dynastic politics15th congress 9 22 2011

An Empirical Analysis An Empirical Analysis of of Political Dynasties in the Political Dynasties in the

1515thth Philippine CongressPhilippine Congress

DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTHDEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

Ronald U. Mendoza, PhDRonald U. Mendoza, PhD

AIM Policy CenterAIM Policy Center

http://Policy.aim.eduhttp://Policy.aim.edu

*Support from Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the AIM-Scientific Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The

views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the

Asian Institute of Management, AIM-SRF and KAS. This presentation is based on Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap (2011).

“An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress.” Asian Institute of Management Policy Center

Research Paper.

Voices of the Politicians

“There are some politicians who wish there were more poor people. The

poor are the bailiwick because […] if you are a moneyed politician, it’s

better to have poor people because you can buy them. Give them

P200, P300 in the elections and they will vote for you.” [A politician

interviewed and cited by Clarke and Sison (2003:221).

“I’m just vice mayor but you know I have an average of twenty to thirty

people every day in [my] house, in [my] office, asking for support. I have

no money and they need money. Even if it’s P100, I’m spending P2000 a

people every day in [my] house, in [my] office, asking for support. I have

no money and they need money. Even if it’s P100, I’m spending P2000 a

day. It’s good I have other businesses, if not you’ll be forced to steal

money from the government to give to the poor […].”

[…] Once you’re a government official, people think you are a rich

person, that you can get money from the government. That’s not

true…My salary is only P21,000 [per month].” [A local politician

interviewed and cited by Clarke and Sison (2003:221).

Motivation

In theory, democracies promote political participation and political equality—

equal voice in government decisionmaking—through various principles such as

one person one vote, equality before the law and equal rights of free speech.

Political equality, in turn, could promote stronger responsiveness and

accountability in addressing the needs of the majority of the citizenry, and in

many cases contribute to improved human capital and other investments.

With political responsiveness, accountability and social spending/investments, With political responsiveness, accountability and social spending/investments,

poverty and inequality reduction as well as higher and more inclusive growth

could ensue.

However, underdeveloped democratic institutions could also be associated with

weak political participation, leading in some cases to the phenomenon of

political dynasties.

How are political dynasties linked to the country’s prospects for inclusive

growth (i.e. high growth accompanied by poverty and inequality reduction)?

Political Dynasties and Poverty/Inequality

Empirical link between political dynasties and poverty/inequality:

•PREDATORY VIEW: Dynasties increase P/I -- If dynasties are associated with rent-

seeking and state capture, corruption and ineffective and poorly designed policies

(e.g. Proud’homme, 1995; Hutchcroft and Rocamora, 2003)

•STATIONARY BANDIT: Dynasties reduce P/I -- If dynasties have longer “runways” for

reform and are more firmly associated with socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Olson,

2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009)2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009)

Additional complexity:

•PATRONAGE: High P/I tends to increase dynastic prevalence: the poor vote for

dynasties as long as these are able to directly provide support during elections or in

times of income shocks (e.g. Coronel, 1998; Manacsa and Tan, 2005)

•SELF-PERPETUATION: Politicians are capable of developing dynasties): being in

public office affords politicians the opportunity and means to keep on winning or to

increase their heirs’ chances of winning (e.g. Dal Bo et al, 2009; Querrubin 2010)

Trend in US Legislators with Relatives in Previous

Congresses (Dynastic Legislators)11% in early 1800s

7% in 1966

Source: Dal bo et al (2009).

Clarification and Improvement of Dynasty Definitions

•Dynasty1: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links

to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress;


to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th or 14th Congress, or at least one

local government official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007;


to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th,14th or 15th Congress, or at least

one local government official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007 or 2010.

•Dynasty*: The share of legislators in the 15th Congress with kinship links

to at least one legislator from the 12th, 13th, or 14th Congresses, and at least

one legislator from the 15th Congress, and at least one local government

official elected in 2001, 2004, or 2007, and at least one local government

official elected in 2010.

