TRUSTED COMPUTING GROUP TRUSTED STORAGE
SPECIFICATION
Jason Cox, Seagate Technology
Trusted Computing Group Trusted Storage Specification © 2008 Storage Networking Industry Association. All Rights Reserved. 22
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Trusted Computing Group Trusted Storage Specification © 2008 Storage Networking Industry Association. All Rights Reserved. 33
Abstract
Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Storage Specification
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Storage Work Group recently published formal specifications for security and trust services on storage devices, including hard drives, flash, and tape drives. The majority of hard drive and other storage device manufacturers participated. Putting security directly on the storage device avoids the vulnerabilities of platform OS-based software security. The details of the Specification will be highlighted, as well as various use cases, including Full Disk Encryption with enterprise key/credential management.
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Storage WG Robert Thibadeau
SeagateKey Management
Services Walt Hubis
LSI
Storage Interface Interactions
James HatfieldSeagate
Optical Storage Bill McFerrin
DataPlay
Storage Conformance
Cyril Guyot HGST/Dave Kreft/NSA
TCG Storage Work Group Structure
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3 Simple reasonsStorage for secrets with strong access control
• Inaccessible using traditional storage access• Arbitrarily large memory space• Gated by access control
Unobservable cryptographic processing of secrets• Processing unit “welded” to storage unit• “Closed”, controlled computing environment
Custom logic for faster, more secure operations• Inexpensive implementation of modern cryptographic functions• Complex security operations are feasible
Security in Storage
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Peripheral Controller Electronics
Primary Host Interface
Diagnostic Ports
Loadable Firmware
Data Sink / Source
Probe Points
Special Hardware Functions
Firmware FunctionsPower
Trust = systems operate as intended Objective: Exercise control over operations
that might violate trust
Needed: Trusted Storage commands
General Risk Model – Storage
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TRUSTED SEND/SECURITY PROTOCOL IN
TRUSTED RECEIVE/SECURITY PROTOCOL OUT
T10/T13 define the “container commands”TCG SWG defining the “TCG payload”
(Protocol ID = xxxx …..)
Protocol IDs assigned to TCG, T10/T13, other standards organizations, or reserved
Joint Work – T10 (SCSI) & T13 (ATA)
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TCG SWG Document StructureTCG Storage Core Architecture Specification
Storage Interface Interactions
Security Subsystem Class (SSC)
Compliance SecurityEvaluation
Compliance SecurityEvaluation
Aux
iliar
y D
ocum
ents
Spec
ific
Doc
umen
tsG
ener
al
Doc
umen
ts
Security Subsystem Class (SSC)
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TCG StorageCore Architecture SpecificationVersion 1.0Revision 0.9 (DRAFT)19 June 2007
TCG Storage Specification Overview
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Define an architecture that:Enables application of access control over select device featuresPermit configuration of these capabilities in conformance to the platform security policy
TCG Storage Specification Purpose
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TRUSTED STORAGE
ATA or SC
SI
Hidden StorageFirmware
Controller
Storage
Trusted Container Commands
Partitioned Hidden StorageSecurity firmware/hardware“Trusted” Commands Assign Hidden Storage to
Applications
Host Application
Enterprise Support
Security Providers
Assign Hidden Storage to Applications
TRUSTED
SP
TCG/T10/T13
Implementation Overview
Firmware/hardware enhancements for security and cryptography
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TCG Storage Architecture Overview
Devices
Applications
End Users
Service Providers
ATA/SCSI
I/F
TCG Storage API
Internet
SW
and
HW
feat
ures
and
fu
nctio
n (e
.g.,
Cry
pto
Cal
ls) TCG Storage Architecture
SP 1
SP 2
SP 3
SP 4
SD or TPer
ADMIN
The host platform, applications, devices, local end users, or remote users/service providers can gain exclusive control of selected features of the storage device. This allows them to simultaneously and independently extend their trust boundary into the storage device or trusted peripheral (TPer).
TPM
Host
Mobile Devices
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Security Providers (SPs)Storage Work Group specifications are intended to provide a comprehensive
command architecture for putting selected features of storage devices under policy-driven access control.
