018):2498–2510.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2018.11.013.
Kahn,MatthewE.,andErinT.Mansur.“DoLocalEnergyPricesandRegulationAffecttheGeographicConcentrationofEmployment?”JournalofPublicEconomics101(May1,2013):105–14.
LampPlantGoesDark.2014.WKBN27.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zQmjNJAPwVY.
“LeadingEmployers|RacineCountyEconomicDevelopmentCorp.”n.d.AccessedDecember20,2019.https://rcedc.org/data-center/leading-employers.
LEDsMagazine.2011.“CreeBeginsExpansionofRuud’sWisconsinLED-FixtureManufacturingFacility,”November16,2011.https://www.ledsmagazine.com/manufacturing-services-testing/test-equipment/article/16697457/cree-begins-expansion-of-ruuds-wisconsin-ledfixture-manufacturing-facility.
Lester,RichardK.2005.“Universities,Innovation,andtheCompetitivenessofLocalEconomies.”IndustrialPerformanceCenter,MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology.
MacGillis,Alec.2018.“WhyDoAmericansStayWhenTheirTownHasNoFuture?”BloombergBusinessweek,May23,2018.https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-05-23/why-do-americans-stay-when-their-town-has-no-future.
Mahone,Amber,ZacharySubin,JenyaKahn-Lang,DouglasAllen,VivianLi,GerritDeMoor,NancyRyan,SnullerPrice.2018.DeepDecarbonizationinaHighRenewablesFuture:UpdatedResultsfromtheCaliforniaPATHWAYSModel.CaliforniaEnergyCommission.PublicationNumber:CEC-500-2018-012;
Malizia,EmilE.1994."ARedefinitionofEconomicDevelopment."EconomicDevelopmentReview12(2)(Spring):83.
Marcy,Cara,andBillSanchez.2017.“PowerSectorCarbonDioxideEmissionsFallbelowTransportationSectorEmissions.”TodayinEnergy(blog).December19,2017.https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34192.
Nelson,George.2017.“AutoParkitBuysGEBuildingsforPlant,HQ.”BusinessJournalDaily.May2,2017.https://businessjournaldaily.com/autoparkit-buys-ge-buildings-for-plant-hq/.
Neumann,Tracy.“ReforgingtheSteelCity:SymbolismandSpaceinPostindustrialPittsburgh.”JournalofUrbanHistory44,no.4(July1,2018):582–602.
Neumann,Tracy.2016.RemakingtheRustBelt:ThePostindustrialTransformationofNorthAmerica.UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress.
36
“NorthwestForestPlan.”n.d.RegionalEcosystemOffice.AccessedNovember14,2019.https://www.fs.fed.us/r6/reo/nwfp/.
“OhioLampPlant,Warren.”LampTech.AccessedDecember17,2019.http://www.lamptech.co.uk/Documents/Factory%20-%20US%20-%20Ohio.htm.
Ohnesoge,Lauren.2015.“CreetoConsolidateDurham’sLEDFactoriesasPartofRestructuringPlan.”MilwaukeeBusinessJournal.June25,2015.https://www.bizjournals.com/milwaukee/news/2015/06/25/cree-to-consolidate-led-factories-in-north.html.
Power,ThomasMichael.“PublicTimberSupply,MarketAdjustments,andLocalEconomies:EconomicAssumptionsoftheNorthwestForestPlan.”ConservationBiology20,no.2(2006):341.
Rareshide,Michael.2017.“PowerintheDataCenterandItsCostAcrosstheU.S.”SiteSelectionGroup(blog).October23,2017.https://info.siteselectiongroup.com/blog/power-in-the-data-center-and-its-costs-across-the-united-states.
Rasker,HeadwatersEconomics,TheTransitionfromWesternTimberDependence:LessonsforCounties,Dec2017
“RLPNC18-11LightingSalesDataAnalysis.”2018.NMRGroup,Inc.
Safford,Sean.2009.WhytheGardenClubCouldn’tSaveYoungstown :TheTransformationoftheRustBelt.Cambridge,Mass. :HarvardUniversityPress,2009.
Simon,CurtisJ,andClarkNardinelli.“HumanCapitalandtheRiseofAmericanCities,1900–1990.”RegionalScienceandUrbanEconomics32,no.1(January1,2002):59–96.