Dynastic and Non-Dynastic District Legislators by

Definition

(Total number and percent share)

Dynastic

Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3 Dynasty*

84 (36.7% 144 (62.9% 155 (67.7% 10 (4.4% Dynastic

84 (36.7%

of

Legislators

144 (62.9%

of

Legislators

155 (67.7%

of

Legislators

10 (4.4%

of

Legislators

Rough Comparison of the Share of Dynastic Politicians in

Selected Parliaments and Congresses

33%

10%

6%

Japan

Argentina

United States

Sources: United States (Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder, 2009); Argentina (Rossi, 2009); Japan and Mexico (Asako and others, 2010); Philippines (Authors’ calculations).

68%

63%

37%

40%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Philippines (Dynasty3)



Mexico

Share of Dynastic Politicians in the Philippine Congress

over Time: Preliminary snapshot

50

60

70

80

90

82

73

50

68

Sources: PCIJ as cited in Clarke and Sison (2003) and authors’ calculations based on data from the Philippine Congress.

0

10

20

30

40

50

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

A Snapshot of One Political Dynasty

Sibling

Spouse

Cousin

PBM (Provincial Board

Member)

Note: Incumbent positions are in brackets.

Are dynastic legislators mostly male?

Female

Legislators Dynasty1 Dynasty2 Dynasty3 Dynasty*

50

21 (42.0%

of Female

Legislators)

32 (64.0%

of Female

Legislators)

36 (72.0%

of Female

Legislators)

3 (6.0% of

Female

Legislators)

Male 17963 (35.2%

of Male

Legislators)

112 (62.6%

of Male

Legislators)

119 (66.5%

of Male

Legislators)

7 (3.9% of

Male

Legislators)

Do dynasties dominate political parties?

LAKAS-

KAMPI

Liberal


76

75

38 (50.0% of

LAKAS-

KAMPI

Legislators)

53 (69.7% of

LAKAS-

KAMPI

Legislators)

58 (76.3% of

LAKAS-

KAMPI

Legislators)

7 (9.21% of

LAKAS-

KAMPI

Legislators)

18 (24.0% of

LP

40 (53.3% of

LP

43 (57.3% of

LP

1 (1.33% of

LP Liberal

Party

NPC

Nacionalista

Party

75

34

21

LP

Legislators)

LP

Legislators)

LP

Legislators)

LP

Legislators)

17 (50.0% of

NPC

Legislators)

24 (70.6% of

NPC

Legislators)

25 (73.5% of

NPC

Legislators)

0

7 (33.3% of

NP

Legislators)

17 (81.0% of

NP

Legislators)

17 (81.0% of

NP

Legislators)

1 (4.76% of

NP

Legislators)

Dynasty 3

24%

76%

LAKAS KAMPI

Non-Dynastic

Dynastic

43%

57%

LP

Non-Dynastic

Dynastic

26%

74%

NPC

Non-Dynastic

Dynastic

19%

81%

Nacionalista

Non-Dynastic

Dynastic

Are dynastic legislators older?


39

98

18 (46% of

Age 26-40

Legislators)

29 (74% of

Age 26-40

Legislators)

30 (77% of

Age 26-40

Legislators)

4 (10% of

Age 26-40

Legislators)

34 (35% of

Age 41-55

60 (61% of

Age 41-55

63 (64% of

Age 41-55

3 (3% of

Age 41-55

26-40

41-55 98

67

25

Age 41-55

Legislators

Age 41-55

Legislators

Age 41-55

Legislators

Age 41-55

Legislators

21 (31% of

Age 56-70

Legislators

37 (55% of

Age 56-70

Legislators

41 (61% of

Age 56-70

Legislators

11 (44% of

Age 70+

Legislators

18 (72% of

Age 70+

Legislators

21 (84% of

Age 70+

Legislators

1 (4% of

Age 70+

Legislators

41-55

56-70

70+

2 (3% of

Age 56-70

Legislators

Dynasty 3

23%

77%

26-40

Non-Dynastic

Dynastic

36%

64%

41-55

Non-Dynastic

Dynastic

39%

61%

56-70

Non-Dynastic

Dynastic

16%

84%

70+

Non-Dynastic

Dynastic

Do dynasties tend to be located in jurisdictions with

lower average per capita income?

Average Standard Deviation

Non-Dynastic PhP26,872.38 PhP7,486.73

Dynastic PhP23,275.43 PhP6,358.38

Mean Mean

Difference -PhP3,596.95 --

Test Statistic

and P-Value

-3.565

(0.0003)*** --

Note: Provincial 1997 Prices

p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,

*** significant at 0.01

Are dynastic legislators richer?