SP
Table
M
Method Name ACL
……Get User1
Set User2
MAuthorities
Features are packaged into individual functionality containers called “SECURITY PROVIDERS(SPs).
Each SP is a “sand box” exclusively controlled by its owner. SP functionality is a combination of pre-defined functionality sets called SP TEMPLATES
SPs are a collection of TABLES and METHODS that control the persistent trust state of the Storage Device (SD).
Method invocation occurs under access control.The SP has a list of authorities and their respective credentials for access control.
User1
User2
BaseAdminCrypto
LogClockLocking
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SPs – Summary
Tables – store persistent state informationRemains active through power cycles, resets, spin up/down, device formats
Methods – remote procedure calls that operate on tables or the SPTable managementTable read/writeAuthenticationAccess Control managementare actions such as: table additions, table deletion, table read access, and table backup
Authorities – authentication agents. Specify cryptographic proofs required to execute the methods in the SP
Access Control Lists – define authorization requirements for method invocation
SPs haveTheir own storage, functional scope, and security domain
SPs are created by: Manufacturer (during Storage Device creation) AND/OR Issuance
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TemplatesTemplates are sets of tables and methods, grouped by feature, from
which SPs are built.Base
All SPs include a subset of tables and methods defined by the Base templateProvides authentication and access control-related tables and methods
AdminOnly one SP on a device includes this templateStores configuration/capability informationUsed in Issuance
LockingOnly one SP on a device includes this templateProvides management capabilities for locking, encryption, and MBR shadowing
CryptoMethods and tables enabling host-invoked on-device signing, verification, hash, HMAC, and encrypt/decrypt
LogAdds forensic logging of SP access
ClockEnables time stamping for logging, adds time limitations to authorities
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TablesTables provide data storage in SPs. Each template defines a set of tables.
Capabilities provided by the Base template allow the host to create additional tables.
Two types of tables:Object – organized storageByte – raw data
UID Col2 Col3 Col48 byte unique identifier Data Data Data… … … …
Object TableUID column contains SP-wide unique, addressable value for that row.
Rows associate column values.
Each column stores data all of the same type.
Index Column0 0x411 0x422 0x43… …
Byte Table
Byte tables have a single column.
Each cell stores one byte
Byte tables have 0 or more rows indexed by position in the table.
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MethodsMethods are remote procedure calls invoked by the host to manipulate
SP state. Methods operate on tables or the SP itself, and are used for session startup, authentication, table manipulation, and access control customization.
InvokingUID.MethodUID [ Method Parameters ] => [ Method Result ]
UID of the table or object upon which the method is being invoked.
UID of the invoked method.
List of method parameters sent by host. List of results
generated by TPer
Key MethodsGet – Retrieve values stored in tables.Set – Change values stored in tables.Authenticate – Prove host knowledge of a secret
Other methods provide capability to: Create/delete tables/table rowsGenerate encryption keys on the devicePerform cryptographic operations on the device
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Access Control - AuthenticationAccess control defines the authorization required to invoke specific
methods. Access control permissions apply at the SP, table, or table row level. Access control settings are configurable and assignable.
UID Name Key Material8 byte identifier Auth Key 1 ------ Auth Key 2 ------ --- ---
C_RSA_1024
UID Name PIN8 byte identifier Auth PWD 1 ------ --- ---
C_PINUID Name Credential Operation8 byte identifier Admin C_RSA_1024 UID Sign--- User C_PIN UID Password--- User C_RSA_1024 UID Sign--- --- --- ---
Authority
Authorities are authentication agents
Link to authentication credential Authorities required
authentication operation
Credential (C_*) tables store authentication secrets
The Host Application invokes the Authenticate method, identifying the Authority to be authenticated and the required proof (password, signed challenge, etc.)
