eagle guardian obama war russia

Eagle_Guardian_Obama_War_Russia

http://www.newsfollowup.com/eagle_guardian_obama_war_russia.htm[5/28/2014 5:39:36 PM]

WMR Obama backed NATO battle plan against Russia BACKDecember 7, 2010 -- from Wikileaks

In a stark display of neo-Cold War policy, the Obama administration backed a NATO plan, code named EAGLEGUARDIAN, to wage war against Russia in defense of the Baltic. The revelations in leaked State Department cables are yetanother indication of the war-like policies of the Obama administration, which include military threats against Iran andbeefing up a U.S. Navy presence in both Chinese economic exclusion zone and North Korean waters.

EAGLE GUARDIAN was discussed at the recent NATO Summit in Lisbon, which was attended by President Obama.Secretary of State Clinton emphasizes in her cable that expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN to Poland and the Baltic statesmust be kept secret.

The relevant State Department cables follow:

VZCZCXRO4913 OO RUEHDBU RUEHSL DE RUEHNO #0464/01 2931658 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 201658Z OCT 09 FMUSMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3502 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTONDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDCIMMEDIATE INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVEPRIORITY RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6537 RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA PRIORITY 7164RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0013 RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS PRIORITY 7310RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGENGE PRIORITY RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000464

NOFORN SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DNG: CO 10/18/2029 TAGS: MARR MCAP PREL NATO ZB RS SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST:BALTIC CONTINGENCY PLANNING: SOME IDEAS

REF: A. VILNIUS 533 B. VILNIUS 527 C. TALLIN 309 D. RIGA 514 E. SECRETARY (SECTO) 007

Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (SBU) This is an action request. See paragraph 10.

2. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Leaders in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are pressing hard for NATO Article 5 contingencyplanning for the Baltic states. President Obama and Secretary Clinton are on record supporting such contingency planningfor Allies. At the same time, however, NATO internal processes and politics make it difficult to openly carry out suchplanning, particularly if it would require specifying Russia as a potential threat. Nevertheless, there are possible ways tomeet the substance of Baltic demands. The existing contingency plan for Poland, for example, might be modified to includethe Baltics or generic plans for the use of the NATO Response Force could be exercised and certified in a mannerconsistent with Baltic defense. We request high-level interagency discussion of the issue to develop the substance andNATO tactics of Baltic planning and exercises. END SUMMARY

Why Baltic Contingency Planning? --------------------------------

3. (S/NF) As reported in refs A-D, leaders in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are pressing hard for NATO Article 5contingency planning for the defense of the Baltics. The Administration at the highest levels is on record supporting suchefforts. President Obama told NATO Secretary General Rasmussen this during the latter's September 28-29 trip toWashington. Furthermore, Secretary Clinton told her colleagues at the September 22 "Trans-Atlantic Dinner" in New Yorkthat the U.S. wants more work on Article 5 contingency plans (ref E).

The Difficulties ----------------

4. (S/NF) At the same time, the internal processes and politics of the Alliance make it unlikely that a Baltic-only Article 5

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contingency plan could be developed. NATO contingency plans are designed for possible future security risks that areconsistent with NATO's General Intelligence Estimate (MC 161) and NATO Ministerial Guidance. While AdmiralStavridis, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), does have the authority to generate, review and revisecontingency plans based on changes in the strategic security environment, those changes to the security environment wouldneed to be reflected in MC 161. Without a change to MC 161, SACEUR does not have the authority to develop new Article5 contingency plans. Moreover, changes to MC 161 are not made by SACEUR. They must be agreed by the NAC.

5. (S/NF) In this case, the Baltic states clearly believe that the Russian Federation represents a future security risk anddesire a contingency plan to address that risk. And therein lies the problem. While the exact content of MC 161 cannot bediscussed in this message, post-Cold War NATO has consistently said that it no longer views Russia as a threat. Allies, forexample, agreed to language in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act that "NATO and Russia do not consider each otheras adversaries." As we saw during the debates over the Russia-Georgia war, many Allies will take great pains to avoid eventhe suggestion that the Alliance and Russia are on course toward a new Cold War. Countries such as Germany are unlikelyto agree changes to MC 161 that explicitly define Russia as a potential threat, preferring instead to argue that the Allianceneeds to find a way to work cooperatively with Moscow.

