dsa alert jan-2012
TRANSCRIPT
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J ANUARY 2012
SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25
9 7 7 0 9 7 6 2 0 6 0 0 3
I SS N 0 9 7 6 - 2 0 6 X
`
VOLUME 3 ISSUE 4
INDIA : 120
Against a Nuclear Backdrop
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do--
T
he 26 November attack on Pakistan Armys post in Mohmand Agency is a seminal event in a troubled relationshipbetween allies in a constant spat. Whatever the spin put out by the Pakistan Army, or United States militaryspokespersons, the truth of the matter will remain confined by the differing perceptions generated out of this
vexed relationship. Stories of vastly different interpretations abound, as they are expected to when the occasion is ofsuch magnitude. And it is of enormous magnitude, one that cannot be measured by merely the statistical recourse tothe number of casualties. 26 dead and at least half as many injured is a significant figure by any stretch of imagination.Even in the realms of South Asian negligence of the value of human life this is an enormous calamity that has hit thePakistan Army.
Pakistani spin masters have been quick to point to various loopholes in their domestic airspace management, rulesof engagement and the unequal nature of the relationship with the United States of America. What matters more tothem is that the convoluted justifications find news space, not that they necessarily absolve the Pakistan Army of allits wrongdoings. And the list of wrongdoings are legendary in their audacity, myopia and the sheer subversion of lawand good relations with all. The relations with the United States has been the bedrock as far as the Pakistani state is
concerned and more so its military. Beneficiaries of arms sales and slush funds by the billions the Pakistani militarymachine was on hire to the United States for the longest time. Both looked the other way when it came to protectingcore interests. If the Pakistani state allowed itself to become the frontline of anti-communist subversion it did so onits own volition. And if the United States slept over Pakistans nuclear shenanigans it did so with its eyes wide open.The problem, however, with looking the other way is that the earth is round and there comes a point when the twoopposing visions are bound to collide.
Which is precisely the basis of the ongoing tensions over happenings on both sides of the Durand Line. Even asthey may claim to be allies in the War On Terror, there is nothing to suggest that Pakistan and United States haveinterests anywhere near being common. The facts on ground clearly point to the fact that there is not convergence ofinterests between the two. In fact even as Pakistan draws coalition support funds from the United States its actionshave clearly been subversive of NATO / ISAF interests. In that Pakistan has always been consistent, especially adept
at pulling wool over the eyes. But such tactics have a limited shelf life and the expiry date was clearly crossed on13 September 2011 when the militant attack on US interests in Kabul left a trail leading directly to the ISI. The Rubiconwas crossed that day by Pakistan and 26 November is a direct outcome of that game. Suffice to say, the final whistle isa long way off.
manvendra singh
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editorr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd)
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T h e E r a o f L i m i t e d W a r s
This months theme Limited Wars in South Asia: Againsta Nuclear Backdrop is by itself a controversial topicgiven that Pakistan believes it has shut any window
of opportunity that may have existed for a conventionallystronger India to exploit by officially unveiling itsbomb-in-the-basement programme in May, 1998 andthreatening that its nukes will be used in a First Strike mode.
India, on the other hand had clearly followed everymajor move by Pakistan to go nuclear at any cost
including, as the progenitor of the concept of Islamic Bomb former Prime MinisterZulfikar Ali Bhutto put it, eating grass if necessary. It was acutely aware of the transferof nuclear weapons technology from China to Pakistan, including blueprints forminiaturised warheads to be fitted on surface-to-surface missiles to be supplied byNorth Korea. Hence its unequivocal refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) that would have foreclosed Indias nuclear option and left the China-Pakistancollusive intent to hold sway in the emerging geopolitics. One cannot but recall withclarity the steely delivery of Indias Ambassador to the Conference on DisarmamentArundhati Ghosh who told the world in no uncertain terms that India would notsign the CTBT Not now, not ever!
Keeping a sharp eye on the ongoing China-Pak nuclear collusion, successive Indiangovernments from Indira Gandhi, who ordered the first nuclear test in 1974 to ensurethat India had got it right, up to the moment the Atal Behari Vajpayee led BJP coalitiongovernment decided to keep its election promise to exercise the nuclear option, withthree underground tests in Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert on 11 May 1998 followedby two on 13 May, all had made sure that India would not be caught napping. Thefinal straw may well have been the testing by Pakistan of a North Korean suppliedmissile in April, 1998. It illustrated that Pakistan now had both the bomb and the meansof delivery. In the face of American and its western allies attempt to put pressure onIndia to sign the CTBT even in the presence of so much evidence that Pakistan hadbeen pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons programme with extensive help fromforeign sources India remained steadfast on its nuclear option. The fact that Pakistanconducted five tests on 28 May showed that American expert Leonard Spector whohad said as early as in 1987 that Pakistans bomb-in-the-basement project was justtwo screwdriver turns away from completion was bang on target and that the Indiantests forced Pakistan to also go public.
With proven nuclear warheads and the means of delivery in its arsenal Pakistansmilitary establishment which has exclusive control of the project decided to takeadvantage of its newfound nuclear parity with India. Gen Musharraf dusted out anold plan to occupy the Kargil heights and threaten to disrupt the Leh supply line to theSiachen Glacier. He did just that and India did not discover the treachery for severalmonths. When it did, it responded with all its conventional weapons and within twomonths had rolled back the Pakistani Army Northern Light Infantry troops with
devastating effect on the Pakistani psyche.
The Kargil campaign highlighted the possibility of a limited war betweennations armed with nuclear weapons. Since then there has been heated debate andcold-blooded analyses about how deep Indian troops could penetrate Pakistani territorybefore Islamabad responds with nuclear weapons; how long would it be that the warescalated into a nuclear exchange between the two countries leading to what is knownas Mutual Assured Destruction or, appropriately, MAD.
In this editionDSA has once again brought before the Indian public a consolidatedready backgrounder on the whole gamut of issues involved in the concept oflimited war in the sub-continental context including one that says that for too long wehave allowed Pakistans nuclear deterrence to work to the detriment of Indian nationalinterests in Jammu and Kashmir.
