dynamic planning for coin in afghanistan - … operations must accomplish three tasks...
TRANSCRIPT
COIN operations must accomplish three tasks simultaneously:
• Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral disposition.
• Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a supportive disposition.
• Retain supportive individuals.These operations are conducted in an environment where tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a society and provide opportunities for insurgents
• This environment may suggest courses of action aimed at reinforcing or widening seams
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
• An increase in Coalition funding will influence economic investment and development.
• A strengthened economy will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
EconomicDevelopment
EconomicInvestment
CoalitionFunding
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
EconomicDevelopment
EconomicInvestment
CoalitionFunding
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly impact the restoration of essential services.
• Improvements in the provision of essential services will influence movement from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups toward the supportive group.
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to DevelopGovernance
EconomicDevelopment
EconomicInvestment
AvailableWorkforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Actsof Violence
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
External MaterialSupportA government that is established,
recognized, and that maintains a secure environment is in a position to
• Send a positive, credible message of success to the populace.
• Provide an environment that enhances stable employment of the workforce.
• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider becoming supporters.
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to DevelopGovernance
EconomicDevelopment
EconomicInvestment
AvailableWorkforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Actsof Violence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix ofEffort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
Information
Host NationSecurity Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
External MaterialSupport
An appropriate force mix, and correct operational tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very significant impacts on
• The restoration of essential services.
• The populace’s perception of security.
• The Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in their communications efforts with the populace.
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to DevelopGovernance
EconomicDevelopment
EconomicInvestment
AvailableWorkforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Actsof Violence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix ofEffort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
Information
Host NationSecurity Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
External MaterialSupport
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to DevelopGovernance
EconomicDevelopment
EconomicInvestment
AvailableWorkforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Actsof Violence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix ofEffort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
Information
Host NationSecurity Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
External MaterialSupport
The Basic Information Ops Loop
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 9
Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively
SupportingGov’t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov vs.Insurgent Path
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs
Insurgents
POPULAR SUPPORT t
Popular Support – Sympathizers and Active Supporters
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 10
Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Gov’t and CF
Strength of Religious
Ideology & Tribal Structures
Cultural Erosion/Displacement
Perceived Damages/Use of Force by Insurgents
Perception of Insurgent Strength and Intent
Relative WOM Message Amplification Gov’t vs Ins
Ethnic/Tribal Rivalry
Perception of Coalition Intent & Commitment
Average Connectedness
of Population
Perceived Security
Fear of Ins. Attack,
Repercussions
Perception of Gov’t Strength and Intent
Satisfaction w/ Gains in Security, Services &
Employment
Visible Gains In Security, Services &
Employment
Expectations for Security, Services &
Employment
Ability to Reconcile Religious Ideology,
Tribal Structures w/
Gov’t Path
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 11
Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov vs.Insurgent Path
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs
Insurgents
POPULARSUPPORT
t POPULAR SUPPORT
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of GovtStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
Population Conditions, Beliefs, & Structures
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 12
Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Insurgent expansion: Insurgent factions with havens as base can expand their presence and influence, further increasing their operating base territory. (Permissive population contribution to Havens / Ability to Operate input from separate sector). 2. Alignment of criminal and insurgent interests: Weakly governed / policed territory may support insurgents, terrorists and criminals alike. Often interests align and lines blur with criminal activity and funding contributing to insurgent operations and expansion, further increasing the weakly governed terrority and ability to operate
2Ins Strategic Comm/IO & Affiliation w/ Population
Insurgent Capacity,
Priorities & Effectiveness
Ins Targeted Attacks on Progress/
Support for Gov’t
Ties to Narcotics & Other Criminal Funding
Territory Not Under Gov’t
ControlIns Provision
of Gov’t & Services
Insurgent Offensives &
Presence (Clear & Hold)
Insurgent Damages & Casualties 1
Funding & Material
Support to Insurgents
Insurgent Terrain
Advantage
Terrain Harshness & Breadth
Illegit Agric Production
Trade & Employment
Narcotics & Criminal
Activity Levels
Likelihood of Crime/ Violence/
Ins Support for Payment
Criminal/ Trafficking
Capability & Coercion
Havens / Ability to Operate
Insurgent Leadership
Training, Skill & Exper
Coordination Among Ins Factions
Outside Support /
Enablement of Ins.