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Access Control - Application
InvokingID MethodID ACL--- ---
XXX YYYXXX ZZZXXX ---
--- ------ ------ ---
AccessControl
BooleanExpr Columns--- ---
User1 Column1,Column3--- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ---
ACE (Access Control Element)
UID Column1 Column2 Column3
XXX
Table
Method: XXX.YYY [ … ] ACL column holds a list of ACE UIDs
BooleanExpr column holds Authority UIDs and Boolean Operators
Columns identifies the columns to which the ACE applies
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ACL
Table/Object/SP + Method(InvokingUID.MethodUID)
ACE2ACE1 ACE3
List of ACEs
Authority1 AND Authority2
Authority1 OR Authority3
(Authority1 AND Authority2) OR
Authority3
Access Control - Hierarchy
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TemplatesThe Base Template is comprised of a core set of commonly used tables
and methods. A subset of the Base Template provides the basis for every SP, and enables authentication, access control, and table management.
SPInfo
SPTemplates
Table
Column
Type
MethodID
AccessControl
ACE
Authority
Certificates
C_PIN
C_RSA_1024
C_RSA_2048
C_AES_128
C_AES_256
C_HMAC_160
C_HMAC_256
C_HMAC_384
C_HMAC_512
C_EC_***
Tables Methods
DeleteSP
CreateTable
Delete
CreateRow
DeleteRow
Get
Set
Next
GetFreeSpace
GetFreeRows
DeleteMethod
Authenticate
GetACL
AddACE
RemoveACE
GenKey
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The Admin Template provides capabilities to allow the host to retrieve device information, affect state of SPs, and issue new SPs.
TPerInfo
Template
CryptoSuite
SP
Tables Methods
IssueSP
The Locking Template provides mechanisms to manage LBA range locking, encryption, re-encryption, and MBR shadow, as well as tables that allow management of LBA range encryption keys.
LockingInfo
Locking
K_AES_128
MBRControl
MBR
K_AES_256
Tables Methods
GetPackage SetPackage
Templates
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TemplatesThe Crypto Template defines tables and methods that enable host-
invoked cryptographic operations with host-supplied data to occur in the device, including hashing, encryption, decryption, signing, and verification.
H_SHA_1
H_SHA_256
H_SHA_384
H_SHA_512
Tables Methods
Random
Stir
EncryptInit
Encrypt
EncryptFinalize
DecryptInit
Decrypt
DecryptFinalize
HashInit
Hash
HashFinalize
HMACInit
HMAC
HMACFinalize
Sign
Verify
XOR
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TemplatesThe Log Template provides a mechanism to enable forensic logging of
host access to the SP.
Log LogList
Tables Methods
AddLog
CreateLog
ClearLog
FlushLog
The Clock Template enables time stamping of log entries, as well as enhancement of authentication limitations by providing time-limited authorities.
ClockTime
Tables Methods
SetClockHigh
SetLagHigh
SetClockLow
SetLagLow
GetClock
ResetClock
IncrementCounter
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Communications Architecture
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Communications - ComIDsMultiple scenarios for Application-SP communication exist:
Single Application communicating with a single SPSingle Application communicating with multiple SPsMultiple Applications communicating with multiple SPs.
SP 1
SP 2
SP 3
SP 4
ADMIN
TPerApp 1
App 2
App 3
App 4
App 5
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Communications - SessionsAn application communicates with an SP via a session. Each separate
application is assigned a ComID that it uses to identify itself to the device. Each session is associated with a ComID. Multiple sessions can be associated with a single ComID.
SP 1
SP 2
SP 3
SP 4
ADMIN
Application
TPerStorage Device
ComID assigned to application by device
Host Application
Session between Application and SP
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Communications - StructuresComPacket –unit of communication transmitted as the payload of an
Interface Command. May hold multiple packets in its payload.
Packet – associated with a particular session between an App & SPMay hold multiple SubPackets.
SubPacket – contains data (Tokens) or buffer management informationToken – encoded data
Session1 Data
Tokens SubPacketPacket
ComPacket
“Trusted” Command
SubPacketSubPacket
Session2 Data
Tokens SubPacketSubPacket
SubPacket
SessionX Data
Tokens SubPacketSubPacket
SubPacket
Packet
Packet
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Issuance ServerSP
SP Issuance/Personalization OverviewIssuance
Creation of a new SP (exchange/validation of credentials), including activation of drive features
Templates Define SP’s initial tables and methods.
