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The Mercosur Parliament: democracy and integration

on European patterns?

Clarissa Franzoi Dri

PhD Candidate - IEP de Bordeaux

[email protected]

Summary: 1. The role of ideas in political mimesis.2. Democracy in EU: the place of the European Parliament. 3. Regionalism after Europe:

a parliament rises in Mercosur. 3.1. Traces of the Joint Parliamentary Committee.3.2. The Mercosur Parliament gets up on the wrong side of the bed.

Conclusion. Bibliographical references.

The presidents of Mercosur member states signed in December 2005

the Constitutive Protocol of the Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur)1. The new assembly

was officially installed in December 2006 and began its work sessions in May 2007.

Although Parliaments functions and competences are not large in comparison to

national chambers, it will be formed by directly elected representatives. Three main

reasons allow the assumption that the decision to create this assembly was not

fortuitous, ingenuous ou merely symbolic: 1. the delay and the difficult negotiations

that preceded it; 2. the contradiction of the Mercosur objective to constitute no more

than a common market2 and 3. the absence of a parliamentary assembly in the

previous essays for integration in which participated Mercosur countries (Oliveira,

2003 : 53-73). How, then, to interpret it?

According to the Constitutive Protocol, the Parliament should answer

to a double necessity: 1. reinforcing the integration process through a balanced and

efficient institutional structure and 2. deepening democracy within Mercosur by

constructing a space of plurality, participation and interest representation3. The paper

aims at examining both purposes from the international relations perspective. More

Paper prepared for the 3rd GARNET Annual Conference - Mapping integration and regionalism in aglobal world: the EU and regional governance outside the EU, Bordeaux, September 17-20th 2008,workshop Parliaments in regional integrations, coordinated by Olivier Costa and Julien Navarro. Draftversion.1 The abbreviation Parlasur is not official, but its formal use has been increasing among media andParliaments civil servants and deputies. This is the reason for its adoption in the paper.2

Article 1 of the Asuncin Treaty. Available in www.mercosur.int.3 Preamble of the Constitutive Protocol (CMC Decision 23/05). The document is available inwww.parlamentodelmercosur.org.
mailto:[email protected]://www.mercosur.int/http://www.mercosur.int/http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/mailto:[email protected]://www.mercosur.int/http://www.parlamentodelmercosur.org/


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rather than to transfer processes. It means this paper focuses more in Mercosur

expectations and movements towards the EU than in specific European transfer

policies on parliamentary issues. This choice corresponds to the ideational approach

that supports the main hypothesis. A deeper analysis of the concrete actions carried

out by the European Union towards the Mercosur Parliament deserves further

research.

The qualitative study is mainly based on public written documents

produced by the Joint Parliamentary Committee, the Mercosur Parliament and other

Mercosur institutions. Minutes of the Brazilian representation meetings and

newspaper reports and interviews constitute an additional source. These data

provide elements for the approach of the following questions: was the creation of theMercosur Parliament inspired in democratic ideas similar to those supported by the

EU? Did the European idea of integration guide the creation of the assembly as it did

with the Mercosur creation itself? In what measure European Unions actions

affected this decision? Do deputies use the European Parliament as a model to

Parlasurs institutionalization? Has the EP contributed to the democratic legitimation

of the EU in such a way that it can be considered as a paradigm for Mercosur

Parliaments builders? Moreover, does the European model fit in Latin American

political context? Would it help to strengthen integration and development within the

region?

1. The role of ideas in political mimesis

Several studies conducted mainly from the nineties on (Goldstein,

1988; Hall, 1989; Sikkink, 1991; Risse-Kappen, 1994; Vennesson, 2004; Madrid,

2005; Thomas, 2005) show that ideas, defined as beliefs shared by individuals, have

an influence over policy-making (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993 : 3). In terms of

European integration, authors point out, for instance, the role of the united Europe

ideal in the communitarian construction (Garrett and Weingast, 1993 : 205); the

significance of political leaders beliefs about macroeconomic strategy in the

evolution of the monetary cooperation (McNamarra, 1998); and the weight of the

democratic ideology in the progressive reinforcement of European Parliaments

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powers (Costa and Magnette, 2003). In fact, ideas constitute active ingredients in the

organization of experience and in the interplay of political positions and, therefore,

are closely implicated in political argument, understanding and action (Foley, 1994 :

1).

The ideas studied in this article may be understood as causal beliefs,

in the sense that they provide guides for actors on how to achieve their objectives

(Goldstein and Keohane, 1993 : 10). But causal beliefs imply strategies for the

attainment of goals only understandable within the context of broader world views,

which define the universe of possibilities for action (Ibid : 8). The conceptions of

integration and democracy built by the European Union would be part of the

desirable alternatives for political conduction to some actors in Mercosur. Concretely,the European Parliament would be seen as a source of inspiration on how to proceed

in order to achieve the aims compatible to the mentioned perspective. In this case,

these ideas could provide a consensual response to the lack of a project in Mercosur.

As focal points, ideas alleviate coordination problems arising from the absence of

unique equilibrium solutions. For the close actors of the Parlasur creation, these

ideas could serve as well as road maps: causal ideas help determine which of many

means will be used to reach desired goals and therefore help to provide actors with

strategies with which to further their objectives; embodied in institutions, they shape

the solution for problems (Ibid : 13-14).

Considering the role of ideas in political outcomes is not to say that

they are the most important explaining elements ; it is only to recognize that they are

also important. This is confirmed by the assumption that ideas often become

politically efficacious when in conjunction with other changes, either in material

interests or in power relationships (Ibid : 25). Besides, probably not only beliefs

derived from the European experience have influenced the creation of the Parlasur.

Nevertheless, analysing these additional factors is beyond the scope of this paper. Its

goal is simply to question if certain European ideals integration and democracy

affected the process of rise of the new South American assembly.

But avoiding reducionism requires at least to mention why these

ideas would have enough force in order to be considered in the context of Mercosur.

The conditions that allow the play of ideas are highly dependent on an array ofenabling circumstances related to institutional arrangements, place, timing, history,

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economics and culture (Risse-Kappen, 1994 : 187; Ikenberry, 1993 : 85; Garrett,

1993 : 203; Hall, 1989 : 362; Weir, 1989 : 56-59). The analysis developed in the

following sections will hopefully contribute to the understanding of reasons such as

the European colonization in Latin America (LA), the industrialization process in

Argentina and Brazil during the seventies, the financial, technical and political

investment of the European Union in Mercosur, the wave of left-wing government

elections in South America from the end of the 1990s on, the increasing popular

questioning of the United States influence in Latin America, the failure of the

negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the knowledge on

the European system by scholars who active participate in Mercosur debates.

The ideas under analysis may have led Mercosur to a process ofreproduction of the institutional framework of the European Union. Institutional

mimicry can be defined as a form of social engineering distinguished by the

importation of external institutional technologies which are rebuilt by exporters and

importers and constantly reinterpreted by competing political strategies (Darbon,

1993 : 119-120). Three main elements emerge from this conception. First,

institutional mimesis is almost always an affair of elites, who have material

possibilities to get in touch with foreign practices. These exchanges are facilitated by

informal networks of experts, scholars and policy-makers from different continents

who share similar references and values (Mny, 1993 : 20-22). Second, the

envisaged model is often an ideal one, engendered by the representation held by

importers. The difficulties and limitations of the institution in its original environment

are frequently neglected (Darbon, 1993 : 120). Finally, the mechanism of mimesis

implies transformation and adjustment to the new context. Local needs and previous

experiences will define the process of institutional appropriation and reinvention

(Mny, 1993 : 10). Like a graft, the imported technology is progressively rejected or

assimilated by the organism. If there is no reaction regarding the strange body, it

becomes ineffective after a process of deviation or escapism (Darbon, 1993 : 120).