Insurgent Recruiting, Retention, Manpower,
& ISR
Fear of Gov’t / ANSF / Coalition Repercussions
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 13
Insurgent Capacity, Outside Support/ Enablement of Insurgents, Narcotics
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
IllegitAgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTSPerceived
Damages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov vs.Insurgent Path
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs
Insurgents
POPULARSUPPORT
t
POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
POPULAR SUPPORT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 14
Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
1
2
Feedback Loop Examples: 1. Agricultural production and markets: Investment and spending enables agricultural production. Production can boost economic activity and trade which feeds back into private sector re-investment. (Public policy and investment in infrastructure, workforce, financial markets, etc helps start / maintain private sector momentum.) 2. Making legit agriculture more attractive: Improved legit agricultural opportunities may make illegit agricultural options less attractive which further increases legit agricultural production, trade, and markets. (Other inputs to decisions related to legit vs illegit from other sectors.)
Private Sector Capital Mgmt, Investment &
Spending
Infr. Services, Econ, Policy & Execution/ Perceived Fairness
Ability to Move People &
Goods Rapidly
Legit Economic Activity, Trade &
Employment
Legit vs Illegit Relative
Economic Opportunity
Fraction of Workforce and Agric.
Legit vs Illegit
Civilian Services (SWET,
Healthcare, Education)
Legit Other Production & Services Non-Agric
Population Basic Needs
Service Levels & Employment
Private Sector Workforce
Skill & Avail
Legit Agric Production
Infrastructure Dev. Adequacy & Sustainment
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 15
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
Infrastructure, Services, & Economy
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector
WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure
Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric
Private SectorCapital Mgmt., Investment &
Spending
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
-
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY
Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov vs.Insurgent Path
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs
Insurgents
POPULARSUPPORT
t
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
POPULAR SUPPORT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 16
Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Feedback Loop Example: Informal learning and mentoring: Formal training and vetting (enabled by institutional capacity) can improve and maintain Government workforce skill and professionalism. However, as you build a skilled, professional workforce base and culture, informal learning and expectations for behavior is also very powerful (and can contribute to institutional development as well…another key loop)
’
’Transparency of Gov’t Processes & Investments
Gov’t Funding
Adequacy
Gov’t/Contractor Corruption &
Tribal Favoritism
Tax Revenues
Central Gov’t Institutional & Execution
Capacity
Gov’t Training, Mentoring,
Vetting, and Hiring
Gov’t Professionalism, Policy Quality &
Fairness
Overall Gov’t Reach,
Execution, Capacity & Investment
Gov’t Workforce
Skill & Avail
Gov’t Security Policy Quality & Investment
Recognition/ Engagement to Integrate Tribal
Structures & Beliefs
Gov’t Integration of Local Tribal Structures
Gov’t / ANSF StratCom/IO
Relative Message Quality
Gov’t vs Ins
Relative Message Impact
Gov’t vs Ins
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 17
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.
Gov't/ANSFStrategic
IOCommun/
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
TaxRevenues
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov'tFunding
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
CapacityExecution
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector
WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure
Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric
Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,
Investment &Spending
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
-
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector
WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure
Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric
Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,
Investment &Spending
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
-
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov vs.Insurgent Path
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs
Insurgents
POPULARSUPPORT
t
Governance – Central Government Development & Capacity; Engagement / Empowerment of Tribal Governance; Overall Governance Capacity & Impacts
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY
POPULAR SUPPORT
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 18
Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support
US Domestic Perceived
Cost/Benefit & Support
US Domestic/ Int’l StratComm
& Diplomacy
US Gov’t Support for Operation
Media Sensationalism
Bias
Breadth of Coalition
& Support
Resource Levels (Mil. & Civ. Forces and Levels)
Coalition StratComm/IO
Coalition Execution Capacity & Priorities
Coalition Avg COIN Experienc e & Skill
Duration of Operation
Coalition Knowledge &
Understanding of Social
Structures
Coalition Appropriate Balance of
Effort & Force
Coalition COIN Support
Strategy & Unity
Coalition Adjustment of Approach to Fit Afghan
Coalition Dev. Ops-ANSF Advisory &
Aid
Coalition Dev. Ops-Gov’t Advisory &
Aid
Coalition Dev. Ops- Infrastructure, Services, Econ Advisory & Aid Provide
Humanitarian Relief
Coalition/Homeland Acceptance of
Afghan Methods
Coalition Visibility to Population
Western Affiliation Backlash
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 19
WesternAffiliationBacklash
Durationof
Operation
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
CoalitionDev.Ops-
Infrastructure,Services,
Econ.Advisory
& Aid
US DomesticPerceived
Cost/Benefit& Support
MediaSensationalism
Bias
US Domestic/Int'l Strategic
Commun.& Diplomacy
US Gov'tSupport forOperation
Breadth ofCoalition &
Support
ResourceLevels
(Mil. & Civ.Forces,
Aid Levels)
CoalitionStrategic
Commun./IO
Duration ofOperation
CoalitionAvg COINExperience
& Skill
CoalitionKnowledge
of SocialStructures
& Underst CoalitionCOIN
SupportStrategy &
Unity
Coalition
Balance ofEffort &Force
Appropriate
CoalitionExecution
PrioritiesCapacity &
Coalition
GovAdvisory
& Aid
Dev. Ops-’t
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
CoalitionDev. Ops-
Advisory& Aid
ANSF
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.