Net Worth Net Worth

(sans MP)

Dynasty

Non-Dynasty

PhP 52M

PhP 57M PhP 42M

PhP 52M

Non-Dynasty

Mean Difference

Test Statistic and

P-Value

Note: Both averages reflect a vacant seat for the 1st District of Ilocos Sur..

p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,


PhP 57M PhP 42M

-PhP4,900,547 PhP9,857,260

-0.2525 (0.4013) 0.7671 (0.2236)

Do dynasties tend to be located in jurisdictions with

higher poverty?

Poverty

Incidence

Poverty Gap Poverty

Severity

Dynastic

Non-Dynastic

24.15%

18.95%

6.18%

4.93%

2.31

1.86Non-Dynastic

Mean

Difference

Test Statistic

and P-Value

Note: p-values are in parentheses, * significant at 0.1, ** significant at 0.05,


18.95% 4.93% 1.86

5.2pp 1.25pp 0.45

2.606

(0.0039)***

2.107

(0.0174)**

1.794

(0.0367)**

Do dynasties tend to enjoy higher margins of victory?

Dynasty1

Definition

Dynasty2

Definition

Dynasty3

Definition

Dynastic

Non-Dynastic

Mean

36.43pp

28.49pp

33.34pp

28.23pp

33.26pp

27.64pp

Definition: If winning candidate received A votes and 2nd place candidate received B

votes; and the total number of votes cast is C , then the margin of victory is A/C minus B/C.

Margin of victory is expressed as the difference in percentage points (pp).

Mean

Difference

Test Statistic



7.94pp 5.11pp 5.62pp

2.3477

(0.0094)***

1.5068

(0.0655)*

1.6602

(0.0485)**

Preliminary Snapshot of Correlations

Dynasty3 by Per Capita Income

Controls Per Capita Income (1997 Prices)

Population (-)0.297 (0.004)***

Employment (-)0.331 (0.001)***

Poverty Incidence (-)0.248 (0.016)**Poverty Incidence (-)0.248 (0.016)**

Pop-Emp (-)0.309 (0.003)***

Pop-Pov (-)0.246 (0.018)**

Emp-Pov (-)0.259 (0.013)**

Pop-Emp-Pov (-)0.259 (0.013)**



Preliminary Snapshot of Correlations

Dynasty3 by Poverty/Inequality

Controls Poverty Incidence Provincial GINI

Population 0.179 (0.086)* (-)0.099 (0.345)

Employment 0.217 (0.037)** (-)0.077 (0.461)

PCI (-)0.56 (0.595) (-)0.012 (0.909)



PCI (-)0.56 (0.595) (-)0.012 (0.909)

Pop-Emp 0.181 (0.084)* (-)0.099 (0.347)

Pop-PCI (-)0.050 (0.633) (-)0.007 (0.946)

Emp-PCI (-)0.039 (0.710) (-)0.010 (0.928)

Pop-Emp-PCI (-) 0.051 (0.629) (-)0.018 (0.868)

Selected References

•Asako, Y., T.Iida, T.Matsubayashi and M.Ueda. 2010. “Dynastic legislators: Theory and evidence from Japan.”

Mimeo. [Available at: http://www.psci.unt.edu/~tmatsubayashi/research/seshu.pdf].

•Balisacan, A. and N.Fuwa.2004. “Going beyond cross-country averages:Inequality and poverty reduction in the

Philippines. Mimeo. South East Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture and UP

Diliman.

•Balisacan, A. and E.Pernia. 2002. “Going beyond cross-country averages: Growth, inequality and poverty reduction

in the Philippines.” World Development 32(11)1891-907.

•Clarke,G. and M.Sison. 2003. “Voices from the top of the pile: Elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in the

Philippines.” Development and Change 34(2):215-242.

•Coronel, S. 1998. Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines. Pasig: Philippine Center

for Investigative Journalism.

•Dal Bo, E., P.Dal Bo and J.Snyder. 2009. "Political Dynasties." Review of Economic Studies 76(1):115-142.

•Dal Bo, E. and M.Rossi. 2009. “Term Length and Political Performance.” NBER Working Paper 14511. Cambridge, •Dal Bo, E. and M.Rossi. 2009. “Term Length and Political Performance.” NBER Working Paper 14511. Cambridge,

Mass.