Mimetic processes are among the means defined by DiMaggio and

Powell through which institutional isomorphic change occurs. When organizational

technologies are poorly understood, when goals are ambiguous or when the

environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on

other organizations (1983 : 151). As a response to uncertainty, the Mercosur

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Parliament may be based in a sort of modeling. Institutional convergence can

contribute efficiently and in a cheap manner to the achievement of desirable similar

results (Mny, 1993 : 17-18). In addition, the dependence on the support from a

single institution and the reduced number of available institutional models may

explain isomorphism in this case (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983 : 155).

Every political system tends to search for inspiration in existent

models. If institutions rise and change in a world already full of them, the conditioning

by previous frameworks is inevitable (Hall and Taylor, 1997 : 490). Institutional

mimesis can thus occur among systems either with similar or different political

standards and levels of industrialization. The last situation was historically verified

during the processes of decolonization: in general, ex-colonies mirrored their newregimes in the features of colonizer countries. This context of unequal rapports

revealed antagonisms between modernity and lack of civilization, cultural

refinement and uncultivated usages. Institutional mimicry allowed the construction

of legitimizing ideologies which opposed dominant models and imperfect copies

(Darbon, 1993 : 114). Contemporary, in spite of the proclaimed respect to cultural

diversity, the occidental state still claims a universalistic vocation which produces

cultural dependency and defines the current international order (Badie, 1992). The

institutional mimesis potentially developed by the Mercosur Parliament vis--vis the

European Union corresponds to this logic. Yet Latin America oscillates between its

occidental pretensions and its indigenous origins, the differences regarding Europe

do not concur to a horizontal relationship. The Europeanization phenomenon,

irrefutable in some aspects of national life within member states and applicant states

(Featherstone, 2003), has perhaps surpassed the continent. Most forms of

cooperation among states can be classified after the European style, which is

probably the case of Mercosur. In this case, challenges concern the risks of

implementing political technologies invented for a diverse reality, more important in

asymmetrical transfers than in symmetrical ones. Next sections conceptualize both

democracy and integration, ideas that may have encouraged this institutional

mimesis within the Mercosur Parliament.

2.

Democracy in EU: the place of the European Parliament

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The first registers of democracy date from Antiquity, but it is possible

that some practices have taken place even before Greece and Rome. The classical

theory on democracy was also born in Europe during the rise of the modern state. A2500 year-old subject could not be new to the European Community (EC). In fact,

academic analysis is vast in this field, although it was not central to the political

debate until the seventies. Before that, the economic nature of the Community limited

its necessity of democratic legitimacy to the national ambit (Tel, 1995 : 7). The EC

was mainly understood as part of the foreign policy of each state, due to the logics of

cooperation and sectorial integration. Another reason, of theological nature, eluded

the legitimacy debate: the consensus that integration was the most efficient methodto achieve peace and development in Europe (Magnette, 2000 : 174). Avoid future

wars and launch prosperity are ideals which based the European construction and

reached to unify national leaders positions (Weiler, 1995). As the project should be

supported by its ends, questions about its means became secondary.

The inclusion of the Common Assembly (CA) in the European Coal

and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty, in 1952, confirms that efforts for democracy at

the supranational level were feeble at the time. There was a consensus that the HighAuthority should be controlled: transferring competencies to the Community required

accountability mechanisms. But governments agreed that the CA would not be able

to exercise legislative or policy-influencing powers. Democracy was accepted in the

form of the CA, but it should not make a difference (Rittberger, 2005 : 106). In

addition, the intergovernmental branch (the Council) should allow state

representation and, consequently, afford possibility for national parliaments actions.

The situation started to change when both economic and theologicalpremises were questioned. The recession period revealed the fragilities of a simply

common market, and peace became more a fact than a concern. When finalities

missed, attentions turned back to procedures and institutions, which intended to be

functional and efficient, but not necessarily democratic. Therefore, the debate on

democracy was opened in Europe through the democratic deficit assumptions. The

Community was challenged to address directly to the people to seek for support.

Since then, Europe has been trying to convince citizens of its conformity to theirvalues and aspirations. Enlarged competences and direct elected representatives

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were considered key elements to achieve political legitimacy. Nonetheless, the

European elections of 1979 did not beat its partisans expectations. The level of

participation was considered weak and went down progressively at each new

election (see Blondel et al, 1998). The electoral campaign remained centered in

national questions. Even if the direct suffrage contributed to expand the studies on

the Community and to warrant a triple organic, institutional and political

independence to the EP (Costa, 2001 : 35-37), it was not able to substantially

improve individuals perception on the integration.

With the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, in 1992, the democratic

discourse entered more emphatically in the supranational arena. As the European

Single Act of 1986 was judged too economic to face some political rearrangements ofthe 1990s (the German reunification and the end of the communist era in the USSR),

Maastricht was conceived to advance deeper and faster forward the political

integration (Wolton, 1993 : 27). New concepts and ideas were introduced mainly

the European citizenship, the monetary union and the denomination European

Union but democracy was treated more like a symbol than a practice, even during

the negotiations for the Treaty. The outputs remained a central element of legitimacy,

whilst the inputs, as the organization of citizens participation on decisions, were not

developed (Magnette, 2000, p. 184). Once more, the reinforcement of the European

Parliaments powers should cover the gap. Parliamentary competences were

enlarged, like in 1985, and a new legislative procedure was added to the Single Act

cooperation: the co-decision. It gave the deputies the same political weight as the

Council, due to the necessity of agreement between both institutions to approve a

project. The Amsterdam Treaty, of 1999, expanded the areas of co-decision and

simplified the procedure, besides confirming the investiture of the Commission by the

Parliament. However, the increase of formal legitimacy did not avoid a decline of

public opinion legitimacy (Tel, 1995 : 18).

Like the previous ones, the following treaties were not able not give

efficient responses to the democratic deficit question. The Nice Treaty, signed in

2001, increased the parliamentary features of EUs political system mainly through

the limitation of the number of commissars, the extension of the majoritarian vote

field in the Council and the improvement of EPs powers (enlargement of the co-

decision procedure and possibilities to act in the Court of Justice). The project of the

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European Constitution (2004) offered an important position to the dialogue with civil

society, but it would not strongly affect the ancient institutional logic (Costa, 2004 :

279). Some of its previsions would also make the EU system more similar to the

nation-state: the parliamentary election of the president of the Commission, the two-

year presidency of the Council and the creation of the Foreign Affairs representative.

After the rejection of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the Lisbon

Treaty (2007) should simplify and assure efficacy to an institutional arrangement

capable to deal with the challenges of the enlarged Europe. But this federal belief,

according to which treaties should warrant Europe more democracy, is apparently

more risky than adopting a functional approach and advance integration through

punctual discussions (Costa and Magnette, 2007a).