Gov't/ANSFStrategic
IOCommun/
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
TaxRevenues
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov'tFunding
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
CapacityExecution
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
OVERALLGOVERNMENT
CAPACITY
TRIBALGOVERNANCE
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.
Gov't/ANSFStrategic
IOCommun/
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
TaxRevenues
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov'tFunding
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
CapacityExecution
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
OVERALLGOVERNMENT
CAPACITY
TRIBALGOVERNANCE
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector
WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure
Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric
Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,
Investment &Spending
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
-
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector
WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure
Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric
Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,
Investment &Spending
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
-
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov vs.Insurgent Path
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs
Insurgents
POPULARSUPPORT
t
Coalition Resources, Actions, & Impacts and Homeland Support
COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES
COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
POPULAR SUPPORT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS
TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 20
ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional
Feedback Loop Examples: 1. ANSF success and informal momentum: ANSF professionalism and skill contributes to
tactical capacity which enables effective operations. Success and experience feeds back into professionalism, skill and morale which further reinforces both leadership & tactical capacity and recruiting / retention.
2. ANSF institutional capacity: Institutional capacity and processes enable manpower, formal training, logistics, planning & budgeting, etc that reinforce informal gains support ANSF capacity over time.
2
1 1
ANSF & Coalition
Damages/ Casualties
ANSF & Manpower
Recruiting & Retention
ANSF Institutional & Execution
Capacity
ANSF Funding
Adequacy
ISR / Open Source Ops Total Security
Force Capacity & focus
ANSF Training & Mentoring
ANSF Unit Leadership & Tactical Capacity
Targeted Strikes
Counter Narcotics /Crime Ops
Sweep Ops (Clear)
Policing & Security
Ops (Hold)
ANSF Unit Capacity,
Priorities & Effectiveness
ANSF Avg Professionalism, Skill, Discipline
& Morale
ANSF Corruption
& Tribal Favoritism
\
R.O.L. Policy, Execution & Perceived Fairness
ANSF Appropriate
Use of Force
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 21
WesternAffiliationBacklash
Durationof
Operation
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
CoalitionDev.Ops-
Infrastructure,Services,
Econ.Advisory
& Aid
US DomesticPerceived
Cost/Benefit& Support
MediaSensationalism
Bias
US Domestic/Int'l Strategic
Commun.& Diplomacy
US Gov'tSupport forOperation
Breadth ofCoalition &
Support
ResourceLevels
(Mil. & Civ.Forces,
Aid Levels)
CoalitionStrategic
Commun./IO
Duration ofOperation
CoalitionAvg COINExperience
& Skill
CoalitionKnowledge
of SocialStructures
& Underst CoalitionCOIN
SupportStrategy &
Unity
Coalition
Balance ofEffort &Force
Appropriate
CoalitionExecution
PrioritiesCapacity &
Coalition
GovAdvisory
& Aid
Dev. Ops-’t
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
CoalitionDev. Ops-
Advisory& Aid
ANSF
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
WesternAffiliationBacklash
Durationof
Operation
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
CoalitionDev.Ops-
Infrastructure,Services,
Econ.Advisory
& Aid
US DomesticPerceived
Cost/Benefit& Support
MediaSensationalism
Bias
US Domestic/Int'l Strategic
Commun.& Diplomacy
US Gov'tSupport forOperation
Breadth ofCoalition &
Support
ResourceLevels
(Mil. & Civ.Forces,
Aid Levels)
CoalitionStrategic
Commun./IO
Duration ofOperation
CoalitionAvg COINExperience
& Skill
CoalitionKnowledge
of SocialStructures
& Underst CoalitionCOIN
SupportStrategy &
Unity
Coalition
Balance ofEffort &Force
Appropriate
CoalitionExecution
PrioritiesCapacity &
Coalition
GovAdvisory
& Aid
Dev. Ops-’t
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
CoalitionDev. Ops-
Advisory& Aid
ANSF
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.