“Sofidel’sLargest,MostModernandSustainablePlantHasBeenInauguratedTodayinCircleville(US).”2018.Sofidel(blog).October3,2018.https://www.sofidel.com/en/press-releases/sofidels-largest-most-modern-and-sustainable-plant-has-been-inaugurated-today-in-circleville-us.
Spies,ThomasA.,JonathanW.Long,SusanCharnley,PaulF.Hessburg,BruceG.Marcot,GordonH.Reeves,DamonB.Lesmeister,etal.2019.“Twenty-FiveYearsoftheNorthwestForestPlan:WhatHaveWeLearned?”FrontiersinEcologyandtheEnvironment17(9):511–20.
Staff,B.F.2019.“CreeInvesting$1BillionInDurham,NorthCarolina.”BusinessFacilities–AreaEconomicDevelopment,SiteSelection&WorkforceSolutions(blog).May9,2019.https://businessfacilities.com/2019/05/cree-investing-1-billion-durham-north-carolina/.
Staff,JournalTimes.2013.“CreeReceives$30MilliontoExpandManufacturing.”JournalTimes,December1,2013.https://journaltimes.com/business/local/cree-receives-million-to-expand-manufacturing/article_84ed9a46-6355-11e3-b1ca-0019bb2963f4.html.
37
Thomas,JerryBruce.2010.AnAppalachianReawakening:WestVirginiaandthePerilsoftheNewMachineAge,1945-1972.WestVirginiaUniversityPress.
Treado,CareyDurkin,andFrankGiarratani.“IntermediateSteel-IndustrySuppliersinthePittsburghRegion:ACluster-BasedAnalysisofRegionalEconomicResilience.”EconomicDevelopmentQuarterly22,no.1(February1,2008):63–75.
Treadwell,David.1990.“UrbanPittsburghSchoolsatHeadofTheirClass.”LosAngelesTimes,September22,1990.
TribuneChronicle.2013.“GEUnionRejectsPlantoStayOpen,”April2,2013.https://www.tribtoday.com/news/local-news/2013/04/ge-union-rejects-plan-to-stay-open/.
Ungar,Lowell.2015.“BendingtheCurve:ImplementationoftheEnergyIndependenceandSecurityActof2007.”AmericanCouncilforanEnergy-EfficientEconomy.
UnitedStatesCensusBureau.“CommunityFacts.”Factfinder.census.gov.AmericanFactFinder.AccessedDecember8,2019.https://factfinder.census.gov/
Whoriskey,Peter.2010.“LightBulbFactoryCloses;EndofEraforU.S.MeansMoreJobsOverseas.”TheWashingtonPost,September8,2010.https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/07/AR2010090706933.html.
Williams,Mark.2019.“DuPonttoInvest$220MilliontoExpandCirclevillePlant.”TheColumbusDispatch,March1,2019.https://www.dispatch.com/business/20190314/dupont-to-invest-220-million-to-expand-circleville-plant.
Worland,Justin.2017.“PresidentTrumpWantstoBringBackCoal.ButCleanEnergyKeepsRising.”Coal’sLastKick(blog).2017.https://time.com/coals-last-kick/.
MIT CEEPR Working Paper Series is published by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research from submissions by affiliated researchers.
Copyright © 2020Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research 77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-411Cambridge, MA 02139 USA
Website: ceepr.mit.edu
For inquiries and/or for permission to reproduce material in this working paper, please contact:
Email [email protected] (617) 253-3551Fax (617) 253-9845
Since 1977, the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) has been a focal point for research on energy and environmental policy at MIT. CEEPR promotes rigorous, objective research for improved decision making in government and the private sector, and secures the relevance of its work through close cooperation with industry partners from around the globe. Drawing on the unparalleled resources available at MIT, affiliated faculty and research staff as well as international research associates contribute to the empirical study of a wide range of policy issues related to energy supply, energy demand, and the environment. An important dissemination channel for these research efforts is the MIT CEEPR Working Paper series. CEEPR releases Working Papers written by researchers from MIT and other academic institutions in order to enable timely consideration and reaction to energy and environmental policy research, but does not conduct a selection process or peer review prior to posting. CEEPR’s posting of a Working Paper, therefore, does not constitute an endorsement of the accuracy or merit of the Working Paper. If you have questions about a particular Working Paper, please contact the authors or their home institutions.
