dreisbach - doctrine religious symbols.pdf

Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols

By Donald F Dreisbach

IN HIS TREATMENT of religious symbols Paul Tillich claims that

Cod or being itself can be known through beings through those beings

which are religious symbols1 Tillich supports this claim by arguing that

there is an ontological relationship between all beings and being itself and

that beings ie objects of perception thought or imagination can become

transparent to being so that it can be known through them This doctrine

is theologically interesting in that Tillich is attempting to provide an onto-

logical foundation for the claim that Cod is manifested in the world and that

man can know and relate himself to Cod through these manifestations It is

also philosophically interesting in that Tillichs claim that we can attain

some grasp of being by means of a relationship to things myths ideas and

so forth is not unlike the claims of Heidegger in his later work and of Karl

Jaspers with his ciphers of transcendence

1 Tillich says at several places that God is being itself See for instance Paul TillichSystematic Theology Vol 1 (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1951) p 238 Hereafter citedas ST I

Unfortunately Tillichs exposition and defense of this theory of sym-

bols is diffused throughout his work and is never neatly gathered together or

summarized in any one place Hence it is easy to misunderstand or to fail

to grasp the strength and coherence of Tillichs position Indeed one critic

Lewis S Ford has written

Though Tillich recognizes the necessity for a theory of symbols and

has sought diligently to formulate one it takes a subordinate position with

in the total systematic framework of his thought From the systematic

standpoint the exact nature of the religious symbol is less important than

the various functions it must perform Thus Tillich has permitted himself

considerable liberty in developing alternative and competing theories con

cerning the nature of the symbol We discern at least three a dialectic

of affirmation and negation an extended use of the metaphor of the trans

parency of the symbolic medium and a theory of participation relevant

to symbolic predication These theories appear singly and in various

combinations with one another Tillichs sole requirement for these

Donald F Dreisbach (P h D Northwestern University) is Associate Pro-fessor in the Philosophy Department of Northern Michigan University

(326)

Paul Tillichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 327

theories is that they adequately describe symbols capable of fulfilling thenecessary metaphysical and religious functions required of them2

Ford is quite correct in discerning the three major movements or steps

in the development of the doctrine of symbols what he fails to perceive is

that these are three elements of one doctrine and that they do come together

to form a coherent whole This unity emerges when the various parts of

Tillichs treatment of symbols are gathered together and when necessary

clarified and restated For one difficult problem in the theory of symbols

the explanation of what constitutes the difference between an ordinary ob-

ject and a symbol Tillich does offer more than one answer In the second

part of this paper I will argue that one of these explanations is far better

than the others and does produce a plausible account of how being itself

can be known through finite beings

The easiest way to enter Tillichs discussion of symbols is through the

list of six characteristics of symbols or really three pairs of characteristics

which he provides in Dynamics of Faith

1 Symbols are similar to signs in that both point beyond themselves

to something else However signs can be replaced for reasons of ex-

pediency or convention while symbols cannot

2 The reason why symbols cannot be replaced in the same way in

which signs can is that the symbol participates in that to which it points

the sign does not

3 A symbol opens up levels of reality which otherwise are closed

for us

4 A symbol also unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which

correspond to the [above mentioned] dimensions and elements of reality

5 Symbols cannot be produced intentionally They grow out of

the individual or collective unconscious and cannot function without being

accepted by the unconscious dimensions of our being

6 Symbols grow and die3

The first important characteristic of a symbol is that it is different from

a sign Signs and symbols both point beyond themselves but signs can be

replaced by convention while symbols cannot The reason for this is that

symbols participate in that which they symbolize Participation then ap-

pears to be the key to this important difference between sign and symbol

2 Lewis S Ford The Three Strands of Tillichs Theory of Religious Symbols The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966) p 106

3 Paul Tillich Dynamics of Faith (New York Harper and Row 1957) p 41-43 Hereaftercited as DF

328 Encounter

However as William Rowe points out what Tillich means by participation

is not at all clear

Participation is a fine old Platonic word never very clearly defined

in Platos work and it is even more obscure in Tillichs This is most un-

fortunate since as Rowe says until the meaning of participation is clarified

Tillichs fundamental distinction between sign and symbol is quite un-

informative4 And Tillichs use of the word participation is so varied

and general that it seems to have for him only the vaguest of meaning Con-

sider for example the following

A symbol participates in the reality it symbolizes the knower participatesin the known the lover participates in the beloved the existent partici-pates in the essences which make it what it is under the condition ofexistence the individual participates in the destiny of separation andguilt the Christian participates in the New Being as it is manifested inJesus the Christ In polarity with individualization participation under-lies the category of relation as a basic ontological element Withoutparticipation the category of relation would have no basis in realityEvery relation includes a kind of participation