Wishing our readers happy reading and an even happier and secure 2012.
Jai Hind!
xv do
The onset of limited wars
The country comes first - always and every time.
Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM
pawan agrawal
On the eve of its second Anniversary the DSA had held a path breaking Seminar onLimited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop. Three former Service Chiefs, aformer Foreign Secretary and Director, Centre for Air Power Studies had participated. The
Seminar was attended by young parliamentarians and a host of serving and retired service officersto include the CISC, DGMT and DGPP.
In this Issue we are publishing the highlights of the Seminar and a number of incisive articleson this theme by very senior retired officers and well known academics including one from the S Rajaratnam SInternational Studies, Singapore.
This is a live and burning issue. We may well have to fight Limited Wars against Pakistan or China or both. Thwill be fought against a Nuclear backdrop. The formulation that we will continue to prepare for a general conflicttwo World Wars) and that preparation can take care of any lesser contingency will not work anymore. Gen Maxwelof the US Army was emphatic on this subject. A Limited War fought against a nuclear backdrop has its own charaand limitations and requires very specific force structuring and preparation. A generalised, one size fits all, solutnot work in all cases related to limited wars. The Chinese are crystal clear on this subject. Since 1978, paramounDeng Xiaoping had come to the clear-cut determination that general global wars were a thing of the past and heChina would structure its armed forces and prepare to fight only Local Wars. The nature of these Local (or Limiteevolved in the Chinese perception to first "local wars fought under high-tech conditions" and now under what i"conditions of informatisation".
Today there is a vital need for wide-ranging and participative debate in India about the nature and characteristwars that we are likely to fight. There is a need to enunciate a Declaratory Doctrine for Limited wars that spells determination to uphold our vital national interests even against a nuclear backdrop and synergises the response othe three services but ensures a whole of the government approach to such situations.
We need to war game a series of response options and escalation ladders for such Limited Conflicts. The CCS wilaccord approval in principle for such contingencies in peacetime itself so that the transition to a limited war is smwell thought through and Escalation Dominance is ensured. There is an urgent need for India to field dominant convwar fighting capabalities in South Asia to generate credible response options to Pakistans asymmetric adventuChinese attempts at hegemonism. Our response so far has been characterised by an unexplicable meekness and timiarms acquisition process has been badly hobbled by inordinate delays and huge time and cost overruns and is procea glacial pace. This process will need to be speeded up urgently.
The deliberations of the Seminar and articles by many retired senior officers on this issue provide food for that will help us crystallise a Doctrine for Limited wars which is long overdue. We will have to go beyond ColLand Power centric approach and examine conflict initiation options that rely more on the far more flexible aAir Power and Sea Power to set the stage for such a conflict. We need to examine the nature of such a confmodus operandi and desired end states. We need to war game scenarios as escalation ladder generators and help ourclass overcome its astonishing diffidence and meekness in the face of external challenges.
Cold Fusion presents a revolutionary new form of energy which we must exploit to create a demassified / dis
energy grid that takes us beyond the fossil fuel era. As a vibrant civilisation we need to invest in this path breakinnow. This issue has a very interesting article on Table Top Fusion.
16th December was the 40th Anniversary of our landmark victory in the 1971 war that led to the birth of Banglaneed to learn our lessons from that seminal conflict which has crystallised the Indian way of war characterised by infodominance, the offensive use of asymmetric warfare to break the adversaries balance, methodical preparation andexecution based on shock and awe generated by massing effects. Lt Gen Jacob, one of the prime architects of therecounts the inside details of the war in this issue.
We would avidly look forward to your feedback on all these vital subjects and hope to kick-start a participawide-ranging debate in the country.
January 2012 Defence AnD security Alert
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Volume 3 Issue 4 January 2012
Limited Wars in South Asia ISSUE January 2012
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IstherespaceforaLimitedWarinSo
uthAsiabetweenthespectral endsof
Nuclearexchangeandsub-convention
alprovocations?
IfsowhatformshouldsuchaLimited
Wartake?Whatwouldbethedesir
stateandobjectives?Whatwouldbe
theprimarylimitations?Whatshould
modusoperandi?Whatwouldbethem
eanstoensureescalationdomin
suchaconict.Howdoweensureco
nictterminationonourterms?
IndiasDefenceMinistrysAnnualRepo
rtshavestatedthatIndiawouldpre
ageneralwar(alaWorldWarIorII)a
ndsuchpreparationcouldtakecar
lessercontingency.This is adeeply
awedapproach. LimitedWars havea
dialecticandneedspecicdoctrine,p
reparation,forcestructuresandtrain
ChinesePLA is specically preparin
gandstructuredfor LocalWarsor
Wars.
Keepingtheabove inview isthereaneedfor Indiatoenunciate
ade
DoctrineforLimitedWar againstanucl
ear backdrop?What shouldbethe
contoursofsuchadoctrine?
AnniversarySeminarofDefencean
dSecurityAlert(DSA)mag04November20
11attheConstitutionClub,NewD
LIMITEDWARS
INSOUTHASIA
Someexcerptsfromthew
elcomeaddre
AGAINSTANUCLEARBACKD
RO
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General V P Malik
SM, AVSM, VSM (retd)
KeynOte ADDress
may be several
s where both the
and the affected nation
ted to use conventional
and forces. The initiator
ed to give it a greater
th conventional forces
e the desired results, as
ned in 1947, 1965. In the
gil war, it did so despite
ear weapons capability.
ther hand, the affected
hen pushed to the wall,
its conventional forces
the proxy war into the
her than fight with all
ations of a no war no
uation. Pakistan did in
almost did in 2002.
Following is the text of the keynote address given by GeneralV P Malik, Former Chief of Army Staff during theKargil conflict at Anniversary Seminar of DSA onLimited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop.
LIMITED WARS IN SOUTH ASIAAGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP
Ved Prakash Malik
d charge of the
Army, as the 19th
of Army Staff, on
ember 1997. He was
ed with the Param
Seva Medal (PVSM)
. He took over as
n of the Chiefs of Staff
ee with effect fromanuary 1999. He
ated and oversaw
nning and execution
peration Vijay to
fully defeat Pakistans
ed intrusion in
rgil sector during
uly 1999.