Gov't/ANSFStrategic
IOCommun/
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
TaxRevenues
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov'tFunding
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
CapacityExecution
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
OVERALLGOVERNMENT
CAPACITY
TRIBALGOVERNANCE
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.
Gov't/ANSFStrategic
IOCommun/
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
TaxRevenues
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Gov'tFunding
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
CapacityExecution
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
OVERALLGOVERNMENT
CAPACITY
TRIBALGOVERNANCE
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov t & Coalition
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov vs Ins’t
Perception ofCoalition Intent& Commitment Perception
Of Gov tStrength& Intent
Expectations
Services, &Employment
Visible Gains
Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
for Security,
In Security,
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
Tribal
w/ Gov’tPath
StructuresEthnic/TribalRivalry
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures Cultural Erosion/Displacement
POPULATIONCONDITIONS& BELIEFS
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector
WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure
Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric
Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,
Investment &Spending
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
-
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Legit AgricProductionPrivate Sector
WorkforceSkill & AvailInfrastructure
Dev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon Agric
Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,
Investment &Spending
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
-
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
EmploymentInfr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
INFRASTRUCTURE,SERVICES &ECONOMY
Neutral/OnPopulationPopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov vs.Insurgent Path
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGovt vs
Insurgents
POPULARSUPPORT
t
ANSF Development, Capacity & Impacts – Tactical & Institutional
COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT
Counter Narcotics/Crime OpsTargeted
StrikesSweep Ops
(Clear)Policing &
Security Ops(Hold)
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &
FairnessPerceived
ANSFPriorities & Effectiveness
Capacity,
TotalSecurityForce
Capacity &Focus
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFFunding
Adequacy
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
ANSF Avg.Professionalism
& MoraleSkill, Discipline,
ISR / OpenSource Ops
ANSFManpower
RetentionRecruiting &
ANSF UnitLeadership
Capacity& Tactical
ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties
ANSF INSTITUTIONAL
ANSF TACTICAL
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Ins. TargetedAttacks on
Supportfor Gov
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Progress/
’t
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Fear ofGov t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties ’
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
Havens / Ability to Operate
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding Funding &
Support to InsurgentsMaterial
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Likelihood of
for Payment
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
InsurgentTerrain
Advantage
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
NARCOTICS
INSURGENTS
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT
FACTIONS
COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES POPULATION
CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
POPULAR SUPPORT
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS
TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES
COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT
OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 22
WORKING DRAFT – V3
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
CoalitionDev.Ops-
Infrastructure,Services,
Econ.Advisory
& Aid
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
CoalitionAvg COINExperience
& Skill
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
CoalitionStrategic
Commun./IO
Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Likelihood of
for Payment
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Breadth ofCoalition &
Support
ResourceLevels
(Mil. & Civ.Forces,
Aid Levels)
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.
of SocialStructures
Coalition‘COIN
Support’Strategy &
Unity
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
Employment
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Private SectorCapital Mgmt., Investment &
Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
IllegitAgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
CoalitionDev. Ops-
ANSFAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSFManpower
Recruiting &Retention
ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity
TotalSecurityForce
Capacity &Focus
ISR / OpenSource Ops
CoalitionDev. Ops-
Gov’tAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFCapacity,
Priorities & Effectiveness
ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
Duration ofOperation
US DomesticPerceived
Cost/Benefit& Support
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
US Domestic/Int'l Strategic
Commun.& Diplomacy
US Gov'tSupport forOperation
CoalitionAppropriateBalance of
Effort &Force
Gov'tFunding
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
TaxRevenues
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Policing &Security Ops
(Hold)
TargetedStrikes
CoordinationAmong Ins.