Theoretically, the European Union meets Dahls criteria for a large-

scale democracy: elected officials; free, fair and frequent elections; freedom of

expression; access to alternative sources of information; associational autonomy and

inclusive citizenship (1998 : 85-86). The dysfunctions rely on the differences of this

special large-scale democracy from the traditional nation-state features (Magnette,

2000 : 200). First, the community method (Quermonne, 2001 : 50), searching for a

balance between the intergovernmental and supranational branches, does not point

one central and hierarchical authority. Instead, the logic of cooperation among

institutions prevails. Second, parties and other traditional political actors do not fit

well in the highly consensual and non-ideological European style. Sectorial actors

strategies (lobby, interest groups, specialized organizations) seem more appropriate

to deal with the fragmentation of European policies. Third, the existence of a

European public space, understood as a symbolic or material place of political

communication (Sintomer, 2003 : 179), is vigorously questioned. In general, citizens

attitudes towards UE vary between indifference and suspicion and they cannot be

considered to form an European society (Smith, 2004 : 46). Political cleavages and

the sovereignty principle, fundamental characteristics of occidental democracies, can

barely be reproduced in the European Union. This situation helps to explain the

perceived elitism in the European construction (Costa and Magnette, 2007b) and

may confirm Dahls prevision that democracy, as states conceive it, is unlikely to

move up to the international level (1998 : 117).

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The European Parliament is directly affected by the chronic lack of

legitimacy of the supranational level. If EU contradicts national logics of decision-

making and interest representation, an elected assembly inspired in the national

chambers cannot warrant a general democratic reliance on the Union (Costa, 2001 :

63). In spite of it, one of the reasons to the significant increase of powers achieved by

the EP since its creation was governments expectative to minimize the democratic

deficit (Costa and Magnette, 2003; Rittberger, 2005). Parliaments creation and

empowerment are connected to democratic needs, but the communitarian logic limits

its role in promoting democracy. This is why the European political system can

neither be considered exactly parliamentary nor presidential: the process of

parliamentarization at the regional scale corresponded to the specificities and

originality of the EU, not to the nation-state model (Costa, 2004; Magnette, 1999).

If the European Parliament itself is not able to surpass the

supranational democratic deficit, why could it be a source of democratic inspiration to

the Mercosur Parliament? A broad analytical register allows some answers which

might have motivated the involved actors.

1. The European Union has been, since its origins, the most democratic process of

regional integration with ambitions which surpassed the establishment of a free tradearea. Its difficulties to improve democracy cannot be denied, but tensions among

descriptive and prescriptive practices are inherent to a democratic system.

Democracy results from, and is shaped by, the interactions between its ideals and

its reality, the pull of an oughtand the resistance of an is (Sartori, 1987 : 8). As

Mercosur itself was partially inspired in the European model, it is intelligible that EUs

institutions and procedures are considered a possible source for the democratization

process in the South American bloc.

2. Even if Latin American experiences of democracy are able to inspire a democratic

construction beyond the nation-state, some of its shapes are considered a sort of

delegative democracy (ODonnell, 1994), also called low-intensity, poor or

democracy or democracy by default. Political institutions used to be too weak to

ensure the representation of diverse interests, constitutional supremacy, the rule of

law, constraint of executive authority, accountability among powers or programmatic

rather than personalistic projects situation that still persists in some countries. The

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reproduction of the European institutional arrangement may constitute an essay to

build up a more efficient and deeper democracy in Mercosur.

3. The European democratic deficit does not impede the Parliament to effectively

influence communitarian decisions. In Mercosur, presidents, ministers and diplomatshave always negotiated and defined most of the policies without consulting the

parliamentary branch. The Mercosur Parliament may contribute to democracy in the

regional level just by promoting an effective parliamentary representation in the

decision-making process.

4. In the same direction, EPs power to control the Commission may inspire the idea

of accountability in Mercosur. As an intergovernmental organization, Mercosur is

generally understood as an element of States foreign policy, which should becontrolled with national mechanisms. But many decisions taken by the Common

Market Group (CMG), the executive branch, do not need to be ratified by national

chambers for being part of the internal functioning of Mercosur. On the other side, the

internalization of norms, when necessary, can take several years, due to the gap

between what governments decide in the regional level and the priorities of national

parliaments. The development of strategies to control CMG by the Mercosur

Parliament could improve transparency in the bloc as well as the amount of validlegislation.

5. Transparency could also be increased if the Mercosur Parliament acts, as its

European homologous, like a catalyst of regional demands from social organizations

and interest groups. Industry associations and productive sectors are almost the only

groups to be able to make their positions known by CMG. The Parliament, despite of

its reduced powers, is already seen by several actors as a unique ally in promoting

and draining their demands through the establishment of work programs favorable totheir claims.

6. After the agenda-setting, the effectiveness of such a catalysis role depends on

parliamentary deliberation. Although the deliberation on the European Parliament is

distinguished by a sort of apoliticization resultant from the pursuit of efficiency

(Costa, 1996) and particular supranational and federal constraints (Costa, 2001 :

85-93), it reflects the different logics of pluralism which support the communitarian

political system (Costa, 2001 : 107). Deliberation procedures in the Mercosur

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Parliament including interest representation from various actors and institutions

(associations of all kinds, Mercosur institutions, governments, national and local

parliaments, municipalities) may contribute to democratic pluralism in the regional

level.

The proclaimed consensus about the need of democracy in Mercosur

has several origins from different natures. Internally, it cannot be understood without

considering the colonial period, the dictatorships which persisted until the end of the

20th century in Latin America and parliamentarians interest in maximizing their

political power. Externally, the concern for regulating globalization and the

supranationality debate also imply consequences for democracy. But the argument

presented in this paper refers to another external reason: the influence of theEuropean Union. The next section shows how the European integration determined

some demarches in Mercosur. Many of its institutions and policies were built on and

with financial and technical support of the EU. Therefore, the idea of integration is not

enough to explain the creation of the Parliament. Democratic ideals derived from the

communitarian example are essential to understand why an assembly was born

among other institutional options.

3. Regionalism after Europe : a parliament rises in Mercosur

Since the 1960s, its constructors and theoreticians started to

consider European integration as a model with a potential for being exported to other

continents. Paradoxically, the critique of the ambiguities and the debilities of the

European example of integration has always been followed by a strong optimism

about its potential virtues to other regions of the world (Costa and Foret, 2005 :

507-508). Therefore, EC institutions progressively developed an exportation policy of

their conceptions and mechanisms, due to technical and financial support from the

states desiring to embark on the regional venture. In the case of Mercosur (as well as

in the Andean Community), these actions led to the rise of a representative assembly

which replaced the intergovernamental parliamentary committee. The first part of this

section explains the context in which Mercosur was born and its basic structure. It

also points out some strategies of the Community to spread its integration ideal. The

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second part analyses some reasons for the importation of both democracy and

integration ideas by the Mercosur Parliament.

3.1. Traces of the Joint Parliamentary Committee

Fostering regional cooperation was one of the first initiatives of the

European Community in the international field (Smith, 2008 : 76), which reflects the

absence of a clear distinction between foreign policy and external economic policy at

the time (Yakemtchouk, 2005 : 56). These activities were carried out by the

Commission within the external relations framework provided by the Rome Treaty

(1957), mainly through the Common Commercial Policy and the power to conclude

association agreements with third countries and groups of states. The Council

discussed broader issues in an informal and intergovernmental manner (Dumond

and Setton, 1999 : 5). The Ministers of Foreign Affairs started in 1959 to conduct

regular meetings, which led to a process referred to as European Political

Cooperation (EPC). It was institutionalized only in 1970 and formalized with the

European Single Act. At the outset, the Community drew its attention to African ex-

colonies, so that Latin America was not chosen as a priority (Mayall, 2005; Grilli,

1993 : 227). The first concrete attempt towards regionalism in Latin America in the

20th century, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), emerged thus

based on developmental assumptions derived from the North American influence on

the region (Santander, 2007 : 123-124) and as a reaction to the European external

tariff and agricultural protectionism (Mattli, 1999 : 140).

