IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
JASON KOKINDA, • CIVIL ACTION •
Petitioner, • •
v. • Case No. 15-3282 •
ROBERT GILMORE, ET AL, • •
Respondents, • District Case No • 13-2202 •
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of -----------, 2015, upon
consideration of prose petitioner's, Jason Kokinda, "Petition for
Release on Recognizance or Surety Pending Disposition of 28 u.s.c.
§ 2254 Petition,'' it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED that the ''Peti-
tion for Release on Recognizance or Surety Bending Disposition of
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition" is GRANTED. THUS SHALL SCI-Greene super-
intendent, Robert Gilmore, immediately release Jason Kokinda on
his own recognizance to ensure that his meritorious claims in the
state court do not become moot by completion of sentence.
BY THE COURT:
Per Curiam
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
JASON KOKINDA, • CIVIL ACTION •
Petitioner, • •
V. • Case No. 15-3282 •
ROBERT GILMORE, ET AL, • •
Respondents, • District Case No. 13-2202 •
PETITION FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE OR SURETY
PENDING DISPOSITION OF 28 U.S.C. § 2254 PETITION
Petitioner, Jason Kokinda, prose, hereby moves for habeas
bail pending disposition of his 28 u.s.c. § 2254 habeas petition,
and represents:
1. On July 17, 2015, Kokinda filed a petition for release on
bail pending disposition of his habeas corpus petition in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
(a). He subsequently filed a "Petition to Correct/Supplement
Pending Bail Motion,"on or about September 22, 2015 (pursuant to
date of mailing and Prisoner's Mailbox Rule).
(b). On August 4, 2015, the respondents filed an answer to
the habeas bail motion.
(c). On or about October 11, 2015, Kokinda filed a traverse
(pursuant to date of mailing and Prisoner's Mailbox Rule).
2. On August 21, 2015, District Puppet-Judge Jan E. DuBois
denied Kokinda habeas bail relief, by simply rubber-stamping the
boilerplate answer provided by respondents; adopting the assertions
in Answer (absent any independent consideration) as authoritative.
(a). Answer dogmatically dictated that Kokinda's claims fell
under AEDPA ''unreasonable determination'' deference standards, and
that he thus failed to plead and prove strong likelihood of success
1
on the merits; and that Kokinda had an indeterminate sentence of
three(3) to seven(7) years, which made his case distingishable from
extraordinary circumstances prong of habeas bail test where the
prior cases in other states involved short flat sentences.
3. In adopting the boilerplate reasoning of the respondents,
DuBois also adopted their ignorant recital of procedural history,
by asserting: (a) that no Response was filed by the state; and
(b) that Kokinda had five habeas claims pending.
4. Kokinda timely filed his ''Motion for Clarification and
Reconsideration of 8/21/15 Order," on or about September 2, 2015,
(pursuant to date of mailing and Prisoner's Mailbox Rule).
(a). Therein, he cited the lack of authentic consideration by
the district court, evinced by its/their wholesale adoption of the
respondents' Answer.
(b). He furthermore proved that he had a right to pre-AEDPA
de novo review to all of his claims, immediately, with exception to
all four habeas preclusion doctrines (including exhaustion require
ment).
5. On or about September 12, 2015, petitioner filed a pre
mature ''Notice of Appeal'' to ensure timely appellate review, the
moment that DuBois predictably denied habeas bail relief in the
clarification/reconsideration motion.
6. On or about September 22, 2015, Clerk Marcia M. Waldron,
mailed Kokinda notice that the court required this bail motion, and
memorandum in support thereof, within five days, with a certificate
of service showing that documents were served on respondents.
(a). Petitioner did not however receive this letter until the
twelfth of October, 2015, because of transfer (See Exhibit-A).
2
( 1). Because the ''Notice of Appeal'' was filed prematurely,
however, the appellate court did not yet have jurisdiciton, because
the motion for clarification/reconsideration was still pending.
See Sacks v. Rothberg, (1988, App. DC) 269 US App DC 353, 845 F. 2d 1 098, 11 FR serv 3d. ( ''Premature notice of appeal becomes effective to vest appellate court with jurisdiction once District Court disposes, finally, of all matters pending before it.")