FactionsInsurgentTerrain
Advantage
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
Legit AgricProduction
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
MediaSensationalism
BiasCultural Erosion/
Displacement
Durationof
Operation
Sweep Ops(Clear)
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Funding &Material
Support to Insurgents
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Havens / Ability to Operate
Significant Delay=
Significant Delay=
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
POPULAR SUPPORT
INSURGENTS
INFRASTRUCTURE, SERVICES & ECONOMY
NARCOTICS
POPULATION CONDITIONS & BELIEFS
COALITION DOMESTIC SUPPORT
ANSF TACTICAL
TRIBAL GOVERNANCE
OVERALL GOVERNMENT CAPACITY
ANSF INSTITUTIONAL
COALITION CAPACITY & PRIORITIES
OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO INSURGENT FACTIONS
CENTRAL GOV’T
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 23
1
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness Private Workf
Skill &
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
InfrastructureDev Adequacy
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
CoalitionDev. Ops-
ANSFAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSFManpower
Recruiting &Retention
ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity
TotalSecurity
ForceCapacity &
Focus
ISR / OpenSource Ops
alitionOps-
ov’tvisoryAid
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFCapacity,
Priorities & Effectiveness
ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the Fence Sw
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
tngacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Policing &Security Ops
(Hold)
TargetedStrikes
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security Services
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcile
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
sparencyGov’t
cesses &stments
Cultural Erosion/Displacement
Sweep Ops(Clear)
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Havens / Ability to Operate
2
Key Feedback Loop: Securing and Empowering the Population
Fear is a key mechanism for insurgent factions to prevent the population from engaging and actively supporting the Government. Securing populated territory (clear and hold ops) can reduce insurgent ability to target and intimidate the population such that Gov’t sympathizers are willing to be active supporters. •
HUMINT: The population will be more willing to provide intel if they do not fear insurgent repercussions.•
ANA & ANP Development: ANSF recruiting and development is facilitated by the expansion of secure regions. (ANA and ANP leaders, families, facilities, etc less likely to be targeted or overrun.
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 24
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
AppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Likelihood of
for Payment
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
Trainingoring,g, and
ring
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
han
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr, Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
Employment
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Private SectorCapital Mgmt.,
Investment &Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Legit vsRela
EconoOpport
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
Illegit AProduc
TradEmploy
N&
Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.alition/HomelandAcceptance offghan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
tionOps-SFsory
Aid
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.alition/HomelandAcceptance offghan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
tionOps-SFsory
Aid
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
Coalitionsibility toopulation
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
v't/ractorption &avoritism
TaxRevenues
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectedness
of Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
Legit AgricProduction
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Cultural Erosion/Displacement
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Funding &Material
Support to Insurgents
& Pakistan)
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Key Feedback Loop: Government Engagement and Integration of Tribal Governance
Critical for the Government to recognize and make the effort to engage existing tribal structures and Governance if they are to be accepted by the population. Ties to local governance can gain popular support and rapidly expand the Government’s overall capacity and ‘reach’ which further increases their capacity and ability to engage the population.
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 26
WORKING DRAFT
Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
CoalitionDev.Ops-
Infrastructure,Services,
Econ.Advisory
& Aid
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
CoalitionAvg COINExperience
& Skill
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
CoalitionStrategic
Commun./IO
Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Likelihood ofActive Ins.Support forPayment
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Breadth ofCoalition &
Support
ResourceLevels
(MilitaryForces,CivilianForces,
Aid Levels)
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.
of SocialStructures
Coalition‘COIN
Support’Strategy &
Unity
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
Employment
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Private SectorCapital
Management,Investment &
Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
CoalitionDev. Ops-
ANSFAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSFManpower
Recruiting &Retention
ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity
TotalSecurityForce
Capacity &Focus
ISR / OpenSource Ops
CoalitionDev. Ops-
Gov’tAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFCapacity &Priorities
ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
Duration ofOperation
US DomesticPerceived
Cost/Benefit& Support
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
US Domestic/Int'l Strategic
Commun.& Diplomacy
US Gov'tSupport forOperation
CoalitionAppropriateBalance of
Effort &Force
Gov'tFunding
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
TaxRevenues
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Policing &Security Ops
(Hold)
TargetedStrikes
CoordinationAmong Ins.