LAFTA was born in 1960 with the Montevideo Treaty. The

negotiations were sponsored by the Economic Commission for Latin America

(ECLA), an agency of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. In

1967, LAFTA was composed by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,

Colombia, Equador, Venezuela and Bolivia. Its formal objective was not only to

achieve a free trade area but also to construct a long-term development model

attentive to social issues. Nonetheless, the absence of delegate powers and the

reduced institutional framework did not encourage more than an economic-oriented

organization. The formation of a continental free trade area was biased by difficulties

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regarding the asymmetric levels of industrialization among states and changes in

national political regimes (nationalist and authoritarian forces governed many Latin

America countries during the 1960s and 1970s). Consequently, LAFTA was

replaced by the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA), created in 1980 by the

second Montevideo Treaty signed by the same states, plus Chile and Cuba. The

general objective of this new association is also to promote trade liberalization in the

region, but through less ambitious and more flexible means. Its relatively complex

institutional design and stable Secretariat contributed to increase commercial

negotiations among its members, which guided to the signature of bilateral and

multilateral agreements. The Asuncin Treaty (1991), constitutive of Mercosur, is one

of them (Bonilla, 1991 : 84-86).

By the time of the creation of LAIA, the European Community started

to establish deeper relations with Central and Andean Americas. The Central

America Common Market (CACM) had been founded in 1960 and was economically

more successful than LAFTA in its first decade. In 1984, after the military crisis

evolving Nicaragua and El Salvador, EC took part on the negotiations to the

pacification and democratization of the region and proposed a cooperation

agreement, signed in 1985. In 1983, a trade and cooperation agreement was

reached with the Andean Community, created in 1969 and today composed by

Bolvia, Colombia, Equador and Peru. During the 1970s, bilateral trade agreements

were concluded with Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil and Mexico. But it was after the

adhesion of Portugal and Spain (1986) and the foundation of Mercosur (1991) that

ties linking the Community and the South Cone were strengthened. The Maastricht

Treaty was signed in this period, implementing the Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of EU, which tried to improve former coordination

procedures. The CFSP is more complex than the EPC and has gradually developed

communitarian characteristics yet not necessarily equal to the ones of the first pillar

(Nuttall, 2000; Neuilly, 2005), but Unions external relations continued to be handled

on an intergovernmental basis. Many scholars would still agree that the CFSP has a

relatively small importance for the foreign policies of EUs member states and is not a

truly comprehensive external policy (Peterson and Sjursen, 1998 : 169).

In terms of cooperation for regionalism, the CFSP intervenes chiefly

through political dialogue. Since 1999, five summits of European and Latin American

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heads of state were organized by the Council. However, the unified and active role

played by EU over the years in this field is actually due to the economic instruments

of the first pillar, or the civil actions of the Union (Tel, 2005 : 176). Trade,

cooperation and association agreements are the leading means driven by the

Commission to stimulate integration worldwide. Actually, CFSP has been following

economic external policies, which are highly unified and have been progressively

politicized (Smith, 1998). This assumption corresponds to the evidence that

economical integration goes faster than the political one in the EU. Regarding the

European Parliament, its competences in external relations are not large but have

been increasing4. In general, deputies support biregional initiatives of the

Commission and even complement them by playing a special role in

interparliamentary relations.

Mercosur was founded in the context of LAIA negotiations by

Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Chile, Bolivia, Equador, Peru and

Colombia are associated countries. Venezuelas Adhesion Protocol was approved in

2005 and waits for parliamentary ratification in Brazil and Paraguay. In addition to the

Asuncin Treaty, the Ouro Preto Protocol (1994) and the Olivos Protocol (2002)

define the objectives and the institutional framework of the bloc. The creation of a

common market, the promotion of social and economic development and the

maintenance of democracy within the member states are among Mercosur goals.

The leading institutions are the following:

4 The Parliament can influence trade and enlargement agreements through the assent procedure,which does not allow amendments. The co-decision is used for ordinary legislation coveringdevelopment aid. Besides, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the current presidency answers oral

questions in the assembly once a session. The EP can adopt resolutions on external policy, which arerarely discussed by the Council. There is also the need to approve the annual budget, which allowsthe EP a general control on Unions external actions, as well as on other subjects.

15

Common Market GroupCMC

ParliamentPermanent Revision Court

PRCCommon Market Group

CMG

Consultative Economic and Social ForumCESF

Secretariat

Mercosur Commerce CommitteeMCC


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The CMC is responsible for the main political decisions and it is

constituted by the ministers of foreign affairs and economy of the member states.

CMG and MCC are the executive branches, formed by diplomats and officials from

ministries and central banks. The latter assists the former in policy-making regarding

commercial issues. CMGs structure includes a large number of thematic committees

and workgroups. The CESF represents the economic and social sectors of Mercosur.

It is formed by an equal number of representatives of each member state, usually

from labor unions, enterprise syndicates and productive sectors associations. It can

present recommendations to CMG. The Permanent Revision Court seats in

Asuncin. It is integrated by five arbitrators who can be requested any time to review

Ad Hoc Courts judgments or directly decide on conflicts among member states. The

Mercosur Secretariat, placed in Montevideo, is an organ of the CMGs structure that

accomplishes the main administrative and technical responsibilities.

The creation of Mercosur was generally inspired in the European

experience (Camargo, 1999; Medeiros, 2000) and influenced by EUs exportation

policies. The EU has promoted its own example through a double passive and active

behavior towards Mercosur for most of the 1990s (Lenz, 2008). In the first role, EU

fosters its ideal of integration simply by existing as a model. In the second, EU acts in

order to diffuse the model. In the case of Mercosur, the actor-strategy includes trade,

economic relations, political dialogue and cooperation (Lenz, 2006 : 7-9). Through

technical assistance, facilitation measures, transfer of know-how and direct financial

aid to institutions, EU has tried to shape Mercosur according to its own programs and

values. In this area, the Union seems to be capable of surpassing the usual gap

between the first and second pillars and develop a relatively successful soft

diplomacy (Petiteville, 2005 : 137).

Nevertheless, important points of dissonance remain between both

integration attempts. The absence of sectorial supranationality in Mercosur is one of

them. Governments did not transfer sovereignty to the regional level; all decisions

are taken by consensus. Regional law does not prime over national rules nor can be

applied to individuals or states without internalization in the national juridical systems.

Consequently, its binding character is precarious (Ventura, 1996 : 59). In economic

terms, it is currently seen as an imperfect customs union because of the various

products excluded from the common external tariff. Even so the institutional structure

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is gradually becoming more alike to the European Union, as shown by the rise of

Parlasur. This event corresponds to the progressive or developmental discourse

about Mercosur, in contrast to the realistic or liberal perspective according to which

higher functional integration should supersede the establishment of participative or

representative institutions (Malamud, 2006 : 6).