(2). Kokinda did not receive October 6, 2015, Order disposing
of motion for clarification/reconsideration, until October 19, 2015,
due to the temporary transfer to SCI-Graterford (September 10, 2015
to October 1 , 201 5) • ( See Exhibi t-B) •
(i). Therefore, pursuant to Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule
9.1, Kokinda has complied with appellate procedures, by filing the
required bail motion and memorandum, as promptly as possible after
the filing of his premature notice of appeal; and is thus entitled
to merit review and relief, or nunc pro tune filing in any regard.
7. In the October 6, 2015, Order, DuBois shows an outrageous
lack of comprehension for the issues presented by Kokinda, before
the Court, seeking disposition of bail issues pursuant to law.
(a). DuBois attempts to paint the wholesale adoption of the
respondents' Answer, as~ mere clerical error, with no prejudice
to Kokinda, because the Response was actually considered, and a
t~ue adjudication with comprehensive review took place regarding
all of his habeas filings of: petition, memorandum, traverse, and
response, etc.
(b). This type of ''trust us'' minimalization rings very hollow,
when you consider that none of the court orders in the postconvic-
tion show any comprehension for claims actually asserted; and the
epic record of judicial traps, and arcane legal facades, prove a
3
fixed agenda to railroad Kokinda through ex parte proceedings to
cover up another profound political scandal.
8. In the October 6, 2015, Order, DuBois further shows proof
of fixed agenda, by fragmenting ''exemption of exhaustion'' legal
standard; allowing the reader to draw the conclusion from his
arcane legal facade, that Kokinda didn't meet standard.
9. Further proof of a fixed agenda, where the opinions are
fabricated to achieve a predetermined result, is the specious
arguments DuBois attempts to apply in rebuttal to AEDPA issues.
(a). Rather than showing comprehension for how ''full and
fair" is used in the Hertz & Liebman habeas treatise that Kokinda
cited as support for his textbook right to de novo review, DuBois
first presumes that there was an 'adjudication on the merits' for
the habeas Court to defer its rulings to, and then addresses the
lack of ''full and fair'' hearings in that context.
(1). Kokinda had argued that the PCRA Court had fabricated
bogus waivers; and/or intentionally misunderstood the nature of
all claims to make its own claims up out of thin air, as if they
were argued by Kokinda.
(2). Kokinda also argued that the presumption that the PCRA
Court had adjudicated his profound age-play based claims on the
merits, was incomprehensible on its face considering that it
would be a dogmatic dictation of per se unrebuttable guilt devoid
of the applicable legal theories and comprehension thereof.
(i). Furthermore, it is clear in opinion what claims Steinberg
believed were meritless (that he did not have to discuss); and what
little he did discuss, is entirely separate from claims presented.
4
(b). It is of critical importance that a habeas corpus court
take care to determine if any actual 'adjudication on the merits'
took place in state postconviction proceedings; considering that
AEDPA standards dramatically foreclose possible relief or hearings.
10. The reasoning employed by DuBois was therefore backwards,
in that he stated failure to plead AEDPA ''unreasonable'' standards
was fatal to habeas bail motion. In truth, if one is pleading the
AEDPA 2254(d) (1) and (2) deference standards, it is highly unlikely
that he will succeed at all.
11. DuBois is attempting to construct a trap, that the AEDPA
standands always apply, to limit the scope of review to a certain
victory for respondents. He tries to mislead the reader, by making
it seem like this is some novel Third Circuit standard, that the
Hertz & Liebman treatise did not consider in excerpt provided.
12. Kokinda has the strongest case possible for immediate
habeas corpus relief:
(a). His case is a simple hollywood delusion. The actors be
hind his official oppression, simply misrepresented figurative age
as a literal fact, to frame Kokinda within a ''To Catch A Predator''
hollywood sting stereotype.
(1). Building myths from that inculpatory lens of 'literal age'
to sell an illogical drama; that Kokinda was severely mentally ill,
andimagined the published ages in chats were figurative rather than
factual; with the help of trial counsel arguing such as a sabotuer.
(b). The criminal officials furthered the oppression by simply
destroying/suppressing evidence which supported truthful innocence,
and using inadmissible hearsay to fill in huge holes they created.