Personalization Customization of a newly created SP via modification of table data, administrator and other authorities, default access control settings, etc.
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SP Issuance/Personalization OverviewUsers/applications/services obtain a certificate from an authorized
organization to obtain an SP with the desired capabilities on a given storage device.
The storage device owner must authorize the issuance. Once issued, the SP can be customized by the user/app/service.
App A
SP A (Base+Locking)
Storage Device
Admin SPOrg 1
Which TemplatesE.g., Base + Locking
Which storage deviceHow much storageEtc.
Storage Device owner must also authorize issuance.
MAuth.
Auth.
MOrg 1 is a pre-installed authority. SP A is issued with
default tables/values and AppA_Auth is the only authority. App A can now customize the SP.
AppA_Auth
Org 1
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Some TCG Storage Use Cases
Self Encrypting Drive ManagementLBA Range ManagementLocking/Unlocking of LBA RangesSecure Erase
End-of-Life, Repurposing
Drive VerificationGeneric Secure StorageForensic Logging
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Here is the un-encrypted
text
P%k5t$@sg!7#x1)
#&%
Self-Encrypting Drive Basics
Data protected from loss, disclosure
Write
Read
100% performance encryption engine
in the drive
The storage device LOCKS when it powers OFF.The storage device remains LOCKED when it is powered back ON.Authentication UNLOCKS the storage device.The storage devices Reads and Writes data normally while drive is unlockedThe plaintext data sent to the device is encrypted before being writtenThe encrypted data read from the device is decrypted before being returned
Authentication Key
Management Service
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“Locking SP” CreationThe “Locking SP” enables host management of Self Encrypting Drive functionality using the TCG Storage Architecture. The “Locking SP” incorporates a subset of at least the Base and Locking Templates. Other Templates may be incorporated at issuance to enable additional capabilities.
SPInfo
SPTemplates
Table
Column
Type
MethodID
AccessControl
ACE
Authority
Certificates
C_PIN
C_RSA_1024
Get
Set
Next
Authenticate
GetACL
AddACE
RemoveACE
GenKey
LockingInfo
Locking
K_AES_128
MBRControl
MBR
Base Template Tables & Methods
Locking Template Tables & Methods
Issuance Locking SP
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Retrieving ConfigurationsAn authorized User can, access control permitting, read device
information and configurations from the Admin SP, and locking configurations from the Locking SP. Application communication with different SPs is performed using separate sessions.
Locking SP
Storage Device
Admin SP
M
Auth.Org 1
Admin SP
M
App A invokes Get to retrieve configurations.
Get
User authenticates to the SP and retrieves configuration information using App A.password
App A
User
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LBA Range Encryption & LockingThe storage device can have only one SP with Locking capability. Access
control to user data can be configured. The storage device will support a certain number of independent ranges of user data.
App ALocking SP
Storage DeviceIndependent encryption and access control for each range.
Ran
ge 1
Ran
ge 2
Ran
ge 3
…
MAuth.
Locking Table
M
User 2
User 1
There can only be one Locking SP per Storage Device.
App A is responsible for configuring encryption and access control for all users
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Locking RangesThe Locking SP enables independent ranges of the user data space to be
separately configured for read/write access control by an authorized and authenticated user (typically an Administrator).
App ALocking SP
Storage Device
Ran
ge 1
Ran
ge 2
Ran
ge 3
…
M
Locking Table
M Range settings are stored in the Locking table.
App A invokes Set to configure the starting address and length of each range.
Separately configured portions of user data space
Set
UserUser authenticates to the SP and configures the ranges using App A.
password
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Configuring PasswordsEach user can be assigned a separate password that is used for
authentication to the Locking SP.
App ALocking SP
Storage Device
Ran
ge 1
Ran
ge 2
Ran
ge 3
…
M
C_PIN Table
M Passwords are stored in the C_PIN table.
App A invokes Set to change the password.
Set
UserUser authenticates to the SP and configures the password using App A.
password
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Unlocking RangesThe authorized user authenticates with his password and then unlocks
the ranges to which she has access.