The Parliament replaces from 2007 on the Joint Parliamentary

Committee (JPC), which represented national parliaments and had consultative

functions. Although LAFTA and LAIA did not display representative institutions, the

Treaty for Cooperation, Development and Integration signed by Brazil and Argentina

in 1988 comprised a parliamentary committee to follow negotiations. The Asuncin

Treaty barely failed in including the JPC: it is not mentioned among the institutionalstructure, but at the very end, in the general provisions. The purpose of this last-

moment organ was to accelerate the ratification of the Treaty in national chambers

and to assure the procedure in the future, considering that more parliamentary

consents would be necessary until the implementation of the common market. JPC

approved its internal rules in 1991: it would be formed by 16 deputies from each

national congress and would meet twice a year. One of its statutory attributions was

to develop the required actions to the installation of the Mercosur Parliament.

Since its beginning, JPC searched for closer relations with the

European Parliament, which actively corresponded to the contacts. Until 1997, three

meetings between both institutions have been organized (table 1), resulting in

declarations on cooperation and on the creation of a parliamentary assembly in

Mercosur. Four Interparliamentary Conferences EU LA have also been carried out

in the period, whose agenda embraced the integration initiatives rising in Latin

America and, consequently, sub-regional interparliamentary dialogue (table 2). In

addition, in December 1995 Mercosur and EU signed the Interregional Framework

Cooperation Agreement, which included technical assistance and interinstitutional

cooperation to foster integration in the new bloc and formalized the basis for the

political dialogue between the parties. However, the behavior of Mercosur deputies

was not, in general, similar to their European colleagues: instead of questioning

CMCs positions or trying to achieve more influence in the decision-making process,

the parliamentarians adjusted themselves to the feeble functions of the JPC

(Vigevani et al, 2000 : 271).

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The Permanent Administrative Parliamentary Secretariat (PAPS),

established in 1997, was responsible for introducing a new breath in the Committees

activities. It was created after a demand of the European Commission, which asked

in 1996 for an organ of contact to negotiate the cooperation project. In spite of the

reduced number of the staff, the Secretariat centralized JPCs structure in

Montevideo and offered administrative support for the meetings. In 1999, it helped to

establish the first agenda for the institutionalization of a Parliament in Mercosur5. The

agreement with EU was implemented in 2000 and offered JPC a budget of 960

thousand euros, which substantially changed the dynamics of work in the

Secretariat6.

Based on PAPSs plan of 1999, JPC started to discuss moreconcretely the idea of creating a Parliament. The Secretariat organized seminars7

and deputies agreed on new actions regarding the subject8. Several activities were

financed or supported by the European Commission, and exchanges with members

of the European Parliament continued (tables 1 and 2)9. In 2004, a permanent group

to discuss the relations between the blocs was created. Meanwhile, explicit

references to the European experience were common among the Brazilian

delegation to JPC and diplomatic body10. In 2003, Argentinean and Brazilian sections

5 JPC Provision 14/99. Most of Mercosur documents referring to the creation of the Parliament may befound in Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Comisin Parlamentaria Conjunta. Hacia el Parlamento delMercosur. 2. ed. Montevideo: KAS Uruguay, 2006.6 Oscar Casal, former secretary of JPC, interview on July 13th 2004, Montevideo.7 JPC Provisions 11 e 12/00.8 For instance, CPC Provisions 35/00 and 05/02 (calendars for the institutionalization of theParliament), Recommendation 25/02 (creation of an ad hoc committee to work on the project) andProvision 08/03 (institutional agreement between CPC and CMC as a first step to the Parliament).9 Besides the occasions indicated in the tables, delegates from both institutions have met in theConference of Speakers of EU Parliaments, Rome, September 22-24 th 2000; Visit of members of theEuropean Parliament to Brazil, June 20th 2001; Workshop La Consulta Parlamentaria, de su concepto

a su prctica, Buenos Aires, September 18th

2003 (declaration reaffirming the decision to create theParliament); I Encuentro de Presidentes de las Cmaras de los Poderes Legislativos de los EstadosPartes del Mercosur, Montevideo, September 22nd 2003 (report from the work group on the creation ofthe Parliament); Workshop Parlamento do Mercosul e Integrao Fronteiria, Foz do Iguau,November 3-4th 2003; Visit of members of the European Parliament to Uruguay and Paraguay,November 21-26th 2005; Visit of members of the European Parliament to Argentina, April 17-22th 2006;Visit of members of the European Parliament to Uruguay and Paraguay and participation in the firstplenary meeting of Parlasur, May 1-8th 2007; Visit of members of the European Parliament toArgentina, March 30th April 4th 2008.10 For instance, Brazilian proposal to an agenda for the institutionalization of the Mercosur Parliament,Porto Alegre, November 9th 2000; Ney Lopes (deputy - Partido da Frente Liberal), Samuel PinheiroGuimares and Jos Botafogo Gonalves, open meeting about FTAA and Mercosur, Braslia,September 9th 2001; Confucio Moura (deputy - Partido do Movimento Democrtico Brasileiro),

ordinary meeting of the Brazilian section of JPC, Braslia, September 18 th 2001; Dr. Rosinha (deputy -Partido dos Trabalhadores), Workshop Parlamento do Mercosul e Integrao Fronteiria, Foz doIguau, November 3-4th 2003. The reference to the European Union when Mercosur is mentioned is

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presented the first written proposals concerning the Parliament, and in 2004 JPC

arrived at a first version of the project of Constitutive Protocol, already mentioned in

the Mercosur Work Program 2004-200611. Before that, in 2002, the Common Market

Council decided to create the Technical Assistance Sector (TAS) within the Mercosur

Secretariat, which would by formed by one specialist from each member state

chosen by public concourse. The Sector should offer juridical and economical

support to Mercosur institutions with the aim to constitute a space of common

reflection about the development and consolidation of the bloc12. Among the four

candidates selected, three had studied regional integration in European universities.

They have actively participated in the processes of discussion and negotiation

concerning the Parliament13.

Committees members expected the approval of the draft Protocol in

the XXVII CMC Meeting in Ouro Preto in December 2004, which would celebrate the

10th anniversary of the Ouro Preto Protocol. But the presidents decided JPC should

pursue the debates on the subject14. A team of specialists and civil servants of

Mercosur and national parliaments was thus formed to technically improve the

proposal in order to support further political discussions15. The Constitutive Protocol

of the Mercosur Parliament was finally approved by CMC in December 200516 and

during 2006 it was gradually ratified in each member state.

also usual in academic sectors and media of all member states.11 JPC Provision 01/04 and CMC Decision 26/03.12 CMC Decision 30/02.13 Notably, TAS has organized seminars with Latin American and European specialists andrepresentatives from national chambers and governments. For instance, Desafos institucionales parael Mercosur: las relaciones entre Estados, instituciones e organizaciones de la sociedad, Montevideo,September 2004 (with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung) and La gobernanza democrtica en el Mercosur,Montevideo, November 2004 (with Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and Universidad Catlica del Uruguay).14

CMC Decision 49/04.15 JPC Provision 03/05.16 CMC Decision 23/05.

