1

Earnings Management of Holding ARA Bank

Dian Anita Nuswantara1

Fitri Syntiadewi

Abstract

The Bank Indonesia (BI) in corporate with some other institutions, ,(i.e. Ministry of the State Owned Corporations, General Directorate of Taxation, Board of Stock Exchange Monitoring, Jakarta Stock Exchange, Chartered of Indonesian Public Accountant, and National Committee Of Corporate Governance Policy), have awarded Annual Report Award (ARA) to all companies either listed eitheror or unlisted as the registered member of the stock exchange company lists.

The lists. The award is addressed to the the companycompany that isis lucratively able to present open and transparent information of the annual financial statement. This , This mechanism

areare employed as proxy of corporate governance. This study tries to tries to investigateinvestigates whether corporate governance mechanism might lower earnings

management practices. Using, using independent t test, we. We can conclude that ARA, as a proxy of good corporate mechanism, cannot fully hinder the earnings management practices.

Keywords: earnings management, Annual Report Award (ARA), corporate governance

A. Introduction1. Background

Bank is an institution that takes a charge to fund-raise from the public as well as distribute them them in many different forms or alternatives of investments; therefore, this central role has made bank considered as one of the segments in business in which the Government directly involves to rule out through strategic policies (Siamat, 2001). The Bank Indonesia (BI), a central bank in Indonesia, is one of the banking institutions who employs such policy. Thus, this institution who takes the control as well as monitors the performances of all banking industries in Indonesia; Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) dan other ratios made under the bases of certain minimum standard that is justified from numbers in the financial statement, where all earnings and expenditures are recorded, are used as instruments to measure the stability condition of the banks (Setiawati dan Na’im, 2001).

Researches have uncovered evidences showing that it is a common practice to modify or adjust some numbers in the financial statement and such a practice can also be found in the banking sector (Rahmawati, 2006; Chang dan Shen, 2008, Setiawati dan Na’im, 2001). Such a practice is known as earnings management. In general, earnings management is skeptically viewed as negative practices (Beneish, 2001); paradoxically, some consider the practices as a good practice of financial management (Gumanti, 2000).

In Indonesia, Leuz et al. (in Utami, 2005) have figured out that within 1990-1999, a period of their investigation, it has revealed that the average score of the earnings management in Indonesia has placed this country in the position of the 15 th among 31

1 Korespondensi dapat dialamatkan ke Fakultas Ekonomi, Kampus Unesa Ketintang SurabayaEmail: dianuswantoro@yahoo.com

2

countries in the world, yet in ASEAN countries (Malaysia, Filiphina, dan Thailand), the ASEAN countries who are used as the sample of the research, Indonesia is placed at the top position or the highest position as the one who has high earnings management.

In line with high rank of earning management practice in Indonesia, it is also found out that in 2001 there was a scandal in public companies that involved some manipulations of the financial statement of Lippo Tbk. Limitted Corporate dan Kimia Farma Tbk Limmited Corporate. This proves that crisis that happened within 1997-1998 is not able to stop financial statement manipulation done by the corporates (Budiono, 2005).

Due to the practice of earnings management, people start to worry and feel doubt with all the numbers or account found in every financial statement that might have been modified. However, against this scepticism toward the practice of earnings management, Chtourou (2001) has critically assured that the negative sides of such a practice can be abandoned, or at least, mitigated through a mechanism called corporate governance. He has tested the effective influence of the corporate governance towards the quality of information published. The result shows that the practice of corporate governance that is rendered by some independent institutions can lessen all types of manipulations that are usually done in every financial activities report of the companies, and at the same time practices of earning management can subsequently and effectively be eliminated.

Nasution and Setiawan (2007) state that, since monetary crisis in Indonesia, good corporate governance has been very contributing for revitalizing the management of the companies in Indonesia. This concept has proposed stimulations that can help companies to improve company performances by means of supervising and monitoring to management performance as well as assure the accountability of the management towards the stakeholders under the bases of the frame of law. Based on the Corporate Governance Watch 2007, the implementation of good corporate governance in Indonesia has been posited in the position of the 11th from the 11 Asia countries surveid.