5
13. To undermine Kokinda's incontrovertible proofs of innocence
and right to unprecedented habeas relief, DuBois is attempting to
subvert his claims using guile. Showing an outrageous lack of corn-
prehension for claims actually presented, to fabricate the appear-
ance of proceedings that are actually held ex parte.
(a). This is accomplished by fabricating Kokinda's claims to
the point they become ridiculous or incomprehensible, ignoring his
claims altogether and making up claims for him, and using false or
fragmented standards of tangential reasoning in fact or law to
fabricate false narratives which appear to be legal decisions (be-
cause they superficially resemble the issues presented, or mere .
fragments of the issues expounded).
14. DuBois then attempts to justify the lack of extraordinary
circumstances required for the grant of bail, by making the length
of sentence (rather than concerns of comity) the gravamen of why
Kokinda failed to meet standard. Thus creating an impossible bar
to habeas bail relief, since Pennsylvania does not give out flat
sentences or typically short sentences like cases in other states.
The need for habeas bail due to severe rapidly progressing illness
requiring release to a hospital, would also be obviated by the fact
such claims are more appropriate under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983, • since
they would deal with Eighth Amendment inadequate prison medical care
or conditions. Making the examples of extraordinary circumstances
articulated in Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir.
1992), into nothing more than intangible myths.
(a). The sole reason why Pennsylvania Courts create such hard-
line standards, is for urban renewal effect of Federally subsidized
state prisons (replacing need to help economically disadvantaged).
6
15. The asserted need for bail demonstrating 'extraordinary
circumstances' is in part due to the fact PCRA petition will be
come moot in state court without grant of bail. And, petitioner
has a petition filed in Pennsylvania Supreme Court seeking to re
solve the judicial corruption surrounding backdated/fabricated
Superior Court judgment order; that will have limited jurisdiction
to grant relief, if bail is denied, or less established procedures,
that make grant of relief more difficult.
15. Petitioner is not able to serve a copy of this bail motion,
exhibits, and memorandum in support of bail motion, on the respondents
due to their extortions on and off the record. See final arguments in
their answer to habeas bail motion, where they attempt to criminalize
loose, figurative, rhetorical hyperbole, by fragmenting provocative
metaphors from the record, and painting them in a false narrative to
mean whatever they want. Which was accompanied by other threats to
bribe judges and simply commit petitioner in ex parte proceedings to
cover up theft of his case-file, off the record.
(a). These circumstances are far more extraordinary than those
mentioned in Landano supra; to release petitioner from dangerous op
pression and threats of extortion, as his whole case has been.
THUS, for each of the foregoing reasons of the dialectic, and
the memorandum and exhibits in support of these pleadings, petitioner
requests that the Court grant release on recognizance or bail pending
the adjudication of 28 u.s.c. § 2254 petition; and that it does so
forthwith, before bail petition becomes moot on November 1st, 2015.
Prisoner for Jesus Christ,
7
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No. 15-3282
District Case No. 13-CV-2202
JASON KOKINDA,
Appellant,
-VERSUS-
ROBERT GILMORE, KATHLEEN KANE, JAMES B. MARTIN,
Appellees,
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF BAIL MOTION FOR APPELLANT
Collateral order appeal of the August 21, 2015
and October 6, 2015 orders denying habeas
bail, entered by Jan E. DuBois in the
U.S. District Ct. for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania
at Case No. 13-CV-2202.
Prisoner for Jesus Christ,
Jason Kokinda #JP8929
SCI-Greene 175 Progress Dr. Waynesburg, PA 15370
III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
A. Petitioner has jurisdiction in U.S. District Ct. below:
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), A federal court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for habeas relief ''only on the ground-.. that _ [ a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. As petitioner has pled in his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, filed timely within year, in court below.
B. The U.S. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this case:
Armstrong v. Grondolsky, 290 Fed. Appx. 451 (3d Cir. 2008) ( ''We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review an order denying a motion for release on bail <290 Fed. Appx. 453> pending the resolution of a habeas petition. United States v . Smith, 835 F.2d 1048 (3d Cir. 1987)'') Petitioner is appealing denial of such a bail motion herein.