USNATO 00000464 002 OF 003

But Hard is Not "Too Hard" --------------------------

6. (S/NF) Despite these difficulties, however, there are steps that can be taken to meet the substance of the Baltic demandsand demonstrate the Allied commitment to their defense. As a start, SACEUR did begin conducting informal "prudentplanning" efforts within his own Headquarters in the wake of the Russian-Georgian war. These efforts should continue.Furthermore, the existing NATO contingency plan for Poland is up for revision. We could explore the possibility ofrevising this plan to include the reinforcement/defense of the Baltics as an element of the reinforcement/defense of Poland.Indeed, this idea was first raised by the German PermRep in conversation with Ambassador Daalder. NATO also has anumber of agreed generic contingency plans for the NATO Response Force (NRF), including for relatively high-end "initialentry operations." Perhaps these generic NRF plans can be exercised/certified in a manner that would be consistent with thedefense of the Baltics. Finally, we could pursue a generic Article 5 Alliance-wide contingency plan which would beapplicable to multiple threats.

Necessary for NATO-Russia; Expeditionary Forces --------------------------------------------- --

7. (S/NF) Baltic reassurance can not be seen in isolation. Our ability to move forward with other U.S. priorities at NATOwill be affected by our ability to reassure the Baltic states. For example, our ability to maintain an Allied consensus on re-engagement with Moscow will depend on it. Furthermore, the Baltic states have made clear that if they do not feel they cantrust Allies to defend them, they will have to consider developing a force structure focused on territorial defense rather thanon expeditionary capabilities.

U.S. Reassurance Does Not Equal NATO Reassurance --------------------------------------------- ---

8. (S/NF) The U.S. has taken a number of bilateral steps to reassure the Baltics, including tasking the U.S. EuropeanCommand (which ADM Stavridis heads under his U.S.-only hat) to develop a plan for supporting NATO deterrence anddefense in the Baltic region. While these efforts can be useful in supporting NATO contingency planning and reassuranceefforts, if done on their own they could actually undermine our efforts to reassure the Baltic states that all NATO Allies willcarry out their Article 5 commitments. Defense of the Baltics must remain a NATO Article 5 commitment, not solely aU.S. bilateral one. Unless consensus can be achieved within the Alliance to take positive steps in this direction, the Balticstates will continue to lose faith in the Alliance, undercutting a key U.S. strategic objective. Washington should not allowU.S. bilateral reassurance efforts to become an easy substitute for NATO-wide efforts.

Recommended Way Ahead ---------------------

9. (S/NF) Ambassador Daalder has been having quiet conversations with some Allies, as well as with SACEUR, to seewhat might be possible. We believe that a key aspect of any approach would be to socialize the NAC on the issue throughbriefings by SACEUR on current plans and the extent to which they satisfy the requirement to defend Allied territory. Inaddition to further consideration of the ideas in para 6 above, Mission proposes the following as an initial way ahead onthis issue that we should seek to set in train:



-- The Military Committee should task NATO Military Authorities to review the current family of contingency plans todetermine if they are sufficient to meet NATO's Article 5 commitments;

USNATO 00000464 003 OF 003

-- The North Atlantic Council should ask SACEUR to brief PermReps on the status of these plans and on their ability toprovide for the defense/protection of Allied territory, populations, and Alliance interests;

-- SHAPE should request that each Ally assess its own national plans and national contributions in support of these plans;

-- Strategic communications/public messaging regarding NATO contingency planning would allow the Alliance to highlightits efforts to provide for the protection of Alliance territory from the range of threats;

-- Ongoing Strategic Concept discussion and seminars should be used to identify new security threats and ways to meetthose threats. This process could help build consensus for new contingency planning efforts;

-- The U.S. should consider the possibility/suitability of adapting the upcoming USEUCOM bilateral exercise, "Baltic Host2010," into a NATO deterrence and defense of the Baltic states exercise; and

-- As NATO contingency plans are developed, task the development of supporting USEUCOM contingency plans.

