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DPI-403 Class 4Policy advocacy
15 September 2009 1www.pippanorris.com
StructureStructureI. Context of the debate
Does democratic governance bring a ‘peace dividend’?
Theoretical arguments
II. No: Why the initial transition to democracy generates y y g
belligerent nationalism and war Mansfield and Snyder
III Yes: Why power-sharing democracies reduce conflict in III. Yes: Why power sharing democracies reduce conflict in
divided societies Center for Systemic Peace - trends
Norris Driving Democracy Ch 5 Norris Driving Democracy Ch 5
IV. Conclusions What are the best reasons for advocating democratic governance?
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I Recap debateI. Recap debate
Impact of democratic democratic governance
1.Economic growth
2. Social welfare 3. Peace growth welfare
‘Yes’
Rodrik et al
‘Yes’
Siegle et al‘Yes’
Norris/CSP
‘No’ ‘No’ Przeworski et
al‘No’ Ross Mansfield &
Snyder
Wh b th id i th d b t ?Why both sides in the debate? Effective advocacy means an awareness of the Effective advocacy means an awareness of the
arguments of critics; not blind propaganda
Genuine uncertainty exists in the research Genuine uncertainty exists in the research
literature; no consensus Different indicators, data, concepts, methods, and dependent variablesDifferent indicators, data, concepts, methods, and dependent variables
Eg slippery notions of ‘good governance’ (World Bank), democracy
(International IDEA), liberal democracy (Freedom House), democratic
governance (UNDP)go e a ce (U )
Need to judge for yourself why you would or
would not favor democratic governanceou d o a o de o a go e a e
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Key debatesKey debates Several distinct claims: True or false?
Strongest universal claim: No democracies have ever fought a war against each other ever fought a war against each other.
Probabilistic claim: Does democratic governance generally reduce the risks of war between states?g y
Conditional claim: Is the transitional process from autocracy to democracy one of increased risks of
?war?
Conditional claim: Do power-sharing democracies reduce internal conflict?reduce internal conflict?
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Democratic peace argumentsDemocratic peace arguments1. Informational argumentsg
Democratic institutions facilitate signals, allowing democracies to resolve disputes with lower hostilities (egIranian intentions?)
2 Normative constraints2. Normative constraints Democracies have norms of tolerance and negotiation,
which help resolve crisis. Autocracies have norms of coercion.
3. Preferences A state’s foreign policy is shaped by domestic
institutions; democracies share similar foreign policy preferences
4. Electoral constraints Public opinion limits elites
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President Bush,2 d l dd J 20062nd inaugural address Jan 2006
The United States Is Committed To The Advance Of F d A d D A Th G Al i T Freedom And Democracy As The Great Alternatives To Repression And Radicalism. The most powerful weapon in the struggle against extremism is the universal appeal of freedom. Freedom is the best way to unleash appeal of freedom. Freedom is the best way to unleash the creativity and economic potential of a nation, the only ordering of a society that leads to justice, and the only way to achieve human rights.
Expanding Freedom Is More Than A Moral Imperative - It Is The Only Realistic Way To Protect Our People. The 9/11 attacks were evidence of an international movement of violent Islamic extremists that threatens free people violent Islamic extremists that threatens free people everywhere. Nations that commit to freedom for their people will not support extremists; they will join in defeating them.
U.S. State DepartmentpBureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
“Supporting democracy not only promotes such fundamentalSupporting democracy not only promotes such fundamental American values as religious freedom and worker rights, but also helps create a more secure, stable, and prosperous global arena in which the United States can advance its national interests.
In addition, democracy is the one national interest that helps to secure all the others. Democratically governed nations are more likely to secure the peace, deter aggression, expand open markets, promote economic development, protect American citizens, combat international terrorism and crime, uphold human and worker rights avoid humanitarian crises anduphold human and worker rights, avoid humanitarian crises and refugee flows, improve the global environment, and protect human health.”
P bl f l i g idProblems of resolving evidence Definitions and measures of democracy and y
autocracy Continuous (Polity IV) Categories (Freedom House) Dichotomies (Cheibub and Gandhi)
Definitions and measures of militarized conflict, internal (civil wars) and external ( )(inter-state)
PRIO/Uppsala conflict database COW Correlates of War CSP/MAR University of Maryland
Underlying reasons behind correlations Case studies of process
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II: Evidence against
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Mansfield SnyderMansfield-Snyder Edwards D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder 2007. Electing
t Fi ht MIT Pto Fight. MIT Press. Mansfield and Snyder ‘Democratization and the
danger of war’, IS 1995 Well-institutionalised democracies virtually never fight
wars against each other. In the transitional phase of democratization, In the transitional phase of democratization,
countries become more aggressive and war prone Incentives for elites to exploit power, populist
nationalist rhetoric, especially in elections, leading , p y , gthem eventually to jettison democracy.