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Table I. Interparliamentary Meetings JPC/Mercosur Parliament Delegation for Relationswith South America/Mercosur of the European Parliament

Where WhenEP Presidency invitation Brussels March 1994I Meeting Brussels June 1996Bureau Meeting Florianpolis October 1996II Meeting Brussels November 1998III Meeting Buenos Aires June 2000IV Meeting Strasbourg November 2001Bureau Meeting Madrid May 2002V Meeting Brussels March 2003VI Meeting Strasbourg and Luxembourg February 2004VII Meeting Buenos Aires November 2004

VIII Meeting Brussels April 2005IX Meeting Braslia May 2005X Meeting Montevideo November 2005Meeting Brussels May 2008Meeting to be confirmed Rio de Janeiro September 2008

Table II. Participation of JPC/Mercosur Parliament in Interparliamentary Conferences

European Union Latin AmericaWhere When

X Interparliamentary Conference Seville April 1991

XI Interparliamentary Conference So Paulo May 1993XII Interparliamentary Conference Brussels June 1995XIII Interparliamentary Conference Caracas May 1997XIV Interparliamentary Conference Brussels March 1999XV Interparliamentary Conference Santiago April 2001XVI Interparliamentary Conference Brussels May 2003Meeting of Regional Integration Parliaments Puebla March 2004XVII Interparliamentary Conference Lima June 2005Meeting of Regional Integration Parliaments Trujillo October 2005Meeting of Regional Integration Parliaments Bregenz April 2006I Plenary Session of EUROLAT Brussels December 2007II Plenary Session of EUROLAT Lima April 2008

3.2. The Mercosur Parliament gets up on the wrong side of the bed

These are the words used by the Uruguayan newspaper El

Observador and the website of the Mercosur Parliament itself to refer to the first

plenary session of the new assembly17. The headline is due to the position of political

sectors in Uruguay which petitioned the Supreme Court for the unconstitutionality of17 Available inwww.observa.com.uyand www.parlamentodelmercosur.org, May 7th 2007.

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Parlasur. They argued direct elections for this organ are against the Uruguayan

Constitution, underlining that a political association with bigger countries do not

correspond to the interests of Uruguay. But more than a legal conflict, the situation

issued from a political dissonance between the left-winged majority and the

opposition parties. The ex-president Luis Lacalle (Partido Nacional) affirmed the

conformation of this organ is related to circumstantial political motivations, in an

explicit reference to ideological affinities existent among Mercosur governments18. As

the empirical results show, this point of view derives from a clear-sighted appraisal of

political struggle in the region.

In the end of the 1990s, the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of

the Americas were progressing and were frequently mentioned in national debatesand institutions related to Mercosur. The Brazilian governments sympathy to the idea

was well-known, as well as the incompatibility of FTAA with a stronger Mercosur or

with the agreement Mercosur-EU19. On the other side, the popular mobilization was

substantial: social movements and left-wing parties organized periodic

demonstrations and even an informal national plebiscite which rejected the

agreement with the United States. But to some politicians, the only way to revert the

tendency was the election of a different government. It happened in 2002 with Luiz

Incio Lula da Silva (Partido dos Trabalhadores). At the same time, historical

opposition parties arrived at the government in Argentina and Uruguay, respectively

with Nstor Kirchner (Partido Justicialista) in 2003 and Tabar Vzquez (Frente

Amplia) in 2004. These governments are convergent in the promotion of social

questions, like the fight against hungriness, poverty and inequality. They do not think

only about economic growth, but also in distributing resources20.

Among the team in charge of the foreign policy of his government,

Lula nominated diplomats and politicians who have supported the non-participation of

Brazil in FTAA and who have kept close contacts with other left-wing South American

parties. In an open meeting organized in the Chamber of Deputies in 2001, the

current secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs compared the FTAA and

UE models and concluded Mercosur would be the best option if it envisages

18 El Parlamento naci con el pi izquierdo, El Observador, Montevideo, May 7th 2007.19 Samuel Pinheiro Guimares and Jos Botafogo Gonalves (diplomats) and Confucio Moura (deputy

- Partido do Movimento Democrtico Brasileiro), open meeting about FTAA and Mercosur, Braslia,September 9th 2001; Dr. Rosinha (Partido dos Trabalhadores), Cartilha Mercosul um ABC, 2007.20 Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, Tengo mi conciencia tranquila, El Pas, Montevideo, October 1st 2006.

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economic union, free movement of workers, structural funds, supranational

institutions and other European features. Mercosur was also defined as a priority to

the other governments21. In 2005, during the forth Summit of the Americas, Mercosur

countries decided not to continue with the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the

Americas, refusing to negotiate a deal where the United States do not limit barriers

and subsidies to their agricultural industry. The adhesion of Venezuela to Mercosur

after the reelection of Hugo Chvez (Movimiento V Repblica/Partido Socialista

Unido da Venezuela) in 2006 and the election of Fernando Lugo (Alianza Patritica

para el Cambio) in Paraguay in 2008 may enlarge the distance of the bloc from the

FTAA. In this context, the approximation with the European Union appears as an

alternative to the North American influence through the reinforcement of integration

(Santander, 2008 : 138-139; Tel, 2005 : 185). Mercosur governments seem to

concur to the world viewaccording to which following European Unions steps and

reaching a bi-regional agreement have a strategic importance to the project of

strengthening Mercosur22.

The year of 2003 was decisive in the conformation of Parlasur. It was

when deputies rejected the proposal of a merely decorative Parliament23 and

presidents said a more ambitious idea was possible24. But the consolidation of the

project was postponed to 2005, when, besides Lula and Kirchner, Tabar was in the

presidency. Nonetheless, this broad ideological perspective shared by governments

is framed by their geopolitical and economic interests. If a deep regional integration

process was always desired by Paraguay and Uruguay, the smaller and less

industrialized countries of Mercosur, Argentina and Brazil have been more reluctant.

Their weight in the international arena has been increasing, as well as the

21

Nstor Kirchner, Kirchner assume e faz duro discurso, poca, Rio de Janeiro, May 26th

2003;Gobierno electo y partidos acuerdan la poltica exterior, El Pas, Montevideo, February 4th 2005;Canciller afirma que Uruguay priorizar el Mercosur y la Comunidad Sudamericana, La Repblica,March 1st 2005; Dr. Rosinha (deputy - Partido dos Trabalhadores), ordinary meeting of the Braziliansection of JPC, Braslia, April 28th 2005; Tabar Vazquez, Presidente uruguayo invita a pasesrabes a aumentar su comercio con la regin, La Repblica, Montevideo, May 11th 2005; TabarVazquez, Presidente de Uruguay pide mayor voz para su pas y Paraguay en el Mercosur, El Pas,Montevideo, May 13th 2005; Marco Aurlio Garcia (special assistant of the Brazilian presidency forforeign affairs), Asesor del presidente brasileo reconoce reclamos del Uruguay por asimetras, LaRepblica, Montevideo, March 2nd 2007.22 Danilo Astori (Uruguayan minister of economy), Uruguay propuso que el Mercosur instrumentearmonizacin tributaria, El Pas, Montevideo, June 19th 2005.23 Roberto Conde (Uruguayan senator Frente Amplia), Nace el Parlamento del Mercosur: Estamos

ante a un cambio de poca, La Repblica, Montevideo, May 6th 2007.24 Alfredo Atanasof (Argentinean deputy Partido Justicialista), verbatim report of the III PlenarySession of Parlasur, Montevideo, June 25th 2007.