Further researches, leveling and rewarding are currently required for promoting as well as encouraging the implementations of good corporate governance principles and also the improvement of the quality of open and transparent financial reports in Indonesia. The Bank Indonesia (BI) in corporate with some other institutions, i.e. Ministry of the State Owned Corporations, General Directorate of Taxation, Board of Stock Exchange Monitoring, Jakarta Stock Exchange, Chartered of Indonesian Public Accountant, and National Committee Of Corporate Governance Policy, have awarded Annual Report Award (ARA) to all companies either listed or unlisted as the registered member of the stock exchange company lists. The award is addressed to the company that is lucratively able to present open and transparent information of the annual financial statement (Warta Ekonomi, 2002; Bapepam, 2002 in Sulistyanto dan Prapti, 2003).

Criteria of ARA have been designed and the emphasis is on the quality of the information that is listed in the annual report or the financial statement. The good quality of the report relies upon the aspects of transparency and good corporate governance (Fitrawibowo, 2008). Two among other categories for determining to whom the award goes are Private Financial Listed and BUMN Financial Listed.

Based on the above elaborations, this study aimed to test the mechanism of corporate governance that is proxified through an appraisal for companies through Annual Report Award (ARA) and the investigation will reveal if such a practice can significantly lessen the practice of earnings management.

3

Therefore, this study attempts to investigate and to find out the differences of the earnings management level between Banks listed who have been awarded or receieved ARA and those who have not received the award.

B. Theoretical Framework1. The Use of Accounting Numbers for Decision Making

Financial statements contain any numbers that portray the financial condition in one period and in particular time. From management view, this can be used as a means to communicate financial performance they achieve. For other information user, it can be used to make rational business decision (Warsidi, 2000).

Belkoui (1993) in Utari (2001) also explain that financial statement function as instrument for manager accountability to the owner. This because accounting profit is used as one important financial performance measurement. According to Gumanti (2000) and Utari (2001) stated that accounting profit now become an indicator to asses department effort (including the manager) and the corporate in general. Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 stated that information about profit can help the related party to measure one corporate earning power for the future.

2. Financial Statements in Banking Sectors

Bank is an institution that takes a charge to fund-raise from the public as well as distribute them in many different forms or alternatives of investments; therefore, this central role has made bank considered as one of the segments in business in which the Government directly involves to rule out through strategic policies.Various forms of investment provided by Banks can be in the form of saving accounts as well as credits or other forms that are offered to overall societies with the attempts to improve the social welfare of the societies (UU Republik Indonesia No 10 Tahun 1998 about banking and the related issues, a revised version from the UU No 7 Tahun 1992). Sector of banking takes ultimately important roles in the economic development in a country. Therefore, transparency of the information becomes increasingly important for the stakeholders of the banking industries. This is due to the role of the stakeholders who are in charge to make all decisions in the companies, whereas information on financial matters will be used as the bases to make the decision, particularly when dealing with earnings information (Warsidi, 2000).

3. Earnings Management

Earnings is a financial information that has proceeded through a process of accrual based accounting in which all reports of the accounting activities are made by the company by considering all financial activities of the company including the right and obligation of the company without taking into account when a certain account is made. In accrual accounting, management has the possibility to choose which accounting method that can be used to earn earning as demanded. This sort of management can be implemented by modifying

4

components of accrual accounting in the financial statements. This is due to the fact that it is easy to modify since accrual is the components that is modifiable to meet their own demands.

Schiper (1989) defines that earnings management is an obstrusive involvement done purposefully in designing external financial statements so that personal earnings and benefits can be achieved optimally. Earnings management is proceeded whenever managements make use of judgement in designing financial statement and making transactions by modifying some numbers in the financial statement; then, by which, the report will mislead the stakeholders in justifying the economic performances of the organization as well as in interfering the result of the contract that is made under the bases of numbers or account reported (Healy dan Wahlen, 1999).

In short, earnings management occurs due to the chances in accounting that is owned by management (Scott, 2006); the chances can be selected purposefully as demanded (Copeland (1968) in Utami (2005). In other words, earnings management is one of the forms of management attempts to maximize or minimize earnings; otherwise, earnings management is an attempt to balance earnings with the demands of the management.