C. The Final Order der1ying Relief in Reconsideration Motion:
The final order denying Relief in Rule 60 and 59 Motion for Reconsideration, was entered on the docket on the 6th day of October , 2015, making the notice of appeal timely even though it was filed in advance of final order.
Premature notice of appeal becomes effective to vest appellate court with jurisdiction once District Court disposes, finally, of all matters pending before it. Sacks v. Rothberg, (1988, App DC) 269 US App DC 353, 845 F.2d 1098, 11 FR Serv 3d 233.
D. The Appeal is from a Final/Collateral Order:
Decision which has not terminated proceedings in District Court is immediately appealable under ''collateral order'' doctrine, under which order is deemed final and appealable for purposes of 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291, if it conclusively determines disputed question, resolves important issue completely separate from merits of action, and is effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard (1988) 486 US 517, 100 L Ed 2d 517, 108 S. Ct. 1945.
1
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Did the District Court apply the wrong standard and scope
of review to deny Kokinda's requested habeas bail, by: (1) not
actually considering filings (as evinced by outrageous lack of
comprehension of claims presented); and (2) presuming that either
all of Kokinda's habeas claims were adjudicated on the merits in
state courts, or that AEDPA 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d) (1) and (2) ap
plies regardless; and (3) making sentence imposed a gravamen in
discussion of 'extraordinary circumstances' prong; rather than
comity interests, duration of sentence remaining, and other extra
ordinary factors comprehensive to injustice of conviction as whole?
2
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Procedural History
1 . On November 1 2, 2009, petitioner entered a plea of ''guilty
but mentally ill" in the Lehigh Co. Court of Common Pleas, for four
counts of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318, and Unlawful Use of a Communication
Facility. He was sentenced to a term of thirty-six to eighty-four
months of incarceration on February 17, 2010.
2. On April 23, 2013, petitioner filed a prose Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. On May 30, 2014, Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski issued
a Report and Recommendation, recommending that proceedings be held
in stay and abeyance pending resolution of Post-Conviction Relief
Act petition in state courts. On June 18, 2014, the District Court
approved, and adopted Magistrate Judge Lynne A. Sitarski's May 30,
2014 Report and Recommendation; staying all further proceedings,
pending the exhaustion of state remedies, refusing to consider any
exemptions to ''exhaustion rule'' asserted.
3. On August 21, 2015, the District Court denied petitioner's
petition for release on recognizance or surety, pending adjudication
and disposition of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
4. Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Clarification and
Reconsideration, received by the Court on or about September 8th,
2015.
5. On September 12th, 2015, petitioner filed in Notice of
Appeal on August 21, 2015, Order, in light of fact that he was on
Writ, and would not receive the Reconsideration disposition order
in time to prepare ''Notice of Appeal'' later; without risk of appeal
becoming moot. 3
B. Relevant Facts
1. Kokinda has proven his ''actual innocence'' and that the
case presented against him, is in reality nonexistent. The Common
wealth has never contested the actual merits of his claims, and
neither has any state or federal judge. 1
2. The questions presented in this case are purely questions
of law, of whether DuBois unlawfully truncated the standard and
scope of review, to deny an otherwise incontrovertible right to
relief under examples of stare decisis.
C. Rulings Presented for Review
1. The August 21, 2015 order by Jan E. DuBois denying bail
relief is simply boilerplate presumptions that adopt the answer
filed by respondents wholesale, truncating the scope and standard
of review to fabricate a special impossible bar for Kokinda.
2. The October 6, 2015 order by Jan E. DuBois denying to
make clarification, and denying reconsideration, is a more subtile
means of achieving the same result; that covers up obvious lack of
comprehension of habeas issues, as if mere clerical error; suggest-
ing that AEDPA deference and exhaustion apply to Kokinda, through
false legal standards that are comprehensively not applicable upon
closer examination. An order full of dogmatic dictations and pre
sumptions in place of proofs, demonstrating an outrageous lack of
comprehension for the habeas claims actually presented.
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Kokinda has shown a strong likelihood of success on the
merits, and entitlement to de novo review on all claims presented;
1: See record generally, especially recent habeas bail filings.