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Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal
This is the text of the talk by Ambassador (Dr) Kanwal Sibal,
former Foreign Secretary. It is remarkable for its analytical andvery clear-headed approach to the subject of limited wars inSouth Asia whether against China or Pakistan or both andprovides an invaluable civilian perspective to this vital issue.
Amb Dr Kanwal Sibal
the Indian Foreign Serv
1966. He reached the h
position in the Indian Fo
Service on his appoin
as Foreign Secretary t
Government of India
July 2002 to November
He is a member of I
National Security AdBoard. He is on the
of Directors of the New
based East-West Institu
is on the Advisory Bo
the Vivekanand Interna
Foundation. He has re
the high distinction of
Ofcier of the Ordre du
from France.
Limited Wars in South Asia:
A civilian Perspective
India has been ble
terrorism from Pakista
almost two decades and Even when dramatic attac
place against our Parliame
later in Mumbai, India
not take even limited reta
military action for fear
conflict escalating into a n
stand-off. This gives Pak
fairly free hand theoretic
use the terrorist weapon
us at a time of its choosing
liMiteD OPtiOns
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Air Cmde Jasjit Singh
AVSM, VrC, VM (retd)
the present trends in
military modernisation,
oncluded with a degree
ence that its future wars
ely to remain in keeping
centrality of local-border
s military doctrine; and
h more likely to shift
limited war where its
missile power are much
ely to be employed on
ge strikes with precision
, though on land it may
the local-border war
Following is the text of the talk given by Air Cmde
Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd), Director of Centre for Air
Power Studies, New Delhi at Anniversary Seminar ofDSA on
Limited Wars in South Asia: Against a Nuclear Backdrop.
LIMITED WAR: Some Doctrinal Issue
iter is Director of
or Air Power Studies,
lhi. He is Fellow of
Academy of Science
and has been awarded
dma Bhushan for a
s contribution to
security and defence.
theOreticAl AsPects
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Amb Arundhati Ghosh
ready friable situation
be exacerbated to
le levels if the state
ollowing the trends
Pakistani society,
a theocratic intolerant
nt on the establishment
liphate in the region.
litary and non-state
re certain to have been
ned by India having
erred in 1999, following
il attack, in 2001 after
ck on Parliament and
n Parakram and more
2008, after the attack
bai. Would India react
y in the event of another
type attack?
An excellent civilian perspective onthe aspect of Limited wars against aNuclear backdrop. India is perhapsthe only country that faces thechallenges arising from having twonuclear neighbours, who closelycooperate with each others nuclearprogrammes and who maintainadversarial relations with her. Anuclear-weapon enabled terroristthreat is supported by strong andconsistent denials of culpabilityfor any such non-state attackand a reliance on its protector
and mentor, China, to handle theinevitable diplomatic furore thatis bound to rise if the taboo onnuclear weapons is broken withhowever limited an application.It would appear that Pakistan hasadopted a policy of battlefielduse of its nuclear weapons, alikely escalation of a conventionalconfrontation to a nuclear level,arrangements for rapid deploymentwhich could entail pre-delegationto unit commanders in the event ofa loss of communications, (whichis what apparently happened atSalala recently when 24 Pakistanisoldiers were killed in an ISAFair attack on two border posts).She asserts that there is a need to
slightly tweak our nuclear doctrine;the objective would be not tochange our No First Use policy,but to revert to the language of theDraft doctrine on the question ofretaliatory strikes - these should bepunitive rather than massive asnow exists. Lastly, she makes thevery bold assertion that in orderto disillusion the adversary of ourintent to retaliate, the control of theweapons should be placed squarelywith the Strategic Forces Command.
ter joined the Indian
Service in 1963 and
n various capacities in
stry of External Affairs
dian missions abroad.
incharge of economic
s when economic
were launched in
erved in the Branch
iat of the Ministry towith the Bangladesh
ment - in - exile in
during the birthpangs
nation-state. Served
bassador in Egypt,
orea and as Permanent
ntative to UNESCO
the UN Ofces in
As Ambassador to the
nce on Disarmament in
she etched in indelible
he sovereign resolve
ndian nation never to
Comprehensive Test
aty (CTBT). Her words
ate in Indian hearts to
She told the world in
ed, authoritative tones
a would never sign the
Not now! Not ever!.
nuclear neighbourhood:
challenges for India
PrAGMAtic enGAGeMent
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ey is the rapid fielding
matching conventional
ies. These will undo
s conventional
ce dialectic and forge the
mind space for waging
d War. What should be
of such a Limited War?
be simply to raise costs
mmetric adventurism
chieve deterrence by
ent. The aim should
terrain oriented but
ented. It should aim to
e adversarys strategic
erational reserves to
n his own territory
grade them seriously.
d aim at destroying /
g his infrastructure
r and decimating the
This is the text of the welcome Address delivered by theExecutive Editor of theDSA at the inauguration of the Seminaron Limited Wars in South Asia. It sets out the issues fordebate and discussion in perspective and flags the aspectsthat merit much deeper study and analysis. It highlights thecrying need for India to enunciate a Declaratory Doctrine forLimited Wars Against a Nuclear Backdrop. It also decries the,one size fits all approach of preparing for a general, totalconflict that can cater for any lesser contingencies. The Chinesehave emphatically recognised that the era of general wars isover and we need to prepare today for Local / Limited warsunder conditions of nuclear symmetry.
aj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi
SM, VSM (retd)
riter is a combat
of many skirmishes
Line of Control and
terrorist operations
mu and Kashmir and
He subsequently
ded the reputed
Force during intensive
terrorist operations in
ouri-Poonch districts.served two tenures
highly prestigious
ateGeneral of Militaryons. He is a prolic
on matters military
on-military and has
ed 24 books and
00 papers in many
ous research journals.
so Executive Editor of
and Security Alert
agazine.