6

From this it appears that participation although it is the basis of relation

really has no meaning beyond relation But this cannot be correct if par-

ticipation is to mark the difference between sign and symbol since even the

sign is related to that for which it stands if only in the sense of being

a sign for

But Tillichs position can be restated so that the meaning of the partici-

pation of the religious symbol in the symbolizandum being itself becomes

clearer First let us forget about all other kinds of participation since we

are not here interested in the relationship of lover and beloved or Christian

and the Christ and it is by no means obvious that these kinds of partcipation

are the same as or even similar to the participation of the symbol in the sym-

bolizandum We should also forget about kinds of symbols other than the

religious Tillich does give a few examples of non-religious symbols such

as symbols within the arts or a flag which participates in the power of king

or country but none of these examples helps to clarify the nature and mean-

ing of the participation of the religious symbol in being itself8

The relation of symbols to being itself is a metaphysical one and so we

might expect to find an answer to the question of participation within the

context of Tillichs metaphysics But although he does construct an ontology

4 William L Rowe Religious Symbols and God A Philosophical Study of Tillichs Theory(Chicago University of Chicago Press 1968) p 119

5 ST I p 1776 DF p 42 Rowe discusses some of the difficulties associated with the flag as a symbol

Rowe p 121


of sorts as is evidenced by his discussion of ontological elements polarities

of being and so forth a detailed and coherent original metaphysical system

is not the major focus of Tillichs efforts and at no point in his discussion

of metaphysics does a clear definition of participation emerge Also al-

though Tillichs ontology is the basis for his soteriology and for his method

of interpreting religious symbols it has no direct bearing on his explanation

of what a symbol is or how it functions

But in a more general way Tillich does make use of and even pre-

suppose a Platonic or perhaps more accurately a neo-Platonic view of

the relation of entities to being itself

Ever since the time of Plato it has been known that the concept of be-

ing as being or being itself points to the power inherent in everything

the power of resisting non-being7

Tillich thinks of being as the power to resist non-being a power present in

all that is Participation is simply a word which points to the relation of all

beings to and their dependence on being itself Participation of the religious

symbol in its symbolizandum simply means that there is some sort of onto-

logical relationship between a being and being itself a relation of depend-

ency A being is or is real it therefore shares in manifests is grounded by

or participates in being or reality itself Without this relationship there

would be no ground or reason for the being to be In that it exists that it is

not non-being an entity manifests its relation to being itself or shows that the

power of being itself is present in it The precise description of this rela-

tionship Tillich does not give but for the purposes of formulating the doc-

trine of symbols it really need not be given Indeed we might say that

Tillichs metaphysical need here can be met by any ontology be it Platonic

Thomistic Scotistic Spinozistic or what have you in which being itself is

treated as real ie as not just a bare abstraction or intellectual concept and

in which a real relationship is seen as existing between all entities or beings

and being itself

The word participation is then not so much a definition or account

of this ontological relationship between beings and being itself as it is a meta-

phor which points to it a metaphor which is occasionally replaced or clari-

fied by another At one point it is replaced by belonging to

Certainly we belong to beingmdashits power is in usmdashotherwise we would

not be8

At another point participation is compared to representation

7 ST I p 236

8 Paul Tillich Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago University

of Chicago Press 1955) p 11

raquo

330 Encounter

The representative of a person or an institution participates in the honorof those whom he is asked to represent but it is not he who is honoredit is that which or whom he represents In this sense we can state gen-erally that the symbol participates in the reality of what it symbolizesIt radiates the power of being and meaning of that for which it stands

