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2 APRIL 1959

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Moscow and Peiping have given Latin American Communists detailed guid- ance on future tactics in "imperialist backyard,"

II. ASIA—AFRICA Nehru promises to raise Tibetan is- sue with Peiping and to ask for full Tibetan autonomy.

Nasir's top aide cautions UAR ambas- sador in Washington against rushing into a rapprochement with the United States»

Sudan - Dissident officer group still planning to move against its oppo- nents in the government.

Special USIB Watch Committee re- port on Israeli- Syrian recalls of reserves.

Turks and Iranians discussing reor- ganization of Baghdad Pact military planning structure.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN ~

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2 April 1959

DAILY BRIEF ;\{2’

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC *Communist bloc outlines tactics for Latin Americiazé.-atin

American delegates to the 21st Soviet party congress have re- '£ df M d id t'

12 PG" d ithn urne rom oscow an a s e rip o iping arme .w new tactical plans worked out with the Soviet party as well as .

guidance and offers of training from the Chinese Communists}

éThe delegates were told to eliminate defense of the USSR fro -their propaganda and to play down their subordination to Moscow, concentrating instead on the "liberation" of their own countries. They decided to schedule an anti—imperialist "Peo- ple's Congress" to meet sometime before July in Latin Amer- ica and, concealing its Communist origin, to attempt toexploit the popularity of Cardenas, Figueres, Be ancourt, and Castro who would be asked to serve as sponsors). _

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ghe Latin American Communists were received in Peiping by 0 Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi who expounded at some length on the benefits not only of maintaining but of increas- ing tension, which "benefits all Communist parties" and forces the W st t att it st h st A e o sc er s rengt over a va area. s an ex-- ample, the Chinese cited their tactics in the Taiwan Strait sit- uation which had "helped by di rting imperialist forces" fol- lowing US landings in Lebanontf

ghe treatment given the delegation in China provides the str gest indication to date that Peiping is bent on increasing; its influence in Latin America. Peiping has decided to sponsor a 4»-6 month course in "practical" tactics for Latin American Communists. The Chinese Communists stressed the need for

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clandestine activity carried out by underground parties parallel with existing7Latin American Communist

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Watch Committee conclusion--Berli 2 (No significant changes bearing on the possibility of hostilities

II. ASIA-AFRICA

India-Tibet: érime Minister Nehru, in acineeting on 31 March with the Dalai Lama's brother, who is one of the lead- ers of the Tibetan resistance movement in India, assured him he would take up the Tibetan question with Peiping and urge the granting of full Tibetan autonomy Although he doubted that this

_

approach would. be successful, Nehru felt it was the only action he could now take. In reaffirming his intention to grant political

Q asylum to the Dalai Lama, Nehruthought it best thatthe Dalai Lamaestay /Y‘ near New Delhi where he could keep in touch with himh

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Sudan: Qghe junior officers‘ movement led by Brigadier

Shannan is m kingkplans to arrest its opponents on the Supreme Military Council,

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Shannan had abandoned an earlier plan for a showdown within \L. the council itself, but his group, which reportedly includes pro-

O Communist and pro-Egyptian elements, will probably make a bid for increased power in the near future./\

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2 Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF 11 y

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Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East; (Situations susceptifile of direct exploitation by Sino-Soviet b oc hostile action hich would jeo ardi e USi t

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sts ist ' th Mid w . p z n ere ex in e --

dle East, particularly in Iran and Iraq. The situation in the Q area remains precarious, but a deliberate initiation of large-

;’{\/ scale hosti ‘ties is unlik in th ' d’ te f t

trol of Ira is continuing.

ely e imme 1a u urea, Iraq: he rapid progfiess of the Communists to ard con-

Israel-Syria Special ee report on Israeli- ‘

rian recalls ofzéservesx _

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Iran-Turkey: Iran's defense problems and reorganiza- tion of the military planning organization of the Baghdad Pact

~ were the major subjectsof recent talks in Tehran between ' Turkish and Iranian military leaders“ In response to an Irani-

an question, the chief of the Turkish General Staff stated that D the Shah" would become commander in chief of the Baghdad

Y1” Pact military structure in time of war. The Shah also reit- erated his concern over Communist encirclement and his con- tinuing dissatisfaction with the level of American military ai.d.

8)

2 Apr 59 DAILY BRIEF 111

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Moscow and Peiping Lay Out Tactics for Latin America

gLatin American delegates to the Soviet 21st party congress hav ‘returned from Moscow and a side trip to Peiping armed with new tactical plans worked out with the Soviet party as well as guidance and offers of training from the Chinese Commu.-- nistsQ

@the 20 Latin American parties, 18 were represented in Moscow and. 12 during the subsequent visit to Peiping. In a series of conferences with key Soviet officials in early Febru- ary and with Chinese Communist party leaders later in the month, the Latin Americans were given extensive advice on. increasing their effectiveness in the "imperialist backyard.">

I Ml the Soviet officials pro-

fessed concern that emphasis on osc0w's domination of the Communist movement had hampered the activities of national Communist parties, and. called for the elimination from all Communist literature of reference to the "directing role" of the USSR. The Latin American delegates were told to elim-- inate defense of the USSR from their propaganda and to play down their subordination to Moscow, concentrating instead on the "liberation" of their own countries, thereby weakening the "common enemy." The Latin Americans decided to convene a "Peop1e's Congress," sometime prior to July. By conceal- ing its origin, the Communists hope to attract former Mex- ican President Cardenas, former Costa Rican President F'i—

gueres,Venezue1an President Betancourt, and Cuban Prime Minister Castro as sponsors of the congress and to reap the advantages of their popularity. The major theme of the con- gress would be struggle against Latin American dictatorships and defense of the new revolutionary "democratic" regimes.)