LIMITED WARSIN SOUTH ASIA:
AGAINST A NUCLEAR BACKDROP
WelcOMe ADDress
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antonu Choudhry (retd)
iter retired as Vice
of Army Staff in
2005. He has served
Military Operations
Military Intelligence
ates and has been
tructor in Defence
s Staff College. He is a
ead ofcer who writes
y on national security.
some guesstimate
has approximately
120 warheads with
e number of delivery
in the shape of aircraft
rent varieties of nuclear
missiles including the
aheen I and Shaheen II.
they have developed /
ed cruise missiles Babur
ad which are nuclear
With enhanced capacity
uction of weapon grade
m they are in a position
four to six warheads
ar to their stockpile. To
latest vector which has
ded is a Tactical Missile
Nasr which Pakistan
s nuclear capable. This
has been tested during
exercise by Pak forces.
ly this also implies
y have in all likelihood,
out miniaturisation of
ear systems to be fitted
NasrMissile which are
to be highly mobile and
mounted
A highly cerebral former Vice Chief of the Army reflects uponthe recent introduction of Nasr Tactical Nuclear Missiles bythe Pak Army. He feels this constitutes a paradigm shift whichcalls for a rethinking of our nuclear and conventional war-fighting Doctrines. Pakistan has enough land based missilesto carry out such a first strike by launching Tactical NuclearWeapons, either as a demonstrative one or on a tactical targetto inflict sufficient damage to own troops and concentrationswhich are purely military in nature and thus be termed asCounter Troop. In all likelihood such a strike would be onIndian soil but be termed as defensive. He feels that thecurrent Indian doctrinal position of a full fledged Indiancounter value response to such tactical nuclear use may not
be viable. He recommends instead a matching response withown tactical warheads which will enable own conventionaloffensives to proceed apace.
tActicAl nuKes
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Lt Gen V R Raghavan
M, UYSM, AVSM (retd)
writer was Indias
General of Military
ons from 1992 to 1994.
urrently a Director at
hi Policy Group. He
n a visiting fellow at
nter for International
and Cooperation,
d University, USA.
d pointed out that
pid escalation to win
would probably risk
nflict, gradual escalation
volve the United States
racted and costly war.
red no solutions, but
y pointed out the fallacy
ng into the Vietnam
hout a clear purpose.
the most important
of Vietnam came from
Summers. His main
t concerning limited
that in Korea, while the
States limited its
s, it did not limit its
attain those objectives.
very resource available
an nuclear weapons.
ther hand, in Vietnam,
ed States reversed the
and consequently
price of a long war and
defeat
A highly perceptive article by a former DGMO and well knownMilitary analyst on the theme of Limited wars in South Asia.This article examines the possibility of limited war betweenIndia and Pakistan and the potential of such a conflict triggeringa nuclear war. It examines the considerations that could pusheach of the two countries to fight a limited war. It discusseshow such a war might be waged and the circumstances thatwould likely precipitate an escalation to a nuclear exchange.The doctrinal beliefs and decision making processes of thetwo countries are examined to trace the likely escalatory spiraltowards a nuclear war. The ar ticle concludes that the probabilityof a nuclear war between India and Pakistan is high in theevent the two countries engage in a direct military conflict.
Limited War and Escalation in
South Asia
DOctrinAl cOntrADictiOns
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Roger Rose took over as Chief Executive, Lockheed Martin India Private Ltd inAugust 2009. In this position, he is responsible for all Lockheed Martin corporatebusiness in the South Asia region that includes India, Sri Lanka, Nepal and theMaldives.
DSA: You have been the Chief Executive Officer, Lockheed Martin India Priv ate Limited, since 2009. How do yo u visualisehe business opportunities in the Indian Market?
Roger Rose:Lockheed Martin is pursuing a range of programmes in India and sees business opportunities across sectors.Our priority is to execute the contracts that we have signed. We have delivered the C-130Jto the Indian Air Force ahead ofchedule and significantly under-budget. This was an FMS sale. We have received a request for additional six C-130Js.
Lockheed is part of the Apache team in which Boeing i s the lead. We have the mission and missile systems on the platform.We are looking forward to a closure o n that contract. We are also part of the team wi th Raytheon onJavelin missiles. This willbe another FMS programme and we are currently at the Letter of Request (LoR) stage. The Indian Army has not only seenhe missile firing during Exercise Yudh Abhyaas in which the US Army had brought theJavelin, but also fired it. There is a lotf interest in Javelin in the Indian Army. Lockheed is also looking at offerings for Coastal and Homeland Security. We havelso offered theMH60R to the Indian Navy.
We have been talking about naval combat system. The Indian Navy has been looking at creating aircraft carrier battlegroups. The best system to protect a carrier battle group is the Aegis Combat System. It is a mature, developed system whichhas been there for 30 years and the only one that can stop an incoming modern missile system.
DSA: Lockheed Martins presence in the Indian m arket is more than 20 years now. What measures and strategies are beingormulated to strengthen and better support Indias Military Sector?
RR: Lockheed Martin has maintained a presence in New Delhi for more than 20 years. With the Indian economygrowing at more than 8 per cent and the simultaneous strengthening of the Indo-US relationship in the past decade,Lockheed Martin has increased its presence in India. In 2005, the Corpo ration expanded its office to better supp ort the IndianMinistry of Defence (MoD) and its global security needs.
Recently, Lockheed Martin has aggressively pursued opportunities for all three military services (Navy, Army andAir Force) apart from civil applications in the fields of renewable energy and civil aviation. Lockheed Martins sale of sixC-130Jspecial mission transports to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2008 represented the first major military deal between thewo countries.
DSA: India is strenuously trying to build a Military Industrial Complex in the Private sector. What role can LM play inctualising this vision. What partnerships, if any, do you have in mind?
RR: Tata LM Aerostructures Pvt Ltd, our joint venture with Tata Group, is our fi rst initiative in this direction. This will addignificantly to defence manufacturing capabilities in the country. We are always looking at more opportunities where wean partner with domestic industry to build lasting partnerships.
DSA: Indias Offset Policy is designed to help build capacities for military production in our private sector. How effectives this policy? What can LM do to promote the growth of a Military Industrial Complex in our Private sector via this route?