Ruling elites haphazardly accountable to electors Yugoslavia/Bosnia Herzegovina Russia/Georgia Yugoslavia/Bosnia-Herzegovina, Russia/Georgia
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Mansfield SnyderMansfield-Snyder Evidence
Democracy-autocracy Polity IV (Gurr) Open executive recruitment, executive constraints, competitive participation
Correlates of War (COW) –Correlates of War (COW) Military conflict with at least 1000 battle fatalities
1811-1980, one, five and ten year periods
Conclusions: Conclusions: “Democratizing states two-thirds more likely to go to war than states with
no regime change.”
More war prone, not lessMore war prone, not less
Why? Democratization brings widening political spectrum, inflexible interests,
competitive mobilization, weakening state
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P d C f M f ld d S d ?Pros and Cons of Mansfield and Snyder?
Suggest other cases of transitional Suggest ot e cases o t a s t o aregimes going to war with democracies?
Suggest contrary cases? Japan/Germany?gg y p y Classification confuses electoral
autocracies and electoral democracies? Data ends 1980; subsequent changes?
Examples not included in dataset. What of civil wars/internal conflict? Lack controls in analysis
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III: Evidence in favor
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Background Trends in Peace & Conflict Background Trends in Peace & Conflict Ted Robert Gurr, Monty Marshall and Deepa Khosla
Center for Systemic Peace Center for Systemic Peace Annual trends in episodes of violent
conflict 1946-2008 Inter-state (between independent nation-states) Societal (civil wars, armed repression, etc)
Rates 160 countries on their capacity for p ypeace-building:
Avoid recent armed conflicts Manage movements for self determinationg Maintain stable democratic institutions Substantial material resources Free of serious threats from external environment
Source: Center for Systemic Peace/MAR ‘Global Conflict Trends’ University of Marylandhttp://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm
MAJOR EPISODES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE, 2000-2007Begin End Type Mag States Directly
InvolvedBrief Description Deaths
2000 2001 CV 1 Guinea Parrot's Beak clashes 10002000 2003 CV 1 Liberia Civil violence (attacks by LURD guerillas) 10002000 2005 CW 2 Ivory Coast Civil war (north, south, and west divisions) 30002001 * EV 1 Indonesia Communal (Dayaks vs Madurese immigrants) 10002001 EV 1 Indonesia Communal (Dayaks vs Madurese immigrants) 10002001 * EW 1 Rwanda Ethnic war (attacks by Hutu guerillas) 25002001 * IV 2 United States Al Qaeda attacks on New York/Washington 30002001 2003 CV 1 Central African Rep. Civil violence (attacks by Bozize loyalists; coup) 1000
2001 2004 EV 3 Nigeria Ethnic violence (Christian-Muslim; Plateau, Kano regions) 55000
2001 2007+ IW 3 Afghanistan Ouster of Taliban; Hunt for al Qaeda 25000C ( G C C2001 2007+ CV 1 India Maoist insurgency (People's War Group; Maoist Communist Centre; People's
Liberation Guerrilla Army)1500
2001 2007+ EV 1 Pakistan Sectarian violence: Sunnis, Shi'ites, and Ahmadis 20002002 2003 CV 1 Congo-Brazzaville Civil violence (Ninja militants in Pool region) 500
2003 * CV 1 Thailand Anti-Drug Traffiking Campaign 25002003 2007+ IW 6 Iraq Ouster of Hussein-Ba'athist regime and subsequent sectarian strife: Sunnis,
Shi K d d f i l Q d150000
Shias, Kurds, and foreign al Qaeda2003 2007+ IW 2 US/UK Invasion of Iraq and military occupation 4000
2003 2007+ CV 1 Saudi Arabia Islamic Militants 7002003 2007+ EV 5 Sudan Communal-separatist violence in Darfur 2000002004 2007+ CV 1 Yemen Followers of al-Huthi in Sadaa 20002004 2007+ CV 1 Haiti General unrest surrounding ouster of President Aristide and his Lavalas 2000g
Family ruling party2004 2007+ EV 1 Pakistan Pashtuns in Federally Administered Tribal Areas, mainly South Waziristan,
and North-West Frontier Province 1500
2004 2007+ EV 1 Thailand Malay-Muslims in southern border region (Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla, and Yala provinces)
2500
2004 2007+ EV 1 Turkey Kurds in the southeast 10002005 2007 EV 1 Pakistan Rebellion in Baluchistan 8002005 2006 CW 1 Chad United Front for Democratic Change (FUC) rebels 10002005 2007+ EW 2 Central African
RepublicAPRD (northwest) and UFDR (northeast) rebels 1500
2006 2007+ EV 2 Chad Communal fighting between Toroboro ("black" sedentary farmer) and Janjawid ("arab" pastoralist) militias
5000
2006 * IV 2 Israel Israel vs Hezbollah 1500
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2006 IV 2 Israel Israel vs Hezbollah 1500Lebanon
2007 2007+ EV 1 Lebanon Palestinian/Islamist militants 5002007 2007+ EW 1 Ethiopia Somalis and Oromo militants in Ogaden 10002007 2007+ EV 1 Kenya Communal violence following disputed presidential election 500
Source: Center for Systemic Peace/MAR ‘Global Conflict Trends’ University of Maryland
Current situation (2007)Current situation (2007) In late-2007 24 states were directly In late 2007, 24 states were directly
affected by ongoing conflict. Of these 12 are protracted wars (10+ Of these, 12 are protracted wars (10+
years). Afghanistan (30 years) Colombia (24) D R Congo Afghanistan (30 years), Colombia (24), D.R.Congo
(16), India (56), Iraq (28), Israel (43), Myanmar (60), Nigeria (11), Philippines (36), Somalia (20), Sri Lanka (25), Sudan (25), Turkey (24), and Uganda (37).