App ALocking SP
Storage Device
Ran
ge 1
Ran
ge 2
Ran
ge 3
…
MAuth.
Locking Table
M Range settings are stored in the Locking table.
App A invokes Set to change the locking values of the appropriate ranges.
Set
UserUser authenticates to the SP and changes unlocks the ranges to which she has access using App A.password
Unlocked range
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Secure EraseThe Locking SP provides the users with the ability to erase data, securely
and quickly, by replacing the encryption key for a range with a new key randomly generated securely in the drive. This ability can be assigned based on security policy and device capability.
App ALocking SP
Storage Device
Ran
ge 1
Ran
ge 2
Ran
ge 3
…
MAuth.
K_* Table
M
App A invokes GenKey to generate a new key for the range.
GenKey
UserUser authenticates to the SP and erases the range using App A.
password
New encrypting key for the range
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Incorporating Additional FeaturesThe basic Locking SP can be enhanced by incorporating additional Templates or a larger subset of the Base Template at issuance.
SPInfo
SPTemplates
Table
Column
Type
MethodID
AccessControl
ACE
Authority
Certificates
C_PIN
C_RSA_1024
Get
Set
Next
Authenticate
GetACL
AddACE
RemoveACE
GenKey
LockingInfo
Locking
K_AES_128
MBRControl
MBR
Base Template Tables & Methods
Locking Template Tables & Methods
Issuance Locking SP
Random
Sign
Crypto Template Methods
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Locking SP – Random Method
App ALocking SP
Storage Device
MAuth.
App A invokes Random to request randomly generated bytes from the device.
Random
UserUser authenticates to the SP and retrieves random bytes using App A.
password
With the Crypto Template’s Random method activated at Issuance, the Locking SP can provide additional functionality for the host. The Random method allows the host to retrieve random bytes generated by the device’s RNG.
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Locking SP – Sign Method
App ALocking SP
Storage Device
MAuth.
App A invokes Signand sends a nonce, which the device will sign using its private key. The signed nonce validates the device to the host.
Sign
UserUser authenticates to the SP requests that the device sign a challenge.
password
C_RSA_* Table
M
With the Crypto Template’s Sign method activated at Issuance, the Locking SP can provide additional functionality for the host. The host can verify a device by having the device sign a host-generated challenge.
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Interface Interactions
Storage Interface Interactions SubgroupDefine a support document for Core Spec and SSCs
Maps Core Spec defined resets to associated interface resetsMaps TCG-based interface command errors in IF-SEND/IF-RECV to associated interface errorsProvides common place for reference
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Storage Architecture Core Specification
Storage
HDD SSC - Enterprise
Optical SSC (OSSC)
HDD SSC - Notebook
Security Subsystem
Class = SSC
Security Subsystem Classes
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ease of useunobtrusive
transparentcompatible
FDE
Optical SSC Goal
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Trusted Platform with Trusted Storage
-Multi-factor authentication: password, biometrics, dongles
-Secure/hardware storage of credentials, confidential financial/medical data
-Trusted life cycle management of personal information
-Integrity-checking of application software
-Cryptographic functions for storage and communications security
-Trusted/secure computation of high-value functions (protection from viruses/etc)
Other Uses (Home banking, remote medical, …
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SPFDE
Enterprise Server:Key generation and distributionKey/Password archive, backup and recovery
Laptop (Application):Master/User passwords, multi-factor authentication, TPM supportSecure log-in, Secure Fast Erase
Self Encrypting Trusted Drive:Disk or sector encryption, sensitive credential store, drive locking
Enterprise Management of Self Encrypting Drives
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EncryptionAutomatic performance scaling, manageability, security
Standards-basedMultiple vendors; interoperability
Unified key managementHandles all forms of storage
The Future…
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www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
Thank You!
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Q&A / Feedback
Please send any questions or comments on this presentation to SNIA: [email protected]
Many thanks to the following individuals for their contributions to this tutorial.
- SNIA Education Committee
Robert Thibadeau Michael Willett
All Storage Manufacturers (contributors)