Why earnings management? We have seen so far that earnings are used as a criterion for justifying process in assessing the achievement either in the level of departments or in the companies. Investors will abruptly see the earnings as the indicator to measure the performance of the organization, in this case the company, without considering wisely the process of modifying accounts in the accounting (Wulandari, 2006; Masodah, 2007). Accounting earnings are also used as other criterion in addressing bonus, as a result, managements are encouraged to modify data in such a way so that they can reach specific numbers addressed for the demanded bonus. In general, there are three points that can be attained by the managers, namely: minimizing the costs of politics, maximizing welfare of the managers and minimizing financial costs (Magnan dan Cormier; 1997 in Gumanti (2000)).

In banking sectors, in their research findings, Setiawati and Na’im (2001) figure out that there are ways for identifying the condition of a bank. Firstly, the bank is not in wellbeing conditions when the CAR is low, and secondly, income increasing accrual is employed to manipulate the quality that is in fact below average. Such conditions really hamper the banking system in Indonesia; earnings management is employed for meeting criteria of bank wellbeing conditions determined by the Bank Indonesia. Such a practice can be categorized in political cost hypothesis in which managers can employ earnings management to reach the level of performance and wellbeing conditions as it has been verified by law settled by the Bank Indonesia. (Rahmawati, 2006; Chang dan Shen, 2008).

4. Basic Model for Determining Earning Management

In accounting–accrual base, there is found an accrual component that can freely be controled or manipulated by means of managerial policies that is called discretionary accruals (Sulistyanto: 2008). Based on this theoretical point of view, most of earning management models gauges any earning management activities with the components of

5

discretionary accruals. As a result, total accrual is derived from the sum of discretionary accruals dan nondiscretionary accruals, thus basic model for gauging earning management is formulated in the following equations:

Earnings t = CFO + TACt

TACt = DAt + NDAt

di mana: CFO = Cash Flow from periodic operation t TACt = Total accrual period t

DAt = Discretionary Accruals period t NDAt = Nondiscretionary Accruals period t

Further research has encouraged the development of previous basic models that have already become empirical mathematic models with various approaches used for detecting earnings management so that it can easily be figured out. One of the models called Beaver & Angel (1996) model is one of most effective models for detecting earnings management practices in banking sectors (Rahmawati, 2006; Nasution and Setiawan, 2007). This model employs component called allowances for loan losses and provisions for loan losses that are derived for comprising total accrual in banking industries which is shown by the Segregating and Eliminating performing Assets, deposits that are allocated based on the percentage of the nominal in the group or classifications of quality of performing assets. Finally, this study is able to formulate the equations for detecting earnings management using the model proposed by Beaver dan Engel (1996):

where: COit : loan charge offs LOANit : loans outstanding NPAit : non performing assets, comprised from performing assets based on the

collectability levels which are classified into (a) less accelarating, (b) doubtful, dan (c) stuck.

ΔNPAit+1 : non performing assets t difference +1 with non performing assets t

5. Corporate GovernanceIssues of corporate governance have been quite well known since the attempt of separating ownerships of a company with management is promoted or fostered (Berle and Means (1934) in Fajri, 2006). The growing awareness towards the importance of corporate governance has triggered scandals that have proliferated in the forms of gluttonous behavior and couping or taking over agressively the companies as it has occured in United Kingdom and the USA in the 1980s. The term “corporate governance” was explicitly used in 1984 in Robert I. Tricker book. Dealing with corporate governance, he states that there are mainly four activities that should be carried out when good governance is employed. The are (1) direction; (2) executive action; (3) supervision; dan (4) accountability.

 Wolfenshon (1999) asserts two main theories related to corporate governance, namely stewardship theory and agency theory.  Stewardship theory is built up based on the philosophical assumsions of human nature. According to him, humanbeings are basically created as trustable creatures who are able to conduct in accountable, reliable, and honest manners to others. Agency theory paradoxically views management of industry or company

6

as an ‘agent’ for shareholders so that it can be inferred that management of a company, or manager, is the agent who can manipulate data in many ways to attain personal earnings and neglect the core responsibility towards the shareholders; in other words, “managers could not be trusted to do their job – which of course is to maximize shareholder value”.

Recently corporate governance is viewed from many different angles and perspectives that lead to see further the idea of agency theory. Thus, many believe that companies should be monitored as well as controlled so that management is carried out properly under the bases of the current law or rule. Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) in their first publication has defined the term using a definition proposed by Cadbury Committee. So, good governance is defined as a set of law that regulate relationships amongst share holders, managers, creditors, government, and employees as well as all other internal and external parties who deal with systems for monitoring and controlling the management process of a company.