9

The meaning of participation is indeed vague and will remain so since

it is more of a metaphor than an explanation But it is now clear enough to

begin to make sense of the difference between sign and symbol A sign

merely stands for or indicates something else There has to be some reason

or ground for this signification some sort of connection between sign and

signified With a sign this connection is only a relation of cause and effect

as with the clouds indicating rain resemblance as with the curved arrow on

the roadsign indicating a curve in the road or convention as red indicating

danger These examples I borrow from Rowe As he points out natural

signs such as nimbus clouds indicating rain or smoke indicating fire are not

the product of convention and cannot be changed at will Hence Tillich is

wrong when he says that all signs are the product of convention and hence

being changeable at will and determined by convention cannot be a mark

which differentiates signs from symbols10 But this is no large problem

Tillichs discussion of signs only needs to be expanded to include natural

signs as well as conventionally determined ones After all Tillichs main

interest is in symbols and he mentions signs only in passing The connec-

tion between sign and signified is either one of convention in which case it

can be changed at will or one of resemblance or causation or temporal order

as with the rain coming shortly after the arrival of the clouds But the rela-

tion of sign to signified usually is not difficult to undtrstand

There must also be some sort of connection between the religious sym-

bol and the symbolizandum being itself But this connection must be of a

different kind from that between sign and signified It cannot be a relation

of resemblance since no finite entity resembles being itself Nor can it be

one of natural causation at least not in the same sense of cause as when

fire is the cause of smoke or clouds of rain Nor finally can the relation

be one of convention Although we have an immediate awareness of the

power of being itself at least insofar as we are aware of the existence ie

the not being nothing of entities and especially of ourselves this is so to

speak a nonconceptual awareness11 Although it discloses the reality of be983085

9 Paul Tillich The Meaning and Justification of Religious Symbols Religious Experienceand Truth ed Sidney Hook (New York NYU Press 1961) p 4

10 Rowe pp 1080911 For a further discussion of Tillichs view of η s awareness of being itself see my

artice Paul Tillichs Hermeneutic forthcoming in the Journal of the American Academy ofReligion


ing it does not disclose the nature or essence of being12

Hence there is no

ground for choosing or defining one entity as that which stands for or repre-

sents being itself

Even more importantly the function of the religious symbol within the

context of Tillichs theology is not merely to indicate but also to make pres-

ent or make manifest the symbolizandum being itself so that it not only

can be known but also can become the center of ones life the object of ones

ultimate concern This is the real work that Tillichs notion of participation

performs it establishes the presence of the genuine ultimate infinite and

transcendent in the finite object which is the symbol

The reason for my use of the term participation is the desire to makethe difference of symbol from sign as sharp as possible and at the sametime to express what was rightly intended in the medieval doctrine of analogia entis namely to show a positive point of identity

13

Without this point of identity there would be no sense to the claim that

the symbol makes the ultimate concretely present

However Tillichs use of the concept of participation is not sufficient

to explain just what a symbol is or how it differs from a sign Everything

every entity be it sign symbol or just a rock in the road participates in

being itself because nothing can be unless it so participates Thus there is

an identity of every thing with being itself

No person and no thing is worthy in itself to represent our ultimate con-cern On the other hand every person and every thing participates inbeing itself that is in the ground and meaning of being Without suchparticipation it would not have the power of being This is the reasonwhy almost every type of reality has become a medium of revelation some-where

14

We are left with too large a class of symbols Anything at all might be a

symbol or more accurately everything is a potential symbol of being itself

The concept of participation does point to a relation between beings and be-

ing itself between potential symbol and symbolizandum but some further

account is needed to explain how a potential symbol becomes an actual one

Referring to the third and fourth propositions on Tillichs list we learn

that symbols open up levels of reality otherwise closed to us and open up

corresponding elements of the self ie symbols awaken sensitivities and

elicit responses from the self that otherwise would remain latent If fol-

12 This is not to say that Tillich claims that being itself has an essence Being simply is itis not something

13 Paul Tillich Rejoinder The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966)p 188

14 ST I p 118

332 Encounter

lowing Tillich we consider art to be a form of symbolic expression these

claims about symbols seem on the level of common sense and general ex-

perience to be correct Art does elicit responses to and make us aware of

things that we would never discover through mundane and prosaic modes of

expression By analogy a religious symbol should open up up the deepest

or ultimate level of reality the level of being itself and should produce in

the self some sort of change an awareness of and relation to ultimate reality

These characteristics although Tillich does not mention them as such can

be counted as marks distinguishing symbols from signs and indeed perform

this function far better than the concept of participation A sign merely

stands for or represents something else something that could itself be known

It is not in itself a disclosure or means of discovering anything new either

about reality or the self The symbol does disclose something that could not

be known except through symbols

While the above is a useful definition of what a symbol does the prob-

lem is to give some plausible account of how this works of how the symbol

becomes transparent or as Tillich prefers translucent to being itself15

In

this becoming translucent the symbol itself must somehow be negated or put

aside it must be experienced as not only the entity it is but also as a mani-

festation of the ground of being

A religious symbol uses the material of ordinary experience in speaking ofGod but in such a way that the ordinary meaning of the material used isboth affirmed and denied Every religious symbol negates itself in itsliteral meaning but it affirms itself in its self-transcending meaning Itis not a sign pointing to something with which it has no inner relationshipIt represents the power and meaning of what is symbolized through par-ticipation

10

The quality of that which concerns one ultimately Tillich calls the

holy17

If the element of negation is absent the symbol loses its translu-

cency and becames itself holy The symbol breaks down it no longer repre-

sents but rather replaces the divine It becomes an idol

Holiness cannot become actual except through holy objects But holyobjects are not holy in and of themselves They are holy only by negatingthemselves in pointing to the divine of which they are the mediums Ifthey establish themselves as holy they become demonic Innumer-able things all things in a way have the power of becoming holy in amediate sense They can point to something beyond themselves But if