FactionsInsurgentTerrain
Advantage
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Criminal/Trafficking
Capability &Coercion
Legit AgricProduction
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
MediaSensationalism
BiasCultural Erosion/
Displacement
Durationof
Operation
Sweep Ops(Clear)
RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Funding &Material
Support to Insurgents
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Havens / Ability to Operate
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – SECURITY
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 27
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
CoalitionDev.Ops-
Infrastructure,Services,
Econ.Advisory
& Aid
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
CoalitionAvg COINExperience
& Skill
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
CoalitionStrategic
Commun./IO
Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Likelihood of
for Payment
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Breadth ofCoalition &
Support
ResourceLevels
(Mil. & Civ.Forces,
Aid Levels)
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.
of SocialStructures
Coalition‘COIN
Support’Strategy &
Unity
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
Employment
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Private SectorCapital Mgmt., Investment &
Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
CoalitionDev. Ops-
ANSFAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSFManpower
Recruiting &Retention
ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity
TotalSecurityForce
Capacity &Focus
ISR / OpenSource Ops
CoalitionDev. Ops-
Gov’tAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFCapacity &Priorities
ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
Duration ofOperation
US DomesticPerceived
Cost/Benefit& Support
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
US Domestic/Int'l Strategic
Commun.& Diplomacy
US Gov'tSupport forOperation
CoalitionAppropriateBalance of
Effort &Force
Gov'tFunding
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
TaxRevenues
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Policing &Security Ops
(Hold)
TargetedStrikes
CoordinationAmong Ins.
FactionsInsurgentTerrain
Advantage
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
Legit AgricProduction
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
MediaSensationalism
BiasCultural Erosion/
Displacement
Durationof
Operation
Sweep Ops(Clear)
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Funding &Material
Support to Insurgents
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Havens / Ability to Operate
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
Reconciliation Effectiveness
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – GOVERNANCE
WORKING DRAFT
Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 28
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – DEVELOPMENT
WORKING DRAFT
Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
CoalitionDev.Ops-
Infrastructure,Services,
Econ.Advisory
& Aid
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
CoalitionAvg COINExperience
& Skill
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
CoalitionStrategic
Commun./IO
Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Likelihood of
for Payment
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Breadth ofCoalition &
Support
ResourceLevels
(Mil. & Civ.Forces,
Aid Levels)
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.
of SocialStructures
Coalition‘COIN
Support’Strategy &
Unity
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
Employment
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Private SectorCapital Mgmt., Investment &
Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
CoalitionDev. Ops-
ANSFAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSFManpower
Recruiting &Retention
ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity
TotalSecurityForce
Capacity &Focus
ISR / OpenSource Ops
CoalitionDev. Ops-
Gov’tAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFCapacity &Priorities
ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
Duration ofOperation
US DomesticPerceived
Cost/Benefit& Support
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
US Domestic/Int'l Strategic
Commun.& Diplomacy
US Gov'tSupport forOperation
CoalitionAppropriateBalance of
Effort &Force
Gov'tFunding
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
TaxRevenues
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Policing &Security Ops
(Hold)
TargetedStrikes
CoordinationAmong Ins.
FactionsInsurgentTerrain
Advantage
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Criminal/TraffickingCapability &
Coercion
Legit AgricProduction
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
MediaSensationalism
BiasCultural Erosion/
Displacement
Durationof
Operation
Sweep Ops(Clear)
RelativePopularSupport/ /ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Funding &Material
Support to Insurgents
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Havens / Ability to Operate
Crime/Violence /Ins. Support
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 29
WORKING DRAFTSignificant Delay=
Significant Delay=
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
CoalitionDev.Ops-
Infrastructure,Services,
Econ.Advisory
& Aid
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
CoalitionAvg COINExperience
& Skill
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness
CoalitionStrategic
Commun./IO
Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Likelihood ofActive Ins.Support forPayment
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
Gov't TrainingMentoring,Vetting, and
Hiring
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
Breadth ofCoalition &
Support
ResourceLevels
(MilitaryForces,CivilianForces,
Aid Levels)
CoalitionAdjustmentof Approachto Fit Afghan
CoalitionKnowledge& Underst.