RR: Indias offset policy is evo lving. We at Lockheed Martin have a lot of experience in executing offsets and I am su re thatwe can work with Indian industry to create a win-win situation for all stakeholders.
India is fast becoming part of the global supply chain of some of the biggest defence suppliers in the world. Indias
potential as a manufacturing hub in the aerospace and defence sector is just being realised. India is a very importaattractive destination for a company such as Lockheed Martin which is interested in a long-term partnership witindustry and services.
We share the thirst for technological innovation The Indian software industry has developed skills and expertiare applied to such varied sectors as banking, insurance, financial applications and artificial intelligence. We recogIndian industry and research facilities are promising partners for us in this strategically critical field.
Lockheed Martin is committed to a long-term partnership in technology development, manufacturing and scollaboration in third markets with Indian companies from both the public and private sectors. Its broad-based portaddress important Indian requirements in defence, security and delivery of vital public services. Lockheed Martiunmatched performance record in establishing partnerships with industry.
DSA:Lockheed Martins sale of six C-130Jspecial mission transports to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 2008 represefirst major military deal between the two countries. What are the other deals in the pipeline?
RR: In addition to the sale of six C-130Jspecial mission aircraft, LM also provided turnkey infrastructure to the IAa separate commercial contract. We have since then sold equipment for a Naval programme to MDL and are close to award with the IAF on two other programmes - as prime in one case and jointly with another US company in secondwith substantial LM work share. Beside these, we are also looking at contract award for additional six C 130Jspecialaircraft under FMS programme for which a letter of request was received on 16 September.
DSA:What are the prospects of LM in the Civil Aviation Sector in India, considering the increasing fleet size and eprivate airlines?
RR: Every day across the globe, 60 per cent of the worlds commercial air traffic is monitored and controLockheed Martin air traffic control systems - systems that are powerful, advanced and completely reliable. Lockheedknows how to work with governments worldwide in a way thats fiscally sound and we are accountable for genstrong results.
We provide the experience, technology and financing to bring the most modern and efficient operations to traffic customers in the United States and worldwide. To meet tomorrows growth in global travel, we are devnext-generation systems today to modernise airspace management. Our systems offer air traffic controllers flexiblecollaborative decision-making, conflict resolution tools and more accurate and timely surveillance information, all oleads to safer skies.
Lockheed Martin provides tools for ground surveillance monitoring, coordination between airport service peand the air navigation and management of aircraft in the taxiways and runways. Our hub and ramp managemenintegrates surveillance data, collaborative decision making tools and airline legacy systems into a single automatedThe system helps airline operations managers and air traffic controllers improve the efficiency of their operatiosecurity systems protect the entire aviation infrastructure.
DSA: The US, which lost a bid for US$ 11 billion contract for 126 war planes, has now offered India partnershdevelopment of the worlds most advanced flying machine, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Can you elaborate on this
RR: Sale of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is an issue to be addressed by the Indian and US governments. As an OEMaircraft, we will be happy to support the decision made by the two governments.
DSA: In a recent development the Pentagon has notified the US Congress about the possibility of a US$ 1.2 billwith India for six more C-130J Super Hercules heavy-lift aircraft in addition to six ordered for the same price in 20comments
RR: The original programme to provide India with a highly advanced airlift capability set a new benin international defence cooperation. The acquisition, under the US Foreign Military Sales programme,C-130J Super Hercules called for the highest levels of cooperation between our countries governments, the United StForce and Lockheed Martin. I am happy to say that the levels of cooperation achieved resulted in India receiving its oriaircraft well ahead of schedule and under cost. As we see the capabilities and flexibility of this proven aircraft put to the teIndian Air Force, I know there are many more roles and missions out there that can be met by the C-130Jand we lookto many decades of IAF C-130 operations around the world.
DSA:Where do you place LM in the next 5 years in India?
RR: We expect much larger footprint for LM in India in the next five years with our top end solutions for thAir Force, Navy, Army and the Coast Guard. In addition, we also hope to work with Paramilitary organisations, NDisaster Management Organisation, DPSUs and the private sector defence industry to meet the emerging requirethe fields of aerospace, defence and internal security.
interVieW
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Conventional Wars and the
Shadow Face
Admiral Vijay Shankar
PVSM, AVSM (retd)
emergence of the
generation of warfare
calculus and how its
has twisted the very
of warfare. In the
of stakes normal to
non state actors bring
hem disproportionate
ve powers. They
primordial threat that
y be countered by
tive action
A former C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command reflectsupon the linkages between conventional warfare and nuclearwarfare. He avers that the dynamics that condition militaryconflicts are largely predicated on the two faces of warfare. Theprimary face as defined by conventional forces and the shadowface as circumscribed by strategic nuclear forces. Application ofthe former is an active art while the latter scripts the perimeterand imposes cut-offs. To bring about a modicum of stabilitygiven a tinderbox situation, diplomacy backed by militaryforce would provide the necessary means of arbitration. Thecoming of non state actors into the picture muddies the waters.Since their stakes in orthodox relations between states do notexist, their potential to cause destruction is extremely high.In dealing with such conditions the state must be preparedto take pre-emptive action and should the need arise, enable
counterforce capabilities to prevent nuclear weapons fallinginto wrong hands.
writer holds an
n Defence Studies
a graduate of the
War College,
, Rhode Island,
He is the former
of the Andaman
Nicobar Command,
f the Strategic Forces
nd and Flag Ofcernding Western Fleet.
mand and operational
nce are comprehensive
clude Command of
at the aircraft carrier.
member of the adjunct
f the National Institute
anced Studies and
rently tenants the
Katari Chair of
ce at the United
s Institute.