éxe attention shown the 12 Latin American delegations whic visited Peiping after the Soviet congress was a strong indication of Peiping's interest in increasing its influency

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émong Communists in underdeveloped areas, particularly Latin America. Mao Tse-tung and second-ranking party leader Liu Shao-chi, among other top leaders who conferred with the Latin Americans, impressed on them the suitability of Chinese Communist revolutionary tactics in the underde- veloped conditions of Latin America“ The Chinese argued that events in Cuba had proven that the "imperialists are pa- per tigers." They asserted that a "policy of tension" benefits Communist parties, which can force "imperialists to spread their forces thin over a vast area," As an example, they cited their tactics in the Taiwan Strait situation which had "helped by diver ing imperialist forces?" following US landings in Lebanons

The Chinese advised formation of clandestine parties in each Latin American country to function parallel to the es- tablished Communist parties, arguing that they themselves had used similar methods, "especially in Shanghai," to great advantage}

The Chinese offered to set up in Peiping, at Chinese ex- pense, a four- to six-month course for Latin American lead- ership cadres. The course, to begin in August, would stress the "practical experience" of the Chinese revolution, rather than gen ral Communist theory "which could be learned in any countryl?)

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11. ASIA-AFRICA Nehru's Position in Tibet

Q/hile officially maintaining his policy of noninterference in the Tibetan situation, Prime Minister Nehru apparently has given secret assurances to resistance leaders in India that he will provide what diplomatic support he can, as well as asylum for the Dalai Lama and his staff. The Indian leader on 31 March publicly expressed his sympathy to a large delegation of Tibetans from the Indian frontier town of Kalimpong, but pointed out that India was not in a position to intervene and counseled patience?)

gin agmeeting later" with the Dalai Lama's brother, a.

lea er 0 the Indian-based resistance movement, Nehru prom-- ised he would take up the Tibetan question with Peiping and urge that Tibet be granted full autonomy. Nehru's own doubt that this approach would be successful suggests that his offer of support represents more a gesture to the ebels than an indication of firm intention to pressure Peipingfi

Q11 the event Nehru does approach the Chinese on behalf of the Tibetans, they probably will inform him that Tibet is consid- ered "autonomous" and that Indian representations are regarded as "interference." People's Daily on 31 March stated, "No for- eign country should inter ere in the Tibet rebellion, which is an internal affair of China.)

Peiping's repetition of charges that Kalimpong is a "com-- man ing center of the rebellion" provoked a new uproar in the Indian Parliament on 1 April. In view of the fact that Nehru had categorically denied this allegation on 30 March, the deputy ex- ternal affairs minister ccused the Chinese of challenging Nehru's "integrity and honesty;

éhe Dalai Lama's party was last reported to have been expected at the Indian frontier in Assam on 31 March. In reaffirming that the Indian Government would "definitely" grant asylum to the Dalai Lama and his staff, Nehru told the Lama's brother’ it would be best that he be brought to the New Delhi area, where Nehru could keep in "touch with him. The prime minister said his government was alreacly mak- ing arrangements for the Dalai Lama's stav in India and he would per- sonall discuss his future with him)‘

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UAR Attitude on Rapprochement_YYitnUS éespite the expressed desire of some UAR officials for

a demonstration of American support of Nasir's anti-Commu-- nist campaign, the regime apparently hopes to avoid the im- pression of a rapprochement with the United States which would lend credibility to Communist charges that Nasir is now subservient to the "imperialists."

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K3 to be "cautious and reserved" in dealing with Washington. apparently referring to Kama1's reports to Cairo on his ta s with US State Department officials,

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Cairo is obviously anxious to continue at least the appearance of neutrality. Both Baghdad and Moscow have claimed repeatedly that Western interests are behind Nasir's attacks on the USSR and Arab Communists. Cairo officials are also fearful of a cessation of Soviet economic and military aid as retaliation to Nasir's continued attacks on the USSR's interference in Arab affairs. They probably hope for American assurances of support in the event of Soviet sanctions, but at this time they apparent- ly wish to keep moves to improve relations with the United States as unobtrusive as possible.)