10. (S/NF) Mission requests that a NATO IPC be scheduled in the near future to discuss this issue further, with a view todeveloping a coherent interagency-agreed strategy on how to take forward the President's vision of contingency planning inNATO. DAALDER

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VZCZCXYZ0001 OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #7892 3491053 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 151050Z DEC 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSYWARSAW IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 127892 NOFORN FOLLOWING STATE 127892 DATED 150910Z DEC 09 SENT ACTION RIGA,TALLINN, VILNIUS, USNATO INFO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IS BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION.QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 127892 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2019 TAGS: NATO MARR MCAPPREL EN LG LH PL SUBJECT: NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR OUR BALTIC ALLIES REFS: A)USNATO 561 B) USNATO 464 C) VILNIUS 569 D) RIGA 514 Classified By: ACTING EUR A/S NANCYMCELDOWNEY -FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraphs 2-3. 2. (S/NF)Summary and Action Request. The United States is developing a strategy for reaffirming both NATO and U.S.commitment to the core responsibility of the Alliance: collective defense. Examining NATO's approach to contingencyplanning will be one element of that strategy. Moving from country-specific to regional contingency plans is one potentialmethod. Expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN could be a first step in favor of regional planning. USNATO should engageNATO Secretary General Rasmussen to begin to build support for expanding Eagle Guardian. In early 2010, the U.S.Military Representative (MILREP) at NATO HQ should take the following actions: 1) meet jointly with the Chairman ofthe Military Committee (CMC), the German MILREP, and other MILREPs as appropriate to urge the CMC to task theSupreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) to include the Baltic States in the revision of EAGLE GUARDIAN, and2) approach the CMC and request that he task SACEUR to brief the Military Committee on each of NATO's contingencyplans with guidance that he identify any gaps in those plans. We will be better positioned to consider a broader regionalapproach after receiving SACEUR's assessment USNATO and Action Embassies are asked to engage with appropriateBaltic and Polish officials before December 16 to outline the U.S. position, while stressing the need to keep details relatedto NATO's military plans confidential. Contingency points are also provided at paragraph 4 for responding to publicinquiries. End Summary and Action Request. 3. (S) Washington shares USNATO's goal of a non-politicized process formoving forward. Washington believes that increased public attention on the issue could complicate our efforts to achievethat goal. We need to make that point clearly to our Baltic Allies and Poland, while also underscoring that we take theirrequest for NATO contingency planning seriously and support steps to address their concerns. We understand Baltic andPolish leaders will meet on December 16 and will discuss, among other topics, NATO contingency planning. It will be