AsPerOus reAlities
4 January 2012 Defence AnD security Alert January 2012 Defence AnD security Alert
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LANDMARK LTD CROSSWORDSPENCERS OM BOOK SHOPODYSSEY
A N N O U N C E SFebruary 2012 Issue on
The First and the Only ISO 9001:2008 Certified Defence and Security Magazine in Ind
Jointness, Synergy and Crafting Vibrant Defence Industrial Base
Available at all leading bookstores
aom
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Dr Rajendra Prasad
imited war theorists
any times emphasised
isks of escalation would
war limited. Arguably,
, contradictory it may
he danger of escalation
the underlying reasons
rategy of Limited War
Deterrence and also
Deterrence fails, there is
lity of holding a conflict
A strategy of limited
tributes to Deterrence
very reason generally
ainst it
Indian formulations of limitedwar are to a great extent basedon the same consensus that thelimited war theorists of theUnited States had in the 1950sand 60s. According to Kissinger,a Limited War is fought forspecific political objectives,which by their existence, tend toestablish a relationship betweenthe force employed and the goal tobe attained. It reflects an attemptto affect the opponents will notto crush it, to make the conditions
imposed seem more attractivethan continued resistance, tostrive for specific goals and notfor complete annihilation. Theconcept of India engaging ina Limited War with Pakistangained primacy following theKargil conflict in the nuclearisedpolitico-strategic milieu ofSouth Asia. The primary aim ofLimited War is to infict damagesor to pose risks for the enemy outof proportion to the objectivesunder contention. Henry Kissingeraptly argues that the restraintwhich keeps a war limitedis a psychological one; theconsequences of a limited victoryor a limited defeat or a stalemate- the three possible outcomes of a
limited war - must seem preferableto the consequences of an all-outwar. If Pakistan could initiate andfinalise a limited war on Indiansoil, could the latter repeat thesame on the formers soil? Indiassuccess [in Kargil] was due to theability of our defence forces tofight and win such a limited warat a time, ground and means offighting chosen by the aggressor.Success would be more likely ifthe initiative lay with India.
Preventing Armageddon:Search for a New Strategy
er is Professor in the
ent of Defence and
c Studies (DDSS) and
aculty of Science, DDU
ur University, UP,
cArDinAl OBJectiVes
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Dr M Srinivasan
rm Low Energy Nuclear
s (LENR) is increasingly
ed as a more appropriate
efer to nuclear reactions
ke place under special
ns when certain metals
r mixtures) such as
m, Nickel, Titanium,
m etc. are made to absorb
antities of Deuterium or
n on the surface
A path breaking article on Table-Top Nuclear power via Cold Fusionor Low Energy Nuclear Reactions which could generate a revolution inEnergy generation. A maverick Italian engineer-inventor Andrea Rossi haddemonstrated a 10 KWth cold fusion reactor at the University of Bologna,in Italy on 14th January 2011. This novel Ni-H LENR reactor which has beennamed by Rossi as Energy Catalyser or E-Cat for short, was fuelled withjust one gram of Nickel nano powder exposed to pressurised hydrogengas.
A practical embodiment of the inventive apparatus, installed onOctober 16, 2007, is at present perfectly operating 24 hours per day andprovides an amount of heat sufficient to heat the factory of the CompanyEON at Bondeno in Italy. Imagine having a new source of clean energywhich is decentralised (needs no electrical grid), does not require Uraniumor Plutonium, does not produce any radioactive waste products nor nuclearradiation, does not leave any carbon footprint and is mass manufacturedand sold in the market place as a common consumer product!
A Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science appears to have indeed takenplace behind the backs of our nuclear scientists. In the USA the DefenseAdvanced Projects Agency (DARPA), the Defense Threat ReductionAgency (DTRA) and the Office of Naval Research (ONR) have all beenquietly funding Cold Fusion / LENR research for the past several years.This could turn out to be a significant game changer that can revolutionisethe field of Energy and take us beyond the fossil fuel era to a new andde-massified energy future. DRDO must take a look at this breakthroughtechnology.
Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science
y Associate Director,
Group, BARC,
the writer is from
batch of the BARC
school. He served as
or Physicist and an
ental Nuclear Physicist
, Mumbai for 40 years
to 1997). His
sation was in thearea of Nuclear Science
hnology, focusing on
ysics of Fission Chain
ns and Fusioning
. At the time of his
nt he was Head,
Physics Division of
and also Associate
of its Physics Group.
n contributions were
design, construction
xperimentation with
e Purnima series of
ental nuclear reactors
mbay and played a
in the 1974 Pokhran
explosion experiment.
s responsible for
g Fusion Plasma
ents culminating
building of the huge
Capacitor Bank Facility
rnima laboratories.
he last seven years of
arch career at BARC
deeply involved in the
the controversial new
Cold Fusion.
The writer of this article has just learnt that Dr P K Iyengar,former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, passedaway on 21st December 2011. He would like to dedicatethis article to the memory of Dr Iyengar as he had thecourage and conviction to stand by the early BARC results(1989 to 1995) which confirmed the occurrence of Nuclearreactions in deuterated metallic samples. In recent months hewas very happy to learn of the development of the Ni-H Rossireactor and the imminent commercialisation of Cold Fusion /LENR and has thus passed on with the feeling that his stand
has been fully vindicated!
tABle-tOP nucleAr enerGy!
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Anna Louise Strachan
wing India and
s nuclear tests in
stakes in the conflict
the two countries were
ntly raised. However,
eve that there is a real
of nuclear conflict
rrorist elements are able
re a nuclear weapon.
g the nuclear weapons
ia and Pakistan became
d in the 1999 Kargil
cording to Chandran,
ict constituted a limited
onal war and served to
the fact that a limited
ween India and Pakistan
ible
A cogently argued article that suggests that there are chances ofpeace breaking out between India and Pakistan and as such theoption of a Limited Conventional War can be ruled out. Someargue that this is the only way to compel Pakistan to containjihadi elements undertaking terrorist activities within Indiasborders. However, the writer cites Ganguly and Kapur to pointout, Pakistan may simply be lacking the capacity to eliminatejihadi groups. She feels it is much wiser to create a situationwhereby the economic costs of supporting jihadi groups faroutweigh the benefits of supporting them. Economic andCommercial Cooperation talks between the countries, she feelshave been progressing at an unprecedented rate. She concludescautiously that there are likely to be many setbacks and giventhe intractable nature of the India-Pakistan conflict the road
to peace will be a long one. However, she feels that at a timewhen there is room for cautious optimism it makes sense toembrace the possibility of a peaceful resolution. The editorsare constrained to point out that far too many previous Indianattempts to seek peace have ended up on the battlefield due tothe intransigence of the Military-ISI complex of Pakistan andhence keeping ones options open may be far more prudent.Pak militarys current endorsement of the peace process maybe purely Tactical to seek a free hand in shaping Post-USwithdrawal Afghanistan to Indias extreme discomfiture.