Five principles of good corporate governance are generally used by bussines practicioners as a parameter for doing the bussiness (Barabah, 2008), including: transparency, accountability, responsibility, independency, dan fairness. Therefore, the implementation of corporate governance requires consistent mechanism for monitoring and controlling as the attempt to hinder the practice of managers who try to manipulate data of the company that are supposed to be publicized and informed transparently to public. The monitoring and controlling mechanism is designed by considering the compositions and sizes of commisariate boards including auditary committee. (Beasly, 1996; Chtourou, 2001; Midiastuty & Machfoedz, 2003; Nasution and Setiawan, 2007)

Annual Report Award (ARA) is an award that is issued by Departement of National Finance (Bapepam-LK and Direktorat General of Taxation), Ministery of State-Owened Corporations, the Bank of Indonesia, Jakarta Stock Exchange, National Committee for Good Governance Policy, and Chartered of Indonesian Public Accountant. The objective of issuing this award is to gauge the quality of the transparency of the information viewed from the annual reports made by the company managemnent. Other purpose of issuing such an award is to monitor as well as control the implementation of good governance.

Awarding that is basically aimed to give an assessment can also motivate as well encourage companies to improve the quality of the transparency of the information that is published in the annuall reports (i.e annual financial statement). Besides, the result of such an assessment or evaluation can trigger better forms of information publication and can be used as a guideline for designing further report in the following year or period (Noerdiansyah, 2006). Criteria for the assessment is emphasized on the quality of the information stated in the annual report, particularly those that incluse aspects of transparency and good corporate governance.

In her research, however, Margaretha (2007) finds out that there is no significant difference between abnormal return before and after the announcement of ARA holders being issued. It implies that mechanism of issuing the award fails to inform as well as attract the investors. Therefore, the researcher is interested to test the mechanism of corporate governance that proxied by holding ARA awards whether or not this is able to control the

7

practice of earnings management in banking industries. A Hypotesis is then generated as the following:

“There is a significant difference on the level of earning management between a group of ARA holders and non ARA holders”

C. Research MethodThis is a comparative study that is aimed to uncover any differences on the level of

earnings management employed by banks holding and non-holding ARA award within 2004-2007 as it is enlisted in the Indonesia Stock Excahange. The approach used in the present study is an accrual estimation model of Beaver & Engel (specified for banking issues). The recent research uses secondary data in the form of financial statements that are publicized in the websites of the Indonesia Stock Exchange.

The population of the study is the emmitance in baking sectors as listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange within a period of 2004–2007. Probability sampling method is used to take the sample from which each member of the population has equal chance being taken as the sample (Nasution, 2003). Specifically, the technique of probability sampling that is selected in the present study is multi phase technique, or a technique of sampling that is based on the information obtained from the first phase, later this information is used as supplementary information for approaching accurate estimation in the following phase,. The procedure of this sampling technique involves:1. Collecting samples under the bases of general criteria namely emmittance in the banking

industries sector as listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange within a period of 2004-2008. In the present study, there are 34 emmittances can be derived as the samples.

2. Selecting and sorting out the samples into sub-samples based on the following criteria:a. Emmittance from banking sectors enlisted from 2004 or previous years in the Indonesia

Stock Exchange (23 emmittances).b. Emmitances which have publicized their annual financial statements in a period ended in 31

Desember 2004 – 2007 subsequently (18 emmittances).c. Data required for detecting earnings management using accrual estimation model of Beaver

& Engel, involving Total Balance PPAP (TA), Loan Charge Offs (CO), Nonperforming Assets (NPA), and Δ NPA in financial statements ended in 31 Desember 2004-2007 that are available completely ( 18 emmittances).

From the above sampling technique, it is figured out that there are 18 emmittances that are taken as the sample of this present study. These 18 emmittances are then categorized into two groups, ARA award holders and non holders. (see details in table 1 and 2).

The variables of this research that are going to be tested are earnings management that is proxied into discretionary accruals, and estimated using accrual model for banking developed by Beaver dan Engel (1996). Hypothesis testing is carried out by means of t test independent sample.