important to engage with Baltic and Polish officials in advance of that meeting to both outline our support for expandingEAGLE GUARDIAN, and our vision for a process that can deliver a successful result. In discussions with Baltic andPolish officials, Action Posts should draw upon the points below. (S/REL NATO) Begin Talking Points: FOR RIGA,TALLINN, AND VILNIUS -- The United States has taken careful note of the repeated requests by all three Baltic states forNATO contingency planning for the defense of the Baltic region. -- The United States believes that NATO - as a matter ofcourse - should conduct appropriate contingency planning for the possible defense of Allied territory and populations.NATO's Article 5 commitment requires no less. -- As President Obama said in Prague: "We must work together as NATOmembers so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from."-- Afterspending the last several months examining options on how to carry out NATO contingency planning for the Baltic states,the United States has decided that the best course of action would be to take advantage of the ongoing revision of theexisting defense of Poland plan, EAGLE GUARDIAN. EAGLE GUARDIAN could be expanded to include the defense ofthe Baltic states. This expansion is a logical military extension of the existing contingency plan and fits well within thescenario posited by EAGLE GUARDIAN. -- We would also like to make clear that we see the expansion of EAGLEGUARDIAN as a step toward the possible expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency plans intoregional plans. This is the first step in a multi- stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans forthe full range of possible threats -- both regional and functional -- as soon as possible. At the same time, we believecontingency planning is only one element of NATO's Article 5 preparedness. -- The United States is prepared to workclosely with NATO Military Authorities and with other Allies to forge a consensus in favor of expanding EAGLEGUARDIAN to include the defense of the Baltic states, starting immediately in the new year when NATO reopensfollowing its winter break. (S/REL NATO) FOR WARSAW -- The United States has taken careful note of the repeatedrequests by all three Baltic states for NATO contingency planning for the defense of the Baltic region. -- The United Statesbelieves that NATO - as a matter of course - should conduct appropriate contingency planning for the possible defense ofAllied territory and populations. NATO's Article 5 commitment requires no less. -- As President Obama said in Prague:"We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, whereverthey may come from."-- After spending the last several months examining options for how to carry out NATO contingencyplanning for the Baltic states, the United States has decided that the best course of action would be to take advantage of theongoing revision of the existing defense of Poland plan, EAGLE GUARDIAN. EAGLE GUARDIAN could be expanded toinclude the defense of the Baltic states. -- This expansion is a logical military extension of the existing contingency planand fits well within the scenario posited by EAGLE GUARDIAN. In fact, defending Poland necessarily entails defendingthe Baltic states, as well. -- We would also like to make clear that we see the expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a steptoward the possible expansion of NATO's other existing country-specific contingency plans into regional plans. This is thefirst step in a multi- stage process to develop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans for the full range of possiblethreats - both regional and functional - as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe contingency planning is only oneelement of NATO's Article 5 preparedness. -- The United States is prepared to work closely with NATO MilitaryAuthorities and with other Allies to forge a consensus in favor of expanding EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the defense ofthe Baltic states, starting immediately in the new year when NATO reopens following its winter break. -- We do not believethat this will result in any significant delays for concluding the EAGLE GUARDIAN revision. Nor do we believe that thisin any way endangers planning for the defense of Poland. In fact, we believe that the planning for the defense of Poland willbe much more robust with the inclusion of the Baltics. (S/REL NATO) POINTS ABOUT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OFPLANS (FOR USE AT POST'S DISCRETION) -- The United States believes strongly that such planning should not bediscussed publicly. These military plans are classified at the NATO SECRET level.-- The Alliance has many publicdiplomacy tools at its disposal. Contingency planning is not one of them. What we should do is explore other public stepsfor demonstrating the vitality of Article 5, such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships. -- Public discussion ofcontingency plans undermines their military value, giving insight into NATO's planning processes. This weakens thesecurity of all Allies. -- Public discussion of the plan would also make it politically much more difficult for some Allies tosupport the EAGLE GUARDIAN revision, creating divisions within the Alliance and throwing the whole project intodoubt. -- A public discussion of contingency planning would also likely lead to an unnecessary increase in NATO-Russiatensions, something we should try to avoid as we work to improve practical cooperation in areas of common NATO-Russiainterest. -- We believe that the proposed revision of EAGLE GUARDIAN is achievable and will represent a significantresponse to the Baltic request for contingency planning. -- We hope that we can count on your support in these efforts,including on keeping discussions on NATO contingency planning out of the public domain.-- We should work together onusing exercises, defense investment, and partnerships to demonstrate to our publics that Article 5's value ultimately lies inNATO's capabilities and deterrence, rather than specific planning. (C) FOR ALL ACTION POSTS -- IF ASKED Q: Whywait until the new year? Why not start now? A: NATO Headquarters is heading into its winter break, when only a skeletalstaff is in place. Our ability to achieve success in this matter will be substantially improved once senior Allied personnelhave returned to work early in the new year. We pledge to take the matter up expeditiously at that time. Q: Will waiting