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Source: Center for Systemic Peace/MAR ‘Global Conflict Trends’ University of Marylandhttp://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm
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Source: Center for Systemic Peace/MAR ‘Global Conflict Trends’ University of Marylandhttp://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm
Trends in violent conflict Trends in violent conflict Total magnitude of violent conflict and of ethnic g
conflict rose 1945-1990 then fell during the 1990s
“Number and magnitude of armed conflict within Number and magnitude of armed conflict within and among states have lessened since the early 1990s by nearly half.”
Conflicts over self determination are being Conflicts over self-determination are being settled with increasing frequency.
Yet African exceptionalism: Little international effort Democratic transitions failed Pervasive poverty
Center for Systemic Peace/MAR ‘Global Conflict Trends’http://members.aol.com/CSPmgm/cspframe.htm
Trends in terrorismTrends in terrorism “Terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the
identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are d i d h i i h ld designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take.”International Terrorism: "Incidents in which terrorists go International Terrorism: Incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers personnel or incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel or equipment."
RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (www.tkb.org)
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15 September 2009 www.pippanorris.com 23RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (www.tkb.org)
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RAND-MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base (www.tkb.org)
III: Evidence in favor
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Do institutions matter?Do institutions matter? Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism:jp a t s t eo y o co soc at o a s Power-sharing rules essential for divided
societies Power-concentrating regimes may work in Power concentrating regimes may work in
homogeneous societies Key features: Executive power-sharing,
minority veto, PR, cultural autonomyminority veto, PR, cultural autonomy Operationalize modern ‘power-sharing’
democracies Electoral systemsy Type of executive Decentralized states Media systems
Consociational theoryConsociational theoryFigure 5.1: The core sequential steps in consociational theoryg q p y
Proportional electoral systems
Plural
societies contain distinct ethnic
communities
with low thresholds
Strengthens democratic
consolidation and reduced ethnic conflict Positive action
mechanisms for
Facilitates the
election of representatives and parties drawn from
minority iti
Community leaders have incentives to cooperate within legislatures and
coalition governments, building trust at elite
levelcommunities mechanisms for minorities: boundary
delimination, communal rolls,
and reserved seats
communities
level
Generates support for
democracy among community members
Impact on conflictImpact on conflict The type of institutions matter, especially The type of institutions matter, especially
in divided societies Electoral systems, types of executives,
federalism/decentralization, independent mediaP h i t i t d Power-sharing arrangements associated with consolidation of democracy and reduced conflictreduced conflict
Power-concentrating regimes less stable democracies and greater conflictg
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Cl if d i tit tiClassify and compare institutions: Electoral systemsElectoral systems
Types of executives
F d li d d t li ti Federalism and decentralization
Media systems
Figure 5 2: Classification of contemporary electoral systems worldwide 2004Figure 5.2: Classification of contemporary electoral systems, worldwide 2004
NationNation States
191
Majoritarian 75
Combined 39
PR 68
No direct elections 9
Majority 26
Plurality 49
Independent 30
Dependent 9
STV 2
Party List 66
AV 4
2nd Ballot 22
FPTP 36
Bloc Vote 9
SNTV 4
Closed 35
Open 31
Notes: FPTP First Past the Post; 2nd Ballot; Block Vote; AV Alternative Vote; SNTV Single Non-Transferable Vote; STV Single Transferable Vote. Systems are classified in May 1997 based on Appendix A in Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly. Eds. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. For more details see http://www.aceproject.org/and Pippa Norris 2004 Electoral Engineering New York: Cambridge University Press
Adversarial Democracy and Government Accountability