D. Discussions and Findings1. Hipotesis TestingTable 3 and 4 below present the result of the computation of earnings management. t test independent sample is used to test the difference between earnings management in ARA holder banks and non-ARA holder; finally, it is found out that t-testing is 9.66 . The calculation of the

8

difference using t-test for correlated samples determines the significance at 7,342 x 10-12; this implies that the significance is lower than 0,05. Thus, in conclusion there is found to a significant difference between earnings management at the ARA holder banks listed in the Stock Excange of Indonesia and non holder ones.

From the table of Group Statistics in t-test it is determined that the average level of earnings management in the ARA holder banks within the period of 2004-2007 is 0.8542, and on the other pole, the ARA non holder banks, the average level is -0.0025. In conclusion, the average level of earning management of banks holding the ARA is bigger or greater. 2. Discussions

Viewed from general characteristics, banking industries can be classified as a group of company owning the greatest Debt Equity Ratio (Bastian & Suhardjono, 2006:60). More specifically, when it is viewed from the characteristics of companies that hold the ARA, the Debt Equity Ratio of this type of company is higher than those non holding the ARA, this is reflected from the fact that 70% of banks holding the ARA belong to the ten greatest banks when it is grouped based on the third party; it means that the fund collected from the public by the ARA holder banks is higher than that collected by the non ARA holders. In line with Debt/equity hypothesis, it is hypothesized that companies owning high ratio of debt equity will tend to practice an income increasing accrual.

Based on the statistical data of Indonesia banking industries in December 2008, seven out of nine banks holding the ARA are categorized as a group of the ten biggest assets, the third party fund, credits, and based on (IDX) Fact Book 2008, these banks belong to the 50 biggest companies with the greatest market capitalization degree. Those seven banks, without considering the levels, sequencially belong to the level. 1- 4, 6, 8, dan 9. From the point of the size of the company, the ARA holders are considered bigger than those non holding the ARA.

The findings of the reseach reveal that the ARA holder banks practice earning management with income increasing accrual pattern, and the average is 0.8542. Yet, non ARA holder banks that practice earning management income minimizing accrual pattern have the average of -0.0025. At the vein, Almilia (2005) identifies that in Indonesia, viewed from the sizes of the companies; ones that the sizes are smaller tend to be lenient toward the political cost than those with bigger sizes. The likely reason is that companies with small sizes tend to receive greater impacts of the regulations (i.e. subsidies, taxes, and labor demands) that have been issued by the Government for all companies of different sizes. In this case, the Political cost hypothesis assumes that a company that is suffered from high political cost will tend to lower their earning for the sake of saving or cutting the political cost. Finally, this recent research finds out that the earnings management level in the banking industries holding the ARA is higher than non holder when it is dealt with positive accounting theory, and it means that the finding of the present research goes in line with debt/equity hypothesis and political cost hypothesis.

In general, the finding of this present research supports other researchers’ findings (i.e. Rahmawati (2006), Wulandari (2006), and Setiawati & Naim (2001). These previous studies have revealed that banking industries in Indonesia employ earnings management practice for meeting the standard of wellbeing bank as well as the regulations issued by the Bank Indonesia. In a more specific view, the present research finding goes in line with Rahmawati (2006) and Wulandari (2006), yet this counters the findings of Setiawati and Naim (2001). Based on the data, it can be figured out that the ARA holders acquire higher CAR percentage, and by no means, it is higher than non holders. This can be inferred that the level of wellbeing conditions of the holder is better than the non holder. In line with this finding, Rahmawati (2006) states that

9

bank which wellbeing condition is not even worsen and not to break the regulation of awareness will tend to practice more earnings managements, and this is aimed to avoid uncertainty in the future, and to improve performance assets as well. Conversely, Setiawati & Naim (2001) cites that bank industries which wellbeing scores are subsequently decreasing will have positive and significant values of discretionary accrual; it means that the values of discretionary accrual of a bank which goodbeing condition is decreasing is higher than those which condition is not decreasing.

Viewed from the side of good corporate governance and the objectives of holding the ARA, in general this study concludes that the aim to issue or address the ARA award to the banking industries as the attempt to monitor and to control the implementation of good corporate governance, as well as to monitor the insistence of the corporations towards the implementations of the principles of good corporate governance is considered ineffective, since the attempt fails to make the practice of earning management lessened. This is due to the fact finding that shows the high level of earnings management practices employed by the ARA holder banks, and this is even higher than the non holder. The findings, based on the previous research findings and theoretical framework, are influenced by some other factors. According to Sulistyanto and Wibisono (2003) cite that despite the importance of good corporate governance, the implementation is carried out for avoding sanctions than for realizing the importance to cultivate this as the behaviors that should be consistently proceeded. In short, good corporate governance in Indonesia is still far from satisfactory result.

E. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONSThe Average level of the earnings management of the ARA holder banks in the period

of 2004-2007 is 0.8542, and the non holder banks have the average of -0.0025. There is a significant difference of the earnings management practiced by the ARA holderbanks and non holder ones, as listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange.

For further research, factors influencing level of earnings management in banking industries should be included in the study. Besides, it is also recommended that further research can relate specific factors encountered in the ARA holder banks and non holder ones with other factors. Say, for instance, find the relationships between factors affecting high level of earning management and the criteria of ARA that is specifically about corporate governance.

For further research, the researcher might test level of earning management of the ARA holders and non holders and compare with other groups of industries. As a result, such a study would present the effectiveness of issueing ARA as the attempt to control and monitor the implementation of the principles of corporate governance in a broader sense in terms of industri characteristics. The findings of this present study can be used as a pathway to evaluate and motivate the ARA to reflect on their performance and further it can be used to improve the standard for assessment as well as the reward given to the companies as the attempt to support the principles of good corporate governance in Indonesia.

REFERENCES

Almilia, Luciana Spica. 2005. Pengujian Size Hypothesis dan Debt/Equity Hypothesis yang Memepengaruhi Tingkat Konservatisma Laporan Keuangan Perusahaan dengan Teknik

10

Analisis Multinomial Logit( Artikel Penelitian). (online) www.spicaalmilia.wordpress.com. diakses 3 Juli 2009.

Arthesa, Ade dan Handiman, Edia. 2006. Bank dan Lembaga Keuangan Bukan Bank. PT. INDEKS Kelompok Gramedia. Almilia, Luciana Spica. 2005. Pengujian Size Hypothesis dan Debt/Equity Hypothesis yang Memepengaruhi Tingkat Konservatisma Laporan Keuangan Perusahaan dengan Teknik Analisis Multinomial Logit( Artikel Penelitian). (online) www.spicaalmilia.wordpress.com. diakses 3 Juli 2009.

Barabah. 2008. Prinsip Good Corporate Governance. http://community.gunadarma.ac.id/blog/view/id, diakses 15 Januari 2009.

Bastian, Indra dan Suhardjono. 2006. Akuntansi Perbankan. Jakarta: Salemba Empat.

Beaver, William H. dan Engel, Ellen E. 1996. Discretionary Behavior with Respect to Allowances for Loan Losses and The Behavior of Security Prices. Journal of Accounting and Economics 22 (1996) 177-206.(online) www.sciencedirect.com

Boediono. 2005. Kualitas Laba: Studi Pengaruh Mekanisme Corporate Governance dan

Dampak Manajemen Laba Dengan Menggunakan Analisis Jalur. Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VIII Solo, 15 – 16 September 2005.

Chang, Ruey-Dang dan Shen, When-Hua. 2008. Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions and Earnings Management For The Banking Industry. International Business & Economics Research Journal vol. 7, no. 3. Maret 2008 (online) www.google.com, diakses 30 Maret 2009

Chtourou, Sonda Marrakchi. 2001. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management.(online) www.papers.ssrn.com, diakses 4 Februari 2009.

Cornett, Marcia Millon, Tehranian, Hassan and Jamie John McNutt. 2006. Corporate Governance and Earnings Management at Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies. Working Paper Series WCRFS: 06-26 (online) www.google.com, diakses 30 Maret 2009.