of SocialStructures
Coalition‘COIN
Support’Strategy &
Unity
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Legit EconomicActivity,Trade &
Employment
CivilianServices(SWET,
Healthcare,Education)
Private SectorCapital
Management,Investment &
Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Legit vs. IllegitRelative
EconomicOpportunity
PopulationBasic Needs
Service Levels& Employment
Fraction ofWorkforceAnd Agric.Legit vsIllegit
Illegit AgricProduction,
Trade &Employment
Narcotics& Criminal
ActivityLevels
InsurgentRecruiting,Retention,Manpower
& ISR
Counter- Narcotics/Crime Ops
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
Fear ofGov’ t/ANSF/
CoalitionRepercussions
Ins. Damages& Casualties
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.Coalition/HomelandAcceptance of
Afghan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
CoalitionDev. Ops-
ANSFAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,
& Morale
ANSFManpower
Recruiting &Retention
ANSF UnitLeadership& TacticalCapacity
TotalSecurityForce
Capacity &Focus
ISR / OpenSource Ops
CoalitionDev. Ops-
Gov’tAdvisory
& Aid
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFCapacity &Priorities
ANSF &CoalitionDamages/Casualties
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopulation
Sympathizingw/ Insurgents
PopulationActively
SupportingInsurgency
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
CoalitionExecutionCapacity &Priorities
TerrainHarshness& Breadth
Duration ofOperation
US DomesticPerceived
Cost/Benefit& Support
CoalitionVisibility toPopulation
US Domestic/Int'l Strategic
Commun.& Diplomacy
US Gov'tSupport forOperation
CoalitionAppropriateBalance of
Effort &Force
Gov'tFunding
Adequacy
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
Gov't/Contractor
Corruption &Tribal Favoritism
TaxRevenues
OutsideSupport/
Enablementof Ins.
Policing &Security Ops
(Hold)
TargetedStrikes
CoordinationAmong Ins.
FactionsInsurgentTerrain
Advantage
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Criminal/Trafficking
Capability &Coercion
Legit AgricProduction
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Transparencyof Gov’t
Processes &Investments
MediaSensationalism
BiasCultural Erosion/
Displacement
Durationof
Operation
Sweep Ops(Clear)
RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Funding &Material
Support to Insurgents
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Havens / Ability to Operate
Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture
Population/Popular SupportInfrastructure, Economy, & ServicesGovernmentAfghanistan Security ForcesInsurgentsCrime and NarcoticsCoalition Forces & ActionsPhysical Environment
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 30
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Claim the Information Initiative
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
iningng,and
g
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
hn
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
CiviliaServic(SWE
HealthcEducat
Private SectorCapital
Management,Investment &
Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Leadership,Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.on/Homelandceptance ofan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
ns-
y
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
& Morale
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopu
Sympaw/ Insu
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
THa&
alitionbility toulation
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
toron &oritism
TaxRevenues
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Cultural Erosion/Displacement
RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
FunMa
SupInsu
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
iningng,and
g
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
hn
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
CiviliaServic(SWE
HealthcEducat
Private SectorCapital
Management,Investment &
Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Leadership,Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.on/Homelandceptance ofan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
ns-
y
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
& Morale
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopu
Sympaw/ Insu
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
THa&
alitionbility toulation
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
toron &oritism
TaxRevenues
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Cultural Erosion/Displacement
RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
FunMa
SupInsu
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
Gov'tWorkforce
Skill & Avail
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
Gov'tProfessionalismPolicy Quality
& Fairness Private SectorWorkforce
Skill & Avail
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'tIntegration ofLocal TribalStructures
iningng,and
g
Overall Gov'tReach,
ExecutionCapacity &Investment
hn
Recognition/Engagement to
IntegrateTribal
Structures&Beliefs
ProvideHumanitarian
Relief
Infr., Services, Econ.Policy & Execution/Perceived Fairness
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
CiviliaServic(SWE
HealthcEducat
Private SectorCapital
Management,Investment &
Spending
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Leadership,Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.on/Homelandceptance ofan Methods
Gov'tSecurityPolicy
Quality &Investment
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairnessANSF
FundingAdequacy
ns-
y
ANSFInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
ANSFTraining &Mentoring
& Morale
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the FencePopu
Sympaw/ Insu
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
THa&
alitionbility toulation
Central Gov'tInstitutional &
ExecutionCapacity
toron &oritism
TaxRevenues
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractiveness
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Path
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Ability toMove
People& GoodsRapidly
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Cultural Erosion/Displacement
RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
FunMa
SupInsu
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Claim the Information Initiative: “Message” quality and availability impact who is relatively more effective in influencing the population. Government message quality has been stronger relative to insurgent factions (who have typically not made the effort or been effective in aligning with civilian beliefs), but lack of progress has undermined message credibility. Message availability is constrained by low “average connectedness” (rural populations spread across harsh terrain, low literacy rates, limited radio) and most message propagation / amplification is by word of mouth (WOM). WOM tends to amplify negative messages more strongly than positive, but also tends to be biased towards current sentiments. “Western affiliation backlash” may undermine Government messages if they are seen as puppets who lack the strength to deliver progress or have taken an overly Western posture
© PA Knowledge Limited 2009 Page 31
Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics – Population Security
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
PrivW
Ski
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'ttegration ofocal Tribal
Structures
ecognition/gagement toIntegrate
Tribaltructures&Beliefs
I f S i E
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Private SeCapita
ManagemInvestme
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
p
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.