ter is a PhD scholar
S Rajaratnam School
rnational Studies in
re. She also holds
in Asian Politics from
and a BA in Middle
Studies from the
ty of Exeter in the UK.
arch interests include
resolution, electoraland UN peacekeeping.
cAutiOus OPtiMisM
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Barry Bharathan (retd)
er is former Vice Chief
Staff. He also served
an Naval Attache in
gton DC, USA.
to not a single conflict
ndicated the reason
initiation. All players
realise that military
ent would perforce be
duration with enormous
c impact along with
r present possibility
ation into the nuclear
n. More critically
ion, by USA, Russia
r countries is bound to
nhibiting influence on a
to miitary engagement.
to have a battle. It is
have a futile one with
for any one
The writer, a former Vice Admiral with a penchant for out of the bsolutions, contends that there is no scope for a Limited war in South AsHe asserts that hitherto not a single conflict has vindicated the reason fits initiation. All players perhaps realise that military engagement wouperforce be of short duration with enormous economic impact along withe ever present possibility of escalation into the nuclear dimension. Mocritically intercession, by USA, Russia and other countries is bound to haan inhibiting influence on a military to military engagement. It is bad have a battle. It is worse to have a futile one with no gains for any one. Havers that economic development alone is the panacea for our ills.
South Asia is like a wounded, lumbering, mad elephant unsure of where it is going. It often tramples
itself. There are many mahouts with different kinds of ankus, anlius or in the vernacular ankusa
for controlling the pachyderm. The two most inimical neighbours, India and Pakistan are declared
nuclear weapons states. However they are still nascent nuclear militaries. China is a robust
military nuclear / conventional power in comparison. It has the unique ability of being the most
strident of the mahouts, with pervasive influence in the region. The current security environment
is simmering, just at the boil thanks to the unstable, volatile, Nobody really in charge situation
in Pakistan. The degraded Afghan angst, the ham handed American / NATO approach, US-
Pakistan misperceptions, Taliban resurgence, the high probability of nuclear installations falling
into terrorist hands and lastly the Indo-Afghanistan stand alone relationship seem to vindicate
THE LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR in the Sub-continent. The enigmatic Chinese keep every one
guessing including their ally Pakistan. The Am ericans would eventually bid good bye and l eave
behind a sordid, squalid mess that is already oozing through the pores of the Sub-continent. South
Asian Leadership has simply changed to pleader-ship and dealer-ship.
The writers appeal: This article needs to be read purely on the narrow context of limited war and
security in a nuclear weapons environment.
Lie means falsity. It is also a golfing term signifying the position of the golf ball with reference to
the grass beneath it. Both these are relevant to the concept of Limited war.
THE LIE OF THE LIMITED WAR
GrOunD reAlities
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Remembering Bangladesh
A Historic VictoryF R Jacob PVSM (retd)
divided the area of
ns for the freedom
into sectors. Maj Zia
be responsible for the
ng sector. Major Khalid
f for Comilla, Maj
for Mymensingh, Wing
der Bashar for Rangpur,
Zaman for Rajshahi,
sman for Kushtia, Maj
Khulna. Tiger Siddiqui
perate from Tangail as
rul Kadar and Toha
The 40th anniversary of the historic victory in Bangladeshfell on 16 December this year. Lt Gen Jacob, former ArmyCdr Eastern Command and one of the prime architects ofthis victory, reminiscences about that text book campaign.It was a classic campaign that saw Indias political andmilitary leadership at its inspired best. In a blitzkrieg ofjust 14 days, a new nation state was created with the force ofarms and over 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war were taken.Gen Jacob highlights the vital role played by the MuktiBahini Guerillas, as also the in-house debates of what shouldbe the centres of gravity of this campaign. Army HQ felt itshould be the entry ports of Khulna and Chittagong, whereasGen Jacob insisted it should be the capital city of Dacca. Hegives a graphic first hand account of the climactic eventsleading to the Pakistani surrender at Dacca.
ter was the Chief of
f Eastern Command
the 1971 war for the
n of Bangladesh. He
ly regarded as one
key architects of that
ular victory. Post
nt, he has served as
ernor of the states of
and Goa.
herOic cAMPAiGn
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Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)
major aim of launching
onally armed military
o action will change from
g the enemy to creating
rily stable favourable
so that negotiations,
mediation, can be
Traditional military
s and aims, that centred
planning for launching
le offensive operations
the enemy, are likely
ge to limiting military
inflicting devastating
on the enemys field
and thus containing
ather than defeating
comprehensively. The
m emerging trend in
e warfare clearly points
limited wars
Today when nations carry out a cost-benefit analysis todetermine whether the achievement of national aims iscommensurate with the likely costs of waging a major war,prudence invariably dictates that if war is unavoidable, itmust remain limited in scope and conduct. It is now wellaccepted in India that future wars in the Indian context arelikely to be limited wars. These will be predominantly landbattles that will spin out of ongoing conflicts on land likethe proxy war being waged by Pakistan against India inJammu and Kashmir and the half-century old militarystand-off along the Line of Control. The Indian doctrinefor limited war must emphasise massive asymmetries offirepower to achieve destruction and degradation of theadversarys war waging potential in a strategic context.
Limited Warin the Indian Context
er is Director, Centre
nd Warfare Studies,
hi. Views are personal.
PrecluDinG escAlAtiOn
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Limited Warsin South Asia:Against the Nuclear Backdrop
Dr Rajiv Nayan
neW PersPectiVe
The writer is a Senior Res
Associate at the Institu
Defence Studies and An
(IDSA), New Delhi since
where he specialises in e
control, non-prolife
and arms control. He
Visiting Research Fell
Japan Institute of Interna
Affairs, Tokyo, wherpublished his monogr
Non-Proliferation Issue
South Asia.