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espite Premier Abboud's repeated assurances to the peop that the Sudan's military government is stable and united, jockeying for power continues at the highest army levels, and the leaders of the suspended political parties are maneuvering to improve their positions. The junior officers’ movement, led by Brigadier Abd al-Rahim Shan- nan, has been holding nightly meetings since 24 March,

Instability in the Sudan

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and is plan- ning an attempt to seize power by arresting most of the senior members of the Supreme Military Council. Briga- dier Muhyi al-Din Abdullah, who participated with Shannan in leading the early March coup, is now being excluded from the group's secret lans, apparently because opposes fur- ther drastic actions

éhe senior council members are acutely aware of the threat posed by Shannan's group, which reportedly contains pro-Communist and pro-Egyptian elements as well as other dissident officers; they are therefore attempting to build up a counter-movement within the army“ They also have to con-- tend with political and religious leaders who want a n mber of military members of the cabinet replaced by civilians'5

éhe governmental changes since early March and the death on 24 March of Ansar leader Sayyid a1-Rahman al- Mahdi have resulted in a sharp decrease in the power and influence of the Ansar sect and its Umma party, the strongest pro-Western elements in the country. The demands of leaders of the neutralist National Unionist, party‘ (NUP) that they‘ be included in the Abboud government have so far been refused, but the senior officers in the government may resort to an £‘al liance" with NUP political leaders against the junior officers‘ movement.)

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Israeli-Syrian Rec lls oFReserves_ __ _

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fllhe USIB Watch Committee issued the followin report afte a special meeting held at 1730, 1 April 1959:

(An Israeli mobilization, announced at 1900 GMT on April, recalling "all" reserves to report for re- serve duty was followed prior to 2100 GMT by a UAR order to personnel of the First (Syrian) Army to re- turn from leave and to all reservists d.etailed to cer- tain numbered formations to report to their units by the morning of 2 April. A later Israeli order ordered reserves of three units (probably brigades) to report by 1700, 2 April. By 2100, a spokesman of the Israeli Defense Forces described the call-up as a recall of certain reservists of only three reserve units for ord- inary training and Tthe Israeli finance minister, speak- ing for the prime minister in the Knesset, declared that the order was only a routine call for training and that no importance was to be attached to it. The Israel.i Embassy in Washington has also characterized this ac- tion as "no)t unusua1;“ observing that "the days of Suez are over "

4N0 preliminary mobilization measures, such as re _isitioning_ of motor vehiclesorj rail rolling stock, have been observed or reported in Israel. The strength. and deployment of Israeli military forces are believed to be normal. Recent incidents along Israells borders have been minor and have not been treated as serious by the Israeli press, and the only specific source of tension between Israel and the UAR recently publicized has been the Egyptian seizure of cargoes of Israeli- chartered ships. Israel is known, however, to be con- cerned over a rapprochement between N sir and the US and possible UAR action against Qasimfi

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{The Syrian recall order appears to be a direct rea tion, about 2 hours later, to the Israeli order. Possible explanations for the Israeli recall of pre- servists, based on limited evidence, includez)

6-as the most likely, a mobilization exer- cise esting the "codeword" open radio call-up, with the codewords indicating the unit and its lo- cation to the reservists involved. The Israeli fiscal year begins 1 April and funds may have just become available for such an exercise.

—-a demonstration of readiness for action as a pressure tactic.

--a true reaction to information unknown to us of real or suspected. impending changes in sit- uations along its borders.

~-as the least likely, an intention to recall reservists, under the guise of a training exercise, for possible military action;

(Whatever the purpose of the Israeli mobilization, this action and the Syrian mobilization in apparent reac- tion can raise Israeli-UAR tensions. In the face of the Syrian call-up, Israel may now retain its recalled forces on r tatus) t ll

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Iranian-Tur_kish Military Talks Strengthen Ties

During recent discussions in Tehran between Iranian and Turkish military leaders, the chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Rustu Erdelhun, stated in response to an Irani- an question that in time of war the Shah would "of course" become the commander in chief of Baghdad Pact forces. Any such decision, however, would require the approval of Britain and Pakistan.

The Shah, pleased with the outcome of the talks and im- pressed. with Erdelhun's presentation, has ordered the chief of the Iranian General Staff to coordinate closely with Turkey on defense problems and on Baghdad Pact military organization. The Turks and Iranians also agreed that, to assure concerted action in an emergency, the Baghdad Pact Military Planning Organization should have a proper staff structure headed by an American officer. These issues probably will be raised for- mally during the July meeting of the Baghdad Pact Military Gom- mittee.

The Shah emphasized to Erdelhun his fear that Iran would. be encircled by hostile powers now that Iraq is working with the Communists. Erdelhun, who is a highly competent officer and strong advocate of close Turkish-American military cooperation, attempted to calm the Shah by stressing that Turkey and Pakistan stand on Iran's flanks and. that US power will deter aggression by the USSR.

In respect to the Shah's continuing dissatisfaction with the level of American military faid, General Erdelhun stressed. that both Turkey and Iran must increase the literacy and technical competence of their service personnel before they can make ef- fective use of modern weapons.

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THE PRESIDENT The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Commandant, United States Marine Corps The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of the Interior The Secretary of the Interior

The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director

Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman

National Security Agency The Director

National Indications Center The Director

United States Information Agency The Director

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