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possibilities to see their demands listened in bilateral or multilateral commercial

negotiations. They want Mercosur insofar as they can at times put it aside to protect

their economy or to maximize their individual international pretensions. At the time of

Parlasur creation, Brazil was sending troops to Haiti to coordinate the humanitarian

mission of United Nations and fostering the debate about a permanent seat in the

Security Council, which raised assumptions about its leadership intentions in South

America. Argentina had publicly disapproved the Uruguayan governments decision

to install cellulose industries close to the Uruguay River, and border Argentinean

citizens started to block bridges linking both countries in order to obstruct the way of

people and goods into Uruguay. Among other bilateral arrangements, Brazil and

Argentina signed, out of the Mercosur ambit, the Mechanism for Competitive

Adaptation, which allows the taxation of certain commodities if national productive

sectors are in risk. This behavior clearly disliked Paraguay and Uruguay, which

entailed negotiations for bilateral free trade agreements with the United States

showing the same disregard for Mercosur treaties as the bigger partners. In this

conflictive scenario, the plan concerning the Parliament rose as a focal point, an

option that reached the assent of all parts despite their different motivations. Indeed,

Brazil and Argentina found in the idea a way to demonstrate they were still interested

in Mercosur without deepening the economic integration25; Uruguay and Paraguay

expect the assembly to be able to compel their neighbors to invest more in the

regional project (Caetano et al, 2006).

This last prospect also motivated some deputies, civil servants and

specialists who were responsible for detailing the Parliament proposal. The general

knowledge about the European Parliaments role in pushing forward the European

integration, in controlling the executive organs and in calling the attention of citizens

supported a belief about a cause-effect relationship between the Mercosur

Parliament and the reinforcement of integration and democracy in the bloc26. This

causal belief stimulated the use of the EP model as a road map which offered

strategies to guide the action. Regional integration may be driven by the25 Rgis Arslanian (Brazilian embassador to ALADI and Mercosur), Banco del Sur podra ser el primerpaso para una moneda comn en el Mercosur, La Repblica, Montevideo, May 28th 2007; SamuelPinheiro Guimares (secretary-general of the Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs), Opinin Cmose define el Mercosur actual?, El Pas, Montevideo, December 10th 2007; Srgio Abreu (ex-ministerof foreign affairs of Uruguay), Opinin Cmo se define el Mercosur actual?, El Pas, Montevideo,

December 10th 2007.26 Oscar Casal (former secretary of JPC), Parlamento del Mercosur: sin levantar vuelo, MercosurABC, Buenos Aires, May 9th 2008.

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convergence of interests (Malamud and Schmitter, 2007 : 9), but in this case ideas

pointed out where to drive.

The European world view is manifest in another policy choice from

the same period: the creation of the Mercosur Convergence Fund (FOCEM)27

. TheFund should finance programs to promote competitiveness and social cohesion of

the smaller and less developed economies, besides supporting the institutions and

the reinforcement of integration. It meets ancient demands from Paraguay and

Uruguay concerning the consideration of asymmetries within the bloc. Along with the

Parliament, FOCEM also responds to some critics from the European Commission in

regards to the limits of the economic integration. That is, instead of improving free

trade or legislation efficacy

28

, Mercosur opts for indirect measures which are able toindicate a relative commitment to the project in order to continue the negotiation of

cooperation and commercial agreements.

The EU not only instigates more integration in Mercosur but also

finances it. According to the Commission, the Union is by far the largest supplier of

assistance to the region29. According to Romano Prodi, Mercosur is a political and

economic priority to the Commission not only because of strategic reasons, but also

for cultural and historical motivations. The European Union will always support theregional integration in Mercosur as an important source of prosperity to our people

and as a contribution to peace, security and sustainable development in Latin

America30. In the Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006, the EC presented an

indicative contribution of 48 millions to support financial, technical and economic

cooperation within Mercosur, including broad institutionalization and specific aid to

the Parliamentary Committee. The report clarifies that although Mercosur is inspired

by the EU, the progress and the modalities of the institutional architecture are a

sovereign right of the states participating in Mercosur. For this very reason, our co-

operation in this area has to be particularly sensitive, respectful and always at

27 CMC Decisions 45/04, 18/05 and 17/06.28 These were areas criticized by Pascal Lamy, former European Commissioner for Trade, and KarlFalkenberg, former Director for Free Trade Agreements, Trade Directorate-General of the EuropeanCommission, who said Mercosur risked to become an incomplete pregnancy or more a vision than areality. Funcionario europeo remarca demoras en armado legal del Mercosur, La Nacin, BuenosAires, March 15th 2004; Editorial Brasil cedeu, mas reforou o Mercosul, Valor Econmico, SoPaulo, December 18th 2003.29

Available inwww.ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mercosur/.30 European Commission. Unin Europea Mercosur: una asociacin para el futuro. Montevideo, May2002.

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request of Mercosur31. This technical and financial aid was thus formally requested

by JPC as a continuum of the former accord32. In 2005 both institutions celebrated a

convention to support the installation of the Mercosur Parliament, which dedicated

900.000 to the activities of the new assembly. According to JPC, this project would

allow Mercosur and EU to work together and to benefit from the mutual experience

in terms of parliamentary integration33. In 2007 EC defined Mercosur

institutionalization as the first priority to the Regional Indicative Programme

2007-2013, which assured this area 10% of the 50 millions dedicated to cooperation

with Mercosur. This cooperation is closely related to institutional mimesis, as JPC

was under permanent pressure of its main resource supplier.

In a broader sense, Mercosur has been influenced by the EuropeanUnion since its creation, as both parts searched for contacts and agreements from

the beginning of the 1990s on. In addition, EU may shadow other examples because

it is certainly the most significant and far-reaching attempt at regionalism (Malamud

and Schmitter, 2007 : 4). The European model has always been more or less present

in the imaginary of elites who conduct Mercosur. Ideas related to this single

experience were thus available at the moment of conceiving a parliament (Weir, 1989

: 54).

UEs policies to foster regional cooperation are recently connected

with an essay to export values worldwide through the emergence of a soft

diplomacy combining economic resources with political ambitions (Petiteville, 2005 :

128). In fact, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms are

expressly mentioned by the Maastricht Treaty among the goals of the Common

Foreign and Security Policy. The promotion of respect for human rights was included

in EUs foreign policy agenda in the 1970s, while democracy and good governance

became a clear objective after the 1990s. Some reasons for such a policy are the

belief that these principles are desirable ends in themselves and they can further

social and economic development (Smith, 2008 : 151-152). These motivations are

explicit in the speech of Srgio Sousa Pinto, the chairman of the Delegation for

relations with Mercosur of the EP, during the first plenary session of Parlasur. He

31 European Commission, External Relations Directorate-General, Mercosur Unit. Mercosur European Community Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Brussels, 2005. p. 26.32

JPC Provision 10/03.33 JPC Recommendation 01/06 (Informe de actividades del primer semestre de 2006 de la Agenda deInstalacin del Parlamento del Mercosur).

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stated that common values like the perspective of an international order based on

democratic regulation, international law and fundamental rights unite Europeans and

Latin Americans. The deputy also affirmed EU has contributed with regionalism

worldwide for believing in its advantages and needs Mercosur to construct a more

balanced international order34.