4
considering that the "loose, figurative, non-literal, rhetorical
language" the Commonwealth bases its prosecution upon, is not it-
self criminal evidence without serious independent evidence to
prove otherwise. Also considering that the state proceedings were
subverted at every level with judicial traps, bogus waivers, and
denials of every fundamental material needed to obtain an 'adjudi-
cation on the merits' of any claim. The analysis of DuBois omits
this, and presumes AEDPA deference, and how lack of ''full and fair''
state proceedings is considered, when the state did 'adjudicate
the merits' of habeas claims presented.
(a). Kokinda has also demonstrated that he did meet the habeas
exemptions to exhaustion; and that DuBois merely failed to define
the cited standard of • review, which makes this incontrovertible.
(b). The lack of true consideration by DuBois, evinced in
part by what he calls clerical errors, is apparent on the face
of every order he drafts; considering that each shows an out-
rageous lack of comprehension for the issues presented.
2. The length of sentence imposed has never been announced as
a gravamen for consideration in habeas bail standards, not even as
a factor. The new scheme being announced by DuBois makes habeas
bail a myth in Pennsylvania, because the standards are fundamentally
impossible. Urban renewal and the need to deal with the poor effected
by the brown properties, is driving force in civil rights erosion.
VII. ARGUMENT
A. KOKINDA HAS DEMONSTRATED 'THE STRONG LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS
ON THE MERITS' AND 'EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES' REQUIRED FOR HABEAS
BAIL, WHEN CONSIDERED UNDER PROPER SCOPE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW.
5
Scope and Standard of Review
Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1239 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[B]ail pending disposition of habeas corpus review is available 'only when the petitioner has raised substantial claims upon which he has a high probability of success or exception circumstances exist which make a grant of bail necessary to make the habeas remedy effective.''' Pellullo v. United States, 487 F.Appx. 1, 3 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Landano, 970 F.2d at 1239)).
1. It is textbook Black Letter Law that Kokinda is exempt
from all preclusion doctrines that typically truncate the scope,
and drastically limit the availability of habeas relief. Because
the state did not 'adjudicate the merits' of his claims, and only
focused on Mistake of Age defense in vacuum of false evidence
that trial counsel was willing to discuss at hearing. 2
(a). The waivers that the state used to evade addressing the
merits of unrebuttable proofs of actual and legal innocence, were
all patently bogus on their face. 3
(b). Thus, there was nothing for the habeas court to logically
defer its decisions to, and no reason to truncate or limit the
scope of review or availability of hearings/relief. The state
court opinions are merely a restatement of the Commonwealth's
bogus ''To Catch A Predator'' delusion held within a vacuum, ab-
sent any application of the legal theories actually argued.
(1). The opinions do not meet state opinion writing stan-
dards, which would preclude extension of the Richter presumption
(to presume an adjudication on the merits), even if any part of
the opinion were hypothetically ambiguous. 4
2: See "Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration of 8/21/15 Order,'' pgs. 4-10, .13,· 19-23 3: Pg.4, 1_9-23 of said n.2 motion 4: ''Petition to Immediately Adjudicate Pending Bail Motion,'' pgs. 2-3, discussing Commonwealth v. Montalvo, and Johnson v. Williams, U.S. , 133 s. Ct. 1088, 185 L.Ed.2d 105, 2013, extending Richter presumption of 'adjudication on the merits' to ambiguous opinions. 6
2. Pgs. 3 at ~4. through pg. 5 at ~6. of the ''Petition to
Immediately Adjudicate Pending Bail Motion," when supplemented to
habeas corpus memorandum, prove incontrovertibly that Kokinda is
entitled to immediate release with a bar to reprosecution; with
great simplicity, for which no subjectivity exists to even debate.
3. Because Kokinda's claims are unrebuttable, DuBois is thus
attempting to argue AEDPA deference in a vacuum, on the presumption
that Kokinda's claims were presumably or actually adjudicated on
the merits. See Pg. 7 of his October 6, 2015 opinion; where he
cites to Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 237 (3d Cir. 2004),
while failing to discuss§ at 238, where it states:
''The current statute simply states that federal courts must defer to legal and factual det rminations "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the me its in State court proceedings." 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d). ''We have int rpreted § 2254(d)'s 'adjudication on the merits' language to meant at 'when, although properly preserved by the defendant, the state co rt has not reached the merits of a claim thereafter presented to federal habeas court, the deferential standards rovided b AEDPA ••• do not a 1 . '' Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 718 (3d Cir. 2004) ( uoting Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)).''(emphasis added).