Consensual democracy and Parliamentary Inclusiveness
Pippa Norris. 2004. Electoral Engineering. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Table 5 2: Electoral systems and democracy all societies worldwide
Liberal democracy Constitutional democracy Freedom House Polity IV
b (pcse) p b (pcse) p
Table 5.2: Electoral systems and democracy, all societies worldwide
INSTITUTIONAL RULES Majoritarian -2.33 (.454) *** -7.64 (.949) *** Proportional representation .904 (.619) N/s 3.85 (.561) *** Positive action strategies 4 13 ( 466) *** 11 41 ( 777) ***Positive action strategies 4.13 (.466) 11.41 (.777) CONTROLS Log GDP/Capita 13.90 (.832) *** 11.91 (1.01) *** Ex-British colony 12.35 (.962) *** 12.36 (1.36) *** Middle East -10.99 (1.16) *** -16.79 (1.40) ***( ) ( )Regional diffusion .632 (.036) *** .883 (.049) *** Ethnic fractionalization -8.45 (.878) *** -1.98 (1.56) N/s Population size .001 (.001) N/s .000 (.001) *** Area size .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** Constant -21.96 -38.45 N b ti 4768 3946N. observations 4768 3946 N. of countries 174 145 Adjusted R2 .487 .533
Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standardpoint scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standarderrors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression.For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system,see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables,see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.
Table 5 3: Electoral systems and democracy plural societies only Liberal democracy Constitutional democracy Freedom House Polity IV
b (pcse) p b (pcse) p INSTITUTIONAL RULES
Table 5.3: Electoral systems and democracy, plural societies only
INSTITUTIONAL RULES Majoritarian -4.27 (.625) *** -3.30 (1.16) *** Proportional representation 4.81 (.966) *** 10.68 (.915) *** Positive action strategies 424 ( 676) N/s 13 96 (1 52) ***Positive action strategies .424 (.676) N/s 13.96 (1.52) CONTROLS Log GDP/Capita 10.21 (.519) *** 7.26 (1.21) *** Ex-British colony 8.35 (.744) *** 8.20 (1.10) *** Middle East 8 39 ( 974) *** 20 72 (3 13) ***Middle East -8.39 (.974) *** -20.72 (3.13) ***Regional diffusion .739 (.027) *** 1.04 (.055) *** Ethnic fractionalization 14.97 (3.18) *** 26.51 (4.27) *** Population size -.001 (.000) *** -.001 (.001) *** Area size .001 (.001) *** .001 (.001) *** C t t 30 9 54 9Constant -30.9 -54.9N. observations 2116 1851 N. of countries 76 66 Adjusted R2 .545 .477 Note: Entries for Liberal Democracy, Constitutional Democracy and Participatory Democracy 100-
point scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standardpoint scales are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (with their panel corrected standarderrors) and the significance (p) of the coefficients for the pooled time-series cross-national analysis obtained using Stata’s xtpcse command. The entries for Contested Democracy are logistic regression.For the measures of democracy, see Chapter 2. For the classification of the type of electoral system,see Figure 5.1. The default (comparison) is mixed electoral systems. For details of all the variables,see Technical Appendix A. Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, and *** the 0.01 level.
Figure 5.4: Contemporary levels of democracy by type of electoral system in heterogeneous
and homogeneous society, 2000
7579
83
74
8180
90
69
59
5046
7075
5964
74
50
60
70
80
acy
>> H
igh
46
20
30
40
50
ow <
< De
moc
ra
0
10
20
FH Polity FH Polity
Lo
Homogeneous Heterogeneous
Majoritarian Combined PR
Note: For the classification of electoral systems, see Figure 5.3.The types of heterogeneous or
homogeneous society are classified by the dichotomized Alesina index of ethnic fractionalization.
ConclusionsConclusions What are the best reasons for advocating g
democratic governance?
Instrumental Consequences of democracy for…
Intrinsic Value for itself
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Potential criticismsPotential criticisms
Constructivist theories Posner: Social identities shaped by political
institutions, not fixedIncentive theory among elites Incentive theory among elites
Horowitz: Incentives for community cooperation or for rivalry?
Trade-off values in failed statesTrade off values in failed states Snyder: Stable, strong and effective states needed in
post-conflict societies more than power-sharing arrangements
Direction of causality? Direction of causality? Institutional endogeneity and path dependency? Eg Cheibub: Military regimes are more likely to select
presidential executives
Next class
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