until the new year give NATO Military Authorities sufficient time to complete the revision of the EAGLE GUARDIAN?A: According to our conversations with NATO's senior military authorities, beginning the process of incorporating theBaltic states into EAGLE GUARDIAN in early January still gives them sufficient time to complete the revision byFebruary as originally planned. 4. (C) Washington strongly prefers that discussion of NATO's contingency plans in general,and the possible expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN in particular, remain in confidential channels. However, posts may usethe points below if necessary in responding to public queries about these issues. (U) PUBLIC/PRESS INQUIRIES -- IFASKED: -- NATO does not discuss specific plans. -- As a matter of course, however, NATO does planning in order to beas prepared as possible for whatever situations might arise, particularly as relates to its ability to carrying out its Article 5commitments. -- Plans are not static. NATO is constantly reviewing and revising its plans. -- NATO planning, however, isan internal process designed to make the Alliance as prepared as possible for future contingencies. It is not "aimed" at anyother country. -- President Obama acknowledged this when he said at Prague that "We must work together as NATOmembers so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from." CLINTONUNQUOTE CLINTON ----- VZCZCXRO8554 PP RUEHSL DE RUEHC #7810/01 0262036 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P262029Z JAN 10 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE PRIORITY INFORUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6905 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 007810 SIPDIS EO12958 DECL: 01/22/2020 TAGS MARR, MCAP, NATO, PREL, EN, LG, LH, PL SUBJECT: EXPANSION OF EAGLEGUARDIAN TO INCLUDE BALTIC ALLIES REF: A. USNATO 35 B. 09 STATE 127892 Classified By: EUR PDASNancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraphs 3-4. 2. (S) Summaryand Action Request. On January 22 NATO Allies agreed in the Military Committee to expand the NATO Contingency Planfor Poland, EAGLE GUARDIAN, to include the defense and reinforcement of the Baltic States. Posts in Allied capitalsshould be prepared to explain, as necessary, U.S. support for this approach and how it fits within our broader vision forNATO contingency planning, as well as how to respond to media inquiries on the matter. Posts are asked to draw on thepoints below, as necessary, in discussions on this issue. End Summary and Action Request. 3. (C) Posts need not engagehost government officials proactively on NATO contingency planning at this time, but are encouraged to use the pointsbelow as the basis for discussions on the matter as needed. (S/REL NATO) CONTINGENCY POINTS (FOR USE ATPOST,S DISCRETION) -- The United States believes that NATO - as a matter of course - should conduct appropriatecontingency planning for the possible defense of Allied territory and populations. -- As President Obama said in Prague: â€œWe must work together as NATO members so that we have contingency plans in place to deal with new threats,wherever they may come from. -- The U.S. welcomes the decision to expand EAGLE GUARDIAN to include the defenseof the Baltic states, and sees it as a logical military extension of the existing contingency plan that fits well within theexisting scenario. -- We see the expansion of EAGLE GUARDIAN as a step toward the possible expansion of NATO'sother existing country-specific contingency plans into regional plans. This is the first step in a multi-stage process todevelop a complete set of appropriate contingency plans for the full range of possible threats - both regional and functional- as soon as possible. At the same time, we believe contingency planning is only one element of NATO's Article 5preparedness. (S/REL NATO) POINTS ABOUT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF PLANS (FOR USE AT POST'SDISCRETION) -- The United States believes strongly that such planning should not be discussed publicly. These militaryplans are classified at the NATO SECRET level. -- The Alliance has many public diplomacy tools at its disposal.Contingency planning is not one of them. What we should do is explore other public steps for demonstrating the vitality ofArticle 5, such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships. -- Public discussion of contingency plans underminestheir military value, giving insight into NATO's planning processes. This weakens the security of all Allies. -- A publicdiscussion of contingency planning would also likely lead to an unnecessary increase in NATO-Russia tensions, somethingwe should try to avoid as we work to improve practical cooperation in areas of common NATO-Russia interest. -- We hopethat we can count on your support in keeping discussions on NATO contingency planning out of the public domain. -- Weshould work together to develop strategies - to include activities such as exercises, defense investment, and partnerships -for demonstrating to our publics that Article 5's value ultimately lies in NATO's capabilities and deterrence, rather thanspecific planning. 4. (C) Washington strongly believes that the details of NATO,s contingency plans should remain inconfidential channels. However, recent press coverage of NATO decisions regarding possible contingency planning optionsfor the Baltic region may lead to additional media inquiries. If necessary, posts may use the points below in responding toSTATE 00007810 002 OF 002 public queries. (U) PUBLIC/PRESS INQUIRIES -- IF ASKED: -- NATO does not discussspecific plans. -- As a matter of course, however, NATO engages in planning in order to be as prepared as possible forwhatever situations might arise, particularly as relates to its ability to carrying out its Article 5 commitments. -- Plans arenot static. NATO is constantly reviewing and revising its plans. -- NATO planning is an internal process designed to makethe Alliance as prepared as possible for future contingencies. It is not "aimed" at any other country. -- President Obamaacknowledged this when he said at Prague that "We must work together as NATO members so that we have contingencyplans in place to deal with new threats, wherever they may come from." CLINTON

eagle guardian obama war russia

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