•Hutchcroft,P. and J.Rocamora.2003. “Strong demands and weak institutions: The origins and evolution of the

democractic deficit in the Philippines.” Journal of East Asian Studies 3(2003):259-292.

•Manacsa, R. and A.Tan. 2005. “Manufacturing Parties.” Party Politics 11(6):748-765.

•Rodrik, D. 2007. One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth. Princeton:

Princeton University Press.

•Querrubin, P. 2010a. “Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute

of Technology.

•Querrubin, P. 2010b. “Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the

Philippines.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

•Rossi, M. 2009. “The Causes of Political Dynasties in Democratic Countries.” Mimeo. [Available at:

economia.uniandes.edu.co/content/.../29957/.../Political_Dynasties_Rossi.pdf].

•Solon, O.,R.Fabella,and J.Capuno. 2009. “Is local development good politics? Local development expenditures and

the re-election of governors in the Philippines in the 1990s.” Asian Journal of Political Science 17(3):265-284.

Democracy and Inclusive GrowthDemocracy and Inclusive Growth

ADDITIONAL SLIDESADDITIONAL SLIDES

Studies Examining Links across Dynasties and Human Capital

Accumulation, Economic Growth and Poverty/Inequality

Solon, O.,R.Fabella,and J.Capuno. 2009. “Is local development good politics? Local

development expenditures and the re-election of governors in the Philippines in the

1990s.” Asian Journal of Political Science 17(3):265-284.

•Study of Philippine Governors elected in 1992,1995 and 1998; finds that incumbent

governors improve their re-election chances with higher spending on economic

development servicesdevelopment services

Balisacan and Fuwa (2004). “Going beyond cross-country averages: Growth, inequality and

poverty reduction in the Philippines.” World Development 32(11)1891-907.

•Study of growth and poverty reduction in the Philippines between 1988 and 1997, using

province-level data, controlling for contextual factors including a measure for political

dynasties; finds that “dynasty” variable is a significant determinant of mean expenditure

growth, but not the rate of poverty reduction; dynasty variable is negatively linked to

subsequent income growth

Studies finding evidence of dynastic self-perpetuation

Dynasties in the Japanese Diet: Asako, Y., T.Iida, T.Matsubayashi and M.Ueda.

2010. “Dynastic legislators: Theory and evidence from Japan.” Mimeo. Bank of

Japan, Waseda University and University of Texas.

Dynasties in the Argentine Congress: Rossi, M. 2009. “The Causes of Political

Dynasties in Democratic Countries.” Mimeo.

Dynasties in the Philippine Congress: Querrubin, P. 2010. “Family and politics:

Dynastic persistence in the Philippines.” Mimeo. Massachusetts Institute of

Technology.

Dynasties in the US Congress: Dal Bo, et al (2009). "Political Dynasties." Review

of Economic Studies 76(1):115-142.

EMPIRICAL REGRESSION MODEL OF THE CHARACTERISTICS

AND POSSIBLE DRIVERS OF DYNASTIES

Dynasty = F [Legislator’s characteristics; Jurisdiction's characteristics;

Political Party Affiliation]

•Age: Are younger lawmakers less dynastic?

•Gender: Further to the previous point, are dynasties part of an "old boys

club" and older style of politics?club" and older style of politics?

•Net Worth: Are dynasties richer?

•Term: Are longer terms associated with legislators that belong to

dynasties?

•City: Are dynasties less prevalent in cities, where the institutions of

democracy (i.e. schools, NGOs, more free flow of ideas, info, people)

might tend to be stronger?

•Enrollment: Are dynasties less prevalent where access to education is

stronger?

•Intergovernmental allocations: Are dynasties associated with higher

(effective) allocations? Alternatively, are dynasties making more or less

use of their allocations? (Do dynasties "bring home the bacon"?)

•Political Parties: Are dynasties associated with the older more

established parties? Are the smaller parties and independents less established parties? Are the smaller parties and independents less

associated with dynasties?

•Poverty: Are dynasties associated with jurisdictions with higher

poverty (suggesting patronage politics)?

•Real GDP Per Capita: Are dynasties associated with lower average

real incomes?

dynastic politics15th congress 9 22 2011

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