15 Tillich prefers translucency because each symbol contributes to and conditions thatwhich one sees or grasps of the symbolizandum See Tillich Rejoinder p 188

16 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol II (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1957)p 9

17 ST I p 215


their holiness comes to be considered inherent it becomes demonic The representations of mans ultimate concernmdashholy objectsmdashtend tobecome his ultimate concern They are transformed into idols18

For any finite entity to become a symbol it must be affirmed and

negated at the same time but exactly how this peculiar operation works is

not immediately obvious Tillich says more about it in his treatment of the

last two propositions on his list that symbols cannot be produced inten-

tionally and that they grow and die

By growth and death Tillich means that symbols have a sort of life

of their own their becoming symbols or their ceasing to be symbols cannot

be controlled by man because symbols are a product of the unconscious

Tillich refers especially to the group unconscious

Out of what womb are symbols born Out of the womb which is usuallycalled today the group unconscious or collective unconscious orwhatever you want to call itmdashout of a group which acknowledges in thisthing this word this flag or whatever it may be its own being It is notinvented intentionally and even if somebody would try to invent a sym-bol as sometimes happens then it becomes a symbol only if the uncon-scious of a group says yes

19

In other words an object becomes a symbol when a group unconsciously de-

cides that it is a symbol To this one might well ask exactly why the symbol

must function for a group The size of the group from which it elicits re-

sponse and acceptance has no apparent connection with an objects ability

to become a symbol If small groups can have symbols why cannot just one

single individual find something to be a symbol of God or being itself

Tillich does give reasons why faith the state of being ultimately con-

cerned demands membership in a community One such reason is that faith

demands language in which it can be expressed and language implies a

community at least a linguistic community to which the language belongs20

Also faith if genuine aims at that which transcends and overcomes the

dividedness of existence and so implies love and action which presupposes

a community in which one acts21

But these all seem to be consequences of

faith consequences of the encounter with being itself through the symbol

and not necessary conditions for it Also even if one grants that symbols

never function just for an individual but always for a group of people surely

the symbol functions for the group because it functions for each member of

the group and not the other way around In other words the primary prob-

18 ST I p 21619 Paul Tillich Theology of Culture (New York Oxford University Press 1959) p 5820 DF pp 232421 DF p 117

334 Encounter

lem in explaining the function of symbols is the individuals relation to

them and not the groups

If the function of a symbol depends on acceptance by the unconscious

dimension of our being22

it would follow that symbols cannot be con-

sciously invented or produced A church some individual or organization

or a theologian might suggest some object or entity as a symbol but whether

this entity would actually function as a symbol for any individual or group

is beyond the control of whoever suggests it Hence symbols have a life of

their own independent of the conscious will of men they grow and die

But this is not much of an explanation If the primary defining mark

of a symbol that which explains how a potential symbol differs from an

actual one is completely hidden in the unconscious we really do not know

very much at all about symbols If knowledge of and relation to being it-

self through symbols is not a completely rational process one cannot expect

or demand a completely rational account of the working of symbols Still

to bury the entire question under the term unconscious does not do much

for the plausibility of the theory

Another important question is that of the truth of symbols In what

sense can a symbol be called true The truth of religious symbols can have

nothing to do with a comparison of the symbol to the symbolizandum since

the symbolizandum is only known through the symbol

The criterion of the truth of a symbol naturally cannot be the comparisonof it with the reality to which it refers just because this reality is abso-lutely beyond human comprehension The truth of a symbol depends onits inner necessity for the symbol-creating consciousness Doubts con-cerning its truth show a change of mentality a new attitude toward theunconditioned transcendent The only criterion that is at all relevant isthis that the unconditioned is clearly grasped in its unconditionedness

23

Hence there must be some other criterion for the truth of symbols Tillich

claims that all truth requires some sort of verification24

Since objects do

not become symbols just in themselves but only through their relation to in-

dividuals or groups of people their truth can only be verified in the human

life-process and their truth must be related to the situation in which indi-

vidual people find themselves The truth of symbols then is their ade-

quacy to the religious situation in which they are created and their in-

adequacy to another situation is their untruth25 But what does this ade-

quacy mean At least in part this adequacy seems to indicate the ability

22 DF p 4323 Paul Tillich The Religious Symbol Religious Experience and Truth p 31624 ST I p 10225 Tillich Theology of Culture pp 66-67


to move people to demand religious attention to create reply

Faith has truth insofar as it adequately expresses an ultimate con-cern Adequacy of expression means the power of expressing an ulti-mate concern in such a way that it creates reply action communicationSymbols which are able to do this are alive But the life of symbols islimited The relation of man to the ultimate undergoes changes Con-tents of ultimate concern vanish or are replaced by others The cri-terion of the truth of faith is whether or not it is alive