Direktorat Perizinan dan Informasi Perbankan. 2009. Buku Statistik Perbankan Indonesia. Jakarta: Bank Indonesia. (online). www.bi.go.id

Fitrawibowo, Haryo Widyo. 2008. Analisis Kinerja Keuangan Bank BUMN dengan Menggunakan Alat Ukur CAMEL (Studi Kasus Pada Bank BUMN Peraih Annual Report Award). Skripsi tidak diterbitkan. Surabaya: Universitas Negeri Surabaya

Forum for Corporate Governance Indonesia (FCGI). Peranan Dewan Komisaris dan Komite Audit dalam Pelaksanaan Corporate Governance (Tata Kelola Perusahaan). Booklet Seri Tata Kelola Perusahaan Jilid II. www. fcgi.or.id

11

Gumanti, Tatang Ary. 2000. Earnings Management: Suatu Telaah Pustaka. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan Universitas Kristen Petra Surabaya vol.2, no.2

Healy, P.M. dan J.M. Wahlen, 1999, A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting. http//www.ssrn.com

Jiraporn, Pornsit, Miller, Gary A., Yoon, Soon Suk, Kim, Young S. 2006. Is Earnings Management Opportunistic or Benefecial? An Agency Theory Perspective. International Review of Financial Analysis 17 (2008)622-634.(online) www.sciencedirect.com

Kusuma, Hadri. 2006. Dampak Manajemen Laba Terhadap Relevansi Informasi Akuntansi: Bukti Empiris dari Indonesia. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan vol.8, no. 1,Mei 2006:1-12 (online) www. petra.ac.id.

Masodah. 2007. Praktik Perataan Laba Sektor Industri Perbankan dan Lembaga Keuangan Lainnya dan Faktor yang Mempengaruhinya. Proceeding PESAT (Psikologi, Ekonomi, Sastra, Arsitek & Sipil) vol. 2.(online) diakses 3 Maret 2009.

Nasution, Marihot dan Setiawan, Doddy. 2007. Pengaruh Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba di Industri Perbankan Indonesia. Simposium Nasional Akuntansi X Unhass Makassar 26-28 Juli 2007.

Nasution, Rozaini. 2003. Teknik Sampling. Fakultas Kesehatan Masyarakat Universitas Sumatera Utara (online). www.google.com. diakses 28 April 2009.

Scott, W. R. 2006. Financial Accounting Theory Fourth Edition. Prentice Hall.

Setiawati, Lilis dan Na’im, Ainun. 2001. Bank Health Evaluation By Bank Indonesia and Earning Management in Banking Industry. Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business May 2001, vol. 3, No. 2, pp.159-176.

Siamat, Dahlan. 2001. Manajemen Lembaga Keuangan Edisi Ketiga. Jakarta:Lemabaga Penerbit Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia.

Sulistyanto, H. Sri. 2008. Manajemen Laba: Teori dan Model Empiris. Jakarta: PT. Gramedia Widiasarana Indonesia.

Sulistyanto, H. Sri dan Prapti, Meniek S. 2003.Good Corporate Governance: Bisakah Meningkatkan Kepercayaan Masyarakat?. Jurnal Ekonomi&Bisnis-EKOBIS,(Online), Vol. 4, No.1, (online) http//www.re-searchengine.com/sulistyanto1.html, diakses 6 Januari 2009).

Sulistyanto, H. Sri dan Wibisono, Haris. 2003.Artikel: Good Corporate Governance: Berhasilkah Diterapkan di Indonesia?.(online) http//www.google.com

12

Utami, Wiwik. 2005. Pengaruh Manajemen Laba Terhadap Biaya Modal Ekuitas (Studi Pada Perusahaan Publik Sektor Manufaktur). Simposium Nasional Akuntansi VIII. Solo, 15-16 September 2005.

Utari, Agnes. 2001. Analisis Faktor-Faktor yang Berpengaruh Terhadap Earnings Management Pada Perusahaan Go Public di Indonesia. (online) http//puslit.petra.ac.id/Journals/Accounting.

Warsidi. 2000. Peminatan Manajemen Keuangan 001. (online) http://peminatanmanajemenkeuangan001.blogspot.com, diakses 1 April 2008.

Wijayanti. 2009. Peranan Dewan Komisaris Independen Dalam Mengurangi Praktek Manajemen Laba pada Sektor Perbankan publik di Indonesia). Skripsi (online). Semarang: Universitas Diponegoro

www.idx.co.id. IDX Factbook.2008.(online)

13

Tabel 1CAR Perusahaan Peraih ARA tahun 2004-2007

Perusahaan Tahun CAR (%)

PT. Bank Mandiri Tbk.

2004 24,482005 23,212006 24,622007 20,75

PT. Bank Niaga Tbk.

2004 10,292005 17,242006 18,882007 17,03

PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk.

2004 16,192005 15,292006 18,822007 15,84

PT. Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk.