In 1953, Ralf Lapps te
work was the first pub
literature which analyse
possibility of nuclear w
in limited war. Howev
most popular and autho
work was produced
Bernard Brodie in 195
argued for limited and role of nuclear weapons in
Europe to scuttle the com
advantage in the region
Another civilian perspective on the issue of Limited
wars in South Asia. Though the writer rules out alimited Nuclear war as an obvious absurdity, his
view on a conventional conflict against a backdrop
of nuclear symmetry is more nuanced.
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Cecil Victor
Karakoram Highway
ross Pakistan-occupied
is soon to be turned
el collar around Indias
h the addition of a rail
pipelines to fuel Chinese
nism
An out of the box civilian view of breaking the
Stabilty-Instability Paradox in South Asia. The writer suggestsattacking the China-Pakistan linkage via the Karakoram
Highway in PoK. Would this trigger a two-front war? BREAK THE STEEL COLLAR-------------------------------
ter has covered all
th Pakistan as War
ondent and reported
e conict zones in
, Laos and Cambodia
heast Asia as well
Afghanistan. He is
f India: The Security
a.
unliMiteD threAts
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Nitin Gokhale
ter, a journalist with
ars of experience
him in various conict
, is currently NDTVs
and Strategic Affairs
ew shift is aimed at
ening the Armys
es to fight what a
general calls a war
and a half fronts
eference to possible
eous confrontation with
and China in addition
deployed in counter-
cy situation internally
Exercise Sudarshan Shakti was a major Air-Landbattle exercise that would help synergise theresources of the Army and Air Force and enablethe actualisation of capabilities envisionedduring the recent Transformation studyconducted by the present Army Chief prior toassuming charge. Over 60,000 troops and 300tanks are participating in the exercise. For the firsttime the Army successfully used its satellites andUAVs during Sudarshan Shakti to provide areal-time picture and information of the war zoneto battlefield commanders. The shift in outlookand the matching changes in the Army structureare based on a Transformation Study, carried
out by a group of senior generals over the past twoyears. The new shift is aimed at strengtheningthe Armys capabilities to fight a war ontwo and a half fronts. The Indian Army willmove from a Command-based deployment toa theatre command format where the front orthe spearhead will be seamlessly integrated withresources in the depth or the rear.
EXERCISE SUDARSHAN SHAKTVALIDATING DOCTRINE
trAnsfOrMAtiOn
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Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thap
SM (retd)
uniQue scenAriO
Indias Unique Security Situation -Two Nuclear Armed Adversaries as Immediate Neighbours.
A succinct article that highlights the dilemmas India wouldbe faced with in a Limited war scenario in South Asia
which could emerge from a collusive threat by China andPakistan. The writer avers that Pak would be keen to useTactical Nuclear weapons and the onus would be on Indiato prevent such an escalation.
The writer is working
multinational inform
technology company
his retirement. He is P
Sino-Indian Relations
contributes regularly
magazines, periodicals
newspapers on Str
Security and Defence r
issues.
SUB-CONTINENTAL
DILEMMA
A future In
conflict will be a
scenario. On one han
of tactical nuclear weapons
is a distinct possibility w
the other our failure will
us to the status of a minor
and we will remain conf
south Asia - exactly what
wants. Our aim should
gain a clear tactical vict
thwarting Pak designs valley while at the sam
not inviting a nuclear st
nightmarish scenario inde
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IFSEC India / Homeland Security India 2011 a resounding success !!!
IFSEC India 2011 was held at Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India from 08 - 10 December 2011.
Delhi, December 2011: The fifth security exhibition, IFSEC India 2011, turned out to be a thunderous success with thousandsecurity professionals from all over the globe descending on Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India, during December 8-10. The UnMinister for Home Affairs, Mr P Chidambaram, inaugurated the event.
The exhibition, which was spread over three days from 8th to 10th December, saw over 11,684 trade visitors, which comprileading names from over 250 exhibitors taking the opportunity to present their latest developments to the market, present and gather market intelligence from the various international pavilions from countries such as UK, USA, France, Sweden, Taiwan China.
This year IFSEC India, in partnership with the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham), featureHomeland Security India conference titled, War against terror- A challenge to our Homeland Security. The conference was a vevent for all homeland and commercial security professionals in both the public and private sector in India. Mr D R KarthikeyPadma Shri, Chairman, ASSOCHAMs National Council on Installations, Premises & Personnel Security (IPPS) delivered the welcoaddress. The conference focused on the advice, solutions and systems required for vigilance and security.
In his welcome address, Shri Karthikeyan said, Homeland Security is the most important aspect that sets the agenda to a secfuture of the country. The event as always has received very positive responses from the industry and I am very excited with the wthe industry is reacting towards the event.
Various associations, supporters, members and sponsors and domestic and international participants along with the strong vissupport contributed to the one of a kind B2B exhibition, which has gained a stronger foothold as the most prominent and imporexhibition on the commercial and homeland security sector in the country.
Amongst the prominent and most reputed industry names in the business of safety and security that were presentthe exhibition viz. ADI, Aditya, ANG India, Arise, Axis, BGI, BOSCH, DVTel, Everfocus, FAAC, Godrej, Gunnebo, HHIKVISION, Honeywell Security, Indigo Vision, Kores, Kufra, LG, Matrix, Miscrosoft, Morpho, NEC, Neural, PanasoSamriddhi Automation (SPARSH), Turbo, Tyco, Vectra Glosec, Verint etc.
HIGHLIGHTS of IFSEC India and Homeland Security India 2011
Indias Largest Exhibition for Commercial, Homeland Security and Fire Technology.
Supported by UK Trade & Investments & APSA- Asian professional Security Association.
Certified by US Commercial Services.
Country pavilions this year from USA, UK, Sweden, France, Taiwan and China.
Over 250 leading Security & Fire Technology Companies exhibiting.
Spread over 15,000 sq mts area.
IFSEC India 2011 aimed at bringing together the security experts from various industries including financial services, infrastructpublic safety, law enforcement retail, realty and hospitality all searching for the latest products and services in the security mar
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