The other criterion of the truth of a symbol of faith is that it ex-presses the ultimate which is really ultimate In other words that it isnot idolatrous

26

Because it participates in being itself an object can be a religious sym-

bol a concrete manifestation of God or being itself for ones ultimate con-

cern But this is not sufficient to define a symbol since all objects partici-

pate in being itself The defining marks of a true symbol are that it is alive

that it communicates and brings about a reply thus making one sensitive to

depths of reality otherwise unnoticed and that the symbol is somehow neces-

sary for the symbol creating consciousness In addition a genuine symbol

is not idolatrous it is not itself the object of ultimate concern but is that

which allows the ultimate or unconditioned to shine through or show itself

without interfering with its unconditionedness

There are then two crucial terms idolatry and the life of symbols up-

on which the entire doctrine of religious symbols appears ultimately to rest

But these two concepts are not really sufficient to explain how an object of

thought or experience becomes a valid symbol

The difference between an idol and a genuine symbol is that the symbol

is translucent to and thereby draws attention to something beyond itself

whereas the idol is itself the object of attention Since being itself cannot

be grasped or thought concretely it can only become an object of thought

and of ultimate concern as it is manifested through the symbol But then the

symbol must be the object of ultimate concern and in this sense must be pre-

cisely the same as the idol If the symbol is to be different from an idol it

must somehow recede it must give up its own claim to ultimacy in order to

let being itself show through27

But obviously the symbol cannot completely

recede If it did there would be no object of consciousness at all So the

symbol must both be and not be present to consciousness and this Tillich

describes in terms of the dialectic of affirmation and negation That is the

26 DF pp 96-9727 For Tillich the paradigm of this is the Crucifixion in that a finite being surrendered all

claims to ultimacy for himself and so became a manifestation of the genuine ultimate See ST Ip 136

336 Encounter

symbol must affirm itself as present to consciousness but must negate itself

as of no interest in itself but only as the medium of the divine If a symbol

is to be a medium for the concrete manifestation of being itself it must be

at once both present (as that entity which is the symbol) and absent (of no

importance in itself)

Within the overall context of Tillichs project this explanation of how

symbols work of how they differ from idols is not very satisfactory On a

purely intellectual level it has a certain appeal especially to anyone who has

a fondness for Hegel One learns to think and un-think something at the

same time But this does sound like an arcane skill or knack something like

learning to perform HusserPs epoche This would not in itself be much of a

problem if Tillichs overall aim were to give instructions in how to be re

ligious if he were in effect inventing religion as though there had been no

genuine religion prior to Tillich But his project is not to invent something

new but to explain how symbols do in fact function not only for the trained

and practiced dialectician but for the average man in the pew And for this

purpose the dialectic of affirmation and negation must be dismissed as just

too complicated and elevated to be plausible

The problem is just the opposite with the notion of the life of symbols

a concept perhaps adequate to describe a symbol but too simple to explain

how or why a symbol comes into being If a symbol does disclose the nature

of being one would expect it to have some sort of life or vivacity to in

Tillichs words create reply action communication But what is it that

turns some object of consciousness into a manifestation of being itself The

only answer Tillich has offered thus far has to do with the unconscious which

is not really an answer at all But without a clearer account of how a sym

bol comes into being the entire doctrine of symbols has little force or

plausibility

In the opening pages of this paper I quoted Lewis S Fords commentsto the effect that Tillich really has three different and unreconciled theoriesof symbols the dialectic of affirmation and negation the metaphor of

transparency and the concept of participation By now it should be clearthat these are not three different theories at all but aspects of the same one

An object cannot become transparent to being itself unless there is some sortof relation or connection of that object to being itself and it is this relationthat Tillich points to with his concept of participation In brief there canbe no transparency unless there is participation But not all beings eventhough they do participate in being itself are symbols Hence some ac-