tyy
&ent
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairness
ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,
& Morale
pcalty
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFCapacity &Priorities
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the Fence
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
OutsidSuppor
Enablemof Ins.
gSecurity Ops
(Hold)
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractivenes
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Pa
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Ability toMove
People
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Cultural Erosion/Displacement
RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Havens / Ability to Operate
Neutral/OnPopulation
Ins. StrategicCommun/IO
& Affiliation w/Population
ANSFAppropriateUse of Force
Relative WOMMessage
AmplificationGov’t vs Ins
PrivW
Ski
Ties toNarcotics &
Other CriminalFunding
InsurgentCapacity,
Priorities &Effectiveness
Strength ofReligious
Ideology &Tribal
Structures
Gov'ttegration ofocal Tribal
Structures
ecognition/gagement toIntegrate
Tribaltructures&Beliefs
I f S i E
InfrastructureDev. Adequacy& Sustainment
Private SeCapita
ManagemInvestme
Expectationsfor Security,Services, &Employment
Perception ofInsurgentStrength &
Intent
WesternAffiliationBacklash Perception of
Coalition Intent& Commitment
RelativeMessage
Impact Gov’tvs Ins
Fear of Ins.Attack/
Repercussions
Ins.Leadership,
Training, Skill& Experience
Ins. ProvisionOf Gov’t &Services
Ins.Offensives &
Presence(Clear & Hold)
p
Gov't/ANSFStrategicCommun/
IO
PerceivedDamages &Use of Force
by Ins.
RelativeMessageQuality
Gov’ ’t vs Ins.
tyy
&ent
R.O.L. Policy,Execution &PerceivedFairness
ANSF Avg.ProfessionalismSkill, Discipline,
& Morale
pcalty
ANSFCorruption &
TribalFavoritism
ANSFCapacity &Priorities
PopulationActively
SupportingGov’ t & SF
Sympathizingw/ Gov’t
the Fence
Ethnic/TribalRivalry
OutsidSuppor
Enablemof Ins.
gSecurity Ops
(Hold)
CoordinationAmong Ins.
Factions
PerceivedDamages/Use
of Force byGov’ t & Coalition
PerceivedSecurity
AverageConnectednessof Population
PotentialAttractivenes
of Gov’t vs.Insurgent Pa
Visible GainsIn Security,Services &
Employment
Satisfactionw/ Gains in
Security, Services& Employment
PerceptionOf Gov’tStrength& Intent
Ability toReconcileReligiousIdeology,
TribalStructuresw/ Gov’t
Path
Ins. TargetedAttacks onProgress/Supportfor Gov’t
Ability toMove
People
Legit OtherProduction& ServicesNon-Agric
Cultural Erosion/Displacement
RelativePopularSupport/ ToleranceGov’t vs
Insurgents
Territory NotUnder Gov’t
Control (Afghan & Pakistan)
Havens / Ability to Operate
Population Security: Security is a function of day to day conditions and also perception of ‘who will win’ over longer term: •
Actual damages by both the Insurgents and ANSF / Coalition forces impact perceived security. •
Insurgents rely targeted “attacks on progress” to generate fear and intimidation to limit sympathizers moving towards active supporters. They often threaten or target civilian and security force individuals who are visibly supporting the government – the fear this generates is powerful in slowing or reversing positive momentum.•
In addition to near term security concerns, the population is assessing ‘who will win’ over the long term by comparing perception of Insurgent strength to perception of Government strength and also considering perceived Coalition commitment. (A key input to perceived strength is how much of the population lives in region secured by the Government.) They will hesitate to actively support the government if they feel they will fail, particularly if they have been witness to “clear and leave” operations.