4. On pg. 8 of his Octobe~ 6, 2015 opinion, DuBois tries to
pull a fast one again, by acknp wledging that there are exceptions
to exhaustion; and not contesting that state proceedings were not
'' full and fair'' See pg. 7 foot~ote 5; while failing to acknowledge
that the lack of ''full and faiir'' proceedings is defined as excep-
tional circumstances that overcome exhaustion requirement.
See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Acknowledging the Supreme Cort's strong presumption in favor of exhaustion, we also recognized that '' in rare cases ~ exceptional circumstances of peculiar urge cy may exist which permit a federal court to entertain an unexhausted claim." Id. at 206-07 (same case § of Christy v. Horn that DuBois cites). We explained that such circumstances exist where "state remedies are inadequate or fail to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised, or where exhaustion in state court would be 'futile.''')
7
(a). Kokinda had argued over and over again, that habeas
proceedings should be exempt from exhaustion on this very law
that he had highlighted, from citing it before. But, DuBois did
not even recognize the controlling standard at that time; as a
means to prejudice Kokinda more blatantly to hopefully have
him become hopeless in light of the judicial corruption. But
Kokinda can care less what any judges dictate, because his power
is through the public and a persuasive record (worth much more
than the worthless fiat awarded in lawsuits).
Extraordinary Circumstances
5. DuBois has added new gravamen considerations to Landano
supra bail standard, which make the grant of bail pending dis-
position of§ 2254 petitions fundamentally impossible.
(a). He attempts to make 'length of sentence imposed' a
gravamen, because the cases of precedent were all out state,
states where short flat sentences are given out. Which would thus
foreclose such relief in Pennsylvania, where long indeterminate
sentences are handed out. He does not even attempt to address the
arguments made on pgs. 14-15, that ''comity is the chief gravamen''
in such cases, and that 'length of sentence remaining' is only
gravamen considered by U.S. Supreme Court, that 'the less time that
remains on a prisoner's sentence, the stronger his interest in re-
lease.' He merely exploits the reliance of other states on the
Federal Model Penal Code; and Pennsylvania's misuse of prisons in
dealing with economically disadvantaged people and places, by pro-
fiting of the federally subsidized bonds w/punishments instead of
helping them solve demons in their lives.
8
(b). Then, after unlawfully truncating the scope and standard
of review applicable to make a preliminary determination for the
''strong likelihood of success on the merits'' element of bail claim;
DuBois attempts to justify incarceration on basis of charges, by
showing an outrageous .lack of comprehension for how malicious and
baseless the nonexistent criminal case against Kokinda is.
(1). It is a hypothetical age-based social engineering com
mercial infraction, wholly devoid of any evidence to present a
prima facie case. But, DuBois characterizes it as a serious crime
that Kokinda was convicted of, because 'ignorance is bliss.'
(2). The dinstinctive difference between Kokinda's pled and
proven claims, and the cursory opinions of DuBois, are that Kokinda
is able to plead and prove his claims; the respondents are unable
to rebut claims, and DuBois is trying to fabricate any excuse in
the book to ignore or limit them within the vacuum created by the
state and upheld through absence of any corrective process (that
would allow for adversarial testing of state's dicta theory).
6. Cases like Landano supra and Lucas v. Hadden, 790 F.2d
365 (3d Cir. 1986), are cases where habeas bail was originally
granted and reversed for lack of 'extraordinary circumstances.'
(a). In none of the case-law, much less the most precedential
cases, has 'length of sentence imposed' or 'supposed seriousness
of charges' been considered as a gravamen or factor.
(1 ). Lucas involved ten year indefinite sentence, and Landano
a life sentence. Surely if 'length of sentence imposed' were a
gravamen factor or even substantial factor to consider, it would
be discussed specifically in at least one habeas bail case.
9
(i). 'Length of possible sentence' and 'seriousness of prima
facie case' may be factors for considering how much bail to require,
but should not be a threshold gravamen to consider a much different
element of whether exceptional circumstances are met by need to
effectuate writ comity interests, or unusual dire health problems.