count must be given of what transforms an object into a symbol what makes

the object transparent and this Tillich attempts with his dialectic of affirma

tion and negation This account I have argued ise to do the

job Indeed Tillich seems aware of this inadequacy and treats this prob-

lem in several different ways It is here in his explanation of just how an

object is transformed into a symbol that Tillich has produced competing

and unreconciled accounts We have already seen two the claim that sym-

bols originate in the group unconscious and the dialectic of affirmation and

negation

A still different and indeed a much better treatment of this problem

arises out of Tillichs discussion of revelation This discussion is not oriented

to the subject of symbols per se but does have a direct bearing on it since a

religious symbol is the carrier of revelation the manifestation of the ground

of being for human knowledge28

or the manifestation of what concerns us

ultimately39

If the religious symbol does reveal there must be some-

thing in the revelatory experience which brings together the person and be-

ing itself

Revelation is a form of knowledge and so we can begin to describe it

by comparing the cognition of religious symbols to the cognition of an ordi-

nary object Tillich does not produce a real epistemology any more than

he does a real metaphysics but for his purposes he does not require one

His position on objective knowledge the usual activity which we call know-

ing is little more than common sense

Knowing is a form of union In every act of knowledge the knower andthat which is known are united the gap between subject and object isovercome The subject grasps the object adapts it to itself and at thesame time adapts itself to the object But the union of knowledge is apeculiar one it is a union through separation Detachment is the condi-tion of cognitive union

30

Knowing requires both knower and known subject and object The object

of knowledge even if it is in me as an object of memory thought or

imagination is not the subject The act of knowing is a bridging of this

separation but not an abolition of it The separation of knower from

known remains

The cognition of a religious symbol is different the separation of

knower from known is overcome This means that the person for whom the

object is a symbol must be in a state different from that of the objective ob-

28 ST I p 9829 ST I p 11030 ST I p 94

338 Encounter

server a state of faith Tillich generally defines faith as the slate of being

ultimately concernedmiddot31 But this state of faith must be more than just ulti-

mate concern In this faithful cognition directed at an object the object is

taken not in terms of understanding use or even pleasure but either as be-

ing or as representing that around which ones li fe revolves But there must

be some difference between this faithful cognition directed at an idol and

that directed at a symbol since both elicit ones ultimate concern a differ-

ence between what we might call genuine and idolatrous faith Til lich de-

scribes this state of genuine faithful cognition by comparing it to other

forms of cognition even that of the theologian

There is a kind of cognition implied in faith which is qualitatively differ-

ent from the cognition involved in the technical scholarly work of the

theologian It has a completely existential self-determining and self-

surrendering character and belongs to the faith of even the intellectually

most primitive believer We shall call the organ with which we receive

the contents of faith self-transcending or ecstatic reason and we shall

call the organ of the theological scholar technical or formal reason32

In the state of genuine faith the status of the self is changed it is surren-

dered rather than defended It reaches out beyond itself to complete union

with the object the self is ecstatic

Ecstasy (standing outside ones self) points to a state of mind which

is extraordinary in the sense that the mind transcends its ordinary situa-

tion Ecstasy is not a negation of reason it is the state of mind in which

reason is beyond itself that is beyond its subject-object structure

Ecstasy occurs only if the mind is grasped by the mystery namely by the

ground of being and meaning And conversely there is no revelation

without ecstasy83

In the ecstatic union the cleavage between subject and object is at least

temporarily and fragmentarily overcome This does not mean that the ob-

ject qua object disappears that knowledge of the object is abolished but

rather that it is included within a different sort of cognitive relationship

which Tillich unfortunately refers to by that overused word participation

Within the structure of subject-object separation observation and conclu-

sion are the way in which the subject tries to grasp the object remaining

always strange to it and never certain of success To the degree in which

the subject-object structure is overcome observation is replaced by par-

ticipation (which includes observation) and conclusion is replaced by

insight (which includes conclusions) Such insight on the basis of partici-

31 As at DF p 132 ST I p 5333 ST I pp 11112

Paul Tuumllichs Doctrine of Religious Symbols 339

pation is not a method which can be used at will but a state of being ele-

vated to what we have called the transcendent unity34

Using this description of the relation of person to symbol we can go on

to define the difference between a genuine religious symbol and an idol An

idol like a symbol participates in being itself it is like every object a po-

tential symbol And an idol may be the object of ones ultimate concern

an idol may be holy But an idol remains the thing it is an object in the

world present to a subject An idol does not bring about or enter into or

complete that relation of genuine faith in which the separation of subject

and object is overcome

Hie finite which claims infinity without having it (as eg a nation or

success) is not able to transcend the subject-object scheme It remains

an object which the believer looks at as a subject He can approach it

with ordinary knowledge and subject it to ordinary handling middot The

more idolatrous a faith the less it is able to overcome the cleavage between

subject and object85

We can now also give a more complete account of how an object of

thought experience or imagination becomes a symbol In the revelatory

event that is in any case where a symbol successfully manifests the ultimate

and unconditioned to a person the ecstatic union occurs in which the subject-

object cleavage is overcome A religious symbol then can never be a sym-

bol in itself but only for a person or a group of people An essential ele-

ment in the transformation of an object into a symbol is the subjects rela-

tion to it

Clearly there are two sides to this event the objective the object pres-

ent to the consciousness of the person and the subjective the response of the

self to this object

Revelation always is a subjective and an objective event in strict

interdependence Someone is grasped by the manifestation of the mys-

tery this is the subjective side of the event Something occurs through

which the mystery of revelation grasps someone this is the objective

side These two sides cannot be separated If nothing happens objec-

tively nothing is revealed If no one receives what happens subjectively

the event fails to reveal anything The objective occurrence and the sub-

jective reception belong to the whole event of revelation86

If an object actually functions as a symbol if it relates a person to the

ground of being there is a mutual grasping The symbol grasps the person

34 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology Vol Ill (Chicago University of Chicago Press 1963)p 256