Democracy in particular has constituted more a reactive than a

proactive policy in the European Union (Smith, 2008 : 168), differently from the

promotion of regional integration. The transmission of the democratic values abroad

remains an ad hoc policy with a low priority relative to more traditional foreign policy

goals, although adherence to these principles serves as one of the prerequisites of

the EU membership (Olsen, 2002 : 313). More than that, the construction ofEuropean integration itself is based on democracy: the European Convention for the

Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was adopted in 1950 by all

members of the Council of Europe. The influence of this idea in the Southern Cone is

thus due to the passive role of the European model combined with an active behavior

of European deputies in advancing the parliamentary example. Indeed, in 1998

Mercosur parties signed the Ushuaia Protocol, which recognizes democracy as a

condition to take part in the bloc and establishes measures to be taken in case of

rupture of democratic institutionality in any member state or associated member.

Although the commitment with democracy had already been declared by presidents

during Las Leas summit of 1992, the risk of coup dtat in Paraguay in 1996 led

CMC to state more emphatically this principle and the consequences of its violation.

The Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement signed with the European

Union in 1995 also comprises a democratic clause. The Constitutive Protocol of the

Mercosur Parliament refers to the Ushuaia Protocol and, in consequence, connects

the new institution with democratic standards introduced in integration processes by

Europe.

The EU has been lately conceived as a civilian power which would

influence other regions rather by the means of its socio-economic model and its

peace and human rights principles than through its military capacity (Tel, 2007). On

one hand, the European way may effectively represent an alternative for regulating

globalization in order to minimize its negative effects. On the other, EUs policies for

34 Verbatim report of the I Plenary Session of Parlasur, Montevideo, May 7th 2007.

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transferring its model seeks to create enlarged markets on terms that are favorable to

its own industry (Lenz, 2008 : 8). That is, regionalism exportation may reflect the

attachment of EU to its values and the desire to promote a multipolar international

order to further development worldwide, but it indicates as well the intention to

stimulate trade between Europe and the new integrated regions. That is why the EU

needs to have important economic interests at stake in order to get involved in the

integrative efforts of other countries (Lenz, 2008 : 7).

The problem is the European model is hardly exportable. As the

consociational approach reveals, the European integration is characterized by

multiple layers of conflicting interests and a great variety of actors which implies its

reproduction involves more than institutional engineering and cooperation amongelites (Costa and Foret, 2005 : 502-503). In fact, it would require similar historical and

cultural conditions which based the project of a unified Europe. Additionally, the

European supranational political system is relatively desirable. Its limitations rely on

the gap between the failing model of the nation state - which it cannot duplicate -

and a logic of international organization which lacks any real popular legitimacy

(Costa and Foret, 2005 : 513). As a consequence, the transplant of single institutions

born in the European Union into Mercosur encloses a double risk. First, copying an

institution out of its context will probably produce effects different from the ones

verified in the original case. Second, the expected effects may derive from an

idealization of the model due to the ignorance of its real conditions.

In the case of Parlasur, both risks seem to be at stake. The latter is

reflected in contradictory declarations of authorities about the outcomes of the

European example and the role of the European Parliament. It has been used to

justify as well as to oppose the FTAA, to defend the reinforcement of integration and

to refrain it. Even the general idea, according to which Parlasur will strengthen

democracy in Mercosur and thus contribute to integration, suffers from lack of precise

information about the means which facilitated or limited this result in Europe. It is

early to infer if this outcome is to be confirmed, but empirical analysis show

significative differences in the organization of both assemblies and in the behavior of

the members, which is occasioned exactly by historical, economic and political

disparities between European Union and Mercosur. Therefore, these procedural

asymmetries do not tend to produce similar political effects. For instance, in spite of a

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general inspiration in the rules of procedure of the European Parliament, the

organization of Parlasur committees is closer to national parliaments than to the EP;

during plenary sessions, deputies seat according to nationality, not according

ideological affinity; the only organized political group is formed just by Uruguayan

deputies; bureaucratic work in the secretariat is marked by national differences; the

bureau changes every six months, according to the temporal presidency of Mercosur;

and parliamentary powers are not explored in almost two years, Parlasur has not

proposed any bills to CMC or national parliaments nor has discussed Mercosur

budget or addressed questions to decisional organs. It means for now the European

Parliament remains more an abstract model than a daily source of inspiration. It

influenced the creation of Parlasur, but so far its process of institutionalization has

corresponded to Mercosur practices (national divisions) combined with national

chambers traditions (legislative power as secondary).

Beyond these implications of institutional mimesis, Parlasur faces a

more complicated one. Some of the actions carried out reveal a critical attitude

towards its model. At times, parliamentarians exalt the European example in the

same speech they condemn Europe for the colonization process and other historical

and contemporary events. In addition, institutional manifestations have not spared

certain European policies. In June 2008, the plenary voted a declaration in favor of

the human rights of migrants, which firmly disapproves the Return Directive of the

European Union35. The document asks the European Parliament to review, based on

Europes civilian values, this mistaken and unfruitful decision which dishonors the

image of the European Union. In the context of Doha Round, deputies also

manifested their support to the position of Mercosur states in negotiating an

agreement that could assure agricultural access in developed markets and correct

the serious asymmetries that characterize international trade36. This behavior does

not necessarily imply a structural questioning of the model, but it certainly reflects

economic and ideological dissonances circumstantial or not. More than that, it

means international issues that affect integration processes are becoming to be

discussed in the assembly. But this situation can denote not only the increasing

interest of deputies for new subjects but also the weakness of the assembly, insofar

as it is simpler to find a consensus to comment on Europe than to propose measures

35 Parlasur Declaration 10/08.36 Parlasur Declaration 11/08.

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to improve the common market. This kind of international output is not enough to

make Parlasur comparable to the European Parliament if deputies do not work on the

inputs. In this case, isomorphism risks inducing the model to offer a false mirror to

the new institution. Besides commenting EPs decisions and searching to influence

the external relations of the bloc, Mercosur deputies face the challenge of identifying

their internal limits and focusing on how to surpass them.

Conclusion

The paper intended to analyze the role of ideas conceived within the

European Union in the creation of Parlasur. The hypothesis according to which

European conceptions of integration and democracy had a special influence in the

process that led to the rise of the Mercosur assembly is confirmed. It is possible to

infer that integration prevailed upon democracy in this institutional mimesis, although

both arguments are necessary to explain the Parliament. That is, from an

international perspective, the rise of Parlasur is more connected to a general view of

integration than to a concern for democracy, which is also due to the active behavior

of EU in promoting regional cooperation. But both ideas concurred to the focal point

which conducted to the conformation of a representative assembly. Integration alone

would not be enough to explain why a parliament was created at the expense of

alternative institutions or mechanisms.

Yet further research is required to evaluate more concretely the

relations between EP and Parlasur and to identify additional elements that converged

to the building of the latter, the influence of European values remains clear. Ideas

coming from more developed systems were always common in the construction of

South American economic, political and legal arrangements. Dependent countries

may opt for copying existent models than creating their own way so they can better fit

in the global economic system. This situation can indicate ideas have a greater

potential of explanation in comparisons center-periphery than they usually have in

analyses between developed countries or regions.

Furthermore, the current political orientation of Mercosur national

governments contributed to an approximation with the European Union. But it does

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not necessarily mean the European model is considered a left-wing alternative; it is

above all an alternative to the United States influence. Integration is commonly a way

of facing domination risks: the European Community also represented a response to

the Soviet menace. But in the case of Mercosur, it seems useful to question at what

extend the region is choosing to replace one form of imperialism for another. Are the

European intentions towards South America comparable to the North American ones

after the colonial period? Or is Europe, as a civilian power, capable of encouraging

horizontal and fruitful forms of cooperation among economically unequal regions?

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