(2). Landano seems to have eroded the rights of litigants to
obtain habeas bail pending adjudication, by suddenly requiring
that both 'exceptional circumstances' and 'high probability of
success on the merits' are required; when the stated standard
uses the operative word OR to denote that either is sufficient.
7. Kokinda has an ''Application for Exercise of King's Bench
Powers or Extraordinary Jurisdiction" pending in the Penn. Supreme
Court at Case No. 140 MM 2015. Which he filed to resolve the judi
cial misconducts/crimes surrounding what was clearly a bogus back
dated/fabricated judgment order; involving all sorts of corruption,
including tip off by FBI, and undercover correctional officer, all
attempting to harm Kokinda unlawfully and grievously.
(a). This application will become ineffective in producing any
significant effect on curing defects in PCRA proceedings, pursuant
to the fact that PCRA relief becomes moot when Kokinda maxes out
his sentence on November 1st, 2015. See ''Petition to Expand Record''
Exhibit-E, Pennsylvania Supreme Court filings in this matter.
(b). The issues present significant t extraordinary -circumstances'
which require bail to allow state to effectively address major de
fects in state proceedings and scandalous corruption/crimes by o f
ficials. Kokinda is also entitled to bail for all of the reasons
cited in pending 140 MM 2015 case, including how the respondents
10
are extorting him both on and off the record.
(c). The American Injustice system, and all others around the
world, are merely the manifestion of the superrich mafias using law
to oppress the economically disadvantaged, as a scapegoat, to say
here they are the bad guys. So, that they continue to hold all
of their fraudulent power, by bathing all of their malificient works
in false light. Pennsylvania, in particular, uses the law to dispose
of the mentally ill and economically disadvantaged persons they ne
glect to help before a crime is committed. This is done to generate
economic interest off the abundance of brown property and wastelands
left over from industrial corps. They generate money off the feder
ally subsidized bonds; by redistributing wealth back into brown pro
perty they obtain under eminent domain. They embezzle kickbacks off
of contracts, and funding that is supposedly going to prisons; and
force prisoners to buy from mafia controlled monopolies. They poison
the prisoners with chemicals like salt peter and androgens in the
food, which leads to chronic health problems. And then they pretend
to treat them to cover up ''deliberate indifference,'' by painting it
as professional negligence. Which under standards produced by this
court, in conspiracy with prison officials, requires a 'certificate
of merit' and BAR attorney to litigate. A BAR attorney whose license
is controlled by the state, who will not fairly litigate claims, if
at all. The civil rights and burden of proof are gone, and it is now
lawyers simply bullying clients into adhesion contracts of guilt,
which waive all constitutional rights. In conclusion, making the
prisons to be nothing more than holocaust camps for a utopian slave
society; as the Jews were such .a perfect scapegoat in Nazi Germany.
1 1
VIII. CONCLUSION
The habeas filings in their entirety, both plead and prove
that Kokinda is the victim of official oppression; a scapegoat
used to produce political demagogue propaganda for the puppet
Torn Corbett to pass $24 billion tax-break for mafia controlled
fracking industry. Anyone who doubts the plausibility of this
lacks erudition over the subject matter. Kokinda is not able to
fully prove it, because the FBI is full of mafia bribes and
extortions; and no one is able to investigate it at this time.
The respondents have openly stated that they want to frame
Kokinda again, using the same exact principle used in the instant
case of taking fragments of figurative language that is at
best provocative, and framing it within a false narrative to mean
whatever they want. All of the proceedings in courts have been held
ex parte, where Kokinda has no real standing to debate bogus case.
The respondents have stated that their case is not even legiti
mate, off-the-record, and that they are just going to bribe more
judgs to commit Kokinda like a Jew to a holocaust camp; with a
complete absence of due process and civil rights. This court has
helped the respondents commit grave crimes against Kokinda, and
done everything opposite of what their jobs required. There is no
end to its abuses of power! The courts are obviously delusional,5
with the belief that there is no right or wrong; and that they can
get away with these immoral acts without divine retribution. Habeas
bail must be granted immediately to ensure justice and right be done.
12Pr1soner for Jesus Christ 5: II Thessalonians 2:10-12