2004 17,092005 15,992006 15,302007 15,74

PT. Bank Bumiputera Tbk.

2004 9,982005 10,372006 12,912007 11,86

PT. Bank Permata Tbk.

2004 11,392005 9,802006 13,472007 13,27

PT. Bank NISP Tbk.

2004 15,112005 19,712006 17,072007 16,15

PT. Bank Central Asia Tbk.

2004 23,952005 21,532006 22,092007 19,22

PT. Danamon Tbk2004 25,642005 22,682006 20,392007 19,27

Sumber: Laporan Keuangan (diolah)

14

Tabel 2CAR Perusahaan Non-Peraih ARA Pada 2004-2007

Perusahaan Tahun CAR (%)

PT. Bank Mega Tbk.

2004 13,502005 11,122006 15,732007 11,84

PT. Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Tbk.

2004 12,862005 10,782006 16,232007 17,00

PT. Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk.

2004 10,242005 21,742006 23,302007 20,21

PT. Bank Kesawan Tbk.

2004 12,672005 14,072006 9,372007 10,33

PT. Bank Swadesi Tbk.

2004 25,952005 24,062006 26,552007 20,66

PT. Bank Victoria Internasional Tbk.

2004 12,552005 20,282006 20,272007 15,43

PT. Bank Artha Graha Tbk.

2004 12,132005 11,142006 11,382007 12,24

PT. Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk.

2004 37,432005 28,722006 29,472007 21,58

PT. Bank Eksekutif Internasional Tbk.

2004 14,692005 11,302006 9,372007 11,82

Sumber: Laporan Keuangan (diolah)

15

Tabel 3Manajemen Laba Perusahaan Perbankan Peraih ARA Pada 2004-2007

Perusahaan Tahun Manajemen Laba

PT. Bank Mandiri Tbk.

2004 0,48072005 0,30702006 0,26952007 0,3394

PT. Bank Niaga Tbk.

2004 0,72472005 1,24872006 1,19052007 1,2978

PT. Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk.

2004 0,28912005 0,27752006 0,22662007 0,3415

PT. Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk.

2004 0,77812005 0,43732006 0,69212007 0,4544

PT. Bank Bumiputera Tbk.

2004 1,16952005 0,49452006 1,36302007 0,9999

PT. Bank Permata Tbk.

2004 0,32462005 0,54802006 0,52042007 0,5003

PT. Bank NISP Tbk.

2004 1,76712005 1,74832006 1,89002007 2,0934

PT. Bank Central Asia Tbk.

2004 1,24952005 1,17872006 1,00702007 1,4005

PT. Danamon Tbk

2004 0,38352005 1,02652006 0,79382007 0,9370

Sumber : Laporan Keuangan Tahunan Bank (diolah)

16

Tabel 4Manajemen Laba Perusahaan Perbankan Non-Peraih ARA

Pada 2004-2007

Perusahaan Tahun Manajemen Laba

PT. Bank Mega Tbk.

2004 -0,09192005 -0,11622006 -0,07042007 -0,0762

PT. Bank Nusantara Parahyangan Tbk.

2004 0,01852005 0,05782006 -0,02302007 -0,0392

PT. Bank Internasional Indonesia Tbk.

2004 0,06682005 0,16982006 0,10472007 0,2120

PT. Bank Kesawan Tbk.

2004 -0,02722005 -0,16212006 0,05142007 0,2373

PT. Bank Swadesi Tbk.

2004 -0,07702005 -0,02762006 -0,04442007 -0,0458

PT. Bank Victoria Internasional Tbk.

2004 0,02622005 0,03582006 0,07982007 0,1135

PT. Bank Artha Graha Tbk.

2004 -0,06892005 -0,06122006 -0,11392007 -0,1035

PT. Bank Pan Indonesia Tbk.

2004 0,06842005 0,02042006 -0,00292007 0,3470

PT. Bank Eksekutif Internasional Tbk.

2004 -0,09742005 -0,17912006 -0,06652007 -0,2036

Sumber : Laporan Keuangan Tahunan Bank (diolah)

Group Statistics

36 ,8542 ,5185 ,0864

36 -,0025 ,1184 ,0197

GrupPeraih ARA

Non Peraih ARA

Dependent variablesPerusahaan Perbankan

N Mean Std. DeviationStd. Error

Mean

Statistics

17

Tabel 5