35 DF pp 11-1236 ST I p 111

340 Encounter

it appeals to him in some way moves him in a way in which ordinary ob-

jects do not the person responds to the appeal he grasps or sees or uses the

symbol in a way different from his response to ordinary objects The event

whereby an object becomes a symbol for someone is a peculiar kind of event

an ecstatic relating of person to symbol

How and why this ecstatic event takes place is and must remain a mys-

tery Why do some objects rather than others elicit this response Why do

not all men make this response to the same object But we are here talking

about an intensely personal relationship of the entire self not a rational or

intellectual one Psychological investigation may reveal some of the grounds

for this appeal and response grounds involving the persons cultural and

educational traditions his family and upbringing and perhaps ultimately

the unconscious elements of his being But one cannot expect such investi-

gations to explain finally and completely why an object is a symbol for one

person and not for another Tillich is unfair to his own doctrine when he

claims that this is due to a symbol growing out of the unconscious whether

of individual or group If faith is an act of the total personality the

movement of faith involves more than just the unconscious It involves the

totality of ones being it involves the person to the utmost Hence the rela-

tion of faith the relation of the person to the symbol is personal to the

utmost

But then it should be of no surprise that this relation cannot be clearly

and completely described We all have personal likes and dislikes and

make personal responses which we cannot understand and which probably

cannot be completely understood One likes lamb but not pork responds to

Beethoven but not Bach On a deeper level we become friends with some

people and not with others Perhaps the best example is falling in love Of

all the people in the world a person falls in love with one Two people come

together they appeal to each other and enter into a relationship in some

ways similar to their relationship with other people but in important ways

quite different Psychological investigation may reveal many grounds for

two people falling in love but not all of the reasons not the reason

Needless to say the relation of person to genuine symbol is not exactly

the same as love One does not fall in love with the Biblical picture of Jesus

or with the consecrated bread and wine or with anything else that serves as a

religious symbol in the same way in which a man falls in love with a woman

We are dealing here in metaphor and analogy not in straightforward de-

scription of matters of fact No way of discussing this mysterious relation

will be totally adequate But it is this relationship which constitutes Til-

lichs best account of how a potential symbol is turned into an actual one


I have criticized Tillichs attempt to explain this transformation by

means of the dialectic of affirmation and negation but the dialectic is in a

sense included or taken up in this broader notion of the special relation of

a person to that which functions for him as symbol In this relationship the

object as symbol is present to consciousness as one pole of the relationship

just as any other object is and in this sense the symbol asserts itself There

is also a negation not of the object itself but of what we might call the obmiddot

jectness of the object Its separation from the subject is overcome or

negated in the ecstatic union of person with symbol This human response

rather than the intricacies of an intellectual dialectic or the vagueness of an

explanation based on the group unconscious provides a far more believable

account of how an object is transformed into a symbol

But if the doctrine of symbols rests on this peculiar subjective relation-

ship we might ask how revelation how knowledge of God or of being itself

through symbols could be considered true We have already seen that the

truth of a religious symbol cannot be based upon its resemblance to the

symbolizandum Its truth does depend upon its participation in being itself

and upon the response and concern it elicits from a person or community

its ability to appeal to a person in such a way that he both aims his ultimate

concern at it and relates himself ecstatically to it The symbols verifica-

tion in the life-process is its ability to continue to be a satisfying aim of

ones ultimate concern Clearly such truth is subjective it depends upon a

personal response and commitment rather than an objective understanding

of what is the case or of what is valid But because its truth is subjective

its truth is at least in one respect certain A symbol is that toward which

one directs ones ultimate concern and concerns like desires and feelings

are immediately given

But with this certainty is the danger of falsehood the danger that the

object of ultimate concern will remain or will fall back to being just an ob-

ject that one will fail to maintain the relation which keeps the symbol open

as a manifestation of the genuine ultimate Revelation can fall into idolatry

The certitude of faith is existential meaning that the whole existence

of man is involved It has two elements the one which is not a

risk but a certainty about ones own being namely on being related to

something ultimate or unconditional the other which is a risk and in-

volves doubt and courage namely the surrender to a concern which is

not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as ultimate37

But if this is the case if it is impossible to adequately describe the re-

lation of a person to a symbol and if the truth of symbols is at the same time

37 DF pp 33-34

342 Encounter

both certain and uncertain is it possible to evaluate this theory or even to

understand clearly just what this theory is This is a problem although

it is by no means unique to Tillichs position Any attempt to describe

Kierkegaards Leap of Faith Bubers I-Thou relationship Jaspers

reading of ciphers of transcendence or Heideggers notion of releasement

(Gelassenheit) toward things leads to similar problems Any such descrip-

tion leads eventually to a via negativa it is not a knowing or relating that is

based on logic proof or demonstration it is not a knowing or relating

aimed at use calculation or manipulation the subject in this relationship is

a real self not a Cartesian scientific knower And neither Tillichs position

nor any of these others can be adequately evaluated in terms of rational

demonstration or hard evidence since it is just this form of objective and

rational thinking to which they are proposing an alternative

It is easy to dismiss Tillichs position out of hand A nominalist or

positivist will reject or find meaningless the first two steps in the argument

the claim that being itself is real rather than merely a concept and that be-

ings participate in being itself To anyone who has no experience of and no

desire for any relation to other people or the world other than a purely cog-

nitive or rational one and who denies the possibility of any other kind of

relation Tillichs claim that the ecstatic encounter of the self with a symbol

must appear not so much false as utterly incomprehensible

A position such as Tillichs does then if it is to make any sense at all

require some measure of good will on the part of the reader a willingness

to put aside demands for logical rigor and to look for analogies in ones own

experience And the measure of Tillichs success should not be his ability

to convince one who vigorously resists him an enterprise in which he will

almost certainly be unsuccessful Rather it should be something like plausi-

bility If rational proof by the very nature of that for which Tillich is try-

ing to build a case is excluded plausibility and completeness are the only

basis on which a judgment can be made

One can of course point out the strengths of Tillichs position espe-

cially the fact that he attacks the problem on both the ontological and the

personal level Although his ontology is neither original nor complete he

does lay an ontological foundation for the claim that the revelation of be-

ing itself by beings is possible He then in a psychological or existential

discussion explains how this possibility is turned into an actuality But

perhaps the ultimate test of Tillichs success is how plausible and complete

his account appears as a way of making sense of our own religious experi-

ence not the grand experiences of mystical unity with the Godhead or the

One nor of the tremendous conversion experiences that completely alter


ones life (kinds of experience which may be important but are relatively

rare) but of the more mundane experiences of what we take to be encounters

with or disclosures of ultimate reality whether this encounter takes place

through the symbol structure of an organized religion or through objects of

nature art human relations or what have you If Tillichs doctrine of sym

bols can shed any light on these experiences it should be judged a success

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theories is that they adequately describe symbols capable of fulfilling thenecessary metaphysical and religious functions required of them2

Ford is quite correct in discerning the three major movements or steps

in the development of the doctrine of symbols what he fails to perceive is

that these are three elements of one doctrine and that they do come together

to form a coherent whole This unity emerges when the various parts of

Tillichs treatment of symbols are gathered together and when necessary

clarified and restated For one difficult problem in the theory of symbols

the explanation of what constitutes the difference between an ordinary ob-

ject and a symbol Tillich does offer more than one answer In the second

part of this paper I will argue that one of these explanations is far better

than the others and does produce a plausible account of how being itself

can be known through finite beings

The easiest way to enter Tillichs discussion of symbols is through the

list of six characteristics of symbols or really three pairs of characteristics

which he provides in Dynamics of Faith

1 Symbols are similar to signs in that both point beyond themselves

to something else However signs can be replaced for reasons of ex-

pediency or convention while symbols cannot

2 The reason why symbols cannot be replaced in the same way in

which signs can is that the symbol participates in that to which it points

the sign does not

3 A symbol opens up levels of reality which otherwise are closed

for us

4 A symbol also unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which

correspond to the [above mentioned] dimensions and elements of reality

5 Symbols cannot be produced intentionally They grow out of

the individual or collective unconscious and cannot function without being

accepted by the unconscious dimensions of our being

6 Symbols grow and die3

The first important characteristic of a symbol is that it is different from

a sign Signs and symbols both point beyond themselves but signs can be

replaced by convention while symbols cannot The reason for this is that

symbols participate in that which they symbolize Participation then ap-

pears to be the key to this important difference between sign and symbol

2 Lewis S Ford The Three Strands of Tillichs Theory of Religious Symbols The Journal of Religion XLVI No 1 Part II (Jan 1966) p 106

3 Paul Tillich Dynamics of Faith (New York Harper and Row 1957) p 41-43 Hereaftercited as DF

328 Encounter


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